CHAPTER-I

MEANING OF FIRST INFORMATION REPORT

A. Introduction
First Information Report is written by a Police Officer. State has duty to take in to
its cognizance the commission of a cognizable case. Generally a Police officer does not
possess the adequate knowledge to deal with these cases promptly, as these cases demand
urgent attention because the delay erases the available evidences.
A Police officer has to perform many duties at the same time when he registers a
case. He has to do the panchnama, finger print expert, forensic expert and investigation is
also conducted by him.
John Cratman in his book “Police” defined police as “Crystallizing the concept
and practices of the maintenance of public peace, safety and security.”1 The ‘Arthsastra’
of Kautilya mentions about the existence of police during the Mauryan period.2 3As a law
enforcing agency ensuring order, the origin of the police in India can be traced to the
earliest Vedic Period of Indian History.
An Inspector General of Police once said: “I have worked 24 years in police
department and honestly speaking, I do not know how to draft a F.I.R. properly. I do not
know how to inspect a scene of crime scientifically and to be more specific, I do not
know how to interrogate a suspect psychologically.”4
The Supreme Court in the case of D.K. Basu v. State of W.B.5 observed that “in
view of the expectation of the society that police must deal with the criminals in an
efficient and effective manner and bring to book those who are involved in the crime. The
cure can’t however, the worst than the decease itself.”
SC disapproves of reckless arrests in criminal cases. “It appears that the police is
not at all implementing it. What invariably happens is that whenever an FIR of a
cognizable offence is lodged, the police immediately go to arrest the accused person. This

1 Gupta. R-“Guide to Police Law in India”-1967, Eastern Book Co., Lucknow, P. 22.
2 Police, Crime & Human Rights: Radha Kalyani, Pointer Publishers, Jaipur (Raj.), 2003, P.351.
3 Sharma, P.D.: “POLICE, SOCIETY AND LAW”, RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS, JAIPUR, NEW
DELHI, 1999, ch.-1 INDIAN POLICE: THE LEGACIES, p. 1.
4 Policing the Largest Democracy; 50 years and later by James Vadackumchery, 1998, at p.13.
5 1997 Cr. L.J. 743(SC).
 2

is clear violation of the judgment of the apex court.” The court issued direction to the
chief secretaries, home secretaries and law secretaries of all the states and Union
Territories to “strictly comply with the judgment of the apex court in Joginder Kumar’s
case.6 Further FIR and important issues have been discussed in eight chapters.

B. FIR-Meaning
A First Information Report or FIR is a written document prepared by the Police
in India, Pakistan and Japan when they receive information about the commission of a
cognizable offence. It is a report of information that reaches the police first in point of
time and that is why it is called the First Information Report. It is generally a complaint
lodged with the police by the victim of a cognizable offence or by someone on his/her
behalf. Anyone can report the commission of a cognizable offence either orally or in
writing to the police.7
The expression, First Information or First Information Report is not defined in the
Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) 1973, but these words are always understood to
mean, Information recorded under Section 154(1) of Cr.P.C. It is the Information given
to a Police Officer in the form of a complaint or accusation, regarding the commission or
suspected commission of a cognizable offence. It is given with the object of setting the
criminal law in motion and police starting the investigation. This report forms the
foundation of the case. The question whether or not a particular document would
constitute F.I.R. is a question of fact, which depends upon the circumstances of each
case.
The statement made by a witness who initiated the proceedings when reduced to
o

writing is the F.I.R. Genuineness or credibility of the information is not a condition

precedent for registration of the case.9 Information lodged with Police disclosing
cognizable offence, the officer-in-charge of a Police station is statutorily obliged to
register a case.10 F.I.R. is the information which is given first in point of time. Obviously,

The Tribune, Thursday, January 31, 2008, p.2.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Information_Report, visited on 3 march 2010, 5:07 P.M.
Hari Dev Sharma v. State, 1971 Cri. LJ 1615(1616).
9
Mohinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2007(1) RCR (Criminal) 536(P&H).
10
Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, 2007(1) RCR (Criminal) 3(SC).
 3

there cannot be more than one F.I.R. in one case; however, there may be many the
victims in one case.11 This First Information Report shall be based on the complaint as
10
made or on the information as available at that point of time.
A good FIR must address the six issues of- What is the nature of the incident,
Where and When did it happen, who is reporting and against whom and why did the
incident happen. These six ‘W’s begin the process of data collection, collation and
analysis that hopefully results in the arrest and prosecution of the involved person or
persons.13
Reporting Centers- while the investigative responsibility may rest at the Police
Station level, we feel it would be desirable to enable some constituent units of a Police
Station- for example, a police outpost- to register a First Information Report as and when
an information or complaint about an offence is lodged with them direct. Apart from
police outposts which are presently established in several states, we may in due course
develop a system of reporting centers also, particularly in urban areas, where some
specified residents of a locality of the type of wardens who function in a civil defence set
up may also be empowered to register First Information Reports and pass them on to the
Police Station concerned for taking up investigation.14 FIR can be lodged at police
outpost/police beat box if special provisions have been made by the State government.
At Present Police officers use eleven points in their view when they reduce the
information in writing. These eleven points are indicated with the help of ‘W\ ‘W’s at
the time of writing FIR systematic and patient questioning by police officer would elicit
relevant replies which should make an exhaustive self speaking FIR.lsl W- What
information you have to convey? The reply should be the crime which is to be reported.
2nd W- In what capacity? Write here whether as an eyewitness or hearsay. 3rd W- Who
has committed the crime? 4th W- Against whom the crime has been committed? 5th W-
When? 6th W- Where? 7th W- Why? (Motive) 8thW-Which Way? 9th W- Witnesses or in
whose presence? 10th W- What was taken away by the accused e.g. any article etc.llth

Ram Lai Singh v. State. AIR 1958 M.P. 380: 1958 Cri. L.J. 1402.
First Report National Police Commission, Ch. - X Modalities for inquiry in to complaints against
Police.
The Indian Police-A Critical Evaluation by Dr. Arvind, Regency Publications, New Delhi, 2005 at
page 229.
Fourth Report- National Police Commission, 27.5- Reporting Centres.
 4

W- What traces were left by the accused, e.g. any article belonging to them, foot marks,
finger marks and so on.15
In pursuance of directions of the Supreme Court Haryana has enacted and notified
the Haryana Police Act (HP A), 2007. A close perusal of the legislation, however, reveals
that it has failed to incorporate the SC directives in letter and spirit. Section 26 of the
HPA provides for a State Police Board whose constitution is not in fully consonance with
the guidelines of the apex court. It was clearly directed that such a commission should be
headed either by the Chief Minister or the Home Minister and include other members to
be chosen in such a manner that it is able to function independent of the government’s
control. The States were asked to choose one of the models proposed by the NHRC, the
Riberio Committee or the Sorabjee Committee, Unfortunately, none of the models has
been fully adopted by Haryana. The Police Board comprises the C.M., the Home
Minister, two senior bureaucrats instead of one and a retired judge of the High Court
whose position can even be filled by a state Advocate- General.
Further, in case of appointment of three non-political or independent members,
the Haryana law provides that one will be a retired IAS officers and one retired IPS
officer, thus leaving only one slot to be filled from representatives of civil society, social
organizations, human right activists, NGOs etc.
Also, these members are to be nominated by the state government as per the HPA
rather than to be chosen through a selection as was suggested by the Sorabjee Committee.
Under these circumstances whether the Police Board will be able to function independent
of government control is any body’s guess. The functions provided for the State Police
Board are also different from those assigned to the State Security Commission by the SC,
Neither the recommendations of the Police Board are binding on the state government
nor there is any provision to place its reports before the state legislative assembly in
complete disregard of the directions of the SC. In respect of the second direction of the
apex court for the manner of the selection of the DGP from a panel prepared by the
UPSC, Section 6 of the HPA provides for the appointment of the DGP by the state
government from amongst the officers holding the rank of DGP, thus retaining the power

Crime, Prosecution & Defence: Investigators Guide by Sukhdev Kohli, Bright Law House, 2001,
p. 13.
 5

of selection of DGP wholly in the hands of powers that be contrary to the SC directive.
Whenever there is a change of guard in the state, the incumbent DGP is one of the first
officers to be removed or transferred. It is not the distinguished or meritorious service
record, but loyalty or proximity of the prospective officer with the ruling elite (Chief
Minister) which plays a vital role in his selection as DGP. This practice needs to be
abolished. Rather than providing for a minimum tenure of two years for the DGP as was
directed by the SC, the Haryana law provides for only one year. Section 13 of the HPA
provides for a fixed term only in respect of an IG and a SP and that too only for a period
of one year rather than two years as was directed. It is difficult to understand why the
SHOs have not been considered for a fixed tenure despite the fact that they are the very
first investigating officers in a case well conversant with facts and incriminating evidence
and as such they need a fixed tenure albeit with exceptions. The Separation of the
investigating Police from the law and order police seems to be only one direction which
I
has been complied with to certain extent in the HPA. It would have been better if a
separate state level cadre of investigators or state bureau of investigation, as suggested in
the fifth report on “Public Order” submitted by the second Administrative Reforms
Commission in June, 2007, was provided for in the legislation with a provision of well
equipped infrastructure, trained manpower and modem state of the- art technology.
Section 34 of the Haryana Police Act provides for a Police Establishment
Committee, the functions of which like preparing an action plan for improving
infrastructural facilities, professionalism, modernization, training and police welfare etc.
are quite different from the one as directed by the apex court.
While the directions of the apex court were clear and unambiguous that police
complaint authorities should be headed only by retired members of the judiciary and have
members from different fields, the Haryana Police Bill provides for only one man state
level Police Complaint Authority as binding upon the state government in complete
disregard of the directives of the apex court.
Haryana is still without a state human right commission and recent spurt in
instances of police atrocities on hapless citizens, especially women, warrants that
immediate setting up of an effective mechanism to tackle these.
 6

It is clear the Haryana Legislation falls short of kickstarting a new era of Police
reforms. As the apex court is already seized of a contempt petition filed against the non­
complaint states in initiating police reforms. Haryana being a partial compliant state
should without delay amend its police legislation accordingly before the state is pulled up
by the court on this count.16
The following two conditions are to be satisfied before information could be
treated as F.I.R.
(i) It must be an information
(ii) Secondly, it must relate to a cognizable offence on the face of it and not
merely in the light of the subsequent events.17
Section 154 uses the word ‘report’ the words F.I.R. have a legal import. It may be
possible that there should be more than one report about the one and the same incident. In
such cases, the F.I.R. would be a report under this section. The F.I.R. is the earliest report
TR
made to the police officer with a view to his taking action in the matter.
The F.I.R. must be in the nature of a complaint or accusation with the object of
getting the law in motion.19 The F.I.R. is information given by an informant given by an
informant on which the investigation is commenced.20
Now, it is well settled that any information given on phone too in respect of a
cognizable offence to a police officer-in-charge of a police station will be treated as
F.I.R.: provided the said information received through the phone is reduced into writing
1

by the police-in-charge of the police station and signed by him.

FIR is the first step of Criminal Procedure that leads to the trial and punishment of
a criminal. It is also most important supportive evidence on which the entire structure of
the prosecution case is built-up. The main objective of the FIR is to enable the Police

The Tribune, April 8,2009. p.9. “Half-hearted police reforms in Haryana”- by Hemant Kumar.
J.K. Devalya v. State of Coorg. AIR 1956 Mys. 51: 1956 Cri. LJ 904.
Soma Bai v. State of Gujarat. AIR 1956 SC 1453: 1975 Cri. LJ 1201.
In Re. M. Ranga Rajulu. 1958 Cri. LJ 906: AIR 1958 Mad. 368: in re: Sreen Vasulu, AIR 1958
A.P. 37: 1958 Cri. LJ 18: Bhanu Lai v. State of Tripura. AIR 1958 Tri. 40: 1958 Cri LJ 1549;
Vinayak Datta v. State. 1970 Cri. LJ 1081: AIR 1970 Goa 96.
State of Bombay v. Rusy Mistry. AIR 1960 SC 391: 1960 Cri. LJ 532: In re. Kanta Reddi, 1963(1)
Cri. LJ 735: AIR 1963 AP 252: State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Singh, 1962(1) Cri. LJ 82: AIR 1962
Raj. 3.
Mehtabai v. State of Maharashtra. 1983(1) Crimes 116 : Cri. L.R. Guj. 236: Randheer Singh v.
State, 1980 Cri. LJ. 1397; Rabezi Krishen v. State of Gujarat, 1977 Cri. L.J. 107.
 7

officer-in-charge of the Police Station to initiate the investigation on the crime and to
collect evidence as soon as possible. It is first report of the crime and so it is a valuable
document that throws much light on the crime. It is also important because it is a
statement which is made soon after the occurrence of the crime without fabrication and
any prosecution case that may be subsequently made-up can be checked in the light of the
first report. FIR is an important document. FIR is not substantive piece of evidence but at
times it affects the prosecution case. Therefore, correct recording of FIR is required. FIR
should contain as much information as is available at the time of recording it.

C. Zero number FIR & Non FIR

Whenever a police officer in charge lodges an FIR but believes that he does not
have the jurisdiction in the case to investigation. Such an FIR which will be ultimately
transferred to the other police station would be called a zero number FIR.
i
As regards missing persons, as long as the information is that the person “is
missing”, or “went missing” (bhag gai), no cognizable offence is made out and therefore
no FIR is lodged. In this context, different procedures are being followed by different
states. In certain states, “Zero FIR” is lodged. In certain others, “Non FIR” is registered.
Only in very few states, like Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, Proper FIR is lodged,
investigation caused with regular case Diaries. In majority of cases of missing persons,
across the country, regular FIR is never registered and, therefore, no investigation is
caused as per the code of Criminal Procedure.22

D. OBJECT AND IMPORTANCE OF F.I.R.

t

FIR sets the Criminal Law in Motion. Object of FIR are many and these are given
below:
Firstly, to inform Magistrate of the District and the District Superintendent of
Police, who are responsible for the peace and safety of the District of the offence reported
at the Police Station.23

The Indian Journal of Criminalogy & Criminalistics, Volume XXVIII, Issue No.-3, Sept, to Dec.-
2007, Page No.-4.
1974, M.L.W. (Crl.) 190(196)(D.B.).
 8

Secondly, to make known to the Judicial Officers before whom the case is
ultimately tried, what are the facts given out immediately after the occurrence and on
what materials the investigation commenced.24
Thirdly, to safeguard the accused against subsequent variations or additions.25
Fourthly, object of the information report is set the criminal law in motion; this is
from the point of view of the informant.26
Fifthly, the object is to obtain information about the alleged criminal activity so as
to able to take suitable steps for tracing and bringing to book the guilty party, this is from
the point of view of investigating officer.27
•jo

In Masta v. State of Punjab the honorable court decided that petition under
section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking directions of High Court for registration of case by the police
and petition dismissed, and petitioner then filed a criminal complaint before magistrate
who is also competent to order registration of case. The alternative remedy was held
equally efficacious.
In Emp. v. Kh. Nazir Ahmed, the honorable court held that the object of the
t

FIR is to obtain early information of alleged criminal activity, to record the circumstances
before there is time for them to be forgotten and embellished, and the report can be put in
evidence when the informant is examined if it is desired to do so. This view was
confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P.30
F.I.R. is the Bible of the case initiated on police report.31 The Object of F.I.R.
from the point of view of the informant is to set the criminal law in motion. From the
i
point of view of investigating authorities it is to obtain information about the alleged
criminal activity so as to be able to take suitable steps for tracing and bringing to book
the guilty party. The report does not constitute substantive evidence though it is important
as conveying the earliest information about the occurrence. It can be used only as a
previous statement for the purpose contemplated under section 157 or section 145 of the

24 1943 Crl. LJ 90 DB (Pat.).

25 1932 Crl. LJ 638 DB (Pat.).
26 1972 Crl. LJ 233 SC.
27 Ibid.
28 1998(2) RCR (Criminal) 504 (P&H).
29 AIR 1945 PC 18.
30 AIR 1953 SC 122.
31 Mohan Lai v. State of U.P., 1982 U.P. Cri. L.R. 155.
 9

Evidence Act that is for corroborating or contradicting its maker and not of other
witnesses.
The object of Section 154, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is to obtain early
information of alleged criminal activity, to record the circumstances before there is time
for them to be embellished or forgotten.
No doubt the F.I.R. being an early record and the first version of the alleged
criminal activity conveyed to the police officers with the object of putting the police in
motion in order to investigate is an important and valuable document.34 F.I.R. is used to
nr

check subsequent improvements and embellishments during trial.

While explaining the legal position as to the right of informant to take the matter
to the police by lodging F.I.R. or to the court direct, by filing complaint, the Andhra
Pradesh, High Court has held that both the courses under Section 154 and under Section
200 Code of Criminal Procedure are open and available to a private citizen and, therefore,
simply because there is a right under Section 154 of the said Code, consequent upon
which the police would investigate, it cannot be said that the right under Section 200 is
not available for purposes of taking recourse.36
FIR is not substantive piece of evidence. Therefore, even if the written report filed
has not been duly proved the prosecution case will not fall on that ground alone and the
court has to consider the substantive evidence which has been adduced by prosecution,
it can be used to corroborate or contradict its maker. It cannot be used to corroborate
another person.38Thus it is not a substantive piece of evidence.
The object of F.I.R. is to obtain early information of the alleged criminal activity
30
to record the circumstances before there is time for them to be forgotten or embellished.

Hasib v. State of Bihar, 1972 Cri. L.J. 233: A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 283.
Tara Chand v. State of Haryana. 1971 S.C.C. (Cri.) 593: A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1891: 1971 Cri. L.J.
1411.
Chandra Bhal v. State of U.P., 1970 U.J. (S.C.) 379: 1979 S.C.C. (Cri.) 290.
Jai Ram v. State of Rajasthan. 1985 R.L.W. 490.
Polavarapu Jagadisharao v. Konda Paturi Venkatesh Worlu, 1991 Cri. L.J. 1419 (1421) A.P.
Kanik Lai Thakur v. State of Bihar, 2003 Cri. L.J. 375 (Pat.).
(1996) 9 SCC 46.
Thulia Kali v. State of T.N., A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 50: 1972 Cri. L.J. 1296: Emperor v. Kwaza Nazir
Ahmad, A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 18.
 10

In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Nahar Singh(dead),40 it was held that purpose of

recording FIR is to set the investigating agency in motion. Therefore the main purpose of
F.I.R. is to give information of a cognizable offence to the police and set them in
motion.41 The value of F.I.R. must always depend on the facts and circumstances of a
given case.42 The importance of the F.I.R. lies in the fact that it is a statement made soon
after the occurrence. Hence the memory of the informant is fresh and it is unlikely that he
had opportunities of fabrication.43
The principal object of F.I.R. is only to make a complaint to the police to set the
criminal law into motion. It’s secondary though equally important; object is to obtain
early information of an alleged criminal activity to record the circumstances before there
is time for them to be forgotten or embellished.44
The value attached to an FIR differs from case to case and no generalizations can
be applied. Thus, where a telephonic message only conveying the fact of killing was
given, it only amounted to giving of information as to commission of offence and could
not be used as substantive evidence.45
The issuance of a notice by the Magistrate to the informant at the time of
consideration of the final report is a must.46

E. Essential conditions required for registration of an FIR

In Moni Mohan v. Emp.47 it was decided that the essential conditions of First
Information Report are
(1) It must be in information and
(2) It must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence on the face of it and
not in the light of subsequent events.

1998(1) RCR(Criminal) 867(SC).

In Re, Viyyuri Ratna Reddi, 1963(1) Cri. L.J. 735: A.I.R. 1963 A.P. 252.
Dharma Rama Bhargav v. State of Maharashtra. (1973) 1 SCC 537.
Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1: 1973 Cri. L.J. 185.
Mohan Lai v. State. 1961(1) Cri L.J. 156.
State of Karnataka v. Rajan, 1994 Cri. L.J. 1042.
Union Public Service Commission v. S. Papaiah, AIR 1997 SC 3876.
35 C.W.N 623; A.W. Khan v. State, 1962, Part II Cri. LJ 751 Cal..
 11

F. PROVISIONS OF SECTION 154(3), CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Section 154(1) Cr.P.C. is as follows:

“Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given
orally to an officer-in-charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or
under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information,
whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person
giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in
such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf.”
The language of sub-section (3) of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 is only directory. There is no penalty prescribed for non-observance of
this sub-section. This provision only enables a party to seek redress. Failure to adopt the
course does not incur any penalty.

G. Conditions required for recording FIR under Section 154 Cr.P.C.

The following requirements are to be satisfied to constitute information as “First
Information Report” within the meaning of this section;

(a) It must be information regarding to the commission of a cognizable offence;

(b) It must be given to an officer-in-charge of a police station;
(c) It must be reduced into writing either by the informant (complainant) himself
and it should be signed by the Informant;
(d) If it is oral, it must be taken down in writing and read over to the Informant,
who should sign it and it should be recorded according to the direction of the Informant.
(e) The substance of information should be entered in the prescribed register,
daily diary, General Diary, otherwise known Station Diary or Station House Register in
the form as the State Government has prescribed for the abovesaid purpose.

48
Mathura Pd. v. State of Haryana, 1982 Cri. L.J. 259.
 12

H. First in point of time

The information regarding a cognizable offence by whomsoever given which is
first in point of time and on which investigation actually commences is the FIR and not
one recorded thereafter or on reaching the spot.49
The information recorded U/S. 154 Cr.P.C. is known as First Information
Report50 though the first is not mentioned in the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The information need not necessarily be against a person by name, it may be
against an unknown person. In such a case it is the duty of the Police Officer to find out
the real offender during the course of investigation.51
The First Information Report is earliest report made to the Police Officer held in
the case of Soma Bhai v. State of Gujarat.52
. (i) Earliest version of the case is F.I.R.
(ii) It is not open to the officer-in-charge of Police Station to consider information
as FIR according to his discretion.
(iii) If information comes at a police station simultaneously from a number of
persons, the officer-in-charge can use his common sense and record one
statement as the FIR.53
(iv) In case of more than one FIR-There could not be more than one FIR in one
case, even if there are many victims of the alleged offence, writing three
FIR’s in one case is illegal. What is recorded in the first point of time and
which reached the officer-in-charge of police station first is FIR.

I. Different types of information which can be considered as FIR under Section 154
of Cr.P.C.
Some information may be different in their nature but may be treated as FIR. First
Information Report (FIR) under Section 154 Cr.P.C., the information must be relating to
the commission of a cognizable offence. Whether information is one under Section 154

Candruk Ram Khuhar v. Emp, 24 Cr.L.J., 129 Patna; Same view was mirrored in the case of
Sirajuddin v. State, 1968 Crl. L.J. 193 Madras.
46 Crl. LJ 413.
1978 (2) Ker. LJ 273.
52
AIR 1975 SC 1453; 1975 Crl. LJ 1201 SC.
53
Moni Mohan’s case 35 CWN 623.
 13

Cr.P.C., is a question of fact and, it is not open to the Offieer-in-eharge of a Police

Station to treat as such or not. In other words, if information is really a piece of
information disclosing commission of a cognizable offence it would constitute the FIR of
the case whether the Police Officer reduced it into writing or not.54

J. Information which is not considered as FIR

The following facts may not be termed as F.I.R. as the facts of the information,
though may be first in point in time, are bereft of basic requirements necessary to bring
an information within the umbrella of the term F.I.R.
(i) Information received after the commencement of the investigation:
F.I.R. must be distinguished from information received after the commencement
of the investigation which is covered by Sections 161 and 162, Code of criminal
Procedure. Such information is inadmissible. When a telephonic message merely
conveys fact of killing, then such message cannot be treated as FIR nor would such
message be admissible as substantive evidence. It only amounts to giving of information
as to commission of offence.56
In State through C.B.I. V. Vistaria Prakash57 the honorable Supreme Court
decided that It is true that he did not make any statement that pink coloured shirt was
worn by the appellant in the first information report as also in his statement recorded
under Section 161 of the code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘the Code’), but the same
i
in our opinion is not of much significance.
The first information report was lodged immediately after the occurrence took
place, namely at 1400 hours. PW-1 was grievously injured. At that point of time it was
not expected of him that he would be in a position to make a statement containing

Bhanulal v. State of Tripura, 1958, Crl. LJ 1549 Tripura; The Sate v. Jagdeo and others, AIR 1955
N.U.C., 1516 (vol. 42).
Durga Ruhidas v. State, 1986 Cri. Lj 1620 1986(2) Crimes 441: State of Bombay v. Rusi MiStry,
A.I.R 1960 S.C. 391 (395) 1960 Cri. LJ. 532: Mangal Mondel v. State, 1981 Cri. LJN.O.C. 168,
Nageshwar v. State of Maharashtra, 1973 Cri. LJ. 235: A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 165: Hanja v. State of
Rajasthan. 1984 Cri. LR. 16 (Raj); Samappa v. State of Mysore, 1979 Cri. LJ. 1358 A.I.R. 1979
S.C. 1831: 1979 S.C.C. (Cri). 910.
State of Karnataka v. Rajan, 1994 Cri. LJ. 1042.
AIR 2009 SUPREME COURT 3129 page 3133.
 14

minutest details. His statement under Section 161 of the Code must have also been
recorded immediately thereafter.
As cryptic and anonymous oral message received by a police officer or a person
in police station, which does not clearly specify a cognizable offence, cannot be treated as
F.I.R., hence subsequent written complaint by eyewitness to the S.I. Police in police
station would not be hit by Section 162, Cr. P.C. This subsequent written complaint
would amount to FIR.58
The dead body of the deceased was brought down from the bus and taken to the
house. The conductor of the bus sent information to the Depot Manager of the State Road
Transport Corporation. The investigating officer was also informed. A report to that
effect might have been noted in the general diary but the same could not have been
treated to be an FIR. When information is received by an officer in charge of a police
station, he in terms of the provisions of the Code was expected to reach the place of
occurrence as early as possible. It was not necessary for him to take that step only on the
basis of a First Information Report. Information received in regard to commission of a
cognizable offence is not required to be preceded by a First Information Report. Duty of
the State to protect the life of an injured as also an Endeavour on the part of the police
officer to reach the place of occurrence is his implicit duty.59
When a murder was committed during communal riots and when information
about riot was already with the police and when F.I.R. about murder was lodged by the
informant afterwards, then it was held by the Apex Court of India that even if F.I.R. is
held to be hit by Sec. 162, Cr. P.C. statement made therein can be used to contradict the
informant. Further, statement under Sec. 162, Cr. P.C. can also be used to corroborate
evidence of other eyewitnesses.60 A statement of a witness or accused made to a police
officer after he started the investigation in no FIR.61 By no stretch of imagination the
statement made by an accused in the course of investigation shall be taken and treated as

Marudhapandiya v. State. 1993 Cri. LJ. 1594.

Ammireddy Venkata Ramana v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., 2008 (2) Crimes 63 (SC).
Paresh Kalyan Das Bhavsar v. Sadiq Yaqoob Bhai Jamadar, 1993 Cri LJ 1857: A.I.R. 1993 S.C.
1544 ;1993: S.C.C. (Cri) 612.
K.K. Das v. State, 1959 Cri LJ. 694. A.I.R. 1959 Cri. 342: Ibrahim Hussanin v. State, A.I.R. 1969,
Goa 68: State v Ram Ajodhya. 1965(2) Cri. LJ. 79: Krishna K. Puthram v. Shri Krishna Jadhav.
(1986) 2 Crimes 458.
 15

FIR as contemplated under Section 154. Cr. P.C.62 Lodging of FIR at place of occurrence
after the start of investigation is hit by Section 162, Code of Criminal Procedure.63
Unless the information lodged in the Police Station before the Station House
Officer as required under Section 154 Cr. P.C., the mere knowledge that a Police Officer
may derive on going to the spot does not make that information the “First Information
Report”.64

(ii) TELEPHONIC INFORMATION

In Ravishwar Manjhi & Ors. V. State of Jharkhand65 Supreme Court held that
mere information received on phone by police officer without any details as regards
identity of accused or nature of injuries caused by victims as well as name of culprits may
not be treated as FIR.
In Vikram & Ors. V. State of Maharashtra66 the honorable Supreme Court
decided that In this case the victim was admitted as an indoor patient in the hospital on
23.1.1997 and was discharged only on 26.1.1997. In a situation of this nature,
explanation of PW2 and others that they gave priority of the treatment of the deceased
and the accused which occasioned the delay in lodging the First Information Report and
the same having been accepted by two courts below, we do not find nay reason to
disagree. We find no reason to discard the testimony of P.W.2 who is an independent
witness. It may be true that PW2 had informed the officer in charge of the Police Station
on telephone, but the circumstances in which the said call had to be made has been
noticed by us heretobefore.
The Head Constable states that he had written down the same but then it must
have been a cryptic report and only for the purpose of visiting the scene of occurrence.
He as well as the Investigation Officer did not say that it was a detailed report.

V. Thoman v. State of Kerala, 1974 Cri. L.J. 849.

Thankeshwar Hazarika v. State of Assam, 1985 Cri. L.J. N.O.C. 101 : 1984 Cri. L.J. 217.
Mohammed v. State of Karnataka, 1990(3) Crimes 417 (413) Kant. (D.B.).
AIR 2009 SUPREME COURT 1262, para 25.
AIR 2007 SUPREME COURT 1893 at page 1896 & 7.
 16

If, in the aforementioned premise, another First Information Report which was a
detailed one came to be recorded, no exception can be taken to same being treated as a
First Information Report.
Prima facie the cryptic and anonymous oral message conveyed through
Telephone which did not in terms clearly specify a cognizable offence cannot be treated
as a first information report. The mere fact that the information was first in point of time
fn
does not by itself clothe it with the character of F.I.R.
Information given to Police telephone or by a person who did not disclose his
identity and gave a cryptic message. FIR could not recorded on such an information. 68
Similarly when there was a telephonic message that some person was lying
injured-then it could not be treated as F.I.R.69 But, telephone message if given by a
known person who discloses his identity and if: it contains all necessary facts which
70
constitute an offence and is reduced to writing by S.H.O., can be treated as an F.I.R.
But such information even given by a person who does not disclose his identity but
discloses the name of the offender and the place where the offence is committed and
where the evidence of the crime is being destroyed can be treated as F.I.R. in view of the
71
circumstances of the case.
A mere anonymous telephonic message at police station that firing had taken
place at a Taxi Stand does not constitute an F.I.R. It must show that a cognizable offence
77
has been committed.
From time to time, controversy has been raised, as to at what stage the
investigation commences. That has to be considered and examined on the facts of each
case. Especially when the information of a cognizable offence has been given on
telephone. If the telephonic message is cryptic in nature and the officer in charge,
proceeds to the place of occurrence on basis of that information to find out the details of

Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1566 : 1970 Cri. L.J. 1415: State of U.P. v.
P.A. Madhu. A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1523 : 1984 S.C.C. (Cri.) 598 : 1984 Cri. L.J. 1438: (1984)2
Crimes 222.
Ramesh Baburao Devaskar v. State of Maharashtra, 2007(4) RCR (Criminal) 671 (SC).
Sakha Ram v. State of Maharashtra. 1968 UJ. (S.C) 423: (1969) 2 S.C.C. 730.
Jadish B. Rao v. Government of U.T. of Goa. Daman and Diu, 1976 Cr. L.J. 132(133-134).
Randhir Singh v. State, 1980 Cri. L.J. 1379: Kanyaya Singh v. State, 1974 Cri. L.J. 465; Rebert
Karsan v. State of Gujarat, 1977 Cri. L.J. 107.
72
Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1970 Cri. L.J. 1415 : A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1566.
 17

the nature of the offence itself, then it cannot be said that the information, which has been
received by him on telephonic, shall be deemed to be First Information Report. The
object and purpose of giving such telephone message is not to lodge the First Information
Report, but to request the officer in charge of the police station to reach the place of
occurrence. On the other hand, if the information given on telephone is not cryptic and on
basis of that information, the officer in charge, is prima facie satisfied about the
commission of a cognizable offence and he proceeds from the police station after
recording such information, to investigate such offence then any statement made by any
person in respect of the said offence including about the participants, shall be deemed to
be a statement made by a person to the police officer” in the course of investigation”,
covered by Section 162 of the Code. That statement cannot be treated as First
Information Report. But any telephonic information about commission of a cognizable
offence irrespective of the nature and details of such information cannot be treated as
First information Report.73
A telegram cannot be treated as F.I.R.74 Where messages are transmitted between
Police Offices inter se, the object and purpose in transmitting the message must be
ascertained before any message is labeled as F.I.R. It is only if the object was to narrate
the circumstances of a crime, with a view that the receiving Police Officer might proceed
to investigate thereon, that the message would be F.I.R. But if the message sent was
cryptic because the object was merely to seek instructions from higher Police Officers or
because the object was to send direction for the police force to reach the place of
occurrence immediately or to merely give information to superior Police Officers about
the situation of law and order, the message would not be F.I.R.75
A telephonic message received by police officer or a person in the police station is
only cryptic and anonymous oral message, which, in view of the Court, may not in terms

Ram singh Bavaji Judeja v. State of Gujarat, 1994(1) Crimes 731 (S.C.)
Sarup Singh v. State, 1964(2) Cri. LJ. 718: A.I.R. 1964 Pun. 508: Sailendra Kumar v. Union
Territory of Tripura, 1959 Cri. L.J. 237; A.I.R. 1959 Tripura 11; C.V. Devassi Kutti v. State, 1953
Cri. LJ. 1301; K.S. Nirmal v. State, 1954 Cri. L.J. 678.
75
State of M.P. v. Jagadish. 1992 Cri. L.J;. 981 : 1991(3) Crimes 551(557) D.B.
 18

clearly specify the cognizable offence and, therefore, cannot be treated as F.I.R. as
defined under Sec. 154, Cr. P.C.76
Telephonic or Telegraphic Message Information about a crime intimated to the
Officer-in-charge of a Police Station on Telephone can be considered as FIR in some
cases where there is possibility to obtain the signature of the informant and information is
authentic one. Sometimes an information regarding the cognizable offence may be
intimated to the Officer-in-charge of a Police Station by means of a Telephonic or
Telegraphic message, thus such piece of information constitute a valid first information
report. Since it is not possible to obtain the signature of the informant, on a telephonic or
telegraphic message, it has been held in some cases that such a message cannot be
regarded as an FIR under the law.77
According to law, telephonic call cannot be the basis of FIR, since it lacks
authenticity and it is not a signed document. There is no guarantee as to its genuineness.
Hence, generally, reliance cannot be placed and investigation commenced, unless and
until it is verified by a preliminary inquiry.
If the telephonic message is given by known person who discloses his identity and
it contains all the required facts which can constitute a cognizable offence and is reduced
into writing by officer-in-charge of Police Station it can be treated as FIR. The question
whether the telephonic message can be treated as the FIR is to be decided with reference
to the facts of each case.78
If, in the opinion of officer-in-charge of Police Station receiving telephonic
message or telegram about the commission of cognizable offence, the circumstances
justify action being taken, he should himself lodge first information on the basis of the
telephonic information or telegram. On receipt of telephonic message of commission of
cognizable offence, officer-in-charge of police station may reduced it into writing and
sign it himself in which case it will become FIR.79

Mrs. Savita Kumari v. Union of India, 1993 S.C.C. (Cri.L.J.) 445 : 1993 Cri. L.J. 1590; 1993 All.
C.C. 253; Marudhapandiyan v. State, 1993 Cri. L.J. 1594 : (1993) Mad. LJ. (Cri.) 434.
Devasis Kutty v. State, 1953 Cri. LJ 1301.
1976 CrLLJ 132.
1943 Cri. LJ 157 DB.
 19

According to Section 157 Cr.P.C. an officer-in-charge of Police Station may

proceed with investigation from information received or otherwise i.e. suo motu. If he
does not take any such action, he should make an entry in General Diary.
If the information given on telephone is not cryptic and on the basis of that
information the officer incharge is prima facie satisfied about the commission of a
Cognizable offence and he proceed from the police station after recording such
information to investigate such offence then a Statement made by any person in respect
of such offence including about the participant shall be deemed to be a statement made
by a person to the police officer in the course of investigation covered by Section 162 of
the Code.
In Damodar v. State of Rajasthan,80the Apex court held that “Coming to the
question whether the message received on telephone would be treated as the FIR, the
D.D., entry shows that unknown person had given an information about a vehicle hitting
the deceased. In order to constitute the FIR, the information must reveal commission of
I

an act which is a cognizable offence.

As observed by this court in Ramsingh Bavaji Jadeja v. State of Gujarat,81 the
question as to at what stage the investigation commences has to be considered and
examined on the facts of each case, especially, when the information of an alleged
cognizable offence has been given on telephone. Any telephonic information about
commission of a cognizable offence, if any, irrespective of the nature and details of such
information cannot be treated as First Information Report. If the telephonic message is
i
cryptic in nature and the officer-in-charge, proceeds to the place of occurrence on the
basis of that information to find out the details of the nature of the offence if any, then it
cannot be said that the information which had been received by him on telephone shall be
deemed to be a FIR. The object and purpose of giving such telephonic message is not to
lodge the First Information Report but to make the officer-in-charge of the Police Station
to reach the place of occurrence. On the other hand, if the information given on
telephones is not cryptic and on the basis of that information, the officer incharge is
prima facie, satisfied about the commission of a cognizable offence and he proceeds from

2003(2) ALD (Criminal) 969 (SC).

1994 (2) SCC 685.
 20

the police station after recording such information to investigate such offence then any
statement made by any person in respect of the said offence including about the
participants shall be deemed to be a statement made by a person to police officer in the
course of investigation covered by Section 162 of the Code.”
Telephonic Message entered in General Diary treated as FIR. In State of
Assam v. Muhim Barkataki,82 held that “The information of the incident was received
over telephone message at 7-15 P.M. by the officer-in-charge of Jorhat Police Station
who recorded an entry in the General Diary being G.D. Entry No. 47, dated November 2,
1978 at 7-15 P.M. The Town Sub-Inspector Sri P.K. Khatoniar was immediately deputed
to make local investigation on the spot. Sri P.K. Khatoniar made enquiry and
investigation locally at the spot, arrested accused Muhim Barkataki at the spot and
returned to police station. He then informed the facts of occurrence to the officer-in-
charge of the Police Station who recorded the same under G.D. Entry No. 50 at 8-10 P.M.
On November 3, 1978 at about 7 A.M. one Montu Chandra Dey, nephew of deceased
Nagen dey, lodged ejahar (first information) with Jorhat Police Station. Thereafter
murder and arson cases have been registered against Muhim Barkataki and Dulu Dutta.
The message received over telephone was an information relating to commission
of cognizable offence and same was entered into General Diary of the police station as
Entry No. 47. On the basis of this information the investigation of the case was entrusted
to the town Sub-Inspector Sri Prafulla Kumar Khatoniar with the recording of G.D. Entry
No. 47 and the Investigation Officer fairly progressed with the investigating on that very
night. Subsequent information of Montu Chandra Dey on November 3, 1978 are nothing
but statements during the course of investigation and as such those are hit by S. 162 of
the Criminal Procedure Code. It has, therefore, been held that Ex.5 cannot be recognized
as the first information report of the occurrence. The G.D. Entry No. 47 which is proved
is the first information report of the occurrence.”
Telegraphic message communicated to the Officer-in-Charge of a Police
Station can be treated as FIR. There are conflicting views of the High Court on this
point. Since Telegraphic Message is not signed by the sender it cannot be treated as
authentic document and so it cannot be always treated as FIR. After receiving telegraphic

82
AIR 1987 SC 98; 1987 Crl. LJ 152.
 21

message, the Police Officer must verify the person alleged to have sent it, really sent it
and that he meant to make that report on such verification steps will be taken to write a
proper report under Section 154(1) Cr.P.C.
Anonymous Telephone Message In Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab,84 Apex
court held that anonymous telephone message at police station that a fire had taken place
at a taxi stand, does not by itself clothe it with a character of first information report,
merely because the said information was first in point of time and the said information
had been recorded in the daily diary of the Police Station, by the Police Officer
responding to the telephonic call.
Cryptic Telephonic Message In State of U.P. v. P.A. Madhu,85 it was held that
“The telephonic message was given to the police that firing was going on. The telephonic
message was an extremely cryptic one and could not be regarded as a FIR in any sense of
the term. Secondly, assuming that Gui had given the telephonic message in utter chaos
and confusion when shots after shots were being fired at the deceased, there was no
1

occasion for Gui to have narrated the entire story of the occurrence. Moreover, such
cryptic information on telephone is of no value at all.”
Similarly in the case of Soma Bhai v. State of Gujarat,86 it was held “the
message given to the Surat Police Station was too cryptic to constitute a first information
report within the meaning of Section 154 of Code and meant to be only for the purpose of
getting further instructions. Furthermore, the facts narrated to the P.S.I Patel which was
reduced into writing a few minutes later undoubtedly constitute first information report in
point of time made to the police in which necessary facts were given. In these
circumstances, therefore, we are clearly of the opinion that the telephonic message to the
Police Station at Surat cannot constitute the FIR and the High Court was in error in
treating the FIR lodged in the person as in admissible in evidence.
In Rane Bhavaji Jadeja v. State of Gujarat,87 the Apex Court held that from
time to time, controversy has been raised, as to at what stage investigation commences.
That has to be considered and examined and the facts of each case, especially, when the

83 AIR 195,9 Tripura, page 11.

84 1970 SC (2) SCC 113; AIR 1970 SC 1566
85 AIR 1984 SC 1523; 1984 Crl.LJ 1438.
86 1975 SCC (Crl.) 515; AIR 1975 SC 1453.
87 1994 SCC Crl. 609.
 22

information of a cognizable offence has been given on telephone. If the telephonic

message is cryptic in nature and the officer-in-charge, proceeds to the place of occurrence
on the basis of that information to find out the details of nature of the offence itself, then
it cannot be said that the information, which had been received bv him on telephone, shall
be deemed to be first information report. The object and purpose of giving such
telephonic message is not to lodge the first information report, but to request the officer-
in-charge of the police station to reach the place of occurrence. On the other hand if the
information given on telephone is not cryptic and on basis of that information, the
officer-in-charge is prima facie satisfied about the commission of a cognizable offence
and proceeds from the police station after recording such information to investigate such
offence, then any statement made by any person in respect of the said offence including
about the participants, shall be deemed to be statement made by a person to the police
officer. “In the course of investigation” covered by Section 162 of the Code, that
statement cannot be treated as first information report. But any telephonic information
about commission of a cognizable offence, irrespective of the nature and details of such
f

information cannot be treated as first information report. This can be illustrated. In a busy
market place a murder is committed. Any person in the market including one of the shop
owners telephones to nearest police station informing the officer-in-charge about the
matter, without knowing the details of murder, the accused or the victim. On basis of that
information, the officer-in-charge reaches the place where the offence is alleged to have
been committed.
In Dhanjaya Chatterjee Alias Dhana v. State of West Bengal,88 it was said that
the cryptic telephonic message received at the Police Station from the father of the
deceased had only made police agency run to the place of occurrence and to record the
statement of the mother of the deceased, the investigation commenced thereafter.
In some cases, the information given may be that a person has been shot at or
stabbed. It cannot be said that in such a situation, the moment the officer-in-charge leaves
the Police Station, the investigation has commenced. In normal course he has first to find
out the person who can give the details of offence before such officer is expected to
collect the evidence in respect of the said offence.

88 1984 (2) SCC 220; JT 1994(1) SC 33.

 23

In the present case, the 1.0. having received the telephonic message immediately
reached the hospital and he first recorded the statement of the brother of the deceased.
This statement must be treated as FIR. There is no dispute in that statement the name of
the appellant was mentioned by the brother of the deceased and details of the occurrence
as disclosed by him in court were stated by him. This is apparent because during the
course of cross-examination of the brother of the deceased, his attention has not been
drawn to his statement recorded by the I.O. saying that he did not name the appellant as
the assailant of his brother during his statement to the I.O. It is held that the witness
brother of the deceased immediately after the occurrence made a statement before the
I.O. and named the appellant as the person who gave a knife blow in the chest of the
deceased. According to us, the Sessions Judge as well as the High Court was in error in
treating, the cryptic message given on the telephone by the Head Constable to the officer-
in-charge of Police Station as FIR.
An authentic information- In the case of Moni Mohan v. Emp.89the honourable
court decided that Authentic information is an information that must be capable of being
traced to a specific individual who would take responsibility for the same so that if the
information subsequently turned-out to be false, the informant could be proceeded
• 90
against.
FIR can be of hearsay action FIR can be a hearsay action of the occurrence of a
crime. The rule contained under Section 60 of Evidence Act is that hearsay evidence is
inadmissible, but the FIR under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. is not an evidence.
It is meant to help the police to start investigation of crime. It can be used during
the trial for the purpose of corroborating or contradicting the information. Information
need not have personal knowledge of incident. In Hally and others v. State of M.P.,91
held that “The Report given by Tibhu suffers from a serious infirmity and the Sessions
Court was justified in stating that infirmity as one of the reasons leading to the acquittal
of the appellants. The High Court however refused to attach any importance to the
circumstances that the names of the appellants were not mentioned in the report on the

35 CWN 623; In Re N. Ranga Rajulu, 1958 Crl. LJ 906 Mad.

First Information Report (F.I.R.) by Rajender Mangari, Asia Law House, Hyderabad, 2nd Edition
2005-2006, Page-18.
91
AIR 1974 SC 1936
 24

ground that though it was earliest in point of time, it cannot be treated as the first
information report under section 154 Cr.P.C. as Tibhu had no personal knowledge of the
incident arid the report was based on hearsay evidence. In this view, the High Court
clearly erred for Section 154 Cr.P.C. does not require that the report must be given by a
person who has personal knowledge of the incident reported. The section speaks of
information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence given to an officer-in-
charge of a police station. Tibhu had given such information and it was in consequence of
that information that the investigation had commenced.

(iii) INFORMATION OF MERE ASSEMBLAGE OF SOME PERSONS :

Mere confidential report received by the police that some bad characters have
assembled at a particular place is not F.I.R and is not adequate for registration of a
cognizable offence.

(iv) VAGUE, INDEFINITE AND UNAUTHORISED INFORMATION:

No piece of information which is vague, indefinite and unauthorized can be
recorded as F.I.R. merely because it was received first in point of time. It must relate to
the commission of a cognizable offence.93
A cryptic message meant of being an appeal for immediate relief is not an F.I.R.94
Mere information recorded in general diary that one student has stabbed another student
is not F.I.R.95
Where messages are transmitted between Police Offices inter se, the object and
purpose in transmitting the message must be ascertained before any message is labeled as
F.I.R. It is only in the F.I.R. to narrate the circumstances of a crime, with a view that the
receiving Police officer might proceed to investigate thereon, that the message would be
F.I.R. But if the message sent was cryptic because the object was merely to seek

92 Dwaraka v. State. A.I.R. 1954 All. 106 : 1954 Cri. L.J. 188.
93 Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1566 : 1979 Cri. L.J. 1415; State of Kerala v.
Samuel, A.I.R. 1961 Kerala 99: 1961(1) Cri. L.J. 505; Jay Prakash v. State of Sikkim. 1992 Cri.
L.J. N.O.C. 196 (cal.); Man Mohan v. Emperor, I.L.R. 58 Cal. 1312; Somabhai v. State of Gujarat,
A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1453 : 1975 Cri. LJ. 1201 Sarup Singh v. State, A.I.R. 1964 Pun. 508 ; 1964(2)
Cri. L.J.718.
94 Nemai Adak v, State, A.I.R. 1965 Cal. 89 : 1965(1) Cri. L.J. 160.
95 SatyaNarain v. State ofRajasthan, 1986 Raj. C.C. 41.
 25

instructions from higher Police Officers or because the object was to send direction for
the police force to reach the place of occurrence immediately or to merely give
information to superior Police Officers about the situation of law and order, the message
would not be F.I.R.96 The mere entry in the records of Railway Protection force (R.P.F.)
is not an F.I.R.97

Further cases and points have been explained below:

In these points it has been declared that the information received on different stages is not
First Information Report:
(i) Where an anonymous caller rang-up the Police Station and merely stated that fire had
taken place at Ludhiana Taxi Stand, it was held that the mere fact of this information,
first in point of time did not clothe it with the character of first information report as the
information did not in terms clearly specify a cognizable offence.98
(ii) If the information that was given at the Police Station, though first in point of time,
but did not disclose commission of cognizable offence it was held that the said
information could not be treated as FIR of the case.99
(iii) Whether the first cryptic and any anonymous telephonic call did not clearly specify
the commission of a cognizable offence, it is not FIR.
(iv) Similarly, where someone gave a cryptic telephonic message to the police station that
a fire had taken place without disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence and the
S.I. of Police then proceeded to the spot and took a detailed statement, disclosing
commission of a cognizable offence, it was held by the Apex Court that the subsequent
statement was rightly treated as FIR of the case.100
(v) A statement casually given by an informant to a Sub-Inspector is not FIR.
(vi) A confidential information received by the police that some bad characters were
assembled at a particular place is not FIR.

The State of M.P. v. Jagdish, 1991 (3) Crimes 551 (557) D.B.
B.C. Saxena v. State, 1983 Cri. L.J. 1432.
Tapinder Singh v. State of Punj.1970 Cr.LJ 1415 SC ; AIR 1970 SC 1566 Para 4 of the All India
Report.
Jay Prakash v. State of Sikkim, 982 NOC 196 Cal.
State of U.P. v. P.A. Madhu, 1984 Cr. LJ 1438 SC, Paras 9 and 10 of the Report.
 26

(vii) An information first given to a police officer-in-charge of a police station cannot be

considered as FIR, if it is very vague and indefinite and the police officer is thereby
necessitated to collect more information before starting investigation in such situation
further information given to him would be more appropriately treated as FIR.
(viii) If an officer-in-charge of police station receives information from a person who
came to police station that there was a shooting incident in the house of ‘Z’, it is not FIR.
The police officer should enter that report in the Daily Diary and go to the house of ‘Z’
and record a statement there. If that statement discloses a cognizable offence, that will
become the FIR and not the first report because the first report is very vague and does not
affirm the commission of a cognizable offence.
(ix) A vague confidential information given by a doctor to a police officer-in-charge of a
police station without disclosing the name of the informer cannot become the basis of the
FIR.
(x) A doctor in a hospital informing the police about the arrival of an injured person in
the hospital cannot be considered as FIR, since the doctor’s information is vague and
does not disclose any cognizable offence and other particulars it cannot be considered as
the FIR. No case can be registered on it. The information should be registered in the
Daily Diary and the officer-in-charge of the police station should go to the hospital,
record the statement of the injured then and there get a case registered on such statement.
The second statement made by the injured person becomes the basis of the FIR and not of
the doctor.
(xi) Any statement made to the police officer after starting the investigation will not be
considered as the FIR. In other words, FIR cannot be recorded on the basis of information
obtained during an investigation. It is forbidden by Section 162 of Cr.P.C. Section 162
clause (1) explains that no statement made by any person to a police officer in the course
of an investigation under this chapter of Cr.P.C. i.e. information to the police, etc. and
statements to the police not to be signed, use of statements in evidence.
(xii) Where the complainant gave information about a murder case to a Sub-Inspector of
Police named Mahender Patel at Olpad police station, but the said Sub-Inspector before
reducing the information into writing sought instruction over phone from his parent
police station at Surat, it was held that the cryptic telephonic information which had been
 27

recorded at the Surat police station though a little earlier in point of time could not be
treated as the FIR of the case as the telephonic call was made only for the purpose of
seeking instruction and not for the purpose of undertaking an investigation by the Surat
police.101
It is further held that the information given to S.I. Patel though recorded a little
later, really constituted the FIR of the case. But where the officer-in-charge of a police
station received a telephonic message from Head Constable saying that in a quarrel a
certain person had been grievously injured and the officer-in-charge deputed another
Head Constable in writing to proceed to the spot and do the needful, it was held that the
telephonic message which required the police to take action did constitute the FIR of the
case even though it was not reduced into writing and a subsequent complaint regarding
the same incident was held to be hit by, S. 162 of Cr.P.C. and as such became
inadmissible in evidence.
(xiii) In Pattad Amarapa v. State of Karnataka,102 it was held that:
“The foremost criticism levelled was that Ex. P-1 is hit by S. 162, Cr.P.Code,
because PWs 1 to 5 have stated in their evidence that they told PW-35 at the village itself
the manner in which the occurrence had taken place and that their statements were
reduced to writing. However, PW-35 has categorically denied having questioned the
witnesses or recording their statements at the village on that night. On the other hand, he
has emphatically stated that he recorded the statement of PW-1 only at Yadgir police
station at about 11-45 P.M. and recorded the statements of the other witnesses thereafter,
PW-35, Investigating Officer, had gone to Kawaloor village on that night only on the
basis of some vague information about violence having broken out in the village. He
could not, therefore, have gone prepared to the village to record any statement or to do
any investigation. Moreover, there were no electric lights in the village and this would
have hampered PW-35 in recording any statement even if he had wanted to do so. There
is also a fact that several witnesses had sustained injuries and were in need of treatment.
The anxiety of PW-35 would, therefore, was to take the injured persons to the Hospital
forthwith and have them treated. Moreover in their panic striken state PWs 1 to 5 would

101
Soma Bhai v. State of Gujarat, 1975 CrI. LJ 1201 SC ; AIR 1975 SC 1453.
102
AIR 1989 SC 2004; 1989 Cr. LJ 2167.
 28

not have been able to give cogent and comprehensive statements to PW-35 about the
attack launched on them and the deceased by the assailants. For all these reasons, it
cannot be said that Ex. P-1 was not the earliest statement to be recorded and, hence it is
hit by S. 162, Cr.P. Code.”
(xiv) In State of Bombay v. Rucy Mistry, it was held that if the complaint made by
informant to the police is not first one, it is not the FIR, so it is hit by sections 161 and
162, Cr.P.C. and the Judge should not rely upon it except to the extent permitted by the
Proviso to Sec. 162 i.e., to contradict the informant with reference to any particular
statement therein.

K. Contents of FIR
The FIR must contain as far as possible the following points.
(a) Whether the Informant is an eye-witness or hearsay witness.
(b) The nature of the cognizable offence.
(c) The name and detailed description of the accused person (his colour, height,
approximate age, features, clothing, distinctive marks on his face etc.).
(d) The name and identity of the victim of the crime.
(e) The date and time of the occurrence.
(f) The place where the crime was committed.
(g) The motive for committing the crime.
(h) How the crime was committed (description of the actual occurrence of the crime,
the part played by the each accused and the weapon used by him).
(i) The name and address of the witnesses of the crime.
(j) The date and time of the occurrence.
(k) The place where the crime was committed.
(l) The motive for committing the crime.
(m) How the crime was committed (description of the actual occurrence of the crime,
the part played by the each accused and the weapon used by him).
(n) The name and address of the witnesses of the crime.
(o) The articles taken away by the accused.

103
AIR 1960 SC 391; 1960 Cr. LJ 532.
 29

(p) What traces left behind by the accused, any articles belonging to the accused such
as footwear, footprints, finger prints etc.).
(q) The description of the culprits should be given as far as possible in detail if the
FIR is registered on the statement of eye witnesses. A mistake or doubtful identity
may spoil the case.

L. Second FIR lodged on closure of investigation on first FIR

Two FIRs in respect of same incident—
In Jasjit Singh Bhasin v. State of Punjab104 honorable court decided that two
FIRs cannot be registered in same set of facts. There cannot be two FIRs against the same
accused in respect of the same case. But when there are rival versions in respect of the
same episode, they would normally take shape of two different FIRs and investigation
can be carried by the same investigating agency. The subsequent registration of the FIR
on the basis is of an application under Section 156(3) Cr. P.C. is uncalled for. Where the
applicant wants to add something by way of giving additional facts of the incident and
feels that something is lacking in the previous FIR, it is always open for him to say so in
his statement before the police during the course of investigation. This alone will not
entitle him to register a second FIR regarding the same incident implicating the same
accused.105 Registration of second FIR by Police on basis of complaint does not amount
to abuse of process of Law.106
Krishna was a Class I Officer in the Karnataka Administrative Service. An FIR
was lodged against him under Sections 13(1) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 (PCA) in respect of check period from August 1, 1978 to August 24, 1989.
This was alleged that he had assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. On
August 24, 1989 the Investigating Officer submitted a B report (closure of the
investigation) which was accepted by the Special Judge who directed that the officer’s
properties were to be released.

2006 RCR(Criminal) 814(P&H).

Rajeev Kumar Singh v. State of U.P., 2006 Cri. L.J. 248 (All.); Kari Chaudhary v. Mst. Sita Dev
AIR 2002 SC 441.
Manak Chand v. The State, 1998(3) RCR(Criminal) 181 (Rajasthan).
 30

On July 25, 1995 another FIR was filed against the officer in respect of the period
)m August 1, 1978 to July 25, 1995 under the same provisions of the Prevention of
MTuption Act and making similar allegations. The officer filed a petition U/S. 482 of
r.P.C. in the Karnataka High Court. He contended that the inclusion of the same check
;riod i.e. from August 1, 1978 to; August 24,1989 in the second FIR was not proper and
;nce, the FIR should be quashed.; The High Court dismissed the contention and held that
le second FIR was valid. Aggrieved by this, the officer filed an appeal in the Supreme
hurt. The Supreme Court held that:
“There is no provision in the criminal Procedure Code or the PCA which debars
le filing of an FIR and investigating into the alleged offences merely because there was
n FIR in respect of an earlier period. Thus, the second FIR was valid.
• However the results of the earlier investigation cannot be totally ignored by the
Investigating Agency.
• The assets, which, in the earlier investigation, were valued cannot be valued at a
higher value in the second investigation unless any positive ground is made out
for such revaluation.
Registration of information as second FIR in regard to same incident is not
permissible.107 Earlier FIR filed by petitioner in morning against respondent. Second FIR
about same incident filed in afternoon on same day by respondent against petitioner.
Respondent’s statement that petitioner pelted stones on him but he took treatment at
home instead of going to doctor. Facts and circumstances indicate that second FIR as
fabricated and filed to counter blast earlier FIR. Proceedings, if continued on basis of
fabricated second FIR would result in abuse of Court’s process. Therefore second FIR is
liable to be quashed.108

M. VALUE OF MORE THAN ONE F.I.R.

Where there are three different versions, the earliest statement should be produced
to enable the court to arrive at the real truth in the case.109

2005 Cri L J 2524 (Ori).

2005 CriLJNOC 34(Raj).
Munsar Ali v. U.T. of Tripura, 1964(2) Cri. L.J 209 (216): A.I.R. 1964 Tripura 41.
 31

Where two persons gave information about the same occurrence to two different
police officers at different places, the one which was a little later in point of time, need
not be excluded on the ground that it made during investigation, but must be regarded as
an independent F.I.R.110
Filing of second complaint based on same facts as the first one not to be treated as
FIR and fresh investigation cannot be permitted.111
In case of two F.I.R., the earliest in time is to be treated as F.I.R., as the
subsequent one is hit by Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure.112 But where an
informant give two statement at the police station at different times, the subsequent
statement cannot be accepted as F.I.R. as contemplated by Section 154, Code of Criminal
Procedure.113
An undecorated First Information Report is of a great value because it is the
version of the incident gives at the first available opportunity by the informant and shows
on what material the investigation commenced and what was the story then told. An
F.I.R. recorded without any loss of time is likely to be free form embroideries,
exaggerations and without anybody intermeddling with it and polluting and adulterating
the same with lies. The purpose of F.I.R. is to obtain the earliest account of a cognizable
offence, before there is an opportunity for the circumstance to be forgotten and
embellished. It is well settled that F.I.R. is not a substantive piece of evidence and can be
used to corroborate or contradict the statement of the maker thereof. It is also equally
established that trustworthiness of the prosecution story can also be judged form the
F.I.R. Besides First Information Report is relevant as it may be a part of the res-gestae}u

N. RES-GESTAE- ITS RELEVANT PROVISIONS, EVIDENTIARY VALUE

AND LIMITAITON OF ITS OPERATION
Res-Gestae means series of facts occurred in furtherance of an act committed.
F.I.R. may in certain circumstances be evidence as to the cause of informant’s death or as

TikaRam v. State, A.I.R. 1957 All. 755 : 1957 Cri. L.J. 1200.
2005 Cri L J NOC 36 (Raj)(A).
1989 Cri. LJ. N.O.C. 151 (M.P.).
Bilandi Cushadh v. State, 1951 Pat L.R. 60.
Gulshan Kumar v. State. 1994(1) Crimes 179 (Delhi).
 32

rt of the Res-Gestae pointing to the informant's conduct.115Section 6 of the Evidence

ft enacts the rule which in English text books is treated under the head of Res-gestae.
:ction 6 of the Evidence Act lays down that facts, which though not in issue are so
•nnected with facts in issue as to form part of the same transaction, are relevant,
hether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places.
Illustration (a) under the Section 6 reads as given below:
“A is accused of the murder of B by beating him. Whatever was said or done by
. or B or the by-standers at the beating, or so shortly before or after it as to form part of
le same transaction, is a relevant fact.”
Section 6 appears to provide for proof of statements which are more or less of a
ollateral nature. Not the principle fact, but the subsidiary ones which are so connected
vith the facts in issue as to form part of the same transaction are relevant.116
Further, where the accused gives a spontaneous explanation right at the moment
vhen the crime is committed, the explanation becomes Res Gestae within the meaning of
Section 6.117
Under Section 6, Evidence Act, facts though not in issue but are so connected as
iip

to form part ofthe same transaction are admitted because they form part of Res gestae.
In Sarkars Law of Evidence119 the learned author, after referring to the various
decisions, summarized the law governing the admissibility of declarations accompanying
facts as follows:
(1) The declarations must relate to the act which is in issue or relevant thereto, they
are not admissible merely because they accompany an act. Moreover, the
declarations must relate to and explain the fact they accompany, and not
independent facts previous or subsequent thereto unless such facts are part of the
transaction which is continuous.
(2) The declarations must be substantially contemporaneous with the facts and not
merely the narrative of a past event.

Manna Lai v. State, 1967 Cri. L.J. 1272: A.I.R. 1967 Cal. 478.
Chhotka v. State, A.I.R. 1958 Cal. 482: 1958 Cri. L.J. 1170.
C.N: Peters v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1959 All. 483 : 1959 Cri. L.J. 924.
1972 All. L.J. 10.
13th Edition, page 69.
 33

(3) the declaration and the act may be by the same person, or they may be by
different persons e.g. the declarations of the victim, assailant and by-standers.
(4) Though admissible to explain or corroborate, or to understand the significance of
190
the Act, declarations are not evidence of the truth of the matters stated.
The scope of this Section has been examined by various High Courts and also by
the Supreme Court in Samal Das v. State of Bihar727, is a case where the deceased was
pushed into a room and is alleged to have been killed inside the room. The only evidence
given as to what could have taken place inside the room was with regard to the cries
“Bachao, Bachao” of the victim. These cries were heard by people who were standing
outside including children of the deceased. Their Lordships while considering the
question whether the evidence of the by-standers as to the cries of the children is
admissible, held the evidence of these witnesses about what the children said or did at
that time is admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act. It can be mentioned here that
Section 6 is relating to the relevancy of facts forming part of same transaction.
In Rex v. Christee722, it was laid down that there cannot be any fixed limit of
time and each case must depend upon its own circumstances and a circumstance
subsequent to the Act may be admissible if it is a part of it and not a mere report of the
past occurrence.
The declaration made subsequent to the occurrence is admissible provided it can
be validly assumed that the exciting influence continued. When the question is whether
because of the lapse of time in making a statement before the police, it can be said to be
not contemporaneous, what the courts have to see in such a case is whether there was
i
scope to allow fabrication. In other words, the conditions for admissibility of such a
statement are the proximity of time, the proximity/ distance of police station and the
continuity of action. While examining whether the declaration is connected with the fact
in issue so as to form part of the same transaction, all the surrounding circumstances
obtaining in each case have to be taken into consideration.123

B.Nagaraju v. State of A.P., 1984 Cri. L.J. 674(679): (1983) 2 Andh. L. T. 374(D.B.).
A.I.R. 1974 SC 778 : 1974 Cri. L.J. 664.
1914, AC 545.
Ban Dela Naga Raju v. State of A.P., 1984 Cri. L.J. 674: (1984) A.P.L.J. (H.C.) 38 : (1983)2
Andh. L.T. 374.
 34

Section 6 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule where under the
hearsay evidence becomes admissible. But for bringing such hearsay evidence with the
provisions of Section 6, what is required to be established is that it must be almost
contemporaneous with the acts and there should not be an interval which would allow
fabrication. The statements sought to be admitted, therefore, as forming part of res gestae
must have been made contemporaneously with the acts or immediately thereafter.
Where the evidence of the witness stated that he heard the sound of firing and he
went to the place and found the injured lying on the ground after being hit by a bullet, but
he did not see him being hit by the bullet and when he asked the injured, the injured told
him that his nephew, the accused, hit him with bullet, the Supreme Court held that the
statement of witness, indicating the injured told him that his nephew had fired at him,
would became admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act.124
When assailant has intruded into court yard during dead of night and when victim
has identified such assailant then her pronouncement that the said assailant was standing
with a gun and was firing with gun at her, then such statement of deceased would be
admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act. But when the father of accused
examined as PW1 has allegedly telephoned father of deceased PW21 that accused has
killed deceased and when PW1 did not support case of prosecution during trial and when
there was no finding as to whether information by said PW1 to said PW21 was either at
the time of occurrence (commission of crime) or immediately thereafter so as to form
same transaction, then said utterance of PW1 cannot be considered as relevant under
Section 6 of Evidence Act.126
The principle of law embodied in Section 6 of the Evidence Act is usually known
as the rule of res gestae recognized in English Law. The essence of the doctrine is that a
fact which, though not in issue is so connected with the fact in issue “as to form part of
the same transaction becomes relevant by itself. This rule, roughly speaking, an exception

Sukhar v. State of U.P., 1999(2) Supreme(Cri.) 394: JT 1999(7) SC 537: 1999(8) Supreme 568:
1999(4) Crimes 191: 1999(4) All. Cri. LR 60: AIR 1999 SC 3883: 2000 Cri. LJ 29.
Rattan Singh v. State of H.P., 1997(1) Supreme (Cr.) 4: AIR 1997 SC 768: 1997(4) SCC 161:
1996(8) Supreme 785: 1996(4) Crimes 282 (SC).
Vasa Chandra Shekhar Rao v. Ponna Satyanarayana, 2000(1) Supreme (Cr.) 549: AIR 2000 SC
2138: 2000 Cri. L.J. 3175(SC): 2000(4) Supreme 173: 2000(2) Crimes 328(SC): 2000 SCC (Cr.)
1104.

i
 35

to the general rale that hearsay evidence is not admissible. The rationale in making
certain statement or fact admission under Section 6 of the Evidence Act is on account of
the spontaneity and immediacy/ expediency of such statement or fact in relation to the
fact in issue. But it is necessary^ that such fact or statement must be part of the same
transaction. In other words, such statement must have been made contemporaneous with
the acts which constitute the offence or at least immediately thereafter. But, if there was
an intervaland delay, however, slight it may be which was sufficient enough for
fabrication their the statement is not part of res gestae.
Here, there was some appreciable interval between the acts of incendiaries
indulged in by the miscreants and the Judicial Magistrate recording statement of the
victims. That interval, therefore, blocks the statement from acquiring legitimacy under
Section 6 of the Evidence Act, High Court;-was, therefore, in error in treating Exts. P71
and P75 as forming part of res gestae evidence.127
In a case where a police official committed forcible sexual intercourse with the
prosecutrix in the upper storey of the Police Station, she did not raise any alarm during
rape or thereafter as she was under threat of the accused. The prosecutrix was under
threat and therefore, she had no option but to submit to the lustful demand made by the
accusedj but she disclosed the incident to her mother and sister immediately after the
occurrence. The immediate disclosure of the incident by the prosecutrix to her mother is
relevant and admissible as res gestae, under Section 6 of the Evidence Act.128
In Mahendra v. State of M.P.129, it was held that a transaction may be a single
incident occupying a few minutes or may be spread over to a variety of facts etc.
occupying much longer time and occurring on different occasions.
Where the eyewitnesses testified to have accompanied the victim in the same bus,
they claimed to have seen accused holding country-made pistol and standing near the
scene of occurrence just after the shot, victim was also seen fallen by them in an injured
state and he proclaimed accused to be the author of his injuries, they also claim to have
hotly chased the accused thus testifying about facts which formed part of the same

Gentela Vijaya Vardhan Rao v. State of A.P., 1996(2) Supreme(Cr.) 241: 1996(3) Crimes
197(SC): AIR 1996 SC 2791: 1996 Cri. L.J. 4151: 1996(7) JT491: 1996 SCC (Cr.) 1290.
128
Gulzar Muhamad v. State of H.P., 2008 Cri. L.J. 350(H.P.).
129
1975 Cri. L.J. 110 (PIP): 1974 MPLJ 357: 1974 Jab. LJ234.
 36

transaction their testimony is relevant as res gestae, under Section 6 of the Indian
Evidence Act.130
When the statement made by a non partisan witness that they learnt the names of
the accused from others on the spot is not controverted, then such statement is admissible
under Section 6.131
When the statement made by a by-stander while still under the influence of the ■
principal transaction is admissible as res gestae vide Section 6, Illustration (a), Evidence
Act.132
The word ‘ By-Standers ’ means the persons who are present at the time of beating
and not the persons who gathered on the spot after the beating. 133and in another case it
was decided that the word ‘Bystanders’ means all persons who were present at , the time
i

of incident.134
Explaining when the statements of any standers are admissible as res gestae, it
nr

was observed in Mahendra v. State of M.P , that Section 6 read with illustration (a)
shows that spontaneous statements in the course of transaction are admissible as being as
res gestae. But what is admissible under Section 6 is a fact which is connected with a fact
in issue as part of the transaction. Therefore, only statements of remarks made by
persons who were eye witnesses to the occurrence would be admissible.
In order for a declaration to be admissible as part of the res gestae, it must be the
spontaneous utterance of the mind while under the influence of transaction, the test being
whether the declaration was the facts talking through the party, or the party talking about
the facts.lj6
What a person states during an occurrence in respect of the occurrence itself is
1 37
admissible as res gestae under Section 6 of the Evidence Act.

Hari alias Satyapal v. State of U.P., 1983 Cri. L.J. N.O.C. 62(AU.): 1983 All. Cri. R. 283(DB):
1983 All. C.C. 22(Sum).
1984 Cri. L.J. N.O.C. 45( Gau.).
Bijal Singh Dangal v. State, 1956 Cri. L.J. 897: AIR 1956 M.B. 170.
Nasiruddin v. Emperor, 46 Cri. L.J. 1945 page 431(Lah.).
Ban Dela Nagaraju v. State of A.P., 1984 Cri. LJ. 674(679): (1984) 2 R.E.C. Cri. R. 114: (1981)2
Andh. LT. 374; Bhaskaran v. State of Kerala, 1985 Cri. L.J. 1711.
1975 Cri. L.J. 110: 1974 MP LJ 357: 1974 Jab LJ 234.
Kameshwar Pd Singh v. Rex, 1951 A.L.J. 149; Bhaskaran v. State of Kerala, 1985 Cri. LJ.1711.
Khijiruddin v. Emperor, 27 Cri. LJ 266: 92 I.C. 442.
 37

Where the transaction is a single incident, a statement by a person who perceived

the incident made simultaneously with occurrence of the incident may be said to be part
of the transaction inasmuch as it is the result of a spontaneous psychological reaction
through perception.138
The declarations in order that they might be admissible as Res gestate should be
contemporaneous with transaction in issue, that is, the interval should not be such as to
give time or opportunity for fabrication, and they should not amount to a mere narrative
of a past occurrence. They are admitted when they appear to have been made under the
immediate influence of some principal transaction relevant to the issue are and to be
connected with it as to characterize or explain it. A bare statement of the complainant
made to another after the complaint to the police has been made is not admissible.139
Similarly where the accused inflicts injuries on the person of the deceased
resulting in fracture of his ribs, and the deceased when questioned, soon after, states that
it was the accused, who inflicted the injuries, the statement is admissible under this
section, as it was made by deceased very shortly after he sustained injuries.140
A first information report may be admissible as part of the informant’s conduct,141
or as one of Res-gestae.142
When the accused gives a spontaneous explanation right at the moment the crime
is committed, the explanation becomes Res-gestae.143
Voluntary statement by accused immediately after arrest is admissible against
accused; it provides a chain of circumstances regarding conspiracy.144
The statements which are a part of the Res-gestae may be admissible under
Section 145 or Section 157, Indian Evidence Act to contradict or to corroborate the
testimony of its maker in Court.145
What a prosecution witness said at or about the time of occurrence is a part of
Res-gestae and can be used as corroborative evidence of her own testimony.146

Hadu v. State, AIR 1951 Orissa 53.

Noor Mohd. V. Imtiaz, 43 Cri. L.J. 280 : 1971 I.C. 830.
Krishna Ram v. State. 1964(1) Cri. LJ. 393.
Azimaddy, 28 Cri. L.J. 99.
Mania Singh v. Emperor, 32 Cri. L.J. 522.
Peters v. State, 1959 Cri, L.J. 924.
State of Bihar v. Param Hans Yadav, 1986 P.L.J.R. 688.
Naga San Pu v. Emperor, 19 Cri. UJ. 155 : 431 I.C. 443.
Santa Bala Desi v. Sahib Bhushan Das, 1953 Cri. L.J. 748.
 38

Section 6 of the Evidence Act pertains to the doctrine of res gestae. This doctrine
is an exception to the hearsay rule. Facts which may be proved, as part of res gestae,
must be facts other than those in issue. Furthermore, these facts must form part of that
very transaction and be thus connected with the facts in issue. Evidence regarding facts in
issue disclosed by a transaction can be given u/s. 5 whereas evidence regarding said facts
which must be connected with the facts in issue in a manner so as to form part of the
same transaction can be given under S. 6.
It is well settled by now that a statement, in order to be a part of res gestae must
have been made substantially contemporaneously with the act or immediately after it so
that there is no opportunity for reflection or fabrication. It is in this background that the
interval between the act and the statement assumes significance. In no case, the statement
should be in the nature of a mere declaration or narration of a past event.
I
The word transaction has not been defined in the Evidence Act, but it can be
equated to a crime so far as a criminal case is concerned. Each essential ingredient of that
crime will be a fact in issue and those facts which are connected with the fact in forming
part of the same transaction should be relevant as res gestae.
In the instant case, Mangla Devi was indisputably present when the incident took
place. She watched helplessly Kamla burning. According to the above-named three
witnesses, she was found immediately thereafter running in the Bazar crying for help and
informing those persons that Thakur Das had set Kamla on fire by pouring Kerosene oil
on her. Manifestly, the time gap between the act of burning and her running into Bazar
and crying for help is not only insignificant, but her coming to the Bazar and crying for
help for the reasons given by her can be safely classified as a fact so connected with the
fact in issue (viz. Thakur Dass having poured kerosene oil on Kamla and set her on fire),
as to form part of the same transaction. The statement of these witnesses is, therefore,
clearly relevant u/s. 6 of the Evidence Act and carry much evidentiary value.147
While explaining the legal position as to the right of informant to take the matter
to the police by lodging F.I.R. or to the court direct, by filing complaint, the Andhra
Pradesh High Court has held that both the courses under section 154 and under section
200 (Examination of complainant) Code of Criminal Procedure are open and available to

147
Thakur Dass v. State of H.P., 1992 Cri. L.J. 2415.
 39

a private citizen and, therefore, simply because there is a right under section 154 of the
said Code, consequent upon which the police would investigate, it cannot be said that the
148
right under Section 200 is not available for purposes of taking recourse.
Where the deceased-wife was set ablaze by her husband, told her brother, a
witness to the occurrence, that “run away, he (her husband) has put fire to me”. Her
brother was an eyewitness to the occurrence and those words were more in the nature of
forming part of the same transaction and cause and effect of the fact in issue and thus
covered by Section. 6 and 7 of the Indian Evidence Act.149
Where the witness stated that he was in the Gali where he heard the alarm and
sound of gunfire, and when he reached near the door of his house his niece told him that
the appellant had shot her aunt. That evidence was admissible under Section 6 of the Act.
It is fully covered by illustration (a) to Section 6. So, he was a truthful witness and his
testimony was entitled to full weight.150
To form a particular statement as part of the same transaction, utterance must be
simultaneous with the incident, or soon after it so as to make it reasonably certain that the
!
speaker is still under stress of excitement in respect of the transaction in question. In the
absence of any such material utterances by the accused that he kills some one cannot be
1 c1
considered as relevant under section 6 of the Evidence Act.
When a witness has stated that he was in the Gali when he heard the alarm and
]

sound of gun and when he reached near the door of his house. Tahira Bibi came out in a
very disturbed condition and said that the appellant had shot her aunt, and then this
evidence is admissible under section 6 of the Evidence Act. Narrating about the
i
incident after and some time has been elapsed; it is not to be treated as res-gestae. It has
been explained in the case of Smt. Chandra Kala v. Ram Kishan153 that Complainants
conduct in narrating about incident to his colleagues is not res-gestae and hence
inadmissible under Section 157 of the Evidence Act.

Polvarapu Jagadisharao v. Konda Paturi Venkatesh Worlu, 1991 Cri. L.J. 1419(1421) A.P.: (1991)
1A.P.L.J.71.
Capt. Radhey Shyam v. State of U.P., 1993 Cri. L.J. 3709 (3713): 1993 All. Cri. R. 124 (All.).
Mohd. Islam v. State of U.P., 1993 Cri. L.J. 1736(1744) (All.).
Jadumani Khondi v. State, 1993 Cri. L.J. 2701 (Orissa) D.B.
Ranmal Samat v. State of Gujarat, 1993 Cri. L.J. 1734 (S.C.).
1985 Cri. L.J. 1490 : A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 268.

A
 40

The place where a murder was committed was occupied by a number of persons
besides the deceased and the eye-witness. The evidence showed that these persons came
up immediately after the murder and it was alleged that they were informed by the eye
witnesses as to who were the culprits. It was held that though those persons did not
actually see the culprits, their evidence was not material, not with a view to prove the
actual fact of murder, which was in ‘issue’ but to prove the relevant fact that, just after
the event, the eyewitnesses disclosed the names of the culprits to those who came there,
this relevant fact being so connected with the facts in issue as to have necessitated the
giving of evidence on that relevant fact itself.154
Where the witnesses stated that they not only saw but also relied on the statements
of her persons made immediately after the occurrence that the accused was the assailant,
the Supreme Court ruled that even if it were taken that the witnesses relied on the
statements of other persons made at the scene immediately after the occurrence, the
evidence was admissible as that of a relevant fact.155
Statements of remarks made by eye witnesses would be admissible under Section
6, Evidence Act but the statement of a person who had come afterwards to the effect that
persons at the spot were saying that the accused had killed the deceased would not be
admissible as it would be only hearsay.156
Where a minor married girl was abducted and soon after her recovery stated that
the accused had run away with her ornaments, held, this statement was admissible under
t

Section 6, Evidence Act. But where a ravished girl made a statement to her mother
after the transaction was over and the perpetrator had gone away and the girl came away
from the place of occurrence to her mother’s house, her statement does not form part of
the transaction of the rape.158
Mention in F.I.R. that kidnapped girl is telling the name of the accused as
kidnapper is admissible as Res-gestae.159

Mehendra Pal v. State, 1955 Cri. L.J. 892 : A.I.R. 1955 All. 328.
Jetha Ram v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 22 : 1978 S.C.C (Cri.) 561.
Mehendra v. State of M.P., 1975 Cri. L.J. 110.
Ram Das Chhedi v. State, 1972 Cri. L.J. 57 (All.).
Sri Hari Swarankar v. Emperor. 31 Cri. L.J. 1930 page 656.
1984 All Cri. R. 162.
 41

Declarations or shouts accompanying the acts that were being committed, but
neither earlier to the act nor after the act, have been held to be admissible in evidence.160
When the witness came out he saw the accused running with an axe in his hand
and the witnesses giving him chase, then even if the part of recognizing the accused is
described, his further statement that every one was shouting the name of accused, the
man who has killed, will be admissible under section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act, as
res-gestae.161
When the deceased made the statement that the accused was standing with gun
firing at her and when the act of the said accused intruding into the courtyard during dead
of night and when the accused identified the assailant then her aforesaid statement the
accused appellant was standing with a gun and his firing the gun at her, are all
circumstances so intertwined with each other by proximity of time and space that the
statement of the deceased became part of the same transaction hence it is admissible
under Section 6 of the evidence Act. Tape recorded conversation is admissible in
1
evidence as “Res-gestae”.
Section 6 of the evidence Act is an exception to the hearsay rule and admits of
certain carefully safeguarded and limited exceptions and makes the statement admissible
when such statements are proved to form a part of the res gestae, to form a particular
statement as a part of the same transaction or with the incident or soon thereafter so as to
i

make it reasonably certain that the speaker is still under stress of excitement in respect of
the transaction in question. In absence of a finding as to whether the information by PW 1
to PW 21 that accused has killed the deceased, was either of the time of commission of
the crime or immediately thereafter, so as to form the same transaction, such utterances
by PW 1 cannot be considered as relevant under Section 6 of the Evidence Act. In this
state of affairs, it may not be proper to accept that part of the statement of PW 21 and the
said circumstance cannot be held to have been established.164

M.P. Jairaj v. State of Karnataka, 1980 Cri. L.J. N.O.C. 13 (D.B.).

Satish v. State of U.P., 1991(3) Crimes 545(548): 1991 All. C.C. 607(610) All. (Para 10).
Rattan Singh v. State of H.P., 1997(1) Supreme (Cr.)4: AIR 1997 SC 768; 1997(4) SCC 161:
1996(8) Supreme 785: 1996(4) Crimes 282 (SC).
R.M. Malkam v. State of Maharashtra, (1972)2 S.C.W.R. 776.
Vasa Chandra Shekhar Rao v. Ponna Satyanarayana, 2000(2) Crimes 328: 2000 Cri. L.J. 3173:
2000(41) All. Cri. C. 210 : 2000 SCC (Cri.) 1104: AIR 2000 SC 2138: 2000 (28) All. Cri. R.
1623.
 42

The statement or declaration would be relevant and admissible as Res-gestae

under Section 6. Evidence Act read with illustration (a) thereof only if it was that of a
person who had seen the actual occurrence and uttered it spontaneously and
simultaneously with the incident or so soon thereafter as to make reasonably certain that
the speaker was still under the stress of the excitement caused by his having seen the
incident. A mere narration about a prior event would not be covered by the provision.
Similarly statement by persons other than the one who witnessed it would be only
hearsay.165
To constitute “same transaction” the series of acts should be so connected as to
form the same transaction. The proximity of time is a significant factor. Whether the
statement made by a witness was a part of the same transaction or not is to be considered
in the light of the circumstances of each case, the principle is that it should be so
intimately connected with the fact in issue as to be a spontaneous utterance inspired by
the excitement of the occasion or a spontaneous reaction thereof, there being no
opportunity for deliberately fabricating the statement.166

O. Section 173(8) of Cr.PC, 1973

Nothing in this Section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in
respect of an offence after a report under sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the
Magistrate and where upon such investigation, the officer in charge of the police station
obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further
report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed and the provisions of
sub-sections(2) (6) of section 173 shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such
|
report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2).
In Nirmal Singh Kahlon V. State of Punjab.167 the honorable Supreme Court
decided that In the instant case, the First Information Report lodged at the instance of the
vigilance Officer Shows that the same Was general in nature. One of the several
allegations contained therein was that irregularities have been committed in the mater of

165
Bhaskaran v. State of Kerala, 1985 Cri. L.J. 1711.
166
Pratap Singh v. State of M.P., 1971 Cri. L.J. 172(174).
167
AIR 2009 SUPREME COURT 985.
 ■ • 43

recruitment of Panchayat Secretaries. No detail, however, was furnished. All the persons
involved were not . named. What types of irregularities have been committed were not
stated. The High Court while entertaining the writ petition filed by the candidates
alleging scam in recruitment formed a prima facie opinion as regards the systematic
commission of fraud. While dismissing the writ petition filed by the selected candidates,
it initiated a suo motu public interest litigation. Since it involved investigation into the
allegations of commission of fraud in a systematic manner, it had a wide ramification as a
former Minister of the State is said to be involved. The High Court directed the
investigation by the C.B.I. The second F.I.R. lodged by the Central Bureau of
Investigation (CBI), was on a wider canvass. It was lodged after holding a detailed
preliminary inquiry. CBI collected a large number of materials. It had also recorded the
i
statements of a large number of persons.. Whereas the first FIR thus, contained the
misdeeds of individuals, the second one depicts a crime committed in course of selection
process of Panchayat Secretaries involving a large number of officers.
Held, if in a situation of this nature, lodging of the second FIR was not
impermissible in law, the main plea that whereas in terms of S. 173 (8) of Cr.P.C. further
investigation is permissible, re-investigation is not, takes a back seat.
The Second FIR would be maintainable not only because there were different
versions but when new discovery is made on factual foundations. Discoveries may be
made by the police authorities at a subsequent stage. Discovery about a large conspiracy
can also surface in another proceeding, as for example, in a case of this nature. If the
police authorities did not make a fair investigation and left out conspiracy aspect of the
matter from the purview of its investigation as and when the same surfaced, it was open
to the State and/or the High Court to direct investigation in respect of an offence which is
distinct and separate from one for which the FIR had already been lodged.
The State Government and the High Court had proceeded on the basis that the
investigation was to be handed over to the CBI. The High Court came to know thereof
only when application for modification was filed. It may be true that the High Court
proceeded on the basis that although the CBI had lodged the FIR, the same would be
deemed to have been lodged only for the purpose of carrying out further investigation,
but, its conclusions are correct in facts and circumstances.
 44

P. Encounters and FIR

In K.G. Kannabiran v. The Chief Secretary, Govt, of A.P. and others,168 held
that it goes with the duty of police and needs no reiteration that every case of homicide in
whatever circumstances it occurs has to be registered as a case for investigation and the
police said reason is duty bound to make all efforts to secure the identification of the
victim of the homicide.
The facts of the case are that “Sri K.G. Kannabhiran, learned Advocate has made
an oral application to the Court and referred to a news item in the morning edition of the
city dated 27-7-1995 of the ‘Indian Express’ newspaper which is as follows:
“Hyderabad - An unidentified Peoples’ War Group (PWG) Naxalite was shot
dead by the police in an alleged encounter near Ashoknagar under Musheerabad police
limits late on Wednesday night.
According to the information available, a special police party from Warangal
district went to a house at Achailahnagar where PWG Naxalites were believed to be
hiding. On spotting a Naxalite in the house, they asked him to surrender. When they tried
to force their way in, the latter opened fire. In the return of fire, the police killed the
Naxal on the spot.”
Sri Kannabhiran has pointed out that he has information that Sri T.
Madhusudanraj Yadav, a Trade Union leader is reportedly missing since the alleged
encounter and his wife and other members of the family would like to identify the body
3f the alleged unidentified Peoples’ War Group Naxalite. He has expressed apprehension
hat the body of the victim of the alleged encounter would be disposed of without any
ittempt by the police or any other authority to establish its identity and if that they do,
here is a change of Sri T. Madhusudanraj Yadav being the victim whose body would be
lisposed of without any opportunity to his family members to identify and establish his
dentity. Sri K.G. Kannabhiran has also stated that the oral application shall be
upplemented by a regular application in writing in a accordance with the requirements of
hie Rules framed by this Court, but there may be some procedural delay in making a
egular application and according to him, the Court should urgently intervene and direct

iS 1995(2) ALT (Crl.) 490 (DB) A'P.

 45

the Director General of Police, Andhra Pradesh, the Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad
City and the Superintendent of Gandhi Medical Hospital, Secunderabad not to dispose of
the body to intervene with it except the post-mortem examination and permit Smt.
Swama, wife of Sri T. Madhusudanraj Yadav and Dr. neelakantha Raja Yadav the father
of the victim Sri T. madhusudanraj Yadav, to identify the body which is kept in the
Mortuary of Gandhi Medical Hospital, Secunderabad. Sri K.G. Kannabhiran has also
sought permission to accompany: Smt. Swama and Sri T. Neelakantha Raj Yadav, the
wife and father of the victim Sri T. Madhusudanraj Yadav.
It goes with the duty of the police and it needs no reiteration that every case of
homicide in whatever circumstances it occurs has to be registered as a case for
investigation and the police for the said reason is duty-bound to make all efforts to secure
the identification of the victim of the homicide. Since no formal application has been
made and there is no appearance before us of any person on behalf of the State, it is not
possible for us to know whether police has registered a case and has taken steps to secure
the identification of the victim of the homicide or not. We, however, see justification in
the prayer made on behalf Smt. Swama and Sri T. Neelakantha Raj Yadav and the
submissions of Sri K.G. Kannabhiran for immediate order of the Court.
(1) that the Director General of Police, Andhra Pradesh and the Commissioner of
Police, City of Hyderabad, shall ensure that the body of the alleged Naxalite which is
kept in the mortuary in Gandhi Medical Hospital, Secunderabad, is not interfered with
and kept in the mortuary until Smt. Swama and Sri T. Neelakantha Raj Yadav the wife
and father of Sri T. Madhusudanraj Yadav, are permitted to see the dead body and
accordingly identify whether the dead body is of Sri T. Madhusudanraj Yadav or of some
other person;
(2) that the Superintendent, Gandhi Medical Hospital, Secunderabad, is directed
to keep the dead body of the alleged naxalite in the mortuary and not to permit anyone to
remove the body from the mortuary until further orders of the Court; and
(3) Sri K.G. Kannabhiran, Advocate, is permitted to accompany Smt. Swarna and
Sri T. Neelakantha Raj Yadav and be present at the time of the identification of the dead
body by them.
 46

Let the case be numbered as writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India and the report in the newspaper mentioned extracted as a part of the petition besides
the oral application contents of which have been recorded by us above, and post for
further orders tomorrow, i.e., 28-7-1995.
Let the copy of the order be handed over to Sri K.G. Kannabhiran, learned
Advocate.
Let the order be communicated to the Director General Police, Andhra Pradesh,
the Commissioner of Police, City of Hyderabad and the Superintendent, Gandhi Medical
Hospital, Secunderabad, by wireless and confirmed by the Registrar by any other means
of communication.”

R. INFORMATION AND VAGUE RUMOUR

Cryptic and Vague FIR cannot be considered as an FIR. In case the FIR is given
on telephone and the person/ informant does not disclose his/ her identity, then in such
cases whether the FIR should be considered as cryptic and therefore, inadmissible is a
moot question.169 The rule of law is, if a general law is broken, any person has a right to
complain, whether he has personally suffered injury or not. Every crime committed is
considered as an offence against the entire society so every member of society has right
to inform the State through police officer representing the State.
Officer-in-charge of a Police Station, is, however not bound to treat a rumour or
piece of vague or indefinite information as the FIR. The information must not only
disclose a cognizable offence but be capable of being traced to a specific individual who
vould take the responsibility for the same, so that should the information subsequently
urn-out to be false, the informant could be proceeded against.170
In Buli Devi case,171 whether the information received and entered in the General
Diary by the Offieer-in-charge of the Police Station, merely disclosed that “some person
n the village Kishore Prasad had been killed”, it was held a subsequent information

59 “First Information Report (FIR): A Critical study of section 154 of Criminal Procedure Code,
1973” by Ankita Lai, Criminal Law Journal, 2004 page 353 on p.359.
70 Moni Mohan v. Emp, 35 CWN 623 In re N. Ranga Rajulu, 1958 Crl. LJ 906 (Mad.). Buli Devi v.
State, 1963(2) Crl.LJ 470 Orissa.
'* 1963(2) Crl.LJ 470 Orissa.
 47 /

received at the place of occurrence giving definite information would be treated as FIR.
Similarly, the mere information that some murder has taken place in the village without
disclosing the name of it, not any other fact and circumstance, was held to be vague
information which could not be treated as FIR.172 Similarly, information to the effect that
some unknown person was lying unconscious or some offence had been or was being
1 "70

committed could not be regarded as the FIR.

In order to constitute FIR,: the information must be a definite one relating to the
commission of cognizable offence. Whether an information is one under Sec. 154 Cr.P.C.
is a question of fact, it is not open to the officer-in-charge of a police station to treat it as
such or not.

S. RESEARCH METHODOLGY
Research is to bring in light the present situation about the topic which has been
lacked contemporary value and there is need to bring the same in present context. In
research endeavor one has to touch every aspect relating to the research topic. Doctrinal
method of research has been opted; doctrinal research is concerned with the formulation
i

of legal ‘doctrines’ through the analysis of legal rules. Within the common law
jurisdictions legal rules are found within statutes and cases decided by the honorable
courts. In the preset research work an attempt has been made to cover latest case law.
Doctrinal research is, therefore, concerned with the discovery and development of legal
doctrines for publication in textbooks or journal articles and its research questions take
the form of asking ‘what is the law?’ relating to the topic and in particular context.
Research is an endless process. It continues in one form or another.

T. REVIEW
In this chapter, an attempt has been made to understand the meaning, object,
importance, essentials relating to FIR. It is a written document prepared by the Police in
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Japan when they receive information about the
commission of a cognizable offence. The expression, First Information or First
Information Report is not defined in the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) 1973, but

172
Raj Mandal Takur v. State of Bihar, 1993, Crl. LJ 1090, Patna.
173
Retamappa’ case, 1966 Crl. LJ 565 (569-70 Mysore).
 48

these words are always understood to mean, Information recorded under Section 154(1)
of Cr.P.C. Information received on telephone is to be treated as FIR. Thus, we find that
authentic information has to be written by the Officer-in-Charge of the Police Station,
irrespective of the information being received by telephone or by any other means.
Recent trends allow that the FIR may be written through e-mail, SMS or by telephone.

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