388 Ethics January1994

not be richiftheywere notable to interacteconomicallywithotherAmericans,

and that mutual dependence leads to mutual obligation. But in economics,
mutual dependence does not stop at national boundaries.The issue of migra-
tion forcesus to ask whetherRawlsian theoriesofjustice need to assume the
existence of a communityof people withmoral obligationsto one another.
One way to avoid these difficultiesis to be egalitarianat the world level:
thisachieves moral consistencyat the cost of politicalirrelevance.Anotheris
to take the libertarianroute and to recognizeonly those obligationsthatindi-
viduals voluntarilyacquire. Such libertarianismmightperhaps view free mi-
grationwithequanimity,since immigrantsto rich countriesneed impose no
burdens on existingresidents.But ifone is seekinga genuinejustificationfor
immigrationcontrols,the mostobvious place to begin is surelywithan ethic
of nationalism.
It is revealing that the editors have not allowed nationalism to count
as an ethical perspective.The contributors,too, seem determinedto avoid
discussingnationalism,exceptas a pathology.The closestwe getto an endorse-
mentof nationalistideas is whenJosephCarens suggeststhatJapanisjustified
in excluding immigrantsso as to preserveits culturalhomogeneity.But then,
in a distinctlyuneasy passage, Carens asserts that the old White Australia
policy could not claim a similarjustification,since that policy "cannot be
separated fromBritishimperialismand European racism"(p. 38). Even if we
grant the contestableclaim that the white Australiansfeltthemselvesto be
culturallysuperior in a way that the Japanese do not, it is not obvious why
this should have disqualifiedthe Australiansfromseeking to preserve their
culture. There is no doubt that nationalismis a dangerous topic. But, after
reading thisbook, I wonder how long it can be kept offthe agenda of liberal
political theory.

ROBERT SUGDEN
ofEast Anglia
University

Kymlicka,Will. Contemporary
PoliticalPhilosophy:
An Introduction.
Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1990. Pp. 321. $42.00 (cloth); $14.00
(paper).

Despite its title,whichvirtuallypromisesa boringprimer,thisbook is terrific.

Will Kymlicka has writtena masterlysurveyof political theoryfromJohn
Rawls to Robert Nozick and beyond. The book is sufficiently clear and direct
and commonsensiblein its approach to be suitable as an introductionforthe
uninitiated,but Kymlickapresses the argumentsto the point that theyyield
freshinsightsfor the most sophisticatedstudentsin the field.
The book is organized around a presentationof a liberalegalitarianposi-
tion,in the mold of Rawls and Ronald Dworkin,seen as correctingthe defects
of utilitarianism.Furtherchapterstreatlibertarianism,Marxism,communitar-
ianism,and feminismforthe mostparteitheras critiquesof liberalegalitarian-
ism or as rivals to it. This way of organizing the material generallyworks
well but creates an odd tone in the chapter on Marxism,which conveysthe

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 BookReviews 389
impressionthatKarl Marx is to be faultedforhavingfailedto do his homework
insofaras Das Kapital would have been farbetterif Marx had read his Rawls.
Kymlickais at his best in the chapters on communitarianismand feminism,
where his discussions of criticismsof liberalismstemmingfrom these ap-
proaches are penetratingand sympathetic,and his rejoinderson behalf of
liberalismare careful,fair-minded,sharp, undogmatic,and engaged. Overall,
the book offersa thoughtfuland criticaldiscussionof liberalismby a commit-
ted partisan.
I have no quarrel withthe idea of placing Rawls and Dworkinat the center
of a discussion of contemporarypoliticalphilosophy.Rawls and Dworkinare
indeed central figures. But Kymlickasets up his discussions with a device
borrowed from Dworkin in a way that is perhaps unfortunate.Following
Dworkin'ssuggestion,Kymlickaproposes thatany normativepoliticalphiloso-
phy worthyof considerationin modernsocietywillbe egalitarianin the broad
sense that it will require treatingpeople as equals. Kymlickaglosses this in
several alternate (nonequivalent) formulationsincluding these: "Egalitarian
theoriesrequirethatthe governmenttreatitscitizenswithequal consideration;
each citizenis entitledto equal concernand respect"(p. 4). Kymlickaproceeds
to assess the rival approaches to justice that he discusses according to the
egalitarianstandardjust described.
The egalitarianstandardproposed is vague in the extreme,so it is hard
to say decisivelywhat it might rule out or rule in. Still, its vague meaning
seems to accord better with liberal egalitarianismthan the other doctrines
Kymlickaconsiders. Upholding this egalitarian standard tiltsthe discussion
againsta fullconsiderationon theirown termsof doctrinessuch as utilitarian-
ism,Lockean naturalrightslibertarianism, and contractarianism.(In fairness,
it should be noted thatKymlicka'sdiscussionis not confinedto the application
of this external standard,but also includes internalcriticismsof the various
doctrineshe surveys.)
The tiltis mostobvious in thecases oflibertarianism and contractarianism,
which are not plausiblyconstrued as attemptsto interpretthe formula that
governmentowes all citizens"equal concern." But Kymlicka'suse of the vague
egalitarianstandardas the measure of theoriesofjustice also tends to distort
his treatmentof utilitarianismand of the complex relationsbetweenutilitarian
moral theoryand liberal politicalarrangements.Of course interpretingutili-
tarianismas a formof egalitarianisminduces only a subtle distortion.Recall
John Stuart Mill's insistence that utilitarianismupholds that true equality
whichis the fundamentalcriterionofjustice. But thereare sources of tension
here which Mill overlooks.In whatsense is a utilitariancommittedto a funda-
mental norm of equality? Well, as Bentham says, "Everybodyto count for
one, nobody for more than one," but thisjust means that each pleasure and
pain will be counted at its full measure no matterwho experiences it. Given
that citizenshave unequal capacities for utility,in some sense utilitarianism
is not fundamentallycommittedto a norm of equal treatmentfor all and
should not be evaluated as though it were.
Kymlickadistinguishestwo interpretations of utilitarianism.One version
is based on a commitmentto treatingpeople as equals, but he quicklydismisses
thisbecause utilitarianprinciplesmanifestly constitutean implausibleattempt
to fulfillvague egalitarianism.The second version,what I would say is the

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 390 Ethics January 1994
only plausible reading of the doctrine,takes the maximizationof utilityas
morallyfoundational.But Kymlickaalso dismissesthisdoctrineon the ground
that "it is difficultto see how thiscan be viewed as a moral principle"(p. 34).
MoralityforKymlickais a matterofinterpersonalobligations,so the utilitarian
dutyto maximize utilityis just bizarre,beyond the pale. He asks rhetorically,
to whom are the obligationsowed which the utilitarianposits?Discussing the
implicationsof utilitarianprinciplesfor population policy,he supposes that
if there is no actual person who is wronged if I fail to have extra babies, it is
absurd to suppose thattherecould be an obligationto create more people so
as to increase utilitytotals.
At thispoint Kymlicka'sargumentgives a superficialtreatmentof a deep
problem. Consider Derek Parfit'sdiscussion of a youth's decision to have a
child now who will be severelyhandicapped fromconception ratherthan to
wait a few years and have a normal, healthy child (in Reasonsand Persons
[Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1984], chap. 16). There is likelyto be a
component of impersonal consequentialistbenevolence in any adequate mo-
ralityand a fortioriin any adequate politicalmorality.At least,the issue cannot
be dismissed so swiftlyas Kymlickasupposes.
Leaving aside the issue of the adequacy of Kymlicka'sorganizingframe-
work for his discussion of theoriesofjustice, I fear he is insufficientlycritical
of the philosophical liberalismthat he espouses.
The core of philosophical liberalismaccording to Kymlickais an ideal of
"liberal equality." Kymlickasupposes that the equal treatmentthat govern-
mentsowe to theircitizensideallywould involve maintainingequal resource
shares for all except insofar as individuals by their voluntarychoices are
responsibleforthe holdingsof resourcestheygain. He followsRawlsin urging
thatpeople are not morallydeservingof theirgood fortunein gaining above-
average holdings of resources if theirgood fortuneis due to theirpossession
of native talents,forwhich theycan claim no special credit.If we begin from
the premise that people should have equal opportunityto gain positionsof
advantage in the social system,equal opportunityshould be interpretedas
requiringthatpeople should receive compensationthatoffsetsdifferencesin
theirinheritedtalents,whichare morallyarbitrary just as differencesin inher-
itedwealthare morallyarbitrary. At thelimit,equalityof opportunityinterpre-
ted in thisway becomes the liberal equality principleas characterizedabove.
The liberal equalityideal can be regarded as expressingthe aspirationto
provide each citizena fairshare of means that enable her freelyto choose to
live a kindof lifethatshe has reason to value. The initialpresumptionis that
fair shares will be equal shares, and this is a radical presumptionbecause
the resources that are to be equalized include people's favorable personal
circumstancessuch as talents.Accordingto Kymlicka,liberal equalityshould
not demand continued equal shares when unequal shares are the foreseeable
outcome of voluntarychoices by individualsfroma startingpoint of equality.
Central to the principle of liberal equality that Kymlickaespouses is a
dichotomybetween an individual'svoluntarychoices (and their foreseeable
outcomes),forwhichthe individualis deemed responsible,and the individual's
unchosen circumstances(including her talents),which societyshould tryto
render equal for all by provision of compensation. But this dichotomyis
problematicbecause the line betweenthe portionof one's lifethatone chooses

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 BookReviews 391
and the portion that is unchosen does not coincide with the line between
mattersforwhich one can and cannot be held personallyresponsible.If your
unchosen circumstancesinclude your talents,how can you be deemed fully
responsibleforyourvoluntarychoices, since the abilityto make good choices
and wise decisionsis obviouslya talentthatis distributedveryunevenlyacross
persons? If my voluntarychoices cause me to be badly off,perhaps justice
requiressocietyto provideme furtherhelp, ifmychoices reflectchoicemaking
deficienciesthatare beyondmycontrol.The divisionof responsibility between
individual and society that Kymlicka's liberal equality ideal expresses can
hardlybe a fundamentaltenet ofjustice.
This worryalso cuts to the basis of the claim that people ought to be
treated as equals, that each person is owed equal considerationand respect.
Philosophical liberalismholds that human persons deserve greater respect
and considerationthan other animals in virtueof our capacities for rational
agency,but personsdifferwidelyin the degree to whichtheypossesscapacities
for rational agency. These cognitiveand emotional abilities are distributed
unevenlyby contingenciesof birthand socialization.We surelydon't want to
conclude thatpersons are owed differentdegrees of considerationand respect
in proportionto theircapacitiesforrationalagency,but how is thisconclusion
to be resisted?Rawls has responded that rationalityis a range propertyand
that any being that passes the threshold of the range is entitled to equal
respect,but the adequacy of thisresponse is worthfurtherscrutiny.I suggest
thatponderingthisissue would have led Kymlickato treatmore carefullythe
rival utilitarianapproach to the topic of human equalityand equal respect.
Kymlicka'sversion of justice as liberal equality is problematicin other
respects.A wide varietyof typesof personal and externalresourcesevidently
must be aggregated into resource shares, but Kymlickasays littleabout how
to measure these heterogeneous resource shares. Assume this problem can
be solved. Then the question arises whethera principlethatrequiresequality
of resources (or thatgives lexical priorityto the goal of maximizingthe share
of the worst off) is too stringent.Kymlickaraises the possibilitythat even
providinghuge offsetting resourcecompensationpaymentsto severelydisad-
vantaged persons mightstillleave themfarworseoffin overallresourcesthan
healthypersons. Equality mightrequire transferof virtuallyall resources to
persons who would get littlebenefitfromthem. Kymlickathinkswe should
not insiston such extremetransfersin the name of equalityand believes this
is not a problem for the liberal equality ideal, but his reasoning puzzles me:
"Our concern forpeople's circumstancesis a concern to promotetheirability
to pursue their ends. If in tryingto equalize the means we preventanyone
fromachievingtheirends, thenwe have failedcompletely"(p. 79). This looks
like a fudge. If transfersare carriedjust to the point of equality, then the
severelydisabled will have resources for achieving their ends equivalent to
everyoneelse's resources. Everyonewillbe able to achieve her ends, but only
to a verysmall extent.The difficulty is not that insistenceon strictequality
is somehow self-defeating, but that in these circumstancesthe cost to better-
off persons of transferringfurtherresources to worse-offpersons does not
seem to be worththe improvementthat these transfersbring about for the
worse off. The cost-to-benefit ratio is too unfavorable. Notice that this is a
broadly utilitariancriticismof equality.This is one of the points in the book

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 392 Ethics January1994
where Kymlicka'sdefenseof the positionhe favorswould have been stronger
if his argumenthad probed more deeply.
The liberal equality ideal also prompts questions from the libertarian
right that Kymlicka does not take as seriously as he might have. Liberal
equality as characterized by Kymlicka fundamentallyrejects the Lockean
idea that each person is the rightfulowner of her own body. In liberal
egalitarian theory, we do not fully own our bodies, because we do not
deserve our talents, and we are obligated to use our bodies in ways that
contributeto the opportunitiesof othersas sanctioned bydistributivejustice
norms. But libertariansnote that the liberal egalitarian is quite selective in
her discussion of self-ownershipand does not fully follow through the
apparent implicationsof its rejection. In the contextof abortion controver-
sies, some liberal egalitarians insist on the woman's right to control her
own body even if the fetus inside her is deemed a person. The talents of
attracting romantic partners and friends are very unevenly distributed
across persons, but liberal egalitarians do not propose talent-poolingreme-
dies for these natural injustices. Why not require handsome persons to
share sexual favorswithunhandsome persons, and charmingwittypersons
to share their company with uncharming and witless folk? As Kymlicka
himself points out in another context,you cannot simplyinvoke a distinc-
tion between privatelifeand public responsibilityto answer these questions,
because the shape of a morallyacceptable public/privatedistinctionshould
be determined by firstprinciples, not by ad hoc accommodation of en-
trenched hunches. This is not to suggest that this line of criticismis unan-
swerable,just that it would have been nice if Kymlicka had addressed it.
In thisreview I have exercised the reviewer'sprerogativeto be curmud-
geonly and to concentrateon disagreements.In conclusion I want to empha-
size thatthere is also a lot to agree withand thatKymlicka'swritingis incisive
and intelligenteven when it promptsdisagreement.Kymlickaarticulatesan
importantline of thoughtin contemporaryliberalism,usefullycompares this
doctrineto rival approaches, and therebycontributessignificantly to our un-
derstandingof theoriesofjustice.

RICHARD J. ARNESON
ofCalifornia,San Diego
University

Klosko, George. The PrincipleofFairnessand PoliticalObligation.

Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield,1992. Pp. 204. $52.50 (cloth); $19.95
(paper).

George Klosko here refinesa number of his recent articlesinto an original,

clear, and pleasinglycompact book on an importantproblem. It is as useful
for its discussion of the principle of fairnessas it is for its defense of politi-
cal obligation.
Though many regard fairnessas a constraint on any theoryof political
obligation,fewernow regard it as the groundof such a theory.First,manyof
thebenefitsthe stateprovidesare unavoidable and, as Nozick argues,thrusting

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