PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST
1. GUTIERREZ VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
FACTS:
22July2010, 4 days before the 15th Congress opened
its first session, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-
Baraquel, Danilo Lim and spouses Pestaño (Baraquel
group) filed an impeachment complaint against
Gutierrez upon endorsement of Party-List
Representatives Walden Bello and Arlene Bag-ao
27July2010, HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint
to House Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 2,
directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the
Order of Business
3Aug2010, private respondents Renato Reyes Jr.,
Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre
Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon
(Reyes group) filed an impeachment complaint
againsta herein petitioner endorsed by
Representatives Colmenares, Casiño, Mariano, Ilagan,
Tinio and De Jesus
HOR provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure on
Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress and
HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House
Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 9, directed the
Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of
Business
11Aug2010, HOR simultaneously referred the two
complaints to the House Committee on Justice (HCOJ
for brevity)
After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 1,
2010, found both complaints sufficient in form
2Sept2010, The Rules of Procedure of Impeachment
Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published
After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 7,
2010 found the two complaints, which both allege
culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of
public trust, sufficient in substance.
Petitioner-Ombudsman challenges House Resolutions
of Sept. 1 and 7, 2010 finding two impeachment
complaints against the petitioner, simultaneously
referred to the House Committee on Justice, sufficient
in form and substance on grounds that she was denied
due process and that the said resolutions violated the
one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment
proceedings for impeachable officers.
Citing Taada v. Tuvera, petitioner contends that she
was deprived of due process since the Impeachment
Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day
after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency
of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks her
contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the
Constitution which directs that Congress
shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
Public respondent counters that promulgation in this
case refers to the publication of rules in any medium of
information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or
newspaper of general circulation.
Page 1 of 16
VB
ISSUE:
Whether the belated publication of the Rules of
Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings of the
15th Congress denied due process to the Petitioner?
RULING:
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in
which it is generally understoodthat is, to make
known. Generalia verba sunt generaliter
inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall be
generally understood. Between the restricted sense
and the general meaning of a word, the general must
prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted
sense was to be used.[49]
Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict
promulgation to publication, the former should be
understood to have been used in its general sense. It
is within the discretion of Congress to determine
on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much
the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to
determine that to promulgate a decision means to
deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and
publication.
It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of
government how to promulgate when the Constitution
itself has not prescribed a specific method of
promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a
mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the
Constitution.
Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of
general circulation is but one avenue for Congress to
make known its rules. Jurisprudence emphatically
teaches that
x x x in the absence of constitutional or statutory
guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any
basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts
of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect
for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts
may not intervene in the internal affairs of the
legislature; it is not within the province of courts to
direct Congress how to do its work. In the words of
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the
opinion that where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must
be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate as well as to implement them, before the
courts may intervene.[50] (italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations
omitted)
Had the Constitution intended to have the
Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated
so as categorically as it did in the case of the rules of
procedure in legislative inquiries, per Neri. Other than
promulgate, there is no other single formal term in the
English language to appropriately refer to an issuance
without need of it being published.
Even assuming arguendo that publication is required,
lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to
the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which
faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing
provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases
where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST VB

each Congress, the mandated periods under Section

3, Article XI of the Constitution would already run or
even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-day
period of publication prior to the effectivity of the
Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would
already violate the Constitution for its inaction on the
impeachment complaints pending the completion of
the publication requirement.
When the Constitution uses the word
“promulgate,” it does not necessarily mean to
publish in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation.—To reiterate, when the
Constitution uses the word “promulgate,” it does
not necessarily mean to publish in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
Promulgation, as used in Section 3(8), Article XI of
the Constitution, suitably takes the meaning of “to
make known” as it should be generally
understood.

Page 2 of 16
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST
2. REPUBLIC OF THE PH V PILIPINAS SHELL
FACTS:
On October 10, 1984 the govt created the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund (OPSF)
The office of the Energy Affairs (Now DOE) informed
Pilipinas Shell that their foreign exchange risk charge
was insufficient in pursuant to MOF CIRCULAR NO. 1-
85 as amended by DOF 2-94 :
2. Remittance of payment to the OPSF as provided for
under Section 5 of MOF Order No. 11-85 shall be
made not later than 20th of the month following the
month of remittance of the foreign exchange payment
for the import or the month of payment to the domestic
producers in the case of locally produced
crude. Payment after the specified date shall be
subject to a surcharge of fifteen percent (15%) of
the amount, if paid within thirty (30) days from the
due date plus two percent (2%) per month if paid
after thirty days.[10] (Emphasis supplied.)
Pilipinas shell justified its calculations pursuant to a
valid interpretation of the MOF’s but nonetheless paid
the principal amount of its underpayment but not the
surcharges.
DOE required shell to pay the surcharges subject to
proceeding against Shell’s Irrevocable standby letter of
credit.
Shell appealed to the office of the President.
The office of the president affirmed DOE.
CA reversed the office of the president, MOF CIRCL 1-
85 as amended was ineffective for failure to comply
with the requirement to file with ONAR.
Even if the circular was issued before the effectivity of
the administrative code book 7, chapter 2 sec 3
specifies that rules already in force at the date of
effectivity of the admin code must be filed within 3
months from effect of the code.
ISSUE:
Whether the MOF CIRC 1-85 was effective?
RULING:
No. Shell did not waive the requisite publication and
filing MOF CIC 1-85 by paying the principal amount of
its underpayment.
Publication; Office of National Administrative Register
(ONAR); Due Process; The requirements of
publication and filing with the Office of National
Administrative Register (ONAR) were put in place as
safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers
and as guarantees to the constitutional right to due
process and to information on matters of public
concern and, therefore, require strict compliance.—
Under the doctrine of Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA
446 (1986), the MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended,
is one of those issuances which should be published
before it becomes effective since it is intended to
enforce Presidential Decree No. 1956. The said
circular should also comply with the requirement stated
Page 3 of 16
VB
under Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987—filing with the ONAR in
the University of the Philippines Law Center—for rules
that are already in force at the time the Administrative
Code of 1987 became effective. These requirements
of publication and filing were put in place as
safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers
and as guarantees to the constitutional right to due
process and to information on matters of public
concern and, therefore, require strict compliance. In
the present case, the Certifications dated 11 February
2004 and 9 February 2004 issued by ONAR prove that
MOF Circular No. 1-85 and its amendatory rule, DOF
Circular No. 2-94, have not been filed before said
office. Moreover, petitioner was unable to controvert
respondent’s allegation that neither of the
aforementioned circulars were published in the Official
Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation.
Thus, failure to comply with the requirements of
publication and filing of administrative issuances
renders MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended,
ineffective.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Strict compliance with the
requirements of publication cannot be annulled by a
mere allegation that parties were notified of the
existence of the implementing rules concerned.—
Petitioner also insists that the registration of MOF
Circular No. 1-85, as amended, with the ONAR is no
longer necessary since the respondent knew of its
existence, despite its non-registration. This argument
is seriously flawed and contrary to jurisprudence. Strict
compliance with the requirements of publication cannot
be annulled by a mere allegation that parties were
notified of the existence of the implementing rules
concerned. Hence, also in National Association of
Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy
Regulatory Board, 481 SCRA 480 (2006), this Court
pronounced: In this case, the GRAM Implementing
Rules must be declared ineffective as the same was
never published or filed with the National
Administrative Register. To show that there was
compliance with the publication requirement,
respondents MERALCO and the ERC dwell lengthily
on the fact that parties, particularly the distribution
utilities and consumer groups, were duly notified of the
public consultation on the ERC’s proposed
implementing rules. These parties participated in the
said public consultation and even submitted their
comments thereon. However, the fact that the
parties participated in the public consultation and
submitted their respective comments is not
compliance with the fundamental rule that the
GRAM Implementing Rules, or any administrative
rules whose purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law, must be published in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. The requirement of publication of
implementing rules of statutes is mandatory and may
not be dispensed with altogether even if, as in this
case, there was public consultation and submission by
the parties of their comments. (Emphasis provided.)
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST
3. CO V. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on
September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the
Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30,
1983 in the sum of P361,528.00.
The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was
dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason
given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage company against
Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.
The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime
charged.
He argued on appeal that at the time of the issuance of
the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years
prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v.
People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a
"rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an
obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an
official pronouncement made in a Circular of the
Ministry of Justice.
ISSUE:
Whether the decision issued by the Court be
applied retroactively to the prejudice of the
accused.
RULING:
No.
Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as
they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a
habitual criminal.—“Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines,” according
to Article 8 of the Civil Code. “Laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided”
declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that
is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code:
“Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as
they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal **.”
Prospectivity principle has been made to apply to
administrative rulings and circulars.—The prospectivity
principle has also been made to apply to administrative
rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142,
Page 4 of 16
VB
holding that a circular or ruling of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect
adversely to a taxpayer; Sanchez v. COMELEC, 193
SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590 of the
Commission on Elections, which directed the holding
of recall proceedings, had no retroactive
application; Romualdez v. CSC,197 SCRA 168, where
it was ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s.
1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to
entitle to permanent appointment an employee whose
temporary appointment had expired before the Circular
was issued.
Principle of prospectivity has also been applied to
judicial decisions.—The principle of prospectivity has
also been applied to judicial decisions which, “although
in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of
what the laws mean, ** (this being) the reason why
under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, ‘Judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system **.’”
Court’s decision of September 21, 1987 in Que vs.
People xxx should not be given retrospective effect to
the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons
similarly situated.—It would seem, then, that the
weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the
proposition that the Court’s decision of September 21,
1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987)—i.e.,
that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered
by B.P. Blg. 22—should not be given retrospective
effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other
persons similarly situated, who relied on the official
opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did
not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of
mala prohibita should override the principle of
prospectivity.—This is after all a criminal action all
doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental
doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused.
Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling
reason why the doctrine of mala prohibitashould
override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear
implications as hereinabove set out and discussed,
negativing criminal liability.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST VB

4. PEOPLE OF THE PH V PATALIN application (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution the

Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed.,
p. 508, citing I RECORD, p. 748; Bernas, The Intent of
FACTS: the 1986 Constitution Writers, 1995 ed., p. 227, citing I
Record, p. 747-748).
Alfonso Patalin and Alex Mijaque, herein accused
were convicted of Robbery with A subsequent statute cannot be so applied
Multiple Rape committed in the evening of August 11, retroactively as to impair a right that accrued under the
1984 against the Aliman family. old law.—There is no question that a person has no
vested right in any rule of law which entitles him to
They were meted the supreme penalty of death. At the insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit, nor
time the crimes charged were committed in 1984,
has he a vested right in the continued existence of a
robbery with rape was punishable by death, however,
statute which precludes its change or repeal, nor in
by virtue of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the
any omission to legislate on a particular matter.
death penalty was abolished and all
However, a subsequent statute cannot be so applied
death penalties already imposed were reduced to retroactively as to impair a right that accrued under the
reclusion perpetua. old law (Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1986 ed., p.
The decision for the present case was promulgated on 264, citing Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs.
June 14, 1995, after the effectivity of RA 7659 which Pineda, 98 Phil. 711 [1956]; Laurel vs. Misa, 76 Phil.
restored the death penalty. Appellants now contend 372 [1946]). Courts have thus given statutes strict
that the trial court erred in imposing the construction to prevent their retroactive operation in
death penalty as the same was suspended order that the statutes would not impair or interfere
upon ratification of the 1987 Constitution. with vested or existing rights. Clearly, accused-
appellants’ right to be benefited by the abolition of the
ISSUE: death penalty accrued or attached by virtue of Article
When the death penalty was abolished in 1987 and 22 of the Revised Penal Code. This benefit cannot be
was retroactively applied to herein accused, did taken away from them.
they gain a vested right thereto so that any future
law restoring the death penalty would no longer
cover them?
RULING:
Although at the time of the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution the present case was still its trial stage, it
is clear that the framers intended the provision to have
a retroactive effect on pending cases without
any penalty of death having been imposed yet.
The retroactive effect may be given during three
possible stages of a criminal prosecution:
a) when the crime has been committed and
the prosecution began;
b) when sentence has been passed but service has
not begun; and
c) when the sentence is being carried out.
The abolition of the death penalty benefits herein
accused by virtue of Art 22 of the RPC which provides
that penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as
they favor the person guilty of the felony who is not
a habitual criminal.Hence, they are subject to a
reduction of penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.
A subsequent statute cannot be applied retroactively
as to impair a right that accrued under the old law.

Death Penalty; There is no question that the abolition

of the death penalty benefits herein
accusedappellants.—There is no question that the
abolition of the death penalty benefits herein accused-
appellants. Perforce, the subsequent reimposition of
the death penalty will not affect them. The framers of
the Constitution themselves state that the law to be
passed by Congress reimposing the death penalty
(Republic Act 7659) can only have prospective

Page 5 of 16
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST VB

5. ORIENTAL ASSURANCE V SOLIDBANK CORP

FACTS:
Petitioner Oriental Assurance Corporation issued Fire
Insurance Policy No. F-92/22733-D, insuring the stock
of finished and/or unfinished products including raw
materials, machinery and equipment belonging to
Wear Me Garments Manufacturing, Inc. (Wear Me).
The policy insured against loss and/or damage by fire
from March 20, 1991 to March 20, 1992. The policy
was subsequently renewed for another year from
March 20, 1992 to March 20, 1993 under Renewal
Receipt No. 40948. A Memorandum stating that the
policy was "[m]ade further subject to MORTGAGEE
CLAUSE in favor of SOLIDBANK CORPORATION"'
was typewritten on the face of the receipt.
On April 27, 1993, petitioner issued another Fire
Insurance Policy (No. F-93-40690-D) insuring the
same items of Wear Me from March 20, 1993 to March
20, 1994.
On July 12, 1993, a fire broke out at the factory of
Wear Me, destroying a major portion of the insured
properties. Wear Me submitted to petitioner and its co-
insurers[3] a Notice of Loss for the value of the
damaged properties. The claims were denied.
As holder of trust receipts over the burned goods,
Solidbank Corporation sent an undated telegram to
petitioner, asking the latter to pay the proceeds of Fire
Insurance Policy No. F-92/22733-D. Petitioner refused
to comply, because the Policy did not contain a
mortgagee clause in favor of Solidbank.
Before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(RTC),[4] respondent then instituted Civil Case No. 94-
70505 against petitioner and Wear Me; as well as
Angelita Amparo Go and Arnold A. Go, Leonila Cui,
and Prudential Guarantee and Assurance Inc. Acting
favorably on respondent's Motion for Summary
Judgment,[5] the RTC rendered a Decision,[6] the
dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants.
the CA denied petitioner's appeal and subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration
ISSUE:
xxx [W]hether or not the Court of Appeals x x x
committed reversible error in giving retroactive
effect to Section 1 (c) of Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure [dismissing] petitioner's appeal
for failure of the petitioner to pay the appellate
court docket and other lawful fees?
RULING:
The retroactive application of procedural rules to
pending cases is undoubtedly well-settled.—The
retroactive application of procedural rules to pending
cases is undoubtedly well settled. Petitioner even
admits this in its efforts to reason out its case. For this
reason alone, the present Petition should be
dismissed.

Page 6 of 16
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST VB

6. BPI VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

FACTS:
Rizaldy T. Zshornack and his wife maintained in
COMTRUST a dollar savings account and a peso
current account. An application for a dollar drat was
accomplished by Virgillo Garcia branch manager of
COMTRUST payable to a certain Leovigilda Dizon. In
the PPLICtion, Garcia indicated that the amount was to
be charged to the dollar savings account of the
Zshornacks. There wasa no indication of the name of
the purchaser of the dollar draft. Comtrust issued a
check payable to the order of Dizon. When Zshornack
noticed the withdrawal from his account, he demanded
an explainaiton from the bank. In its answer, Comtrust
claimed that the peso value of the withdrawal was
given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, brother of Rizaldy.
When he encashed with COMTRUST a cashiers check
for P8450 issued by the manila banking corporation
payable to Ernesto.
ISSUE:
Whether the contract between petitioner and
respondent bank is a deposit?
RULING:
The contract between Zshornack and the bank, as to
the $3,000.00, was a contract of deposit defined under
Art. 1962 of the New Civil Code.—The document
which embodies the contract states that the
US$3,000.00 was received by the bank for
safekeeping. The subsequent acts of the parties also
show that the intent of the parties was really for the
bank to safely keep the dollars and to return it to
Zshornack at a later time. Thus, Zshornack demanded
the return of the money on May 10, 1976, or over five
months later. The above arrangement is that contract
defined under Article 1962, New Civil Code, which
reads: Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the
moment a person receives a thing belonging to
another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and for
returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing
delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract,
there is no deposit but some other contract.
Void Contracts; The contract between the parties
being void, affords neither of the parties a cause of
action against each other.—Hence, pursuant to Article
5 of the Civil Code, it is void, having been executed
against the provisions of a mandatory/prohibitory law.
More importantly, it affords neither of the parties a
cause of action against the other. “When the nullity
proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of
the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense,
both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no
cause of action against each other . . .” [Art. 1411,
New Civil Code.] The only remedy is one on behalf of
the State to prosecute the parties for violating the law.

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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST VB

7. PNB V NEPOMUCENO

FACTS:
Petitioner PNB granted respondents 4 million pesos of
credit line to finance a movie project. The loan was
secured by mortgages on respondents™ real and
personal properties.
Respondents defaulted in their obligation. Petitioner
sought foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. The
auction sale was re-scheduled several times without
need of republication of the notice of sale.
Subsequently, the respondents filed an action for
annulment of the foreclosure sale claiming that such
was void because, among others, there was lack of
publication of the notice of foreclosure sale.
The trail court ordered the annulment and set aside the
foreclosure proceedings.
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether publication of foreclosure sale can be
validly waived by agreement of the parties?
RULING:
Petitioner and respondents have absolutely no right to
waive the posting and publication requirements of Act
No. 3135.—Petitioner, however, insists that the posting
and publication requirements can be dispensed with
since the parties agreed in writing that the auction sale
may proceed without need of re-publication and re-
posting of the notice of sale. We are not convinced.
Petitioner and respondents have absolutely no right to
waive the posting and publication requirements of Act
No. 3135.
The statutory requirements of posting and publication
are mandated not for the mortgagor’s benefit but for
the public or third persons; Statutory provisions
governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure
sales must be strictly complied with and slight
deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and
render the sale at the very least voidable.—The
principal object of a notice of sale in a foreclosure of
mortgage is not so much to notify the mortgagor as to
inform the public generally of the nature and condition
of the property to be sold, and of the time, place, and
terms of the sale. Notices are given to secure bidders
and prevent a sacrifice of the property. Clearly, the
statutory requirements of posting and publication are
mandated, not for the mortgagor’s benefit, but for the
public or third persons. In fact, personal notice to the
mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is
not even necessary, unless stipulated. As such, it is
imbued with public policy considerations and any
waiver thereon would be inconsistent with the intent
and letter of Act No. 3135. Moreover, statutory
provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage
foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with and
slight deviations there from will invalidate the notice
and render the sale at the very least voidable.

Page 8 of 16
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST VB

8. BERNARDINO P. BARTOLOME V. SOCIAL Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and

SECURITY SYSTEM a substantial deviation from Article 167(j) of the Labor
Code when it interpreted the phrase “dependent
parents” to refer to “legitimate parents.”
FACTS:
Dependent Parents; Words and Phrases; Plainly,
In ECC-related death benefit claims, dependent “dependent parents” are parents, whether legitimate or
parents as beneficiaries include biological parents in illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need
case the decedent was adopted. of support or assistance.—The term “parents” in the
phrase “dependent parents” in the aforequoted Article
Petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome initiated a claim for 167(j) of the Labor Code is used and ought to be taken
death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security
in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to
System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union, over
“legitimate parents” as what the ECC did. The phrase
the death of her son John Colcol (John), who she gave
“dependent parents” should, therefore, include all
up for adoption, and alleged that she was the sole
parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether
remaining beneficiary. Previously, John was employed by nature or by adoption. When the law does not
as electrician by Defendant Scanmar Maritime distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly,
Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville.
“dependent parents” are parents, whether legitimate or
He was covered by the government’s Employees’
illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need
Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately, he met
of support or assistance.
an accident on board the vessel wherein steel plates
fell on him resulting in his death.
When petitioner filed her claim, the SSS denied it
stating that she was no longer the parent of John as he
was legally adopted by Cornelio Colocol based on the
documentary evidence submitted by petitioner herself.
On appeal, the Employees’ Compensation
Commission (ECC) affirmed the SSS ruling through a
decision dated 17 March 17 2010 citing Rule XV, Sec.
1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation.
ISSUE:
Whther petitioner was entitled to receive the claim
for death benefits?
RULING:
YES.
The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John,
without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to
receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a
dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise
during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption
already died, then the death benefits under the
Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue
solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining
beneficiary.
Administrative regulations must always be in harmony
with the provisions of the law because any resulting
discrepancy between the two will always be resolved
in favor of the basic law.—This Court held
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune
Tobacco Corporation, 559 SCRA 160 (2008) that: As
we have previously declared, rule-making power must
be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it
has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to
amend or expand the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the
statute. Administrative regulations must always be
in harmony with the provisions of the law because
any resulting discrepancy between the two will
always be resolved in favor of the basic law.
(Emphasis supplied) Guided by this doctrine, We find
that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees’

Page 9 of 16
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST VB

9. DE MESA ET AL V PEPSI PRODUCTS

FACTS:
Pepsi Cola launched a promotional program. Due to
security code problems, they erroneously announced
“349” as winning number instead of the
numbers submitted to the DTI, and deposited in the
safety deposit box in a bank. Pepsi Cola revoked and
dishonored the claim of the frustrated winners, which
moved the petitioners to file breach of contract.
Meanwhile, similar cases, Mendoza and Rodrigo, are
pending with the Court of Appeals. The petitioners
then filed a motion for leave in December 2000 to
adopt the testimonial and documentary evidence in
Mendoza and Rodrigo cases or archive the case until
final resolution of the said two cases.
RTC granted the motion in Jan. 2001.Unfortunately;
Mendoza and Rodrigo cases were both dismissed.
Consequently, De Mesa et al. case was dismissed by
the RTC under the principle of stare decisis which is
contemplated as well in Art. 8 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE:
The applicability of stare decisis et non quieta
movere.
RULING:
Judgments; Stare Decisis; The doctrine of stare
decisis is based on the principle that once a question
of law has been examined and decided, it should be
deemed settled and closed to further argument.—The
principle of stare decisis et non quieta movereis
entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to wit: ART.
8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system
of the Philippines. It enjoins adherence to judicial
precedents. It requires our courts to follow a rule
already established in a final decision of the Supreme
Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to
be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the
land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the
principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled
and closed to further argument.
In the instant case, the legal rights and relations of the
parties, the facts, the applicable laws, the causes of
action, the issues, and the evidence are exactly the
same as those in the decided cases of Mendoza and
Rodriguez. Hence, nothing is left to be argued.—In the
instant case, the legal rights and relations of the
parties, the facts, the applicable laws, the causes of
action, the issues, and the evidence are exactly the
same as those in the decided cases
of Mendoza and Rodrigo, supra. Hence, nothing is left
to be argued. The issue has been settled and this
Court’s final decision in the said cases must be
respected. This Court’s hands are now tied by the
finality of the said judgments. We have no recourse but
to deny the instant petition.

Page 10 of 16
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST
10.REYES V LIM
FACTS:
Petitioner David Reyes filed a complaint for annulment
of contract and damages against respondents. The
complaint alleged that Reyes as seller and Lim as
buyer entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land
located along F.B. Harrison Street, Pasay City with a
monthly rental of P35,000.
The complaint claimed that Reyes had informed
Harrison Lumber to vacate the Property before the end
of January 1995. Reyes also informed Keng and
Harrison Lumber that if they failed to vacate by 8
March 1995, he would hold them liable for the penalty
of P400,000 a month as provided in the Contract to
Sell. It was also alleged that Lim connived with
Harrison Lumber not to vacate the Property until the
P400,000 monthly penalty would have accumulated
and equaled the unpaid purchase price of
P18,000,000.
Keng and Harrison Lumber denied that they connived
with Lim to defraud Reyes, and that Reyes approved
their request for an extension of time to vacate the
Property due to their difficulty in finding a new location
for their business. Harrison Lumber claimed that it had
already started transferring some of its merchandise to
its new business location in Malabon.
Lim filed his Answer stating that he was ready and
willing to pay the balance of the purchase price. Lim
requested a meeting with Reyes through the latter’s
daughter on the signing of the Deed of Absolute Sale
and the payment of the balance but Reyes kept
postponing their meeting. Reyes offered to return the
P10 million down payment to Lim because Reyes was
having problems in removing the lessee from the
Property. Lim rejected Reyes’ offer and proceeded to
verify the status of Reyes’ title to the Property. Lim
learned that Reyes had already sold the Property to
Line One Foods Corporation Lim denied conniving with
Keng and Harrison Lumber to defraud Reyes.Reyes
filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint
due to supervening facts. These included the filing by
Lim of a complaint for estafa against Reyes as well as
an action for specific performance and nullification of
sale and title plus damages before another trial court.
The trial court granted the motion.
In his Amended Answer Lim prayed for the
cancellation of the Contract to Sell and for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against
Reyes. The trial court denied the prayer for a writ of
preliminary attachment.
Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to
deposit the P10 million down payment with the cashier
of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque. The trial
court granted this motion.
Reyes filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order on the
ground the Order practically granted the reliefs Lim
Page 11 of 16
VB
prayed for in his Amended Answer. The trial court
denied Reyes’ motion.
The trial court denied Reyes’ Motion for
Reconsideration. In the same order, the trial court
directed Reyes to deposit the P10 million down
payment with the Clerk of Court.
Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals and prayed that the orders of the trial court be
set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. But the
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of
merit.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether the equity jurisdiction is an applicable law
on the matter?
RULING:
Equity Jurisdiction; Purpose; The rationale of the
exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to prevent
unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution.—The
purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this
case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure
restitution. Equity jurisdiction aims to do complete
justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt
its judgments to the special circumstances of a case
because of the inflexibility of its statutory or legal
jurisdiction. Equity is the principle by which substantial
justice may be attained in cases where the prescribed
or customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate.
Unjust Enrichment; The principle that no person may
unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another is
embodied in Article 22 of the Civil Code.—The
principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at
the expense of another is embodied in Article 22 of the
Civil Code. This principle applies not only to
substantive rights but also to procedural remedies.
One condition for invoking this principle is that the
aggrieved party has no other action based on contract,
quasi-contract, crime, quasidelict or any other
provision of law. Courts can extend this condition to
the hiatus in the Rules of Court where the aggrieved
party, during the pendency of the case, has no other
recourse based on the provisional remedies of the
Rules of Court.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST VB

11. URSUA V CA purpose of the law is to punish evils defined therein so

when no such evil was produced by Ursua’s act, said
law need not be applied.
FACTS:
The reason for the principle that a penal statute should
In 1989, Cesario Ursua was charged with bribery and be construed strictly against the State and in favor of
dishonesty. His lawyer then asked him to get a copy of the accused is the tenderness of the law for the rights
the complaint against him from the Office of the of individuals and the object is to establish a certain
Ombudsman. His lawyer asked him that because the rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe,
law firm’s messenger, a certain Oscar Perez, was and the discretion of the court limited.—Moreover, as
unable to go to the Ombudsman. C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed
strictly against the State and in favor of the accused.
Before going to the Ombudsman, Ursua talked to
The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the
Perez. He revealed to him that he feels uncomfortable
law for the rights of individuals and the object is to
asking for a copy of the complaint because he is the
establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind
respondent in the said case. Perez then told him than would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited.
he can go there as “Oscar Perez” so that he does not Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition
have to reveal his true identity.
that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does
At the Office of the Ombudsman, Ursua signed the not clearly penalize the act done by him.
logbook there as “Oscar Perez”. When he was handed
a copy of the complaint, he signed the receipt as
“Oscar Perez”. However, a staff of the Ombudsman
was able to learn that he was in fact Cesario Ursua.
The staff then recommended that a criminal case be
filed against Ursua. Eventually, Ursua was sentenced
to three years in prison for violating C.A. No. 142, as
amended, otherwise known as “An Act To Regulate
The Use Of Aliases”.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT CESARIO URSUA’S
CONVICTION IS PROPER?

RULING:
No.
Ursua should be acquitted. The Supreme Court ruled
that a strict application of C.A. No. 142, as amended,
in this case only leads to absurdity – something which
could not have been intended by the lawmakers.
Under C.A. No. 142, as amended, save for some
instances, a person is not allowed to use a name or an
alias other than his registered name or that which he
was baptized. Under the law, what makes the use of
alias illegal is the fact that it is being used habitually
and publicly in business transactions without prior
authorization by competent authority. In this case,
Ursua merely used the name “Oscar Perez” once, it
was not used in a business transaction, the use of the
name was with the consent of Oscar Perez himself,
and even if he used a different name, in this instance,
he was not even required to disclose his identity at the
Office of the Ombudsman. When he was requesting a
copy of the complaint, he need not disclose his identity
because the complaint is a public record open to the
public.
In short, the evils sought to be avoided by the C.A. No.
142 was not brought about when Ursua used a name
other than his name. A strict application of the law is
not warranted. When Ursua used the name of Oscar
Perez, no fraud was committed; there was no crime
committed punishable under C.A. No. 142. The

Page 12 of 16
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST VB

12. CIR V AICHI
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a claim of refund/credit of input vat in
relation to its zero-rated sales from July 1, 2002 to
September 30, 2002. The CTA 2nd Division partially
granted respondent’s claim for refund/credit.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,
insisting that the administrative and the judicial claims
were filed beyond the two-year period to claim a tax
refund/credit provided for under Sections 112(A) and
229 of the NIRC. He reasoned that since the year
2004 was a leap year, the filing of the claim for tax
refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the
two-year period, which expired on September 29,
2004. He cited as basis Article 13 of the Civil Code,
which provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is
equivalent to 365 days. In addition, petitioner argued
that the simultaneous filing of the administrative and
the judicial claims contravenes Sections 112 and 229
of the NIRC. According to the petitioner, a prior filing of
an administrative claim is a “condition precedent”
before a judicial claim can be filed.
The CTA denied the MPR thus the case was elevated
to the CTA En Banc for review. The decision was
affirmed. Thus the case was elevated to the Supreme
Court.
Respondent contends that the non-observance of the
120-day period given to the CIR to act on the claim for
tax refund/credit in Section 112(D) is not fatal because
what is important is that both claims are filed within the
two-year prescriptive period. In support thereof,
respondent cited Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Victorias Milling Co., Inc. [130 Phil 12 (1968)] where it
was ruled that “if the CIR takes time in deciding the
claim, and the period of two years is about to end, the
suit or proceeding must be started in the CTA before
the end of the two-year period without awaiting the
decision of the CIR.”
ISSUE:
Thus, applying this to the present case, the two-year
period to file a claim for tax refund/credit for the period
July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 expired on
September 30, 2004. Hence, respondent’s
administrative claim was timely filed.
Words and Phrases; As between the Civil Code, which
provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the
Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year
is composed of 12 calendar months, it is the latter that
must prevail following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori
derogat priori.—In Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., 531 SCRA 436
(2007), we said that as between the Civil Code, which
provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the
Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year
is composed of 12 calendar months, it is the latter that
must prevail following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori
derogat priori. Thus: Both Article 13 of the Civil Code
and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same
subject matter—the computation of legal periods.
Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days
whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is
composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state,
under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of
days is irrelevant. There obviously exists a manifest
incompatibility in the manner of computing legal
periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative
Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section
31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987, being the more recent law, governs the
computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat
priori.

Whether or not the claim for refund was filed

within the prescribed period?
RULING:
Yes.
As ruled in the case of Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (G.R. No.
172129, September 12, 2008), the two-year period
should be reckoned from the close of the taxable
quarter when the sales were made.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown
Property Group, Inc (G.R. No. 162155, August 28,
2007, 531 SCRA 436), we said that as between the
Civil Code, which provides that a year is equivalent to
365 days, and the Administrative Code of 1987, which
states that a year is composed of 12 calendar months,
it is the latter that must prevail being the more recent
law, following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat
priori.

Page 13 of 16
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST
13. DEL SOCORRO V VAN WILSEM
FACTS:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst
Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in
Holland on September 25, 1990.[2] On January 19,
1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo
Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the...
instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19,
1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland.[4] At that time, their son
was only eighteen (18) months old. Thereafter,
petitioner and her son... came home to the Philippines.
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to
provide monthly support to their son in the amount of
Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene.
However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son
in... the Philippines, respondent never gave support to
the son, Roderigo.
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the
Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu,
and since then, have been residing thereat.
To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo,
are presently living in Cebu City.
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel,
sent a letter demanding for support from respondent.
However, respondent refused to receive the letter.
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner
filed a complaint-affidavit with the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City.
Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit.
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-
Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.[16] Consequently, respondent was
arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.
Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent
Protection Order.
Subsequently,respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss.
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the
herein assailed Order,[21] dismissing the instant
criminal case against respondent.
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for
Reconsideration.
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an
Order[25] denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration
ISSUE:
Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to
support his minor child under Philippine law?
RULING:
We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do
not fully agree with petitioner's contentions.
Page 14 of 16
VB
We agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely
on Article 195[34] of the New Civil Code in demanding
support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that
falls under family rights and duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands,
we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the
laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to
whether... he is obliged to give support to his child, as
well as the consequences of his failure to do so.
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is
not obliged to support petitioner's son under Article
195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the
Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland.
This does not, however, mean that respondent is not
obliged to support petitioner's son altogether.
In view of respondent's failure to prove the national law
of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of
processual presumption shall govern. Under this
doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the
foreign law is... the same as our local or domestic or
internal law.[44] Thus, since the law of the Netherlands
as regards the obligation to support has not been
properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is
presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which...
enforces the obligation of parents to support their
children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
The Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does
not completely show that he is not liable to give
support to his son after the divorce decree was issued.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding
that the national law of respondent states that parents
have no obligation to support their children or that such
obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still
not find applicability,.Additionally, prohibitive laws
concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy
and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations
or conventions agreed upon in a... foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant
case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction
proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Doctrine of Processual Presumption; Foreign Laws; If
the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and
proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is
the same as our local or domestic or internal law.—In
view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of
the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the
foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and
proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is
the same as our local or domestic or internal law.
Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the
obligation to suppo rt has not been properly pleaded
and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the
same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation
of parents to support their children and penalizing the
noncompliance therewith.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST
14. BELLIS V BELLIS
FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State
of Texas and of the United States. He had 5 legitimate
children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had
divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd wife, Violet
Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children.
Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the
Philippines in which his distributable estate should be
divided in trust in the following order and manner:
a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;
b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000
each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by
his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares.
Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San
Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate
in the Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust
Company, an executor of the will, paid the entire
bequest therein.
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor
submitted and filed its “Executor’s Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project of Partition”
where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the
legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock
amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the
legacies of the 3 illegitimate children in the amount of
P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project
partition, the executor divided the residuary estate into
7 equal portions
for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by
his 1st and 2nd marriages.
Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and
Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to
the project partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate children.
The lower court denied their respective motions for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.
RULING:
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national
of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of
law rule providing that the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would
still refer to Texas Law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the
situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of
the law of the place where the properties are situated,
renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved
are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however
Page 15 of 16
VB
of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it
should not be presumed different from our appellants,
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of
renvoi.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was
a citizen of the State of Texas, USA and that under the
Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of
the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights has to be determined under Texas
Law, the Philippine Law on legitimates can not be
applied to the testate of Amos Bellis.
Renvoi doctrine.—The doctrine of renvoi is usually
pertinent where the decedent is a national of one
country and is domiciled in another. It does not apply
to a case where the decedent was a citizen of Texas
and was domiciled therein at the time of his death. So
that, even assuming that Texas has a conflicts rule
providing that the domiciliary law should govern
successional rights, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but it would
still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a
conflicts rule, adopting the rule of lex rei sitae,which
calls for the application of the law of the place where
the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, where
the properties involved are found in the Philippines.
Applicability of national law to succession; Capacity to
succeed—The decedent's national law governs the
order of succession, the amount of successional rights,
the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and
capacity to succeed.
Third paragraph of article 17 of New Civil Code does
not modify article 16.—The third paragraph of article
17 of the New Civil Code is not an exception to the
second paragraph of article 16. Precisely, Congress
deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of
this and the next preceding article," when it
incorporated article 11 of the old Civil Code as article
17, while reproducing without substantial change the
second paragraph of article 10 of the old Civil Code, as
article 16. The legislative intent must have been to
make the second paragraph of article 176 a specific
provision in itself which must be applied in testate and
intestate succession. As a further indication of this
legislative intent, Congress added a new provision,
under article 1039, which decrees that capacity to
succeed is governed by the decedent's national law.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST VB

15. ZALAMEA V CA airlines.—Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal

Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to
the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex
FACTS: loci contractus which requires that the law of the place
where the airline ticket was issued should be applied
pouses Cesar and Suthira Zalamea, and their
by the court where the passengers are residents and
daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline
nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such
tickets from the Manila agent of respondent
State by the defendant airline. Since the tickets were
TransWorld Airlines, Inc. (TWA) for a flight from New sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in
York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of this case would be Philippine law.
the spouses were
purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their Foreign Law, How Proved; Foreign laws do not prove
daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets themselves. They must be alleged and proved.—That
represented confirmed reservations. there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent
airline when it did not allow petitioners to board their
While in New York, on June 4, 1984, the spouses flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets
Zalamea and their daughter received a notice of cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or regulation
reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. On
allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been
the appointed date, however, the spouses Zalamea
proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can
and their daughter checked in at 10:00 am, an hour
the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other
earlier than the scheduled flight at 11:00 am but were fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may
placed on the wait-list because the number of be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
passengers who checked in before tem had already
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of
taken all the seats available on the flight.
the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a
Out of the 42 names on the wait-list, the first 22 names certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate
were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los may be made by a secretary of an embassy or
Angeles, including Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
the other hand, being ranked lower than 22, were not consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service
able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare ticket of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
were given first priority among the wait-listed which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal
passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full- of his office.
fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the
plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the
discounted tickets were denied boarding. Even in the
next TWA flight to Los Angeles, Mrs. Zalamea and her
daughter, could not be accommodated because it was
full booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in
another flight and purchased two tickets from
American Airlines.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, the spouses
Zalamea filed an action for damages based on breach
of contract of air carriage before the RTC of Makati
which rendered a decision in their favor ordering the
TWA to pay the price of the tickets bought from
American Airlines together with moral damages and
attorney’s fees. On appeal, the CA held that moral
damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated
upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there
is fraud or bad faith. It further stated that since it is a
matter of record that overbooking of flights is a
common and accepted practice of airlines in the United
States and is specifically allowed under the Code of
Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board,
neither fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on TWA.

ISSUE
Whether PH law applies?

RULING:
The law of the place where the airline ticket was
issued should be applied by the court where the
passengers are residents and nationals of the forum
and the ticket is issued in such state by the defendant

Page 16 of 16