Digested Cases in Civil Law

Donation Case #1 (Melva)
Roman Catholic Archbishop vs. CA
Facts:
A deed of donation in favour of Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM) was

executed. It provides that done shall not dispose or sell the parcel of land that was
donated within a period of 100 years from execution of deed of donation otherwise the
donation shall be void. However the RCAM executed a deed of absolute sale of the
subject property. As a result thereof, a complaint for nullification of deed of donation
was filed. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription.
However, the CA held that the action has not yet prescribed.
Issue:
Whether or not he action has prescribed in accordance to Art. 764 of the Civil Code.
Held:
No. Although it is true that under Art. 764 of NCC, an action for the revocation of a
donation must be brought within 4 years from non-compliance of the conditions of the
donation, the same is not applicable in this case. The donation involved herein
expressly provides automatic reversion of the property donated in case of violation of
the condition, hence, a judicial declaration is not necessary.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Leon Silim, G.R. No. 140487, April 2, 2001
Facts:
Respondent donated half-hectare land in favour of Bureau of Public Schools

(BPS). He imposed condition that said property shall be used exclusively and forever for
school purposes only. However, school building that was supposed to be build in the
donated land could not be erected because the government requires 1 hectare land.
BPS exchanged the land to new suitable location. Respondent filed a case for
Revocation and Cancellation of Donation, etc.
Issue:
Whether or not the donation is null and void due to the alleged violation of
condition.
Held:
No. The purpose for donation remains the same, which is for establishment of
school. The exclusivity of purpose was not altered. In fact, the exchange of lot was in
furtherance for the enhancement of purpose of donation. Since the donation is
remuneratory, there must be an acceptance made in the same deed of donation or
separate public document. In this case, it was complied thru affidavit of acceptance
and/or confirmation of donation.
Tito R. Larga vs. CA, G.R.No. 112796, March 5, 1998
Where the acceptance of a donation was made in a separate instrument but not
formally communicated to the donor, may the donation be nonetheless considered
complete, valid and subsisting? Where the deed of donation did not expressly impose
any burden -- the expressed consideration being purely one of liberality and generosity -
- but the recipient actually paid charges imposed on the property like land taxes and
installment arrearages, may the donation be deemed onerous and thus governed by the
law on ordinary contracts? - Justice Panganiban (I just love this preliminary statement
but did not copy it to my paper though)
Facts:
Petitioner was given SPA over the land of his grandmother. It was revoked and
Grandma executed another SPA in favour of plaintiff-appelle. Due to the failure of
petitioner to accomplish the purpose of the power of attorney granted to him,
Grandmother revoked said authority in another instrument. Simultaneous with the
revocation, she executed another SPA of the same tenor in favor respondent whom a
deed of donation over the lot was granted. The latter paid the instalment arrears and
remaining balance on the lot.
Issue:
Whether or not donation is simple or onerous.
Held:
Simple.
Simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure liberality (no strings
attached), while an onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or
future services equal to or more in value than the thing donated. Under Article 733 of
the Civil Code, donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on
contracts; hence, the formalities required for a valid simple donation are not applicable.
It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge petitioner
as the donee. The words in the deed are in fact typical of a pure donation. Payments
made by petitioner were merely his voluntary acts.
The donees failure to accept a donation whether in the same deed of donation or
in a separate instrument renders the donation null and void also in this case.
Evelyn De Luna vs. Sofronio F. Abrigo, G.R. No. 57455, January 28, 1990
Facts:
Prudencio de Luna donated a portion of land to Luzonian University Foundation, Inc.

(Foundation) subject to certain terms and conditions and provided automatic reversion
to the donor of the donated property in case of violation or non-compliance therewith.
One of the conditions is construction of chapel, nursery and kindergarten school and at
least 70% finished by end of 3 years from date thereof. Heirs of late Prudencio alleged
that the terms and conditions of donation were not complied thus prayed for cancellation
of donation and reversion. The Foundation alleged prescription of action and prayed for
dismissal. The trial court dismissed the case for being beyond the 4 year prescriptive
period under Art. 764 of the Civil Code. Petitioners alleged that the revocation was not
under such provision but one to enforce a written contract which prescribes in 10 years
and that no judicial action is necessary when there is stipulation agreed upon by the
parties.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint.

Held:
No. The donation of this case is one with onerous cause. It was made subject to the
burden of requiring done to construct a chapel, etc., within 5 years. Under the Civil
Code, donations with onerous cause are governed not by law on donation but by the
rules on contract. On matter of prescription of actions for revocation of onerous
donation, it was held that the general rule on prescription applies as provided in Art.
733. True that under Art. 764, revocation of donation must be brought 4 years from non-
compliance of donation, however, said article does not apply to onerous donation in
view of Art. 733. Under 1306, parties have right to establish stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions as they may deem convenient provided not contrary to law, morals, good
customs and public policy. The stipulation providing for automatic reversion upon non-
compliance in this case is not contrary to law. Judicial action is not necessary where
there’s agreement to it. In this case, the action was still within 10 year prescriptive
period for written contracts. Thus, petition is granted and the case is reinstated for trial.
Heirs of William Sevilla vs. Leopoldo Sevilla , G.R. No. 150179, April 30, 2003
Facts:
Filomena died intestate leaving her 8 children: William, Peter, Felipe, Leopoldo, Rosa,
Maria, Luzvilla and Jimmy. Filomena left 4 parcels of land. One of the parcel 1 which is
the subject of the controversy. It was the paraphernal property of FIlomena which she
co-onwed with her sister, Honorata and Felisa who were both single and without issue.
When Felisa died, previous thereto, she executed a lst will and testament devising her
½ share and donation inter vivos ceding ½ share in parcel 1 to Leopoldo. The heirs of
William, Jimmy and Maria filed an annulment of Deed of Donation alleging that it was
tainted with bad faith because Felisa was seriously ill and unsound mind. However,
Leopoldo denied these allegations because Felisa freely and voluntarily ceded her
undivided share in consideration for the love and past services of Leopoldo.
Issue:
Whether or not the donation inter vivos is valid.
Held:
Yes, it is valid, Art. 737 of NCC provide that donor’s capacity shall be determined as of
the time of making of the donation. Agreement of the parties is essential and the
attendance of vice consent renders the contract voidable. It is well-settled rule that he
who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. In the instant case, the self-serving
testimonies of the other heirs are vague as to what acts of Leopoldo constituted fraud
and undue influence. Thus, the donation inter vivos is valid.
Nenita Bienvenido vs. CA, G.R.No. 111717, October 24, 2017
Facts:
Aurelio married Consejo. Without dissolving his marriage to the latter, he married Luisa
whom he cohabited for a long time and whom he begot a child named Chito. Because
of their quarrels, Luisita left the dwelling place and Aurelio courted Nenita and lived with
her before he died. Prior thereto, Aurelio executed a deed of sale of property in favour
of Nenita in consideration of P250, 000. 00which became the subject of the controversy.
Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and it was executed in fraud of her as
the legitimate wife. On the other hand, Nenita claimed that she was a purchaser in good
faith.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Aurelio and Luisita is void.
Held:
No. By applying Art. 83 of NCC, since Aurelio had a valid and subsisting marriage to
Consejo, his subsequent marriage to Luisita was void for being bigamous.
Consequently, there is no basis for holding that the property in question was conjugal
partnership of Luisita and Aurelio. The sale of property to Nenita being void under the
principle embodied in Art. 739 (1) of NCC which declares donations made between
persons who are guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of donation to be void,
can only be brought by innocent spouse, certainly not Luisita but Consejo.
Donation Cases of Franz on PDF File (lacking Gonzales vs. CA)
Donation Case #12 (Carlyn)
Heirs of Salud DIzon Salamat vs. Natividad Dizon Tamayo, G.R. No. 110644,
October 30, 1998
Doctrine:
A transfer of real property from one person to another cannot take effect as a
donation unless embodied in a public document.
FACTS:
Agustin Dizon dies, leaving behind properties to be divided among his 5 children
namely Eduardo, Gaudencio, Salud, Valenta and Natividad.
Eduardo sold his hereditary rights in the sum of P3, 000 to his sister Salud Dizon
Salamat. The sale was evidenced by a private document bearing the signatures
of his sisters Valenta and Natividad as witnesses. Gaudencio likewise sold his
hereditary rights for the sum of P4, 000 to his sister Salud. The sale was
evidenced by a notarized document bearing the signature of Eduardo Dizon and
a certain Angela Ramos as witnesses. Eventually, Gaudencio died, leaving his
daughters.
Petitioners instituted an action for compulsory judicial partition of real properties

registered in the name of Agustin Dizon with the RTC. The action was prompted
by the refusal of herein respondent Natividad Dizon Tamayo to agree to the
formal distribution of the properties of deceased Agustin among his heirs.
Respondent’s refusal stemmed from her desire to keep for herself the parcel of
land covered by OCT 10384 where she presently resides, claiming that her father
donated it to her in 1936 with the conformity of the other heirs. The subject
property is also declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 10376
in the name of respondent.
The Regional Trial Court granted the partition and gave the land to Natividad, as
claimed. Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation of the land to the respondent is valid.
RULING:
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. Article 749 of the Civil Code
reads:
In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a

public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the
charges which the donee must satisfy.
The alleged donation was done orally and not executed in a public document.
Moreover, the document which was presented by respondent in support of her
claim that her father donated the subject parcel of land to her was a mere private
document of conformity which was executed by her elder brother, Eduardo in
1956. It should be pointed out that the brothers Eduardo and Gaudencio had
already ceded their hereditary interests to petitioner Salud Dizon Salamat even
before 1950.
In any case, assuming that Agustin really made the donation to respondent,
albeit orally, respondent cannot still claim ownership over the property. While it
is true that a void donation may be the basis of ownership which may ripen into
title by prescription, it is well settled that possession, to constitute the foundation
of a prescriptive right, must be adverse and under a claim of title.
Respondent was never in adverse and continuous possession of the property. It

is undeniable that petitioners and respondent, being heirs of the deceased, are
co-owners of the properties left by the latter. A co-ownership is a form of a trust,
with each owner being a trustee for each other and possession of a co-owner
shall not be regarded as adverse to other co-owners but in fact is beneficial to
them.
The elements in order that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to

the cestui que trust or the co-owner are:
(1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to

ouster cestui que trust or other co-owners
(2) that such positive acts or repudiation have been made known to the
cestui que trust or other co-owners and
(3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.
None of the aforesaid requirements is present.
The fact that the subject property is declared for taxation purposes in the name of
respondent who pays realty taxes under Tax Declaration No. 14376 has no merit.
It is well settled that tax declarations or realty tax payments are not conclusive
evidence of ownership.
Mariano B. Locsin vs. CA, G.R. No. 89783, February 19, 1992 (see separate
document)
Apolinario Asutria –Amgat vs. CA, G.R. No. 106755, Feb. 1, 2002
Doctrine:
When the deed of donation provides that the donor will not dispose or take away
the property donated, he is in effect making a donation inter vivos.
FACTS:
On December 17, 1975, Basilisa Comerciant, mom to five children, executed a

Deed of Donation to her five children covered by Transfer Certificate 3268, with
an area of 150 square meters provided that the funeral expenses will be
deducted from the total value of the lot before it is to be divided among the
children. The children signed to the same deed in acceptance to the donation.
On that same day, they also signed into a notarized document stating that the
property and the document pertaining to the same will be under the custody of
the original owner for as long as she lives.
On February 6, 1979, Comerciante executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the

same house and lot in favor of the petitioner, prompting the respondents to file an
action against the petitioner for the annulment of the deed of sale on September
21, 1983. The lower court ruled in favor of the respondent (petitioner herein), but
the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation was an intervivos or mortis causa.
RULING:
The donation is intervivos. The court found that whether the donation is inter
vivos or mortis causa depends on whether the donor intended to transfer
ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed.
In Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, the court recalls the characteristics of a donation

mortis causa,:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor
should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property
while alive;
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.
For the case at bar, the phrase “hindi na mababawi” definitely exudes the
character of an inter vivos agreement. The other provisions therein which
seemingly make the donation mortis causa do not go against the irrevocable
character of the subject donation. According to the petitioner, the provisions
which state that the same will only take effect upon the death of the donor and
that there is a prohibition to alienate, encumber is mortis causa. The court
disagrees. The said provisions should be harmonized with its express
irrevocability. In Bonsato where the donation per the deed of donation would also
take effect upon the death of the donor with reservation for the donor to enjoy the
fruits of the land, the Court held that the said statements only mean that “after the
donor’s death, the donation will take effect so as to make the donees the
absolute owners of the donated property, free from all liens and encumbrances.
In Gestopa v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the prohibition to alienate
does not necessarily defeat the inter vivos character of the donation. It even
highlights the fact that what remains with the donor is the right of usufruct and not
anymore the naked title of ownership over the property donated. In the case at
bar, the provision in the deed of donation that the donated property will remain in
the possession of the donor just goes to show that the donor has given up his
naked title of ownership thereto and has maintained only the right to use (jus
utendi) and possess (jus possidendi) the subject donated property.
Furthermore, the act of selling the property to petitioner herein cannot be

construed as a valid act of revocation of donation. A formal case ought to be filed
pursuant to Art 764 which speaks of an action bearing a prescriptive period of 4
years from non compliance with the deed of donation. In this case, the 4 year
prescriptive period does not even apply because none of the terms (if any) were
even violated.
Central Philippines University vs. CA, G.R. No. 112127, July 17, 1995
Doctrine:
When a person donates land to another on the condition that a construction be

made, the condition is akin to a resolutory (not suspensive) one. The non-
compliance to the condition extinguishes the right to the donation, but it need not
occur first in order for the donation to be effected and validated.
FACTS:
The late Don Ramon Lopez was a member of the board of trustees of Central
Philippine University in 1939 when he executed a donation to the school, with a
condition that the land must be for exclusive use of a medical college. 50 years
later, the heirs of Don Ramon filed an action to annul the donation, stating the
failure of the school to construct the medical college over the land. Regional Trial
Court ruled in favor of respondents, which the Court of Appeals affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether there is a resolutory condition.
RULING:
The donation was an onerous one, where failure of the school to construct a
medical college would give the heirs the power to revoke the donation, reverting
the property back to the heirs of the donor. It is therefore a resolutory condition.
Although, the period was not stated, and the courts should have fixed a period, in
this case, 50 years has lapsed since the donation was executed, thus fixing a
period would serve no purpose and the property must already be reverted back.
Dissenting Opinion:
Davide considered the donation as "modal" where the obligations are

unconditional, and the fulfillment, performance, existence or extinguishment is
not dependent on any future and uncertain event. It is more accurate to say that
the condition stated is not a resolutory condition, rather a obligation itself, being
an onerous donation. Since this is an onerous donation, it has to comply with the
rules on Oblicon, and therefore the courts should have fixed a period.
Donation Case #16 (Ryan)
Garrido and Daguro vs. CA, Supplemento
Facts: Tomas Hingco, a widower, originally owned Lot 209 of the Dingle Cadastre, Iloilo. He married
Consolacion Rondael, a widow, who had a daughter Magdalena Rondael. In 1947 he donated one half
(1/2) of Lot 209 to Magdalena on the condition that she could not sell, transfer or cede the same. When
he died, Consolacion inherited the remaining half of Lot 209 which, in turn, was inherited by Magdalena
upon her mother’s death.
Magdalena filed before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo a petition to cancel the lien prohibiting her
from disposing of Lot 209-A because she needed money for her subsistence and medical expenses as she
was then in her 80's. On 17 August 1978, Magdalena executed a Conditional Deed of Sale of Lot 209-A
in favor of respondent spouses Rufino and Conrada Suplemento.
On 24 January 1979 the petition for cancellation of encumbrance was denied for the reason that the
ground cited for the cancellation was not one of those allowed by Sec. 112 of Act 496 and that Magdalena
failed to produce the deed of donation which contained the alleged restriction. Nonetheless, on 19 July
1979 Magdalena executed with the conformity of her husband a Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 209-
A in favor of respondents, spouses Rufino and Conrada Suplemento. The deed was notarized on the same
date. On 13 April 1982, Magdalena died. On 2 December 1982 TCT No. T-108689 was issued in the
name of the Suplementos.
Magdalena had two (2) daughters but only one is still living, Coloma Daguro, married to Alberto Garrido,
On 28 October 1985 they filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City for annulment of
the Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot 209-A, reconveyance and damages claiming that the deed was fictitious
since Magdalena's signature thereon "appears to have been traced" and Lorenzo Daguro's signature was
likewise a forgery since he died prior to the execution thereof.
Issue: W/N petitioners have legal personality to assail the Absolute Deed of Sale and the genuineness of
the signature of Magdalena Rondael.
Ruling: We find for respondents. Petitioners have no personality to question the violation of the
restriction because they are not heirs of the donor. (DONOR IS STEP DAD OF MAGDALENA). When
the donee fails to comply with any of the conditions imposed by the donor, it is the donor who has the
right to impugn the validity of the transaction affecting the donated property, conformably with Art. 764
of the Civil Code, which provides that the right to revoke may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor and
may be exercised against the heirs of the donee, and the action prescribes four years after the violation of
the condition.
Eduarte vs. CA
FACTS:
Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land. He executed a deed of donation inter vivos
of ½ of the land to his niece, Helen Doria. Subsequently, he executed another deed of donation inter vivos
ceding the other ½ of the property to Helen Doria. Helen Doria donated a portion of the lot (157 sqm) to
the Calauan Christian Reformed Church. Helen Doria sold and conveyed the remaining portion save some
700 meters for his residence. Pedro Calapine sought to annul the sale and donation to Eduarte and CCRC
on the ground that the deed of donation was a forgery and that Doria was unworthy of his liberality
claiming ingratitude.
ISSUE:
W/N the falsification of public document committed by Doria is an act of ingratitude against Calapine?
RULING: YES
In commentaries of Tolentino, it is said that “all crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are
causes of revocation.” Petitioner attempted to categorize the offenses according to their classification
under the RPC by deleting the first sentence. However, this is unwarranted considering that illegal
detention, threats and coercion are considered crimes against the person of the donor despite the fact that
they are classified as crimes against personal liberty and security under the RPC.
Imperial v. CA
FACTS:
In 1951, Leoncio sold his 32, 837m parcel of land to his acknowledged natural son Eloy Imperial.
However, in 1953, Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment of the sale alleging that he was deceived by
his son. They entered into a compromise agreement that Leoncio will recognize the validity and legality
of the sale but Eloy has to sold the 1000m to Leoncio. In 1962, Leoncio died and Victor, his adopted
child, substituted him in the execution of the compromise agreement. However, in 1977, Victor died
single and without issue. After 4 years, Ricardo, Victor’s natural father, died too. Cesar and Teresa,
children of Ricardo, filed a complaint for annulment of the donation. A motion to dismiss was filed on the
ground of res judicata. The trial court dismissed the case. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the
trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. Cesar and Teresa filed an Amended Complaint
alleging that the conveyance impaired the legitime of Victor. The RTC ruled that the donation is
inofficious impairing the legitime of Victor. CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for inofficious donation has prescribed.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court applied Article 1144 of the Civil Code which states that “actions upon an
obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from the time the right accrues. Here, the right
accrues from the moment Leoncio died, but it took the respondents 24 years to file the action.
Also, there is estoppel by laches on their part. First, Victor is a lawyer; he even substituted his father in
the execution of the compromise agreement regarding the contested conveyance of parcel of land.
Second, Richardo is the lessee of the contested land and it is expected that he was aware of the sale of the
land. And, the respondents only institud the complaint five years after the death of Ricardo.
The petition is granted.
Prescription Case #19 (Ryan)
DE TUPAS vs. RTC and Tupas FOUNDATION, INC.
Facts: Epifanio R. Tupas died on August 20, 1978 in Bacolod City, childless, leaving his widow,
Partenza Lucerna, as his only surviving compulsory heir. He also left a wil dated May 18, 1976, which
was admitted to probate on September 30, 1980 in Special Proceedings No. 13994 of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental. Among the assets listed in his will were lots Nos. 837, 838 and 839 of the
Sagay Cadastre, admittedly his private capital. However, at the time of his death, these lots were no
longer owned by him, he having donated them the year before to the Tupas Foundation, Inc., which had
thereafter obtained title to said lots.
Claiming that said donation had left her practically destitute of any inheritance, Tupas' widow brought
suit against Tupas Foundation, Inc. in the same Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental to have the
donation declared inofficious insofar as it prejudiced her legitime,
But the Trial Court did not see things her way and ruled that Article 900 is not applicable because the
properties which were disposed of by way of donation one year before the death of Epifanio Tupas were
no longer part of his hereditary estate at the time of his death on August 20, 1978; (2) the donation
properties were Epifanio's capital or separate estate; and (3) Tupas Foundation, Inc. being a stranger and
not a compulsory heir, the donation inter vivos made in its favor was not subject to collation under Art.
106.
Issue: W/N or not a donation inter vivos by a donor now deceased is inofficious and should be reduced at
the instance of the donor's widow.
Ruling: A person's prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations, one of which is that he
cannot give by donation more than he can give by will (Art. 752, Civil Code). If he does, so much of
what is donated as exceeds what he can give by will is deemed inofficious and the donation is reducible to
the extent of such excess, though without prejudice to its taking effect in the donor's lifetime or the
donee's appropriating the fruits of the thing donated (Art. 771, Civil Code). Such a donation is, moreover,
collationable that is, its value is imputable into the hereditary estate of the donor at the tune of his death
for the purpose of determining the legitime of the forced or compulsory heirs and the freely disposable
portion of the estate. This is true as well of donations to strangers as of gifts to compulsory heirs, although
the language of Article 1061 of the Civil Code would seem to limit collation to the latter class of
donations.
The fact, therefore, that the donated property no longer actually formed part of the estate of the donor at
the time of his death cannot be asserted to prevent its being brought to collation. Indeed, it is an obvious
proposition that collation contemplates and particularly applies to gifts inter vivos The further fact that the
lots donated were admittedly capital or separate property of the donor is of no moment, because a claim
of inofficiousness does not assert that the donor gave what was not his, but that he gave more than what
was within his power to give.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and petitioner-appellant Partenza Lucerna Vda. de
Tupas is adjudged entitled to so much of the donated property in question, as may be found in excess of
the freely disposable portion of the estate of Epifanio B. Tupas, determined in the manner above-
indicated. Let the case be remanded to the Trial Court for further appropriate proceedings in accordance
with this decision
Prescription #20 (Rhan)
Pan American Airways v. IAC
G.R. L- 70642
FACTS:
Jose Rapaldas is on board a flight for Pan Am Flight 841 from Guam to Manila. While
standing in line to board the flight at the Guam airport, Rapadas was ordered by Pan
American Airways’ hand carry control agent to check-in his Samsonite attaché case.
Rapadas protested pointed to the fact that other co-passengers were permitted to hand
carry bulkier baggages. But for fear that he would miss the flight, he agreed to check it
in. He gave his attaché case to his brother who happened to be around without
declaring its contents or the value of its contents.
Upon his arrival in Manila, he was given all his check-in baggages except the attaché
case. Because Rapadas felt ill, he sent his son to request for search of the missing
luggage. Eventually, Rapadas received a letter from Pan Am's counsel offering to settle
the claim for the sum of $160.00 representing Pan Am's alleged limit of liability for loss
or damage to a passenger's personal property under the contract of carriage between
Rapadas and Pan Am.
ISSUE:
Is Pan American Airways liable for the lost check-in baggage?
RULING:
Notice of limited liability in airline tickets
On page 2 of the airline ticket, it states that the Warsaw Convention governs in case of
death or injury to the passenger or of loss, damage or destruction to a passenger's
luggage. It says:
"If the passenger's journey involves an ultimate destination or stop in a country, the
Warsaw Convention may be applicable and the conversation governs and in most
cases, limits the liability of carriers for death or personal injury and in respect of loss or
damage to baggage."
Passenger is expected to be vigilant with respect to his baggages
In this case, Rapadas actually manifested a disregard with the airline rules insofar as
his baggages are concerned. He failed to state the value of the said check-in baggage
and failed to remove whatever check-in valuables he had in which should have been
placed in his allowable hand-carry baggage instead.
Prescription Case #21 (Rhan)
-----Rhan has to submit it still-----
DE LA CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
In 1973, the subject lot, a 407 sq. m. residential lot was the subject of an application under
the Land Registration Act by the Ramos bros. Eugenio de la Cruz [petitioner] opposed. After
trial, the application was dismissed on the ground that the land was not yet reclassified and
remains part of the forest reserve. The Ramos bros. pursued the reclassification of the land
and were subsequently awarded ownership of it. Cristina Villanueva, the private respondent,
subsequently purchased the same lot from the brothers. Upon learning of the said sale,
petitioner filed a complaint for reconveyance claiming ownership of the said land having
possessed and occupied it openly, publicly, notoriously and adversely against the whole
world and in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. His complaint was dismissed.
The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is vested with a better right over the residential lot to which he
possessed and devoted time, effort and resources
RULING:
NO
Petitioner possessed and occupied the land after it was declared by the Gov’t as part of the
forest zone. Forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation, and
possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private property.
A positive act by the government is needed to declassify land and to convert it to alienable
or disposable land. And until such declassification, there is no disposable land to speak of.
MARCELINO KIAMCO, petitioner

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
The original owner of the property in dispute, Faustino, is the son-in-law of the
original defendant, Jose. Faustino sold by pacto de retro the subject property to sps.
Villamor. After the sale, Faustino left for Mindanao. He returned to Cebu because the
Villamor sps. needed money. However, since Faustino had no money, he requested his
father-in-law, Jose, to buy the land from the Villamors. The Villamors allegedly sold the land
in dispute to Jose in a private document of sale. Immediately thereafter, Jose took
possession of the property, introduced improvements and paid taxes thereon.
Faustino Maningo returned to Cebu and allegedly tried to forcibly take possession of
the property from his father-in-law although he did not succeed. Nevertheless, Faustino
proceeded to execute a deed of sale in favor of Kiamco. The latter allegedly knew, at the
time of the sale, that Jose had already been in possession of the disputed property for more
than (20) years. (7) months after the execution of the alleged sale, Kiamco filed a complaint
for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages against Jose.
The trial court ruled that the deed of sale executed by the Villamors in favor of Jose
is null and void; and that he had not acquired the subject property by acquisitive
prescription. On appeal the decision of the trial court was reversed and set aside.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jose acquired the property by acquisitive prescription.
HELD:
Yes. It is undisputed that after the Deed of Sale was executed, Jose immediately
took possession of the property, in dispute in the concept of an owner, exercised acts of
dominion and introduced improvements thereon, and enjoyed the fruits thereof,
continuously, peacefully, and adversely for more than twenty years. Pursuant to Art. 1116
of the New Civil Code, which provides for transitional rules on prescription, and which reads:
"Prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by laws
previously in force; but if since the time this Code took effect the entire period herein
required for prescription should lapse, the present Code shall be applicable, even though by
the former laws a longer period might be required," the law to be applied is the Code of Civil
Procedure (Act 190). Inasmuch as here the prescription was already running before August
30, 1950, it follows that only ten (10) years would be required, because under the Code of
Civil Procedure, regardless of good faith or bad faith, the period for acquiring land by
prescription was only ten (10) years. It therefore follows necessarily that in 1960, Jose
Deguilmo had already acquired the subject property by acquisitive prescription. Thus,
Kiamco should have lost the case.
The period of ten (10) years must necessarily start from January, 1950, and not
from August 1950, since here, the prescriptive period under the old law was shorter. Had
the period under the old law been longer, it is the shorter period under the New Civil Code
that should apply, but this time, the period should commence from the date of effectivity of
the New Civil Code August 30, 1950, in view of the clause "but if since the time this Code
took effect."
Prescription Case #24 (Jacob)
HEIRS OF QUIRICO SERASPI AND PURIFICACION R. SERASPI, petitioners, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS AND SIMEON RECASA, respondents. [G.R. No. 135602. April 28, 2000]
The facts are as follows:
Marcelino Recasa(OWNER) was the owner of two parcels of land.
In 1948, his intestate estate was partitioned into three parts by his heirs, each part
corresponding to the share of the heirs in each marriage.
Heirs of the first marriage sold the share of the heirs in the estate to Dominador Recasa, an heir
of the second marriage. On June 15, 1950, Dominador, representing the heirs of the second
marriage, in turn sold the share of the heirs to Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi whose heirs are
the present petitioners.
In 1958, the Seraspis obtained a loan from the Kalibo Rural Bank, Inc. (KRBI) on the security of
the lands in question to finance improvements on the lands. However, they failed to pay the
loan for which reason the mortgage was foreclosed and the lands were sold to KRBI as the
highest bidder. Subsequently, the lands were sold by KRBI to Manuel Rata, brother-in-law of
Quirico Seraspi (PETITIONER). It appears that Rata, as owner of the property, allowed Quirico
Seraspi to administer the property.
In 1974, private RESPONDENT Simeon Recasa, Marcelinos (OWNER’s) child by his third wife,
taking advantage of the illness of Quirico Seraspi (PETITIONER), who had been paralyzed due to
a stroke, forcibly entered the lands in question and took possession thereof.
In 1983, the Seraspis (Pet) purchased the lands from Manuel Rata and afterwards filed a
complaint against Simeon Recasa (Resp) for recovery of possession of the lands.
ISSUES
Two issues are presented: (1) whether petitioners action is barred by extinctive prescription;
and (2) whether private respondent Simeon Recasa acquired ownership of the properties in
question through acquisitive prescription.
HELD:
We rule for petitioners.
(1) What is involved here is extinctive prescription, and the applicable law is Art. 1141 of the
Civil Code which provides:
Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.
This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of

ownership and other real rights by prescription.
(2)The question, therefore, is whether private respondent has acquired the ownership of the
two lands by prescription. On this point, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are
acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need
of title or of good faith.
Private respondent contends that he acquired the ownership of the questioned property by
ordinary prescription through adverse possession for ten (10) years.
The contention has no merit, because he has neither just title nor good faith. As Art. 1129
provides:
For the purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant
came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by
law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not
the owner or could not transmit any right.
In the case at bar, private respondent did not acquire possession of the property through any of
the modes recognized by the Civil Code, to wit: (1) occupation, (2) intellectual creation, (3) law,
(4) donation, (5) succession, (6) tradition in consequence of certain contracts, and (7)
prescription.[5]
Neither can private respondent claim good faith in his favor. Good faith consists in the
reasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor received the thing was its owner
but could not transmit the ownership thereof.[6] Private respondent entered the property
without the consent of the previous owner. For all intents and purposes, he is a mere usurper.s
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED, and private
respondent Simeon Recasa is ordered to return the possession of the contested parcels of land
to petitioners as heirs of Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi.
SO ORDERED. So Ordered.
REYNALDO, TELESFORO, REMEDIOS, ALFREDO and BELEN, all surnamed AGUIRRE, VICENTA,
HORACIO and FLORENCIO, all surnamed MAGTIBAY and LEONILA, CECILIA, ANTONIO, and
VENANCIO, all surnamed MEDRANO, and ZOSIMA QUIAMBAO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ELIAS, JOSE, ARSENIA and ROGELIO, all surnamed BALITAAN, and MARIA
ROSALES, respondents. [G.R. No. 122249. January 29, 2004]
FACTS: In his lifetime, Leocadio Medrano was the owner and possessor of a parcel of residential
land, situated in Aplaya, Bauan, Batangas, containing an area of 2,611 square meters.[4] The
parcel of land was conjugal property, having been acquired by Leocadio during his first marriage
with one Emiliana Narito.
After the death of his first wife, Leocadio contracted a second marriage with Miguela Cario.
Their union bore four children, herein co-petitioners, namely: Venancio, Leonila, Antonio and
Cecilia, all surnamed Medrano.
Upon the death of Leocadio on March 19, 1945, the surviving heirs agreed that Sixto should
manage and administer the subject property.
Sixto died on May 17, 1974. It was only after his death that petitioners heard rumors that
Sixto had, in fact, sold significant portions of the estate of Leocadio.
On August 29, 1957, Sixto sold to Maria Bacong a 160- square meter portion of the subject
land.[8] On September 28, 1959, Sixto sold to Tiburcio Balitaan a 1,695 square meter portion of
the same land.[9] Sometime in November 1967, Maria Bacong sold her property to Rosendo
Bacong.[10]
Petitioners demanded the reconveyance of the portions sold by Sixto but Tiburcio Balitaan,
Maria Bacong and Rosendo Bacong refused to do so.
Maria Bacong and Rosendo Bacong contend that petitioners have no cause of action
because they acquired their property thru a valid deed of sale dated August 29, 1957, executed
by Sixto and, alternatively, petitioners cause of action, if any, was barred by prescription and
laches.[12]
ISSUE: 1. WON ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION APPLIES
HELD : NO PRESCRIPTION.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription demands that possession be in good faith, which consists
in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing is received has been the owner
thereof and could thereby transmit that ownership.[32] There is just title when the adverse
claimant comes into possession of the property through any of the modes recognized by law for
the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but that the grantor is neither the owner nor
in a position to transmit the right.[33]
After a careful examination of the records, we find that private respondents failed to
discharge the burden of proof that Tiburcio Balitaan was a purchaser in good faith. It is
undisputed that Tiburcio practically lived his entire lifetime in the area where the property in
dispute is located and had been a neighbor of petitioners. He knew that Sixto Medrano had
other siblings because his son, Dr. Elias Balitaan, is the godson by baptism of spouses Jose
Aguirre and Gertrudes Medrano, the latter being a deceased sister of Sixto. Thus, Tiburcio was
not a complete stranger to the Medrano clan. Yet, he deliberately chose to close his eyes to
said facts and despite his personal knowledge to the contrary, he purchased the disputed
property from Sixto on the basis of the misrepresentation of the latter in his Affidavit of
Transfer that he is the sole surviving heir of Leocadio. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts
which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith
under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.[37]
Not being in good faith, the ten-year period required for ordinary acquisitive prescription
does not apply.
Even the thirty-year period under extraordinary acquisitive prescription has not been met
in this case. Private respondents claim to have been in possession, in the concept of owner, of
the entire parcel of land sold to Tiburcio Balitaan by Sixto Medrano for only seventeen years
(1958-1975).
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 42350, dated July 26, 1995, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
The sale in favor of private respondents is declared VALID but only insofar as the 292.75
square meters undivided share of Sixto Medrano in the subject property is concerned.
LIM TAY, petitioner vs., COURT OF APPEALS, GO FAY AND CO. INC., SY GUIOK, and THE
ESTATE OF ALFONSO LIM, respondents. [G.R. No. 126891. August 5, 1998]
The Facts
On January 8, 1980, Respondent-Appellee Sy Guiok secured a loan from the [p]etitioner in the
amount of P40,000 payable within six (6) months. To secure the payment of the aforesaid loan
and interest thereon, Respondent Guiok executed a Contract of Pledge in favor of the
[p]etitioner whereby he pledged his three hundred (300) shares of stock in the Go Fay &
Company Inc., Respondent Corporation, for brevitys sake. Respondent Guiok obliged himself to
pay interest on said loan at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of said contract of pledge.
On the same date, Alfonso Sy Lim secured a loan from the [p]etitioner in the amount of P40,000
payable in six (6) months. To secure the payment of his loan, Sy Lim executed a Contract of
Pledge covering his three hundred (300) shares of stock in Respondent Corporation. Under said
contract, Sy Lim obliged himself to pay interest on his loan at the rate of 10% per annum from
the date of the execution of said contract.
Under said Contracts of Pledge, Respondent[s] Guiok and Sy Lim covenanted, inter alia, that:
3. In the event of the failure of the PLEDGOR to pay the amount within a period of six (6)
months from the date hereof, the PLEDGEE is hereby authorized to foreclose the pledge upon
the said shares of stock hereby created by selling the same at public or private sale with or
without notice to the PLEDGOR…
However, Respondent Guiok and Sy Lim failed to pay their respective loans and the
accrued interests thereon to the [p]etitioner. In October, 1990, the [p]etitioner filed a Petition
for Mandamus against Respondent Corporation, with the SEC entitled Lim Tay versus Go Fay &
Company, Inc., SEC Case No. 03894, praying that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that an order be issued directing

the corporate secretary of [R]espondent Go Fay & Co., Inc. to register the stock transfers and
issue new certificates in favor of Lim Tay.
ISSUE: WON petitioner acquired pledged shares by prescription.
HELD:
The petition has no merit.

Petitioner contends that he can be deemed to have acquired ownership over the
certificates of stock through extraordinary prescription, as provided for in Article 1132 of the
Civil Code which states:
Art. 1132. The ownership of movables prescribes through uninterrupted possession for four
years in good faith.
The ownership of personal property also prescribes through uninterrupted possession for eight
years, without need of any other condition. x x x.
Petitioners argument is untenable. What is required by Article 1132 is possession in the concept
of an owner. In the present case, petitioner’s possession of the stock certificates came about
because they were delivered to him pursuant to the contracts of pledge. His possession as a
pledgee cannot ripen into ownership by prescription.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Prescription Case # 27 (Jacob)
G.R. No. 76564 May 25, 1990
SOUTH CITY HOMES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Jose S. Santos, Jr. for petitioner.
CRUZ, J.:
The subject of this dispute is a strip of land between two lots owned by the petitioner.
Registration thereof in the name of the petitioner was decreed in 1984 by the trial court
pursuant to the Property Registration Law. 2 On appeal, the order was reversed by a special
division of the respondent court, with two members dissenting.3 The petitioner is now before
us, claiming that the reversal was erroneous.
ISSUE:
WON REVERSAL IS WITH MERIT
HELD:
The Court has considered the issues and the arguments of the parties and finds that the
petition has no merit .
Neither of the owners of Lots Nos. 2381 or 2386-A, in their respective deeds, transferred Lot
No. 5005 to the petitioner; as already explained, Lot No. 5005 was not part of either of the two
lots.
However, even if it be conceded that the previous owners of the other two lots possessed the
disputed lot, their possession cannot be tacked to the possession of the petitioner. The simple
reason is that the possession of the said lot was not and could not have been transferred to the
petitioner when it acquired Lots Nos. 2381 and 2386-A because these two lots did not include
the third lot. Article 1138 of the Civil Code provides that —
(1) The present possessor may complete the period necessary for prescription by tacking his
possession to that of his grantor or predecessor- in interest.
However, tacking of possession is allowed only when there is a privity of contract or
relationship between the previous and present possessors. In the absence of such privity, the
possession of the new occupant should be counted only from the time it actually began and
cannot be lengthened by connecting it with the possession of the former possessors.
It should also be noted that, according to Article 1135 of the Civil Code:
In case the adverse claimant possesses by mistake an area greater, or less, than that expressed
in his title, prescription shall be based on the possession.
This possession, following the above quoted rulings, should be limited only to that of the
successor-in-interest; and in the case of the herein petitioner, it should begin from 1981 when
it acquired the two adjacent lots and occupied as well the lot in question thinking it to be part
of the other two.
It follows that when the application for registration of the lot in the name of the petitioner was
filed in 1983, the applicant had been in possession of the property for less than three years.
This was far too short of the prescriptive period required for acquisition of immovable property,
which is ten years if the possession is in good faith and thirty years if in bad faith, or if the land
is public.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Prescription Case # 28 (Bryner)
G.R. No. L-29390 April 12, 1989
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Represented formerly by the Land Tenure Administration and
now the Land Authority),
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
FACTS:
On November 5,1959, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Tenure
Administration (now Land Authority), filed an action for the cancellation of a mortgage credit in
the sum of P200,000.00 annotated as a lien on the Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 28975 and
1478 of the land records of Bulacan and Pampanga, owned by Roman R. Santos
The said property is subject of a mortgage credit in the aggregate amount of P200,000.00
consisting of four (4) promissory notes at P50,000.00 each, to mature every August 31 of the
years 1939, 1940, 1941 and 1942.
The Commonwealth of the Philippines, thru the defunct Rural Progress Administration,
purchased the property from Santos. Santos received the sum of P800,000.00, while the
amount of P200,000.00 was paid to the Philippine National Bank and in the Deed of Absolute
Sale it was stated that the parcels of land subject of the contract were "free from any liens and
encumbrances.
During the Japanese occupation the Rural Progress Administration, the predecessor of the Land
Tenure Administration, lost the receipts of payment and/or deed of release of mortgage so the
lien annotated on the titles was not cancelled.
Despite several requests from the petitioner, respondents refused to cancel the annotation
alleging that the mortgage credit has not been paid.
Petitioners argued that the four promissory notes matured on August 31 of the years 1939,
1940, 1941 and 1942, hence, the right to enforce said obligations had prescribed by PNB's
inaction for more than ten (10) years from the time the moratorium law was lifted on July
26,1948.
Respondents argued that the moratorium law has interrupted the ten (10) year period of
prescription, hence, the right to enforce the mortgage credit has not been barred by the statute
of limitations.
On January 9,1959, with leave of court, private respondent, filed its amended answer with
counterclaim alleging that in addition to the moratorium law, a period of 8 years, 2 months and
8 days, reckoned from March 10, 1945 the issuance of Executive Order No. 32 up to May
18,1953, the promulgation of the case of Rutter v. Esteban, the period of 3 years, 1 month and
25 days of Japanese occupation of the Philippines should be included in the determination of
the period of interruption.
Respondents also alleged that the period of prescription was also tolled when private
respondent filed its opposition to the petition to cancel the hen which opposition was
dismissed by the trial court which constitutes constitute res judicata on the issue of prescription
as no appeal was interposed and said orders became final and executory.
The trial court rendered a judgment ordering the petitioner to pay the respondent
P150,000.The trial court ordered the petitioner to pay within a period of 90 days the amount of
P150,000 plus interest at 6% per annum from the date of this decision until fully paid, plus
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation in an amount of not less than 10% of the total amount
due.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the court and so it filed an
appeal but the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming in toto the judgment of the trial
court.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prescriptive period of ten (10) years to enforce the mortgage credit was
suspended by the Pacific War and the moratorium law.
HELD:
On the effect of the moratorium law on the statute of limitations, on several occasions, this
Court ruled that Executive Order No. 32 dated March 10, 1945 suspended the payment of all
monetary obligations contracted before December 8, 1941. Because of the suspension of
payments, the running of the prescriptive period was also tolled or interrupted from March 10,
1945 to July 26, 1948, or for a period of three years, four months and sixteen days (Montilla v.
Pacific Commercial Company, 98 Phil. 133 [1955]; Pacific Commercial Company v. Aquino, 100
Phil. 961 [1957]; Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Chua Tian, 100 Phil. 184 [1957]; Liboro v. Finance
and Mining Investment Corp., 102 Phil. 489 [1957]). However, for war damage claimants in
accordance with Republic Act No. 342 dated July 26, 1948, it was held in a number of cases that
the suspension of the statute of limitations started with the issuance of Executive Order No. 32
on March 10, 1945 and lasted up to May 18, 1953 when Republic Act No. 342 was declared
unconstitutional by this Court in Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953]). In other words, during
the duration of the moratorium law, or for a period of 8 years, 2 months and 8 days, the
prescriptive period was also suspended for debtors with war damage claims. (Tiosejo v. Dag, et
al., L-9944, April 10, 1937; Levi Hermanos, Inc. v. Perez, L-14487, April 29,1960; Nielson & Co.,
Inc, v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., 135 Phil. 532 [1969]; Republic v. Hernaez, 31 SCRA 219
[1970]; Republic v. Grizaldo, 15 SCRA 681 [1965]; De Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank, 38
SCRA 429 [1971]).
In resume, We can therefore, conclude that during the duration of the moratorium law, from
March 10, 1945 up to May 18, 1953 or for a period of 8 years, 2 months and 8 days, the statute
of limitations was interrupted so that said period must be considered in determining whether
or not the action to enforce the three promissory notes has prescribed. Likewise, except for the
promissory note which matured on August 31, 1942, the outbreak of the Pacific War from
December, 1941 up to January 30,1942 must also be considered as it also interrupted the
statute of limitations.
As private respondent's answer with counterclaim was filed on November 24, 1 958, only 9
years, 8 months and 23 days had lapsed from the time the promissory note became due on
August 31, 1940, after the period of moratorium and the war totaling a period of 8 years, 3
months and 31 days are deducted. Similarly, after deducting the same period of interruption,
for the promissory note which matured on August 31, 1941, only 7 years, 8 months and 23 days
had lapsed. For the promissory note which matured on August 31, 1942 only 7 years, and 16
days had lapsed. Clearly, private respondent's right to enforce and collect the mortgage credit
within the prescriptive period of ten years is not barred by prescription.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-55315 September 21, 1982
WILLIAM COLE and HENRY COLE,

vs.
POTENCIANA CASUGA VDA. DE GREGORIO, JOSEFINA G. HUFANO assisted by her husband,
ALFREDO HUFANO and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
FACTS:
William Cole, Sr. and Angelina Munar Cole entered into an "Agreement to Buy and Sell" a parcel
of land located at Bo. Dalumpinas Oeste, San Fernando, La Union (also known as Bo.
Urbiztondo, San Juan, La Union) with the owners, namely, Angel Gregorio and Potenciana
Casuga for P6,000.00.
Luis Salanga, surveyor, conducted a survey of the property in question on September 24 and
October 7, 1963 and submitted his survey plans to the Bureau of Lands on June 22, 1964 for
approval. The survey plans were then delivered to the children of William Cole, Sr., the
plaintiffs-appellants, on May 31, 1966 who paid the balance of his fees.
Unknown to Wilham Cole Sr wrote the latter two angry letters to the surveryor because of the
delay of the delay in the results of the survey, one dated October 20, and the other on April 1,
1965 eleven days before William Cole, Sr. died on April 12, 1965.
After the death of William Cole, Sr. on April 12, 1965, Angel Gregorio died on June 3, 1965
followed by Angelina Munar Cole who died on January 10, 1966.
On May 31, 1966, plaintiffs came to know that their parents have still an unpaid balance on the
land subject matter of the instant case in the amount of P5,000.00 and tried to raise the
amount needed to pay the balance but they discovered that the property was already
transferred to the only daughter of defendant-appellee Potenciana Casuga Vda. de Gregorio,
namely, defendant-appellee Josefina G. Hufano.
Defendants-appellees contend that when the preliminary survey conducted by surveyor Luis
Salanga on October 7, 1963, disclosed that the land subject of the Agreement to Buy and Sell
contained only an area of 23,408 square meters instead of 32,976 square meters as stated in
Tax Declaration No. 38048, Angelina Cole rescinded the contract and Angel Gregorio returned
to her the advance payment of Pl,000.00.
Neither Angelina Cole nor plaintiffs-appellants took possession of the land, nor declared the
same for taxation or paid the taxes thereon. The agreement was likewise not registered in the
name of Angelina Cole in the Office of the Register of Deeds.
The agreement to buy and sell was executed in 1963 and the survey allegedly was finished on
October 7, 1963, the Court of Appeals itself has found that the survey plan approved by the
Bureau of Lands came to the knowledge of petitioners only on May 31, 1966.
To their dismay, however, they discovered that respondent widow Potenciana had already sold
the property to her corespondents herein.
According to the Court of Appeals, "Plaintiffs-Appellants' cause (sic, should be causes) of action
have (has), however, not only prescribed but (are now) barred by laches.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cause of action of plaintiffs-appellants has prescribed.
HELD:
Needless to state, prescription of actions run with the mere lapse of time (Art. 1139, Civil
Code). But it is elementary that the computation of the period of prescription of any cause of
action, which is the same as saying prescription of the action, should start from the date the
cause of action accrues or from the day the right of the plaintiff is violated. In the language of
Article 114 of the Civil Code which is the one pertinently applicable to this case, "the action
must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: (1) upon a written
contract."
Laches is predicated on inaction, inattention, indifference or apathy or failure to do anything

directed towards the assertion of a right. We cannot say any such attitude appears to be
attributable to petitioners. Up to eleven days before he died on April 12, 1965, Cole Sr. was still
berating Surveyor Salanga about not finishing the awaited survey, upon the completion of
which their obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price agreed upon depended. It was
only after he and even his wife had died, that Salanga delivered the survey plan to petitioners.
Thereafter, petitioners immediately sought legal course and money. To perceive laches in such
a milieu of circumstances is to miss the point of that principle of equity altogether.
Considering all the foregoing, We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in finding petitioners
guilty of laches and in holding that their causes of action, first, for specific performance, and
second, for annulment of the sale to the Hufanos have prescribed. The right of the vendors to
collect the balance of the purchase price having arisen only in 1966, their cause of action to
recover arose only then. On the other hand,petitioners' right to demand consummation of the
sale by an action of specific performance also arose only in 1966, after the survey's completion
was brought to their attention.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the decision of the Court of
Appeals in the sense that the action of petitioners is hereby declared as not having yet
prescribed when they filed the same, that they are not guilty of laches, that the sale by
respondent Potenciana Casuga Vda. de Gregorio of the property in issue to her co-respondents
the Hufanos is null and void and that, the respondent should pay to the banks the loans
covered by the mortgages aforementioned and all private respondents are to deliver
possession of the said property to petitioners free from all liens and encumbrances.
Costs against private respondent Potenciana Casuga Vda. de Gregorio.

G.R. No. 98467, July 10, 1992
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CO. and AMERICAN EXPRESS BANK, LTD.,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, VICENTE T. TAN, VICTAN AND
COMPANY, INC., TRANSWORLD INVESTMENT CORP., FIRST INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
CO., INC., FAR EAST PETROLEUM AND MINERAL CORP., and PHILCONTRUST INTERNATIONAL
CORP.,
FACTS:
Private respondents filed a complaint in Civil Case No. 15707 against the Central Bank of the
Philippines (CB), the National Development Company (NDC) and the American Express Bank,
Ltd. (AMEX) for the reconveyance of shares of stock in the International Corporate Bank
(Interbank), with damages and a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order.
Regional Trial Court Judge Ignacio Capulong, issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting
petitioners AMEX and NDC from disposing of or transferring their shares of stock in Interbank. 5
NDC and AMEX move to dismiss the complaint while petitioners' co-defendant in Civil Case No.
15707, the CB, filed its separate motion to dismiss, but Judge Capulong likewise denied it in his
Order dated 15 May 1987.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, the CB filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari while NDC and AMEX filed a supplemental motion to dismiss on the
ground that Tan, et al. had not paid the correct amount of filing fees. The said motion was also
denied by Judge Capulong in the Order dated 8 August 1989.
On 29 September 1989, NDC and AMEX filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 challenging the adverse orders of the trial court; they prayed for
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 15707 and for the issuance of a restraining order to enjoin further
proceedings therein.
The Court of Appeals (First Division) promulgated its decision in the petition filed by the CB,
C.A.-G.R SP No. 12706, granting the petition and ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil
Case No. 15707 insofar as the CB is concerned. 12 Herein private respondents then filed with
this Court a petition for review to set aside the said decision.
The Sixth Division of the respondent Court promulgated its Decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 18865
granting the petition and ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 15707.
Private respondents herein moved to reconsider said decision. An undated resolution penned
by Justice Nicolas Lapeña, Jr., 15 denied the motion; however, Associate Justice Emeterio Cui
indicated his dissent and submitted a dissenting opinion. 16 Pursuant to Section 11 of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and Section 6, Rule I of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals, two (2) Members of the Court, Associate Justices Ricardo J. Francisco and
Alicia V. Sempio Diy, were designated to sit temporarily in a Division of Five. The two concurred
with the dissenting opinion of Justice Cui. Thereafter, the Division of Five promulgated on 11
April 1991 the challenged resolution which granted the motion for reconsideration and
dismissed the petition.
Unable to accept the Resolution, NDC and AMEX filed the herein petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Cout of Appeals erred in holding that prescription as ground (sic) for
dismissal should be resolved at the trial, even though the determinative facts appear on the
face of the complaint.
HELD:
As to the lack of cause of action and prescription, the fate of the private respondents had long
been sealed.
As to prescription, this Court, in said G.R. No. 90365, ruled:
The next question is whether or not any action for reconveyance has
nevertheless prescribed, on the bases of provisions governing reconveyance.
The rule anent prescription on recovery of movables (shares of stock in this case)
is expressed in Article 1140 of the Civil Code, which we quote:
Art. 1140. Actions to recover movables shall prescribe eight years

from the time the possession thereof is lost, unless the possessor
had acquired the ownership by prescription for a less period,
according to Article 1132, and without prejudice to the provisions
of articles 559, 1505, and 1133.
As it provides, Article 1140 is subject to the provisions of Articles 1132 and 1133
of the Code, governing acquisitive prescription, in relation to Articles 559 and
1505 thereof. Under Article 1132:
Art. 1132. The ownership of movables prescribes through

uninterrupted possession for four years in good faith.
The ownership of personal property also prescribes through

uninterrupted possession for eight years, without need of any
other condition.
With regard to the right of the owner to recover personal

property lost or of which he had been illegally deprived, as well
as, with respect to movables acquired in a public sale, fair, or
market, or from a merchant's store the provisions of articles 559
and 1505 of this Code shall be observed.
acquisitive prescription sets in after uninterrupted possession of four years,

provided there is good faith, and upon the lapse of eight years, if bad faith is
present. Where, however, the thing was acquired through a crime, the offender
cannot acquire ownership by prescription under Article 1133, which we quote:
Art. 1133. Movables possessed through a crime can never be

acquired through prescription by the offender.
Please note that under the above Article, the benefits of prescription are denied
to the offender; nonetheless, if the thing has meanwhile passed to a subsequent
holder, prescription begins to run (four or eight years, depending on the
existence of good faith). 30
For purposes of extinctive prescription vis-a-vis movables, we therefore

understand the periods to be:
1. Four years, if the possessor is in good faith;

2. Eight years in all other cases, except where the loss was due to
a crime in which case, the offender cannot acquire the movable
by prescription, and an action to recover it from him is
imprescriptible.
Since the complaint was filed on January 13, 1987, ten years more or less after the petitioners
transferred the shares in question, it is clear that the petitioners have come to court too late.
We cannot accept the petitioners' contention that the period during which authoritarian rule
was in force had interrupted prescription and that the same began to run only on February 25,
1986, when the Aquino government took power. It is true that under Article 1154:
Art. 1154. The period during which the obligee was prevented by a fortuitous
event from enforcing his right is not reckoned against him.
fortuitous event have the effect of tolling the period of prescription. However, we can not say,
as a universal rule, that the period from September 21, 1972 through February 25, 1986
involves a force majeure. Plainly, we cannot box in the "dictatorial" period within the term
without distinction, and without, by necessity, suspending all liabilities, however demandable,
incurred during that period, including perhaps those ordered by this Court to be paid. While
this Court is cognizant of acts of the last regime, especially political acts, that might have indeed
precluded the enforcement of liability against that regime and/or its minions, the Court is not
inclined to make quite a sweeping pronouncement, considering especially the unsettling effects
such a pronouncement is likely to bring about. It is our opinion that claims should be taken on a
case-to-case basis. This selective rule is compelled, among others, by the fact that not all those
imprisoned or detained by past dictatorship were true political oppositionists, or, for that
matter, innocent of any crime or wrongdoing. Indeed, not a few of them were manipulators
and scoundrels.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of respondent Court in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 18865
promulgated on 11 April 1991 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE while its Decision therein,
promulgated on 30 April 1990, is REINSTATED.
G.R.No. 90365, March 18, 1991
VICENTE T. TAN, VICTAN & COMPANY, INC., TRANSWORLD INVESTMENT CORPORATION,

FIRST INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT COMPANY, INC., FAR EAST PETROLEUM & MINERALS
CORPORATION, and PHILCONTRUST INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), CENTRAL BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES,
FACTS:
On June 15, 1974, private respondent Tan was arrested by the military authorities pursuant to
an Arrest, Search and Seizure Order (ASSO) issued by the then Secretary of National Defense on
the basis of criminal charges filed against him before the PC Criminal Investigation Service for
alleged irregular transactions at Continental Bank.
Because of a possible bank run as a result of the arrests, the officers of Continental Bank
requested an emergency loan to meet pending withdrawals of depositors. The Monetary Board
approved the request on June 21, 1974 subject, however, to a verification of the bank's assets.
However, the said bank assets cannot meet its liabilities, since the latter exceeded the former
by P 67.260 million. The report also indicated that Continental Bank was insolvent and that its
continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors and creditors, which are
the two grounds mandated under Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265, otherwise known as the
Central Bank Act, justifying the closure and placing under receivership of a bank.
On the basis of the report, petitioner ordered the closure of Continental Bank effective June 24,
1974 and designated the Director of its Department of Commercial and Savings Banks as
receiver with instructions to take charge of the bank's assets pursuant to Sec. 29 of R.A. No.
265.
While still under detention by the military, respondent Tan executed certain agreements on
February 2, 1977, May 12, 1977 and July 5, 1977 transferring and assigning 359,615 shares of
stock in Continental Bank, as well as other properties belonging to him and his affiliate firms, to
Executive Consultants, Inc., Orobel Property Management, Inc. and Antolum International
Trading Corporation in consideration of the assumption by these assignees of the liabilities and
obligations of respondents Tan and his companies.
The assignees of respondents Tan and his companies rehabilitated Continental Bank and, in
support thereof, respondent Tan wrote the petitioner on July 5, 1977 certifying on his own
behalf and in behalf of the corporations owned and controlled by him, that they have no
objection to the reopening and rehabilitation of Continental Bank under its new name,
International Corporate Bank or Interbank.
Interbank reopened in 1977 and since then operated as a banking institution with controlling
ownership thereof changing hands during the past decade.
After the lapse of more than twelve (12) years, private respondents filed the present case of
reconveyance of shares of stock with damages and restraining order before the respondent
court.
However, the court found that tan is guilty of laches which he filed for a Motion for
reconsideration but was also denied.
Hence, he filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners' action for damages against respondent is barred by prescription
under Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
2. Assuming, arguendo, that the action is not barred by prescription under Section 29 of
Republic Act No. 265, whether or not the action for damages is barred by prescription under
Article 1146 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
1. The first question refers to prescription. In this connection, we are not disposed to accept the
ruling of the Court of Appeals that under Republic Act No. 265, the action has prescribed, and
that in any event, assuming that Republic Act No. 265 is inapplicable, Article 1146 of the Civil
Code is nonetheless a bar. With respect to Republic Act No. 265, the Court notes that the
statute talks of enjoining the Monetary Board from taking charge of a bank's assets. The Court
also notes, however, that the Monetary Board has since relinquished possession of Continental
Bank's assets, and the controlling ownership of the bank has passed from hand to hand in the
course of the decade. It has likewise since reopened under a new name, International
Corporate Bank, and a new management. Clearly, and as a perusal of the petitioners' complaint
confirms, the petitioners are not asking for an injunction against the Monetary Board and the
Board has since in fact ceased from performing any act in connection with Continental Bank or
its successor bank.
Be that as it may, and assuming ex gratia argumenti that Article 1149 were applicable, it still
would not have rescued the petitioners since that meant that they had until 1982 at most,
within which to institute a claim. Prescription would still have been a bar.
2. The rule anent prescription on recovery of movables (shares of stock in this case) is
expressed in Article 1140 of the Civil Code, which we quote:
Art. 1140. Actions to recover movables shall prescribe eight years from the time the
possession thereof is lost, unless the possessor had acquired the ownership by
prescription for a less period, according to article 1132, and without prejudice to the
provisions of articles 559, 1505, and 1133.
As it provides, Article 1140 is subject to the provisions of Articles 1132 and 1133 of the Code,
governing acquisitive presciption, in relation to Articles 559 and 1505 thereof. Under Article
1132:
Art. 1132. The ownership of movables prescribes through uninterruped possession for
four years in good faith.
The ownership of personal property also prescribes through uninterrupted possession

for eight years, without need of any other condition.
With regard to the right of the owner to recover personal property lost or of which he
has been illegally deprived, as well as with respect to movables acquired in a public sale,
fair, or market, or from a merchant's store the provisions of articles 559 and 1505 of this
Code shall be observed.
acquisitive prescription sets in after uninterrupted possession of four years, provided there is
good faith, and upon the lapse of eight years, if bad faith is present. Where, however, the thing
was acquired through a crime, the offender can not acquire ownership by prescription under
Article 1133, which we quote:
Art. 1133. Movables possessed through a crime can never be acquired through
prescription by the offender.
Please note that under the above Article, the benefits of prescription are denied to the
offender; nonetheless, if the thing has meanwhile passed to a subsequent holder, prescription
begins to run (four or eight years, depending on the existence of good faith).9
For purposes of existence prescription vis-a-vis movables, we therefore understand the periods
to be:
1. Four years, if the possessor is in good faith;
2. Eight years in all other cases, except where the loss was due to a crime in which case,
the offender cannot acquire the movable by prescription, and an action to recover it
from him is imprescriptible.
It is evident, for purposes of the complaint in question, that the petitioners had at most eight
years within which to pursue a reconveyance, reckoned from the loss of the shares in 1977,
when the petitioner Vicente Tan executed the various agreements in which he conveyed the
same in favor of the Executive Consultants, Inc., Orobel Property Management, Inc., and
Antolum Trading Corporation.
We are hard put to say, in this regard, that the petitioners' action is after all, imprescriptible
pursuant to the provisions of Article 1133 of the Civil Code, governing actions to recover loss by
means of a crime.
Since the complaint was filed on January 13, 1987, ten years more or less after the petitioners
transferred the shares in question, it is clear that the petitioners have come to court too late.
n fine, the respondent court did not commit any reversible error.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Complaint in Civil Case No. 15707 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 134, Makati, Metro Manila, is hereby DISMISSED.
Costs against the petitioners.
Case # 32 – Prescription (Cora)
DESAMPARADOS M. SOLIVA, Substituted by Sole Heir PERLITA SOLIVA GALDO,

petitioner, vs. The INTESTATE ESTATE of MARCELO M. VILLALBA and VALENTA
BALICUA VILLALBA, respondents
[G.R. No. 154017. December 8, 2003]
Facts:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify
the November 9, 2001 Decision ] and the May 23, 2002[3] Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) where the Decision appealed from is Affirmed. The assailed Resolution
denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
On May 5, 1982, [Petitioner] Desamparados M. Soliva filed a complaint for recovery

of ownership, possession and damages against [Respondent] Valenta Balicua Villalba
alleging that she is the owner of a parcel of agricultural land situated at Hinaplanan,
Claveria, Misamis Oriental, containing an area of 16,542 square meters; that on
January 4, 1966, the late Capt. Marcelo Villalba asked her permission to occupy her
house on said land, promised to buy the house and lot upon receipt of his money from
Manila and gave her P600.00 for the occupation of the house; that Capt. Villalba died in
1978 without having paid the consideration for the house and lot; and that after after his
death, his widow, [Respondent Valenta], refused to vacate the house and lot despite
demands, destroyed the house thereon and constructed a new one.
Issues:
1. Whether petitioner is barred from recovering the disputed property; and
2. Whether the conveyance ordered by the court a quo would unjustly enrich
respondents at her expense.
Court’s Ruling:
1. Petitioner’s claim is already barred from recovering the property due to laches
and prescription. Petitioner failed to sue for collection or rescission.
2. To allow the respondent to keep the property without paying fully for it amounts
to unjust enrichment on her part.
Petition is partly GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED,
with the MODIFICATION that respondent is ordered to pay the balance of the
purchase price of P1,250 plus 6 percent interest per annum, from May 5, 1982 until
the finality of this judgment. Thereafter, interest of 12 percent per year shall then be
imposed on that amount upon the finality of the Decision until the payment thereof.

ALCANTARA-DAUS v. SPOUSES DE LEON
G.R. No. 149750 June 16, 2003
FACTS:
Spouses De Leon are the owners of a parcel of land situated in the Municipality
of San Manuel, Pangasinan with an area of Four Thousand Two Hundred Twelve
square meters more or less. Respondent Hermoso De Leon inherited the said lot from
his father Marcelino De Leon by virtue of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition.Sometime
1960s, Spouses De Leon engaged the services of the late Atty. Florencio Juan to take
care of the documents of their properties. They were asked to sign voluminous
documents by the latter. After the death of Atty. Juan, some documents surfaced and
most revealed that their properties had been conveyed by sale or quitclaim to
Hermoso’s brothers and sisters, to Atty. Juan and his sisters, when in truth and in fact,
no such conveyances were ever intended by them. Furthermore, respondent found out
that his signature in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition with Quitclaim made in favor of
Rodolfo de Leon was forged. They discovered that the land in question was sold by
Rodolfo de Leon to Aurora Alcantara
Spouses De Leon demanded the annulment of the document and re-conveyance

but defendants refused. Petitioner, Aurora Alcantara-Daus averred that she bought the
land in question in good faith and for value on December 1975 and that she has been in
continuous, public, peaceful, open possession over the same and has been
appropriating the produce thereof without objection from anyone.
The RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan rendered its Decision in favor of herein

petitioner. It ruled that respondents’ claim was barred by laches, because more than 18
years had passed since the land was sold. It further ruled that since it was a notarial
document, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition in favor of Rodolfo de Leon was
presumptively authentic.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Deed of Absolute executed by Rodolfo De Leon over the
land in question in favor of petitioner was perfected and binding upon the
parties therein?
2. Whether or not the evidentiary weight of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition
with Quitclaim, executed by respondent Hermoso de Leon, Perlita de Leon
and Carlota de Leon in favor of Rodolfo de Leon was overcome by more than
a preponderance of evidence of respondents?
HELD:
1. NO. It is during the delivery that the law requires the seller to have the right to
transfer ownership of the thing sold. In general, a perfected contract of sale
cannot be challenged on the ground of the seller’s non-ownership of the thing
sold at the time of the perfection of the contract. . It is through tradition or
delivery that the buyer acquires the real right of ownership over the thing sold.
2. NO. As a general rule, the due execution and authenticity of a document must
be reasonably established before it may be admitted in evidence.
The SC finds no reason to reverse the factual finding of the appellate

court. Indeed, Hermoso De Leon’s signature was forged. Aptly held by the
CA, such variance cannot be attributed to the age or the mechanical acts of
the person signing.

LINA ABALON LUBOS, petitioner, vs. MARITES GALUPO, DELIA GALUPO, JUAN
GALUPO, PRUDENCIO GALUPO, PRECIOSA GALUPO and MANSUETO GALUPO,
JR., respondents.
[G. R. No. 139136. January 16, 2002]
Facts:
This is an appeal from the petitioner Lubos to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 66, ruling that
respondents are the absolute owners of the parcel of land involved in the complaint.
The Court of Appeals found the subject of the said case is a parcel of land with an area
of 10.8224 hectares, more or less, located in Sitio Naganaga, Barrio Cababtuan,
Municipality of Pambujan, Northern Samar, originally tax declared in the name of
Victoriana Dulay in Tax Declaration No. 17056.
The plaintiffs claim that on January 28, 1928, in a private instrument written in Spanish
entitled Escritura de Compra y Venta, Victoriana Dulay and her son Restituto D. Merino
sold the said property to Juan Galupo. On the death of Juan Galupo, the said property
was inherited by his son Mansueto Galupo, Sr. He died in 1981. The plaintiffs are his
children out of two marriages.
The plaintiffs complain that in 1984, they discovered the land to be occupied by the
tenant farmers of defendant Lina Abalon Lubos. Lubos contends that the subject land
was originally owned by Victoriana Dulay alone, her great grandmother, who sold the
property to her father Juan F. Abalon. Her father possessed the property for over thirty
(30) years until 1975, when he sold the same to her. Consequently, she caused the
cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 17056 and she obtained Tax Declaration No. 34286
in her name. Subsequently, she sold a portion of the property to the spouses Poldo,
who claim to be purchasers in good faith.
On November 26, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs and
against the defendants.
Petitioner Lubos and the spouses Poldo appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.
On August 29, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision [7] affirming in toto
the decision of the trial court. On October 21, 1997, Lubos filed with the Court of
Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision. However, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Who, between the parties have a better right or title to the subject lot?
The Court's Ruling:
Petition is denied. Issue raised is factual.
It is a well-settled rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.
Obviously, petitioner has failed to establish the chain of title through which the land
passed to her. No proof was presented to show that, indeed, the land was transferred
from its original owner, Victoriana Dulay, to petitioner’s father, Juan Abalon.
In contrast, the respondents have shown that the land came to their possession as heirs
of Mansueto Galupo, Sr. who was the heir of Juan Galupo, the person to whom
Victoriana Dulay transferred the land.
Petition therefore is Denied and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed.
MARCIANA DE MORALES vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OFMISAMIS OCCIDENTAL
G.R. No. L-52278 May 29, 1980
Facts:
On May 7, 1978, petitioner filed Civil Case No. OZ-704 against private respondent with
allegations and reliefs substantially similar to those stated in Civil Case No. 2031which had been
previously dismiss without prejudice.
Private respondents denied the allegations and set up the affirmative defense that plaintiff’’s cause of
action was barred by prescription. On October 10, 1979, the complaint was dismissed on the ground
of prescription.
This is an action which is a petition to set aside the order dismissing the complaint on the ground og
prescription.
Issue:
Whether or not the action by petitioners is barred by prescription.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
Petition granted . Case ordered reinstated.
Ratio Decidendi:
There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One
i s acquisitive, i.e. the acquisition of a right by the lapse of time (Art. 1106, par.1). The
other kind is extinctive prescription whereby rights and actions are lost by
the lapse of time. (Arts, 1106, par. 2 and1139.) Indubitably, from August 12, 1963, to
May 7, 1978, less than thirty (30) years had elapsed. Hence the action had not yet prescribed.
However , the respondent judge apparently relying on paragraph 2 of the above-quoted article has
ruled in effect that the action is barred because the defendants have acquired the subject matter of the
action by acquisitive prescription of 10 years (Art. 1136, Civil Code). This is manifest error for the
defendants have not claimed acquisitive prescription in their answer and even if they did, it cannot be
given judicial sanction on mere allegations. The law requires one who asserts ownership by adverse
possession to prove the presence of the essential elements which in ordinary acquisitive prescription
of real estate are good faith, a just title (which according to Art. 1131, is , never presumed but must be
proved), and the lapse of time fixed by law ( Art. 1117, par. 2, Civil Code). This was not done by the
defendants before the respondent judge dismissed the complaint against them.
Prescription Case #36 (Leanel)
G.R. No. 90776

Phil. Petroleum Corp. vs. Municipality of Pililla
June 3. 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner is a business enterprise engaged in the manufacture of lubricated oil

basestock which is a petroleum product with its refinery plant located at Malaya, Pililla, Rizal. It
conducted its business activities and is in continuous operation within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Municipality of Pililla.
Respondent enacted the Pillilla Tax Code of 1974 (Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 s-
1974) whereby Sections 9 and 10 imposes tax on business, fees and charges.
Petitioner was affected by the implementation of MTO No. 1 s-1974 hereby assailing the
validity and legality of the collection of business tax, fees and charges.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the taxes and duties not collected from petitioner prior to the 5 year
period from the filing of the case on April 4, 1986 had already prescribed.
HELD:
No, the court expressed that since the Local Tax Code does not provide the prescriptive
period for collection of local taxes, Article 1143 of the Civil Code applies. Said law provides that
an action upon an obligation created by law prescribes within 10 years from the time the right of
action accrues. The Municipality of Pililla can therefore enforce the collection of the tax on
business of petitioner due from 1976 to 1986 and not the tax that had accrued prior to 1976.
Prescription Case #37 (Leanel)
G. R. No. 167281
Mary M. Bausa, et. al. vs. Heirs of Juan Dino, et. al.
August 28, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioners instituted a complaint for recovery of possession of a real property, a parcel

of land before the RTC whereby, on October 2, 1985, it rendered a decision declaring
petitioners as the owners.
Respondent Juan Dino, substituted by his heirs upon his death refused to accept the writ
of execution and sign the copy of the Delivery of Possession it received from the sheriff, yet,
they remained in the disputed property. The failure of the execution of the court’s decision,
respondents herein filed an opposition contending that the action was barred by prescription.
Subsequently, the RTC rendered its decision was timely filed. The CA reversed the trial court’s
decision. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s independent action to revive the October 2, 1985 decision
of the trial court was timely filed.
HELD:
Yes, the court ruled, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by
the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice
would result. It would be more in keeping with justice and equity to allow the revival of the
judgment rendered by the RTC. To rule otherwise would result in an absurd situation where the
rightful owner of the property would be ousted by a usurper on mere technicalities.
Prsecription Case #38 (Leanel)
G.R. No. 143990

Maria L. Anido, et.al. vs. Filomeno Negado and CA
October 17, 2001
FACTS:
Private respondent filed a complaint for collection of attorney’s fees before the RTC of
Palo, Leyte against petitioners pursuant to an oral contract for legal services rendered by the
former to the latter executed in July 1978.
Petitioners in their answer contended that private respondent had no cause of action,
there being no contract for legal services to speak of and that ten years after he prepared the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Project Partition. Further, they claimed that private
respondents cause of action had already prescribed since the same was based on an alleged
oral contract, under Article 1145 of the Civil Code, should have been filed within six years from
the time the cause of action accrued. The trial court postponed the resolution of the prescription
issue until after the conclusion of the pre-trial. However, the appellate court overlooked upon the
issue. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cause of action of private respondent arising from an oral contract
had already prescribed.
HELD:
Yes, the court agreed with the petitioner failure to invoke prescription does not amount to
a waiver of the right to invoke the same. Moreover, where the plaintiffs own allegation in the
complaint or the evidence it presented shows that the action had already prescribed.
In the case at bar, private respondent’s allegation in the complaint that petitioners
refused to sign the contract for legal services in October 1978, and his filing of the complaint
only on November 23, 1987, or more than nine years after his cause of action arising from
breach of the oral contract between him and petitioners point to the conclusion that the six-years
prescriptive period within which to file an action based on such oral contract under Article 1145
of the Civil Code had already lapsed.
Prescription Case # 39 (Leanel)
G.R. No. 51593

National Development Corporation vs. Cebu City
November 5, 1992
FACTS:
Petitioner is a government-owned or controlled corporation. It operates among others as

subsidiary corporations one of which is the now defunct National Warehousing Corporation
(NWC). By virtue of Proclamation No. 430 Block no. 4, Reclamation Area No. 4, of Cebu City
was reserved for warehousing purposes under the administration of NWC. Subsequently, in
1940, a warehouse was constructed thereon. However, on year 1947, E.O. 93 dissolved NWC
with NDC taking over its assets and functions.
Respondent assessed petitioner for real estate taxes on the land where the warehouse
was built starting in the year 1948 whereby the latter paid the former. By the year 1970,
petitioner wrote to respondent a demand letter for full refund of the taxes it paid to the latter
claiming that the land and the warehouse standing thereon belonged to the Republic and
therefore exempt from taxation.
The CFI of Manila ruled in favor of petitioner directing respondent to refund all the real estate
taxes paid for the land and the warehouse erected. The defendants appealed to the CA which
also ruled in favor of the petitioner on the improperly collected taxes. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not under the principle of solutio indebiti, the action for refund by the
petitioner of the real estate taxes on the land and warehouse it paid to respondent had
prescribed.
HELD:
No, petitioner paid thru error or mistake, and the government accepted the payment,
gave rise to the application of the principle of solutio indebiti under Article 2154 of the New Civil
Code, which provides that "if something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it
was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises." There is, therefore,
created a tie or juridical relation in the nature of solutio indebiti,expressly classified as quasi-
contract under Section 2, Chapter I of Title XVII of the New Civil code.
Solutio indebiti is a quasi-contract, and the instant case being in the nature of solutio indebiti,
the claim for refund must be commenced within six (6) years from date of payment pursuant to
Article 1145 (2) of the New Civil Code.
Actions for refund of taxes illegally collected must be commenced within six (6) years from the
date of collection. The Court ordered the refund of an undetermined amount based, however, on
the date of payment counted six (6) years backward from October 25, 1972, when the complaint
in this case was filed. 37
Prescription Case #40 (Charmaine)
NOEL E. MORA VS. AVESCO MARKETING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 177414 November 14, 2008
FACTS:
In March 1996, petitioner was hired as a sales engineer at Avesco

Marketing Corporation (respondent) to supervise and install sound and
communications systems for its clientele. On March 25, 2003, he tendered his
letter of resignation to be effective a month after or on April 25, 2003. It appears
that petitioners filing of a resignation letter came about after he was confronted for
selling competitors products to the prejudice and detriment of respondent and was
given the option of either immediately resigning or face administrative charges.
The following day or on March 26, 2003, respondent’s personnel manager issued
to petitioner a notice of disciplinary action reading:
A report by your Superiors has reached our office just recently

some days ago [sic] that you again have committed another breach of
trust [sic] against our Company in violation of our [sic] Company
Rules and Regulations. This time instead of attending to the products
you have to sell, you have surreptitiously undertaken sales
transaction [sic], which is patently inimical to the interest of the
Company that results to sales loss for the company. x x x x.
In his March 27, 2003 Response to the above-quoted notice, petitioner gave
his side as follows, quoted verbatim:
In response to your memo with reference no. PD-C003-095
dated March 26, 2003 regarding to [sic] the preventive suspension you
serve to me [sic], I am not culpable.
The report of my superior that I am surreptitiously selling other

products instead of our products is just speculation and his mere
tactics [sic] for our unfavorable sales output for the month. I sell
products only from Avesco and never transact/deal other products. I
know the consequences of that move and never cross to my mind
doing that kind of accusation [sic].
I have been accused for a thing [sic] that I did not know
what particular transactions [sic], I was not being talked by my
superior [sic] about this or even asked me [sic], this is just a one[-
]sided accusation and I am willing to know what it is all about. Your
office did not explain to me what this accusation is all about[,]
instead offering me an immediate resignation and your notice is a
step for my termination [sic].
Petitioner thereupon filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the

National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which the labor arbiter[8] dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction[9] since the dispute falls within the province of the grievance
procedure provided for by the Collective Bargaining Agreement between
respondent and the workers union.
Petitioners resignation being premised on a qualification ─ that it be

effective April 25, 2003 ─ was conditional in character. It is thus only considered
as a mere offer. Since respondent did not accept the condition attendant to the offer
as, it bears repeating, he was in fact given a show cause letter a day after, there was
no resignation to speak of.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioners questioned filing of the illegal dismissal case

three months and 20 days after he withdrew his letter of resignation does not dent
his case.
HELD:
Under the law he has four years to file his complaint.
In fine, petitioners dismissal was illegal. His claim for damages and
attorneys fees must, however, be denied in light of his failure to prove the bases
therefor. Moral damages are meant to compensate the claimant for any physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injuries unjustly caused.
Broad allegations, bereft of proof, cannot sustain the award of moral damages, as
well as attorneys fees.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent is ordered to reinstate petitioner with
full backwages without loss of seniority rights and privileges from the time of his
dismissal until his actual reinstatement or, if reinstatement is no longer feasible, to
give him separation pay equivalent to at least one month salary for every year of
service.
PHIL. AIRLINES INC. VS. HON. ADRIANO SAVILLO
G.R. NO. 149547 JULY 4,2008
FACTS:
PAL is a corporation duly organized under the Philippine law, engage in the business providing
air carriage for passengers, baggage and cargo. Public respondent Ho. Adriano Savillo is the presiding
Judge while private respondent is the plaintiff in the aforementioned cases. Private respondent was
invited to participate in the 1993 ASEAN Seniors Annual Golf Tournament held in Jakarta Indonesia. He
purchased a ticket with the point of passage MANILA-JAKARTA-SINGAPORE-MANILA. On October 3,
1993 private respondents and companions took the PAL flight to Singapore and arrived at about
6:00pm, upon their arrival, they proceeded to the Singapore Airline to check-in for their flight to Jakarta
scheduled at 8:00pm on the same date. Airlines rejected the ticket of private respondent and group
because they were not endorsed by PAL. Private respondent try to contact on PAL’S office at the airport
only to find out that it was closed . Stranded in the airport, private respondent was in panic and at aloss
where to go. They were then forced to purchase another ticket and arrived at Jakarta at 12 midnight.
After the series of nerve wrecking experience, private respondent became ill and unable to participate
in tournament. Upon his return to the Philippines private respondent brought the matter to the attention
of PAL. He sent a demand letter to PAL on 20 December 1993 and another to Singapore Airlines on 21
March 1994. However, both airlines disowned liability and blamed each other for the fiasco. Private
respondent filed a complaint for damages on Aug. 15,1997.PAL filed a motion to dismiss on Sept.
18,1998 on the ground the said complaint was barred by prescription. PAL argued that the WARSAW
Convention governed this case in connection with International Transportation and is subject to
prescriptive period of 2 years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PAL’S motion to dismiss should have been granted by the Trial Court on the
contention that the claim/complaint are covered by the WARSAW Convention which provide for the 2-
year period .
HELD:
These claims are covered by the Civil Code provision on Tort and not within the purview of the
WARSAW Covention. Hence the applicable prescriptive period is that provided under Art. 1146 of the
Civil Code . Art 1146: The following actions must be instituted within four years (1). Upon injury to the
rights of the plaintiff (2). Upon a quasi delict.
Private respondents complaint was filed less than 4 years. Thus, private respondents claim has not yet
prescribed and PALS motion to dismiss must be denied.
TEXON MANUFACTURING AND BETTY CHUA, vs. GRACE MILLENA AND MARILYN
MILLENA,
G.R. No. 141380. April 14, 2004
FACTS:
Sometime in February 1990 and May 1990, Marilyn and Grace Millena,
respondents, were employed by Texon Manufacturing, petitioner company. However, in
the summer of 1995, petitioner company terminated the services of respondent Grace
Millena, prompting her to file with the Labor Arbiter, on August 21, 1995, a complaint for
money claims representing underpayment and non-payment of wages, overtime and
holiday pay. Impleaded as respondents were petitioner company and its owner, Betty
Chua. Similarly, on September 8, 1995, petitioner company terminated the services of
respondent Marilyn Millena. The following day, she went to petitioners office to get her
salary. Betty Chua then offered her the sum of P1,500.00 as a starting capital for a
small business. At that instance, Francisco Tan, Betty Chuas husband, asked her to
sign a blank piece of paper. Thinking that it was a receipt for the amount of P1,500.00
given by Betty Chua, respondent signed the blank sheet. However, it turned out that it
was a resignation letter and quitclaim of her back salaries. Thus, on September 11,
1995, she filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for
payment of full backwages and benefits, docketed as NLRC Case No. 00-09-06215-95.
Forthwith, the two (2) cases were consolidated.
On November 21, 1995, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both complaints on the
ground of prescription.
On January 10, 1996, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order[3] denying the motion to
dismiss.
Petitioners then interposed an appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).
On February 27, 1997, the NLRC promulgated an Order[4] dismissing the appeal and
affirming the Arbiters Order.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC.
Consequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
On August 9, 1999, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision affirming the NLRC
Order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that both respondents’
actions have not yet prescribed?
HELD:
Respondents complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for the grant of money
claims and benefits is one covered by Article 1146 of the Civil Code, quoted earlier, that
must be filed with the Labor Arbiter within four (4) years. Respondents complaint was
filed on September 11, 1995 or only three (3) days after petitioners terminated her
services on September 8, 1995. Clearly, her suit was filed on time.
HAGONOY RURAL BANK, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION, BASILIO G. DEL ROSARIO, REYNALDO C. CRUZ,
CESAR C. DEL ROSARIO, VICTOR JOVENES, ANTONIA P. RAMIREZ,
ARACELI C. CUZON, LIWAYWAY G. BALTAZAR, DAISY D. REYES,
FEDERICO OWERA, and RODOLFO MANALO.
G.R. No. 122075. January 28, 1998
FACTS:
Complainants [herein private respondents] are all regular employees of

respondents [herein petitioner and its Executive Vice-President, Emilio Suntay
III] having been employed for different positions on different dates and
salaries. Respondent Rural Bank of Hagonoy, Inc., is a banking institution with
principal business and office address at Hagonoy, Bulacan, while co-
respondent Emilio A.M. Suntay III is the Executive Vice-President.
Sometime in 1992, realizing that there was something wrong with the
operations of the bank, its Executive Vice- President engaged the services of
an external auditor, the Laya, Manabat, Salgado & Co., to conduct an audit of
the financial affairs of the bank in order to find out what was wrong. The audit
started in August 1992 and in the course of the audit, it became evident that to
be conducted effectively and to avoid possible tampering with, concealment or
loss of records and interference, as initial findings of auditors disclosed that
some of the bank employees were guilty of irregularities, it was necessary for
all the bank employees to be preventively suspended during the audit but as
an act of leniency, all of them, except the employees in the Money Shop, were
given the choice of either voluntarily going on leave or being preventively
suspended. All of them chose to go on leave including the herein
complainants, except Rodolfo Manalo, assigned at the Money Shop, who was
preventively suspended on October 23, 1992, hence, they were directed and
furnished with pre-typed applications for leave without pay for 30 days from
October 16, 1992, which they signed.
After a meticulous review of the records, we find the decision of the Labor Arbiter
to be supported by substantial evidence; hence, the NLRC committed no grave abuse
of discretion in affirming it with modification and in holding that the private respondents
did not abandon their employment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not complaints filed by the private respondents several months after
their alleged illegal dismissal are barred by laches?
HELD:
We cannot accept the contention of the petitioner and the Solicitor General that the
complaints filed by the private respondents several months after their alleged illegal
dismissal are barred by laches. The private respondents averred that only after waiting
for several months did they realize that they were constructively dismissed by the
petitioner.
An action for reinstatement by reason of illegal dismissal is one based on an injury
to the complainants rights, which should be brought within four years from the time of
the dismissal pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code.[19] Thus, a complaint for illegal
dismissal filed two years and five months after the alleged dismissal from employment
was held to be still well within the prescriptive period. [20] We have also said that in labor
cases laches may be applied only upon the most convincing evidence of deliberate
inaction, for the rights of laborers are protected under the social justice provisions of the
Constitution and under the Civil Code.[21]
Prescription Case #44 (Roque)
RENO FOODS, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NOEL CANTONJOS
G.R. No. 116462 October 18, 1995
Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts are basically
courts of law not court of equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist the
enforcement of an existing legal right.
FACTS:
Private respondent was employed by petitioner as a utility worker, he was verbally
informed by manager of petitioner, that he was terminated from employment effective
January 3, 1990. Petitioner claims that private respondent failed to report for work had
completely abandoned his job. Thus, on June 18, 1992, or two (2) years and five (5) months
after he was allegedly illegally dismissed, private respondent filed a complaint against
petitioner for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision December 22, 1992
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. On February 10, 1994 Private respondent appealed
the said Decision of the Labor Arbiter and reversed its Decision dated December 22, 1992 and
ordered that private respondent be reinstated but without backwages
Both parties appealed the said Decision to public respondent, which in a Decision
dated May 30, 1994 affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by public respondent in
a Resolution dated July 21, 1994.
This is a special civil action for certiorari to set aside the decision of 30 May 1994 and
the resolution of 21 July 1994 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). The former affirmed the decision of 10 February 1994 of Labor Arbiter Numeriano D.
Villena ordering the reinstatement without back wages of private respondent Noel Cantonjos,
while the latter denied the motion to reconsider the former.
The petitioner contends that the NLRC, as well as the Labor Arbiter, had acted with
grave abuse of discretion in ignoring the principles of laches and estoppel although the
private respondent filed the complaint for illegal dismissal only two years and five months
after his alleged dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NLRC, as well as the Labor Arbiter, had acted with grave abuse of
discretion in ignoring the principles of laches and estoppel although the private respondent
filed the complaint for illegal dismissal only two years and five months after his alleged
dismissal.
HELD:
There is no merit in the petitioner's claim of laches on the part of the private
respondent In Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. National Labor Relations Commission, this
Court said:Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts are
basically courts of law not court of equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist the
enforcement of an existing legal right.
Courts should never apply the doctrine of laches earlier than the expiration of time limited
for the commencement of actions at law.
An action for reinstatement by reason of illegal dismissal is one based on an injury to the
complainant's rights which should be brought within four years from the time of his dismissal
pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code.
The private respondent's complaint for illegal dismissal filed two years and five months after
he was dismissed from his employment was still well within the prescriptive period. Laches cannot,
therefore, be invoked yet.
TAN VS NITAFAN
G.R. No. 76965 March 11, 1994
FACTS:
Florentino Lim of Cagayan de Oro City, was shot dead in his office. As a result of NBI
and the police joint investigation of the case, the brothers Luis, William, Joaquin, Vicente,
Alfonso and Eusebio, all surnamed Tan, and Go E Kuan, together with eight (8) others, were
charged with murder, and unlawful possession, control and custody of a pistol before Military
Commission. Incidentally, Alfonso, Eusebio and Go E Kuan died even before the instant
petition could be filed. Thereafter, William also died.
On 11 June 1976, after trial, Military Commission convicted Luis and Five (5) of his co-accused
for murder, while the gunman was also found guilty of illegal possession of
firearm. The other brothers of Luis were simply declared "not guilty" in both cases.
On 11 February 1983, private respondent commenced in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila a civil action for damages against all those charged with the slaying of Florentino Lim.
On 26 July 1984, Mariano Valez, Jr., a co-defendant of petitioners filed a separate
motion to dismiss based on prescription and waiver or abandonment of claim by private
respondents. Invoking Escueta v. Fandialan, Velez argued that the prescriptive period for an
independent civil action under Art. 33 of the Civil Code was four (4) years, and since it took
private respondents almost ten (10) years to file the instant civil action, prescription had
already set in.
Petitioners claim that the complaint filed against them has already prescribed. On the
other hand, private respondents contends that the issue on prescription may no longer be
relitigated on the ground that we have already resolved the same in G.R. No. 69418, and that
assuming that the same may still be activated, respondent Judge committed no grave abuse
of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss grounded on prescription because
private respondents' cause of action for damage is coterminous with the crime of murder on
which it is based.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil action for damages arising from murder, which is filed
independently of the criminal action, prescribe?
Held:
Prescription may be effectively place in a motion to dismiss only if the complaint

shows on its face that the action had already prescribed at the time it was filed. But this is
not the situation here. On the contrary, the applicable prescriptive period in this case is, at
most, dubitable. While petitioners contend that it is four (4) years hence the cause of action
of private respondent already prescribed, the trial court rules that it was coterminous with
the crime so that, in this case where the accused were charged with murder, the prescriptive
period for the offense being twenty (20) years, the action had not yet prescribed it having
been instituted less than ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrued.
The resolution in G.R. No. 69418 having already attained finality, it becomes the "law of the
case" as to the issue of prescription, which simply means that if an appellate court has passed
upon a legal question and remanded the cause to the court below for further proceedings, the
legal question thus determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a
subsequent appeal given the same case and substantially the same facts. The law of the case,
as applied to a former decision of an appellate court, merely expresses the practice of the
courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. Such a rule is necessary to enable an
appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily and efficiently, which would be impossible
if a question, once considered and decided by it, were to be litigated anew in the same case
upon by any and every subsequent appeal. Thus, the matter on prescription in the case before
us is already a settled issue, now long dead to be revived. Corollary thereto, the issue of
whether a cause of action exists against petitioners who were acquitted was already
adjudicated in G.R. No. 67029, hence, is now the law of the case, at least insofar as that issue is
concerned.
MAGNO VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORP. (PNCC)

G.R. No. 87320 June 6, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner was employed by PNCC as welder/heavy equipment mechanic on a regular

status from July 1975 up to October 1979, he was among PNCC's employees chosen to be
deployed in its overseas construction project in Hongkong, he worked there until January
1983 when the project was completed. He returned to the Philippines and since his arrival he
has neither been assigned any work nor paid his salary. On 4 December 1987 petitioner filed a
complaint with the NLRC against PNCC for separation pay and/or retirement benefits after
three hearings, and following receipt of PNCC's position paper which, among others, raised
the issue of prescription, petitioner filed on 23 February 1988 an amended complaint to
include the charge of illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement with full back wages
and without loss of seniority rights and other benefits.
On 22 September 1988 Labor Arbiter Nieves V. de Castro decided the case in favor of
the petitioner. Respondent PNCC appealed to the NLRC. In its decision of 16 February 1989,
the NLRC held that the appeal deserves merit not on jurisdictional grounds but on
prescription. It held:
. . . A complaint for illegal dismissal being a violation of one's right prescribes in four (4) years
from the time of its accrual. Art. 292 of the Labor Code does not apply in the instant case but
Art. 1146 of the Civil Code which supplied (sic) the Labor Code's deficiency.
The Supreme Court ruled that an action for damages involving a plaintiff separated
from his employment for alleged unjustifiable causes is one for "injury to the rights of the
plaintiff, and must be brought within four (4) years. The four (4) years" prescriptive period
under Art. 1146 of the New Civil Code, applies by way of supplement in the instant case.
In the instant case, the complaint of petitioner was filed on 4 December 1987, or more
than four (4) years from the accrual of the cause of action. Accordingly, NLRC reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is barred by prescription?

Held:
Yes, The petition is not impressed with merit.

There is no showing whatsoever that respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It correctly ruled that petitioner's
cause of action had already prescribed when he filed his complaint with the regional office of
the NLRC on 4 December 1987.
On the basis then of his amended complaint, the action is not for an ordinary money
claim but for reinstatement by reason of illegal dismissal, which, undoubtedly, is an injury to
his rights. Accordingly, the action should have been brought within four (4) years from its
occurrence pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code.13
Had petitioner stuck to his original complaint, which was a simple money claim for
separation pay, Article 292 (now 291) of the Labor Code which provides:
. . . All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the
effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action
accrued; otherwise, they shall be forever barred.
While We commiserate with petitioner who found himself jobless upon his return and
while We fully recognize the special protection which the Constitution, labor laws, and social
legislation accord the workingman, We cannot, however, alter or amend the law on
prescription to relieve him of the consequences of his inaction. Vigilantibus, non
dormientibus, jura subveniunt (Laws come to the assistance of the vigilant, not of the
sleeping).
Montero vs. Times Transportation Co.

GR NO. 190828 MARCH 16, 2015
FACTS:
Respondent Times Transportation Co., Inc., (TTCI) is a company engaged in the
business of land transportation for passengers and goods.
TTCI Board of Directors authorized respondent Santiago, TTCI President and Chairman
of the Board of Directors, to gradually dispose the assets of the TTCI as a result of its
unabated increase of the cost of operations and losses for the last two years. Santiago was
given the authority to determine the number of excess employees who would be the subject
of retrenchment. December 12, 1997 TTCI sold to MENCORP its buses and the Certificates of
Public Convenience.
For second time TEU declared a strike against TTCI, but the latter merely reiterated
the earlier return-to-work order of the Labor Secretary. For disregarding the said return-towork
order, Santiago issued two notices of termination dated October 26, 1997terminating
some 106 workers and a revised list dated November 24, 1997 increasing the number of
dismissed employees to 119, for participating in the illegal strike.
On May 14, 1998, petitioners filed several complaints against TTCI and MENCORP
before the NLRC. However, this case was withdrawn on March 4, 1999 upon motion by the
TEU’s counsel which was given due course on March 22, 1999.
Four years later, several complaints for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal with
money claims, damages and attorney’s fees were filed against TTCI, Santiago and MENCORP
before the LA from June to July 2002. Accordingly, these complaints were consolidated.
In response, TTCI asserted that the petitioners’ cause of action had already been
barred by prescription because the complaints were filed only in June 2002 or after almost
five years from the date of their dismissal. MENCORP, on the other hand, raised the defense of
lack of employer-employee relationship.
LA rendered a Decision dismissing the petitioners’ claim for unfair labor practice and
money claims on the ground of prescription. However, with regard to the issue of illegal
dismissal only.
NLRC vacated and set aside the findings of the LA, upon finding that the petitioners’
complaints had already been barred by prescription. The NLRC added that the application of
the principle of prescription should not be done on a selective basis, especially when the
dates of accrual of the causes of action and the filing of the complaints readily show that
prescription has set in.
CA Decision dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners’ complaints for illegal dismissal have already prescribed?
HELD: YES.
Settled is the rule that when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or
means of livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of one’s dismissal from
employment constitutes, in essence, an action predicated upon an injury to the rights of
the plaintiff, as contemplated under Article 114635 of the New Civil Code, which must be
brought within four years.
The petitioners contend that the period when they filed a labor case on May 14, 1998
but withdrawn on March 22, 1999 should be excluded from the computation of the four-year
prescriptive period for illegal dismissal cases. However, the Court had already ruled that the
prescriptive period continues even after the withdrawal of the case as though no action has
been filed at all. The applicability of Article 1155 of the Civil Code in labor cases was upheld
in the case of Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation v. Panganiban where the Court held
that "although the commencement of a civil action stops the running of the statute of
prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by plaintiff leaves the
parties in exactly the same position as though no action had been commenced at all."
In like manner, while the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, its voluntary withdrawal left the
petitioners in exactly the same position as though no complaint had been filed at all. The
withdrawal of their complaint effectively erased the tolling of the reglementary period.
A prudent review of the antecedents of the claim reveals that it has in fact prescribed
due to the petitioners’ withdrawal of their labor case docketed as NLRC RAB-I-01-1007.
Hence, while the filing of the said case could have interrupted the running of the four-year
prescriptive period, the voluntary withdrawal of the petitioners effectively cancelled the
tolling of the prescriptive period within which to file their illegal dismissal case, leaving them
in exactly the same position as though no labor case had been filed at all. The running of the
four-year prescriptive period not having been interrupted by the filing of NLRC RAB-I-01-1007,
the petitioners’ cause of action had already prescribed in four years after their cessation of
employment on October 26, 1997 and November 24, 1997. Consequently, when the petitioners
filed their complaint for illegal dismissal, separation pay, retirement benefits, and damages in
2002, their claim, clearly, had already been barred by prescription.
Prescription Case #48 (Thera)
LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VICENCIO VDA. DE SIMEON
G.R. No. 118387
Facts of the Case:
On June 25, 1965, Emiliano Simeon and Alberta Vicencio, husband and wife, brought an action in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal to compel spouses Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee to resell to them a parcel of
land situated in Sitio Parugan-Iba Barrio San Jose, Antipolo, Rizal. The land, a homestead with an area of
about 27, 342 hectares, is presently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57279 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Rizal in the names of defendants Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee. Defendants filed in due
time their answer with affirmative defenses. After trial, the court decided in favor of Simeon and
Vicencio. The counterclaim of the defendants are dismissed. Defendants (now petitioners) filed a motion
for new trial and later an urgent motion for reconsideration which were both denied by the trial court in
its orders of March 23, 1964 and June 25, 1964. The case is now before Us on a petition for certiorari
filed by spouses Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal was affirmed in toto. A timely motion for reconsideration was filed by
defendants-appellants (now petitioners) to no avail. Petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals erred
in not making "sufficient and complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised as to fully conserve
petitioners' right to appeal to this Supreme Court on questions of law. before it." Petitioners assail the
failure of the Court of Appeals to include in its decision the complete text of the three letters sent by
respondent ( now substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano Simeon to petitioner Vita Uy Lee before the
expiration of the period within which redemption could be made petitioners intimating that such
omission has impaired their position on appeal as anot her question is raised by them on the basis of
the terminology of the three letters.
Issue:
Whether or not the period to reconvey the property, subject of this case, under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 has prescribed (expired or lapsed).
Ruling:
Yes it has prescribed (expired or lapsed). The rule that tender of payment of the repurchase price is
necessary to exercise the right of redemption finds support in civil law. Article 1616 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, in the absence of an applicable provision in Commonwealth Act No. 141, furnishes the
guide, to wit: "The vendor cannot avail himself of the right of repurchase without returning to the
vendee the price of the sale ...". It is clear that the mere sending of letters by vendor Simeon expressing
his desire to repurchase the property without an accompanying tender of redemption price fell short of
the requirements of law. Having failed to properly exercise his right of redemption within the statutory
five-year period, the right is lost and the same can no longer be revived by the filing of an action to
compel redemption after the lapse of the period. Petitioner Vita Uy Lee was justified in ignoring the
letters sent her by respondent Emiliano Simeon because the mere mention therein of respondent's
intention to redeem the property, without making tender of payment, did not constitute a bona fide
offer of repurchase. The rule that tender of the repurchase price is dispensed with where the vendee
has refused to permit the repurchase is premised on the ground that under such circumstance the
vendee will also refuse the tender of payment. From petitioner Lee's silence which we have shown
above to be justified, no such deduction can be made. Unlike a fat refusal, her silence did not close the
door to respondent Simeon's subsequent tender of payment, had he wished to do so, provided that the
same was made within five-year period. Yet he neglected to tender payment and, instead, merely filed
an action to compel reconveyance after the expiration of the period. The Supreme Court, therefore, in
the light of the above ruling reversed the decision oif the Court of Appeals.

Ke Hong Cheng vs CA
G.R. No 144169
Facts:
Petitioner is the owner of Butuan Shipping Line. In one the vessels owned by the petitioner, Philippine
Agricultural Trading Corporation boarded 3,400 bags of copra to be shipped from Masbate to Dipolog
City and which said shipment of copra was insured by PhilAm. While on board, the ship sank amounting
to total loss of the shipments. Because of the loss, the insurer paid the damages to the consignee.
Having subrogated the rights of the consignee, PhilAm instituted a civil case to recover the money paid
to the consignee based on breach of contract of carriage. While the case was pending, petitioner
executed deeds of donations of parcels of land to his children. The trial court rendered judgment against
the petitioner Ke Hong Cheng in the civil case on December 29, 1993. After the decision became final a
writ of execution was issued but it was not served, Therefore an alias writ was was applied for which
was granted. The sheriff did not found any property under Butuan Shipping Lines and/or Ke Hong Cheng.
In 1997, PhilAm filed complaint for annulling the deeds of donation made by herein petitioner to his
children and alleged the donation was to defraud his creditors including PhilAm. Petitioner filed an
answer stating that the action had already prescribed.
Issue:
Whether or not the action to rescind the donation had already prescribed.
Held:
According to the trial court, the period began from December 29, 1993 when the civil case was
resolved. Thus, The CA maintained that, that the four year period began only on January 1997, the time
when it first learned that the judgment award could not be satisfied because the Ke Hong Cheng had no
more properties in his name. Article 1389 of the Civil Code simply provide that "The action to claim
rescission must be commenced within four years." When the law is silent as to when the prescriptive
shall commence, general rule must apply that it will commence when the moment the action accrues.
An action for rescission must be the last resort of the creditors and can only be availed after the creditor
had exhausted all the properties. The herein respondent came to know only in January 1997 about the
unlawful conveyances of the petitioner when together with the sheriff and counsel were to attach the
property of the petitioner and it was then only when they found out it is no longer in the name of the
petitioner. Since the respondent filed accion pauliana on February 1997, a month after the discovery
that petitioner had no property in his name to satisfy the judgment, action for rescission of subject
deeds had not yet prescribed.
Banco Filipino vs CA GR No. 129227, 30 May 2000 332 SCRA 241
FACTS
Elsa and Calvin Arcilla secured, on 3 occassions, loan from petitioner as evidenced by promissory note.
REM was also executed. Under said deeds, Banco Filipino may increase rate of interest on said loans,
within the limits allowed by law. at that time, under Usury Law, the maximum rate of interest for loans
secured by REM was 12% pa. later, the Central bank issued Circular No. 494 provinding for the maximum
interest of 19%pa. meanwhile, Skyli Builders, thru President Calvin Arcilla secured loans from BPI with
FGU Insurance as surety. Banco Filipino issued an account statement with 17% pa as interest. The
Arcillas filed for annulment of the loan contracts because the rate of interests charged were usurious.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondents are entitled to refund of the alleged interest overpayments.
HELD
Yes. Private respondents aver that they are entitled to the refund inasmuch as the escalation clause
incorporated in the loan contracts do not have a corresponding de-escalation clause and is therefore,
illegal.
In Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank vs Navarro, the Court ruled that Central Bank Circular
494, although it has the force and effect of law, is not a law and is not the law contemplated by the
parties which authorizes the petitioner to unilaterally raise the interest rate of loan. The reliance on the
circular was without any legal basis.
VIRGILIO G. ANABE vs. ASIAN CONSTRUCTION (ASIAKONSTRUKT)
G.R. No. 183233
December 23, 2009
FACTS:
The petitioner was hired by respondent Asian Construction (Asiakonstrukt) as radio technician/operator
. His services were terminated on the ground of retrenchment. He thus filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and illegal deduction of his pay.
Because Asiakonstrukt failed to submit financial statements to prove losses, the Labor Arbiter ruled that
petitioner was not validly dismissed. Respondents are ordered to pay Virgilio Anade his 13th month pay,
illegal deductions and overtime pay. NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter’s Decision by holding that
petitioner was not illegally dismissed and reduced the reimbursable amount of illegal deductions.
However, later on employer also claimed that petitioner’s right to claim has already prescribed.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. He then appealed to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the decision rendered by the NLRC.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the period of prescription of action for illegal dismissal has prescribed.
HELD:
NO. It has not prescribed.
As a general rule, the seafarer is only allowed to recover any and all monetary claims within a period of
three years from the date the cause of action accrues. The exception is illegal dismissal cases which can
be filed within four years.
The Labor Code does not provide for a provision on when the counting will start. It simply states that
money claims become due “from the time the cause of action accrued.” A cause of action accrues only
when “the party obligated refuses, expressly or impliedly, to comply with its duty.” A cause of action
consists of three elements. How do we determine cause of action?
… a cause of action has three elements, to wit: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of
the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff.
It bears stressing that it is only when the last element occurs that a cause of action arises.
Thus, the counting will vary depending on when the employer denied the employee’s monetary claim.
Consequently, even if the monetary claim is beyond 3 years from the formal demand but there is no
denial thereof within that time, the employee may still recover the monetary claims within the
prescriptive period after the employer finally makes a denial. In the case at hand... “the complainant
repeatedly demanded payment from respondent Maersk [on different dates earlier than the October
1993 letter], respondent Maersk warded off these demands by saying that it would look into the matter
until years passed by. In October 1993, Serrano finally demanded in writing payment of the unsent
money orders. Then and only then was the claim categorically denied by respondent A.P. Moller in its
letter dated November 22, 1993. … [the employee’s] cause of action accrued only upon respondent A.P.
Moller’s definite denial of his claim in November 1993. Having filed his action five (5) months thereafter
or in April 1994, we hold that it was filed within the three-year (3) prescriptive period provided in Article
291 of the Labor Code.
Prescription Case #53 (Mira)
WILLIAM ALAIN MIAILHE v. CA GR No. 108991, Mar 20, 2001
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Actions for the annulment of contracts prescribe in four years. If the ground for
annulment is vitiation of consent by intimidation, the four-year period starts from
the time such defect ceases. The running of this prescriptive period cannot be
interrupted by an extrajudicial demand made by the party whose consent was
vitiated. If the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period are
apparent from the records, the complaint should be dismissed.
The Facts
On March 23, 1990, [Petitioner] William Alain Miailhe, on his own behalf and on
behalf of Victoria Desbarats-Miailhe, Monique Miailhe-Sichere and Elaine Miailhe-
Lencquesaing filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance and
Damages against [Respondent] Republic of the Philippines and defendant
Development Bank of the Philippines before the [trial] court. It was alleged, to
wit:
a.) That plaintiffs were the former registered owners of three parcels of land
located at J.P. Laurel St., San Miguel, Manila with an aggregate area of
5,574.30 square meters, and a one (1) storey building erected thereon,
formerly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80645 of the Register
of Deeds of Manila;
b.) That the above-mentioned properties had been owned by and in the
possession of plaintiffs and their family for over one hundred (100) years
until August 1, 1976;
c.) That on August 1, 1976, during the height of the martial law regime of the
late President Ferdinand Marcos, [Respondent] Republic of the Philippines,
through its armed forces, forcibly and unlawfully took possession of the
aforesaid properties from defendants;
d.) That [Respondent] Republic of the Philippines, through its armed forces,
continued its lawful and forcible occupation of the premises from August 1,
1976 to August 19, 1977 without paying rentals, despite plaintiffs' demands
therefor;
e.) That meanwhile, the Office of the President showed interest in the subject
properties and directed defendant DBP to acquire for the government the
subject properties from plaintiff;
f.) That on or about August 19, 1977, through threats and intimidation
employed by defendants, plaintiffs, under duress, were coerced into selling
the subject properties to defendant DBP for the grossly low price of
P2,376,805.00 or about P400.00 per square meter;
g.) That defendant DBP, in turn, sold the subject properties to [Respondent]
Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the President, in 1982;
h.) That the only factor which caused plaintiffs to sell their properties to
defendant DBP was the threats and intimidation employed upon them by
defendants;
i.) That after the late President Marcos left the country on February 24, 1986
after the EDSA revolution, plaintiffs made repeated extrajudicial demands
upon defendants for the return and reconveyance of subject properties to
them, the last being the demand letters dated 24 October 1989.
j.) That despite demands, defendants unjustifiably failed and refused, and still
unjustifiably fail and refuse, to return and reconvey the subject properties
to plaintiff;
On May 25, 1990, [respondent] filed its Answer denying the substantial facts
alleged in the complaint and raising, as special and affirmative defenses, that
there was no forcible take-over of the subject properties and that the amount
paid to private respondents was fair and reasonable. Defendant DBP also filed its
answer raising as Special and Affirmative Defense that [petitioner's] action had
already prescribed.
On March 5, 1992, [respondent] filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the

ground that the action ha[d] prescribed pursuant to Article (1)391 in relation to
Article (1)390 of the Civil Code. Defendant DBP likewise filed a Motion for
Preliminary Hearing of the Affirmative Defense raising the same ground of
prescription as contained in the [respondent's] Motion to Dismiss.
On September 11, 1992, that the motion for a preliminary hearing is hereby
denied and the resolution of the motion to dismiss is deferred until trial.
Respondent herein thus filed a Petition for Certiorari with the appellate court.
The CA ruled that petitioner's action had prescribed. A suit to annul a voidable
contract may be filed within four (4) years from the time the defect ceases. As
alleged in paragraph 12 of the Complaint, there is a clear indication that the
alleged threat and intimidation employed against petitioner ceased when then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos left the country on February 24, 1986. From
February 24, 1986 to March 23, 1990, when the Complaint for Annulment of Sale
was filed, more than four (4) years had elapsed. The CA also ruled that Article
1155 of the Civil Code, according to which a written extrajudicial demand by the
creditors would interrupt prescription, referred only to a creditor-debtor
relationship, which is not the case here. Hence, this petition.
The Issues
1. Whether the Court of Appeals committed gross reversible error in finding that
the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals committed gross reversible error in setting aside
the trial court's order of 11 September 1992 and in finding that petitioner's action
had prescribed
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit. Section 3, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which was in
effect at the time, expressly allowed the trial court to "defer the hearing and
determination of the motion [to dismiss] until the trial if the ground alleged
therein does not appear to be indubitable." Under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the rule now reads as follows:
"Sec. 2. Hearing of motion. -- At the hearing of the motion, the parties shall
submit their arguments on the questions of law and their evidence on the
questions of fact involved except those not available at that time. Should the case
go to trial, the evidence presented during the hearing shall automatically be part
of the evidence of the party presenting the same.
"SEC. 3. Resolution of motion. -- After the hearing, the court may dismiss the
action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.
In this case, the trial court deferred until trial the resolution of the Motion to
Dismiss, because it found that the Complaint did not show on its face that the
action had already prescribed. It deemed it better to allow the parties to present
their evidence in a full-blown trial. The CA correctly set aside the Order of the trial
court. This Court held that a complaint may be dismissed when the facts showing
the lapse of the prescriptive period are apparent from the records.
We have ruled that trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action
on the ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record
show it to be indeed time-barred and it may do so on the basis of a motion to
dismiss, or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense; or
even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for
reconsideration; or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no
statement thereof is found in the pleadings, or where a defendant has been
declared in default. What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts
demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period, be otherwise sufficiently and
satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's
complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence. The records in this case
indubitably show the lapse of the prescriptive period, thus warranting the
immediate dismissal of the Complaint.
The suit before the trial court was an action for the annulment of the Contract of
Sale on the alleged ground of vitiation of consent by intimidation. The
reconveyance of the three parcels of land, which the petitioner half-heartedly
espouses as the real nature of the action, can prosper only if and when the
Contract of Sale covering the subject lots is annulled. Thus, the reckoning period
for prescription would be that pertaining to an action for the annulment of
contract; that is, four years from the time the defect in the consent ceases.
A perusal of the Complaint shows that the threat and intimidation ceased after
then President Marcos left the country on February 24, 1986. In fact, it was only
then that petitioner was allegedly able to muster the courage to make
extrajudicial demands on the Republic of the Philippines. Moreover, courts were
functioning after Marcos left the country. There was no hiatus in the judicial
system.
The foregoing clearly shows that the alleged threat and intimidation, which
vitiated petitioner's consent, ceased when Marcos left the country on February
24, 1986. Since an action for the annulment of contracts must be filed within four
years from the time the cause of vitiation ceases, the suit before the trial court
should have been filed anytime on or before February 24, 1990. In this case,
petitioner did so only on March 23, 1990. Clearly, his action had prescribed by
then.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED.
AMADO DE GUZMAN v. CA GR No. 132257, Oct 12, 1998
PANGANIBAN, J.:
All money claims arising from an employer-employee relation are covered by the
three-year prescriptive period mandated by Article 291 of the Labor Code, and
not by Article 1144 of the Civil Code which provides for a ten-year prescriptive
period for written agreements. Thus, Article 291 of the Labor Code applies to
petitioners' money claim, which is based on a provision of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) on retirement and separation benefits and is a
consequence of employer-employee relation. Moreover, voluntary arbitrators
have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide grievances arising from
the implementation of a CBA. Hence, the filing of a CBA-related complaint before
the labor arbiter or the NLRC does not interrupt the three-year prescriptive
period.
The Facts
The private respondent, on April 16, 1992, because of serious business reverses,undertook a
partial suspension of operation resulting in the forced leave for six (6)months of fifteen (15)
rank-and-file employees, including de Guzman, a case instituted by the petitioners on
December 7, 1992 before the NLRC for illegal dismissal or in the alternative, the payment of
CBA benefits. The case was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter, but directing it private respondent
to pay the individual petitioners the amount of P206,959.19, representing retrenchment benefits.
On appeal, petitioners questioned why the Decision of the Labor Arbiter did not touch on the
retirement benefits under the CBA, even if the CBA benefits were being raised repeatedly as
one of the causes of action.
THE ISSUE
Whether or not the complainants are entitled to optional retirement and separation
assistance.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
Because the CBA is a written contract, petitioners contend that any cause of action arising
therefrom is governed by the prescriptive period under Article 1144 of theCivil Code, not
Article 291 of the Labor Code as ruled by the voluntary arbitrator. This contention is devoid of
merit.
Undisputed is the fact that an employer-employee relation exists between the parties in this
case. It is precisely this relation that justified the execution of the CBA. Thus, any money claim
arising from the said agreement is merely a consequence of the employer-employee relation.
We take this occasion to emphasize that the language of Article 291 of the Labor Code does
not limit its application only to "money claims specifically recoverable under said Code, but
covers all money claims arising from employer-employee relation.
Since petitioners' demand for unpaid retirement/separation benefits is a money claim arising
from their employment by private respondent, Article 291 of the Labor Code is applicable.
Therefore, petitioners' claim should be filed within three years from the time their cause of
action accrued, or be forever barred by prescription.
It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special law applicable to
money claims arising from employer-employee relations; thus, it necessarily prevails over
Article 1144 of the Civil Code, a general law. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that
"where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed
therefor specially should prevail. Generalia specialibus non derogant - the provisions
of a general statute must yield to those of a special one. This is also known as the
rule of implied exception.
National Waterworks v NLRC GR No. 121910, July 3, 1996
MELO, J.:
The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to
annul the resolution dated June 21, 1995 of the First Division of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed in toto the order dated March
22, 1989 of Labor Arbiter Evangeline S. Lubaton of the NLRC NCR Arbitration
Branch on the grounds of alleged lack of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The controversy in the instant case arose when the former National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), since then renamed Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), unilaterally stopped the
implementation of a P2.25 daily, or a P49.50 monthly, increase starting January 1,
1966 after it had implemented the same from July 1, 1965 to December 31, 1965
pursuant to a compromise agreement designated by the parties as "Return-to-
Work Agreement."
The Facts
On July 1, 1965, NAWASA and private respondents entered into a Return-to-Work

Agreement, which provided, among other stipulations, the following:
The NAWASA agrees to grant workers and employees in Manila and Suburbs
represented by the Union, the amount of TWO PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE
CENTAVOS (P2.25) each as daily increase in wage for daily wage workers, or
FORTY NINE PESOS AND 50/100 (P49.50) per month each to monthly salaried
workers or employees, the same to be effective on July 1, 1965, provided that the
total increase in salaries or wages both for daily wage and monthly salaried
workers and employees shall not exceed P1,836.00.
The above agreement was ratified by petitioner NAWASA's board in Resolution

No. 309, Series of 1965. From July 1, 1965 up to December 31, 1965, NAWASA
implemented the increases, but unilaterally discontinued the same on January 1,
1966. Thereafter, private respondents demanded the restoration of the wage
increase. Due to NAWASA's then poor state of finances, it could not and did not
heed the demand.
On October 23, 1974, the then Court of Industrial Relation (CIR) rendered
judgment based on a compromise agreement wherein the grant of the P2.25 a
day or P49.50 per month increase was provided for.
Despite the above judgment, NAWASA continued to fail to restore the subject
salary increase, and private respondents, realizing and aware of petitioner's
inability to fully comply with the terms and conditions set forth in the Return-to-
Work Agreement due to financial limitations, agreed to a deferment in the
payment of their claims.
However, after the February 1986 EDSA uprising, private respondents staged
pickets and a series of demonstrations within NAWASA's premises seeking various
concessions from petitioner, which included the restoration of the salary increase.
In July 1988, private respondents filed a motion for restoration of the wage
increase with the Department of Labor and Employment assigned to Labor Arbiter
Evangeline S. Lubaton for resolution.
Petitioner opposed the motion, alleging, among other things, that the claim had
long been rejected is already barred by prescription; and that it was filed without
authority from the alleged claimants. Private respondents filed their reply
thereto.
On March 22, 1989, Labor Arbiter Evangeline Lubaton issued an order, hereby
ordered to pay the Forty-Nine Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P49.50) a month for
monthly employees or Two Pesos and Twenty-Five Centavos (P2.25) daily for daily
paid workers per Return-to-Work Agreement dated July 1, 1965. The Chief of the
Research and Information Unit of this Office or any of his representatives is
directed to coordinate with the NAWASA Auditing Examiner to determine the
claimants entitled to said increases and the amount each claimant is entitled to;
and to deduct or segregate from the total amount thereof the equivalent of 17%
by way of attorney's fees, as awarded in the other cases which is to be paid to
Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda, the counsel of the individual claimants in this case; and
to submit the report within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof for further
disposition.
Petitioner thereupon appealed to NLRC which, per its resolution promulgated on

June 21, 1995, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the labor arbiter's order.
Hence, the instant petition.
Aside from upholding NLRC's Jurisdiction over this case, NLRC committed no grave
abuse of discretion in affirming the appealed decision of the labor arbiter.
Contrary with petitioner contention that the subject salary increase of P2.25 daily
or P49.50 monthly may not be enforced by means of execution for not being part
of the judgment sought to be executed. As correctly found by the labor arbiter,
the said salary increase was part and parcel of the Return-to-Work Agreement
entered into by the litigants therein which they submitted before the then Court
of Industrial Relations for its cognizance and approval. Hence, said agreement
may be enforced as in any other case of a judgment by compromise.
Too, the money claims of private respondents are not barred by prescription.
Since Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides the specific instances when the
period of prescription may be interrupted, any such interruption is, therefore, a
factual matter to be properly supported by evidence. While petitioner claims that
Article 1155 of the Civil Code will not apply in the instant case, it has not denied
the allegations nor refuted the evidence adduced before the labor arbiter
showing repeated demands for payment through letters, pickets, demonstrations
and conferences, and petitioner's alleged plea for time within which to pay
private respondents' demands. Thus, the court sustain the ruling that private
respondents', claims herein are not barred by prescription, the period having,
been interrupted by the written extrajudicial demands made by private
respondents, coupled with petitioner's own pleas for time within which to pay the
claims.
In the same manner, but yet with more reason, will laches not lie because it
cannot be said that private respondents have slept on their right for any
unreasonable length of time. Besides, the defense of laches is being raised by
petitioner for the first time before this Court.
Again, it appears from the records that petitioner's claim that the monetary
award to which private respondents may be entitled should not go beyond June
9, 1971, was not raised in the initial proceedings before the labor arbiter, but was
raised for the first time in its Memorandum on Appeal to NLRC. As in the matter
of laches, this late argument cannot be given consideration.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the resolution under review
was hereby AFFIRMED.
GREGORIO STA. ROMANA substituted by DIOSDADO STA. ROMANA, Plaintiff-

Appellant, v. MARIANO M. LACSON alias Mayo Lacson or Mariano M. Lacson,
Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
G.R. No. L-27754. April 8, 1981.
The Facts
In a civil case where a complaint in intervention was filed and tried jointly with
the original complaint as a single case, the Court of First Instance rendered a
judgment dated March 18, 1954 in favor of the plaintiff and the plaintiff-
intervenor. Upon motion of the plaintiff, an amended decision was issued on July
13, 1954 amending the first paragraph of the dispositive portion which was the
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and clarifying and reaffirming the second
paragraph thereof in favor of the plaintiff-intervenor, thus, ‘The second paragraph
of the dispositive part and the rest of the decision shall remain unaltered and
unamended." Counsel for cross-defendant received his copy of the amended
decision on July 19, 1954. The amended judgment not having been satisfied
earlier, plaintiff-intervenor filed an action for revival against the cross-defendant
on July 3, 1964. The Court of First Instance dismissed the action on the ground
that his right of action under the second paragraph of the dispositive part of the
decision had already prescribed. Hence, this appeal.
The Supreme Court, in finaling for appellant, held, that the amended decision
dated July 13, 1954 was an entirely new decision which superseded the original
decision dated March 18, 1954 from which the time to appeal must be reckoned,
since the lower court, in the amended and clarified decision, not only passed
upon the validity of the rust paragraph of its original decision but likewise clarified
and reaffirmed the second paragraph of the judgment in favor of the plaintiff-
intervenor.
ISSUES
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TEN-
YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD FOR ENFORCING ITS JUDGMENT SHOULD BE
COMPUTED FROM AUGUST 19, 1954, WHEN ITS AMENDED DECISION BECAME
FINAL AND EXECUTORY, AND NOT FROM APRIL 23, 1954, WHEN THE SECOND
PART OF THE FALLO OF SAID JUDGMENT ALLEGEDLY BECAME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT REGARDING THE FALLO
OR DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF ITS 1954 JUDGMENT AS AN INTEGRAL AND
INDIVISIBLE WHOLE, ALTHOUGH CONSISTING OF TWO PARAGRAPHS, AND IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE WHOLE JUDGMENT BECAME FINAL AND EXECUTORY ONLY
FROM THE EXPIRATION OF THE THIRTY-DAY PERIOD FROM NOTICE OF THE
AMENDED JUDGMENT CONTAINING THE AMENDMENT OF PARAGRAPH ONE OF
SAID FALLO.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S

COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION.
RULING
The only issue to be resolved in this appeal is from what date the period of ten
(10) years should be counted. It is not disputed that an action to revive should be
brought within ten (10) years from the date of entry of final judgment.
The provisions of substantive law (Art. 1144 [3] and Art. 1152, New Civil Code) in
relation to the adjective law (Section 6, Rule 39, Revised Rules of Court) are
applicable to this case.
Applying the above cited provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines and the
Rules of Court, the judgment appealed from dismissing the revival action filed for
the enforcement of the amended and clarified judgment dated July l3, 1954 on
the ground of prescription cannot be sustained. The record of the case shows that
the subject matter of the suit in intervention is a Packard 8 Club Sedan which is
part and parcel of the whole transaction of nine (9) motor vehicles purchased on
credit and secured by chattel mortgage executed by the original defendants in
favor of the original plaintiff. A joint trial was held for both the original parties
plaintiff and defendants with the plaintiff-intervenor and defendant-intervenee or
cross-defendant as a single case. In the amended and clarified judgment dated
July 13, 1954 the lower court not only passed upon the validity of the first
paragraph of its original decision but likewise clarified and reaffirmed the second
paragraph of said judgment in favor of the plaintiff-intervenor.cThe court of origin
made a thorough restudy of the original judgment and rendered the amended
and clarified judgment only after considering all the factual and legal issues. The
amended and clarified decision dated July 13, 1954 is an entirely new decision
which superseded the original decision dated March 18, 1954. For all intents and
purposes, the lower court rendered a new judgment from which the time to
appeal must be reckoned.
The counsel for the defendant-appellee received a copy of the amended and
clarified judgment on July 19, 1954. The reglementary period within which to
appeal lapsed on August 19, 1954 which is the date of the finality of the judgment
there being no motion for reconsideration and/or new trial.cha
The filing of the revival action on July 3, 1964 for the enforcement of the
amended and clarified judgment dated July 13, 1954 is well within the
reglementary period of ten (10) years provided by law. The judgment of dismissal
is a palpable error.
At the pre-trial the parties agreed that the question involved in this case is
whether the second paragraph of the decision in Civil Case No. 13717 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila has prescribed or not. There is no dispute as to the
correctness of said decision. Hence the second paragraph was upheld.
Hence, the judgment dismissing Civil Case No. 57587 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila is hereby set aside and the defendant Mariano M. Lacson alias Mayo
Lacson or Mariano M. Lacson, Jr. is ordered to pay the plaintiff, Diosdado Sta.
Romana, as successor in interest of the original plaintiff, Gregorio Sta. Romana,
the sums of P8,000.00, P200.00 and P500.00 plus legal interest on the sum of
P8,000.00 from October 12, 1951 when the complaint in intervention was filed
and legal interest on all the sums and on the accrued interest since July 3, 1964
when the action to revive was filed.
Prescription Case #56 (Weng)
Jaime Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, GR. #: 106646
On August 21, 1980, private respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. filed a civil case in
the CFI of Rizal against Jaime Ledesma to enforce the terms of a Trust Receipt executed by
them on April 1, 1974 but which the latter failed to comply with. Summons could not be
served on Ledesma so the case was dismissed without prejudice on March 3, 1981. On
December 2, 1988, RCBC again instituted a civil case for the same cause of action and
subject matter in the Makati RTC. Ledesma filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
prescription but this was denied and judgment was rendered in favor of RCBC. This was
affirmed by the CA in a decision promulgated on January 7, 1992 and denied Ledesma’s
motion for reconsideration in August 1992. Ledesma filed a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court which was denied, hence the present motion for reconsideration.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT: The second action of the respondent bank had already
prescribed, following the rulings of Vda. de Nator, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et
al. and Fulton Insurance Co. vs. Manila Railroad Co., et al and that in case of the filing of an
action, the prescriptive period is merely tolled and continues to run again, with only the
balance of the remaining period available for the filing of another action.
ISSUES: Whether or not the prescription period is merely tolled by the filing of the first
action.
HELD: NO. The cases cited by petitioner are not controlling – T he cases cited by the
petitioner cannot be relied upon as in Vda. De Nator, there were conflicting statements as to
the interpretation of the provision and the ruling in Fulton Insurance Company is not clear
on the matter – it concluded that the issue of whether the action merely tolled or it actually
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period was moot and academic because, in either
case, the second action was still filed within the prescriptive period.
More recent jurisprudence on the matter support the view that the period is renewed and
not merely tolled - Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the prescription of an action,
involving in the present case the 10-year prescriptive period for filing an action on a written
contract under Article 1144(1) of the Code, is interrupted by (a) the filing of an action, (b) a
written extrajudicial demand by the creditor, and (c) a written acknowledgment of the debt
by the debtor.
The effects of the last two instances have already been decided: a. Interruption by
extrajudicial demand - in Overseas Bank of Manila v. Geraldez, et al, it was held that “the
interruption of the prescriptive period by written extrajudicial demand means that the said
period would commence anew from the receipt of the demand. That is the correct meaning
of interruption as distinguished from mere suspension or tolling of the prescriptive period.”
That same view as to the meaning of interruption was adopted in Florendo vs. Organo. b.
Interruption of prescriptive period by reason of written acknowledgement – In Philippine
National Railways vs. National Labor, it was ruled that the period of prescription, when
interrupted by a written acknowledgment, begins to run anew; and whatever time of
limitation might have already elapsed from the accrual of the cause of action is thereby
negated and rendered inefficacious.
Spouses Barnachea vs Court of Appeals & Spouses Ignacio
The subject matter of the complaint were lots titled in respondent Avelino Ignacios name
which lots are adjacent to the property that the petitioners own and occupy. These
properties were originally part of a piece of land owned by a certain Luis Santos and
subsequently inherited by his daughter Purificacion Santos Imperial. The land was
subdivided and transferred to tenant-farmers Santiago Isidro and Procopio de Guzman. The
property that the petitioners own and occupy was derived from the land transferred to
Santiago Isidro. Respondent Ignacios properties were derived, on the other hand, from the
land originally transferred to Procopio de Guzman.
On December 8, 1999 the complaint was dismissed but was revived on April 5, 2000.
Petitioners received the summons and responded with a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Answer which was denied on May 23, 2000, petitioners then filed Motion for
Reconsideration. Respondents in the meanwhile filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of
Execution which was received by the petitioners on May 26, 2000.
Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal to hinder the implementation of the Writ of Execution.
MTC set hearing for the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and respondents Motion for
Execution. On July 21, 2000 MTC issued an order declaring the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration abandoned because of their filing of Notice of Appeal. Thereafter, the MTC
forwarded the entire record of Civil Case No. 818 to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20
(RTC Branch 20), Malolos, Bulacan. On August 24, 2000, petitioners submitted their Appeal
Memorandum to the RTC Branch 20 which affirmed the MTC decision on September 20,
2000.
On July 21, 2000, the MTC issued an order declaring the petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration abandoned because of the Notice of Appeal they previously filed.
Thereafter, the MTC forwarded the entire record of Civil Case No. 818 to RTC Branch 20,,
Malolos, Bulacan. On August 24, 2000, petitioners submitted their Appeal Memorandum to
the RTC Branch 20 which affirmed the MTC. Following a Petition for Quieting of Title filed by
Petitioner’s sister, Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for the Suspension of Proceedings which
was denied by the RTC together its succeeding Motion for Reconsideration.
The petitioners brought the denials to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court on the issue of whether the pendency of an action involving the issue of
ownership is sufficient basis for [the] suspension of an ejectment proceeding between the
same parties and relating to the same subject matter.
The CA denied the petition and the petitioners' subsequent motion for reconsideration,
essentially on the grounds that (1) the issue in an ejectment suit is limited to the physical
possession of real property and is separate and distinct from the issue of ownership and
possession de jure that either party may set forth in his or her pleading; (2) the pendency
of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property or for annulment of deed of
sale does not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer
case before it, and that ejectment actions generally cannot be suspended pending the
resolution of a case for quieting of title between the same parties over the same subject
property; and (3) the case does not fall under the exception provided by the case of
Amagan v. Marayag, where the Court allowed the suspension of ejectment proceedings
because of strong reasons of equity applicable to the case the demolition of the petitioners
house unless the proceedings would be suspended. The CA ruled that the petitioners
reliance on Amagan was inappropriate because the said case only applies to unlawful
detainer actions while the petitioners ejectment suit is an action for forcible entry. To the
CA, the initial tolerance on the part of the private respondents did not convert the nature of
their ejectment suit from forcible entry into unlawful detainer, following the reasoning this
Court applied in Munoz v. Court of Appeals.
Hence this petition with the Court.

Issues:
1) whether or not the ejectment case filed by the respondents against petitioners with the
MTC of Pulilan is for unlawful detainer or for forcible entry;
2) whether the MTC of Pulilan had validly acquired and exercised jurisdiction over the
ejectment case considering that the complaint was filed beyond one year from the demand
to vacate the subject premises; and
3) whether or not the ejectment proceedings should be suspended at any stage until the
action on ownership of the disputed portion of the subject property is finally settled.
Held:
1 The actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are similar because they are both
summary actions where the issue is purely physical possession. Other than these
commonalities, however, they possess dissimilarities that are clear, distinct, and well
established in law.
In forcible entry, (1) the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession of the
property until he was deprived of possession by the defendant; (2) the defendant secures
possession of the disputed property from the plaintiff by means of force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth; hence, his possession is unlawful from the beginning; (3) the law
does not require a previous demand by the plaintiff for the defendant to vacate the
premises; and (4) the action can be brought only within one-year from the date the
defendant actually and illegally entered the property.
In marked contrast, unlawful detainer is attended by the following features: (1) prior
possession of the property by the plaintiff is not necessary; (2) possession of the property
by the defendant at the start is legal but the possession becomes illegal by reason of the
termination of his right to possession based on his or her contract or other arrangement
with the plaintiff; (3) the plaintiff is required by law to make a demand as a jurisdictional
requirement; and (4) the one-year period to bring the complaint is counted from the date of
the plaintiffs last demand on the defendant.
Under these standards, we do not hesitate to declare the Court of Appeals in error when it
held that the present case involves forcible entry rather than unlawful detainer. A plain
reading of the complaint shows the respondents positions that the petitioners were in prior
possession of the disputed property; that the respondents allowed them to occupy the
disputed property by tolerance; that the respondents eventually made a demand that the
petitioners vacate the property; and that the petitioners refused to vacate the property in
light of the defenses they presented. There is no basis nor occasion to conclude that the
respondents filed a forcible entry case.
2 The one-year period within which to commence an ejectment proceeding is a prescriptive
period as well as a jurisdictional requirement. Hence, Article 1155 of the Civil Code on the
manner of reckoning the prescriptive period must necessarily come into play. Under this
Article, the filing of a complaint in court interrupts the running of prescription of actions. As
an action for unlawful detainer, the one-year prescription period started running after
August 31, 1998 the date of receipt of the respondents demand letter. The period ran for
almost two months until it was interrupted on October 20, 1998 when the respondents filed
their ejectment complaint. This complaint, however, was dismissed on December 8, 1999.
Upon this dismissal, the prescriptive period again began to run for about four months when
another interruption intervened the revival of the complaint on April 5, 2000. Evidently,
under these undisputed facts, the period when the prescriptive period effectively ran does
not add up to the one-year prescriptive period that would jurisdictionally bar the ejectment
case.
3 The issue in an unlawful detainer case is limited to physical possession. When a claim of
ownership is used as a basis for de facto possession or to assert a better possessory right,
the court hearing the case may provisionally rule on the issue of ownership. As a rule,
however, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same property does not justify
the suspension of the ejectment proceedings. Only in rare cases has this Court allowed a
suspension of the ejectment proceedings.
In the absence of a concrete showing of compelling equitable reasons at least comparable

and under circumstances analogous to Amagan, we cannot override the established rule
that a pending civil action for ownership shall not ipso facto suspend an ejectment
proceeding.Additionally, to allow a suspension on the basis of the reasons the petitioners
presented in this case would create the dangerous precedent of allowing an ejectment suit
to be suspended by an action filed in another court by parties who are not involved or
affected by the ejectment suit.
B & I REALTY Vs. CASPE
G.R. No. 146972 January 29, 2008
FACTS: Consorcia L. Venegas was the owner of a parcel of land located in Barrio Bagong-
Ilog in Pasig, Rizal and covered by TCT No. 247434. She delivered said title to, and
executed a simulated deed of sale in favor of, Datuin for purposes of obtaining a loan with
the RCBC. Datuin claimed that he had connections with the management of RCBC and
offered his assistance to Venegas in obtaining a loan from the bank. He issued a receipt to
the Venegases, acknowledging that the lot was to be used as a collateral for bank financing
and that the deed of sale was executed only as a device to obtain the loan. However, Datuin
prepared a deed of absolute sale and, through forgery, made it appear that the spouses
Venegas executed the document in his favor. Venegas learned of Datuin's fraudulent
scheme when she sold the lot to herein respondents for P160,000 in a deed of conditional
sale. She, along with her husband, instituted a complaint against Datuin in the then Court of
First Instance CFI of Rizal, Branch 11, docketed as Civil Case No. 188893, for recovery of
property and nullification of TCT No. 377734, with damages. However, when the case was
called for pre-trial, the Venegases' counsel failed to appear and the complaint was
eventually dismissed without prejudice.
ISSUE: Whether or not filing of Civil Case No. 36852 by the Venegases had the effect of
interrupting the prescriptive period for the filing of the complaint for judicial foreclosure of
mortgage?
RULING: We agree with the CA's ruling that Civil Case No. 36852 did not have the effect of
interrupting the prescription of the action for foreclosure of mortgage as it was not an action
for foreclosure but one for annulment of title and nullification of the deed of mortgage and
the deed of sale. It was not at all the action contemplated in Article 1155 of the Civil Code
which explicitly provides that the prescription of an action is interrupted only when the
action itself is filed in court. Petitioner could have protected its right over the property by
filing a cross-claim for judicial foreclosure of mortgage against respondents in Civil Case No.
36852. The filing of a cross-claim would have been proper there. All the issues pertaining to
the mortgage validity of the mortgage and the propriety of foreclosure would have been
passed upon concurrently and not on a piecemeal basis. This should be the case as the
issue of foreclosure of the subject mortgage was connected with, or dependent on, the
subject of annulment of mortgage in Civil Case No. 36852. The actuations clearly
manifested that petitioner knew its rights under the law but chose to sleep on the same.

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Donation Case #1 (Melva)

Roman Catholic Archbishop vs. CA

A deed of donation in favour of Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM) was

Donation Case #2 (Melva)

Respondent donated half-hectare land in favour of Bureau of Public Schools

Donation Case #3 (Melva)

Tito R. Larga vs. CA, G.R.No. 112796, March 5, 1998

Whether or not donation is simple or onerous.

Donation Case #4 (Melva)

Prudencio de Luna donated a portion of land to Luzonian University Foundation, Inc.

Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint.

Donation Case #5 (Melva)

Whether or not the donation inter vivos is valid.

Donation Case #6 (Melva)

Nenita Bienvenido vs. CA, G.R.No. 111717, October 24, 2017

Whether or not the marriage between Aurelio and Luisita is void.

Donation Cases of Franz on PDF File (lacking Gonzales vs. CA)

Donation Case #12 (Carlyn)

Petitioners instituted an action for compulsory judicial partition of real properties

Whether or not the donation of the land to the respondent is valid.

In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a

Respondent was never in adverse and continuous possession of the property. It

The elements in order that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to

(1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to

(3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.

None of the aforesaid requirements is present.

Donation Case #14 (Carlyn)

On December 17, 1975, Basilisa Comerciant, mom to five children, executed a

On February 6, 1979, Comerciante executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the

Whether or not the donation was an intervivos or mortis causa.

In Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, the court recalls the characteristics of a donation

Furthermore, the act of selling the property to petitioner herein cannot be

Donation Case #15 (Carlyn)

When a person donates land to another on the condition that a construction be

Whether there is a resolutory condition.

Davide considered the donation as "modal" where the obligations are

Donation Case #16 (Ryan)

Garrido and Daguro vs. CA, Supplemento

Donation Case #17 (Ryan)

Donation Case #18 (Ryan)

Whether or not the action for inofficious donation has prescribed.

The petition is granted.

Prescription Case #19 (Ryan)

DE TUPAS vs. RTC and Tupas FOUNDATION, INC.

Prescription #20 (Rhan)

Pan American Airways v. IAC

Is Pan American Airways liable for the lost check-in baggage?

Notice of limited liability in airline tickets

Passenger is expected to be vigilant with respect to his baggages

Prescription Case #21 (Rhan)

-----Rhan has to submit it still-----

Prescription Case #22 (Rhan)

DE LA CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS

Prescription Case #23 (Rhan)

MARCELINO KIAMCO, petitioner

ISSUE: Whether or not Jose acquired the property by acquisitive prescription.

Prescription Case #24 (Jacob)

HEIRS OF QUIRICO SERASPI AND PURIFICACION R. SERASPI, petitioners, vs. COURT OF

The facts are as follows:

Marcelino Recasa(OWNER) was the owner of two parcels of land.

We rule for petitioners.

Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.

This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of

Prescription Case #25 (Jacob)