Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and

NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC.,
respondents.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial
Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.

LAUREL, J.:

The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-
entitled case has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his
motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no
sea para una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que
ilega el plazo fijado para el pago de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado se
termine la obra;
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya
colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por
haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros
de la misma;
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros
sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a
dichos obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica
injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque
su negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo
obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado deser empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en
virtud del paro.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the
judgement rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of
Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in
ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National
Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and
the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the
Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed
delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of
this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548,
petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and
elective representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth
Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of
dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in
interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin
where the industrial peace has always been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against
the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the
exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that
their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered
herein.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion
for a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not
necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed
to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this, however,
we deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of
orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of the
powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which should
be observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the
proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no
substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or
activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the hearing and is more of a
record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion
drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of
counsel have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the
law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the
integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the
Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the
function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is
more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in
the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider,
investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or
affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject
to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take
cognizance or purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or
agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as
regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment,
between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers
or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is
submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy
and certified by the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as
existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.)
It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the
parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.)
When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all industries
established in a designated locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and fairness of
fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants,
or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners.
(Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial
disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective
system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific
controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a
mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the
separation of governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated
September 13, 1939, we had occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R.
No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of
Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act
requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard
to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and
shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such
manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not
be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or
agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination
which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of
preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this
legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently
promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed
legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free
from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases
before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in
trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested
or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of
Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty
and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.)
In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence,
without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is
conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside
without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity,
a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the
more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and
a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs.
Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the
evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor
Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric
Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations
Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of
this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules
so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial
proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United
States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a
desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis
in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not
constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59
S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R.
Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to
the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the
case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is
enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and
informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be
appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their
report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of
Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its
consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or
any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and
may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of
Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the
Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views
of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is
literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the United States
the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other
subordinates to render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our
case there is no such statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as
to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix
A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate,
in a national way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by
respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by
Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharged all the members of the
National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the
petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers
in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or
employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal."
Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his
substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of due
diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of
Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such far reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal
of the judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments
against the petition. By and large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion
that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at
the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to
the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under
which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable
to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be
and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of
Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be
relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So
ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 117565. November 18, 1997]

ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED (deceased), Regional Director, DAR CAR, Represented by his Heirs,
Francisca A. Lumiqued, May A. Lumiqued, Arlene A. Lumiqued and Richard A. Lumiqued,
petitioners, vs. Honorable APOLINIO G. EXEVEA, ERDOLFO V. BALAJADIA and FELIX T.
CABADING, ALL Members of Investigating Committee, created by DOJ Order No. 145 on May
30, 1992; HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, HON. ANTONIO T.
CARPIO, CHIEF Presidential Legal Adviser/Counsel; and HON. LEONARDO A. QUISIMBING,
Senior Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, and JEANNETTE OBAR-
ZAMUDIO, Private Respondent, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an
administrative inquiry?
Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform Cordillera
Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from that
position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993. In view of Lumiqueds
death on May 19, 1994, his heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning
such order.
The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and
private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR. The first
affidavit-complaint dated November 16, 1989,[1] charged Lumiqued with malversation through
falsification of official documents. From May to September 1989, Lumiqued allegedly committed
at least 93 counts of falsification by padding gasoline receipts. He even submitted a vulcanizing
shop receipt worth P550.00 for gasoline bought from the shop, and another receipt for P660.00 for
a single vulcanizing job. With the use of falsified receipts, Lumiqued claimed and was reimbursed
the sum of P44,172.46. Private respondent added that Lumiqued seldom made field trips and
preferred to stay in the office, making it impossible for him to consume the nearly 120 liters of
gasoline he claimed everyday.
In her second affidavit-complaint dated November 22, 1989,[2] private respondent accused
Lumiqued with violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations, alleging that
during the months of April, May, July, August, September and October, 1989, he made
unliquidated cash advances in the total amount of P116,000.00. Lumiqued purportedly defrauded
the government by deliberately concealing his unliquidated cash advances through the falsification
of accounting entries in order not to reflect on `Cash advances of other officials under code 8-70-
600 of accounting rules.
The third affidavit-complaint dated December 15, 1989,[3] charged Lumiqued with oppression
and harassment. According to private respondent, her two previous complaints prompted
Lumiqued to retaliate by relieving her from her post as Regional Cashier without just cause.
The three affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for
appropriate action. On May 20, 1992, Acting Justice Secretary Eduardo G. Montenegro issued
Department Order No. 145 creating a committee to investigate the complaints against Lumiqued.
The order appointed Regional State Prosecutor Apolinario Exevea as committee chairman with
City Prosecutor Erdolfo Balajadia and Provincial Prosecutor Felix Cabading as members. They
were mandated to conduct an investigation within thirty days from receipt of the order, and to
submit their report and recommendation within fifteen days from its conclusion.
The investigating committee accordingly issued a subpoena directing Lumiqued to submit his
counter-affidavit on or before June 17, 1992. Lumiqued, however, filed instead an urgent motion
to defer submission of his counter-affidavit pending actual receipt of two of private respondents
complaints. The committee granted the motion and gave him a five-day extension.
In his counter-affidavit dated June 23, 1992,[4] Lumiqued alleged, inter alia, that the cases were
filed against him to extort money from innocent public servants like him, and were initiated by
private respondent in connivance with a certain Benedict Ballug of Tarlac and a certain Benigno
Aquino III. He claimed that the apparent weakness of the charge was bolstered by private
respondents execution of an affidavit of desistance.[5]
Lumiqued admitted that his average daily gasoline consumption was 108.45 liters. He submitted,
however, that such consumption was warranted as it was the aggregate consumption of the five
service vehicles issued under his name and intended for the use of the Office of the Regional
Director of the DAR. He added that the receipts which were issued beyond his region were made
in the course of his travels to Ifugao Province, the DAR Central Office in Diliman, Quezon City,
and Laguna, where he attended a seminar. Because these receipts were merely turned over to him
by drivers for reimbursement, it was not his obligation but that of auditors and accountants to
determine whether they were falsified. He affixed his signature on the receipts only to signify that
the same were validly issued by the establishments concerned in order that official transactions of
the DAR-CAR could be carried out.
Explaining why a vulcanizing shop issued a gasoline receipt, Lumiqued said that he and his
companions were cruising along Santa Fe, Nueva Vizcaya on their way to Ifugao when their
service vehicle ran out of gas. Since it was almost midnight, they sought the help of the owner of a
vulcanizing shop who readily furnished them with the gasoline they needed. The vulcanizing shop
issued its own receipt so that they could reimburse the cost of the gasoline. Domingo Lucero, the
owner of said vulcanizing shop, corroborated this explanation in an affidavit dated June 25, 1990.
[6] With respect to the accusation that he sought reimbursement in the amount of P660.00 for one
vulcanizing job, Lumiqued submitted that the amount was actually only P6.60. Any error
committed in posting the amount in the books of the Regional Office was not his personal error or
accountability.
To refute private respondents allegation that he violated COA rules and regulations in incurring
unliquidated cash advances in the amount of P116,000.00, Lumiqued presented a certification[7]
of DAR-CAR Administrative Officer Deogracias F. Almora that he had no outstanding cash
advances on record as of December 31, 1989.
In disputing the charges of oppression and harassment against him, Lumiqued contended that
private respondent was not terminated from the service but was merely relieved of her duties due
to her prolonged absences. While admitting that private respondent filed the required applications
for leave of absence, Lumiqued claimed that the exigency of the service necessitated disapproval
of her application for leave of absence. He allegedly rejected her second application for leave of
absence in view of her failure to file the same immediately with the head office or upon her return
to work. He also asserted that no medical certificate supported her application for leave of
absence.
In the same counter-affidavit, Lumiqued also claimed that private respondent was corrupt and
dishonest because a COA examination revealed that her cash accountabilities from June 22 to
November 23, 1989, were short by P30,406.87. Although private respondent immediately returned
the amount on January 18, 1990, the day following the completion of the cash examination,
Lumiqued claimed that she should be relieved from her duties and assigned to jobs that would not
require handling of cash and money matters.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was
not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to
enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither
Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed
the case submitted for resolution.
On August 12, 1992, Lumiqued filed an urgent motion for additional hearing,[8] alleging that he
suffered a stroke on July 10, 1992. The motion was forwarded to the Office of the State Prosecutor
apparently because the investigation had already been terminated. In an order dated September 7,
1992,[9] State Prosecutor Zoila C. Montero denied the motion, viz:
The medical certificate given show(s) that respondent was discharged from the Sacred Heart
Hospital on July 17, 1992, the date of the hearing, which date was upon the request of respondent
(Lumiqued). The records do not disclose that respondent advised the Investigating committee of
his confinement and inability to attend despite his discharge, either by himself or thru counsel. The
records likewise do not show that efforts were exerted to notify the Committee of respondents
condition on any reasonable date after July 17, 1992. It is herein noted that as early as June 23,
1992, respondent was already being assisted by counsel.
Moreover an evaluation of the counter-affidavit submitted reveal(s) the sufficiency, completeness
and thoroughness of the counter-affidavit together with the documentary evidence annexed
thereto, such that a judicious determination of the case based on the pleadings submitted is already
possible.
Moreover, considering that the complaint-affidavit was filed as far back as November 16, 1989
yet, justice can not be delayed much longer.
Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating committee rendered a report dated July
31, 1992,[10] finding Lumiqued liable for all the charges against him. It made the following
findings:
After a thorough evaluation of the evidences (sic) submitted by the parties, this committee finds
the evidence submitted by the complainant sufficient to establish the guilt of the respondent for
Gross Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct.
That most of the gasoline receipts used by the respondent in claiming for the reimbursement of his
gasoline expenses were falsified is clearly established by the 15 Certified Xerox Copies of the
duplicate receipts (Annexes G-1 to G-15) and the certifications issued by the different gasoline
stations where the respondent purchased gasoline. Annexes `G-1 to `G-15 show that the actual
average purchase made by the respondent is about 8.46 liters only at a purchase price of P50.00, in
contrast to the receipts used by the respondent which reflects an average of 108.45 liters at a
purchase price of P550.00. Here, the greed of the respondent is made manifest by his act of
claiming reimbursements of more than 10 times the value of what he actually spends. While only
15 of the gasoline receipts were ascertained to have been falsified, the motive, the pattern and the
scheme employed by the respondent in defrauding the government has, nevertheless, been
established.
That the gasoline receipts have been falsified was not rebutted by the respondent. In fact, he had in
effect admitted that he had been claiming for the payment of an average consumption of 108.45
liters/day by justifying that this was being used by the 4 vehicles issued to his office. Besides he
also admitted having signed the receipts.
Respondents act in defrauding the government of a considerable sum of money by falsifying
receipts constitutes not only Dishonesty of a high degree but also a criminal offense for
Malversation through Falsification of Official Documents.
This committee likewise finds that the respondent have (sic) unliquidated cash advances in the
year 1989 which is in violation of established office and auditing rules. His cash advances
totalling to about P116,000.00 were properly documented. The requests for obligation of
allotments and the vouchers covering the amounts were all signed by him. The mere certification
issued by the Administrative Officer of the DAR-CAR cannot therefore rebut these concrete
evidences (sic).
On the third complaint, this committee likewise believes that the respondents act in relieving the
complainant of her functions as a Regional Cashier on December 1, 1989 was an act of
harassment. It is noted that this was done barely two weeks after the complainant filed charges
against her (sic). The recommendation of Jose G. Medina of the Commission on Audit came only
on May 11, 1990 or almost six months after the respondents order relieving the complainant was
issued. His act in harassing a subordinate employee in retaliation to a complaint she filed
constitute(s) Gross Misconduct on the part of the respondent who is a head of office.
The affidavits of Joseph In-uyay and Josefina Guting are of no help to the respondent. In fact, this
only show(s) that he is capable of giving bribes if only to have the cases against him dismissed.
He could not have given a certain Benigno Aquino III the sum of P10,000.00 for any other
purpose.
Accordingly, the investigating committee recommended Lumiqueds dismissal or removal from
office, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges against him.
Acting on the report and recommendation, former Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon adopted
the same in his Memorandum to President Fidel V. Ramos dated October 22, 1992. He added that
the filing of the affidavit of desistance[11] would not prevent the issuance of a resolution on the
matter considering that what was at stake was not only the violation of complainants (herein
private respondents) personal rights but also the competence and fitness of the respondent
(Lumiqued) to remain in public office. He opined that, in fact, the evidence on record could call
for a punitive action against the respondent on the initiative of the DAR.
On December 17, 1992, Lumiqued filed a motion for reconsideration of the findings of the
Committee with the DOJ.[12] Undersecretary Ramon S. Esguerra indorsed the motion to the
investigating committee.[13] In a letter dated April 1, 1993, the three-member investigating
committee informed Undersecretary Esguerra that the committee had no more authority to act on
the same (motion for reconsideration) considering that the matter has already been forwarded to
the Office of the President and that their authority under Department Order No. 145 ceased when
they transmitted their report to the DOJ.[14] Concurring with this view, Undersecretary Esguerra
informed Lumiqued that the investigating committee could no longer act on his motion for
reconsideration. He added that the motion was also prematurely filed because the Office of the
President (OP) had yet to act on Secretary Drilons recommendation.[15]
On May 12, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos himself issued Administrative Order No. 52 (A.O.
No. 52),[16] finding Lumiqued administratively liable for dishonesty in the alteration of fifteen
gasoline receipts, and dismissing him from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and other
benefits. Thus:
That the receipts were merely turned over to him by his drivers and that the auditor and accountant
of the DAR-CAR should be the ones to be held liable is untenable. The receipts in question were
signed by respondent for the purpose of attesting that those receipts were validly issued by the
commercial establishments and were properly disbursed and used in the official business for
which it was intended.
This Office is not about to shift the blame for all these to the drivers employed by the DAR-CAR
as respondent would want us to do.
The OP, however, found that the charges of oppression and harassment, as well as that of incurring
unliquidated cash advances, were not satisfactorily established.
In a petition for appeal[17] addressed to President Ramos, Lumiqued prayed that A.O. No. 52 be
reconsidered and that he be reinstated to his former position with all the benefits accorded to him
by law and existing rules and regulations. This petition was basically premised on the affidavit
dated May 27, 1993, of a certain Dwight L. Lumiqued, a former driver of the DAR-CAR, who
confessed to having authored the falsification of gasoline receipts and attested to petitioner
Lumiqueds being an honest man who had no premonition that the receipts he (Dwight) turned
over to him were altered.[18]
Treating the petition for appeal as a motion for the reconsideration of A.O. No. 52, the OP, through
Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing, denied the same on August 31,
1993.
Undaunted, Lumiqued filed a second motion for reconsideration, alleging, among other things,
that he was denied the constitutional right to counsel during the hearing.[19] On May 19, 1994,
[20] however, before his motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died. On September 28, 1994,[21]
Secretary Quisumbing denied the second motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the reversal of the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Committee, the October 22, 1992, Memorandum of then
Justice Secretary Drilon, A.O. No. 52 issued by President Ramos, and the orders of Secretary
Quisumbing. In a nutshell, it prays for the payment of retirement benefits and other benefits
accorded to deceased Arsenio Lumiqued by law, payable to his heirs; and the backwages from the
period he was dismissed from service up to the time of his death on May 19, 1994.[22]
Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to
counsel during the hearing. They maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived unless the
waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert that the committee should have
suspended the hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to secure a counsel
of his own. If suspension was not possible, the committee should have appointed a counsel de
oficio to assist him.
These arguments are untenable and misplaced. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived
unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an
accused during custodial investigation.[23] It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or
rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case
at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and
independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the
proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order
No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the
law for the complaints filed against him. The order issued by Acting Secretary of Justice
Montenegro states thus:
In the interest of the public service and pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, a Committee to
conduct the formal investigation of the administrative complaint for oppression, dishonesty,
disgraceful and immoral conduct, being notoriously undesirable and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service against Mr. ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED, Regional Director, Department
of Agrarian Reform, Cordillera Autonomous Region, is hereby created x x x.[24]
As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part of a criminal
prosecution. This was even made more pronounced when, after finding Lumiqued administratively
liable, it hinted at the filing of criminal case for malversation through falsification of public
documents in its report and recommendation.
Petitioners misconception on the nature of the investigation [25] conducted against Lumiqued
appears to have been engendered by the fact that the DOJ conducted it. While it is true that under
the Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall administer the criminal justice system in
accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes,
prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system,[26] conducting criminal
investigations is not its sole function. By its power to perform such other functions as may be
provided by law, [27] prosecutors may be called upon to conduct administrative investigations.
Accordingly, the investigating committee created by Department Order No. 145 was duty-bound
to conduct the administrative investigation in accordance with the rules therefor.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or
may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondents
capacity to represent himself and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel.[28] In an administrative proceeding such as the one that transpired
below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not.
This is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260[29]
(otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on discipline)
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292[30] (otherwise known as
the Administrative Code of 1987). Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of the
hearings attended by Lumiqued[31] clearly show that he was confident of his capacity and so
opted to represent himself. Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative
investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts
that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of
maintaining the dignity of government service.
Furthermore, petitioners reliance on Resolution No. 94-0521 of the Civil Service Commission on
the Uniform Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative Investigation stating that a respondent in
an administrative complaint must be informed of his right to the assistance of a counsel of his
choice,[32] is inappropriate. In the first place, this resolution is applicable only to cases brought
before the Civil Service Commission.[33] Secondly, said resolution, which is dated January 25,
1994, took effect fifteen days following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation,[34]
much later than the July 1992 hearings of the investigating committee created by Department
Order No. 145. Thirdly, the same committee was not remiss in the matter of reminding Lumiqued
of his right to counsel. Thus at the July 3, 1992, hearing, Lumiqued was repeatedly appraised of
his option to secure services of counsel:
RSP EXEVEA:
This is an administrative case against Director Lumiqued. Director Lumiqued is present. The
complainant is present, Janet Obar-Zamudio. Complainant has just been furnished with a copy of
the counter-affidavit of the respondent. Do you have a counsel, Director?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
I did not bring anybody, Sir, because when I went to see him, he told me, Sir, that he has already
set a hearing, morning and afternoon today.
RSP EXEVEA:
So, we will proceed with the hearing even without your counsel? You are willing to proceed with
the hearing even without your counsel?

DIR. LUMIQUED:
Yes, I am confident . . .

CP BALAJADIA:
You are confident that you will be able to represent yourself?

DIR. LUMIQUED:
That is my concern.[35] (Underscoring supplied)
In the course of private respondents damaging testimony, the investigating committee once again
reminded Lumiqued of his need for a counsel. Thus:
CP BALAJADIA:
Q. (To Director Lumiqued) You really wish to go through with this even without your counsel?
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
A. I think so, Sir.
CP BALAJADIA:
Let us make it of record that we have been warning you to proceed with the assistance of counsel
but you said that you can take care of yourself so we have no other alternative but to proceed.[36]
(Underscoring supplied)
Thereafter, the following colloquies transpired:
CP BALAJADIA:
We will suspend in the meantime that we are waiting for the supplemental affidavit you are going
to present to us. Do you have any request from the panel of investigators, Director Lumiqued?
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
I was not able to bring a lawyer since the lawyer I requested to assist me and was the one who
prepared my counter-affidavit is already engaged for a hearing and according to him he is engaged
for the whole month of July.
RSP EXEVEA:
We cannot wait . . .
CP BALAJADIA:
Why dont you engage the services of another counsel. The charges against you are quite serious.
We are not saying you are guilty already. We are just apprehensive that you will go through this
investigation without a counsel. We would like you to be protected legally in the course of this
investigation. Why dont you get the services of another counsel. There are plenty here in Baguio...
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
I will try to see, Sir . . .
CP BALAJADIA:
Please select your date now, we are only given one month to finish the investigation, Director
Lumiqued.
RSP EXEVEA:
We will not entertain any postponement. With or without counsel, we will proceed.
CP BALAJADIA:
Madam Witness, will you please submit the document which we asked for and Director
Lumiqued, if you have other witnesses, please bring them but reduce their testimonies in affidavit
form so that we can expedite with the proceedings.[37]
At the hearing scheduled for July 10, 1992, Lumiqued still did not avail of the services of counsel.
Pertinent excerpts from said hearing follow:
FISCAL BALAJADIA:
I notice also Mr. Chairman that the respondent is not being represented by a counsel. The last time
he was asked to invite his lawyer in this investigation. May we know if he has a lawyer to
represent him in this investigation?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
There is none Sir because when I went to my lawyer, he told me that he had set a case also at 9:30
in the other court and he told me if there is a possibility of having this case postponed anytime
next week, probably Wednesday so we will have good time (sic) of presenting the affidavit.
FISCAL BALAJADIA:
Are you moving for a postponement Director? May I throw this to the panel. The charges in this
case are quite serious and he should be given a chance to the assistance of a counsel/lawyer.
RSP EXEVEA:
And is (sic) appearing that the supplemental-affidavit has been furnished him only now and this
has several documents attached to it so I think we could grant him one last postponement
considering that he has already asked for an extension.
DIR. LUMIQUED:
Furthermore Sir, I am now being bothered by my heart ailment.[38]
The hearing was reset to July 17, 1992, the date when Lumiqued was released from the hospital.
Prior to said date, however, Lumiqued did not inform the committee of his confinement.
Consequently, because the hearing could not push through on said date, and Lumiqued had already
submitted his counter-affidavit, the committee decided to wind up the proceedings. This did not
mean, however, that Lumiqued was short-changed in his right to due process.
Lumiqued, a Regional Director of a major department in the executive branch of the government,
graduated from the University of the Philippines (Los Baos) with the degree of Bachelor of
Science major in Agriculture, was a recipient of various scholarships and grants, and underwent
training seminars both here and abroad.[39] Hence, he could have defended himself if need be,
without the help of counsel, if truth were on his side. This, apparently, was the thought he
entertained during the hearings he was able to attend. In his statement, That is my concern, one
could detect that it had been uttered testily, if not exasperatedly, because of the doubt or
skepticism implicit in the question, You are confident that you will be able to represent yourself?
despite his having positively asserted earlier, Yes, I am confident. He was obviously convinced
that he could ably represent himself. Beyond repeatedly reminding him that he could avail himself
of counsel and as often receiving the reply that he is confident of his ability to defend himself, the
investigating committee could not do more. One can lead a horse to water but cannot make him
drink.
The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the
law. In Nera v. Auditor General,[40] the Court said:
x x x. There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is
entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound
by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal
profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its
members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless
that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones
side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even much more
creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings.[41] An actual hearing
is not always an indispensable aspect of due process.[42] As long as a party was given the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due
process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process.[43] Moreover,
this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[44] Lumiqueds appeal and his subsequent
filing of motions for reconsideration cured whatever irregularity attended the proceedings
conducted by the committee.[45]
The constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property.[46] In the early
case of Cornejo v. Gabriel and Provincial Board of Rizal [47] the Court held that a public office is
not property within the sense of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law for it is a public
trust or agency. This jurisprudential pronoucement has been enshrined in the 1987 Constitution
under Article XI, Section 1 on accountability of public officers, as follows:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
When the dispute concerns ones constitutional right to security of tenure, however, public office is
deemed analogous to property in a limited sense; hence, the right to due process could rightfully
be invoked. Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute. Of equal weight is the
countervailing mandate of the Constitution that all public officers and employees must serve with
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.[48] In this case, it has been clearly shown that
Lumiqued did not live up to this constitutional precept.
The committees findings pinning culpability for the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct
upon Lumiqued were not, as shown above, fraught with procedural mischief. Its conclusions were
founded on the evidence presented and evaluated as facts. Well-settled in our jurisdiction is the
doctrine that findings of fact of administrative agencies must be respected as long as they are
supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or preponderant.
[49] The quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is only
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.[50]
Consequently, the adoption by Secretary Drilon and the OP of the committees recommendation of
dismissal may not in any way be deemed tainted with arbitrariness amounting to grave abuse of
discretion. Government officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity. Strong
evidence is not necessary to rebut that presumption,[51] which petitioners have not successfully
disputed in the instant case.
Dishonesty is a grave offense penalized by dismissal under Section 23 of Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. Under Section 9 of the
same Rule, the penalty of dismissal carries with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave
credits and retirement benefits, and the disqualification for reemployment in the government
service. The instant petition, which is aimed primarily at the payment of retirement benefits and
other benefits plus backwages from the time of Lumiqueds dismissal until his demise, must,
therefore, fail.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED and
Administrative Order No. 52 of the Office of the President is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Velez vs De Vera
496 SCRA 345 [ÀC No. 6697 July 25, 2006]

Facts: An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California,
docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera
handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera
was authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority by the son to control
the case because the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for the release of the funds
in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of the case which he then
deposited to his personal account; The Hearing referee in the said administrative case
recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended from the practice of law for three years; Atty. de
Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of
California. Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he
misappropriated his client’s funds as the latter’s father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use
the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this explanation
notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified under oath that he “expected de Vera might
use the money for a few days. Petitioner claims that such information was concealed by the
respondent. Such and other circumstances which the IBP board deems that respondent is not fit to
be a member of the board, hence his removal was sought.
Issue: Whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a
foreign jurisdiction and who was suspended from the practice of law in said foreign jurisdiction,
can be sanctioned as member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the
foreign jurisdiction.

Held: No. We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who
was admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.) and
against whom charges were filed in connection with his practice in said jurisdiction. However,
unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted
against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered his
license to practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.

In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign
jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines as the
acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and suspension in this
jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar
judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign court’s action includes
any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise held that the
judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.

A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until
a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of
due notice in the foreign forum.

In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the
recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima
facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial
evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is
successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.

G.R. No. 173523: February 19, 2014

LUCENA D. DEMAALA, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and

OMBUDSMAN,Respondents.

DEL CASTILLO,J.:
FACTS:

Petitioner is the Municipal Mayor of Narra, Palawan, and is the accused in criminal cases and for
violations of Section 3(h) ofRA 3019, which cases are pending before the Sandiganbayan.

On January 9, 2006, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed before the Sandiganbayan a Motion
to Suspend the Accused Pursuant to Section 13, RA 3019arguing that under such
sectionpetitioners suspension from office was mandatory. Petitioner opposedthe motion claiming
that there is no proof that the evidence against her was strong; that her continuance in office does
not prejudice the cases against her nor pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the evidence and
records in her office; and that her re-election to office justifies the denial of suspension.

On February 9, 2006, Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting the motion to suspend, thus,
petitioner is suspended from her present position for 90 days.

On March 23, 2006, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration.She argued that the motion to
suspend should have been filed earlier and not when the prosecution is about to conclude the
presentation of its evidence; that the prosecution evidence indicates that petitioners acts are not
covered by Section 3(h) of RA 3019, and thus not punishable under said law; that the evidence
failed to show that petitioner was committing further acts of malfeasance in office; and that
suspension while mandatory is not necessarily automatic. Petitioner scheduled the hearing of her
Motion for Reconsideration on April 26, 2006. However, the Ombudsman (prosecution) opposed
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 19, 2006, the prosecution filed a Manifestation with Motion to Reset the Trial Scheduled
on April 26 and 27, 2006.It sought to reset the scheduled April 26 and 27, 2006 hearing for the
continuation of the presentation of the prosecutions evidence to a later date.

Per the January 19, 2006 Order of the Honorable Court, trial of these cases will continue on April
26 and 27, 2006, both at 1:30 in the afternoon.

On April 21, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued an Ordergranting the prosecutions motion to reset
trial and scheduled the continuation thereof on August 2 and 3, 2006.

On May 23, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution denying petitioners March
23, 2006 Motion for Reconsideration.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant Petition.

ISSUE: Whether Petitioner was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan issued its May 23,
2006 Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration even before the same could be heard on
the scheduled August 2 and 3, 2006 hearings.

HELD: Petitioner was not denied due process

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW due process

The April 21, 2006 Order of the Sandiganbayan indicates that what it referred to were the two
hearing dates of April 26 and 27, 2006 covering the continuation of the trial proper the ongoing
presentation of the prosecutions evidence and not the single hearing date of April 26, 2006 for the
determination of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The prosecutions manifestation and
motion to reset trial itself unmistakably specified that what was being reset was the trial proper
which was scheduled on April 26 and 27, 2006 pursuant to the courts previous January 19, 2006
Order; it had nothing at all to do with petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioners failure to attend the scheduled April 26, 2006 hearing of her own Motion for
Reconsideration is fatal to her cause. Her excuse that she no longer bothered to go to court on
April 26, 2006 since "she had no business to be there" is unavailing. By being absent at the April
21, 2006 hearing, petitioner did not consider the prosecutions manifestation and motion to reset
trial as related to her pending Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, it was incumbent upon her to
have attended the hearing of her own motion on April 26, 2006. Her absence at said hearing was
inexcusable, and the Sandiganbayan was therefore justified in considering the matter submitted for
resolution based on the pleadings submitted.

Consequently, there was nothing procedurally irregular in the issuance of the assailed May 23,
2006 Resolution by the Sandiganbayan.

With the Courts ruling in Batul v. Bayron, later reiterated in De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 565 Phil. 330 (2007)thus Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in
the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. Notice and
hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary
rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. The essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due
course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process.

"To be heard" does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court - one may also be
heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded,
there is no denial of due process.

DISMISSED.

JARDELEZA v. SERENO
G.R. No. 213181
August 19, 2014
733 SCRA 279

FACTS: Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) announce an opening for application and recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H.
Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic was included in the list of
candidates. Hence, he was interviewed.

However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself – CJ Sereno, will be
invoking unanimity rule against him. It is invoked because Jardeleza’s integrity is in question.
During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which characterized
Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious. Jardeleza answered that he would defend himself provided that
due process would be observed. His request was denied and he was not included in the shortlist.

Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to
include him in the list on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of
discretion in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the
position.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in
cases where an objection or opposition to an application is raised.

RULING: Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not automatically
denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process.

The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings.
Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is
availing.
In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due
process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This holding is not an
encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of
due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who
vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is
presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from
making an unsound and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not
expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an
applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of
fairness because the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.

Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the
shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This
consequence arose from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets
of due process.

True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that
the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.

PRIMANILA PLANS, INC., herein REPRESENTED by EDUARDO S. MADRID, Petitioner,

vs.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Respondent.

G.R. No. 193791 August 6, 2014

PONENTE: Reyes

TOPIC: SRC, registration statement, cease and desist order

FACTS:

On April 9, 2008, SEC issued the subject cease and desist order after an investigation
conducted by the SEC’s Compliance and Enforcement Department (CED) on Primanila, a
corporation operating as a pre-need company, yielded the following factual findings: Primanila’s
website (www.primanila.com) was offering a pension plan product called Primasa Plan, that no
registration statement has been filed by Primanila for the approval of said Primasa Plan, and that
many of its planholders mostly members of the PNP remitted the total amount of Php
2,072,149.38 to Primanila representing the aforementioned premium collections via salary
deductions, among others.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Primanila was accorded due process notwithstanding the SEC’s immediate
issuance of the cease and desist order.
Whether or not Primanila violated Sec. 16 of SRC which barred the sale or offer for sale to the
public of a pre-need product except in accordance with SEC rules and regulations.
HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that a cease and desist order may be issued by the SEC motu proprio, it
being unnecessary that it results from a verified complaint from an aggrieved party. A prior
hearing is also not required whenever the Commission finds it appropriate to issue a cease and
desist order that aims to curtail fraud or grave or irreparable injury to investors. There is good
reason for this provision, as any delay in the restraint of acts that yield such results can only
generate further injury to the public that the SEC is obliged to protect.

To equally protect individuals and corporations from baseless and improvident

issuances, the authority of the SEC under this rule is nonetheless with defined limits. A cease and
desist order may only be issued by the Commission after proper investigation or verification, and
upon showing that the acts sought to be restrained could result in injury or fraud to the investing
public. Without doubt, these requisites were duly satisfied by the SEC prior to its issuance of the
subject cease and desist order.

The SEC was not mandated to allow Primanila to participate in the investigation
conducted by the Commission prior to the cease and desist order’s issuance. Given the
circumstances, it was sufficient for the satisfaction of the demands of due process that the
company was amply apprised of the results of the SEC investigation, and then given the
reasonable opportunity to present its defense. Primanila was able to do this via its motion to
reconsider and lift the cease and desist order.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that Primanila clearly violated Section 16 of the SRC which states that
“no person shall sell or offer for sale to the public any pre-need plan except in accordance with
rules and regulations which the Commission shall prescribe. Such rules shall regulate the sale of
pre-need plans by, among other things, requiring the registration of pre-need plans, licensing
persons involved in the sale of pre-need plans, requiring disclosures to prospective plan holders,
prescribing advertising guidelines, providing for uniform plans, imposing capital, bonding and
other financial responsibility, and establishing trust funds for the payment of benefits under such
plans.”

[ GR No. 205870, Aug 13, 2014 ]

LEI SHERYLL FERNANDEZ v. BOTICA CLAUDIO +

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated September 13, 2012
and the Resolution[3] dated February 11, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
123633 which nullified and set aside (a) the Resolution[4] dated March 15, 2010 of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR Case No. 01-22111-06-RI finding petitioner
Lei Sheryll Fernandez (Fernandez) to have been illegally dismissed by respondent Guadalupe Jose
(Jose), and (b) the Order[5] dated August 17, 2010 of Labor Arbiter (LA) Napoleon V. Fernando
granting the issuance of a writ of execution of the foregoing NLRC resolution.

The Facts

On November 14, 2002, Fernandez was hired as a trainee at Botica Claudio,[6] a drugstore located
at Tomas Claudio Street, Morong, Rizal,[7] which is owned and operated by Jose. In January
2003, she was promoted as sales clerk/pharmacy aide, which position she held until the
termination of her services on January 15, 2006.[8] Due to her termination, Fernandez filed a
complaint[9] for illegal dismissal with prayer for the payment of her statutory benefits against Jose
before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) No. IV, docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-
IV-01-22111-06, alleging that: (a) during her employment, she was paid a salary of ?180.00 per
day,[10] and worked from 8 o'clock in the morning until 8 o'clock in the evening, and sometimes,
even up to 10 o'clock at night, but was never paid any overtime pay and/or holiday pay, and that
her Social Security System (SSS) contributions were not duly remitted;[11] (b) Jose merely
fabricated the charges against her in order to justify her dismissal; and (c) she did not go on
absence without official leave (AWOL).[12]

Jose denied the foregoing allegations, and contended that Fernandez's dismissal was valid given
that she went on AWOL; this, in addition to the various infractions she committed during her
employment, particularly, her acts of (a) dispensing wrong medicines, (b) allowing some clients
to buy medicines on credit without her employer's consent, and (c) dishonesty. Further, Jose
claimed that all of her employees, including Fernandez, were paid their corresponding benefits,
and that their SSS contributions were all duly remitted.[13]

The LA Ruling

In a Decision[14] dated December 11, 2007, the LA held that while just cause attended
Fernandez's dismissal from work based on the finding that she went on AWOL, the same was
nonetheless effected without procedural due process.[15] Thus, the LA ordered Jose to pay
Fernandez P11,700.00 as separation pay as well as P14,040.00 representing three (3) years of her
unpaid 13th month pay, but denied her claims for overtime pay and moral/exemplary damages for
lack of factual and legal bases.[16]

Dissatisfied with the LA's ruling, Fernandez filed a Notice of Appeal[17] with Memorandum of
Appeal[18] on February 8, 2008 before the NLRC. Copies of the same were purportedly sent by
registered mail to one "Atty. Ramon E. Solis, Jr., Counsel for respondents, No. 5 Sto. Nino St.,
SFDM, 1100 Quezon City."[19]

The Proceedings Before the NLRC

On March 15, 2010, the NLRC rendered a Resolution[20] (NLRC Resolution) granting
Fernandez's appeal, and thereby reversing the LA's ruling.

It found Fernandez to have been illegally dismissed by her employer, Jose, without a valid cause
and observance of procedural due process.[21] It observed that the pieces of evidence presented
by Jose to substantiate Fernandez's purported infractions were merely fabricated, and that there
was no indication that Fernandez was apprised of her supposed offenses before her dismissal.[22]
Accordingly, it ordered Jose to pay Fernandez the aggregate amount of P297,522.45, consisting of
P254,831.85 as backwages, P42,120.00 as separation pay, and P570.60 as overtime pay.[23]
On June 1, 2010, an Entry of Judgment[24] was issued by the NLRC, declaring its Resolution to
have become final and executory on May 18, 2010. Consequently, the LA issued an Order[25]
dated August 17, 2010 (LA Order) granting Fernandez's motion for execution.[26]

Without disclosing the date when the foregoing resolution was received, Jose filed a motion for
reconsideration[27] dated January 20, 2011 before the NLRC, insisting that just causes attended
Fernandez's dismissal, albeit the same was made without procedural due process.

Despite the fact that the NLRC had yet to act on the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, Jose
filed a second motion for reconsideration[28] dated February 2, 2011 before the same tribunal.[29]

Notwithstanding the pendency of the aforesaid motions for reconsideration, Jose filed a petition
for certiorari[30] before the CA, claiming to have secured a copy of the NLRC Resolution and LA
Order only upon personal verification on February 8, 2010[31] and filed a motion for
reconsideration therefrom on April 12, 2011,[32] referring to her second motion for
reconsideration dated February 2, 2011.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision[33] dated September 13, 2012, the CA granted Jose's petition for certiorari, holding
that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in taking cognizance of Fernandez's appeal despite the
latter's failure to furnish Jose copies of her notice of appeal and appeal memorandum in violation
of Article 223 of the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules of Procedure.[34] Said pronouncement was
based on the CA's finding that copies of Fernandez's notice of appeal and appeal memorandum
were sent to one Atty. Ramon E. Solis, Jr., who was her (Fernandez's) own former counsel, and not
Jose's. Thus, in view of Fernandez's failure to comply with the requirements for the perfection of
her appeal, the CA held that Jose was deprived of her right to due process, and that Fernandez's
appeal of the LA Decision had never been perfected, thereby rendering said decision final and
executory,[35] and the NLRC without any authority to entertain Fernandez's recourse.[36]
Accordingly, the CA declared the NLRC Resolution as well as the corresponding entry of
judgment and the LA Order null and void,[37] and reinstated the LA Decision.[38]

Aggrieved, Fernandez sought reconsideration[39] but the same was denied in a Resolution[40]
dated February 11, 2013, hence, the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in holding that the NLRC
gravely abused its discretion in giving due course to Fernandez's appeal.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

At the outset, the Court notes that the CA gravely abused its discretion in giving due course to
respondent's Rule 65 certiorari petition despite its finding that the latter still had a pending motion
for reconsideration from the Decision dated March 15, 2010 before the NLRC.[41] It is settled
that the filing of a motion for reconsideration from the order, resolution or decision of the NLRC
is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can avail of a petition for certiorari.[42]
This is to afford the NLRC an opportunity to rectify its perceived errors or mistakes, if any.[43]
Hence, the more prudent recourse for respondent should have been to move for the immediate
resolution of its motion for reconsideration before the NLRC instead of filing a petition for
certiorari before the CA. [44] Having failed to do so, her petition for certiorari was prematurely
filed,[45] and the CA should have dismissed the same.

On the merits, the Court finds that the CA erred in declaring that the failure of Fernandez to
furnish Jose with copies of her notice of appeal and memorandum of appeal before the NLRC
deprived the latter of her right to due process. [46]

While Article 223[47] of the Labor Code and Section 3(a), Rule VI of the then New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC[48] require the party intending to appeal from the LA's ruling to furnish
the other party a copy of his memorandum of appeal, the Court has held that the mere failure to
serve the same upon the opposing party does not bar the NLRC from giving due course to an
appeal.[49] Such failure is only treated as a formal lapse, an excusable neglect, and, hence, not a
jurisdictional defect warranting the dismissal of an appeal.[50] Instead, the NLRC should require
the appellant to provide the opposing party copies of the notice of appeal and memorandum of
appeal.[51]

In this case, however, the NLRC could not be expected to require compliance from Fernandez, the
appellant, since it was not aware that the opposing party, Jose, was not notified of her appeal.
Hence, it cannot be faulted in relying on Fernandez's representation that she had sent Jose, through
her counsel, a copy of her memorandum of appeal by registered mail,[52] as evidenced by
Registry Receipt No. 006511.[53]

More significantly, it is undisputed that Jose eventually participated in the appeal proceedings by
filing not only one but two motions for reconsideration from the NLRC Resolution, thereby
negating any supposed denial of due process on her part. As held in the case of Angeles v.
Fernandez,[54] the availment of the opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of in labor cases amounts to due process.[55] After all, the essence of due process is
simply the opportunity to be heard or as applied in administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard, thus, an aggrieved
party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to ventilate
his side, as Jose was in this case.[56]

Accordingly, the Court finds that the CA erred in ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the NLRC in taking cognizance of Fernandez's appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 13, 2012 and the
Resolution dated February 11, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 123633 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated March 15, 2010 of the National Labor
Relations Commission and the Order dated August 17, 2010 of the Labor Arbiter are
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 194061, April 20, 2015

EMELIE L. BESAGA, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES FELIPE ACOSTA AND LUZVIMINDA

ACOSTA AND DIGNA MATALANG COCHING, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the October 30, 2009 decision2
and the October 1, 2010 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.'SP No. 100616.

The CA affirmed the decision4 of the Office of the President setting aside the resolution5 of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary. The DENR Secretary
earlier affirmed the orders dated December 1, 20036 and July 26, 20047 of the DENR Regional
Executive Director (RED), Region IV-B-MIMAROPA.8

The Antecedents9

The dispute involved Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514 located at Barangay Port Barton, San Vicente,
Palawan, which are parts of a six-hectare timberland.

On February 11, 2003, Emelie L. Besaga (petitioner) applied for a Special Land Use Permit
(SLUP) for Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514 for a bathing establishment. According to the petitioner,
the lots are covered by Tax Declaration No. 048 in the name of her father, the late Arturo Besaga,
Sr. who allegedly occupied the land during his lifetime.

On February 13, 2003, spouses Felipe and Luzviminda Acosta (respondent spouses) also applied
for SLUP for a bathing establishment over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514. According to the respondent
spouses, they acquired Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514 through a March 19, 1998 Affidavit of Waiver of
Rights executed by Rogelio Maranon, a registered survey claimant, and a February 9, 1999 Joint
Affidavit of Waiver of Rights, executed by Arturo Besaga, Jr.,10 and Digna Matalang Coching
(another respondent in this case), also registered survey claimants.

On September 10, 2003, the respondents challenged the petitioner's SLUP application before the
DENR. On December 1, 2003, the RED issued the order giving due course to the petitioner's
SLUP application and rejecting the respondents' SLUP application. The RED later denied the
respondents' motion for reconsideration on July 26, 2004.

The respondent spouses received the July 26, 2004 order on August 16, 2004. They tiled on.
August 25, 2004, through registered mail, an Appeal Memorandum to the Office of the DENR
Secretary, copy furnished the petitioner's lawyer and the Office of the RED. The appeal fee was
paid on September 10, 2004. Respondent Digna Matalang Coching received the July 26, 2004
order on August 30, 2004 and filed her appeal (which adopted the appeal of the respondent
spouses) on September 16, 2004.

While the appeal was pending in the Office of the DENR Secretary, the RED issued a Certificate
of Finality11 declaring the December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004 orders final and executory for
failure of the respondents to file a Notice of Appeal.

On December 10, 2004, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO)
issued the SLUP12 to the petitioner covering Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514. On November 18,
2005, the SLUP was converted into a Special Forest Land-Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes
(FLAgT).

On August 6, 2006, the DENR Secretary rendered a decision (i) vacating the December 1, 2003
and July 26, 2004 orders of the RED; (ii) amending the coverage of the SLUP of the petitioner to
cover Lot No. 4513 only; and (iii) giving due course to the SLUP of the respondent spouses to
cover Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514.

Acting on the motion for reconsideration13 filed by the petitioner, the DENR Secretary reversed
his August 6, 2006 decision on October 17, 2006 and held that the December 1, 2003 and July 26,
2004 orders of the RED have attained finality because: (i) the respondent spouses filed an Appeal
Memorandum, instead of a Notice of Appeal; (ii) the Appeal Memorandum was directly filed with
the DENR Secretary and not with the RED; and (iii) the respondent spouses failed to pay the
required appeal fees within the reglementary period.

The Office of the President reversed the October 17, 2006 resolution of the DENR Secretary.

The CA, through the assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the decision of the Office of the
President.

The petitioner filed the present petition to contest the CA's ruling.

The DENR's Findings

The RED, relying mainly on the report14 prepared by the chief of Forest Management Services
ruled in favor of the petitioner.
The report gave credence to Tax Declaration No. 048,15 which purportedly showed that Lot Nos.
4512, 4513 and 4514 are parts of the six (6) hectare timberland occupied by the petitioner's father
during his lifetime. The RED also gave weight to the statements of two former Barangay Captains
of Port Barton and the document signed by the alleged occupants of the said six (6) hectare
timberland supporting the petitioner's claim.

The DENR Secretary reversed the orders of the RED in his decision dated August 6, 2006.16

He ruled that the petitioner cannot claim preferential right to apply for an SLUP over Lot Nos.
4512 and 4514 in view of her sweeping allegation that the said lots are part of the six (6) hectare
timberland, which his father possessed in his lifetime and whose possession she tacked. The
DENR Secretary asked: if indeed the petitioner tacked the possession of his father and she was the
actual occupant over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514, why was she not made the survey claimants of the
said lots?

The DENR Secretary found that the respondent spouses have a preferential right over Lot Nos.
4512 and 4514. Rogelio Maranon, the registered survey claimant and occupant of Lot No. 4512,
waived and transferred his right over the lot in favor of the respondent spouses in a duly-notarized
Affidavit of Waiver of Rights. The respondent spouses derived their right over Lot No. 4514 from
Arturo Besaga, Jr. and Digna Matalang Coching, the registered survey claimants, who executed a
duly-notarized Joint-Affidavit of Waiver of Rights over the said lot. The DENR Secretary held that
these are the legal and vital documents (disregarded by the chief of Forest Management Services)
which support the preferential rights of the respondent spouses over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514.

The DENR Secretary, however, reversed his August 6, 2006 decision in a resolution17 dated
October 17, 2006. He ruled that the respondent spouses failed to perfect the appeal because they
filed a Memorandum of Appeal instead of a Notice of Appeal contrary to Section 1(a) of DENR
Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 87, series of 1990.18

The Office of the President's Ruling19

The Office of the President reversed the October 17, 2006 resolution of the DENR Secretary.

It held that the orders of the RED did not become final because there is no law, rule or regulation
prohibiting an appellant to file an appeal memorandum, instead of a notice of appeal, to the office
concerned. It further held that the appeal memorandum itself serves as a sufficient notice of the
party's intention to elevate the case to a higher authority. The Office of the President observed that
in a plethora of cases, notices of appeal are filed directly with the DENR, rather than with the
RED, which practice has not since been prohibited nor made as a ground for the outright dismissal
of the appeal. Finally, it found that the respondent spouses paid the appeal fees. All of these negate
the finding that the respondent spouses did not perfect their appeal to the DENR Secretary.

As to the merits of the case, the Office of the President found that Tax Declaration No. 048 did not
cover Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514 but Lot No. 4741, which is entirely different and distinct
from the contested lots. It gave credence to the Affidavit of Waiver of Rights executed by Rogelio
Maranon and the Joint Affidavit of Waiver of Rights jointly executed by Arturo Besaga, Jr. and
Digna Matalang Coching in favor of the respondent spouses. No countervailing proof was
presented by the petitioner to impugn these affidavits.

The CA's Ruling

The CA sustained the Office of the President. Citing decisions of this Court, it held that rules of
procedure are construed liberally in proceedings before administrative bodies. They are not to be
applied in a very rigid and technical manner, as they are used only to hold secure and not to
override substantial justice.

The CA ruled that the orders of the RED have not attained finality.

The Petition

The petitioner seeks reversal of the CA decision and resolution for being contrary to law and
jurisprudence. She submits that the respondent spouses failed to perfect an appeal in the
administrative proceedings. She argues that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within
the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and that failure to
conform to the rules will render the judgment sought to be reviewed final and unappealable. She
adds that the liberal interpretation of the rules has no clear application in the present case because
the respondents failed to adequately explain their non-compliance therewith.

As is proper under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner does not raise any factual
questions.

Respondent's Comment20

The respondent spouses ask for the petition's dismissal for lack of merit. They submit that the CA
acted in accordance with law and jurisprudence in upholding the ruling of the Office of the
President.

They argue that to dismiss the case on the mere ground of technicalities would mean to dispense
with the determination of the party having preferential right on the disputed lots and could cause
the perpetuation of a wrong. They maintain that the cases cited by the petitioner, where procedural
rules were strictly enforced by this Court, involved violation of the rules either before the trial
court, the CA or before this Court, and not before an administrative agency like the DENR. In
sum, the respondent spouses contend that the orders of the RED have not attained finality, thus,
said orders are still subject to reversal, amendment or modification on appeal.

Issues

The petitioner raises the following issues:21

WHETHER THE APPEAL INTERPOSED BY THE RESPONDENTS WAS CORRECTLY
FILED TO THE DENR SECRETARY AND NOT TO THE REGIONAL OFFICE AS
PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 1 (A) OF DAO NO. 87, SERIES OF 1990;

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS' APPEAL TO THE OFFICE OF THE DENR

SECRETARY WAS PERFECTED DESPITE OF THEIR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
SECTION 1 (A) OF DAO NO. 87, SERIES OF 1990;

WHETHER THE LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL INVOLVING

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS WAS CORRECTLY APPLIED BY THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS IN THE CASE OF RESPONDENTS;

WHETHER THE ASSAILED ORDERS, ISSUED ON DECEMBER 1, 2003 AND JULY 26,
2004, OF THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF DENR REGION IV-MIMAROPA IN
DENR CASE NO. M-003-03-F, WERE ALREADY FINAL AND EXECUTORY;

WHETHER THE PERFECTION OF APPEAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 1 (A) OF

DAO NO. 87, SERIES OF 1990 IS NOT ONLY MANDATORY BUT JURISDICTIONAL; AND

WHETHER THE ORDERS DATED DECEMBER 1, 2003 AND JULY 23, 2014 CAN STILL BE
MODIFIED AND SET ASIDE BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS.

The resolution of these issues hinges on whether the orders of the RED dated December 1, 2003
and July 26, 2004 have attained finality because the respondents filed a Memorandum of Appeal
directly to the DENR Secretary instead of a Notice of Appeal to the RED.

The Court's Ruling

We deny the petition.

The petitioner insists that the filing of a Memorandum of Appeal instead of a Notice of Appeal
was fatal to the respondent spouses' case.

We are not convinced of the merits of this position.

The crux of the dispute is Section 1(a) of DAO No. 87. It provides:

Section 1. Perfection of Appeals. - a) Unless otherwise provided by law or executive order,

appeals from the decisions/orders of the DENR Regional Offices shall be perfected within fifteen
(15) days after the receipt of a copy of the decision/order complained of by the party adversely
affected, by tiling with the Regional Office which adjudicated the case a notice of appeal, serving
copies thereof upon the prevailing party and Office of the Secretary, and paying the required fees.
[Emphasis ours.]
According to the petitioner, this provision is mandatory and jurisdictional. She argues that
respondents filed a defective appeal because: (i) they filed a Memorandum of Appeal instead of a
Notice of Appeal; (ii) directly to the DENR and not to the Regional Office, which adjudicated the
case; and (iii) no docket fee was paid.22

The petitioner cites jurisprudence to bolster her argument that the perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period prescribed by law is not oniy mandatory but also jurisdictional.

We accordingly review the cited cases to determine the correctness of the petitioner's submitted
position.

In Asian Spirit Airlines v. Bautista,23 the CA dismissed the appeal because the appellant failed to
file his brief within the time provided by the Rules of Court. The appellant not only neglected to
file its brief within the stipulated time but also failed to seek an extension of time based on a
cogent ground before the expiration of the time sought to be extended. In sustaining the CA, we
held that liberality in the application of rules of procedure may not be invoked if it will result in
the wanton disregard of the rules or cause needless delay in the administration of justice.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,24 we affirmed the trial court when it considered a
motion for reconsideration pro forma for not containing a notice of hearing. We held that a motion
that does not contain the requisite notice of hearing is nothing but a mere scrap of paper. The clerk
of court does not even have the duty to accept it, much less to bring it to the attention of the
presiding judge.

In Videogram Regulatory Board v. CA,25 the Regional Trial Court granted the petitioner a non-
extendible 15-day period to file a Petition for Review from the decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court. The petitioner failed to file the petition despite the extension. We held that the requirements
for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly
followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly
discharge of judicial business.

In MC Engineering, Inc. v. NLRC,26 we affirm the CA when it denied due course to the
petitioner's appeal because of its failure to explain why another mode of service other than
personal service was resorted to. We held that an affidavit of service is required merely as proof
that service has been made to the other parties in a case. It is a requirement totally different from
the requirement that an explanation be made if personal service of pleadings was not resorted to.

Finally, in Artistica Ceramica v. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowner's Association, Inc.,27 the issue
was whether the petitioner properly filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We held that as a rule, the remedy from a
judgment or final order of the CA is appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. The failure to file the
appeal within the 15-day reglementary period under Rule 45 is not an excuse to use Rule 65. Rule
65 is not a substitute for a lost appeal,
In sum, all these cases strictly applied the rule that the right to appeal is a mere statutory right and
the party who avails of such right must comply with the law. Otherwise, the right to appeal is lost.

To reiterate, these involved violations of the Rules of Court while the cases were pending in the
trial court, the CA or before this Court. They do not involved violation of administrative rules of
procedure. They are not strictly applicable in the present case.

The Nature of Administrative

Rules of Procedure

It is true that the right to appeal, being merely a statutory privilege, should be exercised in the
manner prescribed by law. This has been consistently held in relation to non-observance by a
party-litigant of the Rules of Court and failure to offer a valid and acceptable excuse for non-
compliance.

Yet, it is equally true that in proceedings before administrative bodies the general rule has always
been liberality.

Strict compliance with the rules of procedure in administrative cases is not required by law.28
Administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their object to
assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective
claims and defenses.29

In Birkenstock Orthopaedie GmbH and Co. KG v. Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corp.,30 we
held:

It is well-settled that the rules of procedure are mere tools aimed at facilitating the attainment of
justice, rather than its frustration. A strict and rigid application of the rules must always be
eschewed when it would subvert the primary objective of the rules, that is, to enhance fair trials
and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the
other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities, x x x This is especially true
with quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, such as the IPO, which are not bound by technical
rules of procedure. [Emphasis supplied.]

The liberality of procedure in administrative actions, however, is subject to limitations imposed by

the requirements of due process.31

Administrative due process means reasonable opportunity to be heard. As held in Vivo v.

Pagcor.32

The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of procedural
due process. The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative
proceedings, this means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot
be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type
hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied.
[Emphasis supplied.]

Where due process is present, the administrative decision is generally sustained.33

Thus, while this Court allows liberal construction of administrative rules of procedure to enhance
fair trial and expedite justice, we are keenly aware that liberal construction has no application
when due process is violated. The crucial point of inquiry in cases involving violation of
administrative rules of procedure is whether such violation disregards the basic tenets of
administrative due process. If the gravity of the violation of the rules is such that due process is
breached, the rules of procedure should be strictly applied. Otherwise, the rules are liberally
construed.

Liberal Construction as
Applied in the Present Case

It is undisputed that the respondent spouses, instead of filing a Notice of Appeal to the RED, filed
a Memorandum of Appeal to the DENR Secretary within the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period.
They paid the appeal fee, although beyond the fifteen (15)-day period. These violate Section 1 (a)
of DAO No. 87 which requires the filing of a Notice of Appeal and the payment of the appeal fee
within the reglementary period.

Do these errors breach due process so as to call for the strict application of administrative rules of
procedure? Is there basis for the liberal construction of the rules?

We uphold liberality.

First, there is no violation of due process. In fact, to sustain the position of the petitioner and
strictly apply Section l(a) of DAO No. 87 may violate the respondent spouses right to due process
as this would result to a denial of their right to appeal.

We stress that the respondent spouses appealed within the reglementary period. The appeal was
timely filed, albeit not directly to the office which issued the order sought to be reviewed. They
also paid the full appeal fees although beyond the 15-day period.

We hold that these procedural lapses were neither prejudicial nor unfair to the petitioner. The
petitioner's right to due process was not breached.

Notably, both the petitioner and the RED were furnished copies of the Memorandum of Appeal, a
fact that the petitioner did not deny.34
We agree with the observation of the Office of the President that the Memorandum of Appeal
essentially served the purpose of the Notice of Appeal. The filing of the Memorandum of Appeal
had the same practical effect had a Notice of Appeal been filed: inform the RED that his order is
sought to be appealed to the DENR Secretary.

Significantly, the respondent spouses notified the petitioner of the filing of the Memorandum of
Appeal. The petitioner subsequently filed her opposition thereto. When the DENR Secretary
initially ruled in favor of the respondent spouses, the petitioner tiled a motion for reconsideration
of the said decision.

Clearly, the petitioner participated in every stage of the administrative proceeding. Her right to be
heard was not compromised despite the wrong mode of appeal.

As to the late payment of the appeal fee, suffice it to say that this Court has disregarded late
payment of appeal fees at the administrative level in order to render substantial justice.35

Second, the liberal construction of DAO No. 87 would serve its purpose, i.e., grant a party the
right to appeal decisions of the Regional Offices to the DENR Secretary in order for the latter to
review the findings of the former. To disallow appeal in this case would not only work injustice to
the respondent spouses, it would also diminish the DENR Secretary's power to review the decision
of the RED. It would deny the DENR Secretary the opportunity to correct, at the earliest
opportunity, "errors of judgment" of his subordinates. This is obviously not the intent of DAO No.
87.

Finally, the petitioner failed to convince us why liberality should not be applied. The petitioner
does not claim that her right to due process was violated as a result of the wrong mode of appeal.
The petitioner merely asks this Court to strictly construe DAO No. 87 and affirm the orders of the
RED, which according to her, have attained finality.

Between strict construction of administrative rules of procedure for their own sake and their
liberal application in order to enhance fair trials and expedite justice, we uphold the latter. After
all, administrative rules of procedure do not operate in a vacuum. The rules facilitate just, speedy
and inexpensive resolution of disputes before administrative bodies. The better policy is to apply
these rules in a manner that would give effect rather than defeat their intended purpose.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the October 30, 2009
decision and October 1, 2010 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100616,
affirming the August 13, 2007 decision of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 06-K-398.

SO ORDERED.
FELIX B. PEREZ and AMANTE G. DORIA, Petitioners, vs PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND
TELEPHONE COMPANY and JOSE LUIS SANTIAGO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 152048; April 7, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioners Felix B. Perez and Amante G. Doria were employed by respondent Philippine
Telegraph and Telephone Company (PT&T) as shipping clerk and supervisor, respectively, in
PT&T’s Shipping Section, Materials Management Group. Acting on an alleged unsigned letter
regarding anomalous transactions at the Shipping Section, respondents formed a special audit
team to investigate the matter. It was discovered that the Shipping Section jacked up the value of
the freight costs for goods shipped and that the duplicates of the shipping documents allegedly
showed traces of tampering, alteration and superimposition.

Petitioners were placed on preventive suspension for 30 days for their alleged involvement in the
anomaly. Their suspension was extended for 15 days twice. Then in a Memorandum, petitioners
were dismissed from the service for having falsified company documents. Petitioners filed a
complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal alleging that they were dismissed on
November 8, 1993, the date they received the above-mentioned memorandum.

LA favored petitioners. NLRC reversed the decision of LA. Petitioners appealed to CA. CA
affirmed the NLRC decision insofar as petitioners’ illegal suspension for 15 days and dismissal for
just cause were concerned. However, it found that petitioners were dismissed without due process.
Petitioners now seek a reversal of the CA decision before the SC. They contend that there was no
just cause for their dismissal, that they were not accorded due process and that they were illegally
suspended for 30 days.

ISSUE:

Whether respondents were dismissed for just cause and with the observance of due process.

RULING:

Respondents’ evidence is insufficient to clearly and convincingly establish the facts from which
the loss of confidence resulted. Other than their bare allegations and the fact that such documents
came into petitioners’ hands at some point, respondents should have provided evidence of
petitioners’ functions, the extent of their duties, the procedure in the handling and approval of
shipping requests and the fact that no personnel other than petitioners were involved. The
alterations on the shipping documents could not reasonably be attributed to petitioners because it
was never proven that petitioners alone had control of or access to these documents.
Willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative is a just cause for termination. However, loss of confidence should not be
simulated. It should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or
unjustified. Loss of confidence may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming
evidence to the contrary. It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify an earlier action
taken in bad faith.

The burden of proof rests on the employer to establish that the dismissal is for cause in view of the
security of tenure that employees enjoy under the Constitution and the Labor Code. The
employer’s evidence must clearly and convincingly show the facts on which the loss of confidence
in the employee may be fairly made to rest. It must be adequately proven by substantial evidence.
Respondents failed to discharge this burden.

Respondents’ illegal act of dismissing petitioners was aggravated by their failure to observe due
process. To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal of an employee, an employer
must furnish the worker with 2 written notices: (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for
termination and giving to said employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2)
another written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds have
been established to justify the employer’s decision to dismiss the employee.

Petitioners were neither apprised of the charges against them nor given a chance to defend
themselves. They were simply and arbitrarily separated from work and served notices of
termination in total disregard of their rights to due process and security of tenure. Respondents
failed to comply with the two-notice requirement for terminating employees.

We note a marked difference in the standards of due process to be followed as prescribed in the
Labor Code and its implementing rules. The Labor Code provides that an employer must provide
the employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative if he so desires.

The omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code, on the other hand, require a hearing and
conference during which the employee concerned is given the opportunity to respond to the
charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him.

In case of conflict, the law prevails over the administrative regulations implementing it. The
authority to promulgate implementing rules proceeds from the law itself. To be valid, a rule or
regulation must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute. As such,
it cannot amend the law either by abridging or expanding its scope.

Article 277(b) of the Labor Code provides that, in cases of termination for a just cause, an
employee must be given “ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.” Thus, the
opportunity to be heard afforded by law to the employee is qualified by the word “ample” which
ordinarily means “considerably more than adequate or sufficient.” In this regard, the phrase
“ample opportunity to be heard” can be reasonably interpreted as extensive enough to cover actual
hearing or conference. To this extent, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI
of the Labor Code is in conformity with Article 277(b).

Nonetheless, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code should
not be taken to mean that holding an actual hearing or conference is a condition sine qua non for
compliance with the due process requirement in termination of employment. The test for the fair
procedure guaranteed under Article 277(b) cannot be whether there has been a formal
pretermination confrontation between the employer and the employee. The “ample opportunity to
be heard” standard is neither synonymous nor similar to a formal hearing.

The standard for the hearing requirement, ample opportunity, is couched in general language
revealing the legislative intent to give some degree of flexibility or adaptability to meet the
peculiarities of a given situation. To confine it to a single rigid proceeding such as a formal
hearing will defeat its spirit.

Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code itself provides that
the so-called standards of due process outlined therein shall be observed “substantially,” not
strictly. This is a recognition that while a formal hearing or conference is ideal, it is not an
absolute, mandatory or exclusive avenue of due process.

A hearing means that a party should be given a chance to adduce his evidence to support his side
of the case and that the evidence should be taken into account in the adjudication of the
controversy. “To be heard” does not mean verbal argumentation alone inasmuch as one may be
heard just as effectively through written explanations, submissions or pleadings. Therefore, while
the phrase “ample opportunity to be heard” may in fact include an actual hearing, it is not limited
to a formal hearing only. The existence of an actual, formal “trial-type” hearing, although
preferred, is not absolutely necessary to satisfy the employee’s right to be heard.

Due process of law simply means giving opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. In
fact, there is no violation of due process even if no hearing was conducted, where the party was
given a chance to explain his side of the controversy. What is frowned upon is the denial of the
opportunity to be heard. Twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements
of due process in the dismissal of employees. It is deemed sufficient for the employer to follow the
natural sequence of notice, hearing and judgment.

In sum, the following are the guiding principles in connection with the hearing requirement in
dismissal cases:

(a) “ample opportunity to be heard” means any meaningful opportunity (verbal or written) given
to the employee to answer the charges against him and submit evidence in support of his defense,
whether in a hearing, conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way.

(b) a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when requested by the employee in
writing or substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company rule or practice requires it, or when
similar circumstances justify it.
(c) the “ample opportunity to be heard” standard in the Labor Code prevails over the “hearing or
conference” requirement in the implementing rules and regulations.

On the other hand, an employee may be validly suspended by the employer for just cause provided
by law. Such suspension shall only be for a period of 30 days, after which the employee shall
either be reinstated or paid his wages during the extended period.

Where the dismissal was without just or authorized cause and there was no due process, Article
279 of the Labor Code mandates that the employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time the compensation was not paid up to
the time of actual reinstatement. In this case, however, reinstatement is no longer possible because
of the length of time that has passed from the date of the incident to final resolution. 14 years have
transpired from the time petitioners were wrongfully dismissed. To order reinstatement at this
juncture will no longer serve any prudent or practical purpose. So petitioners will just be paid their
separation pay.

Petition is hereby GRANTED.

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.

Facts:

On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No.
7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates,
and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and
Similar Establishments in the City of Manila” (the Ordinance).” The ordinance sanctions any
person or corporation who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than 12
hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.

The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa
Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and motels in
Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the
ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests as operators. The respondents, in turn,
alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.

RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it “strikes at the personal liberty of the
individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution.” Reference was made to the
provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed
investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that
the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by
simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities the
power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including
tourist guides and transports. Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila
Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the
sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace,
good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix
penalties for the violation of ordinances.

Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to
privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable
and oppressive interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance.
First, it held that the ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as
it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time
stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful
object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it
aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed
to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its
constituents in general.

Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.

Issue:

Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.

Held:

No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as such, it
is unconstitutional.

The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but
the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City
Mayor of Manila. The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes
beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three
ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit
activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein
there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments
have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State
can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila
has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4)
must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy;
and (6) must not be unreasonable.

The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate
admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted
in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code
through such implements as the general welfare clause.

Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to
protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied
actions by the State.

The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means
must align with the Constitution.

SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed
strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint
imposed by the law that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the
petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the
constitutional rights of their patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short time
access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. The rights at stake herein fell
within the same fundamental rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was
defined by Justice Malcolm to include “the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which
he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the
common welfare,

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion of it
should be justified by a compelling state interest. Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right
to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the
personal life of the citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the
petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of
the ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the
means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for
its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and
those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be
diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the
proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in
easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing
prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the
petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the ordinance can easily be
circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in
illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from their
clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.

SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan
that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well¬-
intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights
of the establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of
the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient
justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a
day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED,
and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance
No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.

Estrada v Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001.

7/13/2010
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Facts: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA
7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes
to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but
distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a
stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly
because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the
"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea
in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear
violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.

That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY
with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER
PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY,
RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-
gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF
THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES through ANY OR A
combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS.

RESPECTIVELY OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED

FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN
PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE
WITH JOHN DOES JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF
SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE
OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT
IN THE EQUITABLE BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE'

Issue: R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the following grounds:

I. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR ITS VAGUENESS
II. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO KNOW THE
NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM
III. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE BY LOWERING THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE
NECESSARY FOR PROVING THE COMPONENT ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER
IV. IT IS BEYOND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO
DELIMIT THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD AND TO ABOLISH THE ELEMENT OF
MENS REA IN MALA IN SE CRIMES BY CONVERTING THESE TO MALA PROHIBITA, IN
VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.
Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder
Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the
law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Ratio:

In view of vagueness and ambiguity

Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the
words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so
long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is
distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal
hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or
special legal meaning to those words 8 The intention of the lawmakers — who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers — to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is
always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly
accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"

Combination — the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To

combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series — a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and
temporal succession.

Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and
"series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. As for
"pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently
defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2. . . under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern'
consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1)
to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is
directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful
scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall
unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and
public officer and others conniving with him, follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the
alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple
accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.

With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free
from ambiguity, as in this case. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however,
that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be
upheld — not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient
notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-
vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways,
but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define
the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited by the statute.

In view of due process

On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder
Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of
overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The running fault in this reasoning
is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes,
the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that
culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.

What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts
sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an
amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in
the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill- gotten wealth.

In view of mens rea

As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se
which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion — . . . Precisely
because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a
prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of
plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on
the part of petitioner.

[With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its
people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an
actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it
governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effect and repercussions of crimes
like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving
government official, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause
further destruction and damage to society. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for
plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg.
22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080,
on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to
resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray
38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is
constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect,
assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.

In view of presumption of innocence

At all events, let me stress that the power to construe law is essentially judicial. To declare
what the law shall be is a legislative power, but to declare what the law is or has been is judicial.
Statutes enacted by Congress cannot be expected to spell out with mathematical precision how the
law should be interpreted under any and all given situations. The application of the law will
depend on the facts and circumstances as adduced by evidence which will then be considered,
weighed and evaluated by the courts. Indeed, it is the constitutionally mandated function of the
courts to interpret, construe and apply the law as would give flesh and blood to the true meaning
of legislative enactments.

A construction should be rejected if it gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that
does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted and that tends to defeat the
ends that are sought to be attained by its enactment. Viewed broadly, "plunder involves not just
plain thievery but economic depredation which affects not just private parties or personal interests
but the nation as a whole." Invariably, plunder partakes of the nature of "a crime against national
interest which must be stopped, and if possible, stopped permanently."

In view of estoppel
Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080. The case at
bar has been subject to controversy principally due to the personalities involved herein. The fact
that one of petitioner's counsels was a co-sponsor of the Plunder Law and petitioner himself voted
for its passage when he was still a Senator would not in any put him in estoppel to question its
constitutionality. The rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of law. Moreover, estoppel
should be resorted to only as a means of preventing injustice. To hold that petitioner is estopped
from questioning the validity of R.A. No. 7080 because he had earlier voted for its passage would
result in injustice not only to him, but to all others who may be held liable under this statute.

What is RICO
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act is a United States federal law that
provides for extended criminal penalties and a civil cause of action for acts performed as part of
an ongoing criminal organization. RICO was enacted by section 901(a) of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 (Pub.L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, enacted October 15, 1970). RICO is codified as
Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1961–1968. While its intended use
was to prosecute the Mafia as well as others who were actively engaged in organized crime, its
application has been more widespread.

In view of facial challenge

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes
regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for
rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes
with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not
be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.'

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the
State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

In view of burden of proof (accused) according to PANGANIBAN, J.

In sum, the law must be proven to be clearly and unequivocally repugnant to the Constitution
before this Court may declare its unconstitutionality. To strike down the law, there must be a clear
showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute allows to be done. 40 To justify the
nullification of the law, there must be a clear, unequivocal breach of the Constitution; not a
doubtful, argumentative implication. 41 Of some terms in the law which are easily clarified by
judicial construction, petitioner has, at best, managed merely to point out alleged ambiguities. Far
from establishing, by clear and unmistakable terms, any patent and glaring conflict with the
Constitution, the constitutional challenge to the Anti-Plunder law must fail. For just as the accused
is entitled to the presumption of innocence in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt, so
must a law be accorded the presumption of constitutionality without the same requisite quantum of
proof.

Petitioner now concludes that the Anti-Plunder Law "eliminates proof of each and every
component criminal act of plunder by the accused and limits itself to establishing just the pattern
of over or criminal acts indicative of unlawful scheme or conspiracy."

All told, the above explanation is in consonance with what is often perceived to be the reality
with respect to the crime of plunder — that "the actual extent of the crime may not, in its breadth
and entirety, be discovered, by reason of the 'stealth and secrecy' in which it is committed and the
involvement of 'so many persons here and abroad and [the fact that it] touches so many states and
territorial units."'
 "The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or argumentative implication; a
law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond a
reasonable doubt. 'The presumption is always in favor of constitutionality . . . To doubt is to
sustain.'

In view of burden of proof (State) according to KAPUNAN, J.

The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process as well as the right of
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. A criminal
statute should not be so vague and uncertain that "men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application. There are three distinct considerations for
the vagueness doctrine. First, the doctrine is designed to ensure that individuals are properly
warned ex ante of the criminal consequences of their conduct. This "fair notice" rationale was
articulated in United States v. Harriss: The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by
a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be
held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be
proscribed.

While the dictum that laws be clear and definite does not require Congress to spell out with
mathematical certainty the standards to which an individual must conform his conduct, it is
necessary that statutes provide reasonable standards to guide prospective conduct. And where a
statute imposes criminal sanctions, the standard of certainty is higher. The penalty imposable on
the person found guilty of violating R.A. No. 7080 is reclusion perpetua to death. Given such
penalty, the standard of clarity and definiteness required of R.A. No. 7080 is unarguably higher
than that of other laws.

It has been incorrectly suggested that petitioner cannot mount a "facial challenge" to the
Plunder Law, and that "facial" or "on its face" challenges seek the total invalidation of a statute. Fr.
Bernas, for his part, pointed to several problematical portions of the law that were left unclarified.
He posed the question: "How can you have a 'series' of criminal acts if the elements that are
supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?" The meanings of "combination"
and "series" as used in R.A. No. 7080 are not clear.

To quote Fr. Bernas again: "How can you have a 'series' of criminal acts if the elements that are
supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?" Because of this, it is easier to
convict for plunder and sentence the accused to death than to convict him for each of the
component crimes otherwise punishable under the Revised Penal Code and other laws which are
bailable offenses. The resultant absurdity strikes at the very heart if the constitutional guarantees
of due process and equal protection.

The component acts constituting plunder, a heinous crime, being inherently wrongful and
immoral, are patently mala in se, even if punished by a special law and accordingly, criminal
intent must clearly be established together with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no
crime is committed. By eliminating mens rea, R.A. 7080 does not require the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the component acts constituting plunder and imposes a lesser burden of
proof on the prosecution, thus paying the way for the imposition of the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death on the accused, in plain violation of the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Constitution.

It obfuscates the mind to ponder that such an ambiguous law as R.A. No. 7080 would put on
the balance the life and liberty of the accused against whom all the resources of the State are
arrayed. It could be used as a tool against political enemies and a weapon of hate and revenge by
whoever wields the levers of power.

In view of due process according to YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

It is an ancient maxim in law that in times of frenzy and excitement, when the desire to do justice
is tarnished by anger and vengeance, there is always the danger that vital protections accorded an
accused may be taken away.

Substantive due process dictates that there should be no arbitrariness, unreasonableness or

ambiguity in any law which deprives a person of his life or liberty. The trial and other procedures
leading to conviction may be fair and proper. But if the law itself is not reasonable legislation, due
process is violated. Thus, an accused may not be sentenced to suffer the lethal injection or life
imprisonment for an offense understood only after judicial construction takes over where
Congress left off, and interpretation supplies its meaning.

The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process as well as the right of
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Substantive due
process requires that a criminal statute should not be vague and uncertain. More explicitly — That
the terms of a penal statute. . . must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it
what conduct on their part will render them liable to penalties, is a well-recognized requirement,
consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law. And a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of
due process.

In its early formulation, the overbreadth doctrine states that a governmental purpose to control
or prevent activities constitutionally subject to regulation may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. 9
A statute, especially one involving criminal prosecution, must be definite to be valid. A statute is
vague or overbroad, in violation of the due process clause, where its language does not convey
sufficiently definite warning to the average person as to the prohibited conduct. A statute is
unconstitutionally vague if people of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.

In malversation or bribery under the Revised Penal Code, the criminal intent is an important
element of the criminal acts. Under the Plunder Law, it is enough that the acts are committed.
Equally disagreeable is the provision of the Plunder Law which does away with the requirement
that each and every component of the criminal act of plunder be proved and instead limits itself to
proving only a pattern of overt acts indicative of the unlawful scheme or conspiracy. 18 In effect,
the law seeks to penalize the accused only on the basis of a proven scheme or conspiracy, and does
away with the rights of the accused insofar as the component crimes are concerned. In other
words, R.A. No. 7080 circumvents the obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime of plunder, because the law requires merely
proof of a pattern of overt acts showing an unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

I agree with petitioner's concern over the danger that the trial court may allow the
specifications of details in an information to validate a statute inherently void for vagueness. An
information cannot rise higher than the statute upon which it is based. Not even the construction
by the Sandiganbayan of a vague or ambiguous provision can supply the missing ingredients of
the Plunder Law. The right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him is most often exemplified in the care with which a complaint or information should be
drafted. However, the clarity and particularity required of an information should also be present in
the law upon which the charges are based. If the penal law is vague, any particularity in the
information will come from the prosecutor. The prosecution takes over the role of Congress.

In view of vagueness according to SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

As a basic premise, we have to accept that even a person accused of a crime possesses
inviolable rights founded on the Constitution which even the welfare of the society as a whole
cannot override. The rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution are not subject to political
bargaining or to the calculus of social interest. Thus, no matter how socially-relevant the purpose
of a law is, it must be nullified if it tramples upon the basic rights of the accused.

When Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080 mandates that it shall not be necessary for the prosecution to
prove each and every criminal act done by the accused, the legislature, in effect, rendered the
enumerated "criminal acts" under Section 1 (d) merely as means and not as essential elements of
plunder. This is constitutionally infirmed and repugnant to the basic idea of justice and fair play.
As a matter of due process, the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged. The State may not
specify a lesser burden of proof for an element of a crime. 8 With more reason, it should not be
allowed to go around the principle by characterizing an essential element of plunder merely as a
"means" of committing the crime. For the result is the reduction of the burden of the prosecution
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

In short, all that R.A. No. 7080 requires is that each Justice must be convinced of the existence
of a "combination or series." As to which criminal acts constitute a combination or series, the
Justices need not be in full agreement. Surely, this would cover-up a wide disagreement among
them about just what the accused actually did or did not do. Stated differently, even if the Justices
are not unified in their determination on what criminal acts were actually committed by the
accused, which need not be proved under the law, still, they could convict him of plunder.

The Special Prosecution Division Panel defines it as "at least three of the acts enumerated
under Section 1(d) thereof." 33 But it can very well be interpreted as only one act repeated at least
three times. And the Office of the Solicitor General, invoking the deliberations of the House of
Representatives, contends differently. It defines the term series as a "repetition" or pertaining to
"two or more."

A statute which is so vague as to permit the infliction of capital punishment on acts already
punished with lesser penalties by clearly formulated law is unconstitutional. The vagueness cannot
be cured by judicial construction.

In fine, I can only stress that the one on trial here is not Mr. Estrada, but R.A. No. 7080. The
issue before this Court is not the guilt or innocence of the accused, but the constitutionality of the
law. I vote to grant the petition, not because I favor Mr. Estrada, but because I look beyond today
and I see that this law can pose a serious threat to the life, liberty and property of anyone who may
come under its unconstitutional provisions. As a member of this Court, my duty is to see to it that
the law conforms to the Constitution and no other. I simply cannot, in good conscience, fortify a
law that is patently unconstitutional.

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., vs.ANTI-TERRORISM

COUNCIL, et. al G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010 chilling effect, facial challenge, Human
Security Act of 2007, in terrorem effect
OCTOBER 6, 2017
FACTS:

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime
of terrorism under RA 9372 (the Human Security Act of 2007) in that terms like “widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure
the prohibited acts.

ISSUE:

Can the Human Security Act of 2007 be facially challenged on the grounds of vagueness and
overbreadh doctrines?

RULING:

No.

A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of
constitutional litigation are rightly excepted.
In Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan it was held that:

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because
of possible”chilling effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting
some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected
speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the
State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (5th Div.) and the
PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES

[G.R. No. 152259; July 29, 2004] Constitutional Law| Overbreadth Doctrine| Facial Challenge|

FACTS:

Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)

National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO)
Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO)
The PCGG filed an information before Sandiganbayan charging Alfredo Romualdez of violation
of Sec. 5 of the Anti-Graft Law. Said petitioner is the brother-in-law of former Pres. Ferdinand
Marcos, that he allegedly “intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract between NASSCO, a gov’t
owned and controlled corporation and BASECO, a private corporation, the majority stocks of
which is owned by former President Marcos.
Petitioner contends that Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft Law is unconstitutional because
its vagueness violates the due process right of an individual to be informed of the nature and the
cause of the accusation against him.

ISSUES:

Whether Sec. 5 of RA 3019 is unconstitutional;

Whether the information is vague.
HELD:

Section 5 of the Anti-Graft Law is constitutional. It penalizes certain presidential relatives who
“intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the
Government.” This provision is not vague or “impermissibly broad,” because it can easily be
understood with the use of simple statutory construction. Neither may the constitutionality of a
criminal statute such as this be challenged on the basis of the “overbreadth” and the “void-for-
vagueness” doctrines, which apply only to free-speech cases. Overbreadth and the vagueness
doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases. They are not appropriate for testing
the validity of penal statutes

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

People of the Philippines vs Cayat

In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or
any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera,
was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to
pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he
challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his
right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them
with discrimination or “mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled” will meet
with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians
from Christians.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.

HELD: No. The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable
classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the
characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable
requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;

(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not
merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon “accident of birth or
parentage.” The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as “an inferior or
less capable race.” On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the
public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the
enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no
true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has
endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for
them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their
Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.
from Drinking Gin

In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or
any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera,
was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to
pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he
challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his
right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them
with discrimination or “mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled” will meet
with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians
from Christians.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.

HELD: No. The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable
classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the
characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable
requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;

(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not
merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon “accident of birth or
parentage.” The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as “an inferior or
less capable race.” On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the
public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the
enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no
true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has
endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for
them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their
Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.