1.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG

SALIBO, DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX,
BJMP BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA, TAGUIG CITY AND ALL OTHER PERSONS
ACTING ON HIS BEHALF AND/OR HAVING CUSTODY OF DATUKAN MALANG
SALIBO, Respondents.

Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In
such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally
detained.

FACTS From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) and other
Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage. 4 "While in Saudi Arabia, . . . Salibo visited
and prayed in the cities of Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah." 5 He returned to the Philippines on
December 20, 2009.6

SUSPECTED On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in
Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang. 7

MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of
murder for allegedly participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending
warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.8

Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name. There,
he explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he could not have participated in the November
23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time. 9

To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the police "pertinent portions of his passport, boarding
passes and other documents"10 tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi
Arabia from November 7 to December 19, 2009. 11

APPREHENDED Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page two of
his passport that evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009. They then detained
Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police Station for about three (3) days. 13

TRASFERRED TO CIDG The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group in Cotabato City, where he was detained for another 10 days. While in Cotabato City, the
Criminal Investigation and Detention Group allegedly made him sign and affix his thumbprint on
documents.14

TO TAGUIG On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of
Jail Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently
detained.15

CA –HC On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas
Corpus16 questioning the legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty. 17 He maintained that he is
not the accused Butukan S. Malang.18

CA ISSUED WRIT
RTC he trial court granted Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered his immediate release
from detention.

CA REVERSED
ISSUES
First, whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City on petitioner
Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals; and S econd, whether
petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

HELD We grant the Petition.cralawlawlibrary

I. Contrary to petitioner Salibo's claim, respondent Warden correctly appealed before the Court of
Appeals.

The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ. 55 Should the court
issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall proceed
to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court "acquire[s] the power
and authority to determine the merits of the [petition for habeas corpus.]" 56Therefore, the decision on the
petition is a decision appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower
court.57

II

The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so as to entitle a person to
the efficient remedy of habeas corpus. It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy 84 or when
there is an alleged violation of the liberty of abode. 85 In other words, habeas corpus effectively
substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally protected in the right to liberty in Article
III, Section 1 of the Constitution. 86 Habeas corpus being a remedy for a constitutional right, courts
must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the substantive right to liberty will not
be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes. 87

Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition for its issuance, it is the issuance of
the writ that is essential. The issuance of the writ sets in motion the speedy judicial inquiry on the
legality of any deprivation of liberty. Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas corpus even if the
petition for its issuance "on [its] face [is] devoid of merit[.]" 108 Although the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus may be suspended in cases of invasion, rebellion, or when the public safety requires it, 109 the writ
itself may not be suspended.110
III

It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of
liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court. 111 The restraint then has become
legal,112 and the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. 113 Rule 102, Section 4 of the
Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue
of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect
in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment
under lawful judgment.

At any time before a plea is entered,135 the accused may file a motion to quash complaint or information
based on any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 3. Grounds.—The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the
following grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;.
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is
prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
If the accused avails himself or herself of a motion to quash, the accused "hypothetical[ly] admits the facts
alleged in the information."137 "Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic from the information are not to be
considered."138ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

IV

However, Ilagan142 and Umil do not apply to this case. Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue
of any warrant charging him of an offense. He was not restrained under a lawful process or an
order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of
a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules
of Court enumerates the instances when a warrantless arrest may be made:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on- personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
section 7 of Rule 112.

Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.
None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if petitioner
Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he alleged could not have been cured by mere
amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused
appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan
Malang Salibo" will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case.

2. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS ENGR. ASHRAF

KUNTING, Petitioner.

FACTS ARRESTED On October 19, 2001, petitioner Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the
Malaysian Internal Security Act. On June 12, 2003, the Royal Malaysian Police in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, turned over Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela City, Basilan, Branch 2, Ninth Judicial Region.
Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention with the
RTC under separate Amended Informations, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 3674-1187, 3537-1129,
3608-1164, and 3611-1165.
FLOWN TO PH Petitioner was immediately flown to the Philippines and brought to the PNP-IG at Camp
Crame for booking and custodial investigation.

Atty. Guillermo G. Danipog, Jr., Police Superintendent and Chief of the Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG,
informed the Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC that Kunting was already in the custody of the PNP-IG.
Atty. Danipog requested for Kunting’s temporary detention at the PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon
City due to the high security risks involved and prayed for the issuance of a corresponding
commitment order.

Emilio F. Enriquez, Acting Clerk of Court of the RTC, replied to the request of Atty. Danipog, thus:

xxx

accused As[h]raf Kunting y Barreto [may be] temporarily detained thereat by virtue of the Alias Warrant of
Arrest issued in this case, however considering that the accused is a high security risk, he should be
brought to Isabela, Basilan as soon as the necessary security escort can be provided for his transfer,
where the proper commitment order can be issued as the herein mentioned case is about to be submitted
by the prosecution.

Thank you ever so much for your usual cooperation extended to the Court. 2

RTC the RTC issued an Order directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-
IG, to immediately turn over Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an Urgent Motion for
Reinvestigation.

PNP-IG Director Arturo C. Lomibao wrote a letter to Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño,
Department of Justice (DOJ), requesting for representation and a motion to be filed for the transfer
of the venue of the trial from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City, for the following reasons: (1) Several
intelligence reports have been received by the PNP-IG stating that utmost effort will be exerted by the Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG) to recover the custody of Kunting from the PNP considering his importance to the
ASG; and (2) there is a big possibility that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG if he will be detained in
Basilan due to inadequate security facility in the municipal jail and its proximity to the area of operation of
the ASG.

On August 13, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision against petitioner’s co-accused in the consolidated
Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165, finding 17 of the accused, who
were tried, guilty of the crime/s charged.

RTC DENIED the RTC issued an Order denying Kunting’s Motion to Set Case for Preliminary
Investigation since the PNP-IG has not turned over Kunting. The trial court reiterated its Order dated
September 15, 2003, directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to
turn over Kunting to the court.

On March 15, 2005, Police Inspector Amado L. Barbasa, Jr., OIC, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, filed
with the RTC a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Order dated February 11, 2005, citing, among
other grounds, the existence of a pending motion for the transfer of the venue of the trial of Criminal Case
No. 3537-1129 against Kunting, which was allegedly filed by the DOJ before this Court. Police Inspector
Barbasa prayed that the Order of the RTC dated February 11, 2005, directing the turnover of Kunting to
the court, be suspended until the motion for the transfer of venue is resolved.

HABEAS CORPUS Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Kunting stated that he has been restrained of his liberty since June 12, 2003 by the PNP-IG led by
Police Chief Superintendent Ismael Rafanan and assisted by PNP Intelligence Chief, General Robert
Delfin. He alleged that he was never informed of the charges filed against him until he requested his
family to research in Zamboanga City. It was discovered in the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan that his
name appeared in the list of accused who allegedly participated in the kidnapping incident which
occurred on June 2, 2001 in Lamitan, Basilan.

ISSUE whether the petition for habeas corpus can prosper.

HELD Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed:

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized

In this case, Kunting’s detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He was
arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest issued by Judge Danilo M. Bucoy, RTC,
Branch 2, Isabela City, Basilan. His temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City,
was thus authorized by the trial court.1avvphil.net

Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention
in Criminal Case. In accordance with the last sentence of Section 4 above, the writ cannot be issued and
Kunting cannot be discharged since he has been charged with a criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of
Appeals7 holds that "once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question
his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."

In the absence of evidence that the DOJ has indeed filed a motion for the transfer of venue, In its
Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General stated that the PNP-IG is presently awaiting the
resolution of the Motion for Transfer of Venue it requested from the DOJ. In this regard, t the
Police Chief Superintendent is, therefore, directed to take positive steps towards action on said
motion.comply with the Order of the trial court, dated February 11, 2005, to turn over the body of
petitioner Kunting to the trial court..

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED.

3. IN RE: PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DAVID CRUZ y GONZAGA

MARIA CRUZ y GONZAGA and DAVID CRUZ y GONZAGA, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE NATIONAL PENITENTIARY, DIRECTOR OF THE
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, respondents.

FACTS CHARGED WITH RA 6425 Petitioner David Cruz y Gonzaga was charged before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 167, Pasig, Metro Manila with a violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He allegedly sold to another person on April 11, 1992 dried marijuana
fruiting tops weighing 2.70 grams. On September 23, 1993, the trial court found David Cruz guilty of the
crime charged and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment with all the accessory penalties of the law
and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and the costs.

David Cruz seasonably appealed to this Court. The First Division accepted his appeal and the
case was docketed as G.R. No. 113390. Meanwhile, David Cruz was transferred from the Municipal Jail
to the New Bilibid Prisons.

On October 3, 1994, we issued a Resolution referring the appeal to the Court of Appeals in view of the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659 and the promulgation of the case of People v. Martin Simon y
Sunga.2 We noted that as the quantity of the marijuana involved in the case was less than 750 grams,
the imposable penalty on the appellant was not life imprisonment but one within the range of prision
correccional to reclusion temporal, in accordance with the People v. Simon y Sunga ruling.

David Cruz filed with us an "Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal."

CA issued a Resolution holding in abeyance its resolution on the motion to withdraw appeal "until the
situation is explained to him by the Director, National [sic] Bilibid Prison

On September 18, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued another Resolution declaring David Cruz's appeal
as abandoned and dismissed the same.

Petitioners claim that:

I. The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in considering petitioner's appeal
abandoned despite its October 24, 1995 Resolution.

II. The correct penalty to be imposed should be determined in a new trial.

III. There is no lawful writ or process which justifies petitioner's restraint of liberty. 7

HELD The petition for certiorari must be dismissed.

Respondent Court of Appeals did not err in declaring the appeal of petitioner David Cruz as abandoned
and dismissed.

HELD HC GRANTED Maria Cruz's petition for habeas corpus, on the other hand, must be granted. Her
son, David, was tried and convicted by the trial court for violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. He was convicted on September 27, 1993 and sentenced to life imprisonment and its
accessory penalties. He was committed to the National Penitentiary on October 13, 1993. On December
31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659 took effect. This law amended provisions of several penal laws,
including the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

The penalty for the illegal sale of marijuana under the old law was "life imprisonment to death." Under
R.A. 7659, the penalty depended on the quantity of the drug. The sale of "750 grams or more of indian
hemp or marijuana" became punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.9 The penalty for the sale of less
than 750 grams of marijuana was reduced to a range "from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua,
depending upon the quantity" of the drug.

In the instant case, the amount of marijuana for which David Cruz was convicted is 2.70 grams.
The imposable penalty for this amount under the Simon ruling is prision correccional which has a
duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Presently, David Cruz has already
served six (6) years and three (3) months of his sentence which is way beyond the last day
of prision correccional. The continued detention of Cruz at the National Penitentiary has been
admitted by the Solicitor General as already illegal. 13 David Cruz should therefore be released
from prison without further delay.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. Let a writ of habeas corpus issue immediately. The
Director, Bureau of Corrections, is commanded to forthwith execute the writ for the discharge of DAVID
CRUZ y GONZAGA from confinement and RELEASE him, unless he is being detained for some other
lawful cause, and to make due return of the writ. With costs de oficio.

4.IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF PETE C. LAGRAN,
PETE C. LAGRAN, petitioner.
FACTS BP 22On April 18, 1994, petitioner Pete C. Lagran was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City of three (3) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22. He was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of one (1) year for each count and to pay a fine of P125,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.[1] He appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals
but the appeal was dismissed on July 11, 1997 for failure to file appellant's brief. The decision became
final and executory on August 6, 1997 and entry of judgment was made on March 5, 1998. [2]
QC JAIL TO NEW BILIBID By virtue of a Commitment petitioner was committed to the Quezon City Jail
on February 24, 1999.[3] On April 3, 1999, he was transferred to the New Bilibid Prison [4] where he has
been serving his sentence until the present.
PRAYED FOR HC Petitioner filed the instant petition for habeas corpus on March 19, 2001. He prayed for
his immediate release as he had allegedly completed the service of his sentence. Citing Article 70 of
the Revised Penal Code, he argued that if the penalties or sentences imposed on the accused are
identical, and such penalties or sentences emanated from one court and one complaint, the accused shall
serve them simultaneously. He stated that he has been incarcerated for two (2) years and four (4) days,
counted from February 28, 2001, thus, his detention in the New Bilibid Prison is now without legal basis.
HELD NO. Petitioner's argument deserves scant consideration.
Section 70 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 70. Successive service of sentences.--When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he
shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit; otherwise, the following rules
shall be observed:

In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed so that they may
be executed successively or as nearly as may be possible, should a pardon have been granted as to the
penalty or penalties first imposed, or should they have been served out.

For the purpose of applying the provisions of the next preceding paragraph the respective severity of the
penalties shall be determined in accordance with the following scale:

1. Death,
2. Reclusion perpetua,
3. Reclusion temporal,
4. Prision mayor,
5. Prision correccional,
6. Arresto mayor,
7. Arresto menor,
8. Destierro,
9. Perpetual absolute disqualification,
10. Temporary absolute disqualification,
11. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the right to follow
profession or calling, and
12. Public censure.

Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceeding, the maximum duration of the convict's
sentence shall not be more than threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the
penalties imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum
total of those imposed equals the same maximum period.

Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.

In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties (penal perpetua) shall be
computed at thirty years.

Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code allows simultaneous service of two or more penalties only if the
nature of the penalties so permit.[5] The penalties that can be simultaneously served are: (1) perpetual
absolute disqualification, (2) perpetual special disqualification, (3) temporary absolute disqualification, (4)
temporary special disqualification, (5) suspension, (6) destierro, (7) public censure, (8) fine and bond to
keep the peace, (9) civil interdiction, and (10) confiscation and payment of costs. These penalties,
except destierro, can be served simultaneously with imprisonment. The penalties consisting in deprivation
of liberty cannot be served simultaneously by reason of the nature of such penalties. [6] Where the accused
is sentenced to two or more terms of imprisonment, the terms should be served successively. [7]
In the case at bar, petitioner was sentenced to suffer one year imprisonment for every count of the
offense committed. The nature of the sentence does not allow petitioner to serve all the prison
terms simultaneously. Applying the rule on successive service of sentence, we find that petitioner
has not yet completed the service of his sentence as he commenced serving his sentence only on
February 24, 1999.His prayer, therefore, for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has no basis.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

5. In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of CEZARI GONZALES and JULIUS MESA
ROBERTO RAFAEL PULIDO, petitioner,
vs.
Gen. EFREN ABU, as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and all persons acting
in his stead and under his authority, and GEN. ERNESTO DE LEON, in his capacity as the Flag
Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy, and all persons acting in his stead and under his
authority, respondents.

FACTS OAKWOOD MUTINY At around one o’clock in the morning of 27 July 2003, three hundred
twenty-one (321) junior officers and enlisted personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
entered and took over the premises of the Oakwood Premiere Luxury Apartments (Oakwood) located at
the Glorietta Complex, Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They disarmed the security guards of said
establishment and planted explosives in its immediate surroundings.

The soldiers publicly announced that they went to Oakwood to air their grievances against the
administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (President Arroyo). They declared their withdrawal of
support from the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP – President Arroyo – and demanded her resignation
and that of the members of her cabinet and top officers of both the AFP and the Philippine National Police
(PNP).

At about one o’clock in the afternoon, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring the country
to be under a "state of rebellion." Consequently, she issued General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and
the PNP to carry out all reasonable measures, giving due regard to constitutional rights, to suppress and
quell the "rebellion."

After a series of negotiations between the soldiers and the government negotiators, the former agreed to
return to barracks, thus ending the occupation of Oakwood.

Among those involved in the occupation of Oakwood were Cezari Gonzales and Julius Mesa, both
enlisted personnel of the Philippine Navy. It is in their behalf that the Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed
before the Court of Appeals.
On 2 August 2003, then AFP Chief of Staff Narciso L. Abaya issued a directive 3 to all Major Service
Commanders and to the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP)
regarding the Custody of Military Personnel Involved in the 27 July 2003 Mutiny. On the strength
thereof, Gonzales and Mesa were taken into custody by their Service Commander.

Gonzales and Mesa were not charged before a court martial with violation of the Articles of War.
They were, however, among the soldiers charged before Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, with the crime of Coup D’etat as defined under Article 134-A of the Revised
Penal Code.

On 8 December 2003, Gonzales and Mesa were discharged5 from military service.

Commodore Normando Naval, Commander of Naval Base Cavite, asked the Makati RTC, Branch 148, to
relieve him of his duty as custodian of Gonzales and Mesa and that the latter be transferred to the Makati
City Jail.7 In an Order dated 29 April 2004, the RTC relieved him of his duty but ordered the transfer
of Gonzales and Mesa from the Naval Base Cavite in Sangley Point, Cavite City, to the Philippine
Marine Brigade Headquarters, Philippine Marine, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila, under the
custody of the Commander of the Marine Brigade of the Philippine Marines, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro
Manila.8

BAIL , the RTC resolved the petitions for bail filed by the accused-soldiers. It admitted Gonzales and
Mesa, and twenty-five other co-accused to bail pegging the amount thereof at P100,000.00 each.9

RELEASE The RTC issued orders directing the Commanding Officer of Philippine Marine Corps, Fort
Bonifacio, Makati City, to release Gonzales and Mesa from his custody. 11 Despite said orders and their
service to the marines, Gonzales and Mesa were not released.

PETITION FOR HC Since Gonzales and Mesa continued to be in detention, a Petition for Habeas
Corpus14 was filed by petitioner Pulido on their behalf on 22 July 2005

CA issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus directing respondents Gen. Efren Abu, Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and all persons acting in his stead and under his authority, and Gen. Ernesto de
Leon, Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy, and all persons acting in his stead and under his
authority, to produce the bodies of Gonzales and Mesa before the Court and to appear and show the
cause and validity of their detention.15

RESP a return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was made.16 Respondents prayed that the Petition
for Habeas Corpus be dismissed primarily on two grounds: (1) the continued detention of Gonzales and
Mesa is justified because of the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari questioning the order dated 8 July
2004 of the RTC granting bail to Gonzales and Mesa before the 7 th Division of the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88440; and (2) petitioner is guilty of forum shopping because of his failure to
state in the petition that the order granting bail has been elevated to the Court of Appeals and pending
before its 7th Division.

DISMISSED HC the Court of Appeals (3rd Division) dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus for violation
of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. It ratiocinated:

In short, the petitioner conveniently omitted in his narration of facts the material factual
antecedents detrimental to his cause; he chose to narrate only the factual antecedents
favorable to his cause.

ISSUES WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS ON THE GROUND OF FORUM SHOPPING.
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
NATURE OF THE ACTION AND LIMITED ITSELF TO THE ISSUE OF FORUM SHOPPING.

B. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON

PETITIONER THE PENALTY OF CENSURE.

C. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT PASSING UPON
THE EXISTENCE OR ABSENCE OF VALID GROUNDS TO DETAIN JULIUS MESA AND CEZARI
GONZALES.

Before respondents could comment on the petition, petitioner filed, with leave of court, a Motion to
Withdraw the Prayer for the Immediate Release of Julius Mesa and Cezari Gonzales. 22 Petitioner
informed the Court that the Commanding General of the Philippine Marines had ordered the release of
Gonzales and Mesa and surrendered their persons to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 148. Thus, Mesa
and Gonzales are now enjoying temporary liberty by virtue of the release orders dated 20 July 2004
issued by the RTC. Petitioner asks that the prayer for the immediate release of Gonzales and Mesa be
dismissed but asks that the other prayers in the petition be granted.

HELD MOOT When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. 23 With
the release of both Mesa and Gonzales, the Petition for Habeas Corpus has, indeed, been rendered
moot. Courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions where no
actual interests are involved. Thus, the well-settled rule that courts will not determine a moot question.
Where the issues have become moot and academic, there ceases to be any justiciable controversy, thus
rendering the resolution of the same of no practical value. 24 This Court will therefore abstain from
expressing its opinion in a case where no legal relief is needed or called for. 25

The only remaining issues to be resolved are: (1) Is petitioner guilty of forum shopping? (2) Should
petitioner be penalized when he failed to inform the 3rd Division of the Court of Appeals of the pendency of
the Petition for Certiorari filed by respondents before the 7th Division of the same court which asked for
the annulment of the RTC’s order granting Gonzales and Mesa’s petition for bail?

For filing a Petition for Habeas Corpus despite the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari that
questioned the validity of the order granting bail, which order is precisely the very basis of the
Petition for Habeas Corpus, petitioner is guilty of forum shopping.

As lucidly explained by the Court of Appeals, the ultimate relief sought by petitioner in both
the certiorari and habeas corpus cases is the release of Gonzales and Mesa. Petitioner should not have
filed the Petition for Habeas Corpus because the relief he is seeking therein is the same relief he is asking
for in the certiorari case. Moreover, the main issue in both cases boils down to whether Gonzales and
Mesa should be released on bail. Because of the presence of the elements of litis pendentia -- parties,
reliefs and issue are substantially the same/similar in the two cases; and any decision in
the certiorari case will be binding on the habeas corpus case – petitioner is thus guilty of forum shopping.

For his failure to inform the Court of Appeals of the pendency of the certiorari case, petitioner clearly
violated his obligation to disclose within five days the pendency of the same or a similar action or claim as
mandated in Section 5(c), Rule 728 of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90546
dated 12 September 2005 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 6.NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN, G.R. No. 182497
Petitioner,

Present:
- versus -

JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA,
BRANCH 37, DIRECTOR GENERAL
AVELINO RAZON, JR., DIRECTOR GEARY
BARIAS, PSSUPT. CO YEE M. CO, JR. and
POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR AGAPITO
QUIMSON,
Respondents.

FACTS Petitioner alleged in her petition that her husband PO1 Ampatuan was assigned at Sultan Kudarat
Municipal Police Station. On 14 April 2008, he was asked by his Chief of Police to report to the Provincial
Director of Shariff Kabunsuan, Superintendent Esmael Pua Ali (Supt. Ali). The latter brought PO1
Ampatuan to Superintendent Piang Adam, Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Maguindanao. PO1 Ampatuan was directed to stay at the Police Provincial Office of Maguindanao without
being informed of the cause of his restraint.
The next day, 15 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to the General Santos City Airport and was
made to board a Philippine Airlines plane bound for Manila. Upon landing at the Manila Domestic Airport,
PO1 Ampatuan was turned over to policemen of Manila and brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim by
Police Director Geary Barias and General Roberto Rosales. A press briefing was then conducted where it
was announced that PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for the killing of two Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Officials. He was then detained at the Police Jail in United Nations
Avenue, Manila. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to inquest Prosecutor Renato Gonzaga of the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila due to the alleged murder of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, head of the
Law Department of the COMELEC. On 20 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was turned-over to the Regional
Headquarters Support Group in Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City.[3]

REFUSED TO RELEASE Petitioner continues that on 21 April 2008, Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson
Salva ordered the release for further investigation of PO1 Ampatuan. [4] The Order was approved by the
City Prosecutor of Manila. But Police Senior Superintendent Co Yee Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector
Agapito Quimson refused to release PO1 Ampatuan.
HC This prompted Petitioner to file the petition for writ of habeas corpus in the RTC of Manila, Branch 37.
[5]

RESP VERSION Private respondents had another version of the antecedent facts. They narated that at
around 7:08 PM of 10 November 2007, a sixty-four-year-old man, later identified as Atty. Alioden D.
Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and
Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila.Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District (MPD) Homicide
Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was
commanded to the MPD District Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were
conducted by the Manila Prosecutors Office.

MURFER Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Clarence V. Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation
Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct
(Murder) and recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing.

On even date, a charge sheet for Grave Misconduct was executed against PO1 Ampatuan, the
accusatory portion of which reads:

REST CUSTODY Police Director General Avelino I. Razon, Jr. directed the Regional Director of the
National Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO) to place PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody, thus:

RECOMMEND RELEASE City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against PO1 Ampatuan
be set for further investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is being held for
other charges/legal grounds.[11]

WIFE FILED PETITION Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila Citys Prosecution
Office, petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Corpus before the RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008.

RTC respondent Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding
therein respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing said respondents to show cause
why they are withholding or restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan.[12]

ISSUES
 I. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE
ARREST AND DETENTION OF PO1 BASSER B. AMPATUAN WAS MADE
WITHOUT ANY WARRANT AND THEREFORE, ILLEGAL;

II. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION WHEN IT CONCEDED THE AUTHORITY OF RESPONDENT
AVELINO RAZON, JR. UNDER SEC. 52, PAR. 4, R.A. 8551 TO PLACE
AMPATUAN UNDER RESTRICTIVE CUSTODY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS;

III. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

WHEN IT SHIRKED FROM ITS JUDICIAL DUTY TO ORDER THE RELEASE OF
PO1 AMPATUAN FROM THE CUSTODY OF RESPONDENTS MAMANG
PULIS.[14]

HELD The Solicitor General is correct.

In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975
(also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic
Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998),
clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery
of the PNP. Section 41(b) of the said law enumerates the disciplinary actions, including restrictive
custody that may be imposed by duly designated supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP as a
matter of internal discipline. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 8551 reads:
Sec. 52 x x x.

xxxx

4. The Chief of the PNP shall have the power to impose the disciplinary punishment of
dismissal from the service; suspension or forfeiture of salary; or any combination thereof
for a period not exceeding one hundred eighty (180) days. Provided, further, That the
Chief of the PNP shall have the authority to place police personnel under
restrictive custody during the pendency of a grave administrative case filed
against him or even after the filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against
such police personnel. [Emphasis ours].

Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a

valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and

monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors

is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. [26]

 Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit

of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy

prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers

concerned are always accounted for.[27]

Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuans restrictive custody is the administrative case filed against him,

his remedy is within such administrative process.

We likewise note that PO1 Ampatuan has been under restrictive custody since 19 April 2008. To

date, the administrative case against him should have already been resolved and the issue of his

restrictive custody should have been rendered moot and academic, in accordance with Section 55 of

Republic Act No. 8551, which provides:

SEC. 55. Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a
complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP
for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or
more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office for a period not
exceeding ninety (90) days from arraignment: Provided, however, That if it can be shown
by evidence that the accused is harassing the complainant and/or witnesses, the court
may order the preventive suspension of the accused PNP member even if the charge is
punishable by a penalty lower than six (6) years and one (1) day: Provided, further, That
the preventive suspension shall not be more than ninety (90) days except if the delay in
the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petitions of the
respondent: Provided, finally, That such preventive suspension may be sooner lifted by
the court in the exigency of the service upon recommendation of the Chief, PNP. Such
case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90)
days from arraignment of the accused. (Emphasis supplied.)

Having conceded that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, we have

to dismiss the petition.

In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to the issuance

of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face that

the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

ANITA MANGILA, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN, ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR II LUCIA JUDY SOLINAP, and
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (DIRECTOR REYNALDO WYCOCO), Respondents.

Restraint that is lawful and pursuant to a court process cannot be inquired into through habeas corpus.

FACTS ESTAFA seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila and four others with
syndicated estafa in violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential Decree
No. 1689, and with violations of Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipino Act of 1995) were filed in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities in Puerto Princesa City (MTCC),
docketed as Criminal Cases No. 16916 to No. 16922. The complaints arose from the recruiting and
promising of employment by Mangila and the others to the private complainants as overseas contract
workers in Toronto, Canada, and from the collection of visa processing fees, membership fees and on-line
application the private complainants without lawful authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA).1

PRELIM INVESTIGATION-WARRANT On the following day, June 17, 2003, Judge Heriberto M.
Pangilinan, Presiding Judge of the MTCC, conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints. After
examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the
arrest of Mangila and her cohorts without bail.2 On the next day, the entire records of the cases, including
the warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City for further
proceedings and appropriate action in accordance with the prevailing rules. 3

ARRESTED AND DETAINED As a consequence, Mangila was arrested on June 18, 2003 and detained
at the headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). 4

HABEAS Claiming that Judge Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation; that the preliminary investigation he conducted was not yet completed when he issued the
warrant of arrest; and that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was without sufficient justification or
without a prior finding of probable cause, Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals (CA)a petition for habeas
corpus to obtain her release from detention. Her petition averred that the remedy of habeas corpus was
available to her because she could no longer file a motion to quash or a motion to recall the warrant of
arrest considering that Judge Pangilinan had already forwarded the entire records of the case to the City
Prosecutor who had no authority to lift or recall the warrant. 5

CA DENIED

Issue Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to obtain the release of
Mangila from detention?

HELD. NO.

There is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged against Mangila and her cohorts on
June 16, 2003,Judge Pangilinan, as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, was empowered to conduct
preliminary investigations involving "all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial
jurisdictions." His authority was expressly provided in Section 2, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Section 2.Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations.

– The following may conduct preliminary investigations:

(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;

(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and

(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.

To begin with, Judge Pangilinan issued the order of arrest after examining Palayon, one of the
complainants against Mangila and her cohorts. If he, as the investigating judge, considered Palayon’s
evidence sufficient for finding probable cause against her and her cohorts, which finding the
Court justifiably presumes from his act of referring the case and its records to the Office of the
City Prosecutor on the day immediately following the preliminary investigation he conducted, her
petition for habeas corpus could not be the proper remedy by which she could assail the
adequacy of the adverse finding. Even granting that there was a failure to adhere to the law or rule,
such failure would not be the equivalent of a violation of her constitutional rights. 15

Secondly, it was not procedurally correct for her to impugn the issuance of the warrant of arrest by
hinting that the investigating judge did not at all consider the necessity of determining the existence of
probable cause for its issuance due to time constraints and in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, for
that consideration was presumed.

And, lastly, it was clear that under Section 5, 16 Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the resolution of the investigating judge was not final but was still subject to the
review by the public prosecutor who had the power to order the release of the detainee if no
probable cause should be ultimately found against her. In the context of the rule, Mangila had no
need to seek the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to secure her release from detention. Her proper
recourse was to bring the supposed irregularities attending the conduct of the preliminary investigation
and the issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the attention of the City Prosecutor, who had been
meanwhile given the most direct access to the entire records of the case, including the warrant of arrest,
following Judge Pangilinan’s transmittal of them to the City Prosecutor for appropriate action. 17 We agree
with the CA, therefore, that the writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for another
available remedy.18

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on October 14, 2003 and November 19,
2003 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 79745; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

RULE 103

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE, Respondent.

FACTS PETITION FOR HER WARD Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote filed a petition for change of
name of her ward from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores on September 9, 1998. In Special
Proceeding No. R-481,3 Capote as Giovanni’s guardian ad litem averred:
 xxx xxx xxx

1. [Respondent] is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, married, while minor GIOVANNI N.

GALLAMASO, is also a Filipino citizen, sixteen (16) years old and both are residents of San
Juan, Southern Leyte where they can be served with summons and other court processes;

2. [Respondent] was appointed guardian [ad litem] of minor Giovanni N. Gallamaso by

virtue of a court order in Special [Proc.] No. R-459, dated [August 18, 1998] xxx xxx authorizing
her to file in court a petition for change of name of said minor in accordance with the desire of his
mother [who is residing and working abroad];

4. The minor was left under the care of [respondent] since he was yet nine (9) years old up to the
present;

5. Minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores

and Diosdado Gallamaso. [He] was born on July 9, 1982 [,] prior to the effectivity of the New
Family Code and as such, his mother used the surname of the natural father despite the absence
of marriage between them; and [Giovanni] has been known by that name since birth [as per his
birth certificate registered at the Local Civil Register of San Juan, Southern Leyte];

6. The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time [Giovanni] was born and up to the present,
failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on matters of financial, physical, emotional and
spiritual concerns. [Giovanni’s pleas] for attention along that line [fell] on deaf ears xxx xxx xxx;

NO OPPOSITION Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of court to
present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commissioner. The OSG, acting through the
Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court granted the motion.

CHANGE NAME After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the change
of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. 8

APPEAL BY GOVTFrom this decision, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an
appeal with a lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary
proceeding.

CA AFFIRMED CHANGE Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required,
the CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name. 9

In this petition, the Republic contends that the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s decision which
granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of indispensable parties.10 Petitioner
cites Republic of the Philippines v. Labrador11 and claims that the purported parents and all other
persons who may be adversely affected by the child’s change of name should have been made
respondents to make the proceeding adversarial.12

HELD We deny the petition.

The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy,
a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the
procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that
the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established that,
under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never
recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of
name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best
interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the United States.
This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.

A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and
afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. 24 Respondent gave notice of the petition through
publication as required by the rules.25 With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the whole
world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG by
serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were
satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the OSG, were afforded the
opportunity to contest the petition.

2.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
ROSELIE ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE a.k.a. MARIA ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE, respondent.

FACTS RESP

Resp alleged, among other things, the following:

1. That she is a Filipino, of legal age, married, born to spouses Floriano B. Bolante and Paula B.
Bringas and a resident since birth of Bangued, Abra;

2. That per records in the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar, Bangued, Abra, her registered
name is Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante which name, as far as she can remember, she did not
use but instead the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante;

3. That the name Maria Eloisa appears in all her school as well as in her other public and private
records; and

4. That her married name is Maria Eloisa B. Bolante-Marbella.

Thus, to prevent confusion, Ms. Bolante prayed that her registered name be changed to conform to the
name she has always carried and used.

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court ordered respondent, as petitioner
thereat, to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of notice and publication, and set the hearing on
February 20, 2001.

At the scheduled February 20, 2001 initial hearing, the trial court issued an Order giving respondent five
(5) days within which to file a written formal offer of evidence to establish jurisdictional facts and set the
presentation of evidence proper on March 26, 2001. In the afternoon of February 20, respondent filed her
"Offer of Evidence for Marking and Identification Purposes to Prove Jurisdictional Facts."

RTC The Municipal Registrar of Bangued, Abra, is hereby directed:

a) To change the name of the petitioner in her record of birth from Roselie Eloisa Bringas
Bolante to Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante; and,

b) To record this decision in the Civil Registry in accordance with Registry Regulations.

Furnish copy of this Order to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Bangued, Abra for recording and
compliance.
 SO ORDERED.3 (Underscoring added)

ISSUES WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH SEC. 3, RULE 103
OF THE RULES OF COURT IS SUFFICIENT TO VEST THE TRIAL COURT WITH JURISDICTION TO
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION A QUO.

II

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S BARE TESTIMONY, UNSUPPORTED BY ANY OTHER

EVIDENCE, IS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT THE CHANGE OF HER NAME IS NOT RESORTED FOR
ILLEGAL PURPOSES.

Sections 2 and 3, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court prescribe the procedural and jurisdictional
requirements for a change of name.

On the postulate that the initial hearing of a petition for a change of name cannot be set within four (4)
months from the last publication of the notice of such hearing, petitioner submits at the threshold that the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for want or defective publication.

HELD We are not persuaded.

As gleaned from the records, the basic petition for change of name was filed on October 18, 2000 and set
for hearing on February 20, 2001 via an Order issued on November 13, 2000. The notice of hearing was
published in the November 23, and 30, 2000 and December 7, 2000 issues of the Norluzonian Courier.
Counted from the last day, December 7, 2000, of publication of the Order, the initial hearing scheduled on
February 20, 2001 is indeed within the four-month prohibited period prescribed under Section 3, Rule 103
of the Rules. The Court, as did the CA, 7 must emphasize, however, that the trial court, evidently upon
realizing the error committed respecting the 4-month limitation, lost no time in rectifying its mistake by
rescheduling, with due notice to all concerned, the initial hearing for several times, finally settling
for September 25, 2001.

In the context of Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules, publication is valid if the following requisites
concur: (1) the petition and the copy of the order indicating the date and place for the hearing
must be published; (2) the publication must be at least once a week for three successive weeks;
and, (3) the publication must be in some newspaper of general circulation published in the
province, as the court shall deem best. Another validating ingredient relates to the caveat against
the petition being heard within 30 days prior to an election or within four (4) months after the last
publication of the notice of the hearing.

In this case, the Solicitor General deputized the provincial prosecutor of Abra for the purpose of
appearing in the trial on his behalf. As it were, the provincial prosecutor of Abra was fully apprised of the
new dates of the initial hearing. Accordingly, there was no actual need for a republication of the initial
notice of the hearing.

Not lost on the Court is the fact that during the September 25, 2001 initial hearing which, to reiterate is
already outside the 4-month limitation prescribed by the Rules, the provincial prosecutor of Abra
interposed no objection as to the genuineness, authenticity, relevancy or sufficiency of the exhibits
presented to prove the jurisdictional requirements exacted by the Rules. In a very real sense, therefore,
the petitioner Republic fully and knowingly acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the trial court. The peculiar
circumstances obtaining in this case and the requirements of fair dealing demand that we accord validity
to the proceedings a quo.
On the issue as to propriety of the desired change of name, we are guided by decisional law on the
matter.. Among these are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change will avoid confusion; (c) when one has been continuously used and been
known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (d) when the surname
causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name will prejudice public interest. 13

The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of name and the corollary issue of what is a proper
and reasonable cause therefor rests on the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need
only be satisfactory to the court; it need not be the best evidence available. 14 What is involved in special
proceedings for change of name is, to borrow from Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 "not a mere matter of
allowance or disallowance of the petition, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and
propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in
the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in
the courts."

With the view we take of the case, respondent's submission for a change of name is with proper and
reasonable reason. As it were, she has, since she started schooling, used the given name and has been
known as Maria Eloisa, albeit the name Roselie Eloisa is written on her birth record. Her scholastic
records, as well as records in government offices, including that of her driver's license, professional
license as a certified public accountant issued by the Professional Regulation Commission, and the
"Quick Count" document of the COMELEC, all attest to her having used practically all her life the
name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante.

The imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the instant petition is granted. But beyond practicalities,
simple justice dictates that every person shall be allowed to avail himself of any opportunity to improve his
social standing, provided he does so without causing prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of
other people.16

The OSG's argument that respondent's bare testimony is insufficient to show that the requested
name is not sought for any illegal purpose and/or in avoidance of any entanglement with the law
deserves scant consideration. Surely, the issuance of a police and NBI clearance or like certification,
while perhaps apropos, cannot, as the OSG suggests, be a convincing norm of one's good moral
character or compelling evidence to prove that the change of name is not sought for any evil motive or
fraudulent intent. Respondent's open court testimony, given under pain of perjury and for which she was
cross-examined, that she had not been accused of any crime under her registered name or under her
present name (name that she is using) had convinced the trial court of the bona fides of her request for
change of name. As the CA correctly ratiocinated:

In the case at bar, petitioner [now respondent] seeks to change her registered name in order to
avoid confusion having used a different name all her life. This is a valid ground under the afore-
mentioned enumeration not to mention that the instant remedy presents the less cumbersome
and most convenient way to set her records straight.

Anent the contention of oppositor-appellant that petitioner failed to prove that the petition is not
resorted to for an illegal purpose due to her inability to present NBI as well as police clearance to
the effect that she has no derogatory records, due perusal of the requirements of Rule 103
reveals that it does not so provide such a quantum of proof to establish the fact that a petitioner
has no derogatory records. This purpose, we think, is served upon the declaration and affirmation
of the petitioner in open court that the petition is not to further fraud but for a legitimate purpose,
coupled by the absence of any oppositor to the petition. There is yet no jurisprudence requiring a
petitioner in a petition for a change of name to present NBI and police clearances to prove that
the said petition is not resorted to for purpose of fraud. Until such time, we see no urgency to
impose the requirements espoused by oppositor-appellant. (Word in bracket added).
At bottom, petitioner Republic has not demonstrated that the allowance of the basic petition is whimsical
or based on a consideration other than to avoid confusion. The trial court appears to have exercised its
discretion judiciously when it granted the petition. Like the CA, the Court loathes to disturb the action thus
taken.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October
21, 2003 is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 207147, September 14, 2016 - EMELITA BASILIO GAN, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 207147, September 14, 2016

EMELITA BASILIO GAN, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts

Emelita Basilio Gan (petitioner) was born on December 21, 1956 out of wedlock to Pia Gan,
her father who is a Chinese national, and Consolacion Basilio, her mother who is a Filipino
citizen.3 The petitioner's birth certificate,4 which was registered in the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar (LCR) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, indicates that her full name is Emelita
Basilio.

On June 29, 2010, the petitioner filed a Petition5 for correction of name with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur. The petitioner sought to change the full
name indicated in her birth certificate from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio Gan." She
claimed that she had been using the name "Emelita Basilio Gan" in her school records from
elementary until college, employment records, marriage contract, and other government
records.6chanrobleslaw

Ruling of the RTC

On July 15, 2010, the RTC issued an Order, which noted that the petition filed sought not
merely a correction of entry in the birth certificate, but a change of name. Accordingly, the
RTC ordered the petitioner to make the necessary amendment to her petition to conform to
the requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.7chanrobleslaw

Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the CA, in its Decision15 dated April 26, 2013, reversed and set aside the RTC
Orders dated July 19, 2011 and October 17, 2011. The CA opined that pursuant to Article
176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255,16 the petitioner, as an
illegitimate child, may only use the surname of her mother; she may only use the surname
of her father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by her father.17

Ruling of the Court

The petition is denied.

A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right; a proper and reasonable cause
must exist before a person may be authorized to change his name.21 " After a judicious
review of the records of this case, the Court agrees with the CA that the reason
cited by the petitioner in support of her petition for change of name, i.e. that she
has been using the name "Emelita Basilio Gan" in all of her records, is not a
sufficient or proper justification to allow her petition. When the petitioner was
born in 1956, prior to the enactment and effectivity of the Family Code, the
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code then regarding the petitioner's use of
surname provide:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Article 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname
of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the
surname of the recognizing parent.

Article 368. Illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 shall bear the surname of the
mother.

In her amended petition for change of name, the petitioner merely stated that she
was born out of wedlock;23 she did not state whether her parents, at the time of
her birth, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, which
would make her a natural child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code. If, at the
time of the petitioner's·birth, either of her parents had an impediment to marry the other,
she may only bear the surname of her mother pursuant to Article 368 of the Civil
Code. Otherwise, she may use the surname of her father provided that she was
acknowledged by her father.

However, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence that would show that she
indeed was duly acknowledged by his father. The petitioner's evidence consisted only
of her birth certificate signed by her mother, school records, employment records, marriage
contract, certificate of baptism, and other government records. Thus, assuming that she is a
natural child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code, she could still not insist on using her
father's surname. It was, thus, a blatant error on the part of the RTC to have allowed the
petitioner to change her name from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio Gan."

Here, the petitioner filed a petition for change of name under Rule 103 and not a petition for
correction of entries under Rule 108. Unlike in Lim, herein petitioner's birth certificate
indicated that she bears the surname of her mother and not of her father.

4. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MERLYN MERCADERA through her Attorney-in-Fact, EVELYN M. OGA, Respondent.

FACTS MARILYN TO MERLYNOn June 6, 2005, Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera), represented by her
sister and duly constituted Attorney-in-Fact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga), sought the correction of her given
name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth - from Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L.
Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No.
9048 (R.A. No. 9048).2

The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect the correction unless a
court order was obtained "because the Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with a permanent
appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their office as mandated by
Republic Act 9048."5

Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the
Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City (RTC). The petition
was docketed as Special Proceedings No. R-3427 (SP No. R-3427). Section 2 of Rule 108 reads:

SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds, the following
entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name. [Underscoring supplied]

RTC GRANTED

Petitioner Merlyn M. Mercadera was born on August 19, 1970 at Dipolog City. She is the daughter of
spouses Tirso U. Mercadera and Norma C. Lacquiao. The fact of her birth was reported to the Office of
the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City on September 8, 1970. It was recorded on page 68, book no. 9, in
the Registry of Births of said civil registry. In the certification of birth dated May 9, 2005 issued by the
same registry, her given name appears as Marilyn and not Merlyn (Exhibit "C").

In her elementary diploma issued by the Paaralang Sentral ng Estaka, Dipolog City; her high school
diploma issued by the Zamboanga del Norte School of Arts and Trades, Dipolog City; and college diploma
issued by the Silliman University, Dumaguete City, where she earned the degree of Bachelor of
Secondary Education, uniformly show her name as Merlyn L. Mercadera

Presently, she is working in U.P. Mindanao, Buhangin, Davao City. Her certificate of membership issued
by the Government Service Insurance System also bears his [sic] complete name as Merlyn Lacquiao
Mercadera

When she secured an authenticated copy of her certificate of live birth from the National Statistics Office,
she discovered that her given name as registered is Marilyn and not Merlyn; hence, this petition.

RTC the RTC granted Mercadera’s petition and directed the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog
City to correct her name appearing in her certificate of live birth, Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera, to MERLYN
Lacquiao Mercadera. Specifically, the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City
is hereby directed to correct the given name of petitioner appearing in her certificate of live birth, from
Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera to MERLYN Lacquiao Mercadera.

HELD Appellant’s insistence that the petition should have been filed under Rule 103 and not Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court is off the mark. This Court does not entertain any doubt that the petition before
the trial court was one for the correction on an entry in petitioner’s Certificate of Live Birth and
not one in which she sought to change her name. In Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No.
138496, February 23, 2004, the High Court reiterated the distinction between the phrases "to
correct" and "to change." Said the High Court:
 I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE CHANGE IN

RESPONDENT’S NAME UNDER RULE 103.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN CONSIDERING

SECONDARY EVIDENCE.

Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or both,
pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code

Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or cancellation of
entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code.

Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply
sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to
remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace something with something else of the same
kind or with something that serves as a substitute." 36 From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera
clearly prayed for the lower court "to remove the faults or error" from her registered given name
"MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the same to conform to the one she grew up to, "MERLYN." It
does not take a complex assessment of said petition to learn of its intention to simply correct the clerical
error in spelling. Mercadera even attempted to avail of the remedy allowed by R.A. No. 9048 but she
unfortunately failed to enjoy the expediency which the law provides and was constrained to take court
action to obtain relief. Thus, the petition was clear in stating:

7. That as such, there is a need to correct her given name as appearing in her Certificate of Live
Birth from MARILYN to MERLYN to conform to her true and correct given name that she had
been using and had been known within the community x x x.

8. That herein petitioner went to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City and
requested them to effect such correction in her Certificate of Live Birth, however, the Local Civil
Registrar of Dipolog City will not effect such correction unless an order is obtained by herein
petitioner from this Honorable Court because the Local Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped
with permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their
office as mandated by Republic Act 9048, hence the filing of this petition. [Emphases supplied]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 189476

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG- BERSAMIN, and
MAGPAYO (A.K.A. JULIAN EDWARD VILLARAMA, JR., and
EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG), SERENO, JJ.
Respondent.
Promulgated:
February 2, 2011
FACTS Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent)
is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondents
certificate of live birth[1] shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.

PETITION Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22,
2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward
Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. The petition, docketed as SPP No. Q-0863058, was entitled IN RE
PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG
MAGPAYO TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG.

COSETENG In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics
Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriag e.
[2]
Respondent also submitted his academic records from elementary up to college [3] showing that he
carried the surname Coseteng, and the birth certificate of his child where Coseteng appears as his
surname.[4] In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of
Quezon Citys 3rd District using the name JULIAN M.L. COSETENG.[5]

On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, [6] respondent amended his petition by alleging
therein compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court.[7]

No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered by the trial
court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte.[9]

By Decision of January 8, 2009, [10] the trial court granted respondents petition and directed the
Civil Registrar of Makati City to:

1. Delete the entry March 26, 1972 in Item 24 for DATE AND PLACE OF
MARRIAGE OF PARTIES [in herein respondents Certificate of live Birth];

2. Correct the entry MAGPAYO in the space for the Last Name of the
[respondent] to COSETENG;

3. Delete the entry COSETENG in the space for Middle Name of the
[respondent]; and

4. Delete the entry Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr. in the space for FATHER
of the [respondent] (emphasis and underscoring supplied; capitalization in the
original)
 The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by
the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009, [11] hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to
the Court on pure question of law.

The Republic assails the decision in this wise:

I. . . . THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAMEINVOLVES THE CHANGE

OF [RESPONDENTS] CIVIL STATUS FROM LEGITIMATE TO
ILLEGITIMATE AND, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH
APPROPRIATE ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDINGS

II. THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT DIRECTED

THE DELETION OF THE NAME OF RESPONDENTS FATHER FROM HIS
BIRTH CERTIFICATE.[12] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and place of marriage of
respondents parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing his civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a person must be effected through
an appropriate adversary proceeding.[13]
.
HELD The petition is impressed with merit.

A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious
grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname
causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. [17] Respondents reason for
changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds,
however.

The change being sought in respondents petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in
relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not
suffice to grant respondents supplication.
 A reading of these related provisions readily shows that Rule 108 clearly mandates two
sets of notices to different potential oppositors. The first notice is that given to the persons named in
the petition and the second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons who are not
named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as
creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the
subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for two periods (for the two types of potential
oppositors) within which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication).

IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court is mandated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, GRANTED. The January 8,
2009 Decision of Branch 77 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in SP Proc. No. Q-0863058 is
NULLIFIED.

GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner,

vs.
PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.

FACTS LIVE IN PARTNERS Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio
(Antonio) for a period of time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time
already married to someone else.3 Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis
(on February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999).4The children were not expressly
recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry.
The parties’ relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with
her two children in May 2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial
Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody,
Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC), appending a notarized Deed of
Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.5

RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent Antonio, ruling that "[t]he evidence at hand is
overwhelming that the best interest of the children can be promoted if they are under the sole
parental authority and physical custody of [respondent Antonio]." 6

GRANDE petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied by the trial court
in its Resolution dated November 22, 20108 for being pro forma and for lack of merit.

CAThe appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by
respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally protected
"best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO." 11
As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in order considering that not only did
Antonio express his willingness to give support, it is also a consequence of his acknowledging the
paternity of the minor children.12 Lastly, the CA ruled that there is no reason to deprive respondent Antonio
of his visitorial right especially in view of the constitutionally inherent and natural right of parents over their
children.13

Not satisfied with the CA’s Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for reconsideration,
particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors’ surname to
"Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition. In it, she
posits that Article 176 of the Family Code––as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is
in permissive language––may not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of
his surname without the consent of their mother.

HELD We find the present petition impressed with merit.

The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate
children upon his recognition of their filiation. Central to the core issue is the application of Art.
176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:

Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist
of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil
Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.

This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 14 which now reads:

Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may
use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through
the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action
before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child
shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use
the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation
is expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or
when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father.
In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.

In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of
the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from
Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court15 is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted
more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of
his children’s surname as Antonio.

Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondent’s prayer
has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor children
also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.

Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is there a legal basis for the
court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and unequivocal provision
of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not.
It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to
dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.

Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean
what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation. 16 Respondent’s position
that the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.

On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must
abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged
illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is
permissive and operates to confer discretion17 upon the illegitimate children.

It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting children are to be
measured is their best interest. On the matter of children’s surnames, this Court has, time and again,
rebuffed the idea that the use of the father’s surname serves the best interest of the minor child

In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,20 We gave due deference to the choice of an illegitimate minor to
use the surname of his mother as it would best serve his interest, thus:

The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a person’s name to his identity, his
status in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure,
these matters should not be taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the right
to present evidence in favor of or against such change.

The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a
petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural
requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence
presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil
Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother
has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever
recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to
have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother
and son. (Emphasis supplied.)

An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the father’s surname upon his
recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA
9255,21 which states:

Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father

7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered

7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document is executed by the
father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate document.

7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private instrument, the child shall use the surname of the
father, provided the registration is supported by the following documents:

xxxx
7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother

7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the surname of the father
upon the submission of the accomplished AUSF [Affidavit of Use of the Surname of the Father].

7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the surname of the
father upon submission of a public document or a private handwritten instrument supported by the
documents listed in Rule 7.1.2.

7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is required if he/she has reached the age of
majority. The consent may be contained in a separate instrument duly notarized.

xxxx

Rule 8. Effects of Recognition

8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered

8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of the child in the Certificate of Live
Birth. The Certificate of Live Birth shall be recorded in the Register of Births.

xxxx

8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother

8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate
public document or in a private handwritten document, the public document or AUSF shall be recorded in
the Register of Live Birth and the Register of Births as follows:

"The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname) to (new surname) pursuant
to RA 9255."

The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth and Register of Births shall not
be changed or deleted.

8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of registration, the public document or
AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Legal Instruments. Proper annotation shall be made in
the Certificate of Live Birth and the Register of Births as follows:

"Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the child is hereby changed from
(original surname) on (date) pursuant to RA 9255." (Emphasis supplied.)

Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot amend a legislative act.

Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted provisions of the IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it
provides the mandatory use by illegitimate children of their father’s surname upon the latter’s recognition
of his paternity.

To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The clear,
unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate
father’s surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given the choice on the
surnames by which they will be known.
At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now aged thirteen (13) and fifteen
(15) years old, to this Court declaring their opposition to have their names changed to
"Antonio."26 However, since these letters were not offered before and evaluated by the trial court, they do
not provide any evidentiary weight to sway this Court to rule for or against petitioner. 27 A proper inquiry
into, and evaluation of the evidence of, the children's choice of surname by the trial court is necessary.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 24, 2012 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406 is MODIFIED, the dispositive portion of which shall read:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly. the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter
read as follows:

a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis to the
custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded
the full or sole custody of these minor children;

b. [Antonio] shall have visitation rights28 at least twice a week, and may only take the children out
upon the written consent of [Grande]:

c. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor children Jerard Patrick
and Andre Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30%
for [Grande]; and

d. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan for the sole
purpose of determining the surname to be chosen by the children Jerard Patrick and Andre
Lewis.

Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004
are DISAPPROVED and hereby declared NULL and VOID.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN
MUNSON y NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE, respondents.
FACTS PETITION TO ADPT KEVIN On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van
Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a petition [2] to adopt the minor Kevin Earl
Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court
for adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under
and by reason of which the adoption of the aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition,
private respondents prayed for the change of the first name of said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the
same being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition, and by which he has
been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private
respondents residence.[3]
At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of
name in the same petition for adoption. In its formal opposition dated May 3, 1995,[4]petitioner
reiterated its objection to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for change of name in a
single proceeding, arguing that these petitions should be conducted and pursued as two separate
proceedings.
RTC minor child Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran is freed from all legal obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and for all legal intents and purposes shall be known
as Aaron Joseph Munson y Andrade, the legally adopted child of Van Munson and Regina Munson
effective upon the filing of the petition on March 10, 1994. As soon as the decree of adoption becomes
final and executory, it shall be recorded in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila
pursuant to Section 8, Rule 99 and Section 6, Rule 103, respectively, of the Rules of Court, and shall be
annotated in the record of birth of the adopted child, which in this case is in Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
where the child was born. Likewise, send a copy of this Order to the National Census and Statistics
Office, Manila, for its appropriate action consisten(t) herewith. [5]

ISSUES (1) whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the change of the registered
proper or given name of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption; and (2) whether or not
there was lawful ground for the change of name.
I. It is the position of petitioner that respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he additionally
granted the prayer for the change of the given or proper name of the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special
proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other, being
respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. In order to be entitled to both reliefs, namely, a
decree of adoption and an authority to change the given or proper name of the adoptee, the respective
proceedings for each must be instituted separately, and the substantive and procedural requirements
therefor under Articles 183 to 193 of the Family Code in relation to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for
adoption, and Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change
of name, must correspondingly be complied with.[10]
A perusal of the records, according to petitioner, shows that only the laws and rules on adoption have
been observed, but not those for a petition for change of name. [11] Petitioner further contends that what
the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of
the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of
the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a substantial change of ones legal
name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive
and adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied. [12]
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer
for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes
of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging
protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the
joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a
single petition. Further, the conditions for permissive joinder of causes of action, i.e., jurisdiction of the
court, proper venue and joinder of parties, have been met. [13]
Corollarily, petitioner insists on strict adherence to the rule regarding change of name in view of the
natural interest of the State in maintaining a system of identification of its citizens and in the orderly
administration of justice.[14] Private respondents argue otherwise and invoke a liberal construction and
application of the Rules, the welfare and interest of the adoptee being the primordial concern that should
be addressed in the instant proceeding.[15]
On this score, the trial court adopted a liberal stance in holding that

Furthermore, the change of name of the child from Kevin Earl Bartolome to Aaron Joseph should not be
treated strictly, it appearing that no rights have been prejudiced by said change of name. The strict and
meticulous observation of the requisites set forth by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is indubitably for the
purpose of preventing fraud, ensuring that neither State nor any third person should be prejudiced by the
grant of the petition for change of name under said rule, to a petitioner of discernment.
The first name sought to be changed belongs to an infant barely over a year old. Kevin Earl has not
exercised full civil rights nor engaged in any contractual obligations. Neither can he nor petitioners on his
behalf, be deemed to have any immoral, criminal or illicit purpose for seeking said cha(n)ge of name. It
stands to reason that there is no way that the state or any person may be so prejudiced by the action for
change of Kevin Earls first name. In fact, to obviate any possible doubts on the intent of petitioners, the
prayer for change of name was caused to be published together with the petition for adoption. [16]

Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the legal effects of adoption:

(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall
acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the
right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;

(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested in the
adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental
authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and

(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives.

Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the
adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptees surname to follow that
of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must
specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must
remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not
confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptees registered Christian or first name. The
automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a
decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a
prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption proceedings
in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, [17] and shall continue to be so
used until the court orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the
civil register is a substantial change in ones official or legal name and cannot be authorized without a
judicial order. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have,
wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, a court to which
the application is made should normally make its decree recording such change) [18]
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing
therein, If a change in ones name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the
substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and
accordingly determined.
Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial court of the province
where the person desiring to change his name resides. It shall be signed and verified by the person
desiring his name to be changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall state that the petitioner
has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three years prior to
such filing, the cause for which the change of name is sought, and the name asked for. An order for the
date and place of hearing shall be made and published, with the Solicitor General or the proper provincial
or city prosecutor appearing for the Government at such hearing. It is only upon satisfactory proof of the
veracity of the allegations in the petition and the reasonableness of the causes for the change of name
that the court may adjudge that the name be changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a
copy of said judgment to the civil registrar of the municipality concerned who shall forthwith enter the
same in the civil register.
 A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements
therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. [19] It is an
independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it
cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of
another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy
available under our remedial law system.
The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject petition insofar as it seeks
the change of name of the adoptee, [20] all of which taken together cannot but lead to the conclusion that
there was no petition sufficient in form and substance for change of name as would rightfully deserve an
order therefor. It would be procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of
name in the absence of the corresponding petition for the latter relief at law.
Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of imagination and liberality, be
justified under the rule allowing permissive joinder of causes of action. Moreover, the reliance by private
respondents on the pronouncements in Briz vs. Briz, et al.[21] and Peyer vs. Martinez, et al.[22] is
misplaced.
A restatement of the rule and jurisprudence on joinder of causes of action would, therefore, appear to
be called for.
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant the uniting of two or
more demands or rights of action in one action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a
declaration.[23] It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis
of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain
circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration,
complaint or petition.[24]
As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is generally not required to join in one
suit several distinct causes of action. The joinder of separate causes of action, where allowable, is
permissive and not mandatory in the absence of a contrary statutory provision, even though the causes of
action arose from the same factual setting and might under applicable joinder rules be joined. [25] Modern
statutes and rules governing joinders are intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the
efficient administration of justice wherever this may be done without prejudice to the rights of the
litigants. To achieve these ends, they are liberally construed.[26]
While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our
present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following
requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of
action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for
money or are of the same nature and character.
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties and
subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a complete determination of all matters in
controversy and litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition
of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where
possible, without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. Being of a remedial nature, the provision should be
liberally construed, to the end that related controversies between the same parties may be adjudicated at
one time; and it should be made effectual as far as practicable, [27] with the end in view of promoting the
efficient administration of justice.[28]
The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to encourage joinder of
actions which could reasonably be said to involve kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not
succeeded in giving a standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal
application. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is
some substantial unity between them.[29] While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims
as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common
question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue
and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized. [30]
 Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso subjecting it to the correlative
rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties [31] and requiring a conceptual unity in the problems
presented. effectively disallows unlimited joinder. [32]
Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express prohibition against the
joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of name, we do not believe that there is any relation
between these two petitions, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any
common question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant their joinder. In short, these petitions do
not rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder under our
Rules.
As keenly observed and correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General

A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance
and purpose, are different from each other. Each action is individually governed by particular sets of laws
and rules. These two proceedings involve disparate issues. In a petition for adoption, the court is called
upon to evaluate the proposed adopters fitness and qualifications to bring up and educate the adoptee
properly (Prasnick vs. Republic, 99 Phil. 665). On the other hand, in a petition for change of name, no
family relations are created or affected for what is looked into is the propriety and reasonableness of the
grounds supporting the proposed change of name (Yu vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 253).

xxx xxx xxx

x x x Hence, the individual merits of each issue must be separately assessed and determined for neither
action is dependent on the other. [33]

The rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is clear. Joinder may be allowed only if the actions
show a commonality of relationship and conform to the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties
(Section 5, Rule 2, Rules of Court).

These conditions are wanting in the instant case. As already pointed out in our Petition (pp. 9-10), an
action for adoption and an action for change of name are, in nature and purpose, not related to each other
and do not arise out of the same relation between the parties. While what is cogent in an adoption
proceeding is the proposed adopters fitness and qualifications to adopt, a petition for change of first name
may only prosper upon proof of reasonable and compelling grounds supporting the change
requested. Fitness to adopt is not determinative of the sufficiency of reasons justifying a change of
name. And similarly, a change of first name cannot be justified in view of a finding that the proposed
adopter was found fit to adopt. There is just no way that the two actions can connect and find a common
ground, thus the joinder would be improper.

In contending that adoption and change of name may be similarly sought in one petition, private
respondents rely upon Peyer vs. Martinez and Briz vs. Briz (p. 4, Comment).

We however submit that these citations are non sequitur. In both cases, the fact of intimacy and
relatedness of the issues is so pronounced. In Peyer, an application to pronounce the husband an
absentee is obviously intertwined with the action to transfer the management of conjugal assets to the
wife. In Briz, an action for declaration of heirship was deemed a clear condition precedent to an action to
recover the land subject of partition and distribution proceeding. However, the commonality of relationship
which stands out in both cases does not characterize the present action for adoption and change of
name. Thus the rulings in Peyer and Briz find no place in the case at bar.

Besides, it is interesting to note that although a joinder of the two actions was, in Briz, declared feasible,
the Supreme Court did not indorse an automatic joinder and instead remanded the matter for further
proceedings, granting leave to amend the pleadings and implead additional parties-defendants for a
complete determination of the controversy (Briz vs. Briz, 43 Phil. 763, 770). Such cautionary stance all the
more emphasizes that although joinders are generally accepted, they are not allowed where the
conditions are not satisfactorily met.[34]

It furthermore cannot be said that the proposed joinder in this instance will make for a complete
determination of all matters pertaining to the coetaneous grant of adoption and change of name of the
adoptee in one petition. As already stated, the subject petition was grossly insufficient in form and
substance with respect to the prayer for change of name of the adoptee.The policy of avoiding multiplicity
of suits which underscores the rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is addressed to suits that are
intimately related and also present interwoven and dependent issues which can be most expeditiously
and comprehensively settled by having just one judicial proceeding, but not to suits or actions whose
subject matters or corresponding reliefs are unrelated or diverse such that they are best taken up
individually.
In Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, et al. , [35] the Court clarified the rule on permissive joinder of causes of
action:

The rule is clearly permissive. It does not constitute an obligatory rule, as there is no positive provision of
law or any rule of jurisprudence which compels a party to join all his causes of action and bring them at
one and the same time. Under the present rules, the provision is still that the plaintiff may, and not that he
must, unite several causes of action although they may be included in one of the classes specified.This,
therefore, leaves it to the plaintiffs option whether the causes of action shall be joined in the same action,
and no unfavorable inference may be drawn from his failure or refusal to do so. He may always file
another action based on the remaining cause or causes of action within the prescriptive period therefor.
(Italics supplied.)

The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception from the Rules under the policy of
liberal construction thereof in general, and for change of name in particular, as proposed by private
respondents and adopted by respondent judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in
situations wherein there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that
the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at
compliance with the Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the
policy of liberal construction.
The Court is not impervious to the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike would at times
encounter in procedural bureaucracy but imperative justice requires correct observance of indispensable
technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper dispensation. [36] It has long been recognized that
strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for
the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business. [37]
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the
convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive
rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not intended to hamper
litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to provide for a system under which a suitor may be heard in
the correct form and manner and at the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose
authority they acknowledge.[38]
It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly
administration of justice. Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate
arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality. [39] We have been cautioned and reminded in Limpot vs. CA, et
al. that:[40]

Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection of
substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to propose that substantive law
and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has often been suggested, that enforcement of
procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the
litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the
courts is to give both kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the
dispute between the parties. Observance of both substantive rights is equally guaranteed by due process,
whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.

xxx xxx xxx

x x (T)hey are required to be followed except only when for the most persuasive of reasons they may be
relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed. x x x. While it is true that a litigation is not a game of
technicalities, this does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the
prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their just resolution. Justice
eschews anarchy.

Only exceptionally in very extreme circumstances, when a rule deserts its proper office as an aid to
justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy such that rigid application thereof frustrates
rather than promotes substantial justice, will technicalities deserve scant consideration from the court. In
such situations, the courts are empowered, even obligated, to suspend the operation of the rules. [41]
We do not perceive any injustice that can possibly be visited upon private respondents by following
the reglementary procedure for the change in the proper or given name that they seek for their adopted
child. We are hard put to descry the indispensability of a change of the first name of the adoptee to his
welfare and benefit. Nor is the said change of such urgency that would justify an exemption from or a
relaxation of the Rules. It is the State that stands to be prejudiced by a wanton disregard of Rule 103 in
this case, considering its natural interest in the methodical administration of justice and in the efficacious
maintenance of a system of identification of its citizens.
The danger wrought by non-observance, of the Rules is that the violation of or failure to comply with
the procedure prescribed by law prevents the proper determination of the questions raised by the parties
with respect to the merits of the case and makes it necessary to decide, in the first place, such questions
as relate to the form of the action. The rules and procedure laid down for the trial court and the
adjudication of cases are matters of public policy. [42] They are matters of public order and interest which
can in no wise be changed or regulated by agreements between or stipulations by parties to an action for
their singular convenience.[43]
In Garcia vs. Republic,[44] we are reminded of the definiteness in the application of the Rules and the
importance of seeking relief under the appropriate proceeding:

x x x The procedure set by law should be delimited. One should not confuse or misapply one procedure
for another lest we create confusion in the application of the proper remedy.

Respondent judges unmindful disregard of procedural tenets aimed at achieving stability of procedure is
to be deplored. He exceeded his prerogatives by granting the prayer for change of name, his order being
unsupported by both statutory and case law. The novel but unwarranted manner in which he adjudicated
this case may be characterized as a regrettable abdication of the duty to uphold the teachings of remedial
law and jurisprudence.
II. Petitioner avers that it was error for the lower court to grant the petition for change of name
without citing or proving any lawful ground. Indeed, the only justification advanced for the change of name
was the fact of the adoptees baptism under the name Aaron Joseph and by which he has been known
since he came to live with private respondents.[45]
Private respondents, through a rather stilted ratiocination, assert that upon the grant of adoption, the
subject minor adoptee ipso facto assumed a new identification and designation, that is, Aaron Joseph
which was the name given to him during the baptismal rites. Allowing the change of his first name as
prayed for in the petition, so they claim, merely confirms the designation by which he is known and called
in the community in which he lives. This largely echoes the opinion of the lower court that naming the
child Aaron Joseph was symbolic of naming him at birth, and that they, as adoptive parents, have as
much right as the natural parents to freely select the first name of their adopted child. [46]
The lower court was sympathetic to herein private respondents and ruled on this point in this
manner:

As adoptive parents, petitioner like other parents may freely select the first name given to his/her child as
it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is fixed by law. x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other purpose than for identification
purposes in a birth certificate by a woman who had all intentions of giving him away. The naming of the
minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon the grant of their petition for adoption is symbolic of naming
the minor at birth.[47]

We cannot fathom any legal or jurisprudential basis for this attenuated ruling of respondent judge
and must thus set it aside.
It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a persons name is a word or combination of words
by which he is known and identified, and distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at
large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public
interest that every person must have a name. The name of an individual has two parts:

The given or proper name and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is
given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or
family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to
child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the
child is entitled is fixed by law.[48]

By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a persons birth must be entered in the civil register. The official
name of a person is that given him in the civil register. That is his name in the eyes of the law. [49] And once
the name of a person is officially entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the same Code seals that
identity with its precise mandate: no person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority. This statutory restriction is premised on the interest of the State in names borne by individuals
and entities for purposes of identification.[50]
By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed legally is through a petition
for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. [51] For purposes of an application for change of
name under Article 376 of the Civil Code and correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only name that
may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register. As earlier mentioned, a petition
for change of name being a proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance
with all the requisites therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is essential, and failure therein
renders the proceedings a nullity.[52]
It must likewise be stressed once again that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right,
addressed to the sound discretion of the court which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences
of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Before a person can be
authorized to change his name, that is, his true or official name or that which appears in his birth
certificate or is entered in the civil register, he must show proper and reasonable cause or any convincing
reason which may justify such change.[53]
Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being sufficient to warrant a
change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to
adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
[54]

Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was baptized by another
name, under which he has been known and which he used, has been denied inasmuch as the use of
baptismal names is not sanctioned.[55] For, in truth, baptism is not a condition sine qua non to a change of
name.[56] Neither does the fact that the petitioner has been using a different name and has become known
by it constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of name. [57] A name given to a
person in the church records or elsewhere or by which he is known in the community - when at variance
with that entered in the civil register - is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name. [58]
The instant petition does not sufficiently persuade us to depart from such rulings of long accepted
wisdom and applicability. The only grounds offered to justify the change of name prayed for was that the
adopted child had been baptized as Aaron Joseph in keeping with the religious faith of private
respondents and that it was the name by which he had been called and known by his family, relatives and
friends from the time he came to live with private respondents. [59] Apart from suffusing their pleadings with
sanctimonious entreaties for compassion, none of the justified grounds for a change of name has been
alleged or established by private respondents. The legal bases chosen by them to bolster their cause
have long been struck down as unavailing for their present purposes. For, to allow the adoptee herein to
use his baptismal name, instead of his name registered in the civil register, would be to countenance or
permit that which has always been frowned upon.[60]
The earlier quoted posturing of respondent judge, as expressed in his assailed order that

(a)s adoptive parents, petitioners like other parents may freely select the first name given to his/her child
as it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is fixed by law x x x.

The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other purpose than for identification
purposes in a birth certificate by a woman who had all the intentions of giving him away. The naming of
the minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon grant of their petition for adoption is symbolic of naming
the minor at birth.

and supposedly based on the authority of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong,
supra, painfully misapplies the ruling therein enunciated.
The factual backdrop of said case is not at all analogous to that of the case at bar. In the Wong case,
therein petitioner Maximo Wong sought the change of his surname which he acquired by virtue of the
decree of adoption granted in favor of spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong. Upon reaching
the age of majority, he filed a petition in court to change his surname from Wong to Alcala, which was his
surname prior to the adoption. He adduced proof that the use of the surname Wong caused him
embarrassment and isolation from friends and relatives in view of a suggested Chinese ancestry when in
reality he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, thereby hampering his business and social
life, and that his surviving adoptive mother consented to the change of name sought. This Court granted
the petition and regarded the change of the surname as a mere incident in, rather than the object of, the
adoption.
It should be noted that in said case the change of surname, not the given name, and the legal
consequences thereof in view of the adoption were at issue. That it was sought in a petition duly and
precisely filed for that purpose with ample proof of the lawful grounds therefor only serves to reinforce the
imperative necessity of seeking relief under and through the legally prescribed procedures.
Here, the Solicitor General meritoriously explained that:
Respondent Judge failed to distinguish between a situation wherein a child is being named for the first
time by his natural parent, as against one wherein, a child is previously conferred a first name by his
natural parent, and such name is subsequently sought to be disregarded and changed by the adoptive
parents. In the first case, there is no dispute that natural parents have the right to freely select and give
the childs first name for every person, including juridical persons, must have a name (Tolentino, A.,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, 1987 edition, page 721). In the second case,
however, as in the case at bar, private respondents, in their capacities as adopters, cannot claim a right to
name the minor adoptee after such right to name the child had already been exercised by the natural
parent. Adopting parents have not been conferred such right by law, hence, the right asserted by private
respondents herein remains but illusory. Renaming the adoptee cannot be claimed as a right. It is merely
a privilege necessitating judicial consent upon compelling grounds. [61]

The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading up to adoption insofar as it carries out the
beneficent purposes of adoption and ensures to the adopted child the rights and privileges arising
therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted
child,[62] should be understood in its proper context. It should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted to
extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence.
The practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to select the proper or given name of the
child presupposes that no other name for it has theretofore been entered in the civil register. Once such
name is registered, regardless of the reasons for such choice and even if it be solely for the purpose of
identification, the same constitutes the official name. This effectively authenticates the identity of the
person and must remain unaltered save when, for the most compelling reasons shown in an appropriate
proceeding, its change may merit judicial approval.
While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed and protected under
the law, the so-called right of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a
consequence of adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in
law and consequently cannot be favorably considered. To repeat, the change of the surname of the
adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully extend to or include
the proper or given name. Furthermore, factual realities and legal consequences, rather than
sentimentality and symbolisms, are what are of concern to the Court.
Finally, it is understood that this decision does not entirely foreclose and is without prejudice to,
private respondents privilege to legally change the proper or given name of their adopted child, provided
that the same is exercised, this time, via a proper petition for change of name. Of course, the grant
thereof is conditioned on strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements and satisfactory proof of the
compelling reasons advanced therefor.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed order of respondent judge is hereby
MODIFIED. The legally adopted child of private respondents shall henceforth be officially known as Kevin
Earl Munson y Andrade unless a change thereof is hereafter effected in accordance with law. In all other
respects, the order is AFFIRMED.

IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN

CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to
be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented by his
mother ANNA LISA WANG, petitioner, vs. CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented
by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO, respondent.
PETITION DROP MIDDLE NAME On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor,
represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name
and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner
sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
to Julian Lin Wang.
The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB and raffled to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57.
 The RTC established the following facts:

Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and
Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married
on September 22, 1998, ...they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs name was
changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.

The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because they will let
him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore. Since in
Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a persons name, they
anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered
name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother
and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin language
since they do not have the letter R but if there is, they pronounce it as L. It is for these reasons that the
name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang. [1]

RTC DENIED
HELD We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied.
Weighing petitioners reason of convenience for the change of his name against the standards set in
the cases he cites to support his contention would show that his justification is amorphous, to say the
least, and could not warrant favorable action on his petition.
The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are not at all analogous to the
case at bar. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from the cases of Oshita and Alfon, where the
petitioners were already of age when they filed their petitions for change of name. Being of age,
they are considered to have exercised their discretion and judgment, fully knowing the effects of their
decision to change their surnames. It can also be unmistakably observed that the reason for the grant of
the petitions for change of name in these two cases was the presence of reasonable or compelling
grounds therefore. The Court, in Oshita, recognized the tangible animosity most Filipinos had during that
time against the Japanese as a result of World War II, in addition to the fact of therein petitioners election
of Philippine citizenship. In Alfon, the Court granted the petition since the petitioner had been known since
childhood by a name different from her registered name and she had not used her registered name in her
school records and voters registration records; thus, denying the petition would only result to confusion.
Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name filed by a mother in behalf of
her illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites this case to buttress his argument that he does not have to
reach the age of majority to petition for change of name. However, it is manifest in Calderon that the
Court, in granting the petition for change of name, gave paramount consideration to the best interests of
the minor petitioner therein.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society
easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause
confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered
complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for
change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and
discretion when he reaches the age of majority. [26] As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and
appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice
him in his rights under our laws.

RULE 108
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY, Respondent.

FACTS respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth. 5Impleaded as
respondent is the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City. She alleged that she was born on February 8,
1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay 6 Her Certificate of Live
Birth7 shows that her full name is “Anita Sy” when in fact she is allegedly known to her family and
friends as “Norma S. Lugsanay.” She further claimed that her school records, Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine Certificate,8 and passport9 bear the name “Norma S. Lugsanay.”
She also alleged that she is an illegitimate child considering that her parents were never married, so she
had to follow the surname of her mother.10 She also contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not
Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos. 11cralaw virtualaw library

Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the corrections on her name and citizenship which was supposedly
granted.12 However, the National Statistics Office (NSO) records did not bear such changes. Hence, the
petition before the RTC.

RTC concluded that respondent’s petition would neither prejudice the government nor any third party. It
also held that the names “Norma Sy Lugsanay” and “Anita Sy” refer to one and the same person,
especially since the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City has effected the correction. Considering that
respondent has continuously used and has been known since childhood as “Norma Sy Lugsanay” and as
a Filipino citizen, the RTC granted the petition to avoid confusion. 16cralaw virtualaw library

CA AFFIRMED
OSG the present petition on the sole ground that the petition is dismissible for failure to implead
indispensable parties.

Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court
library
HELD

In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly those
pertaining to her first name, surname and citizenship. She sought the correction allegedly to
reflect the name which she has been known for since childhood, including her legal documents
such as passport and school and professional records. She likewise relied on the birth
certificates of her full blood siblings who bear the surname “Lugsanay” instead of “Sy” and
citizenship of “Filipino” instead of “Chinese.” The changes, however, are obviously not mere
clerical as they touch on respondent’s filiation and citizenship. In changing her surname from
“Sy” (which is the surname of her father) to “Lugsanay” (which is the surname of her mother),
she, in effect, changes her status from legitimate to illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship
from Chinese to Filipino, the same affects her rights and obligations in this country. Clearly, the
changes are substantial.

It has been settled in a number of cases starting with Republic v. Valencia20 that even substantial errors in
a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error
avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. 21 The pronouncement of the Court in that case
is illuminating:
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably
substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in
nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long
as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a
civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error
avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. x x x

What is meant by “appropriate adversary proceeding?” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “adversary
proceeding” as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the
party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to
contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding.22cralaw virtualaw library
In sustaining the RTC decision, the CA relied on the Court’s conclusion in Republic v. Kho,23Alba v. Court
of Appeals,24 and Barco v. Court of Appeals,25 that the failure to implead indispensable parties was cured
by the publication of the notice of hearing pursuant to the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
In Republic v. Kho,26 petitioner therein appealed the RTC decision granting the petition for correction of
entries despite respondents’ failure to implead the minor’s mother as an indispensable party. The Court,
however, did not strictly apply the provisions of Rule 108, because it opined that it was highly improbable
that the mother was unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries in her children’s birth certificates
especially since the notices, orders and decision of the trial court were all sent to the residence she
shared with them.27cralaw virtualaw library

In Alba v. Court of Appeals,28 the Court found nothing wrong with the trial court’s decision granting the
petition for correction of entries filed by respondent although the proceedings was not actually known by
petitioner. In that case, petitioner’s mother and guardian was impleaded in the petition for correction of
entries, and notices were sent to her address appearing in the subject birth certificate. However, the
notice was returned unserved, because apparently she no longer lived there. Thus, when she allegedly
learned of the granting of the petition, she sought the annulment of judgment which the Court denied.
Considering that the petition for correction of entries is a proceeding in rem, the Court held that
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner is, therefore, not required and the absence of
personal service was cured by the trial court’s compliance with Rule 108 which requires notice by
publication.29cralaw virtualaw library

In Barco v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court addressed the question of whether the court acquired jurisdiction
over petitioner and all other indispensable parties to the petition for correction of entries despite the failure
to implead them in said case. While recognizing that petitioner was indeed an indispensable party, the
failure to implead her was cured by compliance with Section 4 of Rule 108 which requires notice by
publication. In so ruling, the Court pointed out that the petitioner in a petition for correction cannot be
presumed to be aware of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. It
emphasized that the petitioner therein exerted earnest effort to comply with the provisions of Rule 108.
Thus, the publication of the notice of hearing was considered to have cured the failure to implead
indispensable parties.

In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded as respondent in the
petition below. This, notwithstanding, the RTC granted her petition and allowed the correction sought by
respondent, which decision was affirmed in toto by the CA.

We do not agree with the RTC and the CA.

This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue involved in this case. Aside from Kho,
Alba and Barco, the Court has addressed the same in Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo,31Ceruila v.
Delantar,32 and Labayo-Rowe v. Republic.33cralaw virtualaw library

In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo,34 claiming that his parents were never legally married, respondent
therein filed a petition to change his name from “Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo,” the name
appearing in his birth certificate to “Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng.” The notice setting
the petition for hearing was published and there being no opposition thereto, the trial court issued an
order of general default and eventually granted respondent’s petition deleting the entry on the date and
place of marriage of parties; correcting his surname from “Magpayo” to “Coseteng”; deleting the entry
“Coseteng” for middle name; and deleting the entry “Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr.” in the space for his
father. The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, assailed the RTC decision on the grounds that
the corrections made on respondent’s birth certificate had the effect of changing the civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate and must only be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding. The
Court nullified the RTC decision for respondent’s failure to comply strictly with the procedure laid down in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Aside from the wrong remedy availed of by respondent as he filed a
petition for Change of Name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, assuming that he filed a petition under
Rule 108 which is the appropriate remedy, the petition still failed because of improper venue and failure to
implead the Civil Registrar of Makati City and all affected parties as respondents in the case.

In Ceruila v. Delantar,35 the Ceruilas filed a petition for the cancellation and annulment of the birth
certificate of respondent on the ground that the same was made as an instrument of the crime of
simulation of birth and, therefore, invalid and spurious, and it falsified all material entries therein. The RTC
issued an order setting the case for hearing with a directive that the same be published and that any
person who is interested in the petition may interpose his comment or opposition on or before the
scheduled hearing. Summons was likewise sent to the Civil Register of Manila. After which, the trial court
granted the petition and nullified respondent’s birth certificate. Few months after, respondent filed a
petition for the annulment of judgment claiming that she and her guardian were not notified of the petition
and the trial court’s decision, hence, the latter was issued without jurisdiction and in violation of her right
to due process. The Court annulled the trial court’s decision for failure to comply with the requirements of
Rule 108, especially the non-impleading of respondent herself whose birth certificate was nullified.

In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,36 petitioner filed a petition for the correction of entries in the birth certificates
of her children, specifically to change her name from Beatriz V. Labayu/Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz
Labayo, her civil status from “married” to “single,” and the date and place of marriage from “1953-Bulan”
to “No marriage.” The Court modified the trial court’s decision by nullifying the portion thereof which
directs the change of petitioner’s civil status as well as the filiation of her child, because it was the OSG
only that was made respondent and the proceedings taken was summary in nature which is short of what
is required in cases where substantial alterations are sought.

Respondent’s birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese citizen and a
legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the petition, however, she seeks the correction of
her first name and surname, her status from “legitimate” to “illegitimate” and her citizenship from
“Chinese” to “Filipino.” Thus, respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil
Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the
changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.

The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof
was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. 37 A reading of Sections 4
and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different
potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another given to other persons
who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected
parties.38 Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction
but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the
opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. 39cralaw virtualaw library

While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or
interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by
petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties. 40 Such failure was likewise excused where
the interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; 41 when there is no actual or
presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; 42 or when a party is inadvertently left
out.43cralaw virtualaw library

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in
the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of
Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court is mandated.44 If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or
changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who
may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be
set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching. 45cralaw virtualaw library

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution dated July 27, 20011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN, are SET
ASIDE. Consequently, the June 28, 2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, in
Spl. Proc. No. 230-2004 granting the Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by
respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy, is NULLIFIED.
Resolution
7
G.R.
No.
211724
the
persons
who
have
interest
and
are
affected
by
the
changes
or
corrections
h
41
soug
t.
In
this
case,
the
CA
correctly
found
that
petitioner
failed
to
implead
both
the
Local
Civil
Registrar
and
his
half-siblings.
42
Although
he
claims
that
his
half-siblings
have
acknowledged
and
accepted
him,
the
procedural
rules
nonetheless
mandate
compliance
with
the
requirements
in
the
interest
of
fair
play
and
due
process
and
to
afford
the
person
concerned
the
opportunity
to
protect
his
interest
if
he
so
chooses.
43
Moreover,
although
it
is
true
that
in
certain
instances,
the
Court
has
allowed
the
subsequent
publication
of
a
notice
of
hearing
to
cure
the
petition's
lack/failure
to
implead
and
notify
the
affected
or
interested
parties,
such
as
when:
(a)
earnest
efforts
were
made
by
petitioners
in
bringing
to
court
all
possible
interested
parties;
(b)
the
parties
themselves
initiated
the
corrections
proceedings;
(
c)
there
is
no
actual
or
presumptive
awareness
of
the
existence
of
the
interested
parties;
or,
(
d)
when
a
party
is
inadvertently
left
out,
44
these
exceptions
are,
unfortunately,
unavailing
in
this
case.
In
sum,
the
failure
to
strictly
comply
with
the
above-discussed
requirements
of
Rule
I
08
of
the
Rules
of
Court
for
correction
of
an
entry
in
the
civil
registrar
involving
substantial
and
controversial
alterations renders
the
entire
proceedings
therein
null
and
void.
In
Republic
v.
CA,
45
the
Court
held
that
the
proceedings
of
the
trial
court
were
null
and
void
for
lack
of
jurisdiction
as
the
petitioners
therein
failed
to
implead
the
civil
registrar,
an
indispensable
party,
in
the
petition
for
correction
of
entry,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.

FACTS CERT OF MARRIAGE Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a
Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of
five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a
Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of
Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged
husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the
marriage certificate is not hers.4 She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage
Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. 5 Respondent impleaded the Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.

During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared before
Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly
celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She
completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named
witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels
Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel
agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. 6 Respondent
also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed
that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife
who appeared was definitely not respondent.7 Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature
appearing in the marriage contract was forged.8

On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the petitioner, Merlinda L.
Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of
the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune.

SO ORDERED.9

Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of respondent, the court
found basis in granting the latter’s prayer to straighten her record and rectify the terrible mistake. 10

Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there
was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall
within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries
in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio. 11

In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration couched in this
wise:

WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Republic of the
Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor General, the petitioner’s counsel, and
all concerned government agencies.

SO ORDERED.12

I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE ARE ERRORS IN
THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.

II.

GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION OF THE ALLEGED
MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO. 14

HELD

We deny the petition.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry, to wit:

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of
a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of
Republic v. Valencia19 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the
parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." 20 An
appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all
relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed
and considered.21

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the
remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always
summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires
publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which
would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in
interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the
proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate
adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register. 22

In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal
circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not
the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such
marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be
recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she was
married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the
marriage certificate.

In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil Registrar of
Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is likewise undisputed
that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor
General was likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to
participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the
stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a document examiner,
testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence
presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was
different from respondent’s signature appearing in some of her government issued identification
cards.23 The court thus made a categorical conclusion that respondent’s signature in the marriage
certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her
petition, no such marriage was celebrated.

Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay,
Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General
of the National Statistics Office24 that:

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an
action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive
and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related
laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A
direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention
of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court
where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his
marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of
marriage.1âwphi1 Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered
into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence
clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery.
While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot
nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to
contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties
had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as
there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as
set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage
by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there
was no marriage to speak of.

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, G.R. No. 186571

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
*
ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The August 11, 2010
SOLICITOR GENERAL,
Respondents. -- -
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
FACTS PEitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000.[3] On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.[4] Due to work and other professional commitments,
Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to
surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt
and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The
divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.[5]

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to
love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office ( NSO)
informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be
enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court,
pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.[6]

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file
any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but
was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as
a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that
Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree
as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy,
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, [8] in order for him or her to be able to
remarry under Philippine law.[9] Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido
III;[10] the provision was enacted to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. [11]

THE PETITION

From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that
filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He
claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the
petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient
legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he
marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file
with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,[14] both support Gerberts position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a
foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right under the

second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of
the Filipino spouse

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void [15] and voidable[16] marriages. In
both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage
exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of
the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.[17] Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens.[18]
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,
[19]
enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording,
as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the
law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[20] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In both cases, the Court
refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree
between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already
severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered
still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x
cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
[22]

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.[23] The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying
his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to
have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.[24] Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the
foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related
issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; [25] Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the
policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The
inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this
rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and
his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to
the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien
spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien
spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally
governed by his national law.[26]

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence

of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to
petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient
basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to
petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after
its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or

final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the
judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the

judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the

judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
 In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party
with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law. [27]

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule,
no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another
country.[28] This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on
the alien himself or herself.[29] The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the
purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.

In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority,
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1)
official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the
copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as
the required certificates proving its authenticity, [30] but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce.[31] Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of
supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that
will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the
same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners
presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity
with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the
effect of res judicata[32] between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. [33]

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of
foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as
the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its
terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the
substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the

foreign divorce decree
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has
already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the
mere presentation of the decree.[34] We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need
to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register. The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial
decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those
affecting all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.[35]

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons legal
capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status
specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil status
of persons, in which shall be entered:

(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.

xxxx
 Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their
offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries
concerning the civil status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages
solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization

register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission
of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read
in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res
judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign
divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of
law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the
strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition,
as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, [36] and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of
1982[37] both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment,
dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of
the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite
judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A
petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules
of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by
specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be
judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition
must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; [38] that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; [39] and
that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. [40] As these
basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition
Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two
separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for
recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding [41] by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional
infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30,
2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance
with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

MINORU FUJIKI, Petitioner, -versus- MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR
GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,

FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with
each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara
brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped
Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled:
“Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).”

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC: dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment ·(or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to
file the petition.

ISSUES & RULING:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy.” While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article
35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki
can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections
24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.

Yes. “[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact.”Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning
the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition
for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of
the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation
or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Yes. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign
judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided
under foreign law.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on
how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the “family rights and duties, or on the
status, condition and legal capacity” of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex
nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent
with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an
extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment
as part of the comity of nations.