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Journal of Egyptian Archaeology
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9
1 This lecture was delivered on March 11, 1913, not from a manuscript but from short notes; nor
did I then suppose that it was to be published in full. In writing it out from my notes some months
later, I have had to shorten it by omitting most of what was said about the Hittites. It is not
worth while to repeat this part without the photographic illustrations of Carchemish, shown during the
delivery, but not allowed to be published till the official account of the excavations is issued by the
British Museum. D. G. H.
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10 EGYPTIAN EMPIRE IN ASIA
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EGYPTIAN EMPIRE IN ASIA 11
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12 EGYPTIAN EMPIRE IN ASIA
him proof. But I repeat that northwards from Kadesh, which Thothmes seems not
to have meddled with before his forty-second year, and then merely to have blackmailed,
the Egyptian position seems to me to have been imperial only in the third degree, not
secured by either permanent garrisons or even indirect representatives in the governorate.
North middle, and north Syria were not more incorporated in the Egyptian dominion
than, say, Afghanistan is in the British. I will state presently a reason based on
Syrian exploration for thus reducing to narrow limits what others (for example so
sound an authority as Mr H. R. Hall) have held to have been a wider Egyptian
Empire of a higher degree, in the time of Thothmnes III.
Such as it was, this somewhat ill-defined and loosely knit empire survived intact
through the reigns of three successors of Thothmes, and gathered strength by the mere
influence of use and wont. Under Amenhetep III Syria seems to have lain quiescent
from end to end; we hear of no Egyptian raids into any part, but on the contrary of
unimpeded relations between the Nile and Mesopotamia and of much peaceful intercourse
illustrated by the initiation of an attempt to assimilate the Syrians to the Egyptians
through education of the princely youth of the former on the Nile. Such attempts
have often been repeated by imperial powers since. Rome tried them; the Ottoman
power has tried them; France has tried them; we and Russia try them still. None
has met with much success. The young bear, once returned to his native hills, remembers
some of the tricks which his captors have taught him, but remembers them with no
sort of gratitude.
Certainly the experiment bore little fruit for Amenhetep's successor. From the
first years of the reign of Akhenaten the decline of the Asiatic Empire of Egypt
began. Thanks to the Amarna Letters we can follow the foreign relations of Egypt in
this period more closely than in almost any other. But that story of cities falling away
one after another because Amenhetep IV no longer maintained garrisons or even sent
an occasional expeditionary force; of native governors, after vain appeals, electing for
his enemies; of new powers growing unchecked in the north and centre, is well known
to you. Perhaps however the decline is laid too much to the charge of Akhenaten
himself, and too little to that of his predecessors. It is more surprising that an empire
so weakly organized, so dependent on mercenary swords and indirect representatives,
should have survived four reigns than that it should have collapsed in the fifth.
Egypt won and held her Asiatic dominion only in an interval between the collapse
of elder Asiatic powers and the rise of younger ones. When Thothmes III marched
through Syria there was none stronger than the weak Kassite monarchy, and the
inconsiderable power of Mitanni to dispute his path. The Hatti, who had ruined the
elder Dynasty of Babylon, had retired to Cappadocia and were not yet ready to emerge
again. Assyria was growing but not yet grown. The Aramaean wave of Arabian
Semites was only beginning to flow northward and westward. A hundred years later
the Hatti had found a strong dynasty to lead south again; Assyria was become a power
prepared to dispute the west with them, and had made a mighty effort under Shalmaneser I
to cut their southward path: the Aramaeans had coalesced into a settled state about
Damascus. Each of these powers was more strongly planted in Asia than Egypt at
her strongest, and swiftly and inevitably the Egyptian fell back into Africa. By the
time Horemheb sat on the throne of the Pharaohs, the former foreign empire of Egypt
had reverted to Asiatic hands. It was not, of course, lost for ever. The next Dynasty of
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EGYPTIAN EMPIRE IN ASIA 13
Pharaohs would regain all the provinces that their predecessors had h
the second degree, i.e. Palestine and south Phoenicia, and would re-asse
claim in the south of the northern province. But it would be an interm
momentary revival. If that can be said of the Asiatic Empire of Seti I
still more truly may it be said of occasional later excursions made by
into Palestine from'the tenth to the eighth centuries. In fact what su
Osorkon I, Shabaka and Tirhakah did in Asia can hardly be said to have created an
Empire of any degree. What finally the first Ptolemies did there we need not take
into account to-day: for, although all that they seized and held in Syria and of Asia
Minor became constituted Empire of the first degree, it was really not Egyptian but
Greek Empire taken and held not directly from the Egyptian land, but from the
Greeks' element, the sea. If we try to estimate what Egyptian Empire meant, what
effect it had on its lords and subjects, it is the Empire of the Eighteenth Dynasty
which has to be considered.
What effects of it do we trace on the culture of Egypt and on the culture of We
Asia respectively? On the first a very considerable effect; on the second so little that
on present evidence, we have hardly any choice but to presume the Empire to have be
only in very small measure administered or garrisoned by Egyptians even in south Sy
while in the northern "province" there can hardly have been any permanent Egyptian
element whatever.
In Egypt, as all students of Egyptology agree, the greatest change in culture took
place in the latter part of the reign of Thothmes III. Fabrics, forms, decoration, which
had been developing evenly and continuously since the Old Kingdom, suddenly felt a new
influence and either advanced or declined per saltum. New ones appeared, and in their
company there was a rush of foreign products, many of which can be ascribed with
certainty and some with probability, to a Syrian origin, while others again were due to
importation or to influence from the East Mediterranean (or "Aegean") culture. Non-
Egyptian names become frequent on monuments, and non-Egyptian ideas begin to
germinate in Egyptian soil. The social apparatus grows quickly to an unprecedented
height of luxury, while at the same time we note a social development which in the history
of nations has often been concomitant with a sudden increase of wealth, and is always
significant of it, namely, a rapidly growing use of mercenary alien, rather than native,
soldiery to uphold national interests. That the root and fostering influence of these
changes is to be sought in the imperial expansion resultant on Thothmes' Asiatic conquests
admits of no question. What the Egyptians had learned and seen in Asia, what their
raiding armies had brought back, what came to the Nile as tribute from native princes
and indirect representatives in Syria, what came from further Asia and the Aegean in
the course of trade along roads long closed-all these novelties combined to affect
Egyptian culture rapidly and profoundly.
Upon Syria, on the other hand, so far as we can tell from the exploration of sites
which were important throughout the period of the Eighteenth Dynasty, no comparable
reciprocal influence was exerted at that time by Egypt. Several such sites in the
Philistine country have been examined, chiefly by the enterprise of the Palestine
Exploration Fund. Of these Gezer is the most informing, because its results have been
by far the most completely published; but Tells' Hesy, Mutesellim, Zakaria and others
have also much to tell us. At all, and especially at Gezer, a great number of objects
Journ. of Egypt. Arch. I. B
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14 EGYPTIAN EMPIRE IN ASIA
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EGYPTIAN EMPIRE IN ASIA 15
more highly developed, much more potent than Syrian culture. Its influence might have
been expected to leave a wider and deeper mark on Syria than was left by any reciprocal
Syrian influence on Egypt. Yet, on the contrary, it has left much less mark. The one
explanation I can suggest is that far fewer agents of Egyptian culture were active in
Syria, than agents of Syrian culture in Egypt-that is to say, while numbers of Asiatics
flocked to and resided in Egypt under the Eighteenth Dynasty, very few Egyptians stayed
in their Syrian Empire, and those few were not of the commercial class. We must
conclude that after the first conquest the Egyptians were content to hold per alios, and
were not to be seduced by the possession of foreign territories from their traditional home-
keeping particularism, and their distaste for foreign adventure or trade.
In fact the cultural effect of the Eighteenth Dynasty Empire particularly illustrates
what I venture to propound as a historical generalisation-that, at all periods, Egyptian
culture remained without influence on the general progress of the world, unless agents
from without visited Egypt to learn of it on the spot. The Egyptians themselves did
nothing to disseminate it abroad. They were not adventurers, they were not traders.
They had not the instincts of an imperial people. The periods during which we find the
influence of Egyptian culture spread wide and far afield are four in history, separated
by other periods more or less long, during which it seems to have shrunk back to tihe
Nile. The four are the Late Minoan (sixteenth and fifteenth centuries B.C.), the Later
Assyrian (tenth to seventh centuries), and the Ptolemaic and Roman periods (together third
century B.C. to sixth century A.D.). In the whole or part of two of these Egypt was
subject to external powers; in one dominated by a foreign dynasty with intitmate
Mediterranean relations. In the fourth and earliest of the periods we do not know the
political conditions; but certainly Egypt, though she had Asiatic Empire then, had none
over Crete and neither troops nor agents in Cyprus. Nevertheless these two islands
between them have yielded more Egyptian Eighteenth Dynastyv objects than all Syria.
There could hardly be a better illustration of my contention that Egyptian civilization did
not follow the flag.
It has been the fashion, since the discovery of many Egyptian and Egyptianizing
objects in Aegean strata, whether in the islands or on the Greek mainland, to discredit the
previously accepted maxim that the Egyptians were a closely exclusive and home-keeping
people: and narratives of Egyptian travellers and the diplomatic correspondence between
Egypt and Asiatic localities have been adduced to support a correction of the old idea.
I venture, however, to think the old idea is still sound and good, and that the new
Aegean evidence confirms, not corrects, it. For while, as I have maintained already,
the diplomatic correspondence in question does not prove the residence of actual Egyptians
abroad, and the narratives in question, if they indicate anything, indicate that foreign
travel was a very rare and uncongenial occupation for an Egyptian, the Egyptian objects
found on Aegean sites were almost certainly brought thither not by Egyptians but by
Aegeans trading with foreign settlements in northern Egypt. If so they illustrate,
rather than traverse, the view that, whenever Egyptian culture passed the limits of the
Nile Valley in antiquity, it was by the agency of foreigners. Trading adventurers or
invaders from without had to go to its home-land, and themselves ignite a torch at that
bright flame of civilization which from first to last the native Egyptian was fain to hide
under his bushel.
The failure of the Eighteenth Dynasty to maintain its imperial hold on West Asia
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16 EGYPTIAN EMPIRE IN ASIA
was, I have said, inevitable. So soon as a power of any strength appeared in Asia
itself, Egypt could not but obey an order to quit. This may appear, however, a hard
saying and I must offer a little more justification, which may, I think, be obtained by
looking not at Eighteenth Dynasty Empire alone but at the whole history of both
Egyptian Empire in Asia and Asiatic Empire in Egypt.
From first to last that history exemplifies one empirical law that Egypt has never been
able long to retain anything in Asia, or any alien to retain Egypt, saving and excepting
when one or the other has held command also of the Levant Sea. Exceptional instances
prove the rule. The first durable empire established over foreign lands by Egypt was that
of the earlier Ptolemies, whose fleets were predominant over the whole Levant as far north
as the Cyclades, and as far west as the mouth of the Adriatic; and their empire endured
just so long as their sea-power. With the increase of the Rhodian navy it ceased in Asia
Minor: with the appearance of Roman fleets it ceased in Syria also. On the other hand
the first durable empire established by an alien power in Egypt was that of Rome, not
won until she had taken command of the Levant after the suppression of the Pirates of
Crete and Cilicia, and never again lost until she and her successor, Byzantiutm, ceased
to rule the sea.
The best illustrations on the other side, the best examples of the rule itself, a
to be found in the history of Asiatic Empire over Egypt. The overwhelming mig
of Assyria failed to keep its African conquests for more than the space of a sing
generation. It occupied Egypt before it had completely reduced Tyre, and, when t
mistress of the Levant trade finally submitted to Ashurbanipal, the Assyrian apparen
did nothing to enlist her or the Phoenician navies in his own service. The result was t
Psammetichus and the national party in Egypt remained free to open negotiations wit
the enemies of Assyria oversea and, with the co-operation of Gyges of Lydia, to impo
shiploads of fighting men from Asia Minor, with whose assistance the Assyrians were forced
back out of the Nile Valley after an occupation of very few years.
The New Babylonian Kingdom never obtained a footing in Egypt at all; but its
Persian successors, who, from their first appearance on the Mediterranean coast, cour
and made use of the Phoenicians, succeeded in capturing the realm of the Pharaohs at th
first attempt, and in maintaining themselves there without difficulty for about half
century. But the moment that Phoenician sea-supremacy was seriously challenged by a
new and independent maritime power, that of the Greeks, trouble began for the Persian
in Egypt. The history of the first Psammetichus repeated itself. The national par
called in Greeks again and again and finally, after half a century more, with their aid
expelled the Asiatic masters once more. Nor, so long as the Greek navies continue
active and dominant in the Levant, could the Persians regain their footing, despite ma
attempts, in which, from the time of Artaxerxes Mnemon onwards, they themselves us
Greeks to fight the Egyptian's Greeks. Only when the rising and aggressive power
Philip of Macedon had weakened the Greek states and forced them to look to their ow
houses, and at the same time Persian gold was become a dominant factor in Gre
politics, could Asiatic rule be re-established over Egypt, to endure to the coming
Alexander less than twenty years later.
I think, therefore, that I am stating nothing but obvious truth when I say th
the fall of the Eighteenth Dynasty Empire in the face of the first strong Asiatic pow
which should challenge its tenure, was inevitable. The power which actually did
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EGYPTIAN EMPIRE IN ASIA 17
determine its fall was, of course, that of the Hatti. Once this came
retirement of the Egyptians began. There is some sign that Thothmne
the sea for his conquests and his communications, but little or none that any of his
successors imitated him. Since men of Dor, the Tchakaray, appear in Egyptian service
at this time, it is possible that their ships, as well as those of Phoenicians to the north, plied
awhile in the service of Egypt: but in the time of Amenhetep IV these cities fell awvay
one after another to Hatti or Aramaean allegiance. Though the first Pharaohs of the
Nineteenth Dynasty recovered them for the moment they could not keep them against
a consolidated Hatti power. We find Arvad, for example, helping the enemy of
Rameses at Kadesh. Whatever the immediate issue of this battle, it is clear, as has often
been pointed out, that Rameses' speedy withdrawal after it and the tone and content of
the treaty made in his twentieth year with the Hatti King, indicate that its ultimate
result was the abandonment of Egyptian Empire over any part of Syria except south
Palestine; and even this last province had gone the way of the rest by the time of
Rameses III. Thereafter, although Pharaoh Necho would pass up through Syria even
to Carchemish, and hold it in fee for some four years, there will be no Egyptian Empire,
but only Egyptian raids and Egyptian intrigues, to be considered in Asia, till after the
conquest of Alexander.
D. G. HOGARTH.
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