Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Annual Reviews is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Annual Review of
Sociology.
http://www.jstor.org
Ann.Rev. Sociol. 1982. 8:1-33
Copyright? 1982 byAnnualReviewsInc. All rightsreserved
THE SELF-CONCEPT
Viktor
Gecas
Departments
of Sociologyand RuralSociology,Washington
State
University,
Pullman,Washington 99164
INTRODUCTION
1
0360-0572/82/0815-0001
$02.00
2 GECAS
SourcesofSelf-Evaluation
Self-evaluation
or self-esteemrefersto theevaluativeandaffective aspectsof
theself-concept(Wells & Marwell1976; Shibutani1961). Mostresearchon
theself-conceptfocuseson thisdimension, so thatsometimes is
self-concept
equatedwithself-esteem (Wells & Marwell 1976). For example,Wylie's
(1974, 1979) extensivereviewsof the self-concept literaturedeal almost
withself-evaluation.
exclusively The mainreasonforthepreeminence ofthis
aspectof self-concept is the motivational significanceof self-esteem(see
below).
THE SELF-CONCEPT 5
Identities
ContentofSelf-Concepts:
If thereis a centralthemein thesociologicalliterature on theself-concept it
is theideathatthecontent andorganization ofself-concepts reflectthecontent
and organization of society.Prominent as theevaluativedimensionof self-
conceptis in socialpsychology, itdoes notbeardirectly on thisproposition.
The conceptof identity does. Perhapsthisis one reasonthatthemostpromi-
nentcontributor to thesociologicalresearchon self-esteem has urgedthatwe
"go beyondself-esteem" (Rosenberg1979). Beyondself-esteem lies thecon-
ceptof identity, thatvastdomainof meanings attached to the selfand com-
prisingthecontentand organization of self-concepts.
The interpenetration of selfand societyis mostdirectly addressedin the
symbolicinteractionist tradition[tracedprimarily to Mead (1934), Cooley
(1902), and Thomas(1923)]. This tradition has splitintotwo major(and
severalminor)variantsthatdifferon fundamental conceptualizations and
assumptions regarding self and society,on substantive foci, and on meth-
odology.The two mainvariantsare the "processualinteractionists" (more
commonly knownas the"ChicagoSchool")andthe"structural interactionists"
(associatedwiththe"Iowa School"). The divisionsbetweenthesetwoorien-
tationsreflect inmanyrespectsthefundamental divisioninthesocialsciences
betweenhumanistic/interpretive orientationsand positivistic/nomothetic ori-
entations[forreviewsof the "Chicago" and "Iowa" schools of symbolic
interactionism, see Kuhn(1964) and Meltzeret al (1975)]. The conceptof
"identity" has a somewhatdifferent character in each of theseorientations.
NEGOTIATING IDENTITIES IN SOCIAL INTERACTION The key featureof the pro-
cessualinteractionist byBlumer(1969), itsmajor
as exemplified
perspective,
and others(Glaser & Strauss1967; Strauss1978; Becker 1964;
architect,
Stone1962), is itsemphasison thesocial situationas thecontextin which
identities through
are establishedand maintained theprocessof negotiation.
Thisidentitynegotiation,oridentity
bargaining(Blumstein1973),is a central
aspect of the individual'sbroadertask of "definingthe situation"and
"constructingreality."Meaningis viewedas an emergent of thisfluidand
reciprocalprocessofinteraction.
Actionandinteraction areseenprimarily as
indeterminate "I" and theprobleminvolvedin
becauseof theunpredictable
THE SELF-CONCEPT 11
1968;Blumstein
et al 1974), and embarrassment
and face-saving
processes
(Goffman1967; Gross & Stone 1964; Modigliani 1971).4
In contrast methodsof mostsymbolicinteractionist
to thenaturalistic re-
search,some recentstudieson thesetopicsuse experimental
methods.Of
special note is the work of Alexander and his colleagues (1971, 1977, 1981)
on "situatedidentity theory."Buildingon Goffman'sideas aboutthe im-
portanceof "expressionsgivenoff" as the basis formakingdispositional
inferences, Alexander& Lauderdaledefinesituatedidentities as "theattri-
butionsthatare made aboutparticipants in a particularsettingas a con-
sequenceoftheiractions"(1977:225). The establishment of identities is con-
sideredthefundamental taskof social encounters. Alexanderconsidersan
identity to be a workingself-meaning constructed out of thematerialof a
particular andnotan aspectof a person'sself-concept
situation, carriedfrom
one situationto another(Alexander& Wiley 1981). Alexanderarguesthat
people act (because of the self-esteem motive)to createthe mostsocially
desirablesituated identityavailable(Alexander& Wiley1981).Alexander has
testedsituatedidentity theoryin a numberof experimental studiesoriginally
designedtotestothersocial-psychological theories(e.g. cognitive dissonance,
riskyshift,prisoner'sdilemma,and expectationstates).He has foundthat
situated identity
theory can accountfortheresultsoftheseexperiments atleast
as well as theothertheoriesproposed.
It shouldbe noted,however,thatthe"situatedidentities" in Alexander's
studiesaredescribedby evaluativeterms-warm,friendly, honest-thatare
attachedto experimental outcomealternatives suchas "conforming subject"
vs. "non-conforming subject".Otherwaysofoperationalizing situatedidenti-
tieswouldpresumably producedifferent results.Furthermore, therelationship
between"situatedidentities" and theidentities actorsbringwiththeminto
socialsituations has notbeenexplored.Alexanderandassociatesareawareof
thisissue buthave not yetpursuedit themselves[see Alexander& Wiley
(1981)]. Doingso wouldtakethembeyondtheimmediate interaction situation
andcloserto theconcernsof thestructural symbolicinteractionists.
A secondbodyofworkinspired bytheprocessualinteractionist perspective
involves"labelingtheory."Labelingtheoryis an adaptationof the more
generalprocessofreflected appraisalto thedevelopment ofdeviantidentities
[Wells (1978) reviewsthe place of self-concept in theoriesof deviance].
Labelingtheory suggeststhatsociety'sreactionto an individual'sinitialdevi-
antbehavioris themajorfactorin thesystematization of deviance,sinceit
alterstheself-concept andsocialidentity ofthepersonlabeled(Lemert1951;
Becker1963; Scheff1966). This societalresponsecan be eitherformal(e.g.
4Theconceptsof "impression
management" and"self-presentation"
havebecomeincreasingly
prominent
withinpsychology as well (see, forexample,Tedeschi1981).
THE SELF-CONCEPT 13
Identities
andself-concept. roles.The con-
areviewedmainlyas internalized
nectionbetweenthesetwo conceptsis so close thattheyare oftenused
(Stryker1980:60; McCall & Simmons 1978:16;
together,as in "role-identity"
Burke& Tully1977).Thisconnection directlylinksself-conceptions tosocial
structuresbecauserolesare seen as elementsof social structure, and it pro-
videsthebasis forconsidering theself-concept in organizational terms-i.e.
as a multidimensional configurationofrole-identities. Stryker putitthisway:
"Theselfis seenas embracing multipleidentities linkedto therolesandrole
relationshipsthat constitutesignificantelementsof social structures"
(1979:177).Gordonelaborates justhowroleslinkpersonstosocialstructures:
"thevalue aspectsof rolesconnectpersonsto culture;thenormative aspects
ofrolesprovidemotivation to conductand structure to social action;and the
'sense-making' aspectsof rolesdetermine
or interpretive muchof personal
cognition, predispositions,
attitudinal memories,andplans"(1976:405). The
term"role"typically refersto thebehavioralexpectations associatedwitha
positionor status(eitherformalor informal) in a social system.However,
"role"and "position"are frequently used interchangeably, especiallywhen
they are translatedinto identities e.g. "father,""handball player,"
mediator".
The structureof self-conceptis viewedas a hierarchical organization of an
(Stryker1968;
individual'srole-identities McCall & Simmons 1978; Heiss
1968). Strykerdevelopedtheidea of self-concept as a saliencehierarchy of
identitiesmost fullythroughthe concept of commitment.He proposes that
''oneis committed to an identityto thedegreethatone is enmeshedin social
relationshipsdependenton thatidentity" (1979:177). In thisview of self-
structure,thegreater the commitment to an identity, themoreconsequential
itis fortheindividual'sconduct[elaborated in Stryker (1980), especiallypp.
83-84]. Note thatStryker'sconceptionof commitment emphasizesthere-
The natureandextensiveness
lationalaspectofrole-identities: ofthe"role-set"
(Merton 1957) or "identity-set"(i.e. the network of identitiesand role-
relationshipsa givenidentityimplies)affectthedegreeofcommitment to the
identity.
Turner(1978) expandsourvisionof theidentity commitment process.He
casts theproblemof commitment in the formof role-person mergerand
examinestheconditions underwhichthisis mostlikelytooccur.A distinction
is madebetween"situational determinants" and "individualdeterminants".
The former are circumstancesunderwhichobserversconsiderthepersonas
revealedin therole. Underthelattercategory,Turneridentifies threeprin-
ciplesgoverning role/personmerger:(a) Individuals tendto mergewiththose
rolesbywhichsignificant othersidentify them;(b) theytendtomergeroleand
personselectively so as to maximizeautonomy (cf. theself-efficacymotive)
THE SELF-CONCEPT 15
ethnicidentities],
or conflict
and strainin theself-conceptas a consequence
of role-transitions
[e.g. Lopata (973) on adjustments to widowhood;and
Weigert& Hastings(1977) on identity loss in thefamily].
SOCIAL STRUCTURAL INFLUENCES ON SELF-CONCEPTION The influence ofsocial
structureon self-conceptions has been mostapparentat the macrolevelsof
analysis-i.e. wherethe societyor its majorinstitutions are the focusof
attention.
Turner's(1976) workon "therealself"is exemplary. He arguesthat
"thearticulationof real selveswithsocial structure shouldbe a majorlinkin
thefunctioning and changeof societies"(1976:990). By "real self"Turner
meansthelocus of an individual'ssenseof authenticity, responsibility, and
accountability."To varyingdegrees,"Turnerproposes,"people acceptas
evidenceof theirreal selveseitherfeelingsand actionswithan institutional
focusoronestheyidentify impulse"(1976:990). Thisdistinction
as strictly is
reminiscent ofKuhn& McPartland's (1954) distinctionbetween"consensual"
and"subconsensual" identities,although Turnerelaboratesto a muchgreater
extenttheconsequencesof thesetwo self-anchorages forpersonalbehavior,
forsocial structure,and forsocial change."Institutionals" are likelyto be
future-oriented;theyadhereto highmoralstandards and considertheselfto
be createdthrough theiractions."Impulsives,"on theotherhand,are likely
tobe orientedtowardthepresent, tofeelconstrained byinstitutional roles,and
toviewtheselfas something tobe discovered.Turnerseekstolocatethe"real
self"byusingan open-ended format to elicitresponseson thecircumstances
in whichpeople feelmost"authentic" or "inauthentic"(Turner& Schutte
1981). An important feature of Turner'sapproachto self-concept is notonly
itsconcernwithwhattheselfis (experientially), butalso withwhattheself
is not(Turner& Gordon1981).
Considering social change,Turner(1976) hypothesizes thatoverthepast
fewdecadestherehas beena substantial shiftawayfroman institutional and
towardan impulsivelocus of self. (He also speculatesaboutFreud'srole in
thisshift.)Othershaveobservedsimilarchangesinself-orientation
facilitating
as a function of changesin society:Riesmanet al (1950) arguedforan
historicalshiftfrom"inner-directed" to "other-directed"motivational types;
Lifton's(1970) chameleon-like "proteanman" and Snyder's(1979) high
''self-monitoring"individualare offeredas prototypes of the individualin
contemporary society.Zurcher(1977) proposedthe"mutableself" to be a
healthyadaptation torapidsocialchange.Marginality anduncertainty seemto
facilitate
thedevelopment of a "mutableself". Even if such conditionsare
becoming increasingly prevalent, thereis somequestionwhether rootlessness,
lack of commitment to social institutions, and "goingwiththe situational
flow"are salutary features of theselfeven in a rapidlychangingsociety.
Symbolicinteractionists havenotbeenaloneinconsidering therelationship
THE SELF-CONCEPT 17
Motive
Self-Efficacy
Perhapsthemostfundamental senseof self-conceptas cause is foundin the
notionof humanagency,expressedin such termsas effectance motivation
(White1959;Harter1978),personalcausation(deCharms1968),self-efficacy
(Bandura1977), intrinsicmotivation(Deci 1975), intentionality(Weigert
18 GECAS
Motive
Self-Esteem
The motivationto maintain andenhancea positiveconception of oneselfhas
beenthought to be pervasive,even universal(Rosenberg1979; Wells 1978;
Kaplan 1975; Rokeach1979; Hales 1981a). Wells & Marwellobservethat
everyselftheorypositssome variantof thismotive(1976:54). Even some
social-psychological thatdidnotstartoutas selftheories
theories becamesuch
largelybecauseoftheoperation oftheself-esteem motive.Themostdramatic
transformationoccurredfor cognitivedissonancetheory[see especially
Greenwald & Ronis(1978)]. The originalversionof thetheory, in whichthe
motivationalfactorwas a perceivedincongruity betweentwo cognitiveele-
ments,has essentially beenreplacedwithone in whichself-esteem motivates
dissonance-reducing actions. Aronson(1968) and Rokeach (1968, 1973)
arguedthatcognitive dissonanceis a significant
motivationalforceonlywhen
theself-conceptis involved.Greenwald& Ronisdescribethepresentstateof
cognitivedissonancetheoryas follows:"The motivational forcein present
versionsof dissonancetheoryhas muchmoreof an ego-defensive charac-
ter. . . . The theoryseems now to be focused on cognitivechanges occurring
in theserviceof ego defense,or self-esteem maintenance,ratherthanin the
interestof preserving
psychological consistency"(1978:54-55).
Othernotabletheorieshaveincreasingly becomeselftheories becauseofthe
perceived importanceoftheself-esteem motiveincognitive functioning-e.g.
Rokeach'svalue theory(1973, 1979), and attribution theory.Rokeachhas
recentlystated:"Thus,in thefinalanalysis,I havecometo viewtheproblem
of attitudechangeand behaviorchangeas being ultimately linkedto the
problem ofhowchangesarebrought aboutin theself"(1979:53). Rokeach's
theory resemblesthereformulated cognitivedissonancetheoryin thatboth
locatethemotivating mechanismin thediscrepancy betweena cognitiveor
behavioral elementand theperson'sself-conception. Such discrepanciesare
motivating, Rokeachpointsout,becausetheythreaten self-maintenance
and
self-enhancement (1979:53).
THE SELF-CONCEPT 21
esteemmotivedistorts perceptionsandcognitions,
resulting
in self-deception.
This may be bothfunctional and dysfunctionalforthe individual.In this
regard,someinteresting butdisconcertingfindings
havebeenreported on the
relationshipbetweenaccuracyof self-perception and depression(Alloy &
Abramson 1979;Lewinsohn& Mischel1980). Lewinsohn& Mischel(1980)
foundthatclinicallydepressedpatientswere morerealisticin theirself-
perceptions(as judgedby thedegreeof congruence betweenself-ratingsand
observerratingson a numberof social competencies)thanwerethosein the
"normal"controlgroup,who weremorelikelyto engagein self-enhancing
distortions.
This line of researchon the mixedbenefitsof self-esteem led
Mischelto speculatethat"self-enhancing informationprocessingand biased
self-encodingmay be botha requirement forpositiveaffectandthepricefor
achievingit" (1979:752).
Motive
Consistency
The motivation forconsistency and continuity in self-concepts is considered
weakerthanthatforself-enhancement (Jones1973). Some have evenques-
tionedits existenceas a selfmotive(Gergen1968). The researchevidence
seemsto supporttheclaimthatself-esteem is a morepowerfulmotivethan
self-consistency when the two are posed againsteach other(Jones 1973;
Krauss& Critchfield 1975). However,thismaybe due largelyto thenature
ofthecontrasts madeandtheareasoftheirapplication. Comparisons between
therelativeefficacy of self-esteem andself-consistency haveall beenmadeat
theevaluativelevel of theself-concept, a circumstance thatfavorstheself-
esteemmotive.Self-consistency is morerelevant tothesubstantive dimension
of the self-concept, the domainof identitiesand beliefsabout self. Two
literaturesin social psychology addresstheself-consistency motive:thepsy-
chologicalliterature on self-concept as a cognitive organization ofknowledge
and beliefs;and the sociologicalliterature on identities as sourcesof mo-
tivation.In the former, consistency refersto the cognitiveorganization of
attitudesabouttheself.In thelatter,consistency is thecongruence between
identitiesand rolebehaviors.
To considertheself-concept as an organization ofknowledgeis toempha-
size itsinformation processing(or encoding)functions, whichstrivetoward
perceivedconsistency[see Epstein (1973), discussedearlier;Greenwald
(1980);Markus(1977, 1980)]. Lecky(1951), an earlyadvocateoftheconsis-
tencymotive,viewedthemaintenance of a unifiedconceptualsystemas the
overriding needof theindividual.The self-concept as a self-theory (Epstein
1973)seekstomaintain a coherent viewofitselfinordertooperateeffectively
in theworld.Markus(1977) considerstheself-concept to be a collectionof
cognitive generalizations (self-schemata) thatorganizetheprocessing of self-
relevant information. These self-schemata becomeincreasingly resistantto
24 GECAS
CONCLUSION
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS