ECOND DIVISION Because the RTC denied the Lee-Keh childrens motion for reconsideration, they filed a special
the Lee-Keh childrens motion for reconsideration, they filed a special civil action of certiorari before
IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION G.R. No. 177861
AND CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE
RECORD OF BIRTH,
EMMA K. LEE, Present:
Petitioner,
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
PEREZ,** and
MENDOZA, JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS, RITA K. LEE,
LEONCIO K. LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-ONG,
JULIAN K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE,
ROSA LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY
LEE-CHIN, HENRY K. LEE, NATIVIDAD
LEE-MIGUEL, VICTORIANO K. LEE,
and THOMAS K. LEE, represented by Promulgated:
RITA K. LEE, as Attorney-in-Fact,
Respondents. July 13, 2010
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the grounds for quashing a subpoena ad testificandum and a parents right not to testify in a case against
his children.
The Facts and the Case
Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China. They had 11 children,
namely, Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Rosa Lee-Vanderlek, Melody Lee-Chin, Henry K. Lee, Natividad
Lee-Miguel, Victoriano K. Lee, and Thomas K. Lee (collectively, the Lee-Keh children).
In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as housemaid. The respondent
Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another property of Lee nearby, and had a relation with him.
Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tius children with Lee (collectively, the Lees other children)
claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to investigate the matter. After conducting such an investigation, the NBI concluded in its report:
[I]t is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much
younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK
SHENG is in a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with his grand design of
making his 8 children as their own legitimate children, consequently elevating the status of his second
family and secure their future. The doctor lamented that this complaint would not have been necessary had
not the father and his second family kept on insisting that the 8 children are the legitimate children of KEH
SHIOK CHENG.[1]
The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the eldest of the Lees other children, Marcelo Lee (who was
recorded as the 12th child of Lee and Keh), was born of a 17-year-old mother, when Keh was already 38 years old at the time. Another of
the Lees other children, Mariano Lee, was born of a 23-year-old mother, when Keh was then already 40 years old, and so forth. In other
words, by the hospital records of the Lees other children, Kehs declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly gave
birth to such other children, numbering eight.
On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two separate petitions, one of them before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City[2]in Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from the certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma
Lee, one of Lees other children, the name Keh and replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate her true mothers name.
In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to
compel Tiu, Emma Lees presumed mother, to testify in the case. The RTC granted the motion but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena,
claiming that it was oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lees
stepmother.[3] On August 5, 2005 the RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and oppressive considering that Tiu was
already very old and that the obvious object of the subpoena was to badger her into admitting that she was Emma Lees mother.
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 92555. On December 29, 2006 the CA rendered a decision,[4] setting aside the RTCs August 5, 2005
Order. The CA ruled that only a subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena ad testificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive or
unreasonable under Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA also held that Tius advanced age alone does not render her
incapable of testifying. The party seeking to quash the subpoena for that reason must prove that she would be unable to withstand the
rigors of trial, something that petitioner Emma Lee failed to do.
Since the CA denied Emma Lees motion for reconsideration by resolution of May 8, 2007,[5] she filed the present petition
with this Court.
The Question Presented
The only question presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court may compel Tiu to testify
in the correction of entry case that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to
show that she is not Kehs daughter.
The Ruling of the Court
Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC correctly quashed the subpoena ad testificandum it issued against Tiu on the
ground that it was unreasonable and oppressive, given the likelihood that the latter would be badgered on oral examination concerning the
Lee-Keh childrens theory that she had illicit relation with Lee and gave birth to the other Lee children.
But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds citedunreasonable and oppressiveare proper for subpoena ad duces tecum or for
the production of documents and things in the possession of the witness, a command that has a tendency to infringe on the right against
invasion of privacy. Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus provides:
SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena. The court may quash a subpoena duces tecum upon motion
promptly made and, in any event, at or before the time specified therein if it is unreasonable and
oppressive, or the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear, or if the person in whose
behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of the production thereof.
Notably, the Court previously decided in the related case of Lee v. Court of Appeals[6] that the Lee-Keh children have the right
to file the action for correction of entries in the certificates of birth of Lees other children, Emma Lee included. The Court recognized that
the ultimate object of the suit was to establish the fact that Lees other children were not children of Keh. Thus:
It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed
by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners' records of birth were intended to
establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have
conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners'
contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer
therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that
the former are not the latter's children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all
between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.[7] (Underscoring supplied)
Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh childrens action, obviously, they would want Tiu to testify or admit that
she is the mother of Lees other children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had died and so could not give testimony that Lees other
children were not hers. The Lee-Keh children have, therefore, a legitimate reason for seeking Tius testimony and, normally, the RTC cannot
deprive them of their right to compel the attendance of such a material witness.
But petitioner Emma Lee raises two other objections to requiring Tiu to come to court and testify: a) considering her advance
age, testifying in court would subject her to harsh physical and emotional stresses; and b) it would violate her parental right not to be
compelled to testify against her stepdaughter.
1. Regarding the physical and emotional punishment that would be inflicted on Tiu if she were compelled at her age and
condition to come to court to testify, petitioner Emma Lee must establish this claim to the satisfaction of the trial court. About five years
have passed from the time the Lee-Keh children sought the issuance of a subpoena for Tiu to appear before the trial court. The RTC would
have to update itself and determine if Tius current physical condition makes her fit to undergo the ordeal of coming to court and being
questioned. If she is fit, she must obey the subpoena issued to her.
Tiu has no need to worry that the oral examination might subject her to badgering by adverse counsel. The trial courts duty is
to protect every witness against oppressive behavior of an examiner and this is especially true where the witness is of advanced age. [8]
2. Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her stepdaughter, petitioner Emma Lee, invoking Section
25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, which reads:
SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to testify against his
parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.
The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But
those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or
administrative, filed against parents and other direct ascendants or descendants.
 But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot
apply to them because the rule applies only to direct ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A
stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus provides:

Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with
those who descend from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.

Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
92555.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132081. November 26, 2002]
JOEL M. SANVICENTE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner was charged with homicide for the killing of one Dennis Wong y Chua. On June 11, 1995, at around 5:30 p.m., petitioner
fatally shot the victim outside the Far East Bank along Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City after the latter allegedly attempted to
rob him of a large amount of cash which he had just withdrawn from the automatic teller machine. [1]
Responding policemen found the lifeless body of the victim at the parking space in front of the Far East Bank and Trust Company
Branch along Katipunan Road, Loyola Heights, Quezon City. Recovered at the scene were five empty caliber .45 shells, two live caliber .45
bullets and an ATM card in the name of Violeta Sanvicente.[2]
On June 13, 1995, police authorities located petitioners car in Barrio Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija and took custody thereof.
Petitioners counsel, Atty. Leonardo A. Valmonte, turned over to Police Station 9 petitioners .45 caliber Mark IV pistol bearing Serial
No. 5504095. He also wrote a letter addressed to P/Major Antonio Diaz, Station Commander of PNP Station 9, CPDC, Anonas Road, Quezon
City which reads as follows:
This is in connection with the alleged death of one Dennis Wong that occurred in Katipunan Ave., Q.C., in the afternoon of June 11, 1995.
According to my client, Joel Sanvicente, on said date, place and hour above he just withdrew from the Far East Bank and Trust Co.,
Katipunan branch a large amount of cash. On his way out of the bank, said victim immediately attacked him to grab the money he has just
withdrew (sic). My said client pulled out his gun (duly licensed with Permit to Carry) and fired a warning shot upwards. Still the deceased
continued his attack and grabbed his gun. After a brief struggle, my client was forced to shoot the deceased in the defense of his person and
money. My client will submit a formal statement during the proper preliminary investigation, if needed.
On June 13, 1995, my clients car (Mercedes Benz with plate no. TFU 736) was taken by your operatives led by Capt. Alejandro Casanova and
[is] now in your custody.
In view of the untoward incident, my client suffered serious anxiety and depression and was advised to undergo medical treatment and
confinement at the Delos Santos Hospital in Rodriguez Ave., Q. C. My client would have no objection if you assigned police escort/guard
under your supervision pending his confinement.
For all intense (sic) & purposes, this letter shall serve as a voluntary surrender, without admission of guilt on the part of my client. [3]
At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.[4]
During the trial, the prosecution presented Ballistics Report No. B-046-95, stating that slugs recovered from the crime scene, on
the one hand, and cartridge cases fired from petitioners caliber .45 Mark IV pistol, on the other hand, were fired from the same
firearm.[5] The Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy on the deceased failed to appear at the trial. In order to dispense with her
testimony, petitioner admitted the due execution and genuineness of the medico-legal report. After trial, the prosecution filed its Formal
Offer of Exhibits,[6] which included the above-quoted letter of petitioners counsel to P/Maj. Antonio Diaz, marked as Exhibit LL. The trial
court admitted all the prosecutions exhibits in its Order dated August 27, 1996. [7]
Meanwhile, petitioner begged leave to file a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the trial court. [8] Hence, on August 29,
1996, petitioner filed a Motion To Dismiss (On Demurrer to Evidence),[9] based on the following grounds: (1) the lack of positive
identification of the accused is a fatal omission warranting dismissal; (2) prosecutions evidence are totally hearsay/incompetent, hence,
inadmissible and the guilt of the accused was not proven by positive evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
On October 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the case together with the civil aspect thereof for insufficiency of
evidence.[10]
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration,[11] which was denied on the ground, among others, that with the dismissal of
the case double jeopardy had set in.[12]
The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43697. In a Decision dated July
25, 1997,[13] the appellate court nullified the October 7, 1996 Order of the trial court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration[14] was likewise
denied in a Resolution dated January 2, 1998.[15]
Hence, the instant petition.
In reversing the trial courts Order dismissing the criminal case against petitioner, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in preventing the prosecution from establishing the due execution and authenticity of Exhibit LL which,
it claimed, positively identified petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime charged.[16]
Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the trial court may dismiss the action on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. In resolving accuseds
demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment
or support a verdict of guilt.[17]
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling on the matter shall not
be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. [18] Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an
acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. [19] This constitutes an
exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea
of double jeopardy.[20] The finality-of-acquittal rule was stressed thus in People v. Velasco:[21]
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into the humanity of the laws and in jealous
watchfulness over the rights of the citizens, when brought in unequal contest with the State xxx. [22] Thus Green expressed the concern that
(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense thereby subjecting
him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty. [23]
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct
consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is part of the
paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction. [24] The interest in the
finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for repose, a desire to know the
exact extent of ones liability.[25] With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent,
even those whose innocence rests upon a jurys leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding. [26]
Given the far-reaching scope of an accuseds right against double jeopardy, even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of
evidence will not lie.[27] The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case,[28] or where the
trial was a sham.[29] However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary
proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power
to dispense justice.[30]
In the instant case, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence after the prosecution adduced its evidence and rested its case. The trial
court subsequently dismissed the case after finding that the evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to support the charge
against petitioner. The prosecution, which relied primarily on Exhibit LL as the basis for the indictment against petitioner, however,
contested the dismissal of the case allegedly because the trial court prevented it from further identifying the genuineness and due
execution of said document in the manner that it wanted.[31]
The crux of the problem lies in the confusion between the due execution of a piece of documentary evidence vis--vis the truth of
its contents. Likewise at the core of the dilemma is the fundamental distinction between an admission and a confession. The prosecution
maintains that the letter, Exhibit LL, constituted a confession and argues thus: What better evidence is there to positively identify the
perpetrator of the crime than the confession of the petitioner himself, freely and voluntarily given, assisted by counsel? [32]According to the
prosecution, this extrajudicial confession constitutes the strongest evidence of guilt.[33]
An admission is defined under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court as the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact. A confession, on the other hand, under Rule 130, Section 33 is the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged or any offense necessarily included therein.
More particularly, a confession is a declaration made at any time by a person, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement
stating or acknowledging that he had committed or participated in the commission of a crime. The term admission, on the other hand, is
usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of the guilt of the
accused or of criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged.[34]
In short, in a confession, an accused acknowledges his guilt; while there is no such acknowledgment of guilt in an
admission.[35] Only recently in People v. Licayan,[36] the Court distinguished confession and admission in this wise:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a
statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove
his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance
which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. (Emphasis ours) [37]
There is no question that the letter dated June 14, 1995 is an admission, not a confession, because of the unmistakable
qualification in its last paragraph that
For all intense (sic) & purposes, this letter shall serve as a voluntary surrender, without admission of guilt on the part of my client. .
. (Emphasis and italics supplied).
With the foregoing distinctions in mind, the trial court correctly rejected the prosecutions motion to have Exhibit
LL further identified in the manner that it wanted,[38] i.e., through the proposed testimony of petitioners counsel, Atty. Valmonte, who
incidentally refused to testify. Aside from covering a subject which squarely falls within the scope of privileged communication, it would,
more importantly, be tantamount to converting the admission into a confession.
It can not be denied that the contents of Exhibit LL, particularly with regard to the details of the shooting communicated by
petitioner to Atty. Valmonte, is privileged because it is connected with the business for which petitioner retained the services of the
[39]
latter. More specifically, said communication was relayed by petitioner to Atty. Valmonte in order to seek his professional advice or
assistance in relation to the subject matter of the employment, or to explain something in connection with it, so as to enable him to better
advice his client or manage the litigation.[40]
Pertinent to this is Section 24 (b) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in
the following cases:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice
given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment nor can an attorneys secretary, stenographer, or clerk be
examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such
capacity; x x x.
It is worthy to note that the prosecution did not summon petitioner himself to testify although he too was a signatory of Exhibit
LL. Apparently, it was aware that petitioner could well invoke his right against self-incrimination and refuse to answer its questions. The
prosecution then attempted to draw out what it could not constitutionally extract from his lawyer. Yet, and as stated previously, said Exhibit
LL had earlier been admitted in evidence by the trial court in its Order dated August 27, 1996. What was objectionable was the
prosecutions sole reliance on the document without proof of other facts to establish its case against petitioner because of its mistaken
assumption that the same was a confession.
Significantly, the prosecution was neither barred nor prevented by the trial court from establishing the genuineness and due
execution of the document through other means. Rule 132, Section 20of the Rules of Court provides the following means of authenticating
the document:
SEC. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
Thus, the due execution of a document can be proved through the testimony of: (1) the person/s who executed it; (2) the person
before whom its execution was acknowledged; or (3) any person who was present and saw it executed and delivered or who, after its
execution and delivery, saw it and recognized the signatures therein or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument previously
confirmed the execution thereof.[41]
Thus, respondent could have called to the witness stand P/Maj. Antonio Diaz, the addressee of Exhibit LL, to identify the said
document since it was supposedly delivered to him personally. Samples of the signatures appearing on the document which can be readily
obtained or witnesses who are familiar with them could have also been presented.The prosecution did not. Neither did it subpoena
P/Senior Inspector Alejandro M. Casanova, who prepared the detailed Police Report of the incident used as the basis of the inquest
proceedings, nor were any eyewitnesses presented, notwithstanding that there appeared to be at least two eyewitnesses to the incident.
It must be borne in mind that in a criminal trial, it is the prosecution that determines the charges to be filed and how the legal and
factual elements in the case shall be utilized as components of the information. [42] Stated differently, the determination of what evidence to
adduce to bolster a successful prosecution of a criminal offense is the exclusive domain of prosecutorial discretion. Indeed, courts generally
can not interfere with the prosecutors discretion as to control over criminal prosecutions. [43] However, it is the court which ultimately
determines whether such evidence is sufficient to sustain an indictment, thus, the care with which the prosecution must build up its case
against the accused can not be gainsaid because, as has been stated time and again, in any criminal prosecution, the State must rely on the
strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defense. [44]
Viewed vis-a-vis the foregoing lapses detailed above, the prosecutions insistence to have Exhibit LL admitted in the manner it
wanted shows only too clearly a subtle but shrewd scheme to cover up for the foregoing procedural missteps and to cut evidentiary corners
to build its case at the expense of the defense. This cannot be countenanced. An accused should not be prejudiced for the failure of the
prosecution to discharge its burden of overcoming the constitutional presumption of innocence and to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.[45] Indeed, if the prosecution fails to discharge the burden, then it is not only the accuseds right to be freed, it is
even more the courts constitutional duty to acquit him.[46]
If at all, the foregoing acts of the prosecution underscores just how careless and haphazard it had been in building up a case
against the petitioner. For such, it has nothing but itself to blame if the trial court in assaying the proof it adduced found the same
wanting. It will neither be allowed to sweep its procedural miscues under the rug, so to speak, on the pretext that it was denied due process
when the trial court supposedly prevented it from presenting Exhibit LL. To be more precise, the trial court had admitted Exhibit LL in
evidence but rejected the further admission of the document in the manner that it wanted. Verily, the prosecution can not have its cake and
eat it too.
Moreover, we agree with the trial court that the letter marked as Exhibit LL is hearsay inasmuch as its probative force depends in
whole or in part on the competency and credibility of some person other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it.[47] The term
as used in the law of evidence signifies all evidence which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the witness from whom it is
elicited, and which consequently does not depend wholly for its credibility and weight upon the confidence which the court may have in
him. Its value, if any, is measured by the credit to be given to some third persons not sworn as witnesses to that fact and consequently not
subject to cross-examination.[48] In short, it is the evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from
others.[49] Thus, in one case we stated that [w]hen evidence is based on what was supposedly told the witness, the same is without any
evidentiary weight being patently hearsay.[50] In the case at bar, it is noteworthy that the statements in the letter were made by petitioners
counsel, who even began his narration of the events with the phrase: According to my client. [51]
In holding that petitioner was identified as the person who committed the offense, the appellate court relied on the following
circumstances: (1) he admitted responsibility therefor through Exhibit LL, which was signed by him and his counsel; (2) he surrendered even
before the issuance of the warrant of arrest; (3) his gun was also surrendered to the police authorities by his counsel; (4) empty shells
recovered at the scene of the crime matched his gun; and (5) the letter-referral of P/Senior Inspector Alejandro Casanova to Quezon City
Prosecutor indicated that petitioner was under the custody of the policeman on detail supposedly to guard him at the hospital. [52]
With regard to the first circumstance, suffice it to state that, as has lengthily been discussed earlier, Exhibit LL is merely an
admission and not a confession. In fact, petitioner specifically denied criminal intent therein. By and of itself it is insufficient to support a
conviction unless it is considered in connection with other proof to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.
The second and third incidents actually support petitioners innocence because were he indeed guilty of the felony, he would not
likely have surrendered even before the warrant was issued for his arrest. Courts go by the biblical truism that the the wicked flee when no
man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion.[53]
The fourth event merely proves the fact that the empty shells recovered from the crime scene were fired from the surrendered
gun. It, however, does not answer the penultimate question of who actually pulled the trigger of the firearm.
Lastly, the appellate courts reading of the letter-referral,[54] mentioning that petitioner had been placed under the custody of a
policeman, was inaccurate. As explained by Atty. Valmonte in Exhibit LL, the policeman was actually requested for petitioners personal
safety owing to the untoward incident which caused petitioner serious anxiety and depression, and for which he had to undergo treatment
and confinement.[55]
All told, we find no grave abuse on the part of the trial court in dismissing the charges against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 25, 1997 and
the Resolution dated January 2, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 43697 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Acting Chairman), Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on official leave.
G.R. No. 165987 March 31, 2006
JOSHUA S. ALFELOR and MARIA KATRINA S. ALFELOR, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSEFINA M. HALASAN, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to nullify the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74757, as well as the
Resolution2 dated June 28, 2004 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
On January 30, 1998, the children and heirs of the late spouses Telesforo and Cecilia Alfelor filed a Complaint for Partition 3 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. Among the plaintiffs were Teresita Sorongon and her two children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, who
claimed to be the surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor, one of the children of the deceased Alfelor Spouses. The case, docketed as Civil Case No.
26,047-98, was raffled to Branch 17 of said court.
On October 20, 1998, respondent Josefina H. Halasan filed a Motion for Intervention,4 alleging as follows:
1. That she has legal interest in the matter of litigation in the above-entitled case for partition between plaintiffs and
defendants;
2. That she is the surviving spouse and primary compulsory heir of Jose K. Alfelor, one of the children and compulsory heirs of
Telesforo I. Alfelor whose intestate estate is subject to herein special proceedings for partition;
3. That herein intervenor had not received even a single centavo from the share of her late husband Jose K. Alfelor to the
intestate estate of Telesforo K. Alfelor.
WHEREFORE, movant prays that she be allowed to intervene in this case and to submit attached Answer in Intervention. 5
Josefina attached to said motion her Answer in Intervention,6 claiming that she was the surviving spouse of Jose. Thus, the alleged second
marriage to Teresita was void ab initio for having been contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage. Josefina further alleged
that Joshua and Maria Katrina were not her husband’s children. Josefina prayed, among others, for the appointment of a special
administrator to take charge of the estate. Josefina attached to her pleading a copy of the marriage contract 7 which indicated that she and
Jose were married on February 1, 1956.
Since petitioners opposed the motion, the judge set the motion for hearing. Josefina presented the marriage contract as well as the Reply-
in- Intervention8 filed by the heirs of the deceased, where Teresita declared that she knew "of the previous marriage of the late Jose K.
Alfelor with that of the herein intervenor" on February 1, 1956.9However, Josefina did not appear in court.
Teresita testified before the RTC on February 13, 2002.10 She narrated that she and the deceased were married in civil rites at Tagum City,
Davao Province on February 12, 1966, and that they were subsequently married in religious rites at the Assumption Church on April 30,
1966. Among those listed as secondary sponsors were Josefina’s own relatives–Atty. Margarito Halasan, her brother, and Valentino Halasan,
her father.11 While she did not know Josefina personally, she knew that her husband had been previously married to Josefina and that the
two did not live together as husband and wife. She knew that Josefina left Jose in 1959. Jose’s relatives consented to her (Teresita’s)
marriage with Jose because there had been no news of Josefina for almost ten years. In fact, a few months after the marriage, Josefina
disappeared, and Jose even looked for her in Cebu, Bohol, and Manila. Despite his efforts, Jose failed to locate Josefina and her
whereabouts remained unknown.
Teresita further revealed that Jose told her that he did not have his marriage to Josefina annulled because he believed in good faith that he
had the right to remarry, not having seen her for more than seven years. This opinion was shared by Jose’s sister who was a judge. Teresita
also declared that she met Josefina in 2001, and that the latter narrated that she had been married three times, was now happily married to
an Englishman and residing in the United States.
On September 13, 2002, Judge Renato A. Fuentes issued an Order12 denying the motion and dismissed her complaint, ruling that
respondent was not able to prove her claim. The trial court pointed out that the intervenor failed to appear to testify in court to
substantiate her claim. Moreover, no witness was presented to identify the marriage contract as to the existence of an original copy of the
document or any public officer who had custody thereof. According to the court, the determinative factor in this case was the good faith of
Teresita in contracting the second marriage with the late Jose Alfelor, as she had no knowledge that Jose had been previously married.
Thus, the evidence of the intervenor did not satisfy the quantum of proof required to allow the intervention. Citing Sarmiento v. Court of
Appeals,13 the RTC ruled that while Josefina submitted a machine copy of the marriage contract, the lack of its identification and the
accompanying testimony on its execution and ceremonial manifestation or formalities required by law could not be equated to proof of its
validity and legality.
The trial court likewise declared that Teresita and her children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, were the legal and legitimate heirs of the late Jose
K. Alfelor, considering that the latter referred to them as his children in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities, among others. Moreover, the
oppositor did not present evidence to dispute the same. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of intervenor, Josephina (sic) Halasan through counsel, not sufficient to prove a preponderance of
evidence and compliance with the basic rules of evidence to proved (sic) the competent and relevant issues of the complaint-in-
intervention, as legal heir of the deceased Jose K. Alfelor, the complaint (sic) of intervention is ordered dismiss (sic) with cost[s] de oficio.
On the other hand, finding the evidence by Teresita Sorongon Aleflor, oppositor through counsel sufficient to proved (sic) the requirement
of the Rules of Evidence, in accordance with duly supporting and prevailing jurisprudence, oppositor, Teresita Sorongon Alfelor and her
children, Joshua S. Alfelor and Maria Katrina S. Alfelor, are declared legal and legitimate Heirs of the late Jose K. Alfelor, for all purposes, to
entitled (sic) them, in the intestate estate of the latter in accordance to (sic) law, of all properties in his name and/or maybe entitled to any
testate or intestate proceedings of his predecessor-[in]-interest, and to receive such inheritance, they are legally entitled, along with the
other heirs, as the case maybe (sic).13
Josefina filed a Motion for Reconsideration,15 insisting that under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court, an admission need not
be proved. She pointed out that Teresita admitted in her Reply in Intervention dated February 22, 1999 that she (Teresita) knew of Jose’s
previous marriage to her. Teresita also admitted in her testimony that she knew of the previous marriage. 16 Since the existence of the first
marriage was proven in accordance with the basic rules of evidence, pursuant to paragraph 4, Article 80 of the New Civil Code, the second
marriage was void from the beginning. Moreover, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that the
person entitled to claim good faith is the "spouse present" (thus, the deceased Jose and not Teresita). Josefina concluded that if the validity
of the second marriage were to be upheld, and at the same time admit the existence of the second marriage, an absurd situation would
arise: the late Jose Alfelor would then be survived by two legitimate spouses.
The trial court denied the motion in its Order17 dated October 30, 2002.
Aggrieved, Josefina filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, alleging that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring that she failed to prove the fact of her marriage to Jose, in considering the
bigamous marriage valid and declaring the second wife as legal heir of the deceased. Josefina also stressed that Articles 80 and 83 of the
New Civil Code provide for a presumption of law that any subsequent marriage is null and void. She insisted that no evidence was presented
to prove that she had been absent for seven consecutive years before the second marriage.
In their comment, Teresita and her children countered that anyone who claims to be the legal wife must show proof thereof. They pointed
out that Josefina failed to present any of the following to prove the fact of the previous marriage: the testimony of a witness to the
matrimony, the couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedding; the birth and the baptismal
certificates of children during such union, and other subsequent documents mentioning such union. Regarding Teresita’s alleged admission
of the first marriage in her Reply in Intervention dated February 22, 1999, petitioners claim that it was mere hearsay, without probative
value, as she heard of the alleged prior marriage of decedent Jose Alfelor to Josefina only from other persons, not based on her own
personal knowledge. They also pointed out that Josefina did not dispute the fact of having left and abandoned Jose after their alleged
marriage in 1956, and only appeared for the first time in 1988 during the filing of the case for partition of the latter’s share in his parents’
estate. They further pointed out that Josefina does not even use the surname of the deceased Alfelor. Contrary to the allegations of
Josefina, paragraph 2, Article 83 of the Civil Code, now Article 41 of the Family Code, is applicable. Moreover, her inaction all this time
brought to question her claim that she had not been heard of for more than seven years.
In its Decision dated November 5, 2003, the CA reversed the ruling of the trial court. It held that Teresita had already admitted (both
verbally and in writing) that Josefina had been married to the deceased, and under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, a
judicial admission no longer requires proof. Consequently, there was no need to prove and establish the fact that Josefa was married to the
decedent. Citing Santiago v. De los Santos,18the appellate court ruled that an admission made in a pleading cannot be controverted by the
party making such admission, and is conclusive as to such party; and all contrary or inconsistent proofs submitted by the party who made
the admission should be ignored whether objection is interposed by the other party or not. The CA concluded that the trial court thus
gravely abused its discretion in ordering the dismissal of Josefina’s Complaint-in-Intervention. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed orders, having been issued with grave abuse of discretion are hereby ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. Resultantly, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is ordered to admit petitioner’s complaint in intervention and to
forthwith conduct the proper proceeding with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.19
Thus, Joshua and Maria Katrina Alfelor filed the instant petition, assailing the ruling of the appellate court.
Petitioners limit the issue to the determination of whether or not the CA erred in ordering the admission of private respondent’s
intervention in S.P. Civil Case No. 26,047-98. They insist that in setting aside the Orders of the trial court, dated September 13, 2002 and
October 30, 2002, the CA completely disregarded the hearsay rule. They aver that while Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of
Evidence provides that an admission does not require proof, such admission may be contradicted by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake. Moreover, Teresita’s statement in the Reply-in-Intervention dated February 22, 1999, admitting knowledge of the alleged
first marriage, is without probative value for being hearsay.
Private respondent, for her part, reiterates that the matters involved in this case fall under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of
Evidence, and thus qualify as a judicial admission which does not require proof. Consequently, the CA did not commit any palpable error
when it ruled in her favor.
x x x [T]he interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other parties must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct
and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if
persons not parties to the action were allowed to intervene, proceedings would become unnecessarily complicated, expensive and
interminable. And this would be against the policy of the law. The words "an interest in the subject" means a direct interest in the cause of
action as pleaded, one that would put the intervenor in a legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the complaint without the establishment
of which plaintiff could not recover.30
In Uy v. Court of Appeals,31 the Court allowed petitioners (who claimed to be the surviving legal spouse and the legitimate child of the
decedent) to intervene in the intestate proceedings even after the parties had already submitted a compromise agreement involving the
properties of the decedent, upon which the intestate court had issued a writ of execution. In setting aside the compromise agreement, the
Court held that petitioners were indispensable parties and that "in the interest of adjudicating the whole controversy, petitioners’ inclusion
in the action for partition, given the circumstances, not only is preferable but rightly essential in the proper disposition of the case."32

Petitioners counter that while Teresita initially admitted knowledge of Jose’s previous marriage to private respondent in the said Reply-in-
Intervention, Teresita also testified during the hearing, for the purpose, that the matter was merely "told" to her by the latter, and thus
should be considered hearsay. They also point out that private respondent failed to appear and substantiate her Complaint-in-Intervention
before the RTC, and only submitted a machine copy of a purported marriage contract with the deceased Jose Alfelor.
Contrary to petitioners’ argument, the case of Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals 33 is not in point, as the Court therein did not discuss the
propriety of allowing a motion for intervention, but resolved the validity of a marriage. In relying on the merits of the complaint for
partition, the Court ultimately determined the legitimacy of one of the petitioners therein and her entitlement to a share in the subject
properties.

CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74757 is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch
The issue in this case is whether or not the first wife of a decedent, a fact admitted by the other party who claims to be the second wife, 17, Davao City, is ORDERED to admit respondent Josefina Halasan’s Complaint-in-Intervention and forthwith conduct the proper
should be allowed to intervene in an action for partition involving the share of the deceased "husband" in the estate of his parents. proceedings with dispatch.

The petition is dismissed. SO ORDERED.

The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her co-heirs, petitioners herein, admitted the existence of the first marriage in their Reply- ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
in-Intervention filed in the RTC, to wit: Associate Justice

1.1. Plaintiff Teresita S. Alfelor admits knowledge of the previous marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor, with that of the herein intervenor were
married on February 1, 1956;20

Likewise, when called to testify, Teresita admitted several times that she knew that her late husband had been previously married to
another. To the Court’s mind, this admission constitutes a "deliberate, clear and unequivocal" statement; made as it was in the course of
judicial proceedings, such statement qualifies as a judicial admission.21A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as
judicial admissions are a waiver of proof;22production of evidence is dispensed with.23 A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact
from the field of controversy.24 Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such
admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection
is interposed by the party or not.25 The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader.
A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded. 26

On the matter of the propriety of allowing her motion for intervention, the pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court is Section 1,
Rule 19, which provides:

SEC. 1. Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights
may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal interest in the matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of any of
the parties; (3) or an interest against the parties; (4) or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of
property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof.27Intervention is "a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is
permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with
defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a third
person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original party to pending
legal proceedings, by which such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be affected
by such proceedings."28

Considering this admission of Teresita, petitioners’ mother, the Court rules that respondent Josefina Halasan sufficiently established her
right to intervene in the partition case. She has shown that she has legal interest in the matter in litigation. As the Court ruled in Nordic Asia
Ltd. v. Court of Appeals:29
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, Petitioner argues that, in her Offer of Compromise, respondent unequivocally admitted her liability to private complainant-appellant duly
Petitioner, assisted by her counsel.[24]
We quote in full Kalalos Offer of Compromise addressed to petitioner:
- versus -
December 5, 2000
HELEN T. KALALO,
Respondent. Mr. JOSELITO MANALO
GENERAL MANAGER
San Miguel Corporation
x--------------------------------------------------x
Biglang Awa Street
DECISION
Caloocan City
SERENO, J.:
This Rule 45 Petition assails the Decision and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30473. The CA
[1]
Dear Sir:
affirmed the Decision[3] and Order[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, Manila, in Crim. Cases Nos. 04-230278-84, which had in
turn affirmed the Decision[5] of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 11, Manila, in Crim. Case No. 372535-41. The MeTC acquitted
My client, Ms. HELEN T. KALALO of No. 1055-A Dagupan Street, Tondo, Manila, hereby acknowledges the
respondent Helen T. Kalalo (Kalalo) of a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, or the Bouncing Checks Law, but ruled that she was civilly
receipt of the Statement of Account demanding the payment of the sum of ₱816,689.00 representing her
liable to petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) for the amount of ₱71,009 representing the value of unpaid goods.[6]
unpaid accounts.
As culled from the records, it appears that respondent Kalalo had been a dealer of beer products since 1998. She had a credit overdraft
arrangement with petitioner SMC whereby, prior to the delivery of beer products, she would be required to issue two checks to petitioner:
The reason why she was not able to pay her accounts on time is because she had great difficulty in collecting
a blank check and a check to be filled up with an amount corresponding to the gross value of the goods delivered. At the end of the week,
from the following wholesalers:
Kalalo and an agent of SMC would compute the actual amount due to the latter by deducting the value of the returned empty beer bottles
and cases from the gross value of the goods delivered. Once they succeeded in determining the actual amount owed to SMC, that amount
1) MRS. EVELYN R. MONTILLA/MINES & LYN General Merchandise
would be written on the blank check, and respondent would fund her account accordingly. [7]
624 Chacon St., Tondo, Manila
In time, respondents business grew and the number of beer products delivered to her by SMC increased from 200 to 4,000 cases a week.
₱413,444.50 amount of Pilsen, Red Horse and Grande Beers (full goods)
Because of the increased volume of deliveries, it became very difficult for her to follow and keep track of the transactions. Thus, she
₱115,500.00 amount of empties.
requested regular statements of account from petitioner, but it failed to comply. [8]
In 2000, SMCs agent required Kalalo to issue several postdated checks to cope with the probable increase in orders during the busy
2) Mr. DANIEL TOMAS/ MRS. FORTUNE TOMAS
Christmas season, without informing her of the breakdown of the balance. She complied with the request; but after making several cash
Ladies and Rum Gen. Merchandizing (sic)
payments and returning a number of empty beer bottles and cases, she noticed that she still owed petitioner a substantial amount. She
1501 N. Zamora St., Tondo, Manila
then insisted that it provide her with a detailed statement of account, but it failed to do so. In order to protect her rights and to compel
₱150,000.00 amount of full goods, Pilsen and Red Horse beers.
SMC to update her account, she ordered her bank to stop payment on the last seven checks she had issued to petitioner, [9] the details of
which are as follows:[10]
She is respectfully submitting her proposal by way of Compromise Agreement to settle the said
obligation:

Advance payment for the empties: ₱11,500.00

Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Check No. Date Amount Installment of ₱10,000.00 per month for the principal, then later on for the interest due.

0012825 Sept. 16, 2000 ₱ 62,200.00 Considering the economic crisis, she is hoping that her proposal merits your kind consideration
0008250 Sept. 18, 2000 190,000.00 and approval.
0012801 Sept. 25, 2000 190,000.00 Very respectfully
0012802 Sept. 30, 2000 208,162.00 yours,
0012826 Sept. 30, 2000 62,200.00
0012823 Sept. 30, 2000 104,327.00 SGD
0012824 Oct. 14, 2000 104,326.00 Vicente G. Villamil
TOTAL ₱ 921,215.00 Counsel for Helen T.
Kalalo[25]
On 19 October 2000, instead of updating the account of respondent Kalalo, petitioner SMC sent her a demand letter for the value of the Contrary to petitioners contention, the aforequoted letter does not contain an express acknowledgment of liability. At most,
seven dishonored checks.[11] what respondent acknowledged was the receipt of the statement of account, not the existence of her liability to petitioner.
On 5 December 2000, and in the face of constant threats made by the agents of SMC, [12] respondents counsel wrote a letter (the Offer of Furthermore, the fact that respondent made a compromise offer to petitioner SMC cannot be considered as an admission of
Compromise) wherein Kalalo acknowledge[d] the receipt of the statement of account demanding the payment of the sum of ₱816,689.00 liability. In Pentagon Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[26] we examined the reasons why compromise offers must not be considered as
and submitt[ed] a proposal by way of Compromise Agreement to settle the said obligation. [13] evidence against the offeror:
It appears, however, that SMC did not accept the proposal. On 9 March 2001, it filed a Complaint against respondent for First, since the law favors the settlement of controversies out of court, a person is entitled to "buy his or her
violating the Bouncing Checks Law.[14] peace" without danger of being prejudiced in case his or her efforts fail; hence, any communication made
In the meantime, Kalalo kept reiterating her demands that SMC update her account. During trial, and after the prosecution toward that end will be regarded as privileged. Indeed, if every offer to buy peace could be used as evidence
had rested its case, petitioner finally complied. After tallying all cash payments and funded checks and crediting all returned empty bottles against a person who presents it, many settlements would be prevented and unnecessary litigation would
and cases, the Statement of Account showed that the net balance of the amount owed to petitioner was ₱71,009.[15] Respondent thereafter result, since no prudent person would dare offer or entertain a compromise if his or her compromise position
recanted her Offer of Compromise and stated that, at the time she had the letter prepared, she was being threatened by SMC agents with could be exploited as a confession of weakness.
imprisonment, and that she did not know how much she actually owed petitioner. [16]
After trial on the merits, the MeTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: Second, offers for compromise are irrelevant because they are not intended as admissions by the parties
WHEREFORE, these cases are hereby dismissed and the accused is hereby acquitted of all the making them. A true offer of compromise does not, in legal contemplation, involve an admission on the part of
charges against her. However, it appearing that she still owes the private complainant, the accused is hereby a defendant that he or she is legally liable, or on the part of a plaintiff, that his or her claim is groundless or
ordered to pay the amount of ₱71,009.00 to private complainant.[17] even doubtful, since it is made with a view to avoid controversy and save the expense of litigation. It is the
As the right against double jeopardy prevented an appeal of the criminal aspect of the case, SMC appealed only the civil distinguishing mark of an offer of compromise that it is made tentatively, hypothetically, and in contemplation
aspect of the MeTCs Decision to the RTC. Petitioner claimed that it was entitled to the larger amount of ₱921,215.[18] After the parties of mutual concessions. [27] (citations omitted)
submitted their respective Memoranda, the RTC found no reversible error in the MeTCs Decision, dismissed the appeal of petitioner,[19] and
denied the latters Motion for Reconsideration.[20] Petitioner further argues that respondents Offer of Compromise may be received in evidence as an implied admission of
Dissatisfied with the RTCs Decision, SMC filed with the CA a Rule 42 Petition for Review, which was eventually dismissed by guilt.[28] It quotes Rule 130, Section 27 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which states:
the appellate court.[21]Petitioner moved for reconsideration, to no avail.[22] Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any
SMC thereafter filed this Rule 45 Petition before this Court. [23] liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.
The Courts Ruling
We deny the instant Petition and uphold the assailed Decision and Resolution of the appellate court. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be
I compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of
The Offer of Compromise may not be considered as evidence against respondent Kalalo. guilt.
 We do not agree. As correctly pointed out by respondent, the Offer of Compromise dated 5 December 2000 was
made prior to the filing of the criminal complaint against her on 9 March 2001 for a violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. [29] The Offer of
Compromise was clearly not made in the context of a criminal proceeding and, therefore, cannot be considered as an implied admission of
guilt.
Finally, during the testimony of respondent and after her receipt of the Statement of Account from SMC, she recanted the
contents of the Offer of Compromise. She explained that, at the time she had the letter prepared, the final amount owed to petitioner SMC
was yet undetermined; and that she was constantly facing threats of imprisonment from petitioners agents. [30] The trial courts and the CA
gave weight to her justification,[31] and we find no cogent reason to disturb their findings. We rule, therefore, that the Offer of Compromise
may not be considered as evidence against respondent Kalalo, nor can it be the basis of her liability to petitioner in the amount of ₱921,215.
II
SMC failed to prove that Kalalo is indebted to it in the amount of ₱921,215.
SMC claims that it is entitled to collect the amount of ₱921,215 representing the value of unpaid goods from respondent
Kalalo. It argues that the MeTC erred in ruling that respondent was liable to it to the extent of only ₱71,009, because the Statement of
Account does not reflect the transactions covered by the dishonored checks, as it only covers cash transactions. [32]
We find, however, that aside from its bare assertions on appeal, SMC failed to present any evidence to prove that cash
transactions were treated differently from check transactions. Respondent correctly argues that if the check transactions were covered by
other statements of account, petitioner should have presented evidence of those transactions during the proceedings before the lower
court.[33]
In any event, we cannot allow SMC to recover the amount of ₱921,215 from respondent, as it failed to prove the existence of
the purported indebtedness. The records are bereft of any evidence, other than the dishonored checks, establishing the existence of that
obligation. Checks, however, are not issued merely for the payment of a preexisting obligation. They may likewise be issued as a guarantee
for the performance of a future obligation. In this case, it was sufficiently established that the dishonored checks were issued merely to
guarantee the performance of a future obligation; that is, the payment of the net value of the goods after the value of the empty bottles
and beer cases returned to petitioner were deducted from the gross value of the goods delivered to respondent.
As to the amount of ₱71,009, both parties admit that the Statement of Account provided by SMC to respondent showed a
liability of only ₱71,009. Respondent presented in evidence the Statement of Account, which petitioners witness confirmed to have come
from SMCs accounting department.[34]
We therefore rule that SMC failed to present enough evidence to prove Kalalos indebtedness to it in the amount of ₱921,215,
but that respondents obligation to petitioner in the amount of ₱71,009 is unrebutted and supported by sufficient evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no reversible error committed by the appellate court, the instant Petition for
Review is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30473 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION quality. Shrimp Specialists states that it continued to purchase prawn feeds from Fuji, but the stocks were still contaminated with
aflatoxin.[8]

Fuji denies that the feeds were contaminated. Fuji asserts that Shrimp Specialists requested to put on hold the deposit of the checks due to
SHRIMP SPECIALISTS, INC., G.R. No. 168756 insufficient funds. Fuji adds that when the checks were presented for payment, the drawee bank dishonored all the checks due to a stop-
Petitioner, payment order.[9]

- versus - In January 1990, Ervin Lim, Fujis Vice-President and owner, and Edward Lim, Shrimp Specialists Finance Officer, met in Ozamiz City to discuss
the unpaid deliveries. After the meeting, both agreed that Shrimp Specialists would issue another set of checks to cover the ones issued
FUJI-TRIUMPH AGRI-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, earlier. This agreement was reduced into writing and signed by both parties on behalf of their corporations.[10] The agreement reads:
Respondent.
x-------------------------x Received from SSI the ff. checks representing full payment of the previous stopped (sic) payment checks to Fuji
as follows:
FUJI-TRIUMPH AGRI-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION,
Petitioner, Ck # 158002 - P 153,485.40
003 - 153,485.40
G.R. No. 171476 004 - 153,485.40
- versus - 005 - 153,485.40
Present: 006 - 153,485.40

CARPIO, J., Chairperson, To inform in advance in case the above checks cannot be deposited for failure to replace the defective feeds.
CORONA,*
SHRIMP SPECIALISTS, INC. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** Prepared by: Received by:
and EUGENE LIM, BRION, and (signed) Edward Lim (signed) Ervin Lim[11]
Respondents. ABAD, JJ.

Promulgated: Fuji states that it accepted the checks in good faith and believed that the account would finally be paid since Edward Lim assured Ervin Lim
of the payment. However, upon presentment of the replacement checks, these were again dishonored due to another stop-payment order
December 7, 2009 issued by Shrimp Specialists.[12]
x--------------------------------------------------x
Shrimp Specialists argues that despite the written agreement, Fuji deposited these checks without first replacing the defective feeds or at
least informing Shrimp Specialists in advance that it would not replace the defective feeds. Thus, Shrimp Specialists contends that it was
DECISION
constrained to issue another stop-payment order for these checks.[13]
CARPIO, J.:
Fuji claims that despite repeated demands for payment, Shrimp Specialists failed to comply with its obligation to make good the
replacement checks.[14]
The Case

This is a consolidation of two separate petitions. In G.R. No. 168756, Shrimp Specialists, Inc. (Shrimp Specialists) filed a Petition for Review Fuji filed criminal charges against the officers of Shrimp Specialists who signed the checks for violation of the Anti-Bouncing Checks Law. The
on Certiorari[1]assailing the Court of Appeals Decision[2] dated 28 June 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 57420. In the assailed decision, the Court of charges were all dismissed.[15]
Appeals (CA) ordered Shrimps Specialists to pay Fuji-Triumph Agri-Industrial Corporation (Fuji) the following:

1. the sum of P767,427.00 representing the principal amount for the
deliveries made by plaintiff from June to July 1989 inclusive plus six
percent (6%) thereon per annum computed from extrajudicial demand,
February 2, 1990, until the finality of the judgment plus twelve percent
(12%) interest thereon per annum, computed from the finality of this
judgment until the amount is fully paid;
the sum of P30,000.00 as reasonable attorneys fees; and
the cost of this suit.[3]
On 26 October 1990, Fuji filed a civil complaint for sum of money against Shrimp Specialists and Eugene Lim. On 15 April 1997, the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City (trial court), Branch 76, rendered a decision finding Shrimp Specialists and Eugene Lim solidarily liable to
pay P767,427 representing the deliveries made from June to July 1989 plus interests. Fuji was also awarded P30,000 as reasonable
attorneys fees and the cost of the suit.[16]
Shrimp Specialists and Eugene Lim elevated the case to the CA. On 28 June 2005, the CA rendered a decision modifying the trial courts
decision. The CA affirmed the trial courts decision to hold Shrimp Specialists liable to pay Fuji P767,427 for the prawn feeds delivered plus
interests, P30,000 as attorneys fees and cost of suit. However, the CA absolved Eugene Lim from any liability.
Aggrieved by the decision, both Shrimp Specialists and Fuji elevated the case before this Court.

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The CA modified the Regional Trial Courts Decision[4] dated 15 April 1997 by dismissing the case against Eugene Lim, President of Shrimp
Specialists.
In G.R. No. 171476, Fuji filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari [5] assailing the CA Resolution dated 26 January 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No.
57420, denying Fujis Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision dated 28 June 2005.
The Facts
In the Decision dated 15 April 1997, the trial court found Shrimp Specialists liable to pay Fuji P767,427 for the prawn feeds delivered from
June to July 1989. The trial court stated that since Eugene Lim negotiated with Fuji and signed the Distributorship Agreement in his capacity
as President of Shrimp Specialists, Eugene Lim was privy to the agreement and hence, was also liable. [17]
After hearing the testimonies of Alphonsus Faigal, Fujis Internal Auditing Division manager,[18] Salvador P. Sequitin, Fujis liaison
officer,[19] Esteban del Mar, Shrimp Specialists managing director,[20] Jose Marquez, Provincial Fishery Officer of Misamis Occidental and a
member of the International Aquaculture Consultancy (IAC),[21] Joan Maria Antonia Sato, owner of seven prawn ponds,[22] and Edward Lim,
Shrimp Specialists' finance officer,[23] the trial court made the following findings:

1. Shrimp Specialists did not submit a proper complaint to Fuji when it found out that the
Shrimp Specialists and Fuji entered into a Distributorship Agreement, under which Fuji agreed to supply prawn feeds on credit basis to prawn growers allegedly experienced tremendous losses in their prawn harvest due to
Shrimp Specialists. The prawn feeds would be used in prawn farms under Shrimp Specialists technical supervision and management. In the defective feeds.
1987, Shrimp Specialists began purchasing prawn feeds from Fuji and paid for them in the regular course of business. [6]
From 3 June 1989 to 24 July 1989, Fuji delivered prawn feeds, and Shrimp Specialists issued 9 postdated checks as payment. [7] 2. Shrimp Specialists did not find it necessary to seek representation from Fuji to form part of
the group which conducted the inspection.
Shrimp Specialists alleges that it issued a stop-payment order for the checks because it discovered that earlier deliveries were contaminated
with aflatoxin. Shrimp Specialists claims that it verbally informed Fuji about the contamination and Fuji promised to send stocks of better
 3. IACs findings were not reduced into writing as to put in question the veracity of its report.
Jose Marquezs testimony that he was part of the group who conducted the inspection
on the prawn ponds is not a substitute to the absence of a written report by IAC.
4. The alleged inspection was conducted on four prawn ponds only. Prawn ponds are exposed
to the harsh elements of nature. The supply of water, bacterial content, salinity, and
temperature are other factors which may contribute to the high mortality rate of
prawns.
5. The inspection was directed on the prawn ponds and not on the questioned feeds itself.
Hence, IACs findings that the feeds were contaminated with aflatoxin when these feeds
were not subjected to examination is without basis.
6. IACs existence as an entity was not duly proven. Fuji disputed the existence of IAC through a
certification issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission certifying that IAC was
not registered as a corporation or partnership. Further, no representative from IAC was
presented during the hearing to testify on its existence, expertise and authenticity of its
findings.[24]
The trial court ruled that the written agreement signed by Edward Lim and Ervin Lim does not suffice to convince the court that the feeds
delivered by Fuji were defective. The trial court explained that even if the agreement mentions Fuji as having to replace the defective feeds,
this statement is not tantamount to an express admission of the defective quality of the feeds that were delivered. [25]
Citing Article 1249[26] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the trial court held that the obligation of Shrimp Specialists to pay Fuji still subsists
because Edward Lim, Fujis finance officer, issued a stop-payment order, hence, the checks were never cashed.[27]
The trial court held that Eugene Lim is solidarily liable with Shrimp Specialists. The trial court reasoned that Eugene Lim negotiated with Fuji
and signed the Distributorship Agreement in his capacity as president of Shrimp Specialists, hence, he is privy to the agreement.[28]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In resolving the petition, the CA agreed with the trial court that Shrimp Specialists failed to prove with certainty that Fuji delivered defective
feeds. Based on the records, the inspection and discovery of the alleged defect in Fuji's prawn feeds were made as early as March 1989
while the feeds subject of this case were delivered to Shrimp Specialists only from 3 June to 24 July 1989. The CA added that Shrimp
Specialists argument is inconsistent with the delivery receipts where the representative from Shrimp Specialists acknowledged receipt of
the feeds in good order and condition.[29]
The CA stated that the findings of the trial court deserve utmost consideration. The CA held that there was no credible evidence showing
that the feeds were contaminated with aflatoxin. No technical or scientific evidence was shown. In fact, no laboratory tests were
conducted. Only four ponds were inspected and on those occasions, there was no representative from Fuji. [30]
The CA declared that the portion in the agreement, which states to inform in advance in case the same checks cannot be deposited for
failure to replace the defective feeds, is too nebulous to be taken as an admission on the part of Fuji's representative that the feeds earlier
delivered were defective. The CA doubted if Fuji really acknowledged that its earlier feeds were defective because the agreement was just
to acknowledge receipt of the checks. The qualification was not clear as to its true import. To be an admission of any breach of warranty,
the evidence must be clear and convincing.[31]
The CA dismissed the case against Eugene Lim. The CA found that based on a review of the evidentiary records, there was no reason to
pierce the corporate veil. The CA reasoned that the evidence should be more than just signing on behalf of the corporation because these
artificial entities cannot act except through a natural person. The CA added that there is no evidence that Eugene Lim and Shrimp Specialists
are one and the same and they dealt with Fuji in bad faith or that Eugene Lim assumed solidary obligation with Shrimp Specialists for any
liability which might arise under the Distributorship Agreement. [32]
The Issue
In G.R. No. 168576, Shrimp Specialists assigns this error for our consideration: whether the CA erred in interpreting the provision to inform
in advance in case the same checks cannot be deposited for failure to replace the defective feeds.
In G.R. No. 171476, Fuji presents this sole issue: whether the CA erred in dismissing the case against respondent Eugene Lim and freeing
him from solidary liability with Shrimp Specialists.
The Ruling of the Court
An Admission must be expressed
in definite and unequivocal language
Shrimp Specialists maintains that the provision to inform in advance in case the same checks cannot be deposited for failure to replace the
defective feeds clearly shows that Fuji admitted that the feeds delivered were defective, otherwise, there would be no reason to include the
statement in an agreement that merely acknowledged receipt of the checks. [33] On the other hand, Fuji asserts that the statement is too
ambiguous to be considered an admission that Fuji delivered defective feeds to Shrimp Specialists when there is evidence to support the
contrary.[34]
In CMS Logging, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[35] we held:
It is a rule that a statement is not competent as an admission where it does not, under a reasonable
construction, appear to admit or acknowledge the fact which is sought to be proved by it. An admission or
declaration to be competent must have been expressed in definite, certain and unequivocal language.
As correctly ruled by the CA, the statement to inform in advance in case the same checks cannot be deposited for failure to replace the
defective feeds is not expressed in definite, certain and unequivocal language that Fuji admitted to delivering defective feeds. The CA also
ruled that to be an admission of any breach of warranty, the evidence must be clear and convincing. The CA pointed out that the inspection
and discovery of the alleged defective feeds were made as early as March 1989 while the feeds subject of this case were delivered to
Shrimp Specialists only from 3 June to 24 July 1989. Even assuming that Fuji admitted that the feeds delivered were defective, the question
of whether Fuji had replaced the feeds is a factual matter not usually reviewable in a petition filed under Rule 45. [36]
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable by this Court
because they are final and conclusive especially if borne out by the record or based on substantial evidence. [37] In Paterno v. Paterno,[38] the
Court explained:
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or rejected
as feeble or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and
adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact. Whether or not the body of
proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse
party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing; whether or not certain documents presented by one side
should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side;
whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give
said proofs weight all these are issues of fact. Questions like these are not reviewable by this Court, which, as a
rule, confines its review of cases decided by the Court of Appeals only to questions of law raised in the petition
and therein distinctly set forth.
Whether Fuji delivered defective feeds, or whether the statement is tantamount to an admission that the feeds delivered were defective, or
whether Fuji failed to replace defective feeds, are questions of fact which necessitate an examination of the probative value of the evidence
adduced before the trial court.
The written agreement signed by Edward Lim and Ervin Lim did not convince the trial and appellate courts that the feeds supplied by Fuji
were defective because evidence to the contrary exists, to wit:
a. No proper complaint was submitted to Fuji when the prawn growers allegedly experienced tremendous
losses;
b. Fuji was not represented in the group which conducted the inspection;
c. The existence of the IAC was not duly proven and its findings were not reduced into writing;
d. The inspection was conducted on four prawn ponds only, which could be exposed to other harsh elements of nature; and
e. No inspection was conducted on the prawn feeds itself, hence, the IACs findings that the feeds were contaminated with aflatoxin is
without basis.
The CA pointed out that a representative from Shrimp Specialists even acknowledged receipt of feeds in good order and condition, hence,
Shrimp Specialists argument is contrary to the evidence on record.
The factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are generally binding on the Supreme Court. [39] After a careful
review of the records, the Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court.
Solidary Liability
Fuji claims that the CA erred in dismissing the case against Eugene Lim and freeing him from solidary liability with Shrimp Specialists to Fuji
for the amount of the delivered feeds.[40] Fuji alleges that Eugene Lim, as President of Shrimp Specialists, was the one who solicited and
negotiated with Fuji for the purchase of prawn feeds. Fuji contends that it was primarily because of Eugene Lims representation that Fuji
entered into the Distributorship Agreement with Shrimp Specialists and agreed to supply prawn feeds on credit. [41]
Shrimp Specialists asserts that Fuji has not presented any evidence to show that Eugene Lim acted in bad faith. Fuji also failed to present
any evidence to prove that Eugene Lim had maliciously and deliberately caused Shrimp Specialists to default on its obligation without any
valid reason. Hence, Eugene Lim cannot be made personally liable for the obligations of Shrimp Specialists. [42]
A corporation is vested by law with a personality separate and distinct from the people comprising it. Ownership by a single or small group
of stockholders of nearly all of the capital stock of the corporation is not by itself a sufficient ground to disregard the separate corporate
personality. Thus, obligations incurred by corporate officers, acting as corporate agents, are direct accountabilities of the corporation they
represent.[43] In Uy v. Villanueva,[44] the Court explained:
 The general rule is that obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its directors, officers, and
employees, are its sole liabilities. However, solidary liability may be incurred, but only under the following
exceptional circumstances:

1. When directors and trustees or, in appropriate cases, the

officers of a corporation: (a) vote for or assent to patently
unlawful acts of the corporation; (b) act in bad faith or with
gross negligence in directing the corporate affairs; (c) are
guilty of conflict of interest to the prejudice of the
corporation, its stockholders or members, and other
persons;
When a director or officer has consented to the issuance of watered stocks or who, having knowledge thereof, did not forthwith file with
the corporate secretary his written objection thereto;
When a director, trustee or officer has contractually agreed or stipulated to hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the
corporation; or
When a director, trustee or officer is made, by specific provision of law, personally liable for his corporate action. [45]

In this case, none of these exceptional circumstances is present. In its decision, the trial court failed to provide a clear ground why Eugene
Lim was held solidarily liable with Shrimp Specialists. The trial court merely stated that Eugene Lim signed on behalf of the Shrimp
Specialists as President without explaining the need to disregard the separate corporate personality. The CA correctly ruled that the
evidence to hold Eugene Lim solidarily liable should be more than just signing on behalf of the corporation because artificial entities can
only act through natural persons. Thus, the CA was correct in dismissing the case against Eugene Lim.

WHEREFORE, we DENY both petitions. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 June 2005 and the Resolution dated 26
January 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 57420.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He believed that the charge against him was ill-motivated
because he sometimes physically abuses his wife in front of their children after engaging in a heated argument, [29] and beats the children as
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 186228 a disciplinary measure.[30] He went further to narrate how his day was on the date of the alleged rape.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
He alleged that on 15 March 2000, there was no food prepared for him at lunchtime. [31] Shortly after, AAA arrived.[32] She
Present: answered back when confronted.[33] This infuriated him that he kicked her hard on her buttocks. [34]

CARPIO, J., Appellant went back to work and went home again around 3 oclock in the afternoon.[35] Finding nobody at home,[36] he
Chairperson, prepared his dinner and went to sleep.[37]
-versus- BRION,
DEL CASTILLO, Later in the evening, he was awakened by the members of the Bantay Bayan headed by Moises Boy Banting.[38] They asked
ABAD, and him to go with them to discuss some matters.[39] He later learned that he was under detention because AAA charged him of rape. [40]
PEREZ, JJ.
On 8 July 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, rendered its decision[41] in Criminal Case No.
10372-0, finding appellant guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIASTERIO, Promulgated: perpetua.[42] It also ordered him to indemnify AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity with exemplary
Accused-Appellant. damages of P25,000.00.[43]
March 15, 2010
On 30 September 2008, the decision of the trial court was AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS [44] by the Court of Appeals in CA-
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x G.R. CR HC No. 00456-MIN.[45] The appellate court found that appellant is not eligible for parole and it increased both the civil indemnity
and moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.[46]

DECISION On 24 November 2008, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellants notice of appeal. [47] This Court required the
parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs,[48] but both manifested that they will no longer file supplemental
PEREZ, J.: pleadings.[49]

Before Us for final review is the trial courts conviction of the appellant for the rape of his thirteen-year old daughter.
[1]
Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto, the real name and the personal circumstances of the
victim, and any other information tending to establish or compromise her identity, including those of her immediate family or household
members, are not disclosed in this decision.
The lone assignment of error in the appellants brief is that, the trial court gravely erred in finding him guilty as charged
despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt,[50] because: (1) there were inconsistencies in the
testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB;[51] (2) his extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting was without the assistance of a
counsel, in violation of his constitutional right;[52] and (3) AAAs accusation was ill-motivated.[53]

The Facts Our Ruling

[2]
In an Information dated 21 September 2000, the appellant was accused of the crime of QUALIFIED RAPE allegedly
committed as follows:
Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with a bantay bayan and the credibility of the witnesses for the
That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening, at Barangay xxx, municipality of prosecution.
xxx, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being the father of AAA with lewd design, with the use of force and intimidation, did then and there, Admissibility in Evidence of an
willfully, unlawfully and criminally have carnal knowledge with his own daughter AAA, a 13 year[s]old minor Extrajudicial Confession before
against her will.[3] a Bantay Bayan

On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.[4] During the pre-trial conference, the prosecution and the
defense stipulated and admitted: (a) the correctness of the findings indicated in the medical certificate of the physician who examined AAA;
(b) that AAA was only thirteen (13) years old when the alleged offense was committed; and (c) that AAA is the daughter of the
appellant.[5] On trial, three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely: victim AAA; [6] her brother BBB;[7] and one Moises Boy
Banting,[8] a bantay bayan in the barangay. Their testimonies revealed the following:
In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone at home. [9] AAAs father, the appellant, was having a drinking spree at
the neighbors place.[10] Her mother decided to leave because when appellant gets drunk, he has the habit of mauling AAAs mother.[11] Her
only brother BBB also went out in the company of some neighbors. [12]
At around 10:00 oclock in the evening, appellant woke AAA up; [13] removed his pants, slid inside the blanket covering AAA
and removed her pants and underwear;[14] warned her not to shout for help while threatening her with his fist;[15] and told her that he had a
knife placed above her head.[16] He proceeded to mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and inserted his penis inside her vagina. [17]
Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying. [18] Appellant claimed he scolded her for staying out late. [19] BBB decided to
take AAA with him.[20] While on their way to their maternal grandmothers house, AAA recounted her harrowing experience with their
father. Upon reaching their grandmothers house, they told their grandmother and uncle of the incident, [22] after which, they sought the
[21]
assistance of Moises Boy Banting.[23]
Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear. [24] He invited appellant to the police
station,[25] to which appellant obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he raped AAA because he was unable to control
[26]
himself.
The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical examination. [27] Dra. Josefa Arlita L. Alsula, Municipal Health Officer of
x x x, Bukidnon, issued the Medical Certificate, which reads:
Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan, the confession was inadmissible in evidence
because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement. [54]
The case of People v. Malngan[55] is the authority on the scope of the Miranda doctrine provided for under Article III, Section
12(1)[56] and (3)[57] of the Constitution. In Malngan, appellant questioned the admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the
barangay chairman and a neighbor of the private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus:
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed
as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When
accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a
suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses x x x. She was, therefore, already
under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by x x x [the] Constitution should have already been
observed or applied to her. Accused-appellants confession to Barangay Chairman x x x was made in response
to the interrogation made by the latter admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her
rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-
appellant, given to Barangay Chairman x x x, as well as the lighter found x x x in her bag are inadmissible in
evidence against her x x x.
[But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x x [T]he constitutional safeguards during custodial
investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but given
in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits x x x as x x x in the case at bar when accused-
appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors x x x [of the private
complainant].[58] (Emphasis supplied)

hyperemic vulvae with 4 oclock & 6 oclock freshly lacerated hymen; (+) minimal to moderate Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to ascertain whether or not a bantay bayan may be
bloody discharges 2 to an alleged raping incident[28] deemed a law enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.
 In People of the Philippines v. Buendia,[59] this Court had the occasion to mention the nature of a bantay bayan, that is, a
group of male residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary
of the x x x PNP.[60]
Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11 November 1987, as
amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be organized to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and
Order Council at the Barangay level.[61] The composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman;
(2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3)
Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative
well-known in his community.[62]
This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case
of the bantay bayan, are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at
the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and
responsibilities delegated to a bantay bayan, particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the
color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article
III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.
Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the appellant was not deduced solely from the
assailed extrajudicial confession but from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. [63]
The consistent and forthright testimony of AAA detailing how she was raped, culminating with the penetration of appellants
penis into her vagina, suffices to prove that appellant had carnal knowledge of her. When a woman states that she has been raped, she says
in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed.[77] Further, when such testimony corresponds with medical findings, there is
sufficient basis to conclude that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been established. [78]
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the element of force or intimidation is not essential when the accused is the father of
the victim, inasmuch as his superior moral ascendancy or influence substitutes for violence and intimidation. [79] At any rate, AAA was
actually threatened by appellant with his fist and a knife allegedly placed above AAAs head. [80]
It may be added that the self-serving defense of appellant cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward testimony of
AAA. Settled is the rule that, alibi is an inherently weak defense that is viewed with suspicion because it is easy to fabricate. [81] Alibi and
denial must be supported by strong corroborative evidence in order to merit credibility. [82] Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the
accused must establish two elements (1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its commission.[83] Appellant failed in this wise.
Aggravating/Qualifying Circumstances
The presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship with the offender in the instant case has likewise
been adequately established. Both qualifying circumstances were specifically alleged in the Information, stipulated on and admitted during
the pre-trial conference, and testified to by both parties in their respective testimonies. Also, such stipulation and admission, as correctly
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court because they are judicial admissions within the contemplation of Section 4,
Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court. It provides:

Credibility of the Witnesses for the Prosecution

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
Appellant assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB. AAA testified that BBB accompanied her to the house proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing
of their grandmother.Thereafter, they, together with her relatives, proceeded to look for a bantay bayan. On the other hand, BBB testified that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
that he brought her sister to the house of their bantay bayan after he learned of the incident.

Citing Bartocillo v. Court of Appeals,[64] appellant argues that where the testimonies of two key witnesses cannot stand
together, the inevitable conclusion is that one or both must be telling a lie, and their story a mere concoction.[65]
The principle, however, is not applicable in the case at bar. In Bartocillo, the two testimonies could not simply stand together because:
On one hand, if we are to believe Susan, Orlando could not have possibly seen the hacking
incident since he had accompanied Vicente home. On the other hand, if we are to accept the testimony
of Orlando, then Susan could not have possibly witnessed the hacking incident since she was with Vicente at
that time.
Here, the testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both testified that they sought the help of a bantay
bayan. Their respective testimonies differ only as to when the help was sought for, which this Court could well attribute to the nature of the
testimony of BBB, a shortcut version of AAAs testimony that dispensed with a detailed account of the incident.
At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the assailed inconsistency is too trivial to affect the veracity of the
testimonies.[66] In fact, inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or inconsequential circumstances even strengthen the credibility of the
witnesses, as they erase doubts that such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed. [67]
Appellants contention that AAA charged him of rape only because she bore grudges against him is likewise unmeritorious. This Court is not
dissuaded from giving full credence to the testimony of a minor complainant by motives of feuds, resentment or revenge. [68] As correctly
pointed out by the Court of Appeals:
Penalty
Finally, in increasing the amount of civil indemnity and damages each from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, the Court of Appeals
correctly considered controlling jurisprudence to the effect that where, as here, the rape is committed with any of the
qualifying/aggravating circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty, the victim is entitled to P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto[84] and P75,000.00 as moral damages.[85] However, the award of exemplary damages should have been increased
from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.[86] Also, the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death was correctly imposed considering that the
imposition of the death penalty upon appellant would have been appropriate were it not for the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, or An
Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.[87] We further affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals on appellants non-
eligibility for parole. Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 clearly provides that persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or
whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-MIN is
hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant Antonio Lauga is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough to make daughters in a Filipino family invent a
charge that would not only bring shame and humiliation upon them and their families but also bring their
fathers into the gallows of death.[69] The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is unbelievable for a
daughter to charge her own father with rape, exposing herself to the ordeal and embarrassment of a public
trial and subjecting her private parts to examination if such heinous crime was not in fact committed.[70] No
person, much less a woman, could attain such height of cruelty to one who has sired her, and from whom she
owes her very existence, and for which she naturally feels loving and lasting gratefulness. [71] Even when
consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a
story which would put her own father to jail for the most of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family
including herself to a lifetime of shame.[72] It is highly improbable for [AAA] against whom no proof of sexual
perversity or loose morality has been shown to fake charges much more against her own father. In fact her
testimony is entitled to greater weight since her accusing words were directed against a close relative. [73]

Elements of Rape

Having established the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution, We now examine the applicability of the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997[74] to the case at bar.

The law provides, in part, that rape is committed, among others, [b]y a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman
through force, threat or intimidation.[75] The death penalty shall be imposed if it is committed with aggravating/qualifying circumstances,
which include, [w]hen the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent. [76]
 THIRD DIVISION On March 8, 2004, Columna (whose real name was Manuel, Jr.) executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his participation
as look out during the shooting and implicated respondent Romulo Awingan (alias Mumoy) as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also
tagged as masterminds respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, respondent Lloyd Antiporda. [9] The former was the ex-mayor and the
latter the mayor of Buguey, Cagayan at that time. When the killing took place, Licerio Antiporda was in detention for a kidnapping case in
HAROLD V. TAMARGO, G.R. No. 177727 which Atty. Tamargo was acting as private prosecutor.

Petitioner,

Present: Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint against those implicated
by Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.[10]

CORONA, J., Chairperson,

On April 19, 2004, Columna affirmed his affidavit before the investigating prosecutor[11] who subjected him to clarificatory
CARPIO MORALES, questions.[12]

- v e r s u s - VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA and Respondents denied any involvement in the killings. They alleged that Licerio was a candidate for mayor in Buguey, Cagayan
during the May 2004 elections and that the case was instituted by his political opponents in order to derail his candidacy. The Antipordas
admitted that Atty. Tamargo was their political rival for the mayoralty post of Buguey. Atty. Tamargo had been defeated twice by Lloyd and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
once by Licerio. Before the killing, Atty. Tamargo filed an election case against Lloyd and a kidnapping case in the Sandiganbayan against
Licerio. However, they claimed that both cases were dismissed as Lloyd emerged as the winner in the elections and Licerio was acquitted by
the Sandiganbayan.[13]

ROMULO AWINGAN, LLOYD

ANTIPORDA and LICERIO During the preliminary investigation, respondent Licerio presented Columnas unsolicited handwritten letter dated May 3,
2004 to respondent Lloyd, sent from Columnas jail cell in Manila. In the letter, Columna disowned the contents of his March 8, 2004
ANTIPORDA, JR., affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. He stated that those he implicated had no
participation in the killings.[14] Respondent Licerio also submitted an affidavit of Columna dated May 25, 2004 wherein the latter essentially
repeated the statements in his handwritten letter.
Respondents. Promulgated:

January 19, 2010

Due to the submission of Columnas letter and affidavit, the investigating prosecutor set a clarificatory hearing, to enable
Columna to clarify his contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited letter. During the hearing held on October 22, 2004, Columna categorically
admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. He affirmed the May 25, 2004 affidavit and denied that any violence
x---------------------------------------------------x had been employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from him.[15]

DECISION Thus, on November 10, 2004, the investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges. This was approved by
the city prosecutor.
CORONA, J.:

Meanwhile, in another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor Ramon Garcia dated October 29, 2004, Columna said
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of the November 10, 2006 decision[2] and May 18, 2007 resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) that he was only forced to withdraw all his statements against respondents during the October 22, 2004 clarificatory hearing because of the
in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610. threats to his life inside the jail. He requested that he be transferred to another detention center. [16]

Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed at around 5:15 p.m. of August 15, 2003 along
Nueva Street corner Escolta Street, Binondo, Manila. The police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo
Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit dated September 12, 2003. He stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking
spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent Lloyd Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty.
Tamargo. He added that he told the Tamargo family what he knew and that the sketch of the suspect closely resembled Columna. [4]
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the charges, petitioner filed an appeal to the Department of Justice (DOJ). [17] On May 30, 2005,
the DOJ, through then Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, reversed the dismissal and ordered the filing of the Informations for murder.[18] He
opined that the March 8, 2004 extrajudicial confession was not effectively impeached by the subsequent recantation and that there was
enough evidence to prove the probable guilt of respondents. [19] Accordingly, the Informations were filed and the cases were consolidated
and assigned to the RTC of Manila, Branch 29.[20]

After conducting a preliminary investigation and on the strength of Gerons affidavit, the investigating prosecutor[5] issued a resolution dated
December 5, 2003 finding probable cause against Columna and three John Does. [6] On February 2, 2004, the corresponding Informations for
murder were filed against them in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, one assigned to Branch 27 for the death of Atty. Franklin
Tamargo, and the other to Branch 29 for the death of the minor Gail Franzielle. [7] Columna was arrested in the province of Cagayan on
February 17, 2004 and brought to Manila for detention and trial.[8]
However, on August 12, 2005, Secretary Gonzales granted the Antipordas motion for reconsideration (MR) and directed the
withdrawal of the Informations.[21] This time, he declared that the extrajudicial confession of Columna was inadmissible against respondents
and that, even if it was admissible, it was not corroborated by other evidence. [22] As a result, on August 22, 2005, the trial prosecutor filed a
motion to withdraw the Informations. On October 4, 2005, Secretary Gonzalez denied petitioners MR.
 The RTC, through Judge Cielito Mindaro-Grulla, granted the motion to withdraw the Informations in an order dated October
26, 2005.[23] Petitioner filed an MR but the judge voluntarily inhibited herself without resolving the same. The cases were re-raffled to
Branch 19, presided by Judge Zenaida R. Daguna. Judge Daguna granted the MR of petitioner in a resolution dated December 9, 2005. She
ruled that, based on Columnas March 8, 2004 affidavit which he affirmed before the investigating prosecutor, there was probable cause to
hold the accused for trial. She denied the MR of the Antipordas in an order dated February 6, 2006.
Consequently, respondent Awingan filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition in the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 93610. The Antipordas separately filed another certiorari case docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94188.
In a decision dated November 10, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610, the CA ruled that the RTC judge gravely abused her
discretion because she arbitrarily left out of her assessment and evaluation the substantial matters that the DOJ Secretary had fully taken
into account in concluding that there was no probable cause against all the accused. It also held that Columnas extrajudicial confession was
not admissible against the respondents because, aside from the recanted confession, there was no other piece of evidence presented to
establish the existence of the conspiracy. Additionally, the confession was made only after Columna was arrested and not while the
conspirators were engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
After this decision was promulgated, CA-G.R. SP No. 93610 was consolidated with CA-G.R. SP No. 94188. The CA denied
reconsideration in a resolution dated May 18, 2007. In a decision dated August 24, 2007, the CA likewise granted the petition for certiorari
of respondents Antiporda.[24]
Petitioner filed this petition assailing the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610. Later on, he filed an amended petition impleading respondents
Antiporda and likewise assailing the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 94188. The Court treated this as a supplemental petition.
The main issue for our resolution is whether or not the CA erred in finding that Judge Daguna had committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying the withdrawal of the Informations for murder against respondents.
Petitioner argues that, based on the independent assessment of Judge Daguna, there was probable cause based on the
earlier affidavit of Columna. She considered all the pieces of evidence but did not give credit to Columnas recantation.
Respondents counter that Judge Daguna committed grave abuse of discretion by limiting her evaluation and assessment only
to evidence that supported probable cause while completely disregarding contradicting evidence. They also contend that Columnas
extrajudicial confession was inadmissible against respondents because of the rule on res inter alios acta.
We find no merit in the petition.
It is settled that, when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information (on the ground of lack of probable cause to
hold the accused for trial based on a resolution of the DOJ Secretary), the trial court has the duty to make an independent assessment of
the merits of the motion.[25] It may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary. Reliance alone on the resolution of
the Secretary would be an abdication of the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case.[26] The court must itself be
convinced that there is indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused. [27]
We agree with the CA that Judge Daguna limited herself only to the following: (1) Columnas affidavit dated March 8, 2004
wherein he implicated the respondents in the murders; (2) his affirmation of this affidavit during the April 19, 2004 clarificatory hearing; (3)
his letter dated October 29, 2004 and (4) the May 30, 2005 DOJ resolution upholding the prosecutors recommendation to file the murder
charges.[28]
She completely ignored other relevant pieces of evidence such as: (1) Columnas May 3, 2004 letter to respondent Lloyd
Antiporda narrating the torture he suffered to force him to admit his participation in the crimes and to implicate the respondents; (2) his
May 25, 2004 affidavit where he stated that neither he nor the respondents had any involvement in the murders and (3) his testimony
during the October 22, 2004 clarificatory hearing wherein he categorically affirmed his May 3, 2004 letter and May 25, 2004 affidavit.
We declared in Jimenez v. Jimenez[29] that
[although] there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same
must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large
degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not
disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason. The judge or fiscal,
therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn
up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to
uphold.[30] (Emphasis supplied)
Had Judge Daguna reviewed the entire records of the investigation, she would have seen that, aside from the pieces of
evidence she relied on, there were others which cast doubt on them. We quote with approval the reflections of the CA on this point:
The selectivity of respondent RTC Judge for purposes of resolving the motion to withdraw the
informations effectively sidetracked the guidelines for an independent assessment and evaluation of the
merits of the case. Respondent RTC Judge thus impaired the substantial rights of the accused. Instead, she
should have made a circumspect evaluation by looking at everything made available to her at that point of the
cases. No less than that was expected and required of her as a judicial officer. According to Santos v. Orda, Jr.,
the trial judge may make an independent assessment of the merits of the case based on the affidavits and
counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence appended to the Information; the records of the public prosecutor
which the court may order the latter to produce before the court; or any evidence already adduced before the
court by the accused at the time the motion is filed by the public prosecutor.[31]
Moreover, Judge Daguna failed to consider that Columnas extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004 affidavit was not
admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios acta.
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.[32] Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is
not admissible against his or her co-accused[33] and is considered as hearsay against them.[34] The reason for this rule is that:
on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon himself, and are
evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but
also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party
ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence
against him.[35]
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court:
Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be
given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial
[36]
confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a)
the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has
been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. [37] Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-
conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.[38]
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to
prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could
corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value and
was inadmissible as evidence against them.
Considering the paucity and inadmissibility of the evidence presented against the respondents, it would be unfair to hold them for
trial. Once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused, they should be relieved
from the pain of going through a full blown court case.[39]When, at the outset, the evidence offered during the preliminary investigation is
nothing more than an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession of an alleged conspirator, the criminal complaint should not prosper so that
the system would be spared from the unnecessary expense of such useless and expensive litigation. [40]The rule is all the more significant
here since respondent Licerio Antiporda remains in detention for the murder charges pursuant to the warrant of arrest issued by Judge
Daguna.[41]

Indeed, at that stage of the proceedings, the duty of Judge Daguna was only to satisfy herself whether there was probable
cause or sufficient ground to hold respondents for trial as co-conspirators. Given that she had no sufficient basis for a finding of probable
cause against respondents, her orders denying the withdrawal of the Informations for murder against them were issued with grave abuse of
discretion.

Hence, we hold that the CA committed no reversible error in granting the petitions for certiorari of respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 184681 February 25, 2013
GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, GOV. JUM AKBAR, and NOR-RHAMA J. INDANAN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The instant petitiOn assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 dated August 6, 2008 and October 16, 2008, respectively, of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 103461, which affirmed the inclusion of petitioner Gerry A. Salapuddin (Salapuddin) in the amended information for
multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder filed in Criminal Case No. Q-07-149982 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), -Branch 83 in
Quezon City.
The present controversy started on November 13, 2007 when, shortly after the adjournment of the day's session in Congress, a bomb
exploded near the entrance of the South Wing lobby of the House of Representatives (HOR) in the Batasan Complex, Quezon City. The blast
led to the death of Representative Wahab Akbar (Congressman Akbar),3 Marcial Taldo,4 Jul-Asiri Hayudini5 Maan Gale Bustaliño6 and Dennis
Manila,7 and the inflicting of serious injuries on Representatives Henry Teves 8 and Luzviminda Ilagan,9 Ismael Lim, Vercita Garcia,10 Kumhar
Indanan,11 Larry Noda12 and Paula Dunga.
The post-blast investigation revealed that the explosion was caused by an improvised bomb planted on a motorcycle that was parked near
the entrance stairs of the South Wing lobby.13
Acting on a confidential information that the person who parked the motorcycle near the South Wing lobby of the HOR was staying with
members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and learning that one ASG member, Abu Jandal alias "Bong," has standing warrants of arrest for
kidnapping and serious illegal detention,14 police officers raided an alleged ASG safehouse located at Blk. 4, Lot 23, Anahaw St., Parkwood
Hills, Payatas, Quezon City (Parkwood) on November 15, 2007. During the course of the operation, a firefight ensued killing three persons:
Bong, Redwan Indama (Redwan) and Saing Indama.15 Meanwhile, Caidar Aunal (Aunal), Ikram Indama (Ikram) and Adham Kusain
(Kusain)16 were arrested and then brought to Camp Crame in Quezon City. Several items were likewise seized from the premises, including
two (2) Cal. 45 pistols, one motor vehicle plate number "8," an I.D. of HOR issued to Ikram, and a black wallet with a GSIS ID card issued to
Aunal with calling cards of Salapuddin.17 One of the Cal. 45 pistols found was traced back to Julham S. Kunam, Political Affairs Assistant of
Salapuddin.18
On November 16, 2007, a day after the raid, Kusain executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay. In it, he stated that he is from Tipo-Tipo, Basilan and
came to Manila in March 2005, staying when he first arrived in Manila in the house of Salapuddin, his father’s friend. Salapuddin paid for
one year of his college education and helped him be employed as a building attendant at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. He
explained that he was in the house at Parkwood Hills because Redwan asked him to get the payment for his black XRM Honda motorcycle
that Redwan took from his house on November 2, 2007. He claimed that Redwan did not disclose the purpose for which the motorcycle will
be used and it was only after the raid that he learned that his motorcycle was the very same motorcycle used during the bombing at
the Batasan Complex.19
On the same day, November 16, 2007, Ikram executed the first of his several affidavits (Ikram’s first affidavit). He stated that he is a driver
working for Salapuddin since July 2002 and was staying in a house at 48-A Greenbucks, Filinvest St., Batasan Hills, Quezon City
(Greenbucks), owned by Salapuddin, from June 2004 until he went home to Isabela City, Basilan in June 2007. 20 He maintained that he
returned to Manila on October 16, 2007. He stressed that before returning to Manila, or on October 9, 2007, his cousin Redwan talked to
him about a mission to kill Congressman Akbar of Basilan by means of a bomb to be planted on a motorcycle. He was not, however,
informed of the reason for the mission or the identity of the person who gave the order. He stated that upon arrival in Manila, he stayed
at Greenbucks where the bombing was planned. He stated that those who took part in the planning of the bombing included: Redwan and
his wife Saing; Jang, who was a cousin and member of the staff of Congressman Mujiv Hataman; Bong, who made the bomb; Aunal; and
Kusain. On October 20, 2007, he and Aunal went home to Basilan and returned to Manila only on November 5, 2007. He also admitted
bringing the motorcycle with the bomb to the HOR.21 He narrated that at 3:30 p.m. of November 13, 2007, he went to the Batasan premises
on board a black Honda XRM with the bomb and parked it near the entrance of the South Wing lobby, at a spot reserved by Jang. 22 Later
that day, he heard the bomb explode and received a text message from Jang confirming that it was the bomb he brought that exploded. He
explained that it was Jang who set off the bomb by calling the cellphone attached to the bomb inside the motorcycle.23
Jilbert C. Ortega, Chief of the Complaint and Investigation Unit of the HOR, likewise executed an affidavit on the same day, November 16,
2007, stating that in the morning of November 13, 2007, he noticed two men near the South Wing lobby of the HOR roaming around and
seemingly surveying the premises. He identified Ikram as one of the two. 24
On the basis of the sworn statements, a request for the conduct of inquest proceedings relative to the participation or involvement of
Aunal, Ikram, Kusain, and Jang was made.25
On November 17, 2007, Salapuddin went to Camp Crame and voluntarily gave a sworn statement denying any knowledge of
the Batasan bombing, asserting that his name was being used by the media only because of his relationship with the persons arrested in
connection with the incident: Ikram was his former driver;26 Aunal, his former brother-in-law, being a brother of his ex-wife whom he
divorced under Muslim laws; and Kusain who once sought his assistance for employment. He clarified that he knew Redwan and Saing
Indama only because they were members of the Moro National Liberation Front but denied knowing Bong. He stated that the individuals
thus mentioned rarely visited him, and before the incident, he spoke only to Ikram, who was then working in his water refilling station in
Basilan, when the latter asked permission to leave for Manila to look for better employment.27 He explained that his house at Greenbucks is
usually used by his constituents, including Kusain and Ikram, as a temporary residence or shelter whenever they are in Manila.28
As the police investigation prospered, Ikram executed several supplemental affidavits augmenting the statement he previously gave to the
authorities. At 8:00 in the morning of November 18, 2007, Ikram narrated in his first supplemental affidavit 29 (Ikram’s second affidavit) that
he, together with Aunal, Redwan, and Bong, planned the Batasan bombing on the night of October 17, 2007 at Greenbucks. On October 19,
2008, they all proceeded to Raon, Quiapo to shop for materials to make the bomb. 30 He added that on October 25, 2007, he and Aunal went
home to Basilan and returned to Greenbucks in Manila only on November 5, 2007. Bong made the bomb and placed it inside the toolbox of
a Honda motorcycle in Greenbucks.31 The following day, they all transferred to Parkwood bringing the motorcycle with them. 32 It was in
Parkwood where they completed the plan to kill Congressman Akbar. 33
At 6:00 in the evening of the same day, November 18, 2007, Ikram executed another supplemental affidavit (Ikram’s third affidavit).34 There
he stated that on October 13, 2007, when they were about to leave for Manila, he, Bong, Redwan and Aunal passed by Gersal Hardware
owned by Salapuddin in Zamboanga City35 upon the prodding of one Bayan Judda, who handed them a bag. Redwan later informed him that
the bag contained ingredients for explosives. They brought the bag with them to Greenbucks in Manila. 36 On October 17, 2007, he, along
with Bong, Redwan and Aunal, went to Quiapo to buy the wires needed to make a bomb. 37 Thereafter, Bong made two bombs to be used in
killing Congressman Akbar: one intended for the HOR premises and another for either his Valle Verde house or his condo unit in Ortigas. On
October 22, 2007, Hajarun Jamiri (Jamiri), the ex-mayor of Tuburan, Basilan arrived at Greenbucks on board a black Suzuki motorcycle
where the bomb intended for the Valle Verde house or the Ortigas condo will be placed. After Bong placed the bomb in his motorcycle,
Jamiri left on board the same motorcycle.38 On November 10, 2007, Ikram went to Jamiri’s apartment in Malate, Manila to get money.
During the said occasion, he saw the Suzuki motorcycle with the bomb parked inside Jamiri’s apartment. 39
Notably, Ikram, in his first three affidavits, never mentioned Salapuddin’s involvement, let alone implicate him, in the plan to kill
Congressman Akbar. Ikram’s narration of events altogether changed in his third supplemental affidavit dated November 20,
2007 (Ikram’s fourth affidavit).40 There, Ikram alleged that, after receiving his last salary from the HOR, he worked for Salapuddin’s water
refilling station in Isabela City as a delivery boy. In September 2007, before the Ramadan, Salapuddin asked him to fetch Redwan.41 Ikram
complied and brought Redwan to Salapuddin’s house on the same day. 42 He claimed that he was beside Redwan when Salapuddin ordered:
"Pateyun si Cong. Wahab Akbar."43 Ikram saw Redwan again on October 9, 2007 when the latter told him about the mission in Manila to kill
Congressman Akbar.44 Ikram further narrated in his fourth affidavit that on October 13, 2007, he, Bong, Redwan and Aunal left Isabela City
for Manila. In Manila, they stayed at Greenbucks owned by Salapuddin. Ikram also alleged in his affidavit that in the third week of October
2007, he and Redwan met with Hadjiman Hataman-Salliman (Jim Hataman) in a Figaro Coffee House in Ever Gotesco, Commonwealth
Avenue, Quezon City (Figaro Café). During the said occasion, Ikram heard Jim Hataman tell Redwan of the plan to kill Congressman Akbar
using a bomb. A week later, Redwan brought Ikram to the house of Congressman Mujiv Hataman (Congressman Hataman) in Filinvest II,
Batasan Hills where Ikram heard Congressman Hataman order Redwan to kill Congressman Akbar. Ikram explained that Redwan was a
cousin of the Hatamans.45
Ikram would later amend the dates mentioned in his earlier affidavits by executing an affidavit dated January 10, 200846 (Ikram’s fifth
affidavit), where he made it appear that after bringing Redwan to Salapuddin’s house in Basilan, he and Redwan again saw each other on
the night of September 5, 2007, not October 9, 2007.47 He declared, however, that Redwan talked to him about a mission to kill
Congressman Akbar only on September 8, 2007,48 which was also the date that they started for Manila49 and dropped by Salapuddin’s
Gersal Hardware, not October 13, 2007.50 He added that they returned to Manila on September 11, 2007, not on October 16, 2007. 51 He
declared that Bong made the bomb at Greenbucks on September 13, 2007, not October 18, 2007.52Inconsistently, however, he stated in
the same affidavit that he, together with Aunal, Redwan and Bong, planned the Batasan bombing only on the night of September 17,
2007 at Greenbucks,53 then shopped in Raon for materials to make the bomb only on September 19, 2007.54 On September 17, 2007, not
October 22, 2007, Jamiri supposedly went to Greenbucks to have his motorcycle fitted with a bomb. 55 Ikram also stated that he last saw
Congressman Hataman in September 2007, not October 2007.56 He further declared that he and Aunal returned to Basilan on October 14,
2007, not October 20, 2007.57
Incongruously, however, Joel Maturan, the mayor of Ungkaya Pukan, Basilan, stated in his affidavit that he saw Ikram driving Salapuddin’s
minitruck in Lamitan, Basilan on September 20, 2007 and delivering water from Salapuddin’s water refilling station. 58
On November 19, 2007, Jamiri was apprehended for illegal possession of firearm. The following day, or on November 20, 2007, he executed
an affidavit where he narrated that during Ramadan, in the month of October,59he brought a Suzuki motorcycle to Greenbucks on the
instruction of Redwan. The latter requested Jamiri to leave the motorcycle behind so that he could place a bomb inside it. Jamiri returned
the following day and was given instructions on how to remove the bomb from the motorcycle. 60 In exchange for keeping the bomb,
Redwan gave Jamiri PhP 50,000 with the promise of an additional PhP 500,000 should the bomb be actually used to kill Congressman Akbar
when he dines at Sulo Hotel.61
However, the bomb was never used as Jamiri failed to bring the motorcycle to the hotel on October 23, 2007. 62 He admitted hiding the
bomb in a house located at Leveriza Street, Pasay City and expressed his willingness to surrender it to the police. 63 Pursuant to the
undertaking he made in his affidavit, Jamiri accompanied and guided police authorities in retrieving an improvised explosive device at an
apartelle located in Leveriza St., Malate, Manila on the same day he executed his affidavit. 64
In a supplemental affidavit,65 Jamiri added that during the last week of October 2007, Redwan called him from Figaro Café, in Ever Gotesco,
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City and asked him to go to the same place. When he arrived at the café, Jamiri saw Redwan with
Congressman Hataman and his brother Jim Hataman. Congressman Hataman then asked Jamiri to help Redwan in his "project" to kill
Congressman Akbar.66 Jim Hataman thereafter interposed that the death of Congressman Akbar will bring peace to Basilan. 67
On November 22, 2007, Aunal executed his own affidavit68 where he stated that he left Isabela City, Basilan for Manila on October 13, 2007
with Ikram, Redwan and Bong.69 They arrived in Manila on October 16, 2007 and proceeded to stay at Greenbucks. 70 He recalled watching
Bong assemble the two improvised bombs. He stated that when he asked about who their target was, Bong answered that it was
Congressman Akbar. He explained that it had something to do with the politics in Basilan. Aunal likewise declared that Bong told him that
the order to kill Congressman Akbar was made by Jim Hataman who vied for the congressional seat won by Congressman Akbar. 71Aunal
himself heard Jim Hataman order Redwan to kill Congressman Akbar one evening in October 2007 when they were in Figaro Café. 72 He and
Ikram then went back to Basilan during the last week of October and came back to Manila in the first week of November. 73 On November
13, 2007, Ikram brought one of the improvised bombs, hidden inside a motorcycle, to the Batasan premises where Jang detonated it, killing
Congressman Akbar.74
Based on the affidavits of Jamiri, Ikram, and Aunal, Police Superintendent Asher Dolina indorsed a letter dated November 29, 2007 to then
Chief State Prosecutor Zuño requesting the inclusion of Salapuddin, Congressman Hataman, Jim Hataman and Police Officer 1 (PO1) Bayan
Judda in the complaints for murder and multiple frustrated murder.75 After conducting preliminary investigation, the Chief State Prosecutor
approved a Resolution dated December 6, 2007 where he: (1) found probable cause to indict Aunal, Ikram, and Kusain for multiple murder
and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829; (2) recommended the conduct of further investigation for their indictment for multiple
frustrated murder; and (3) recommended the conduct of preliminary investigation as to the other respondents who were not under
detention.76
In the meantime, upon the request of the relatives and counsel of the accused, Dr. Benito Molino (Dr. Molino) 77conducted in the presence
of investigators from the Commission on Human Rights a medical examination of the detained on December 1, 4, and 7, 2007. The results:
Kusain, Aunal and Jamiri were subjected to physical and mental torture. 78 In particular, Dr. Molino found that "the injuries found on the skin
and private parts of Mr. Jamiri two weeks after his claimed ordeal that he received countless blows all over his body in spite of being sick
with diabetes, hit by a blunt object on his head and his shins and that electric current was applied to his private parts while being
interrogated as to his knowledge and participation in the Batasan bombing x x x are consistent. In his case, the three elements of torture are
present."79 Similarly, he found that both Aunal and Kusain "underwent severe physical injuries and subjected to deep emotional stress x x x
intentionally inflicted by men believed to be officers of the CIDG [Criminal Investigation and Detection Group] x x x to get information from
them."80
On December 10, 2007, Jamiri executed an affidavit withdrawing and disavowing the statements he made in his previous affidavits.81 He
alleged that he was not carrying any weapon, much less an explosive, when arrested. He was merely walking when six men suddenly
arrested him, forced him to a van, and blindfolded him.82 He was thereafter tortured and forced to sign an affidavit on November 20, 2007,
not knowing its contents.83 On the same day, he was forcibly brought to an apartment in Leveriza Street, Manila where the police found a
bomb. He was thereafter forced to admit that it was he who placed the bomb in the apartment. 84 He was again prevailed upon by Mayor
Tahira Ismael of Sumisip, Basilan to sign another affidavit when the latter told him that the Hatamans and Salapuddin were out to kill his
wife and children.85 He claimed that the contents of the affidavits he was forced to sign were all fabricated by the police. 86
On December 12, 2007, Kusain and Aunal executed their respective affidavits of recantation. 87 Both stated that they were coerced to sign
their confessions after they were subjected to physical and psychological torture. They were also assisted by counsels not of their choice
but endorsed by the Philippine National Police-CIDG.88
On January 3, 2008, Salapuddin submitted his counter-affidavit where he reiterated the statements he made in his November 17, 2007
affidavit and assailed Ikram’s attempt to implicate him as Ikram’s desperate act of selfredemption after owning up to the crime.89
Nevertheless, on February 22, 2008, Prosecutor Zuño approved the Department of Justice (DOJ) Investigating Panel’s Supplemental
Resolution. The Resolution recommended the amendment of the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-07-149982, pending before Quezon
City RTC, Branch 83, to include respondents Ikram, Aunal, Kusain, Jamiri, PO1 Bayan Judda, Jang Hataman and Salapuddin. 90 Referring to
Salapuddin in particular, the DOJ Investigating Panel stated the observation that: "Salapuddin’s participation in the [crime] cannot be
downplayed just because he did not actively take part in the planning. Rather, despite this, it has his hands written all over it. The
circumstances, the people and place used are all, [in] one way or another, associated with him. It cannot be mere coincidence."91 On the
other hand, the resolution dismissed the charge as against Julham Kunam, Congressman Hataman, and Jim Hataman. So the DOJ
Investigating Panel found, "their participation as conspirators in the grand scheme is unstable x x x apart from the statements implicating
respondents Mujiv Hataman and Hadjiman Hataman-Salliman, no other evidence was presented to sufficiently establish their involvement
in the crime."92
On March 7, 2008, Salapuddin filed a Petition for Review of the Supplemental Resolution with the Office of the Secretary of Justice.93 The
Investigating Panel, Salapuddin rued, refused to give probative weight to the incriminating statements of Ikram with respect to the
Hataman brothers, but relied on the very same statements in finding probable cause to indict him. Moreover, he maintained that there is
no evidence independent of Ikram’s statements that will support the finding of probable cause to indict him for murder and multiple
frustrated murder.
On April 23, 2008, the Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution excluding Salapuddin from the Information for the complex crime of murder
and frustrated murder, thus modifying the Supplemental Resolution of the Investigating Panel. 94 The Secretary of Justice predicated his
modificatory action on the interplay of the following premises: the only material evidence against Salapuddin is the statements of
Ikram.95 However, Ikram’s statements are laden with irreconcilable inconsistencies and contradictions that they cannot be considered
worthy of belief.96 What is more, the Secretary added, "there is nothing on record that will indicate that x x x Salapuddin performed the
overt acts of the offense charged."97 The Secretary of Justice observed that the statements of the other accused cannot be given weight as
they were obtained through force and intimidation contrary to the Constitution and were in fact later recanted.
In a Petition for Certiorari dated May 13, 2008, herein respondents Jum Akbar and Nor-Rhama Indanan questioned the Secretary of Justice’s
Resolution98 before the CA, the recourse docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 103461. They argued in the main that matters relating to the
admissibility of evidence and credibility of witnesses are best determined by the courts during trial, and not at the stage of determining
probable cause. There is, so respondents claimed, overwhelming evidence to link Salapuddin in the conspiracy to kill Congressman Akbar.
The appellate court, by its Decision dated August 6, 2008, set aside the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. As held, the totality of the
evidence "sufficiently indicates the probability that Salapuddin lent moral and material support or assistance to the perpetrators in the
commission of the crime,"99 the CA adding in this regard that "the absence (or presence) of any conspiracy among the accused is evidentiary
in nature after a full-blown trial on the merits."100And to the CA, the recantation made by Jamiri, Aunal, and Kusain and their claim of
torture were of little probative value inasmuch as these were "unsupported by competent proof." 101
Salapuddin moved for, but was denied, reconsideration per the CA’s Resolution dated October 16, 2008. 102
In the meantime, Ikram filed a Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pagbabawi, Pagwalang Bisa ng Naunang Mga Salaysay at Pagpapatotoo dated
October 6, 2008103 with the Quezon City RTC-Branch 83 claiming that he was forced to sign the affidavits he previously executed and was
merely forced to implicate Salapuddin and the Hataman brothers in the alleged conspiracy by respondent Gov. Jum Akbar and several
mayors from Basilan because of their political rivalry in the province. 104 On November 11, 2008, Ikram submitted another affidavit of
recantation supplying details of his ordeal while under custodial investigation and alleging that he was physically and mentally tortured so
that he was forced to write and sign statements regarding the Batasan bombing that were in fact supplied by the police officers
themselves.105
On November 24, 2008, Salapuddin filed a Petition for Review before this Court, ascribing on the appellate court the commission of grave
error in admitting the extrajudicial admissions of Jamiri, Kusain, and Aunal obtained as they were through torture and physical abuse,
without the effective assistance of a competent independent counsel of their choice, and were in fact recanted. The appellate court also
grievously erred, so Salapuddin argued, in according full probative value to Ikram’s extrajudicial confession implicating Salapuddin even if it
was riddled with serious contradictions and inconsistencies.
The Court, in a minute resolution, denied the petition on September 29, 2010. Hence, on December 1, 2010, Salapuddin filed a Motion for
Reconsideration106 specifically inviting attention to the prosecution’s admission no less that there is no other direct evidence linking him to
the crime charged except Ikram’s testimony.107 Since, as urged, Ikram has recanted his testimony on account of the violations of his
constitutionally protected rights, there is no longer any reason or probable cause to maintain the criminal case filed against Salapuddin.
To the motion, respondents interposed an Opposition dated December 17, 2010108 stating that Salapuddin has not provided this Court any
new and substantial matter that would show the serious error attributed to the CA; that the allegations of torture and recantation have
already been denied by the investigating prosecutors and should not sway this Court to reverse the Decision of the appellate court;109 and
that Salapuddin’s evasion from arrest is evidence of his guilt.110
In a Resolution dated November 21, 2012, the Court granted the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner and reinstated the petition.
Upon a second hard look and thorough reexamination of the records, the Court finds merit in the instant petition.
The determination of probable cause is, under our criminal justice system, an executive function that the courts cannot interfere with in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion.111 Otherwise, a violation of the basic principle of separation of powers will ensue. The Executive
Branch, through its prosecutors, is, thus, given ample latitude to determine the propriety of filing a criminal charge against a person. In the
landmark Crespo v. Mogul,112 We ruled, thus:
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction
and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the
complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence, in his opinion, is
sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the
direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecutions by private persons x x x. Prosecuting officers under
the power vested in them by the law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence
received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office. They have equally the
duty not to prosecute when the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. (Emphasis supplied.)
This broad authority of prosecutors, however, is circumscribed by the requirement of a conscientious conduct of a preliminary investigation
for offenses where the penalty prescribed by law is at least 4 years, 2 months and 1 day. 113This rule is intended to guarantee the right of
every person to be free from "the inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial,
until the reasonable probability of his or her guilt has been passed upon"114 and to guard the State against the "burden of unnecessary
expense and effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials arising from false, frivolous or groundless charges."115
Hence, even at this stage, the investigating prosecutors are duty-bound to sift through all the documents, objects, and testimonies to
determine what may serve as a relevant and competent evidentiary foundation of a possible case against the accused persons. They cannot
defer and entirely leave this verification of all the various matters to the courts. Otherwise, the conduct of a preliminary investigation would
be rendered worthless; the State would still be forced to prosecute frivolous suits and innocent men would still be unnecessarily dragged to
defend themselves in courts against groundless charges. Indeed, while prosecutors are not required to determine the rights and liabilities of
the parties, a preliminary investigation still constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case 116 so that the investigating
prosecutor is not excused from the duty to weigh the evidence submitted and ensure that what will be filed in court is only such criminal
charge that the evidence and inferences can properly warrant.117
The prosecutor’s call on the existence or absence of probable cause is further subject to the review of the Secretary of Justice who exercises
the power of control over prosecutors.118 This much is clear in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals:119
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code,
exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their
rulings.
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Code gives the secretary of justice supervision and
control over the Office of the Chief Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. The scope of his power of supervision and
control is delineated in Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Code:
‘(1) Supervision and Control.—Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law
or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and
decisions of subordinate officials or units; x x x’
Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of R.A. 3783 and Section 37 of Act 4007, which read:
‘Section 3. x x x
The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutors, the Senior State Prosecutors, and the State Prosecutors shall x x x perform
such other duties as may be assigned to them by the Secretary of Justice in the interest of public service.’
xxx xxx xxx
‘Section 37. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever a specific power, authority, duty, function, or
activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division or service, the same shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper
Department Head who shall have authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify, or revoke any decision or action of
said chief of bureau, office, division or service.’
‘Supervision’ and ‘control’ of a department head over his subordinates have been defined in administrative law as follows:
‘In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform such
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.’
Thus, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, if the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor(s), he or she can direct the prosecutor(s) concerned "to dismiss or move for dismissal of the
complaint or information with notice to the parties."120 This action is not subject to the review of courts unless there is a showing that the
Secretary of Justice has committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to an excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the challenged
resolution.121
Not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, is grave abuse of discretion.122The phrase "grave abuse of
discretion" connotes "a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to constitute
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law."123
In CA-G.R. SP No. 103461, the appellate court, in reversing the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, has evidently neglected this
elementary principle. In fact, the CA has assumed, but has not sufficiently explained, how the Secretary of Justice’s decision finding the
absence of probable cause to indict Salapuddin amounts to a grave abuse of discretion. Instead, the CA glossed over the testimonies
presented by the parties and adopted the reversed conclusion of the Investigating Prosecutors that the totality of the evidence presented
points to the probability that Salapuddin has participated in a conspiracy that culminated in the Batasan bombing.
Indeed, probable cause requires less proof than necessary for conviction. Nonetheless, it demands more than bare suspicion and must rest
on competent relevant evidence.124 A review of the records, however, show that the only direct material evidence against Salapuddin, as
he had pointed out at every conceivable turn, is the confession made by Ikram. While the confession is arguably relevant, this is not the
evidence competent to establish the probability that Salapuddin participated in the commission of the crime. On the contrary, as pointed
out by the Secretary of Justice, this cannot be considered against Salapuddin on account of the principle of res inter alios acta alteri
nocere non debet125 expressed in Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 28. Admission by third-party. – The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as
hereinafter provided.
Clearly thus, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant. 126 It cannot be admitted against his or her co-accused and is
considered as hearsay against them.127 Tamargo v. Awingan128 elaborated on the reason for this rule, viz:
On a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his
conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts
of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used
as evidence against him.
The exception provided under Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to the rule allowing the admission of a conspirator129 requires the
prior establishment of the conspiracy by evidence other than the confession.130In this case, there is a dearth of proof demonstrating the
participation of Salapuddin in a conspiracy to set off a bomb in the Batasan grounds and thereby kill Congressman Akbar. Not one of the
other persons arrested and subjected to custodial investigation professed that Salapuddin was involved in the plan to set off a bomb in
the Batasan grounds. Instead, the investigating prosecutors did no more than to rely on Salapuddin’s association with these persons to
conclude that he was a participant in the conspiracy, ruling thus:
Respondent Gerry Salapuddin’s participation in the forgoing, cannot be downplayed just because he did not actively take part in the
planning. Rather, despite this, it has hands written all over it. The circumstances, the people and place used are all, one way or another,
associated with him. It cannot be mere coincidence.131 (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court, however, has previously stressed that mere association with the principals by direct participation, without more, does not
suffice.132 Relationship, association and companionship do not prove conspiracy.133 Salapuddin’s complicity to the crime, if this be the case,
cannot be anchored on his relationship, if any, with the arrested persons or his ownership of the place where they allegedly stayed while in
Manila.
It must be shown that the person concerned has performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.134 In fact, mere
knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation or approval to cooperate, is not sufficient to prove
conspiracy.135 There must be positive and conclusive factual evidence indicating the existence of conspiracy,136 and not simple inferences,
conjectures and speculations137 speciously sustained because "it cannot be mere coincidence."138
The investigating prosecutors themselves were aware of the need for other clear and positive evidence of conspiracy besides the confession
made by a supposed co-conspirator in charging a person with a crime committed in conspiracy. In discharging the Hataman brothers, the
investigating prosecutors ratiocinated:
Apart from the statements implicating respondents Mujiv Hataman and Hadjiman Hataman-Salliman, no other evidence was presented to
sufficiently establish their involvement in the crime. Certainly, this is not sufficient basis for finding probable cause to indict them for a non-
bailable crime. To do so would open the floodgates to numerous possible indictments on the basis alone of name by mere mention of
anyone. To establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation, rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required x x
x.139
Notably, the Hataman brothers were named not just by Ikram140 but also by Jamiri141 and Aunal142 as the persons who ordered the murder
of Congressman Akbar. It is with more reason, therefore, that the foregoing rationale applies squarely to Salapuddin who was mentioned
only by Ikram, and not by the other persons arrested.
Indeed, the Secretary of Justice has decided in accordance with the dictates of our jurisprudence in overturning the investigating
prosecutors and ordering Salapuddin’s exclusion from the Information. The Secretary cannot plausibly be found culpable of grave abuse of
his discretion. The appellate court has committed a reversible error in holding otherwise. As a matter of fact, the CA has failed to capture
the import of Our ruling in People v. Listerio143 in supporting its general declaration that "the totality of evidence"144 indicates Salapuddin’s
participation in the conspiracy. The appellate court held:
The totality of evidence sufficiently indicates the probability that Salapuddin lent moral and material support or assistance to the
perpetrators or assistance to the perpetrators in the commission of the crime.
Jurisprudence teaches that ‘it is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt acts as a direct or indirect contribution in
the execution of the crime planned to be committed.’ However, this overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission
of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by
exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
In holding thus, the CA failed to correctly appreciate that even in Listerio, the "assistance," which was considered by this Court as an "overt
act" of conspiracy, was extended while "by being present at the commission of the crime."145 There We stressed:
x x x The rule is that conspiracy must be shown to exist by direct or circumstantial evidence, as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself. In
the absence of direct proof thereof, as in the present case, it may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense
was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action
and community of interest. Hence, it is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt acts as a direct or indirect
contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be committed. The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the
crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators.
Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, it denotes an intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose x x x. In this case, the presence of accused-appellant, all of them armed with deadly weapons at the locus
criminis, indubitably shows their criminal design to kill the victims.146 (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, on the other hand, no evidence or testimony, not even Ikram’s, suggests the presence of Salapuddin during the blast that killed
Congressman Akbar and injured several others. He cannot, therefore, be properly accused of exerting an "overt act" by extending
"assistance" to whoever was responsible for the commission of the felony.
Furthermore, the very cases the appellate court cited provide that while conspiracy can be proven by circumstantial evidence, the series of
evidence presented to establish an accused’s participation in the conspiracy must be consistent and should lead to no other conclusion but
his participation in the crime as a conspirator.147 After all, the conspiracy itself must be proved as positively as the commission of the felony
itself, for it is a "facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold." 148
The confession of Ikram relied on by investigating prosecutors and the appellate court does not provide the threshold consistent picture
that would justify Salapuddin’s complicity in the conspiracy that led to the Batasan bombing. Consider: Ikram made the allegation regarding
Salapuddin’s participation in the conspiracy in his fourth affidavit, after he categorically denied knowing who the mastermind was. In his
affidavit dated November 16, 2007, Ikram gave the following answers to the questions thus indicated:
T: Bakit nyo daw papatayin si Wahab Akbar?
S: Hindi po sa amin pinaalam.
xxxx
T: Alam mo ba kung sino ang nagutos sa inyo para patayin si
Wahab Akbar?
S: Hindi po.149 (Emphasis supplied.)
He did not correct this statement in the two affidavits he executed on November 18, 2007. When shown his affidavit of November 16, 2007,
Ikram did not refute his categorical statement denying any knowledge of the person who gave the command to kill Congressman Akbar.
Instead, in the morning of November 18, 2007, he simply admitted that the November 16, 2007 affidavit was his own sworn statement:
T: Mayron akong ipapakitang sinumpaang salaysay ni IKRAM INDAMA Y LAWAMA na may petsa ika-16 ng Nobyembre 2007. Maaari bang
suriin mo at sabihin mo kung ito ang sinasabi mong salaysay mo? (For purposes of identification, affiant was allowed to examine the
Sinumapaang Salaysay of IKRAM INDAMA Y LAWAMA dated April 16, 2007.
S: Opo sa akin pong sinumpaang salaysay na ito.150
He repeated this acknowledgment in the evening of November 18, 2007:
T: Mayron akong ipapakitang sinumpaang salaysay ni IKRAM INDAMA Y LAWAMA na may petsa ika-16 ng Nobyembre 2007. Maari bang
suriin mo at sabihin mo kung ito ang sinasabi mong salaysay mo? (For purposes of identification, affiant was allowed to examine the
Sinumpaang Salaysay of IKRAM INDAMA Y LAWAMA dated April 16, 2007)
S: Opo sa akin pong sinumpaang salaysay na ito.151
Again, Ikram made the same acknowledgment on November 20, 2007 when he did not say that he lied when he answered "Hindi po" to the
question "Alam mo ba kung sino ang nagutos sa inyo para patayin si Wahab Akbar?" In his November 20, 2007 affidavit, Ikram stated:
T: Ikaw rin ba si Ikram Indama y Lawama na nagbigay ng Sinumpaang Salaysay kay PO2 Ubaldo Macatangay Jr noong ika-16 ng Nobyemb[re]
2007, Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay kay PO3 Jonathan F Jornadal noong ika – 18 ng Nobyembre 2007 at Karagdagang Sinumpaang
Salaysay kay PO2 Ubaldo Macatangay Jr noong ika-18 ng Nobyembre 2007?
S: Opo.
T: Mayroon akong ipapakita sayong Sinumpaang Salaysay kay PO2 Ubaldo Macatangay Jr noong ika-16 ng Nobyembre 2007, Karagdagang
Sinumpaang Salaysay kay PO3 Jonathan F Jornadal noong ika-18 ng Nobyembre 2007 at Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay kay PO2 Ubaldo
Macatangay Jr noong ika-18 ng Nobyembre 2007 na iyong ibinigay. Maari mo bang suriin kung ito ang sinasabing salaysay mo? (For
purposes of identification, affiant was allowed to examine the Sinumpaang Salaysay kay PO2 Ubaldo Macatangay Jr noong ika-16 ng
Nobyembre 2007, Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay kay PO3 Jonathan F Jornadal noong ika – 18 ng Nobyembre 2007 at Karagdagang
Sinumpaang Salaysay kay PO2 Ubaldo Macatangay Jr noong ika-18 ng Nobyembre 2007).
S: Opo, ako po ang nagbigay ng mga salaysay na yan.152
Ikram’s acknowledged denial of the person behind the plan to kill Congressman Akbar is to be sure inconsistent with the claim he made in
the very same affidavit dated November 20, 2007 that he heard Salapuddin order Redwan to kill Congressman Akbar. 153 Reference to
Salapuddin as the mastermind behind the grand plan to kill Congressman Akbar also varies with Ikram’s claim that the Hataman brothers
made the order on two separate occasions,154which allegation was, as previously stated, corroborated by Jamiri155 and Aunal156 in their own
affidavits.1âwphi1
Furthermore, if We consider Ikram’s last affidavit where he moved back by at least a month the chronology of the alleged events that led to
the Batasan bombing, the coherence of the arrested persons’ narration crumbles. For instance, where Aunal stated that he, Redwan, and
Ikram left Basilan for Manila on October 13, 2007,157 Ikram maintained that they started for Manila way back on September 8, 2007. 158 And
while Ikram claims that he witnessed Bong assemble the bomb on September 13, 2007, he himself maintains that the plan to kill
Congressman Akbar by means of a bomb was hatched only four days after, or on September 17, 2007, and they shopped for the materials
on September 19, 2007 or six days after the bombs were actually assembled.159 Further, to reinforce Ikram’s association with Salapuddin, a
witness for the prosecution, Joel Maturan, was presented to make it appear that Ikram was driving Salapuddin’s mini-truck on September
20, 2007 in Basilan.160 Ikram himself, however, claims that he went home to Basilan only on October 14, 2007. It is not necessary to state
the impossibility of Ikram being in two places at the same time. Ikram also alleged that Jamiri went to Greenbucks on September 17,
2007,161 but Jamiri claims that he went to Greenbucks during Ramadan in the month of October. 162 Inconsistently, Ikram further claims that
he saw the Hatamans at Figaro Café during the last week of September 2007, but Jamiri and Aunal both stated in their respective affidavits
that the meeting with the Hatamans took place in the latter part of October 2007. 163
The discrepancies in Ikrams’ affidavits and the variations in the statements of the other accused do not persuade this Court to find probable
cause that Salapuddin, who was indicted primarily because of Ikram’s confession, was part of the conspiracy that led to
the Batasan bombing. Instead, while We are not pre-empting the findings of the trial court with regard to Ikram, Aunal, Jamiri and Kusain,
the variations and the inconsistencies contained in their affidavits lend credence to their allegations of torture and coercion, especially as
these allegations are supported by medical reports prepared by an independent medical practitioner who was assisted by the personnel of
the Human Rights Commission.

It must not be neglected that strict adherence to the Constitution and full respect of the rights of the accused are essential in the pursuit of
justice even in criminal cases. The presumption of innocence, and all rights associated with it, remains even at the stage of preliminary
investigation. It is, thus, necessary that in finding probable cause to indict a person for the commission of a felony, only those matters which
are constitutionally acceptable, competent, consistent and material are considered. No such evidence was presented to sufficiently
establish the probable cause to indict Salapuddin for the non-bailable offenses he is accused of. It, thus, behooves this Court to relieve
petitioner from the unnecessary rigors, anxiety, and expenses of trial, and to prevent the needless waste of the courts' time and the
government's resources.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the Decision dated August 6, 2008 and Resolution dated October 16, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103461 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice dated April 23, 2008 in
I.S. No. 2007-992 is REINSTATED.

Accordingly, let the name of Gerry A. Salapuddin be stricken off and excluded from the Information for the complex crime of multiple
murder and frustrated murder filed in Criminal Case No. Q-07-149982, Regional Trial Court, Branch 83 in Quezon City.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191752 June 10, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
JOSE ARMANDO CERVANTES CACHUELA and BENJAMIN JULIAN CRUZ IBANEZ, Accused.
BENJAMIN JULIAN CRUZ IBANEZ, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We decide the appeal filed by appellants Jose Armando Cervantes Cachuela and Benjamin Julian Cruz Ibanez assailing the August 7, 2009
decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 03474. The CA decision affirmed with modification the July 14, 2008
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 196, Parañaque City, finding the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The prosecution’s evidence revealed that on July 23, 2004, Ibañez went to Weapons System Corporation (WSC) on board an old car, and
told Henessy Auron, WSC’s Secretary and Sales Representative, that he was the one who bought a gun barrel at the company’s gun show in
SM Megamall. Ibañez inquired from Henessy about the schedule and the rates of WSC’s firing range and the amount of the membership fee
of its gun club. He also asked the days when there are many people in the firing range, and whether Henessy was WSC’s only female
employee.3
At around 9:00 a.m. of July 26, 2004, Henessy arrived at WSC and rang the doorbell, but no one opened the door. She went to the back of
the office where the firing range was located, and called Zaldy Gabao, another employee of WSC. Zaldy answered from inside the store but
Henessy did not understand what he said. Henessy returned to the front door and called again. Zaldy replied that he could not open the
door because his hands were tied. Henessy called Raymundo Sian, the company’s operations manager, and informed him that Zaldy’s hands
had been tied. After one hour, the police arrived; they opened the gate at the back using acetylene. When Henessy and the police entered
the premises, they saw that Zaldy had been handcuffed to the vault. Zaldy informed the police that the company’s gunsmith, Rex Dorimon,
was inside the firing range. The police entered the firing range, and saw the lifeless body of Rex. 4 Dr. Voltaire Nulud conducted an autopsy
on the body of Rex, and found that the victim suffered several gunshot wounds on the head, thorax and abdomen, caused by a .45 pistol.5
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) received an information from an asset that the group of Cachuela was involved in the robbery of
WSC and in the killing of one of its employees; and that Cachuela had been looking for prospective buyers of firearms. The NBI formed an
entrapment team and proceeded to Bacoor, Cavite to execute the operation. Upon their arrival, Melvin Nabilgas approached them and told
them that he had been sent by Cachuela and Ibañez to look for buyers of firearms. The police introduced themselves and told Nabilgas that
they were conducting an entrapment operation against the suspects of the robbery at WSC. Nabilgas surrendered to the police, and gave
the names of the other persons involved in the crime. 6
Thereafter, the asset contacted Cachuela and informed him that Nabilgas had already talked to the buyers, and that they would like to see
the firearms being sold. Cachuela set up a meeting with the buyers at a gasoline station in Naic, Cavite. NBI Special Investigator Allan Lino,
Supervising Agent Jerry Abiera and the asset went to the agreed place. Cachuela came and talked to them, and brought them inside his
house where Cachuela showed them several firearms. When the agents inquired from Cachuela whether the firearms had legal
documentation, the latter sensed that the meeting was a set-up. The NBI agents arrested Cachuela before he could make any move. The
agents recovered four (4) firearms7 from Cachuela’s house, including a .9 mm Bernardelli with serial number T1102-03E000151.8
The NBI conducted a follow-up operation on Ibañez whom the asset also contacted. Ibañez directed the asset to bring the prospective
buyers to his residence in Imus, Cavite. The NBI agents went to Imus and there met Ibañez whom they saw inside a Nissan California car
bearing plate no. PMN 645. Lino, Abiera and the asset entered the car, and asked Ibañez where the firearms were. Ibañez brought out two
(2) firearms, and showed them to the agents. The agents asked whether the guns had legal documentation; they then arrested Ibañez when
they sensed that he was already becoming suspicious. The agents recovered two guns from Ibañez, viz.: a .45 Glock 30 with serial number
FML 245 and a .45 Llama with serial number 04490Z.9
At the NBI Main Office, Zaldy pointed to the appellants, during a police line-up, as the persons responsible for the robbery at WSC and for
the killing of Rex.10 Nabilgas also executed a handwritten confession implicating the appellants and Zaldy in the crime. 11
The prosecution filed an Information12 for robbery with homicide before the RTC against the appellants, Nabilgas and Zaldy, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 04-0943. The accused all pleaded not guilty on arraignment. 13 Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. During trial, Zaldy
died.14
In its decision dated July 14, 2008, the RTC found the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It also ordered them to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs
of Rex ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. The trial court likewise ordered the appellants to pay Hector C.
Rodriguez, Jr.15 ₱1,563,300.00, representing the value of the firearms and ammunitions stolen from WSC. Excepted from the conviction was
Nabilgas whom the RTC acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt.
The appellants filed an appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 03474. In its decision of August 7, 2009, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision with the following modifications: (a) the appellants were ordered to pay Arms Depot Philippines, Inc. the amount of ₱1,093,947.50,
representing the value of the stolen firearms and ammunitions from WSC, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the
decision until fully paid; and (b) they are likewise ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Rex ₱45,000.00 as actual damages with
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the decision until fully paid.
The CA held that the following pieces of circumstantial evidence showed that the appellants robbed WSC and killed Rex during the course of
this robbery: (1) Ibañez visited WSC two days before the robbery and asked several questions from Henessy; (2) a robbery occurred at WSC
where 53 firearms and several ammunitions worth ₱1,563,300.00 had been stolen; (3) among the firearms stolen were a .9 mm Bernardelli
with serial number T1102-03E000151 and a .45 Glock 30 with serial number FML 245; (4) Rex, a gunsmith working in WSC, was found dead
at the firing range; (5) Rex sustained gunshot wounds on different parts of his body; (6) Cachuela and Ibañez were caught trying to sell the
.9 mm Bernardelli, with serial number T1102-03E000151, and the .45 Glock 30, with serial number FML 245, respectively, in separate
entrapment operations; and (7) Cachuela and Ibanez were unable to explain how they came into possession of the stolen firearms.
The CA ruled that the totality of these circumstances point to the appellants as the perpetrators of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide. It disregarded the appellants’ defenses of alibi, denial and frame-up for being self-serving. The CA likewise found
unmeritorious the appellants’ argument that the firearms confiscated from them were inadmissible in evidence, pointing out that the
seizures were the result of lawful entrapment operations. It further held that the appellants failed to impute any ill or improper motive
against the police officers who conducted the entrapment operations.
Our Ruling
In this final review, we deny the appeal, and resolve to increase the amount for restitution by the appellants to Arms Depot Philippines, Inc.
from ₱1,093,947.50 to ₱1,481,000.00.
"A special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on the occasion, of the
robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal
property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion
or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires certitude that the
robbery is the main purpose, and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must
precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery." 16
Admissibility of the out-of-court
identification and the extrajudicial
confession
Lino testified that Zaldy identified the appellants as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex in a police line-up
held at the NBI Main Office on Taft Avenue, Manila. We note that Zaldy did not testify in court since he was brought to the National Center
for Mental Health, and subsequently died there during the trial. For this reason, we examine with greater scrutiny Lino’s testimony
regarding Zaldy’s alleged out-of-court identification.
People v. Algarme17 explains the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to determine its admissibility, as follows:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face-to-
face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is
also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the
admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description, given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness
at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure. [italics and emphasis supplied]
In the present case, Lino merely stated that Zaldy, during a police line-up, identified the appellants as the persons involved in the robbery of
WSC and in the killing of Rex. Lino did not state when the line-up took place; how this line-up had been conducted; who were the persons in
the line-up with the appellants (if there were indeed other persons included in the line-up); and whether the line-up was confined to
persons of the same height and built as the appellants. Lino likewise did not indicate who accompanied Zaldy before and during the line-up,
and whether there had been the possibility of prior or contemporaneous improper insinuations on Zaldy regarding the appearance of the
appellants.
To our mind, Lino’s failure to state relevant details surrounding the police line-up is a glaring omission that renders unreliable Zaldy’s out-
ofcourt identification. No way exists for the courts to evaluate the factors used in determining the admissibility and reliability of out-of-
court identifications, such as the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; the length of time between the crime
and the identification; and the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. The absence of an independent in-court identification by
Zaldy additionally justifies our strict treatment and assessment of Lino’s testimony.
The records also bear out that Nabilgas executed an extrajudicial confession18 at the NBI Main Office, where he implicated the appellants
and Zaldy in the crime charged. During trial, he repudiated this confession, and claimed that he had been tortured by the NBI agents, and
that he was forced to copy a previously prepared statement.
After a careful examination of the evidence on hand, we hold that Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. The Court
has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must satisfy the following requirements: "(1) the confession must be
voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessant's choice; (3) it
must be express; and (4) it must be in writing."19
We point out that Nabilgas was already under custodial investigation by the authorities when he executed the alleged written confession.
"A custodial investigation is understood x x x as x x x any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. x x x It begins when there is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime and the investigation has started to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts
interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.20
In People v. Rapeza,21 we explained that the lawyer called to be present during custodial investigations should, as far as reasonably possible,
be the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer is furnished by the police for the accused, it is important that the
lawyer should be competent, independent and prepared to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from
one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights.
After a close reading of the records, we rule that Nabilgas’ confession was not made with the assistance of a competent and independent
counsel. The services of Atty. Melita Go, the lawyer who acted in Nabilgas’ behalf, were provided by the very same agency investigating
Nabilgas – the NBI itself; she was assigned the task despite Nabilgas’ open declaration to the agency’s investigators that he already had a
lawyer in the person of Atty. Donardo Paglinawan. Atty. Paglinawan confirmed this fact when he stated that he was already representing
Nabilgas at the time his client made the alleged confession. Nabilgas also testified that Atty. Go did not disclose that she was a lawyer when
she was called to assist him; she merely represented herself to be a mere witness to the confession. There was also nothing in the records
to show that Atty. Go ascertained whether Nabilgas’ confession was made voluntarily, and whether he fully understood the nature and the
consequence of his extrajudicial confession and its impact on his constitutional rights.
To be sure, this is not the kind of assistance required of lawyers in a custodial investigation. "An ‘effective and vigilant counsel’ necessarily
and logically requires that the lawyer be present and be able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first
question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession." 22 In addition, the extrajudicial confession of
Nabilgas was not corroborated by a witness who was present at the time the written confession was made. We note in this regard that the
prosecution did not present Atty. Go at the witness stand despite hints made during the early stages of the trial that she would be
presented.
At any rate, Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against the appellants in view of the res inter alios acta rule. This
rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial
confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible against his or her co-accused because it is considered as hearsay against
them.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This
provision states that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy, and during its existence, may be given in evidence
against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. Thus, in order that the admission of
a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other
than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to the common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in
carrying out the conspiracy.23
This exception, however, does not apply in the present case since there was no other piece of evidence presented, aside from the
extrajudicial confession, to prove that Nabilgas conspired with the appellants in committing the crime charged. Conspiracy cannot be
presumed and must be shown as distinctly and conclusively as the crime itself. Nabilgas, in fact, was acquitted by the trial court due to
insufficiency of evidence to prove his participation in the crime.
Sufficiency of the proven
circumstantial evidence
In view of the inadmissibility of Zaldy’s out-of-court identification and Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession, the prosecution’s case rests purely
on circumstantial evidence. Conviction can be secured "on the basis of circumstantial evidence if the established circumstances constitute
an unbroken chain leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion proving that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all
others."24 There can be conviction if the prosecution can establish the appellants’ participation in the crime through credible and sufficient
circumstantial evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that the accused, and none other, committed the imputed crime. 25
"Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the main fact in issue may be inferred based on
reason and common experience. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if the following requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been
established; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances unavoidably leads to a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. These
circumstances must be consistent with one another, and the only rational hypothesis that can be drawn therefrom must be the guilt of the
accused."26
In our view, no doubt exists, based on the appellants' actions, that their primary objective was to rob WSC, and that the killing of Rex was
done on occasion, or by reason, of the robbery: first, Ibañez went to WSC on July 23, 2004, and inquired from Henessy about the schedule
and the rates of the firing range, the amount of the membership fee of the company’s gun club, the days when there are many people in
the firing range, and whether she was the only female employee of the company; second, when Henessy arrived at WSC at 9:00 a.m. on July
26, 2004, Zaldy informed her that he cannot open the front door because his hands were tied; third, Henessy called the company’s
operations manager and informed him that Zaldy had been tied; fourth, the police saw Zaldy handcuffed to the vault when they opened the
back gate; fifth, the police saw the lifeless body of Rex lying on the floor with several gunshot wounds when they entered the firing range;
sixth, the operations manager discovered that 53 guns and several ammunitions had been missing from the gun store, including a .9 mm
Bernardelli with serial number T1102-03E000151 and a .45 Glock 30 with serial number FML 245; seventh, the NBI agents caught Cachuela
trying to sell the .9 mm Bernardelli with serial number T1102-03E000151 in an entrapment operation in Cavite; eighth, the NBI agents
caught Ibañez trying to sell the .45 Glock 30 with serial number FML 245 and a .45 Llama with serial number 04490Z in a follow-up
entrapment operation in Cavite; ninth, Cachuela and Ibañez were unable to explain how they came into possession of the stolen firearms;
tenth, Police Inspector Armin Austria, the PNP Forensic Firearm Examiner, found that the 98 pieces of .45 fired cartridge cases found at the
crime scene were fired from the .45 Llama with serial number 04490Z recovered from Ibañez;27 and finally, Dr. Nulud conducted an autopsy
on the body of Rex, and found that the victim suffered several gunshot wounds on the head, thorax, and abdomen caused by a .45 pistol.
From these established circumstances, the overriding intention of the appellants cannot but be to rob WSC; the killing of Rex was merely
incidental to the robbery. "Intent to rob is an internal act, but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal
property."28 Rex was killed to facilitate the robbery; he was also the person who would have been a witness to the crime. In People v. De
Leon,29 we held that "homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed (a)
to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the
commission of the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime."
In this regard, we cannot overlook the fact that another WSC employee – Zaldy – was not killed, but merely tied to the vault. The Court
cannot second-guess on what could have been behind the malefactors’ decision to spare Zaldy’s life, but we note that Zaldy became one of
the accused in this case after the Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict him in the crime, as the robbery could have
been the result of an "inside job." Unfortunately, Zaldy was unable to testify during trial since the RTC ordered that he be brought to the
National Center for Mental Health for treatment. Accordingly, Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession (which we ruled to be inadmissible) was the
only evidence linking Zaldy to the crime. For lack of evidence, we cannot make any definite conclusion and can only speculate on Zaldy’s
involvement in the crime charged.
We find it worthy to stress that the appellants failed to overcome the disputable presumption that "a person found in possession of a thing
taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act."30 To recall, Ibañez was at WSC two days before the
robbery, asking questions to the company’s secretary. Several days after the robbery, the appellants were caught trying to sell firearms that
were reported stolen from WSC in separate entrapment operations; they could not satisfactorily explain how and why these guns came to
their respective possession. The appellants likewise did not impute ill motive on the part of the arresting officers that would impel the latter
to fabricate evidence against them. These factors lead to no other conclusion than that the appellants, to the exclusion of others, had
robbed WSC.
To our mind, the fact that the cartridge bullet shells found at the firing range (where the lifeless body of Rex had been discovered) matched
with one of the guns recovered from Ibañez during the entrapment operation clinches the case against the appellants insofar as establishing
the nexus between the robbery and the victim’s killing. Notably, the gunshot wounds suffered by Rex also came from the same caliber of
gun31 recovered from Ibañez. In the final analysis, the prosecution sufficiently established the direct and intimate connection between the
robbery and the killing, and that the death of Rex had been committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. When homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as
principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly
appears that they endeavored to prevent the same.32
The penalty and the awarded civil
indemnities

Robbery with homicide is a single indivisible crime punishable with reclusion perpetua to death under paragraph 1, Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. We find that the trial and appellate courts correctly sentenced the appellants to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua only in the absence of any aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime.1âwphi1

We affirm the award of ₱50,000.00 civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 moral damages to the heirs of Rex, as these awards conform to
prevailing jurisprudence on robbery with homicide when the penalty imposed is only reclusion perpetua. 33 We also affirm the award of
₱45,000.00 as actual damages, as the prosecution successfully proved this amount through a receipt.

The CA ordered the appellants to restitute the amount of ₱1,093,947.50, representing of the value of the stolen firearms and ammunitions.
We, however, increase this amount to the total amount of ₱1,481,000.00 as !his is the value of the stolen items as proven by the evidence
on record.34

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 7, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 03474 is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount to be restituted by the appellants to Arms Depot Philippines, Inc. be increased from
₱1,093,947.50 to ₱1,481,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines Evelyn Gan, the stenographic reporter of Prosecutor Lucina Dayaon, jotted down notes during the preliminary investigation. She attests that
SUPREME COURT Bokingco admitted that he conspired with Col to kill Pasion and that they planned the killing several days before because they got "fed up"
Manila with Pasion.14

SECOND DIVISION The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Joven G. Esguerra (Dr. Esguerra), contained the following findings:

G.R. No. 187536 August 10, 2011 1. Marked pallor of lips and nailbeds

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, 2. Body in rigor mortis

vs.
MICHAEL BOKINGO alias "MICHAEL BOKINGCO" and REYNANTE COL, Accused-Appellants.
3. Contusion with hematoma, right medial infraorbital region extending to the right of the root of the nose.

DECISION
4. Contusion with hematoma, left post-auricular region.

PEREZ, J.:
5. Contusion with hematoma, right angle of mandible.

For review is the Amended Decision1 dated 14 November 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00658, finding appellants
Michael Bokingco2 (Bokingco) and Reynante Col (Col) guilty as conspirators beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing 6. Contusion with hematoma, right mandibular region.
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

7. Contusion with hematoma, left occipital region.

On 31 July 2000, an Information3 was filed against appellants charging them of the crime of murder committed as follows:

8. Contusion with hematoma, right fronto-parietal region.

That on or about the 29th day of February, 2000 in the City of Angeles, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed with a claw hammer and with intent
to kill by means of treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of confidence, and nighttime, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and 9. Contusion with hematoma, right supraorbital region.
feloniously attack, assault and maul NOLI PASION, by hitting and beating his head and other parts of his body with said hammer, thereby
inflicting upon said NOLI PASION fatal wounds on his head and body which caused his death. 4
10. Abrasions, linear, confluent, proximal third, right leg anterior 2 ½ x 6 ½ cm.

On arraignment, Bokingco entered a guilty plea while Col pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial, Bokingco confessed to the crime charged.5
11. Contusion with hematoma, left shoulder, level of head of left humerus.

The victim, Noli Pasion (Pasion) and his wife, Elsa, were residing in a house along Mac Arthur Highway in Balibago, Angeles City. Pasion
owned a pawnshop, which formed part of his house. He also maintained two (2) rows of apartment units at the back of his house. The first 12. Stab wound, anterior chest along the anterior median line, 7 cm above the nipple line, 0.8cm length, 0.5 cm wide and 1
row had six (6) units, one of which is Apartment No. 5 and was being leased to Dante Vitalicio (Vitalicio), Pasion’s brother-in-law, while the cm deep, hitting and puncturing the manubrium sterni, not entering the thoracic cavity. Both extremities round.
other row was still under construction at the time of his death. Appellants, who were staying in Apartment No. 3, were among the 13
construction workers employed by Pasion.6
13. 2 stab wounds, non-penetrating, anterior chest, 13 cm to the left of the anterior median line, 3 cm below injury (12) 14
cm the right of the anterior median line 4 ½ on below injury (12). Wound 0.8 cm in length, both extremities round.
The prosecution’s evidence show that at around 1:00 a.m. on 29 February 2000, Vitalicio was spin-drying his clothes inside his apartment
when Pasion came from the front door, passed by him and went out of the back door. 7A few minutes later, he heard a commotion from
Apartment No. 3. He headed to said unit to check. He peeped through a screen door and saw Bokingco hitting something on the floor. Upon 14. Lacerated wound, semi-lunar shape, 3 cm length, left shoulder.
seeing Vitalicio, Bokingco allegedly pushed open the screen door and attacked him with a hammer in his hand. A struggle ensued and
Vitalicio was hit several times. Vitalicio bit Bokingco’s neck and managed to push him away. Bokingco tried to chase Vitalicio but was
15. Lacerated wound, right eyebrow area, C-shaped 2 ½ cm length.
eventually subdued by a co-worker. Vitalicio proceeded to his house and was told by his wife that Pasion was found dead in the kitchen of
Apartment No. 3. Vitalicio went back to Apartment No. 3 and saw Pasion’s body lying flat on the kitchen floor. Pasion and Vitalicio were
brought to the hospital. Pasion expired a few hours later while Vitalicio was treated for his injuries. 8
16. Lacerated wound, lateral angle, right eye, 0.8 cm length.

Elsa testified that she was in the master’s bedroom on the second floor of the house when she heard banging sounds and her husband’s
17. Lacerated wound, right supraorbital region, medial aspect, 2 cm length.
moans. She immediately got off the bed and went down. Before reaching the kitchen, Col blocked her way. Elsa asked him why he was
inside their house but Col suddenly ran towards her, sprayed tear gas on her eyes and poked a sharp object under her chin. Elsa was
wounded when she bowed her head to avoid the tear gas.9 Col then instructed her to open the vault of the pawnshop but Elsa informed 18. Lacerated wound, semi-lunar, 5 cm length, occipital region 5 cm length involving all layers of the scalp with brain tissue
him that she does not know the combination lock. Elsa tried offering him money but Col dragged her towards the back door by holding her seen on the gaping wound.
neck and pulling her backward. Before they reached the door, Elsa saw Bokingco open the screen door and heard him tell Col: "tara, patay
na siya."10 Col immediately let her go and ran away with Bokingco. Elsa proceeded to Apartment No. 3. Thereat, she saw her husband lying
on the floor, bathed in his own blood.11 19. Lacerated wound, 4 cm length, C-shaped 2 ½ cm to the right of injury (18) 1 ½ cm below, wound involving the whole
scalp.

PO3 Quirino Dayrit (PO3 Dayrit) was stationed at Police Station No. 4 in Barangay Salakot, Balibago, Angeles City. At 1:20 a.m. of 29
February 2000, he received a phone call regarding the incident. He, together with a certain P/Insp. Maniago, proceeded to Apartment No. 3 20. Lacerated wound, left post-auricular region, C-shaped 4 cm length, 3 cm length.
and conducted an investigation. He noticed a pool of blood on the cemented floor of the kitchen. He also saw a claw hammer with a green
lead pipe handle approximately 13 inches long near the kitchen sink. A lead pipe measuring 40 inches and a chisel were also found in the
nearby construction site. The police went to Angeles University Medical Center afterwards. PO3 Dayrit saw Pasion lying in one of the beds 21. Lacerated wound left post-auricular region, region of the squamous part of the left temporal bone, C-shaped (2) 3.5 cm
while Vitalicio was still loitering around the emergency room. He approached Vitalicio and Elsa who both informed him of the incident. 12 He and 4 cm lengths.
prepared a police report on the same day narrating the result of his investigation.13
 22. Lacerated wound, right mandibular region 4 cm length, 1 cm wide.
23. Lacerated wound, stellate, 5.5 x 5 x 5 cm, right fronto-parietal region with brain tissue out of the gaping wound.
24. Lacerated wound, right submandibular region 0.3 x 3.5 cm.
25. Lacerated wound, right cheek 0.8 cm length.
26. Depressed, complete fracture, occipital bone right with stellate linear extensions, with gaping, with brain tissue
maseration.
27. Skull fracture, right fronto-parietal region, depressed, complete, C-shaped with linear extensions, with gaping of bone
with brain tissue maceration and expulsion.
28. Hemorrhage, massive, subdural and epidural.
29. Brain tissue damage.15
Dr. Esguerra concluded that the injuries sustained by Pasion on his skull proved fatal.16
Appellants testified on their own behalf. Bokingco recalled that he was sleeping in Apartment No. 3 at around 1:20 a.m. on 29 February
2000 when he was awakened by Pasion who appeared to be intoxicated. The latter wanted to know why he did not see Bokingco at the
construction site on 28 February 2000. When Bokingco replied that he just stayed at the apartment the whole day, Pasion suddenly hit him
in the head. This prompted Bokingco to take a hammer and hit Pasion. They both struggled and Bokingco repeatedly hit Pasion. Bokingco
escaped to Manila right after the incident. He was subsequently arrested in Mindanao on 11 June 2000.17 During the cross-examination,
Bokingco admitted that he harbored ill feelings towards Pasion. 18
Col confirmed that he was one of the construction workers employed by Pasion. He however resigned on 26 February 2000 because of the
deductions from his salary. He went home to Cainta, Rizal, where he was apprehended and brought to Camp Olivas. Upon reaching the
camp, he saw Bokingco who pointed to him as the person who killed Pasion. He insisted that he doesn’t know Bokingco very well.19
On 16 December 2004, the trial court rendered judgment20 finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused MICHAEL BOKINGO alias MICHAEL BOKINGCO and REYNANTE COL guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being the two aggravating circumstances of
nighttime and abuse of confidence to be considered against both accused and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty in
favor of accused Bokingo only, hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of DEATH. Each accused is ordered to indemnify the
heirs of victim Noli Pasion in the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos (P75,000.00) to pay the heirs of the victim Seventeen thousand six
hundred pesos (P17,600.00) as actual damages, Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as attorney’s fees, Twenty five thousand pesos
(P25,000.00) as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.21
In its Decision dated 24 July 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court but reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua
in view of Republic Act No. 7659, thus:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant REYNANTE COL is found GUILTY as conspirator
beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified
by treachery and evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence, with no
mitigating circumstances. The proper imposable penalty would have been death. However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, appellant is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused-appellant is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of victim Noli Pasion in
the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos (₱75,000.00); Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages; Twenty five thousand pesos
(₱25,000.00) as exemplary damages; Twenty five thousand pesos (₱25,000.00) as temperate damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (₱15,000.00)
as attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs.22
Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration23 and called the appellate court’s attention on the omission to rule on Bokingco’s fate when it
rendered the challenged decision. Appellants also noted the absence of other evidence, aside from Bokingco’s admission, to prove that
conspiracy existed in the instant case. Appellants maintained that the admission made by Bokingco cannot be used as evidence against his
alleged co-conspirator. Appellants also took exception to the findings of the lower courts that the aggravating circumstances of treachery,
evident premeditation, nighttime and abuse of confidence attended the commission of the crime. 24
The Court of Appeals merely modified its Decision by including the criminal liability of Bokingco in its dispositive portion of its Amended
Decision, which reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants MICHAEL BOKINGCO and REYNANTE COL are
found GUILTY as conspirators beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of nighttime
and abuse of confidence, with no mitigating circumstances. The proper imposable penalty would have been death. However, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9346, the accused-appellant are sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without the possibility of parole (in
accordance with Section 3 of the said law). Each of the accused-appellants is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of victim Noli Pasion in
the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos (₱75,000.00); Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages; Twenty five thousand pesos
(₱25,000.00) as exemplary damages; Twenty five thousand pesos (₱25,000.00) as temperate damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (₱15,000.00)
as attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs.25
Appellants filed a notice of appeal. In its Resolution dated 26 October 2009, this Court required the parties to submit their Supplemental
Briefs within 30 days from notice thereof if they so desire.26 Appellants manifested that they are no longer filing a Supplemental Brief and
are adopting their arguments in the Appellant’s Brief submitted before the Court of Appeals.27 The appellee likewise manifested that it is
dispensing with the filing of a Supplemental Brief.28The instant case was thus submitted for deliberation.
In seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals’ Amended Decision, two issues were raised: 1) whether the qualifying circumstances were
properly appreciated to convict appellant Bokingco of murder and 2) whether appellant Col is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-
conspirator.
There is no question that Bokingco attacked and killed Pasion. Bokingco made two (2) separate and dissimilar admissions: first, in his
extrajudicial confession taken during the preliminary investigation where he admitted that he and Col planned the killing of Pasion; and
second, when he testified in open court that he was only provoked in hitting Pasion back when the latter hit him in the head. On the basis of
his extrajudicial confession, Bokingco was charged for murder qualified by evident premeditation and treachery.
Appellants maintain that they could not be convicted of murder. They question the presence of treachery in the commission of the crime
considering that no one from the prosecution witnesses testified on how Pasion was attacked by Bokingco. They also submit that evident
premeditation was not proven in the case. They belittle Bokingco’s extrajudicial admission that he and Col planned the killing. The
attendance of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence was likewise assailed by appellants. They aver that
nighttime was not purposely sought but it was merely co-incidental that the crime took place at that time. Neither has trust and confidence
been reposed on appellants by the victim to aggravate the crime by abuse of confidence. Appellants claim that they were living in an
apartment owned by Pasion, not because the latter trusted them but because they worked in the construction of the victim’s apartment.
On the other hand, the OSG emphasizes that the prosecution has established that Pasion was defenseless when fatally attacked by
Bokingco and there was no opportunity for him to defend himself from the unexpected assaults of Bokingco. The OSG agrees as well with
the trial court’s findings that evident premeditation, nighttime, and abuse of confidence attended the commission of the crime.
We agree with appellants that treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the crime to murder in the absence of any proof of the manner in
which the aggression was commenced. For treachery to be appreciated, the prosecution must prove that at the time of the attack, the
victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack
employed by him.29 Nobody witnessed the commencement and the manner of the attack. While the witness Vitalicio managed to see
Bokingco hitting something on the floor, he failed to see the victim at that time. 30
Bokingco admitted in open court that he killed Pasion.31 But the admitted manner of killing is inconsistent with evident premeditation. To
warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish the confluence of the following requisites: (a) the time when the
offender was determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a
sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his
act.32 It is indispensable to show how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. 33 In
the instant case, no proof was shown as to how and when the plan to kill was devised. Bokingco admitted in court that he only retaliated
when Pasion allegedly hit him in the head.34 Despite the fact that Bokingco admitted that he was treated poorly by Pasion, the prosecution
failed to establish that Bokingco planned the attack.
It was during the preliminary investigation that Bokingco mentioned his and Col’s plan to kill Pasion. 35 Bokingco’s confession was admittedly
taken without the assistance of counsel in violation of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself and must be shown as clearly as the
commission of the crime.44

In People v. Sunga,36 we held that "the right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be deemed ‘critical stages’ in the
criminal process. The preliminary investigation can be no different from the in-custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsa’s testimony that appellants fled together after killing her husband and the extrajudicial
part in a preliminary investigation will be subjected to no less than the State's processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing confession of Bokingco.
those who might be liable for criminal prosecution."37 In said case, Sunga made an uncounselled admission before the police. He later
acknowledged the same admission before the judge in a preliminary investigation. Sunga was thrust into the preliminary investigation and
while he did have a counsel, for the latter’s lack of vigilance and commitment to Sunga’s rights, he was virtually denied his right to counsel. Nobody witnessed the commencement of the attack. Col was not seen at the apartment where Pasion was being attacked by Bokingco. In
Thus, the uncounselled admission was held inadmissible.38 In the instant case, the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against Bokingco fact, he was at Elsa’s house and allegedly ordering her to open the pawnshop vault, thus:
because he was not assisted at all by counsel during the time his confession was taken before a judge.

Q: Do you remember any unusual incident that happened on that time and date when you were in your master’s bedroom?
The finding that nighttime attended the commission of the crime is anchored on the presumption that there was evident premeditation.
Having ruled however that evident premeditation has not been proved, the aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot be properly
appreciated. There was no evidence to show that Bokingco purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense. A: I heard a bumping sound (kalabog) at the back portion of our building where we reside.

Abuse of confidence could not also be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this case. Taking into account that fact that Bokingco xxxx
works for Pasion, it may be conceded that he enjoyed the trust and confidence of Pasion. However, there was no showing that he took
advantage of said trust to facilitate the commission of the crime.
Q: What did you do when you heard those sounds in the wee hours of the morning on that day when you were in your
master’s bedroom?
A downgrade of conviction from murder to homicide is proper for Bokingco for failure of the prosecution to prove the presence of the
qualifying circumstances.
A: I wondered why and I immediately went down to the kitchen since the door of the kitchen was directly leading to the back
door or back portion of the building where the apartments were situated.
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the applicable penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance alleged and proven in the instant case, the penalty should be applied in its medium period pursuant to Article
64(1) of the Revised Penal Code, which ranges from a minimum of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to a maximum of 17 years and 4 months. Q: Why, on what floor is this master’s bedroom located?
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty shall be within the range of prision mayor in any of its periods as
minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium period as the maximum. The range of prision mayor is from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years,
while reclusion temporal in its medium period, ranges from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. Therefore, the A: Second floor.
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum is appropriate under the circumstances.39 The award of exemplary damages should be deleted as no aggravating circumstance
Q: Were you actually able to go down and see what was happening?
was proven.

A: Yes, sir, but I was only able to reach the stairs leading to the kitchen. I was not able to go out of the kitchen because I was
Col, on the other hand, was charged as a co-conspirator. He contends that to hold him guilty as co-conspirator, it must be established that
blocked.
he performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Applying Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, Col asserts that Bokingco’s
uncounselled testimony that appellants planned to kill Pasion bears no relevance considering the fact that there was no other evidence
which will prove the conspiracy. Col also claims that Elsa’s statements during trial, such as the presence of Col inside her house and his
Q: You were blocked by whom?
forcing her to open the vault of the pawnshop, as well as the alleged statement she heard from Bokingco "Tara, patay na siya," are not
adequate to support the finding of conspiracy.
A: By Reynante Col.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) justifies Col’s conviction of murder by conspiracy by mentioning that starting from the declaration
of Bokingco, the victim’s wife, Elsa, also positively declared that Col blocked and attacked her with a knife when she tried to check on her Q: Are you referring to the same Reynante Col, the accused in this case?
husband. She was left alone by Col when he was told by Bokingco that the victim was already dead. For the OSG, appellants’ acts are
indicative of conspiracy. The OSG contends that the prosecution witnesses had no ill-motive to lie and falsely accuse appellants of the crime
of murder. A: Yes, sir.

The lower courts concluded that there was conspiracy between appellants. xxxx

We disagree. Q: You said you were blocked by Reynante Col. How did he block you?

This Court is well aware of the policy to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the trial court, owing to their unique opportunity A: As soon as I reached the stairs, I was blocked by Reynante Col and he was situated near the back door of the pawnshop.
to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. 40 However, this rule admits There is a pawnshop in the front portion of our residence.
of exceptions, namely: 1) when the trial court’s findings of facts and conclusions are not supported by the evidence on record, or 2) when
certain facts of substance and value likely to change the outcome of the case have been overlooked by the lower court, or 3) when the
assailed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts.41 The second exception obtains in this case. Q: When you saw him near the door of your pawnshop, did you confront him?

Indeed, in order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the case before us, it is necessary that conspiracy between him and A: Yes, sir.
Bokingco be proved. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit an unlawful act. It may be inferred
from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, Q: How did you confront him?
concerted action, and community of interest.42 Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential to
establish the existence of conspiracy.43
A: I asked him, Reynante, what are you doing here?
Q: What was the reaction of Reynante Col? Q: When you offered him money so he will not kill you, did he agree?

A: He ran towards me and sprayed something into my eyes and he put a sharp object under my chin. (Witness demonstrating A: No, sir.
by putting her hand under her chin)

Q: What else happened next when he did not agree to your offer of money?
Q: How far was he before he attacked you?

A: He dragged me going towards the back door.46

A: Probably, from the witness stand up to the chair of Fiscal Hilario. Maybe two steps away from him. (Around 3 meters)

Based on these acts alone, it cannot be logically inferred that Col conspired with Bokingco in killing Pasion. At the most, Col’s actuations can
Q: Were you able to identify what this spray is and what part of your body was hit? be equated to attempted robbery, which was actually the initial information filed against appellants before it was amended, on motion of
the prosecution, for murder.47

A: My eyes were sprayed with tear gas.

Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion had been killed and that they had to leave the place. This does not prove
that they acted in concert towards the consummation of the crime. It only proves, at best, that there were two crimes committed
Q: What did you feel when your eyes was (sic) sprayed with tear gas? simultaneously and they were united in their efforts to escape from the crimes they separately committed.

A: It was "mahapdi" (painful). Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already killed Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves
were not coordinated because while Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting to rob the
pawnshop.1avvphi1
Q: When you felt pain in your eyes, how were you able to see something or a sharp weapon under your chin?

In as much as Bokingco’s extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against him, it is likewise inadmissible against Col, specifically where he
A: Before he sprayed the tear gas to my eyes, I was able to see him poke the sharp object under my chin and I bowed my implicated the latter as a cohort. Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
head a little to avoid the tear gas. I was wounded under my chin and I felt the sharpness of the object.45 declaration or omission of another. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on
the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused, and is considered as hearsay against them. 48 An exception to the res inter
alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act or declaration of the
xxxx conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator provided that the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than by such act or declaration. 49 In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received
against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself;
Q: What else happened while he was doing that to you? second, the admission relates to the common object; and third, it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy.50 As we have previously discussed, we did not find any sufficient evidence to establish the existence of conspiracy. Therefore,
the extrajudicial confession has no probative value and is inadmissible in evidence against Col.
A: He sprayed tear gas in my eyes and told me to be silent.

Bokingco’s judicial admission exculpated Col because Bokingco admitted that he only attacked Pasion after the latter hit him in the head.
Q: What else, if any, did he tell you?

All told, an acquittal for Col is in order because no sufficient evidence was adduced to implicate him.
A: To open the combination of the vault.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00658 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Q: Did you comply to his order that you open the combination of the vault?
Appellant Reynante Col is ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt. The Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause the immediate release
of accused-appellant, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court of action taken within ten (10) days from
notice.
A: No, sir. I do not know the combination.

Appellant Michael Bokingco is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the
Q: What vault are you referring to?
penalty of six years (6) and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum Appellant is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Noli Pasion in the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos (₱75,000.00);
A: Vault of the pawnshop. Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages; Twenty five thousand pesos (₱25,000.00) as temperate damages; Fifteen thousand
pesos (₱15,000.00) as attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs.

Q: Where is that pawnshop located with reference to your residence?

SO ORDERED.

A: At the first floor is the pawnshop and at the back is our kitchen.

Q: When you refused to open the vault of the pawnshop, what did Reynante Col do about it?

A: He did not say anything.

Q: How about you, was there anything else you did?

A: I offered him money so he will not kill me.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 185710 January 19, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ROMULO TUNIACO, JEFFREY DATULAYTA and ALEX ALEMAN, Accused.
ALEX ALEMAN, Appellant.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the requirements of a valid extrajudicial confession and the establishment of the existence of corpus delicti in murder
cases.
The Facts and the Case
The city prosecutor of General Santos City charged the accused Romulo Tuniaco, Jeffrey Datulayta, and Alex Aleman with murder before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City in Criminal Case 8370.
Based on the findings of the RTC, in the morning of June 13, 1992 some police officers from the Lagao Police Sub-Station requested police
officer Jaime Tabucon of the Central Police Station of General Santos City homicide division to take the statement of accused Alex Aleman
regarding the slaying of a certain Dondon Cortez. On his arrival at the sub-station, Tabucon noted the presence of Atty. Ruperto Besinga, Jr.
of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) who was conversing with those taken into custody for the offense. When queried if the suspects would
be willing to give their statements, Atty. Besinga said that they were.
Some other police officer first took the statement of accused Jeffrey Datulayta. Officer Tabucon next took the statement of accused
Aleman, whom he observed to be in good physical shape.
Before anything else, officer Tabucon informed accused Aleman in Cebuano of his constitutional right to remain silent and to the assistance
of counsel of his own choice and asked him if he was willing to give a statement. Aleman answered in the affirmative. When asked if he had
any complaint to make, Aleman said that he had none. When Aleman said that he had no lawyer, Tabucon pointed to Atty. Besinga who
claimed that he was assisting all the suspects in the case. Tabucon warned Aleman that anything he would say may be used against him
later in court. Afterwards, the police officer started taking down Aleman’s statement.
Accused Aleman said that in the course of a drinking bout with accused Datulayta and Tuniaco at around 9 p.m. on June 6, 1992, Dondon
Cortez threatened to report his drinking companions’ illegal activities to the police unless they gave him money for his forthcoming
marriage. According to Aleman, Datulayta and Tuniaco had already planned to kill Cortez in Tupi, South Cotabato, for making the same
threats and now they decided to do it. They got Cortez drunk then led him out supposedly to get the money he needed.
The three accused brought Cortez to Apopong near the dump site and, as they were walking, accused Aleman turned on Cortez and stabbed
him on the stomach. Accused Datulayta, on the other hand, drew out his single shot homemade M16 pistol 1 and shot Cortez on the head,
causing him to fall. Datulayta handed over the gun to Aleman who fired another shot on Cortez’s head. Accused Tuniaco used the same gun
to pump some bullets into Cortez’s body. Then they covered him with rice husks.
After taking down the statement, Tabucon explained the substance of it to accused Aleman who then signed it in the presence of Atty.
Besinga.
On June 15, 1992 the police brought Aleman to the City Prosecutor’s Office where he swore to his statement before an assistant city
prosecutor. In the afternoon, accused Datulayta and Aleman led Tabucon, the city prosecutor, and a police inspector, to the dump site
where they left their victim’s body. After some search, the group found a spot covered with burnt rice husks and a partially burnt body of a
man. About a foot from the body, they found the shells of a 5.56 caliber gun and an armalite rifle.
On being arraigned, all three accused, assisted by Atty. Besinga, pleaded not guilty to the murder charge. After the prosecution rested its
case, accused Tuniaco filed a demurrer to evidence which the Court granted, resulting in the dismissal of the case against him. On being re-
arraigned at his request, accused Datulayta pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of Homicide. The trial court sentenced him to imprisonment
of six years and one day and to pay ₱50,000.00 to the victim’s family.
For some reason, the trial court had Aleman subjected to psychiatric examination at the Davao Mental Hospital. But, shortly after, the
hospital sent word that Aleman had escaped. He was later recaptured. When trial in the case resumed, Aleman’s new PAO lawyer raised the
defense of insanity. This prompted the court to require the Provincial Jail Warden to issue a certification regarding Aleman’s behavior and
mental condition while in jail to determine if he was fit to stand trial. The warden complied, stating that Aleman had been observed to have
good mental condition and did not commit any infraction while in jail.
Although the prosecution and defense stipulated that Atty. Besinga assisted accused Aleman during the taking of his extrajudicial
confession, the latter, however, recanted what he said to the police during the trial. He testified that sometime in 1992, some police officers
took him from his aunt’s house in Purok Palen, Labangal, General Santos City, and brought him to the Lagao police station. He was there
asked to admit having taken part in the murder of Cortez. When he refused, they tortured him until he agreed to sign a document admitting
his part in the crime.
Accused Aleman also testified that he could not remember having been assisted by Atty. Besinga during the police investigation. He even
denied ever knowing the lawyer. Aleman further denied prior association with accused Tuniaco and Datulayta. He said that he met them
only at the city jail where they were detained for the death of Cortez.
On October 8, 2001 the RTC rendered judgment, finding accused Aleman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The court also ordered him to pay death indemnity of ₱70,000.00 and moral
damages of ₱50,000.00 to the heirs of Cortez.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC 00311, the court rendered judgment on January 21, 2008, affirming the decision of
the RTC with the modification that directed accused Aleman and Datulayta to indemnify the heirs of Cortez, jointly and severally, in the
amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages; and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary
damages. Aleman appealed to this Court.
The Issues Presented
Accused Aleman raises two issues: a) whether or not the prosecution was able to present evidence of corpus delicti; and b) whether or not
accused Aleman’s extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence.
The Rulings of the Court
1. Corpus delicti has been defined as the body, foundation, or substance of a crime. The evidence of a dead body with a gunshot wound on
its back would be evidence that murder has been committed.2 Corpus delicti has two elements: (a) that a certain result has been
established, for example, that a man has died and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for it. 3 The prosecution is burdened to
prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence. 4
The defense claims that the prosecution failed to prove corpus delicti since it did not bother to present a medical certificate identifying the
remains found at the dump site and an autopsy report showing such remains sustained gunshot and stab wounds that resulted in death;
and the shells of the guns used in killing the victim.
But corpus delicti need not be proved by an autopsy report of the dead victim’s body or even by the testimony of the physician who
examined such body.5 While such report or testimony is useful for understanding the nature of the injuries the victim suffered, they are not
indispensable proof of such injuries or of the fact of death.6 Nor is the presentation of the murder weapons also indispensable since the
physical existence of such weapons is not an element of the crime of murder. 7
Here, the police authorities found the remains of Cortez at the place pointed to by accused Aleman. That physical confirmation, coming
after his testimony of the gruesome murder, sufficiently establishes the corpus delicti of the crime. Of course, that statement must be
admissible in evidence.
2. There is no reason for it not to be. Confession to be admissible must be a) voluntary; b) made with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel; c) express; and d) in writing.8 These requirements were met here. A lawyer, not working with or was not beholden to
the police, Atty. Besinga, assisted accused Aleman during the custodial investigation. Officer Tabucon testified that he saw accused Aleman,
before the taking of his statement, conversing with counsel at the police station. Atty. Besinga did not dispute this claim.
Aleman alleges torture as the reason for the execution of the confession. The appellate court is correct in ruling that such allegation is
baseless. It is a settled rule that where the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of violence was presented, all these will be considered
as indicating voluntariness.9 Here, although Aleman claimed that he bore torture marks on his head, he never brought this to the attention
of his counsel, his relatives, or the prosecutor who administered his oath.

Accused Aleman claims, citing People v. Galit,10 that long questions followed by monosyllabic answers do not satisfy the requirement that
the accused is amply informed of his rights. But this does not apply here. Tabucon testified that he spoke to Aleman clearly in the language
he knew. Aleman, joined by Atty. Besinga, even signed a certification that the investigator sufficiently explained to him his constitutional
rights and that he was still willing to give his statement.

Further, Aleman asserts that he was lacking in education and so he did not fully realize the consequences of a confession. But as the CA said,
no law or jurisprudence requires the police officer to ascertain the educational attainment of the accused. All that is needed is an effective
communication between the interrogator and the suspect to the end that the latter is able to understand his rights. 11 This appears to have
been done in this case.

Moreover, as the lower court noted, it is improbable that the police fabricated Aleman’s confession and just forced him to sign it. The
confession has details that only the person who committed the crime could have possibly known. 12 What is more, accused Datulayta’s
confession corroborate that of Aleman in important details. Under the doctrine of interlocking confessions, such corroboration is
circumstantial evidence against the person implicated in it.131avvphi1

The Court notes that, when it modified the award of civil damages to the heirs of Cortez, the CA made both accused Aleman and Datulayta,
jointly and severally liable, for the damages as modified. But the appeal by one or more of several accused cannot affect those who did not
appeal, except if the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to them. 14 Here accused Datulayta pleaded guilty to the
lesser offense of homicide and the trial court ordered him to pay only ₱50,000.00 in civil indemnity to the heirs of Cortez. The CA erred in
expanding that liability when he did not appeal from his conviction. 15

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Court AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals’ judgment in CA-G.R. CR-HC 00311 dated January 21, 2008 against
accused Alex Aleman. The Court, however, DELETES from such judgment the portion increasing the civil liability of accused Jeffrey Datulayta
who did not appeal from the RTC decision against him.

SO ORDERED.