People v.

Vera
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937
Laurel, J.

Doctrine: The Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning
power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if the
Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it
beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and imprisonment.

As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or
definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the
discretionary powers delegated to it.

Facts:

The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng on November 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act
No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng states in his
petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal
record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge
Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which
recommended denial of the same June 18, 1937. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila,
seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.

On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to
the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on April 5,
1937, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section
2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the
Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform
throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the
power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective
provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on
the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the
opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the
constitutionality of Act No. 4221.

Issue:
1) Whether Act No. 442 encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive

2) Whether Act No. 442 (Probation Law) is unconstitutional on the ground that it constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power

Held:

1) Section 21 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, in
force at the time of the approval of Act No. 4221, otherwise known as the Probation Act, vests in
the Governor-General of the Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and
remit fines and forfeitures". This power is now vested in the President of the Philippines. (Art. VII,
sec. 11, subsec. 6.)

Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same.
In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and completely
exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts. Under the Probation Act,
the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation. Section 4 of the
Act provides that the probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer finally discharged from
supervision only after the period of probation shall have been terminated and the probation officer shall
have submitted a report, and the court shall have found that the probationer has complied with the
conditions of probation. The probationer, then, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody —
subject to the control of the probation officer and of the court; and, he may be rearrested upon the non-
fulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve the
sentence originally imposed upon him.

We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The
pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and complete
as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus
place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and imprisonment.

2) Yes. The power to make laws — the legislative power — is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the
Jones Law and in a unicamiral National Assembly by the Constitution. The Philippine Legislature or the
National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other
body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle
that potestas delegata non delegare potest. The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative
power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial
practice permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. On quite
the same principle, Congress is powered to delegate legislative power to such agencies in the territories
of the United States as it may select. Courts have also sustained the delegation of legislative power to the
people at large. Doubtless, also, legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14,
paragraph 2, of article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that “The National Assembly may
by law authorize the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within
specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues.” And section 16 of
the same article of the Constitution provides that “In times of war or other national emergency, the
National Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribed, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national
policy.”

The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions hereinabove mentioned. The
challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:

This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for
the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said
probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the
Probation Office. (Emphasis ours.)

In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual
to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.
The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may be left
to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and
administrative boards.
 As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any
rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the
discretionary powers delegated to it. In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in
the exercise of their discretionary power to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in their
respective provinces? What standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none has been
pointed to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and
impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power.
What is granted is a“roving commission” which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary
discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the
benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various
provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to
determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The
applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards.
If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to
decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.