Divorce-Philippine Style by Gonzales-Decano

3/21/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 306
VOL. 306, MAY 5, 1999 783

Divorce------Philippine Style?
ANNOTATION
DIVORCE—PHILIPPINE STYLE?
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
Article 36, Family Code
By *
ALICIA B. GONZALEZ-DECANO
The Family Code was an innovative and highly notable

measure promulgated by Pres. Corazon Aquino, and which
took effect on August 3, 1988.
Many Filipinos were very much elated because finally,
“Divorce—Philippine Style”—came to the fore! Article 36
of the Family Code provides:
“A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the

celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization (as amended by Executive Order No. 227 dated
July 17, 1987).”
(Sempio-Diy, Family Code—p. 1)
Before delving on a full-blown discussion of the above

provisions, a definition of marriage and an interpretation of
psychological incapacity are imperative.
Marriage, according to Article 1 of the Family Code is a
special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
____________________
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000162492b72c4b602f7b9003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/14
* Regional Trial Court, Br. 48, Urdaneta City.
784
784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The term “psychological incapacity” was not defined by the

Family Code. Its interpretation was left to the discretion of
the Court. The judge, however, in the appreciation of the
meaning of psychological incapacity can refer to the
minutes of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the
Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila, Canon
Laws pertaining to Marriage, opinions of well-known
civilists and landmark decisions of the Supreme Court.
Justice Vitug in his concurring opinion in the case of
Republic of the Philippines vs. Molina, G.R. No. 108763,
February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198, cited:
“The committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on

a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decision of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from
Canon Law.”
Justice Flerida Ruth Romero, in her Separate Opinion in

the same case, enunciated:
“With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the

provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of
change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices
of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of
Canon Law.”
Canon Law 1095 provided the model for what is now Art.
36 of the Family Code. Said Canon provides:
“The following persons are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. x x x
2. x x x
3. (Those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature
are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.”
She stated further, that “Canon Law recognizes only two

types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and
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VOL. 306, MAY 5, 1999 785

void. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal “annuls” a

marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void
i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid
sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a
properly performed and consummated marriage between
two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the
formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal
procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church “annulments” are not recognized
by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate
the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. Justice
Romero further stated that since quite a number of
married couples found themselves in confusion, freed from
the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church, yet
they are unable to contract a valid civil marriage under
state laws. Heedless of the Civil Law sanctions, some
persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in
relations. In this regard, Justice Romero stated that “the
Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the
Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the
Family Code—and classified the same as a ground for
declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in-existent
from the beginning.”
To understand more fully the meaning of psychological
incapacity, the interpretation of the former Presiding
Judge, Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese
of Manila, Dr. Gerardo Veloso, is in order. In his pamphlet,
“Psychological Incapacity as Ground for Marriage
Annulment, Family Code Article 36,” Dr. Veloso defines
Psychological Incapacity for Marriage as “the condition of a
person who does not have the mind, will, heart for the
obligations of marriage. He might be able to execute the
bodily manifestation of marriage routines, insofar as they
are theatric affectations based on script. In everyday real
life, however, there is no prepared script, so without the
enabling mind, will, and heart for marriage, a person
cannot perform his obligations.” Dr. Veloso continued by
saying that “there are some categories of psychological
incapacity from birth, for example, people with feeble
intelli-
786

gence. Other categories are acquired, either without design

or initially with volition.
People could have loved and grown up in an adverse
milieu, so that they turned out to be unsuitable for married
and family life.
Some people could have launched themselves into life
pursuits not sympathetic to marriage, and become
habituated; for example, monks and nuns, obsessed
enthusiasts of arts, sciences, noble causes, business,
politics, the professors.
A small minority could have acquired psychological
incapacity for having deliberately given themselves to
licentious living, alcoholic excess, drug abuse, thereby
becoming unfit not only for marriage but also unfit as
members of a society.
Justice Sempio-Diy stated that based on dialogues with
Father Healy and another expert on church annulments,
Monsignor Oscar Cruz, now Archbishop of the Archdiocese
of Lingayen-Dagupan, the Revision Committee gathered
the information that psychological incapacity to discharge
the essential obligations of marriage may also be made
manifest:
“(1) by the refusal of the wife to dwell with the husband

after the marriage without fault on the part of the
latter or to have sex with the husband or to have
children;
(2) when either party or both of them labor under an
affliction that makes common life as husband and
wife impossible or unbearable such as compulsive
gambling or unbearable jealousy on the part of one
party or other psychic or psychological causes of
like import and gravity; and
(3) in manifestations of sociopathic anomalies in
husbands like sadism or infliction of physical
violence on the wife, constitutional laziness or
indolence, drug dependence or addiction, or some
kind of psychosexual anomaly.”
Family Code author Ernesto Pineda cited Church

authorities to wit: “Aside from the well-known
psychological cases of psychosis, psychoneurosis, and other
psychic disorders, which render a party or spouse
psychologically unfit to assume the essential functions and
duties of marriage, the following may
787
VOL. 306, MAY 5, 1999 787

also be considered as causes of psychological incapacity: (a)

homosexuality, Art. 55, No. 6 (also a ground for legal
separation); (b) lesbianism (a ground for legal separation,
Art. 55, No. 6); (c) satyriasis; (d) nymphomania; (e)
emotional immaturity or irresponsibility; (f) epilepsy; (g)
habitual alcoholism, (ground for legal separation, Art. 55,
No. 5) and (h) criminality. Except for (c), (d), (e) and (f), the
rest are also grounds for legal separation.”
According to Webster’s Universal Dictionary and
Thesaurus, nymphomania refers to an abnormally strong
sexual desire in women while satyriasis indicates an
excessive sexual desire in men. The same authority defines
lesbianism as that which refers to characteristic of a female
homosexual while homosexuality means that characteristic
referring to a person who is sexually attracted to a person
of the same sex.
Pineda continued by saying that “emotional immaturity
is a psychological condition which affects the ability to
make judgments to control one’s actions and to relate to
another. As such, it is not a temporary condition but a
permanent one.” It was held to constitute as a marital
incapacity according to one Rotal decision. The diagnostic
criteria for this disorder include: “Gross and sustained
impairment in social relationships, e.g., lack of appropriate
affective responsibility, inappropriate clinging, asociality,
lack of empathy.”
In cases of psychological incapacity, the party suffering
from such incapacity has given his or her free consent to
the marriage. But after the marriage, he or she finds
himself or herself a strange bedfellow for he or she could
not fulfill the duties and obligations attendant to a married
life for which he or she had given his or her consent. The
consent is free and voluntary.
If the consent is vitiated, the marriage is voidable and
the remedy is annulment. Otherwise, it is the declaration
of nullity of the marriage, as the marriage is considered
void there being failure to comply with the essential
marital obligations due to psychological incapacity.
788
Pineda cites causes of Psychological Incapacity which are

not limited to sexual anomalies. The Canon Law does not
specify why types for psychic causes can incapacitate one
for marriage nor does it give a partial listing or disorders
which has a detrimental effect on the marital community.
However, the marriage committee clearly intended to
include not simply sexual anomalies but also other
psychological disorders, which affect the personality
(Canon 7 [1975], 50).
Non-performance of essential marital obligations
constitutes psychological incapacity. Essential marital
obligations are obligations which arise by reason of
marriage. The non-performance of such obligations by the
problem spouse endows the other certain causes of action
such as declaration of nullity of the marriage (Art. 36),
separation of property, receivership and sole
administration of community property (Art. 101, FC).
Under the Family Code, Pineda enumerates the
following essential marital obligations:
“1. To procreate children based on the universal

principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage;
2. To live together under one roof (Art. 68, FC) for
togetherness spells the unity in marriage;
3. To observe mutual love, respect, and fidelity (Art.
68, FC) for love, sexual comfort, and loyalty to one
another are basic postulates of marriage;
4. To render mutual help and support (Art. 68) for
assistance in necessities, both temporal and
spiritual, is essential to sustain the marriage;
5. To jointly support the family (Art. 70) for the
spouses are joint administration in the partnership;
6. Not to commit acts which will bring danger,
dishonor or injury to each other or to the family
(Art. 72) for the safety and security of the family at
all times is a primordial duty of the spouses.”
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VOL. 306, MAY 5, 1999 789

According to Pineda, “the constant non-fulfillment of any of

the above obligations will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage.
There is a problem of chronic and contumacious refusal
of performing essential marital obligations, if a spouse,
although physically capable refused to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless
and constant. Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protected refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. (Veloso, p. 20, Psychological
Incapacity). Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse, with his or her spouse is considered a
sign of psychological incapacity.”
According to one Family Code author, Rufus Rodriguez,
the Civil Code Revision Committee in one of its Committee
meetings held on August 9, 1986, p. 10, opined that “there
is psychological incapacity where a contracting party has
no understanding of the effects of the marriage or the lack
of appreciation of one’s marital obligations at the time of
the marriage which incapacity continues and becomes
manifest only after the marriage.” The committee likewise
in its meeting on August 2, 1986 arrived at the following
observations:
“1. That at the time of the celebration of the marriage,

one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations, which incapacity
continues and later becomes manifest;
2. If after the marriage, one’s psychological incapacity
becomes manifest but later on he was “cured,” the
void marriage does not become valid and the
remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry;
3. The ground of psychological incapacity will not
apply if the marriage was contracted at the time
when there is an understanding of the
consequences of marriage.”
Declaration of nullity under Art. 36 is different from

annulment of marriage provided by Art. 45. In the former,
the marriage is void from the beginning, while in the latter,
the marriage is valid until annulled. The ground in the
former is psychological incapacity before—during and after
marriage—
790
while in the latter, the grounds are—(a) lack of parental

consent, (b) insanity, (c) consent obtained by fraud, (d)
consent obtained thru force, intimidation or undue
influence, (e) physical incapacity (impotency), and (f)
affliction of sexually transmissible disease.
Who can avail of Article 36?
The party who is psychologically incapacitated or his/her

spouse may file an action for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of the marriage.
A marriage under the condition of Art. 36 is void ab
initio. Cohabitation or even the bearing of children does not
cure or validate the void marriage because of psychological
incapacity.
It is admitted that immediately after the Family Code
took effect on August 3, 1988, majority of the spouses who
found life unbearable because of conflicts on varied grounds
filed cases of declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36. Courts then decided cases of this nature one
after another in favor of the plaintiffs/petitioners, hence the
latter emerged victorious and happy in their desire to end
once and for all their perpetual tie with their spouses when
they could not see eye to eye. Thus, bloom the most awaited
Divorce—Philippine Style. However, these moments of
bliss enjoyed by those spouses who were the earlier
beneficiaries of the law were no longer today available to
those who were placed under the same situation as the
former, because the Supreme Court came out with the
stricter interpretations of cases, namely: Santos vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA
20, and the Molina case, Republic of the Philippines vs.
Court of Appeals and Roudel Olaviano Molina, G.R.
108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198.
In the Santos case, the Supreme Court decided that the
refusal of the wife to live with the husband, a decision she
arrived at after the celebration of the marriage, is not
“psychological incapacity,” and cannot be a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36. In this
case, the spouses Leonel Santos and Julia Bedia got
married in 1986. After the birth of their child, family
quarrels resulted. The wife, a
791
VOL. 306, MAY 5, 1999 791

nurse, then left for the United States in 1988 against her
husband’s will. She never came back. In 1990, the husband
then went on a training program in the U.S. as a member
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. He was not able to
find his wife. He then filed for a declaration of nullity of his
marriage upon his return to the Philippines. The trial court
dismissed the petition in 1991, which dismissal was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Brought before the Supreme Court, the latter through
Justice Jose C. Vitug ruled:
x x x “Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a

mental (not physical) incapacity x x x and that there is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious case of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedent, and (c)
incurability.”
In the Molina case, the petitioner Roridel O. Molina alleged

that she and her husband, Reynaldo Molina, were married
on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church in Manila.
After a year of marriage, a son, Andre O. Molina was born.
Reynaldo showed “signs of immaturity and irresponsibility”
as a husband and a father, since he preferred to spend
more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for
aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife
with respect to their finances, resulting in frequent
quarrels between them.
Sometime in February, 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of
his job in Manila and since then Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner of the family. In October, 1986, the couple had
a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their
relationship was estranged. In March, 1987, Roridel
resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her
parents in Baguio City. A few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child and had since then abandoned
them. Reynaldo had thus shown that he
792
was psychologically incapable of complying with essential

marital obligations and was a highly immature and
habitually quarrelsome individual who thought of himself
as a king to be served, and that it would be to the couple’s
best interest to have their marriage declared null and void
in order to free them from what appeared to be an
incompatible marriage from the start.
The trial court rendered judgment declaring the
marriage void. The appeal of the petitioner was denied by
the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC’s
decision, hence, the present case before the Supreme Court.
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that “the
Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect
interpretation of the phrase “psychological incapacity” and
made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the
case,” adding that the appealed decision tended “to
establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in
the world which is anathema to our culture.”
—The Supreme Court’s ruling—
In this instant case, Justice Vitug stated “that there is no

clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of
is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a “difficulty,”
if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of
some marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable
differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities
and duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (not physical) illness.”
The evidence adduced by respondent, according to
Justice Vitug, merely showed that she and her husband
could not get along with each other. There had been no
showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his
alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological
793
VOL. 306, MAY 5, 1999 793

incapacity existing at the time of the marriage celebration.

While some effort was made to prove that there was a
failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of “thoughtfulness
and gentleness” on Reynaldo’s part and of being
“conservative, homely and intelligent” on the part of
Roridel, such failure of expectation is not indicative of
antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely
shows love’s temporary blindness to the faults and
blemishes of the beloved. In this particular case, the
Supreme Court enunciated the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code:
“1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the

marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the
nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,”
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be “protected” by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on

marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must

be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts,
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36
of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological—not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the Court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically
ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application
of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless, such root cause must be
identified as psychological illness and its inca
794

pacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence

may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the
time of the celebration” of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illness of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted
as root cause. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-

complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated
in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
795
VOL. 306, MAY 5, 1999 795

7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate

Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given a great respect by our courts. It is
clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983
and which provides:
“The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who

are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature.”
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family

Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith
of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to our
law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source
and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given
persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church—while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each
other—shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney

or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is

deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.”
796

With these two landmark decision of the Supreme Court,

the Filipinos are forewarned that it is not very easy after
all to declare a marriage void ab initio in the Philippines.
They cannot just interpose any quarrel or emotional
immaturity as signs of psychological immaturity, even if
these symptoms are certified to by a licensed psychiatrist
as in the Molina case.
Many sectors were not happy with the said decisions
because they expected that the Supreme Court would
interpret the Family Code provisions not too strictly in
order to provide a liberalized divorce—Philippine Style.
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3/21/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 306

VOL. 306, MAY 5, 1999 783

The Family Code was an innovative and highly notable

“A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the

Before delving on a full-blown discussion of the above

* Regional Trial Court, Br. 48, Urdaneta City.

784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The term “psychological incapacity” was not defined by the

“The committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on

Justice Flerida Ruth Romero, in her Separate Opinion in

“With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the

“The following persons are incapable of contracting marriage:

She stated further, that “Canon Law recognizes only two

VOL. 306, MAY 5, 1999 785

void. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal “annuls” a

786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

gence. Other categories are acquired, either without design

“(1) by the refusal of the wife to dwell with the husband

Family Code author Ernesto Pineda cited Church

VOL. 306, MAY 5, 1999 787

also be considered as causes of psychological incapacity: (a)

788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pineda cites causes of Psychological Incapacity which are

“1. To procreate children based on the universal

VOL. 306, MAY 5, 1999 789

According to Pineda, “the constant non-fulfillment of any of

“1. That at the time of the celebration of the marriage,

Declaration of nullity under Art. 36 is different from

790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

while in the latter, the grounds are—(a) lack of parental

Who can avail of Article 36?

The party who is psychologically incapacitated or his/her

VOL. 306, MAY 5, 1999 791

x x x “Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a

In the Molina case, the petitioner Roridel O. Molina alleged

792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

was psychologically incapable of complying with essential

—The Supreme Court’s ruling—

In this instant case, Justice Vitug stated “that there is no

VOL. 306, MAY 5, 1999 793

incapacity existing at the time of the marriage celebration.

“1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on

2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must

794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

pacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence

regard to parents and their children. Such non-

VOL. 306, MAY 5, 1999 795

7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate

“The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family

8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney

within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is

796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

With these two landmark decision of the Supreme Court,

© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

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