JMM Promotions and Management, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals concluded that the said issuance constituted a valid exercise of
FACTS:
The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines
(FETMOP for brevity) filed a class suit on January 27, 1995 assailing
that the Department Order No. 3 which establishes various
procedures and requirements for screening performing artists
under a new system of training, testing, certification and
deployment of the former and other related issuance, principally
contending that the said orders, 1.)violated the constitutional right
to travel; 2.) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3.)
deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of
law. FETMOP also averred that the issuance of the Artist Record
Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and in gross violation of
the constitutional right to life liberty and property. FETMOP prayed
for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against the
orders.
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. (JMM for brevity) and Kary
International, Inc. (Kary for brevity) filed a motion for intervention
in the civil case which was granted by the trial court on February 15,
1995. However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an
order denying petitioner's prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction and dismissed the compliant. An appeal was
made to the trial court regarding its decision but it was also
however, dismissed. As a consequences, ARB requirement was
issed. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision and
Police power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the the said issuance is a valid exercise of Police
Power.
RULING:
Yes, the ARB requirement and questioned Department Order
related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of
Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of Police Power by the State. The
proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has
always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of
police power by the state particularly when their conduct afffects
either the execution of a legitimate governmental functions, the
preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public
morals. According to the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas (use your property in such a fashion so as to not disturb
others) it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative
action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so
use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the right
of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is
certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation
requirements violates due process clause is to ignore the settled
practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry
to the practice of various trades or profession. Professional leaving
for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams
before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. It is not claimed
that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a
property right under the due process clause. So long as
professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory
standards no such deprivation exists.
Bernardo v. NLRC
Facts:
Petitioners numbering 43 are deaf–mutes who were hired on
various periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far East Bank and
Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly
worded agreement called ‘Employment Contract for Handicapped
Workers. Subsequently, they are dismissed.
Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular
employees, because their task as money sorters and counters was
necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. They
further allege that their contracts served merely to preclude the
application of Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular
employees.
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners
were hired only as “special workers and should not in any way be
considered as part of the regular complement of the
Bank.”[12] Rather, they were “special” workers under Article 80 of
the Labor Code.
Issue: WON petitioners have become regular employees.
Held:
The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated
that they shall be trained for a period of one month, after which the
employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to
finish the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, the
employer may terminate the contract at any time for a just and
reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer, the
contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of
56 handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of
them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the
renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring
of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and
necessary to the bank. More important, these facts show that they
were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In
other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit
for the tasks assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that
a qualified disabled employee should be given the same terms and
conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied
person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta provides:
“Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment.—No disabled
person shall be denied access to opportunities for suitable
employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the
same terms and conditions of employment and the same
compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or
allowances as a qualified able bodied person.”
The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons
necessarily removes the employment contracts from the ambit of
Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of
qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280
of the Labor Code, which provides:
“ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of
written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless
of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be
deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, x x x”
“The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular
employment is the reasonable connection between the particular
activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or
business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer. The connection can be determined by considering the
nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the
particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has
been performing the job for at least one year, even if the
performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law
deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as
sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that
activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered
regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such
activity exists.”
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of
56 handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of
them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the
renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring
of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and
necessary to the bank. More important, these facts show that they
were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In
other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit
for the tasks assigned to them.
Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary
and desirable to the business of respondent bank. With the
exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for
more than six months.
Petition granted
Calalang v. Williams
Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940,
resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn
vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending
from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30
a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal
Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940,
recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the
measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions
of Commonwealth Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public
Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate
and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On 2 August
1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to
the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the modification
that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles
be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad
crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street.
On 10 August 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the
Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the
latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of
animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as
indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date of the opening of the
Colgante Bridge to traffic.
The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have
enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus
adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as
a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme court the
petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman
of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of
Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and
Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila;
and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
Issue:
Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of
Public Works infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people.
Held:
The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a
mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice
is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,"
but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through
the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus
populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on
the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers
and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be
equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and
paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort,
and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to
the greatest number."
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of
the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all
groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the
state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of
bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”
Phil. Merchant Marine School, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC., vs. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC. (PMMSI),
was established in Manila in 1950 to train and produce competent
marine officers.
Public respondent Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) has repeatedly disapproved petitioner's requests for renewal
permit/recognition due to the following recurrent violations against
public respondent’s orders:
1). That Petitioner is ordered to cease operating without a renewal
permit/recognition;
2.) That Petitioner is deficient in terms of the minimum
requirements as provided in DECS Order No. III, series of 1987,
which refers to the policies and standards for Maritime Education
Plan.
3.) The Petitioner school has not acquired its own school site and
building. The present school campus is not conducive for training
and is found to be very limited in space so that there is difficulty for
school development and expansion.
4.) That the petitioner is ordered to phase-out its Marine
Engineering and Marine Transportation courses.
Despite these violations, petitioner still continued to enrol students
and still offered courses in Marine Engineering and Marine
Transportation. The DECS informed petitioner that it had received
reports that petitioner enrolled freshmen for its maritime programs
which were ordered phased out.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration regarding the non-compliance
with the DECS’ minimum requirements and subsequently moved for
reconsideration regarding the phasing out of the two Marine
courses stated above. Both motions were denied by the DECS.
Petitioner appealed to the Office of the President. Pending appeal,
the DECS issued a Closure Order. Thereafter, petitioner sought
reconsideration of the Closure Order alleging compliance with the
DECS’ requirements.
The Office of the President dismissed the appeal finding no reason
to disturb the DECS’ action. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
praying that the case be remanded to the DECS for another ocular
inspection and evaluation of its alleged improved facilities.
Petitioner anchored its motion on the proposition that since it had
made substantial improvements on school equipment and facilities
there existed no valid ground to deny them a permit to offer
maritime courses. After another circumspect review of the case, the
Office of the President found no cogent reason to set aside its
previous resolution.
Petitioner assailed both resolutions of the Office of the President
before respondent Court of Appeals by way of certiorari. It alleged
that the resolutions failed to meet the constitutional requirement of
due process because the basis for affirming the DECS phase-out and
closure orders was not sufficiently disclosed.
Respondent CA dismissed the petition and denied the motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was denied due process of law.
RULING:
Set against the records of the case, the assertion of petitioner that it
was deprived of its right to a hearing and any opportunity
whatsoever to correct the alleged deficiencies readily collapses. The
earlier narration of facts clearly demonstrates that before the DECS
issued the phase-out and closure orders, petitioner was duly
notified, warned and given several opportunities to correct its
deficiencies and to comply with pertinent orders and regulations.
We agree with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor General
that —
As long as the parties were given opportunity to be heard before
judgment was rendered, the demands of due process were
sufficiently met (Lindo v. COMELEC, 194 SCRA 25). It should also be
noted that petitioner herein repeatedly sought reconsideration of
the various orders of respondent DECS and its motions were duly
considered by respondent DECS to the extent of allowing and
granting its request for re-inspection of its premises. In connection
therewith, it has been ruled that the opportunity to be heard is the
essence of procedural due process and that any defect is cured by
the filing of a motion for reconsideration (Medenilla v. Civil Service
Commission, 194 SCRA 278)
Petition DENIED.
MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
Facts:
January 29, 1999, concerned residents of Manila Bay filed a
complaint before the RTC Imus, Cavite against several government
agencies for the clean-up, rehabilitation and protection of the
Manila Bay/ The complaint alleged that the water quality of Manila
Bay is no longer within the allowable standards set by law (esp. PD
1152, Philippine environment Code).
DENR testified for the petitioners and reported that the samples
collected from the beaches around Manila Bay is beyond the safe
level for bathing standard of the DENR. MWSS testified also about
MWSS efforts to reduce pollution along the bay. Philippine Ports
Authority presented as evidence its Memorandum Circulars on the
study on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal as its Linis
Dagat project.
RTC ordered petitioners to Clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.
The petitioners appealed arguing that the Environment Code relate
only to the cleaning of the specific pollution incidents and do not
cover cleaning in general. Raising the concerns of lack of funds
appropriated for cleaning, and asserting that the cleaning of the bay
is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.
CA sustained the RTC stressing that RTC did not require the agencies
to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions.
Issue:
(1) Whether PD 1152 relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution
incidents.
(2) Whether the cleaning or rehabilitation of the Manila Bay is not
ministerial act of petitioners that can be compelled by mandamus.
Held:
(1) The cleaning of the Manila bay can be compelled by mandamus.
Petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on
one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other,
are two different concepts. While the implementation of the
MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts
to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by
mandamus.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be
noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and
RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper
waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for,
as earlier stated; discretion presupposes the power or right given by
law to public functionaries to act officially according to their
judgment or conscience.
(2) Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
Include Cleaning in General
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where the quality of
water has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely
affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take
such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such
water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of
the polluter to contain, remove and clean-up water pollution
incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the
government agencies concerned shall undertake containment,
removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said
operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities
responsible for such pollution.
Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies
concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment,
removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident
occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the
absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality “has
deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best
usage.” This section, to stress, commands concerned government
agencies, when appropriate, “to take such measures as may be
necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards.” In fine,
the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not
conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.
Note:
- The writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial
duty. Ministerial duty is one that requires neither official discretion
nor judgment.
Tablarin v. Gutierrez
Facts:
Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and
Evangelina S. Labao sought admission into colleges or schools of
medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they either did
not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education and
administered by the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).
On 5 March 1987, Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for
admission into the Medical Colleges who have not taken up or
successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory
Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and
the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5
(a) and (f) of Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order 52
(series of 1985), dated 23 August 1985 [which established a uniform
admission test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of
a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the
Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987] and from
requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for
securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding
with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from
administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the
future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary
injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The
NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari
with the Supreme Court to set aside the Order of the RTC judge
denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges
contravenes the Constitutional guarantee for the accessibility of
education to all, and whether such regulation is invalid and/or
unconstitutional.
Held:
No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224 and 5946,
known as the “Medical Act of 1959″ defines its basic objectives to
govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education;
(b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the
supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in
the Philippines. The Statute created a Board of Medical Education
and prescribed certain minimum requirements for applicants to
medical schools.
The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987
Constitution which are, in their assertion, violated by the continued
implementation of Section 5(a) and (f) of RA 238, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52 series 1985. One of the provision is Article 14,
Section 1 which states “The State shall protect and promote the
right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and take
appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.
The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make
quality education “accessible to all who might for any number of
reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to
make such education accessible to all who qualify under “fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.”
Also, the legislative and administrative provisions impugned by the
petitioners, to the mind of the Court, is a valid exercise of the Police
Power of the State. The police power is the pervasive and non-
waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and
promote important interest and needs -- in other words, the public
order -- of the general community. An important component of that
public order is health and physical safety and well being of the
population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate
objective of governmental effort and regulation.
The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has
long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the
health and safety of the public. The power to regulate and control
the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission
to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. Legislation
and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice
medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have
long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental
powers. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical
educational requirements for admission to the medical profession,
has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory
authority of the state.
Thus, prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain scores as a
condition for admission to medical schools do not constitute
unconstitutional imposition.
Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.
Miriam College Foundation v. Court of Appeals
Facts
Miriam college has found its school paper (Chi-Rho), and
magazine (Ang Magasing Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho) contents of the
September-October 1994 issue “Obscene,” “vulgar,” “indecent,”
“gross,” “sexually explicit,” “injurious to young readers,” and devoid
of all moral values.” Following the publication of the paper and the
magazine, the members of the editorial board, author, all students
of Miriam College, received a letter signed by Dr. Aleli Sevilla, Chair
of the Miriam College Discipline Committee to inform them that
their are letters of complaint filed against them by members of the
Miriam Community and a concerned Ateneo grade five student that
had been forwarded to the Discipline Committee for inquiry and
investigation and required them submit a written statement in
answer to the charge/s on or before the initial date of hearing, but
none of the students submitted their respective answers. They
instead requested Dr. Sevilla to transfer the case to the Regional
Office of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS),
which they contested, that had jurisdiction over the case. Dr. Sevilla
again required the students to file their written answers. In
response, the lawyer for the students submitted a letter to the
Discipline Committee reiterating his clients’ position that said
Committee had no jurisdiction over them. The Discipline
Committee proceeded with its investigation ex parte. Thereafter,
the Discipline Board, after a review of the Discipline Committee’s
report, imposed disciplinary sanctions upon the students. The
students were suspended, expelled, dismissed, and one was not
allowed to attend her graduation.
The students thus filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with
preliminary injunction/restraining order before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City questioning the jurisdiction of the Discipline
Board of Miriam College over them. The RTC issued an order
denying the plaintiffs’ prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order.
The students thereafter filed a “Supplemental Petition and Motion
for Reconsideration.” The RTC issued an Order granting the writ of
preliminary injunction. Both parties moved for a reconsideration of
the order. On the matter raised by both parties that it is the DECS
which has jurisdiction, the RTC DISMISSED the case and all orders it
issued are recalled and set aside. The CA issued a Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining Miriam College from enforcing letters of
dismissal/suspension, but it eventually declared the RTC Order, as
well as the students’ suspension and dismissal, void.
Issue
1. Whether or not the trail court has the jurisdiction to
entertain the petition for certiorari filed by the students
2. Whether or not Miriam College has the jurisdiction over the
complaints against the students.
Held
1. YES, the grounds invoked by the students in their refusal to
answer the charges against them were limited to the
question of jurisdiction – a question purely legal in nature
and well within the competence and the jurisdiction of the
trial court, not the DECS Regional Office. This is an
exception to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
As the Court held in Phil. Global Communications, Inc. vs. Relova :
Absent such clarity as to the scope and coverage of its franchise, a
legal question arises which is more appropriate for the judiciary
than for an administrative agency to resolve. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction calls for application when there is such
competence to act on the part of an administrative body.
A court having jurisdiction of a case has not only the right and the
power or authority, but also the duty, to exercise that jurisdiction
and to render a decision in a case properly submitted to it.
2. YES, Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act should be read
in a manner as not to infringe upon the school's right to
 discipline its students. At the same time, however, we
should not construe said provision as to unduly restrict the
right of the students to free speech. Consistent with
jurisprudence, we read Section 7 of the Campus Journalism
Act to mean that the school cannot suspend or expel a
student solely on the basis of the articles he or she has
written,except when such articles materially disrupt class
work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others.
The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to
suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of
rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly
educational environment conducive to learning. That power, like
the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic
freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the
Constitution.
SC rule that Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the
cases filed against students.
SSS Employees v. Court of Appeals
Facts:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9,
1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and
baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking
employees from reporting for work and SSS members from
transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to
the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the
strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to
work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike.
The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to
work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay
damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act
on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the
provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay,
night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or
contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into
regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the
same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular
employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of
P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the
salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of
discrimination and unfair labor practices.
Issue:
Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have
the right to strike.
Held:
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human
Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes
helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading
of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted
the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of
government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to
limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only,
without including the right to strike.

Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service

embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also
Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are
denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one
such government-controlled corporation with an original charter,
having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of
the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295,
November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service
Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case,
the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.