Perez vs.

Pomar Article 1254 of the Civil Code provides that a contract exists
G.R. No. L-1299 November 16, 1903
Where one has rendered services to another, and these services are accepted
by the latter, in the absence of proof that the service, as rendered gratuitously,
it is but just that he should pay a reasonable remuneration therefore because
it is a well-known principle of law, that no one should be permitted to enrich
himself to the damage of another.
Facts:
It appears that the plaintiff, Perez, did on various occasions
render Don Eugenio Pomar services as interpreter of English;
and that he obtained passes and accompanied the defendant
upon his journeys to some of the towns in the Province of
Laguna. It does not appear, however, that the plaintiff was
constantly at the disposal of the defendant during the period
of six months, or that he rendered services as such interpreter
continuously and daily during that period of time.
It does not appear that any written contract was entered into
between the parties for the employment of the plaintiff as
interpreter, or that any other innominate contract was
entered into.
Issue: W/N there was unjust enrichment on the part of
defendant Pomar.
the moment that one or more persons consent to be bound,
with respect to another or others, to deliver some thing or to
render some service. Article 1255 provides that the
contracting parties may establish such covenants, terms, and
conditions as they deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals or public policy. Whether the service
was solicited or offered, the fact remains that Perez rendered
to Pomar services as interpreter. As it does not appear that he
did this gratuitously, the duty is imposed upon the defendant,
having accepted the benefit of the service, to pay a just
compensation therefor, by virtue of the innominate contract
of facio ut des implicitly established.
The obligations arising from this contract are reciprocal, and,
apart from the general provisions with respect to contracts
and obligations, the special provisions concerning contracts for
lease of services are applicable by analogy.
In this special contract, as determined by article 1544 of the
Civil Code, one of the parties undertakes to render the other a
service for a price certain. The tacit agreement and consent of
both parties with respect to the service rendered by the
plaintiff, and the reciprocal benefits accruing to each, are the
best evidence of the fact that there was an implied contract
sufficient to create a legal bond, from which arose enforceable
rights and obligations of a bilateral character.

If it is a fact sufficiently proven that the defendant, Pomar, on

Ruling: Yes. (Take note that The NCC is not yet enacted. So the
various occasions consented to accept an interpreter's
discussion revolves around old provisions.)
services, rendered in his behalf and not gratuitously, it is but
just that he should pay a reasonable remuneration therefor,
Whether the plaintiff's services were solicited or whether they
because it is a well-known principle of law that no one should
were offered to the defendant for his assistance, inasmuch as
be permitted to enrich himself to the damage of another.
these services were accepted and made use of by the latter,
we must consider that there was a tacit and mutual consent as
With respect to the value of the services rendered on different
to the rendition of the services. This gives rise to the obligation
occasions, the most important of which was the first, as it does
upon the person benefited by the services to make
not appear that any salary was fixed upon by the parties at the
compensation therefor, since the bilateral obligation to render
time the services were accepted, it devolves upon the court to
services as interpreter, on the one hand, and on the other to
determine, upon the evidence presented, the value of such
pay for the services rendered, is thereby incurred. (Arts. 1088,
services, taking into consideration the few occasions on which
1089, and 1262 of the Civil Code). The supreme court of Spain
they were rendered. The fact that no fixed or determined
in its decision of February 12, 1889, holds "that not only is
consideration for the rendition of the services was agreed
there an express and tacit consent which produces real
upon does not necessarily involve a violation of the provisions
contract but there is also a presumptive consent which is the
of article 1544 of the Civil Code, because at the time of the
basis of quasi contracts, this giving rise to the multiple juridical
agreement this consideration was capable of being made
relations which result in obligations for the delivery of a thing
certain. "That as stated in the article of the Code cited, which
or the rendition of a service."
follows the provisions of law 1, title 8, of the fifth partida, the
contract for lease of services is one in which one of the parties
Notwithstanding the denial of that defendant, it is
undertakes to make some thing or to render some service to
unquestionable that it was with his consent that the plaintiff
the other for a certain price, the existence of such a price being
rendered him services as interpreter, thus aiding him at a time
understood, as this court has held not only when the price has
when, owing to the existence of an insurrection in the been expressly agreed upon but also when it may be
province. It follows that there was consent on the part of both
determined by the custom and frequent use of the place in
in the rendition of such services as interpreter. Such service
which such services were rendered."
not being contrary to law or to good custom, it was a perfectly
licit object of contract, and such a contract must necessarily
For the reasons stated, we are of the opinion that judgment
have existed between the parties, as alleged by the plaintiff.
should be rendered against Don Eugenio Pomar for the
(Art. 1271, Civil Code.)
payment to the plaintiff of the sum of 200 Mexican pesos, from
which will be deducted the sum of 50 pesos is made as to the
The consideration for the contract is also evident, it being clear
costs of this instance.
that a mutual benefit was derived in consequence of the
service rendered. It is to be supposed that the defendant
accepted these services and that the plaintiff in turn rendered
them with the expectation that the benefit would be
reciprocal. This shows the concurrence of the three elements
necessary under article 1261 of the Civil Code to constitute a
contract of lease of service, or other innominate contract, from
which an obligation has arisen and whose fulfillment is now
demanded.
Pacific vs. Consolacion
G.R. No. L-30204 October 29, 1976
Facts:
1. October 19, 1962, a Writ of Execution was filed by Pacific
Merchandising Corp against Defendant Consolacion Insurance
& Surety Co.
2. That by virtue of the aforesaid Writ of Execution, the Sheriff
of Manila levied and attached on several properties.
3. That on October 9, 1963, plaintiff's counsel demanded from
the said principal, Greg V. Paiarillo, the payment of the
installments corresponding to the months of May, June, July,
August and September, 1963, which remain unpaid in spite of
said demand
4. That on December 19, 1963, plaintiff's counsel demanded
from the defendant the payment of the unpaid obligation of
the principal, Greg V. Pajarillo but refused and failed to pay the
same in spite of said demand;
5. That when reminded by third-party plaintiff regarding his
obligations in favor of the plaintiff, the third-party defendant,
Greg V. Pajarillo replied that he no longer was bound to pay
because he had ceased to be the receiver of Paris Theatre
operated by Leo Enterprises, Inc.
Trial Court’s Decision:
The trial court predicated its judgment on the following
considerations: (1) Since the unpaid claim represents the cost
of certain materials used in the construction of the Paris
Theatre, the possession of which reverted to Gregorio V.
Pajarillo as owner of said property by virtue of the judgment in
Civil Case No. 50201, "it is only simple justice that Pajarillo
should pay for the said claim. otherwise he would be enriching
himself by having the said building without paying plaintiff for
the cost of certain materials that went into its construction";
(2) "under Section 7 of Rule 61 of the former Rules of Court,
one of the powers of a receiver is to pay outstanding debts,
and since the said plaintiff's claim has been outstanding since
August 27, 1962, if not before, Pajarillo should have paid the
same long before the alleged termination of the receivership
on July 1, 1963"; (3) when Gregorio V. Pajarillo undertook to
pay the amount owed to plaintiff and executed the surety
bond in favor of plaintiff, he stepped into the shoes" of Leo
Enterprises, Inc., and the properties of the said debtor having
all subsequently passed on to Pajarillo, there is no reason for
relieving defendants of their said undertaking."
Issues: The legal question is whether or not third party
defendant-appellant Gregorio V. Pajarillo is liable to plaintiff
for the unpaid amount claimed.
Relevant: W/N the third party defendant unjustly enriched
himself.
Ruling: Yes.
1. A receiver is not an agent or representative of any party to
the action. He is an officer of the court exercising his functions
in the interest of neither plaintiff nor defendant, but for the
common benefit of all the parties in interest. He performs his
duties "subject to the control of the Court," and every question
involved in the receivership may be determined by the court
taking cognizance of the receivership proceedings. Thus, "a
receiver, strictly speaking, has no right or power to make any
contract binding the property or fund in his custody or to pay
out funds in his hands without the authority or approval of the
court.The custody of the receiver is the custody of the court.
His acts and possession are the acts and possession of the
court, and his contracts and liabilities are, in contemplation of
law, the contracts and liabilities of the court. As a necessary
consequence, receiver is subject to the control and supervision
of the court at every step in his management of the property
or funds placed in his hands. He cannot operate independently
of the court, and cannot enter into any contract without its
approval.
2. In the case at bar, appellant Pajarillo does not dispute the
fact that he never secured the court's approval of either the
agreement of March 11, 1963, with Pacific Merchandising
Corporation or of his Indemnity Agreement with the
Consolacion Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. on March 14, 1963, in
consideration of the performance bond submitted by the
latter to Pacific Merchandising Corporation to guarantee the
payment of the obligation. As the person to whom the
possession of the theater and its equipment was awarded by
the court in Civil Case No. 50201, it was certainly to his
personal profit and advantage that the sale at public auction
of the equipment of the theater was prevented by his
execution of the aforesaid agreement and submission of the
afore-mentioned bond. In order to bind the property or fund
in his hands as receiver, he should have applied for and
obtained from the court authority to enter into the aforesaid
contract. Unauthorized contracts of a receiver do not bind the
court in charge of receivership. They are the receiver's own
contracts and are not recognized by the courts as contracts of
the receivership. Consequently, the aforesaid agreement and
undertaking entered into by appellant Pajarillo not having
been approved or authorized by the receivership court should
be considered as his personal undertaking or obligation.
The judgment creditor having been induced to enter into the
aforesaid agreement by appellant Pajarillo it was the duty of
the latter to comply with is end of the bargain. He not only
failed to perform his undertaking, but now attempts to evade
completely his liability.
As the trial court aptly observed "... it is only simple justice
that Pajarillo should pay for the said claim, otherwise he
would be enriching himself without paying plaintiff for the
cost of certain materials that went into its construction. It is
to be noted, however, that he did so only as a receiver of Leo
Pajarillo by virtue of the judgment in Civil Case No. 50201 all of
the properties of Leo Enterprises, Inc. passed on to Pajarillo.
This Roman Law principle of "Nemo Cum alterious detrimento
locupletari protest" is embodied in Article 22 (Human
Relations), and Articles 2142 to 2175 (QuasiContracts) of the
New Civil Code. Long before the enactment of this Code,
however, the principle of unjust enrichment which is basic in
every legal system, was already expressly recognized in this
jurisdiction.
As early as as 1903, in Perez v. Pomar, this Court ruled that
where one has rendered services to another, and these
services are accepted by the latter, in the absence of proof that
the service, as rendered gratuitously, it is but just that he
should pay a reasonable remuneration therefore because it is
a wellknown principle of law, that no one should be permitted
to enrich himself to the damage of another.