European Mana ement Review (2005) 2,36-47

0 2005 EURAM Palgrave Macrnillan Ltd. All rig?& resewed 1740-4754/05 $30.00
palgrave-journals.com/emr

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~owardsan epistemology of collective
action: management research as a
responsive and actionabIe discipline
Armand Hatchuel
Ecole des Mines de Paris/Fenix Center, Chalmers Institute, Goteborg

Correspondence:
A Hatchuel, Ecole des Mines de Paris/Fenix Center, Chalrners Institute, Goteborg.
E-mail: Armand.hatchuel@cgs.ensrnp.fr

Published online: 27 May 2005

Abstract
Critics simultaneously question the relevance of academic knowledge about manage-
ment, the scientific unity of the field and the performance of business schools. They signal
the lack of an adequate epistemology for management research. This paper explores the
possible nature of such an epistemology. Classic epistemology looked for universal truth
but ended up accepting a model of action: the experimental method. Contemporary
critiques of classic epistemology offer relativist views about truth but focus on metaphysics
of action, that is, false universals of collective action. Truth being dependant of models of
action, a useful epistemology can be defined as the research-based revision of these
models. It is quite different from pragmatism and relativism: applied to the ‘knowing
observer’ it led to important discoveries in physics and mathematics. Management
research should similarly recognize that each knowing method gives access to different
truths and corresponds to a different conception of responsiveness and actionability. The
identity and value of management research is also clarified as opposing metaphysics of
action and developing a research process for the identification and revision of new models
of action. Four examples of management research leading to such revision are discussed:
the theory of management instruments vs the metaphysics of social control; the theory of
prescribers vs the metaphysics of markets and hierarchies; the theory of collective
knowledge production vs the metaphysics of expertise; the theory of innovative design vs
the metaphysics of R&D projects. Within an epistemology of collective action, manage-
ment research can be defined as a basic discipline and not as an applied one.
European Management Review (2005) 2, 36-47, advance online publication, 27 May 2005
d0i:lO.l OS7/palgrave.emr.l500029
Keywords: management theory; epistemology; modernity; post-modernism; action theory

To act at all is to confess limits. et al., 1996). Evidence of this change can be found in the
John William Miller historical growth of the institutions devoted to manage-
ment teaching and diffusion, including business schools,
Introduction: the paradox of management consulting firms, conferences, journals, and so on (Ken
Starkey et al., 2004).
Yet, the social recognition of management contrasts with
The dual status of management research - social success but the controversial academic status of management theory
criticism and research which is criticized at three levels: its lack of

A
lmost one century after Fayol and Taylor, management
has gained wide social legitimacy. At least, the
historical mission that was in the mind of the founders
of modern Management has succeeded to build a popular
culture and a shared language that helps people cope with
the organizational revolution in modern societies (Clegg
scientific unity (the ‘paradigm wars’), its lack of action-
ability (the ‘relevance gap’) and the limited efficiency of
its educating institutions (the criticism of business school
curriculum and results). This paper revisits these con-
troversies from a different perspective. For me, these
debates are not the sign of a systemic failure of manage-
 Towards an epistemology of collective action
ment research but the signal of a necessary aggiornamento.
What is needed is a better definition of the scientific identity
and value of management research for contemporary
societies.
A field mature enough for reflection and revision
Hopefully, reflection and revision are now easier than
during the early years of the field. As any young academic
domain, management research has explored a wide variety
of studies and methodologies. Both its achievements and
the recurring criticism it has generated constitute a basis
for renewal. There are academic signs ‘...that the
transformation is beginning to take place. Still the work
has just begun and does not point in a single direction’
(Huff and Huff, 2001: S49). Recent literature on the research
experience in different countries’ suggests that the paradox
between the social and the academic history of management
comes from the inadequate epistemological foundations of
the latter.’
During its years of formation, academic management had
no epistemology that was consistent with its research
program (Nodoushani, 2000). It had to import classic
epistemology with its own controversies, both the modern
view of knowledge and its critics. Pettigrew suggests that
‘there is a widespread view that management has taken
more fi-om the social sciences and has given little back’
(2001: S64). Is this surprising? Within classic epistemology,
the core issue of discussion is the nature of ‘universal truth’
and/or ‘general knowledge’. Our problem is that manage-
ment research makes sense only in human contexts where
collective action is transformative and creative and where
the definition of the ‘truth‘ or the ‘real’ depends on models
of action that determine a knowing process. Now we need
to decide what could be the specific epistemology of such
ventures and how could it contribute in return to other
sciences?
The epistemological enigma of management research
I support the hypothesis that for management theory, the
central epistemological issue is not ‘truth’ but ‘action’. This
does not mean that academic management should turn to a
pragmatic or practical epistemology (James 1907; Wicks
and Edward, 1998; Aram and Salipante, 2003) where action
is seen simply as the ‘hands-on’ solution. Within this
conception academic research disappears. On the contrary,
we have learned from management research that ‘action’, be
it a phenomena to observe or the observing process itself, is
the central theoretical enigma and not a ready made and
obvious universal. Thus an ‘epistemology of action’ stands
for the idea that ‘action’ is the unknown and mysterious
category. Moreover, from the point of view of management
research, pure individualistic and isolated action with no
observer, no stakeholder and no cooperation would be of
little interest and its existence could even be questioned.
Consequently, management research can be defined as the
identification, criticism and invention of models of collective
action. In a management-relevant epistemology ‘truth‘ is
still a major and inevitable issue, yet it is a dependant one.
‘Accessible truth’ is defined as that we are able to ‘manage’,
that is, that we can reach through an identified ‘model of
collective action’. In this paper, for the sake of brevity we
Armand Hatchuel 3 37
will somehow indifferently use the words ‘action’ or
‘collective action’.
Opposing metaphysics of action
The perspective I am advocating avoids traditional
cleavages. When it was a question of criticizing old models
of action in companies, as Fayol (against pure owner’s
governance) and Taylor (against shop floor bargaining)
did, classic rationality and positivism served as a new and
creative epistemology of action. Today, however, in
common with critiques of modernity, it is important to
reject the idea of dogmatic knowledge. However, we must
also refuse the idea of relativism per se advocated by critical
movements and post-modernist trends, which leads ironi-
cally (as shown later) to a blind reliance on metaphysics of
action, that is, false universals of action. In short, manage-
ment research can be defined as the discipline that is
opposed to metaphysics of action.
Overview of the paper
The next section summarizes three criticisms of manage-
ment research the relevance of academic knowledge, the
scientific unity of the field and the performance of business
schools. It is suggested that these criticisms are the
consequence of an epistemological trap resulting from
classic epistemology’s critique of management research.
The subsequent section recalls the principles of classic
epistemology and suggests how the experimental method
substitutes the good management of an action process for
the observer. It surveys contemporary relativisms opposing
to classic epistemology that all insist on a new class of
metaphysics about how we act on other humans and on
the world. As appropriate ‘epistemology of action’ - the
objective of this paper - is defined as the critique and
research-based revision of these false universals of action.
The third section recalls some important results in
physics and mathematics (mainly Mandelbrot, 1999;
Bertrand, 1889) which are examples of an epistemology of
action applied to the revision of the usual concept of
‘measurement’. Through surprising paradoxes, we discover
that seemingly simple ‘measurement’ is an action that may
create the ‘real’ it claims to describe: a central issue for
management research and practice. These examples are
used to formulate the main propositions of the new
epistemology. A key hypothesis, relevant to the purpose
of this special issue, is that theories of collective action
become contingent, historic, and provisional in the same
way as scientific theories.
The next section uses this and other propositions to
define actionability and responsiveness in management
research. It examines some contributions of management
research to the criticism of the metaphysics of social
control, markets, hierarchies, learning and R&D. The
conclusion of this paper is that management research can
be defined as a basic discipline and not as an applied one. A
discipline that explores collective action, not as a closed
repertoire of organizational forms and rationalities but as
an expandable field where criticism and research allow for
revision and invention.
*
38
Towards an epistemology of collective action
Paradigm wars, the relevance gap and business school
critics: an epistemological trap?
During the last 30 years, the management and organization
literature has informed readers about persistent contro-
versies and debates. This could be seen as a sign of vitality
and dynamism of the field. However, this optimistic view is
tempered by the fact that these controversies simulta-
neously attack three important, if not vital, pillars of an
academic field the relevance of the knowledge produced, its
epistemological foundations and finally, its educational
institutions. Considered together, controversy in these
areas signals the necessity of exploring new perspectives.
Revisiting them, even briefly, clarifies arguments in favour
of an epistemological revision.
Are the ‘paradigm wars’ paradigmatic for management
research?
The first steps of management theory are widely viewed as
rationalistic and functionalist. Later, several schools of
thought introduced social and human perspectives to the
field. Yet, the criticism of the first positivistic approach did
not pave the way for a new paradigm, that is, a new set of
assumptions governing the field. Instead, management
theory had to cope with the complexities of the social
sciences as a ‘multiple paradigm field’ (Sorge, 2002).
However, classic descriptions of competing paradigms in
the social sciences (Burrell, 2002; Sorge, 2002) reveal no
paradigmatic controversy about the identity of manage-
ment research. In one presentation of these paradigms that
has been widely discussed (Burrell, 2002), different para-
digms for organization theory are positioned in a matrix
having two dimensions: a ‘subjectivelobjective’ dimension,
and a ‘regulationhadical change’ dimension. These dimen-
sions appear as the basic epistemological assumptions
behind the various paradigms. The first axis ‘subjective1
objective’ is about the nature of truth and can be related to
the heritage of classic epistemology. But what about the
second one which opposes two models of action: ‘regula-
tionlradical change’? Why should management research
consider as universal and paradigmatic such an over-
simplistic theory of action?
From a management point of view, ‘regulation and
radical change’ are only two variants within an open set of
‘models of action’ or grammars of action. This observation
has an important consequence: If management research
provides a more complex framework of change, it could
partly reshape the existing paradigms of the social sciences!
Hence, the existing ‘paradigm wars’ could be less paradig-
matic than it seems for management research. Moreover,
most of the controversies in the field are not built on a
theory of management as such, but are still driven by the
‘objectivelsubjective’ issue or by the opposition between
contextual (monographic) vs general knowledge (survey
based) (Tsoukas, 1989; Cook and Seely Brown, 1999; Calori,
2002). As we will see later in this paper, the new debates
created by post-modernist litterature maintain discussion
on these issues while being dogmatic about the models of
action they advocate. The conclusion from this observation
is that the debate about what is paradigmatic for manage-
ment research is still in front of us.
Armand Hatchuel
The ‘Relevance gap’ and actionable knowledge: an issue in
methodology
Recently Starkey and Madan (2001) discussed the ‘rele-
vance gap’ in management, that is, the widespread doubts
about the usefulness of existing academic knowledge.
Starkey and Madan also advocate new modes of knowledge
production based on collaborative research work with
practitioners. In 2004, the organizers of the AOM con-
ference in New-Orleans added their voice to this cause by
calling for the development of ‘actionable knowledge’ in
management. This opens a debate that is obviously
paradigmatic for management research (Hatchuel, 2001b).
As suggested by Weick (2001) in his comment on the
Starkey and Madan paper, we need more theoretical
clarification about what is ‘actionable knowledge’. Unfortu-
nately, there is no universal criteria that would help us
recognize what is an actionable knowledge.
The existence of such criteria would mean that we have a
universal theory of action or a model of action that would
be of universal value. Therefore, the ‘relevance gap’ should
be interpreted in an epistemological way. It cannot simply
mean that academic knowledge should be more ‘practical’
as if we knew what ‘practical’ means. To define ‘relevance’
more rigorously it is necessary to make ‘actionability’ a
research issue in management like ‘therapy’ is a research
issue in medicine. And this has strong consequences for
research methodology.
For example, let us assume that research has established
the proposition P: ‘good coordination increases team
performance.’ Is P ‘actionable’? In spite of its universalistic
formulation, P alone cannot be said ‘true’. What can be
said to be true is P contextualized, hence conditioned,
by the hypothesis and knowing instruments that gave
access to such ‘truth’. In this case, the operationalization
of ‘coordination’, ‘performance’, ‘team’ is required. It is
not P alone, but ‘P and the research m e t h ~ d ’that ~ are
required to discuss ‘actionability’as the research method is
itself a ‘model of action’! This is obvious in all scientific
fields. For instance, in Medicine, the efficiency of a remedy
means that some parts of the proof methodology (how the
medicine has been absorbed, in which quantity, when, to
whom and so one) will be prescribed to other physicians in
order to obtain the curing impact. Further, actionability
also depends on the background (and the capacities,
including instruments) of the people informed of the
research method and making their own sense of it (Weick,
2001).
Hence, ‘to be actionable’ is the result of the specific inter-
actions between two different contextualizations: C1, the
academic methodology of knowledge production and C2,
the reception processes that could in return inform
academic methodology. Actionability is not given: it is a
phenomena that can be studied and evaluated ifand on& if
the interaction between C1 and C2 is settled and designed
as an integral part of the research agenda. For sure, any
knowledge may be discovered actionable ex post. Yet, only
specific research methodologies treat ‘actionability’itself as
a research issue and as a condition of knowledge
production and validation. These methodologies belong to
the experimental method’s heritage and we will see below
that the experimental method was an epistemological shift
in classic views of knowledge.
 In management, collaborative forms of research, when
they follow a rigorous academic protocol, clearly belong to
this tradition and offer the possibility to introduce some
criteria of actionability in their methodology (Hatchuel and
Weil, 1995; Adler et al., 2004). Collaborative research does
not necessarily produce actionable knowledge, but this is a
‘relevant’ design parameter of the research method. Being
‘relevant’ (and being actionable) is not an issue in classic
epistemology: it is not a discussion about the universality of
‘truth’. It is an inquiry about how academia and society can
built cooperation and co-design models of research.
This also shows how the epistemology of management
research is embedded in management research itself. Let us
assume that a new research protocol, M, is established
between scholars and some companies in order to improve
the quality and validity of a survey. M could be viewed both
as a scientific innovation (through its results) and as an
invention in management if it generates for instance a new
model of organization, cooperation or alliance. Thus M, as
a new model of management, would appear as a requisite
for the accessibility to new ‘truths’ in management science.
The famous Hawthorne experiments showed such simulta-
neous effects: they gave birth to a new school about
productivity at work and the experiments themselves
initiated a new production management model - the
introduction of human-oriented staff at the shopfloor. That
Management research is both a cause and a consequence of
the evolution of management is another sign that the field
needs a specific epistemology.
The critics of management education: an epistemological trap
Management education (mainly the education of MBAs)
has been criticized even by renowned scholars (Mintzberg
and Gosling, 2002; Pfeffer and Fong, 2004). In all academic
fields, even in the natural sciences, educational methods
and institutions are objects of debate. In most cases it is not
the content of knowledge that is discussed but pedagogy. In
management, however, critical arguments deeply link
content and teaching methods. Both the lack of scientific
unity of the field and the relevance gap are deeply involved
in criticisms of business schools. For Mintzberg and his
colleagues (2002), management education should really
prepare and train competent managers. In that case, the
lack of relevance of academic knowledge is a main obstacle
and this explains their claim that less academic education is
required. For Pfeffer and Fong (2004), in contrast, business
studies should leave their short-sighted professional view
and adopt the logic and ethics of true scholarship. However,
the lack of scientific unity and identity of the field is also
part of the criticism made by these authors.
To summarize, academic management seems trapped in
vicious circles that impede any consistent identity, be it as a
professional field or an academic field or a hybrid. Can we
avoid these vicious circles? Even briefly revisiting these
controversies suggests that the vicious circles are artifac-
tual. They result from an inadequate epistemology where
truth is the central issue and action is seen as a self-evident
notion. The lack of an adequate epistemology nurtures
paradigm wars that are not paradigmatic for management
theory and reinforces a relevance gap by not understanding
that actionability is not a property of knowledge per se but
is itself an important research issue. In the next section of
this paper I offer a more systematic treatment of this
assertion by discussing traditional epistemology and its
critics.
Traditional epistemology and its critique: competing
conceptions of truth
In the West, epistemology is inseparable from the history of
‘truth’. When Galileo published his famous ‘Dialogue
concerning the two Chief World Systems’ (1632), he set
the truth of new Copernican knowledge against the old
metaphysics of Aristotle. But the new science had its own
mysteries and the victory against the old dogmas was not
sufficient to explain the ‘truth‘ of ‘scientific’ knowledge.
The nature of scientific knowledge: the quest for universal laws
How could human ‘reason’ which reinterpreted even the
most assured of truths be defined? And where did evidence
of the ‘laws’ it observed come from? From Galileo to
Descartes, and Hume to Kant, this debate provided the
framework for an epistemology designed above all as a
critical exploration of the conditions of ‘truth’. Yet it was
soon necessary to invent major variations in this tradition.
At first, the question of truth led to a fresh exploration of
the conditions of knowledge. Kant dissected the ‘antinomies
of reason’ and insisted on the primacy of ‘transcendental’
schemes such as causality and logic. The knowing subject is
not just an observer, from Kant’s point of view. The
observer uses active interpretation schemes to order the
results of his senses and judgement. But where do these
schemes come from? The assurance provided by the laws of
science creates the feeling that these schemes reflect the
reality or the nature from which universal determinism
reveals the superiority of scientific method.
This was how Kant helped create classic epistemology:
the laws of the world were considered to be independent of
human reason, which merely uncovers them. Despite the
success of this scientific idealism, however, the quarrel over
epistemology did not cease, but was merely displaced.
Mechanical things (movement of the planets, homogeneous
bodies) seemed to obey invariable laws, but knowledge of
chemical or living beings, especially human beings
(medicine, behaviour, etc.) proved much more enigmatic.
Observation and good sense no longer went hand in hand.
At this point ‘experience’ was elevated to science. Not
the immediate experience of radical empiricism, but the
‘experimental method’ - that is to say, empirical investiga-
tion became an action completely directed towards the
controlled production of a ‘real’ that is forced to declare
itself. It was precisely in the field of medicine that this was
formulated most explicitly by Claude Bernard in 1867.
Bernard, who discovered experimentally the role of the
pancreas and several physiological transformations, criti-
cized classical Anatomic observations and showed that they
could not reveal the real biological behaviour of bodies.
Management as a hidden requisite for scientific truth: the
epistemological shift of the experimental method
In experimental research, the production of ‘the truth’
demands much more than thinking and simple observation.
 Towards an epistemology of collective action
40
Many activities (building a laboratory, a test bed, etc.) must
be organized and numerous devices (repeated measure-
ments, modification of factors, adequate collection of data,
etc.) must be decided upon. Observers must accept the
operations which make up the experimental condition in
order to discuss the content of the knowledge produced.
Important changes were taking place with this develop-
ment, an understanding of which are crucial for the whole
of our own analysis. Most important: the epistemology of
the experimental method could no longer be reduced to a
philosophy of knowledge or to data treatment. The
experimenter must be clear in his intentions and the
methods that are intrinsic to his acts. Above all, in the end,
his results will be circumstantial and limited to the actions
undertaken. Experimentation is therefore a domestication
of the real, an active and managed domestication issuing
from an investigator who is both a strategist and prepared
for the surprises of his own action. Without it being clearly
stated, the experimental method broadened the scope of
epistemology, because the experimenting researcher had to
be an acting, enquiring and administrating investigator.
Knowledge was first and foremost the reward of the correct
management of the experiment.
The influence of the experimental method on Science was
considerable, but the question of truth nonetheless
remained at the heart of the epistemological debate. This
was particularly so in the case of American pragmatism.
Charles Peirce (1878) made any concept into a hypothetical
signifier which was only validated by the ‘effects’that could
be attributed to it, effects which were themselves evaluated
through experiment. A hypothesis is therefore a provisional
belief which will be confirmed or not, in accordance with
the tests of the experiment. The ‘true’ is therefore
provisional and relative to the interpretation of action.
The only acceptable criteria becomes that of the success of
the experiment, a success which always relates to the initial
aim of the subject. Peirce tried also a systematic approach
to operations of inference, an undertaking which only really
became a scientific revolution with the development of the
theory of contemporary statistical inference, which clearly
demonstrates that inference and theoretical modelling of
the real are inseparable and disqualifies any theory of
interpretation per se.
Despite its name and the image it is commonly given,
Pragmatism as developed by Pierce and others is not a
theory of action but a theory of truth, defined as belief
systems which can be revised through action. Action is
reduced to the signs that cause beliefs to evolve. We will see
later how contemporary physics and mathematics, rever-
sing pragmatism, have turned concepts of action into a new
subject of inquiry. The pragmatist simply asks action to
bear witness to the idea, to be its temporary guarantor. It is
easy to understand why Emile Durkheim, one of the
founding fathers of sociology, shared the arguments of
pragmatism concerning the provisional nature of truth, but
also criticized at length the absence of a theory of collective
action in Pragmatism (Durkheim, 1955). In defence of
Pragmatism, one might remark that few observers have
understood that the experimental method went far beyond
a practical view of truth. Kant substituted an active
knowing investigator for the traditional observer. This
investigator designs and manages a knowledge producing
Armand Hatchuel
‘dispositif (Foucault, 1966) and expects that this dispositif
will uncover a portion of the real.
Contemporary critiques of classic epistemology: the ever-present
question of truth
It was after the Second World War that the most radical
critiques of traditional epistemology appeared. Above all,
they tried to remove the authority that Science had been
accorded by contemporary societies. The arguments of
these new critics echoed criticisms of modern society itself.
Three trends are of interest to our discussion: post-
modernism, dialogic relativism, and constructivism. The
critique of truth remains their central issue, but references
to doctrines of action as an antidote to relativism are to be
found throughout.
Post-modernism and the fate of domination
Post-modernism is certainly the most radical of these
movements. Lyotard (1979, 1984), one of its principal
theoreticians, stresses the inevitability of ‘differend’ (dis-
agreement) in human societies. Differend makes all
dialogue impossible or useless. There is no longer any
global knowledge capable of giving coherence to a set of
views, even at the level of a simple conversation! For
Lyotard, nothing can force subjects to construct a common
meaning. Knowledge therefore disappears, to be replaced
by ‘information’ that is completely malleable depending on
those addressed and the viewpoints of those concerned. An
equally absolute kind of relativism can be found in
Feyerabend (1988). His famous ‘anything goes’ expresses
two radical ideas. First, that science’s most important
discoveries owe nothing to scientific method. Second, that
scientific knowledge is not superior to mythological
knowledge. Post-modernism thus dismisses back-to-back
the two protagonists introduced by Galileo (Copernicus and
Aristotle). Each now represents only one vision of the
world - a narrative account - among many other possible
narratives.
Post-modernist arguments have had a visible, but limited
and controversial impact on contemporary research on
management and organizations (Hassard, 1994, 1999). Yet,
it is interesting to remark in their defense that post-
modernist authors make an important claim. They
emphasize that it is worthwhile to avoid domination and
that it is important to protect critical minorities within an
academic field (Burrell, 2002). One can also remark that in
this perspective a model of collective action, the protection
of diversity, is not discussed as such and is taken as a
universal solution for the production of knowledge.
Dialogic reason in quest of a model of action
In the light of ancient rhetoric, this post-modernist critique
takes on a different meaning. The problem of points of
reference in knowledge never worried the sophist (Laufer,
2001) for whom knowledge and organization are not a
question of science but of persuasion and conviction.
Rhetoric is thus a system of action before it is a system of
truth. It does not even pre-suppose consent to discussion,
since this may be obtained by arousing curiosity or by
seduction. The rhetorical tradition offers us a particularly
interesting conception, on condition that it is reinstated as
 Towards an epistemology of collective action
an analysis of action. This avenue has been particularly well
explored by Laufer (2001).
Nonetheless, some authors hope that rhetoric can
provide a dialogical reason (Myerson, 1994). At first sight,
dialogue does not aim to suppress the variety of points of
view or to demonstrate the superiority of one over another.
It simply supposes that the multiplicity of viewpoints is not
immutable, that they can influence one another, and are not
condemned to banish or ignore one another. Nonetheless,
the different viewpoints do not possess an equal aptitude
for dialogue and mutual enrichment. Does not Cartesian
doubt lend itself more readily to dialogue than dogma and
eternal truths? Habermas (1987) emphasized this point by
affirming the preliminaries to dialogue and the need to
organize to allow for the expression of arguments and a
critical examination of them. Dialogical rationalism (Myer-
son, 1994) therefore has an implicit price. It does not know
what a universal truth is but claims to know how to
organize a good dialogue. It is based on a metaphysic of
debate and exchange.
Constructivism and the necessity of procedure
With constructivist epistemologies (Le Moigne, 1999), the
call to action as a solution to the problem of knowledge
becomes more r a d i ~ a l . Constructivism
~ takes up the
critiques of rationality by countering the idealisms which
were the foundation of theoretical economy and modern
science at the beginning of the 20th century. From a
constructivist viewpoint, future action cannot flow from
present knowledge alone into possible means or desirable
ends because this knowledge, whatever kind it may be, is
always uncertain and partial. Consequently, ‘the path is
built by walking’ (A. Machado quoted by Le Moigne, 1997).
In other words, knowledge and action develop together.
Over and above these unquestionably stimulating premises,
however, it remains difficult to find a research project
favourable to constructivism.
One can nonetheless note the principal influences which
support this approach. Piaget’s ‘Genetic Epistemology’ is
one of the most important. For our purposes, it is
interesting to observe that Piaget makes use of a theory
of learning as a simultaneous model of action and
generation of the ‘real’. The influence of Herbert Simon
has also left its mark on the constructivist movement.
Simon not only opposed substantive rationality, he
introduced the notion of bounded and procedural ration-
ality. The latter is one of the most revealing ideas in
constructivism, since it places the essence of truth in the
procedure, that is to say, in action! Yet, Constructivist
movements have not tried to build a critical theory of
procedure. Moreover, despite its promises, constructivism,
in its turn, still proposes action as an idealized solution to
the problem of truth.
Move to the metaphysics of action
Since critical epistemologies no longer provide any stable
reference points for knowledge, they cannot conceive of
truth other than by referring to archetypical models of
action, models which are then put forward as obvious, if
not miraculous solutions to the problem of knowledge. For
instance, the more relativism is confirmed, the greater the
Armand Hatchuel
41
need to put forward a positive model of dialogue. The more
we renounce knowledge, the more we must suppose that
action creates learning processes. In all the forms it has
taken, contemporary relativism has amplified the depen-
dence between knowledge and a universal model of action!
However, none of the schools cited draw the necessary
theoretical conclusion: reversing the direction of analysis
reveals the question of action as a central epistemological
issue.
Contemporary relativism is limited to building upon the
presuppositions relative to action and to mobilizing
metaphysics of action (or collective action). I use this term
(Hatchuel, 2001a) to describe the representations of action
which reduce collective action to a single principle or
subject (individual or collective) without understanding
how this principle or subject works. These are therefore
falsely universal representations of collective action. How-
ever, by using this observation as a starting-point, the place
and need for a reversed epistemology clearly emerges.
Science in general, and management in particular, needs an
epistemology that does not put action forward as a solution
but as the central, enigmatic question - the real subject of
research and the grounds for its critique. Before returning
to management issues let us see such an epistemology at
work in physics and mathematics with surprising results.
Epistemology of action as a critical movement within the
contemporary sciences: what means measuring?
The precursor of a more complete epistemology of action
can be seen in many major discoveries from physics and
mathematics. These breakthroughs proceeded from a
critical examination of pre-suppositions relative to the
action of the knowing investigator. In physics, the most
famous come from Einstein and Heisenberg. Einstein’s
theory of relativity was based on the idea that the ‘truth of
time’ was dependant on the relative movement of observers
who had to synchronize their clocks. Heisenberg is also
celebrated for his analysis of the interaction between the
observer and the observed, which led to his well-known
uncertainty formulas concerning the position or the energy
of observed particles. In both cases, we clearly see that the
central subject of inquiry and criticism is how the observer
thinks about his own action of observing. These are well-
known examples, but I have chosen to go into more detail
with two other example? closer to mathematics where the
action of measuring is under scrutiny. Measuring is also a
central issue in management research and we shall see how
the discoveries made by Mandelbrot and Bertrand clarify
the necessary epistemology of measurement in manage-
ment and more generally reveal the status of management
instruments (see next section).
Mandelbrot and the epistemology of measuring length
Traditionally, we know that a line is a space in dimension 1,
a plane a space in dimension 2, a cube a space in dimension
3, etc. But what is a space in dimension 1.5 or 2.3?
Mandelbrot developed this idea from an apparently
elementary question: ‘What is the length of the coast of
Brittany?’ At first sight there is nothing mysterious about
that. Nonetheless, if we ask ourselves how to take this
measurement, strange phenomena appear. At first, obtain-
 Towards an epistemology of collective action
42
ing a value (of length) does not pose a problem. One only
has to give oneself a unit of measurement (kilometre, metre,
millimetre, etc.), and an acceptable degree of precision, for
a true length to become accessible. At this stage, a
traditional experimenter or a pragmatist, in Peirce’s
(1878) sense of the term, would see in this only a perfect
illustration of his doctrine of truth. The length of the coast
of Brittany is, in fact, a conventional and interpretive truth,
relative to consensus about the scale to be adopted. But
Mandelbrot’s discoveries smashed traditional relativism
and conventionalism to smithereens. By studying, not ‘the
effects of the concept of length‘, to adopt Peirce’s language,
but the very enigmas of the act of measuring and its strange
properties, Mandelbrot’s approach illustrates what sepa-
rates traditional pragmatism from a contemporary episte-
mology of action.
Mandelbrot was intrigued by this strange property of
measurement: the length of the coast increases indefinitely,
depending on the measuring scale adopted. To understand
the total strangeness of this observation, it should be noted
that the phenomenon does not occur if one measures, using
the same conventions, the length of a triangle or a circle!
For geometric figures, the length calculated grows first with
the scale, and then converges rapidly towards an asympto-
tic value (which is the theoretical calculable length).
However, the length of the coast of Brittany does not have
asymptotes. It will grow indefinitely, so long as one can
reduce the scale of measurement. Thus the ‘length‘ of a
curve is not a simple problem of consensus! Moreover, and
this is the crucial point, Mandelbrot discovered that the rate
of variation of the length depending on the scale used is a
particularly interesting measurement: it constitutes a new
and profound definition of the idea of ‘dimension.’ It
enabled fractional dimensions to be imagined and opened
up the vast field of fractal geometry.
The critical point is that we can only measure (including
by consensus) that which we have, ourselves, made
measurable beforehand: for example, a calculable geometric
shape. As for the rest, measuring is an act which is both
conforming (may be self-fulfilling) and exploratory (dis-
covers the ‘real’). In other words, measuring creates as
many realities as it uncovers or destroys. This remark also
defines the epistemology of every quantitative indicator in
the field of management, for example, all the measurements
involved in accounting.
Bertrand and the paradoxes of probability measurement
Mandelbrot interacted with an object which seemed to him
to be outside himself. With Bertrand’s paradoxes, the
epistemology of action operates at the very heart of
reasoning: it has no need of any ‘real’ other than the theory
itself. The important result is that the epistemology of
action is now revealed as a critique oftheories ofaction and
not only practices such as measurement techniques.
In 1889 the mathematician Bertrand published certain
paradoxes of the calculation of probabilities. One famous
example stemmed from the following problem: Given a
circle, what is the probability that a rope thrown
haphazardly is longer than the length of the side of the
equilateral triangle described within this circle C? Here
again, at first sight, nothing seems problematic: we can
Armand Hatchuel
easily calculate an exact value for this probability. Where is
the hidden paradox?
The surprise came when Bertrand made several calcula-
tions, all exact, but without obtaining the same result! After
discovering this paradox, pragmatic readers may think of
resorting to the judgement of the experiment (throwing a
great many ropes). They hope this will settle the question
since the experiment can only result in a single value and
that would be the only true value. Here, however, action
does not even have the result it did for Mandelbrot. It might
be hoped that action would at least have the power to
decide against the ambiguities of calculation. However,
Bertrand shows (through calculation) that the experiment
cannot be carried out without first choosing a conception of
chance. However, this choice will irremediably lead the
experimental process towards the value predicted by the
calculation! The paradox was subtle. We knew that the
expression ‘rope thrown haphazardly‘ had several possible
meanings. However, depending on our definition of a rope,
chance is calculated differently! As a result, three possible
definitions of a rope will lead to three different values of
probability.
Once again, action was not the solution, but the
overlooked problem. NaYve experimentation revealed noth-
ing, and even masked the phenomenon. Only a skilful
critique of the interaction between the definition of the rope
and the construction of chance shed light on the paradox.
Because a metaphysic of action found its way into the
classic theory of probabilities, it took the talent of a
Bertrand to root it out. His demonstration is one of the
purest critiques of pragmatism and of all radical empiri-
cism. It also shows clearly why management research
cannot rely on simple pragmatism and non-reflexive
measurements but needs a wide and inventive theory of
action.
All of these examples from contemporary science offer us
powerful pleas in favour of an epistemology of action.
Equally clearly, it can be seen that it is a question of an
expansion of classic epistemology that is required, and not
a radical relativism! We can now propose a systematic set of
assumptions that define an epistemology of action.
Five propositions of an epistomology of collective action
H1. An extension of classic epistemology: The required
epistemology of action does not refute classic epistemology,
but widens its field of analysis. In common with classic
epistemology, it rejects dogmatic knowledge (old meta-
physics).
H2. Collective action as the central research enigma:
Collective action is considered to be a broader central issue
than the question of truth. For example, it is no longer a
question of affirming, like certain relativisms, that the truth
is a question of consensus, but a question of examining the
different conditions under which ‘consensus’ is produced.
The conditions of consensus between mathematicians, for
example, are very specific, since there is no ‘fact’
independent of the mathematicians themselves: it is these
conditions which make axiomatic theory necessary and
possible and not the reverse.
H3. Research methodology: a principle of accessible truth.
Research methodologies are specific forms of collective
 Towards an epistemology of collective action
action; they do not determine the nature of truth per se, but
only the content and value of the truths that they render
accessible.
For example, in the field of management different
research methods have been developed classic research
surveys, monographs, collaborative forms of research, and
so on. These methods are not only based on different types
of ‘data’ (as usually said) but on different models of action
on the ‘real’ which determine what is called ‘data’ through
this model of action. Therefore they do not give access to the
same type of truths and they cannot define actionability or
relevance in the same way. Each of these methods should
take its place in management research according to its
specific ability to contribute to the core issue of the field:
the identification and/or invention of new models of action
similarly depends on their potential contribution (David
and Hatchuel, 2004).
H4. Models of action can be defined through axiomatic
operators: We must abandon the Weberian idea that we can
define the ‘rationality’ of an ‘action’ (be it a substantive or a
procedural one) as if ‘action’ was given or self-evident.
Instead, like Mandelbrot’s length or Bertrand’s ropes, we
have to recognize the operators by which we make an
action observable or knowable. For instance, we cannot
observe ‘coordination’ or ‘performance’. We need models
and theories that temptatively make them visible. Still, this
is not enough. We have to create observable events that can
be related to these theories. These operators determine the
accessible truths about an action and therefore the basis for
its possible management.
I have suggested (Hatchuel, 2001a) that there are only
two interdependent classes of operators that seem to play
an axiomatic role in the formation of a model of action for
all sciences:
Operators of relation: (ethnic, social, power, hierarchi-
cal.. . ) All differentiations that define subject - subject and
subject - collective relationships.
Operators of knowledge: (emotions, senses, gestures,
symbols.. .) All means that define subject - object relation-
ships through rationalizations and codifications (language,
representations, medias, memories, and so on).
One can remark that traditional social sciences tend to
favour one of these classes. Economics builds knowledge-
based models of action, while sociology and psychology
insist on relational models. However, from the point of view
of an epistemology of action these two classes of operators
are both necessary and inseparable. It might appear that
these operators could be universal but there exists no
closed repertoire or given list of these two classes. Likewise
in mathematics, set theory seems to be a universal
language, but it cannot determine the nature of numbers
or the objects that mathematics can generate and study.
H5. Theories of collective action are not universal
invariants: From the preceding epistemology of action,
and therefore for management research, it follows that the
traditional universals of action: organization, rationality,
social processes, values, networks and so on are not
invariants or basic universals. When they are submitted
to epistemological interrogation, they become liable to
revision, discovery and a subject for research (David et al.,
2001). Under certain conditions therefore, collective action
leads to its own reform, and theories of collective action
Armand Hatchuel
43
become contingent, historic, and provisional in the same
way that all scientific theories are.
Taken together, these five propositions avoid the pitfalls
of classic epistemology and of pure relativism. Above all,
they establish the epistemological foundations of manage-
ment research as a field where theories of collective action
are the central issue. They are theories that can be shared
with or be independent from the paradigms of other social
sciences.
Discussion: the identity and value of management research.
The production of responsive and actionable knowledge
This final section discusses the identity and value of
management research when actionability and responsive-
ness are considered as central methodological issues.
The identity of management research: an epistemological
perspective
(a) Responding to the expandable nature of modern
organizations
Management research is linked to the entrepreneurial
revolution of the modern era. ‘Companies’ and ‘organized
trade’ (markets, shops, fairs.. .) are a collective invention
of the West. Unlike traditional organizations (families,
churches, public authorities etc.), these new collective
ventures are not based on any transcendental value and
in principal, are destined to a transitory existence!
Management research therefore cannot be based on a
universal nature of these ventures and must study the
collective processes which make or break what ‘the
company‘ or any ‘managed‘activity is at any given moment.
The artefactual nature of these collectives has theoretical
and methodological consequences. The most important of
these relates to the expandable rationality (Hatchuel, 2002)
of companies and organizations. They are the theatre of
multiple innovations and critical processes (human devel-
opment, environmental issues, anti-globalization, etc.) that
have the ability to generate human commitment, know-
ledge, symbolic systems, and expansion. The collective
design of new models of action is the engine of their
expandable nature and their survival. It is this collective
potential, never certain and always unfinished, which
explains the birth of management research and defines its
scientific identity and mission: to theorize about the
activation of collective potential.’
(b) Actionable knowledge as the revision of models of action
The expandable nature of companies prevents management
research from putting forward a substantive theory of
management that would deny this ‘expandability‘. Manage-
ment research studies the theoretical instruments which
enable the collective designhedesign of models of collective
action (Hatchuel, 2001b).
Therefore, the foundations of management research
merge with the very same elements of the epistemology of
action previously defined (see section on Move to the
metaphysics of action), in the same way as traditional
science merges with classic epistemology. Let us take the
example of the very common notion of ‘command’ (in its
*
44
Towards an epistemology of collective action
usual sense of conduct or govern). A universal definition of
‘command‘ runs the risk of creating a metaphysic of action
which draws on common pre-suppositions. Following the
principles and operators of the epistemology of action,
however, we should ask ourselves how we would go about
observing a command activity or recognizing a new form of
command? The arguments for an epistemology of action
developed in this paper tell us that the activity of command
is inseparable from operators of relation and knowledge,
which will determine accessible truths about ‘command’.
That being the case, the most well-described types of
command implicitly stem from the operators that we know
and the actionable renewal of ‘command’ is inseparable
from new developments of these operators. However, this
renewal cannot be achieved by itself. It is not simple
adaptation. Neither is it a question of discovering hidden
aspects of command that must be uncovered, but of
designing new forms of command which will become, in
some cases, accessible truths. In other words, ‘command’ is
the same as any other model of action, even one as ordinary
as that of a ‘chair’. The creative chair that a talented
designer creates is not an occurrence of the universal idea
of chair! Nor is it a pragmatic effect of the concept of chair!
It is a manifestation of the expandability of the very concept
of ‘chair’ (Hatchuel, 2002) made possible through collective
action. Management research operates in the same way on
any model of action. It considers them neither as universals
nor as empirical realities, but as constitutional and
revisable concepts that allow activities and organisations
to be actionable and relatively ‘true’.
The value and results of management research: some indications
This discussion cannot summarize several decades of
management research, but can show how epistemology of
action sheds new light on some contributions of manage-
ment research. Above all the discussion constitutes a
theoretical way forward. Four issues are briefly discussed: a
theory of management instruments as a criticism of the
invariance of social control; a theory of prescribed activity
and prescribers as a critique of markets and hierarchies; a
theory of collective knowledge production as a critique of a
universal theory of learning and expertise; and finally, a
theory of collective innovative design as a critique of the
metaphysics of R&D and projects.
(a) A theory of management instruments vs the metaphysics
of social control
The idea of ‘social control’ is almost universal. This is
however a false universal. As early as the Middle Ages and
during the Renaissance, the inventive renewal of the
accounting system’ showed that commercial activity could
not content itself with traditional forms of control. Neither
family ties, religion, nor feudal hierarchies generated the
operators of knowledge (subject - objects relationships)
and relation (subject - subjects relationships) that allowed
trade expansion. Accounting systems produced a new
epistemology of action founded on the idea of ‘account’
and ‘balance’, as well as the elaboration of account books
and their special jurisdictions. This epistemology has been
active for five centuries. However, it embodies a manu-
factured and non-traditional conception of network and
Armand Hatchuel
social control. The development of accounting meant it was
no longer a question of positions in lineages, prerogatives
and rank but of a set of ‘management instrument^'^ which
determined, independent of common social networks, the
validity and justice of a particular kind of collective
action.”
The accounting system is only one particular form of
management instrument. Another contribution of manage-
ment research was to characterize this category in its
theoretical generality, to show the paradoxical nature of
these instruments which can prescribe (generate confor-
mity) or enrich (invent new views, allow new voices)
‘reality’ (Hatchuel and Molet, 1986; Moisdon, 1997).” The
concept of ‘management instrument’ makes sense only
within an epistemology of action. Indeed, it is both
axiomatic and revisable and its basic components have
been identified (Hatchuel and Weil, 1995). One of the
important consequences of this theory deserves to be
reiterated in Mandelbrot’s terms, as developed earlier, a
quantified management measure (profit, productivity, etc.)
may create the real that it wishes to render accessible if
there is no clear epistemology of the measuring action.I2
The idea of the management instrument also redefines the
concepts of organization. How can one recognize an
organization without identifying the management instru-
ments which enable it to be put in action? In fact,
rationality cannot operate without a management instru-
ment, be it the simplest in the world. The history of
management instruments is therefore a specific marker for
the history and genealogy of rationality (Townley 2005).13
(b) A theory of prescribers (and prescribed action) vs the
metaphysics of market and hierarchy
The figure of the accountant is still only one particular form
of ‘prescriber’ and the more management instruments
develop, the more the activity of prescription and the role
of ‘prescribers’ expands in contemporary society. The
activity of prescription has the particularity of making
some form of collective action possible. Although the
prescriber does not lead collective action, he or she is one of
its designers. Classic economics has sought out the ‘laws of
the market’ as a theory of collective action but these laws
are based on some well-known metaphysic of action.14 If
one examines more closely the conditions under which
trade is exercised, one discovers few laws but many more
prescribers conditioning the exchanges. Trading activities
are particularly dependent on many third parties who make
and unmake the epistemology of the commercial act. The
financial analyst, the critic, and the magazine which gives
stars to objects or services, are also common prescribers.
They manage markets even if they do not totally master
them. Hatchuel (1995) has proposed a theory of prescrip-
tion-based markets (march& B prescripteurs), which argues
that markets are only made accessible (become true) thanks
to the existence of these prescription relationships within
society. This theory extends easily to hierarchy and
delegation. The famous distinction between staff and line,
born with modern organizational charts, ratifies the
prescribers (also called functional departments) necessary
to any hierarchy. Finally, the prescriber resolves crises of
collective action either because it knows the world better or
 Towards an epistemology of collective action
because it restores a legitimate system of action and
pacified relationships (Laufer, 2001). From the point of
view of management research, the prescribers-prescribed
model opens a class of models of action much richer than
existing models of hierarchies, markets or ‘networks’.
(c) A theory of collective knowledge production vs
metaphysics of learning and expertise
How are prescribers born, and how do they act and die?
Just as Management instruments are markers of changes in
rationality, the history of prescribers reveals the history
of the relationships between expertise and organization,
and therefore that of the processes of the production of
knowledge in collective action. Is it a question of
competence that can be built up? Of skills that can be
acquired or transferred? Of institutional power? Of com-
munity based or individual learning? These are universa-
listic ways of tackling the question of knowledge
production. However, a thorough epistemology of action
can shape these variables differently. Hatchuel and Weil
(1995) have distinguished between the epistemology of the
craftsman, the repairer, and the designer - strategist. Each
of these epistemologies correspond to a different collective
model of knowledge production, sharing and validation.
This distinction also enables to characterize long trend
changes in the shaping of contemporary organizations.
Traditional forms of management were shaped by the
epistemology of the craftsman. Societies such as ours
which are characterized by risk, innovation and the desire
for empowerment, strengthen the epistemologies of the
repairer and the strategist, and neglect the craftsman
epistemology. Linked to these epistemologies of collective
knowledge production, there is a potential for the
emergence of new forms of organization (Hatchuel et al.,
2002), depending on the context.
(d) A theoly of innovative design vs metaphysics of R&D
projects
As a result of this same revolution, R&D projects have come
to occupy increasing space in contemporary companies and
organizations (Midler and Lundin, 1999). How does action
settle in R&D projects? How innovative projects can be
rendered knowable? Recent Management research has gone
beyond classic oppositions between linear and turbulent
models of R&D by re-establishing an epistemology of
design activities. In R&D projects, management means
setting provisional design principles for the many possible
projects that could emerge. Therefore, the active and
appropriate revision of goals, stakeholders or competencies
during projects becomes a necessary model of action, yet a
model that is actually a difficult issue for management
research in most companie~.’~ I have shown elsewhere
(Hatchuel, 2002) that to reach such expandable rationality
managers activate open and revisable concepts that allow
the settling of some actionable work divisions which
generate new realities. And then they use these new truths
to redefine initial projects. The act of revising the initial
concepts of an R&D project cannot be compared to classic
flexibility or adaptative planning. This perspective explains
the most visible mutations in contemporary firms (partner-
ships, collective platform strategies, innovative strategy,
Armand Hatchuel
45
etc.) much better than the traditional views of R&D.
Furthermore, through new processes in favour of innova-
tive design, companies are embarking on a long-term
transformation of which we are probably only seeing the
beginnings. This is an appropriate area for collaborative
research. Standard surveys can only capture a stabilized
‘reality’, that is, the content and performance of manage-
ment models that have been already and actively made
knowable and describable by both academics and practi-
tioners. Whereas collaborative research is more adapted to
the identification or invention of new models of manage-
ment which can only occur in deviant andlor pioneering
contexts (David and Hatchuel, 2004).
Conclusion
I hope to have demonstrated in this necessarily introduc-
tory paper that the true cultural and operational vocation of
management research lies in putting forward an epistemo-
logy of collective action which is different from classic or
relativist epistemologies. In the end, the objective of this
epistemology may be expressed by a simple inversion of the
usual point of view: it is not a question of revising the status
of truth but that of the universals of collective action from
which the status of truth then flows.
A key assertion of this paper is that management
research cannot put forward a universal repertoire of
models of collective action, nor can it take part in
contemporary relativism. Relativism weakens, quite rightly,
the universal reference points of knowledge, but to resolve
the questions it has raised then calls upon metaphysics of
action without first taking any precautionary measures.
Management research can only identify its object by
elaborating a different epistemology, a surprising episte-
mology, which no longer makes ‘truth’ a central concept,
but which does not dilute it in a relativism which has no
points of reference either.
Truth is a dependant and evolutionary notion, the
consequence of theories of collective action. The conditions
under which it is exercised should be reflected upon and
studied. Action, and more specifically collective action,
constitutes the field of management research. We have seen
this epistemology at work in certain of the great discoveries
in physics and mathematics. In each of these cases, the
critique of a universal of action and not the discovery of
new facts, was determinant. The epistemology of action is
neither relativism, nor pragmatism (in Peirce’s sense of the
term). It is clearly different in that it makes collective action
the principal theoretical question. The major philosophical
options on knowledge are thus expressions of the
consequences of an implicit theory of collective action.
Since it is based on an epistemology of action, manage-
ment research fills a hitherto unoccupied place in academia.
It cannot be reduced either to pure economics, pure
sociology, or pure psychology, at least to the extent that the
identity of each of these disciplines depends on a particular
metaphysic of action (the rational subject, the collective as
subject, and the subject as an autonomous entity). Manage-
ment research too is dependent on the history of its
discipline. It is constructed in connection with the history
of firms and organizations and we now must expand,
through research, our models of collective action.
 Towards an epistemology of collective action
46
Owing to the weakening of the major explanatory
principles in the social sciences, contemporary research
into economics, history, sociology and psychology also
pays increasing attention to capture ‘action’. Describing
this development would be to begin another article, if not
several. However, it can be suggested that a more assured
epistemology of action would limit the aporia, the pitfalls,
and the false controversies in the field of management.
Acknowledgements
The author is very grateful to Ann Sigismund-Huff for her
comments, remarks and editorial help. This article also benefited
from the suggestions of two anonymous referees.
Notes
1 For France an overall vision of this development is analysed in
two collective works (Martinet, 1988; David et al., 2001); for
Sweden, see (Adler et al., 2004); for the UK, see BJM special
issue, Vol 12 (SI), 2001.
2 For sure, there are also social and organizational reasons for
such paradox (Pettigrew, 2001) but they are out of the scope of
this paper.
3 The word ‘method’ is very close to ‘management’; a method is
in philosophy a way to ‘conduct’ some thinking or investiga-
tion; and management knowledge is always a method even if
its a critical one.
4 Le Moigne (1997) insists on the principle of intelligent action
as the basis of constructivism.
5 To my knowledge, no previously published work has studied
these two discoveries within the same epistemological pers-
pective.
6 That which we call a family business is obviously not a family
if only because it can be sold.
7 Management research had burst in the second-half of the 20th
century, which was precisely a peak period for the dissemina-
tion, maturing and globalization of the organizational
phenomenon.
8 The simplest of commercial ‘accounts’ can be traced back into
the mists of time.
9 An expression generally equivalent to those of ‘Management
tools’, ‘managerial techniques’, and management methods.
10 One can always slant accounts in one’s favour, even mask
them, but one must nonetheless produce accounts.
11 This idea was present in Fayol and Taylor’s work but without
its theoretical status and epistemological specificity being
recognized.
12 Let us remember that the Management instrument is no less
objective for all that. It has the same objectivity as the objects
studied by Mandelbrot.
13 It is only very recently that sociologists and political scientists
(Lascoumes, 2005) have become aware of the importance of
management instruments as analysers of social relationships.
Yet, the theory of management instruments was born in
management research, years before.
14 For instance, they pre-suppose that subjects are omniscient in
their choices and are independent of others.
15 This point is often neglected in constructivist approaches. The
more the boundaries of collective action are unkown and
uncertain, the more necessary it is to define activities and
organizations whose objective is precisely to deal with these
incertitudes. If the path must be built by walking, it is
Armand Hatchuel
necessary that every one should be prepared for collective
revision.
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