agreement is merely part of the first agreement.

Topic Legal compensation \ Requisites (Art. 1279`1280): Due

distinguished from demandable
Case No. G.R. No. 111890. | May 7, 1997
Case Name CKH v. CA ISSUE & RATIO DECIDENDI
Full Case CKH INDUSTRIAL AND DEVELOPMENT
Name CORPORATION and RUBI SAW, petitioners, vs. THE 1. May one of the two solidary creditors sue by himself alone for the
COURT OF APPEALS, (FORMER 13TH DIVISION), recovery of amounts due to both of them without joining the other
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF METRO MANILA - creditor as a co-plaintiff?
DISTRICT III (VALENZUELA), CENTURY-WELL Yes. A solidary creditor can by himself alone enforce payment.
PHIL. CORPORATION, LOURDES CHONG, CHONG
The SC interpreted “joint obligation” using Tolentino’s definition:
TAK KEI and UY CHI KIM, respondents.
Ponente TORRES, JR., J. “A joint obligation is one in which each of the debtors is liable only for a
Doctrine There can be no valid compensation of the obligations if the proportionate part of the debt, and each creditor is entitled only to a
principal contracting parties are not mutually bound as creditors proportionate part of the credit. A solidary obligation is one in which
and debtors in their own name. each debtor is liable for the entire obligation, and each creditor is entitled
Nature Petition for certiorari from the Decision of CA which reversed the to demand the whole obligation. Hence, in the former, each creditor can
decision issued by RTC.
recover only his share of the obligation, and each debtor can be made to
pay only his part; whereas, in the latter, each creditor may enforce the
RELEVANT FACTS
entire obligation, and each debtor may be obliged to pay it in full.”
On August 30, 1983, petitioner Quiombing together with a Dante Biscocho Likewise, Tolentino was cited to define “active solidarity”:
entered into a “Construction and Service Agreement” with the respondent
Saligo spouses wherein it was agreed that Quiombing and Biscocho will build “The essence of active solidarity consists in the authority of each creditor
a house of the Saligo spouses for PhP 137,940. A year later, Quiombing to claim and enforce the rights of all, with the resulting obligation of
entered into a second agreement with one of the spouses, Manuelita, agreeing paying every one what belongs to him; there is no merger, much less a
for payment of balance. Three years later or 1986, despite a promissory note renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation.”
signed in 1984 to pay a balance of PhP 125,363.50 and despite insistent demand
for payment, the balance for the constructed house is still left unpaid. Full satisfaction of a judgment obtained against them by Quiombing
Quiombing filed a complaint for recovery. would discharge their obligation to Biscocho, and vice versa; hence, it
was not necessary for both Quiombing and Biscocho to file the
Saligo spouses instead of filing an answer moved to dismiss on the grounds complaint. Inclusion of Biscocho as a co-plaintiff, when Quiombing was
that Biscocho is not included as an indispensable party. competent to sue by himself alone, would be a useless formality.
RTC initially dismissed the motion to dismiss but eventually granted the same Interpreting Art. 1212 of the New Civil Code which provides that: “Each
upon reconsideration. Petitioner Quiombing instead of filing an amended one of the solidary creditors may do whatever may be useful to the others,
complaint, appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals arguing that as a but not anything which may be prejudice to the latter.”
solidary creditor he could act by himself alone in the enforcement of his claim
and besides the second agreement only mentions him as creditor without The SC interpreted that Quiombing’s act of “suing for recovery of the
Biscocho. CA sustained RTC stating that the RTC cannot decide for the rights contract price” as “useful” to Biscocho.
of Biscocho who is not impleaded as a party. CA also ruled that the second
 2. Is the defendant entitled to the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground of non-joinder of the second creditor as an indispensable party?
No, a solidary debtor may by himself alone be held liable for any possible
breach of contract that may be proved.
Although the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the second
agreement, which was concluded alone by Quiombing with the spouses,
was based on the original Construction and Service Agreement as well as
the promissory note later signed. However, this matter is not really that
important now in view of the conclusion that the complaint could have
been filed alone by Quiombing.
3. Is the second solidary creditor an indispensable party?
No, because the participation of Biscocho is not at all necessary for
complete relief to be obtained by either him or Quiombing.

The Supreme Court defined “indispensable party” using the definition of

Justice Feria: "where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either one
of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even necessary (now
proper) because complete relief may be obtained from either."

DISPOSITIVE

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent

court dated March 27, 1990, is SET ASIDE, and the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, is directed to REINSTATE Civil Case No. 913-A. Costs against
the private respondents.