RAZON vs TAGITIS

WRIT OF AMPARO

The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts
at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt
from this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the individual
situations require. The second is to address the disappearance, so that the life of
the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security restored. In these
senses, our orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing efforts that
are not truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is
fully addressed by the complete determination of the fate and the whereabouts
of the victim, by the production of the disappeared person and the restoration of
his or her liberty and security, and, in the proper case, by the commencement of
criminal action against the guilty parties.

INTERNATIONAL LAW THAT ADDRESSES FORCED DISAPPEARANCE

1. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced

Disappearance
In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice of enforced
disappearance had become a global phenomenon, the UN General Assembly
adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance (Declaration).[104] This Declaration, for the first time, provided in
its third preambular clause a working description of enforced disappearance, as
follows:
Deeply concerned that in many countries, often in a persistent manner,
enforced disappearances occur, in the sense that persons are arrested, detained
or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by
officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized
groups or private individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct
or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government, followed by a refusal
to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, which places such persons outside
the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
 2. UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Convention)

Fourteen years after (or on December 20, 2006), the UN General Assembly
adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance (Convention).[105] The Convention was opened for
signature in Paris, France on February 6, 2007.[106] Article 2 of the Convention
defined enforced disappearance as follows:
For the purposes of this Convention, enforced disappearance is
considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation
of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the
protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]

The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert that there is
a right not to be subject to enforced disappearance[107] and that this right is non-
derogable.[108] It provides that no one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance
under any circumstances, be it a state of war, internal political instability, or any
other public emergency. It obliges State Parties to codify enforced disappearance
as an offense punishable with appropriate penalties under their criminal law. [109] It
also recognizes the right of relatives of the disappeared persons and of the society
as a whole to know the truth on the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared and on
the progress and results of the investigation.[110] Lastly, it classifies enforced
disappearance as a continuing offense, such that statutes of limitations shall not
apply until the fate and whereabouts of the victim are established.[111]

3. UN DECLARATION

Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the Court is
guided, in acting on Amparo cases, by the reality that the Philippines is a member
of the UN, bound by its Charter and by the various conventions we signed and
ratified, particularly the conventions touching on humans rights. Under the UN
Charter, the Philippines pledged to promote universal respect for, and observance
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race,
sex, language or religion.[112]Although no universal agreement has been reached on
the precise extent of the human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed to all
by the Charter,[113] it was the UN itself that issued the Declaration on enforced
disappearance, and this Declaration states:[114]
Any act of enforced disappearance is an offence to dignity. It is condemned as
a denial of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and as a grave
and flagrant violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms
proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed and
developed in international instruments in this field. [Emphasis supplied]

As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy matter made
in a UN Declaration, the ban on enforced disappearance cannot but have its effects
on the country, given our own adherence to generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land.[115]
4. State Practice and Opinio Juris

5. In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the

Philippines v. Duque III,[116] we held that:
6.
7. Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere
of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere
constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force
of domestic law. [Emphasis supplied]
8.
9. We characterized generally accepted principles of international law as
norms of general or customary international law that are binding on all
states. We held further:[117]
10.
11.[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even
if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in
international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result
from the combination [of] two elements: the established, widespread, and
 consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element
known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity).
Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring
it. [Emphasis in the original]
12.
13.The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law today
is Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which
provides that the Court shall apply international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law.[118] The material sources of custom
include State practice, State legislation, international and national judicial
decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern
of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs, and
resolutions relating to legal questions in the UN General
Assembly.[119] Sometimes referred to as evidence of international
law,[120] these sources identify the substance and content of the
obligations of States and are indicative of the State practice and opinio
juris requirements of international law.[121
5. Specific Sources

First, barely two years from the adoption of the Declaration, the
Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly adopted the Inter-
American Convention on Enforced Disappearance of Persons in June
1994.[122] State parties undertook under this Convention not to practice, permit, or
tolerate the forced disappearance of persons, even in states of emergency or
suspension of individual guarantees.[123] One of the key provisions includes the
States obligation to enact the crime of forced disappearance in their respective
national criminal laws and to establish jurisdiction over such cases when the crime
was committed within their jurisdiction, when the victim is a national of that State,
and when the alleged criminal is within its territory and it does not proceed to
extradite him, which can be interpreted as establishing universal jurisdiction
among the parties to the Inter-American Convention.[124] At present, Colombia,
Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela have enacted separate laws in
accordance with the Inter-American Convention and have defined activities
involving enforced disappearance to be criminal.[125]

Second, in Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights has no

explicit provision dealing with the protection against enforced disappearance. The
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), however, has applied the Convention in
a way that provides ample protection for the underlying rights affected by enforced
disappearance through the Conventions Article 2 on the right to life; Article 3 on
the prohibition of torture; Article 5 on the right to liberty and security; Article 6,
paragraph 1 on the right to a fair trial; and Article 13 on the right to an effective
remedy. A leading example demonstrating the protection afforded by the European
Convention is Kurt v. Turkey,[126] where the ECHR found a violation of the right to
liberty and security of the disappeared person when the applicants son disappeared
after being taken into custody by Turkish forces in the Kurdish village of Agilli in
November 1993. It further found the applicant (the disappeared persons mother) to
be a victim of a violation of Article 3, as a result of the silence of the authorities
and the inadequate character of the investigations undertaken. The ECHR also saw
the lack of any meaningful investigation by the State as a violation of Article
13.[127]

Third, in the United States, the status of the prohibition on enforced

disappearance as part of customary international law is recognized in the most
recent edition of Restatement of the Law: The Third,[128] which provides that [a]
State violates international law if, as a matter of State policy, it practices,
encourages, or condones (3) the murder or causing the disappearance of
individuals.[129] We significantly note that in a related matter that finds close
identification with enforced disappearance the matter of torture the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Court held in Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala[130] that the prohibition on torture had attained the status of customary
international law. The court further elaborated on the significance of UN
declarations, as follows:
 These U.N. declarations are significant because they specify with great
precision the obligations of member nations under the Charter. Since their
adoption, "(m)embers can no longer contend that they do not know what human
rights they promised in the Charter to promote. Moreover, a U.N. Declaration is,
according to one authoritative definition, "a formal and solemn instrument,
suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting importance are
being enunciated. Accordingly, it has been observed that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights "no longer fits into the dichotomy of binding treaty
against non-binding pronouncement,' but is rather an authoritative statement of the
international community." Thus, a Declaration creates an expectation of
adherence, and "insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice,
a declaration may by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding
upon the States." Indeed, several commentators have concluded that the Universal
Declaration has become, in toto, a part of binding, customary international law.
[Citations omitted]
Fourth, in interpreting Article 2 (right to an effective domestic remedy) of
the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the
Philippines is both a signatory and a State Party, the UN Human Rights
Committee, under the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, has
stated that the act of enforced disappearance violates Articles 6 (right to life), 7
(prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) and
9 (right to liberty and security of the person) of the ICCPR, and the act may also
amount to a crime against humanity.[131]

Fifth, Article 7, paragraph 1 of the 1998 Rome Statute establishing the

International Criminal Court (ICC) also covers enforced disappearances insofar as
they are defined as crimes against humanity,[132] i.e., crimes committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population, with knowledge of
the attack. While more than 100 countries have ratified the Rome Statute,[133] the
Philippines is still merely a signatory and has not yet ratified it. We note that
Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute has been incorporated in the statutes of other
international and hybrid tribunals, including Sierra Leone Special Court, the
Special Panels for Serious Crimes in Timor-Leste, and the Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia.[134] In addition, the implementing legislation of State
Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC has given rise to a number of national
criminal provisions also covering enforced disappearance.[135]
 While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the
Convention on enforced disappearance (or by the specific terms of the Rome
Statute) and has not formally declared enforced disappearance as a specific crime,
the above recital shows that enforced disappearance as a State practice has
been repudiated by the international community, so that the ban on it is now
a generally accepted principle of international law, which we should consider a
part of the law of the land, and which we should act upon to the extent already
allowed under our laws and the international conventions that bind us.

MIJARES vs. RANADA

Is foreign judgment enforced in foreign Court be automatically recognized?

1. No existing Law
2. Accepted Customary Int’t law

As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted to a
review of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of personal notice, collusion, fraud,
or mistake of fact or law. The limitations on review is in consonance with a strong and
pervasive policy in all legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and
issues.[32] Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party
expectations resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of
defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation
of the same disputes, and in a larger sense to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrers
Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: rest and quietness. [33] If every judgment of
a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on
his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded
litigation.[34]

Whatever be the theory as to the basis for recognizing foreign judgments, there can be
little dispute that the end is to protect the reasonable expectations and demands of the
parties. Where the parties have submitted a matter for adjudication in the court of one
state, and proceedings there are not tainted with irregularity, they may fairly be
expected to submit, within the state or elsewhere, to the enforcement of the judgment
issued by the court. [58]

There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that

requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure
for the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form
part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those
[66]

customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination two

elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of
States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a
belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a
rule of law requiring it. [67]

The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment in this

country merely due to an exhorbitant assessment of docket fees is alien to
generally accepted practices and principles in international law. Indeed, there
are grave concerns in conditioning the amount of the filing fee on the
pecuniary award or the value of the property subject of the foreign decision.
Such pecuniary award will almost certainly be in foreign denomination,
computed in accordance with the applicable laws and standards of the
forum. The vagaries of inflation, as well as the relative low-income capacity
[72]

of the Filipino, to date may very well translate into an award virtually
unenforceable in this country, despite its integral validity, if the docket fees for
the enforcement thereof were predicated on the amount of the award sought
to be enforced. The theory adopted by respondent judge and the Marcos
Estate may even lead to absurdities, such as if applied to an award involving
real property situated in places such as the United States or Scandinavia
where real property values are inexorably high. We cannot very well require
that the filing fee be computed based on the value of the foreign property as
determined by the standards of the country where it is located.
Secretary of Justice vs Lantion

We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant
controversy: Would private respondents entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the
Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in
the affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due process clause
in the Constitution?

First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon
the constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the
Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the
grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign
relations.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of
international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in
good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also
compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of
the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules
applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed.,
p. 12).

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local

courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between
a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local
state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both
since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the
generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation
Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law,
1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a
choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law,
jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts
(Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230
[1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs
of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga &
Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been made part of the law of
the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or
municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in
most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with,
but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex
posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may
repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as
the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they
are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.).

In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or
national law? En contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pitted
against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld.
Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as
implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights
of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the
procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the
judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing
are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is
silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests
this silence.

Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he

describes the evaluation procedure as an "ex parte technical assessment" of the
sufficiency of the extradition request and the supporting documents.

We disagree.

In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An
application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go
against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law
precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American
jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate
extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even
request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state,
and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right
(35 C.J.S. 410).

Mark Jimenez has right to due process

PIMENTEL vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Treaty Making Process

The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation,

signature, ratification, and exchange of the instruments of ratification.
The treaty may then be submitted for registration and publication
under the U.N. Charter, although this step is not essential to the
validity of the agreement as between the parties.

Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he

now usually assigns this task to his authorized representatives. These
representatives are provided with credentials known as full powers,
which they exhibit to the other negotiators at the start of the formal
discussions. It is standard practice for one of the parties to submit a
draft of the proposed treaty which, together with the counter-
proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent negotiations. The
negotiations may be brief or protracted, depending on the issues
 involved, and may even collapse in case the parties are unable to
come to an agreement on the points under consideration.

If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty,
the same is opened for signature. This step is primarily intended as a
means of authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of
symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does
not indicate the final consent of the state in cases where
ratification of the treaty is required. The document is ordinarily
signed in accordance with the alternat, that is, each of the several
negotiators is allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring
home to his own state.

Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state
confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its
representatives. The purpose of ratification is to enable the
contracting states to examine the treaty more closely and to give
them an opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they find it
inimical to their interests. It is for this reason that most treaties
are made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of
the government other than that which negotiated them.

xxx

The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the

instruments of ratification, which usually also signifies the effectivity
of the treaty unless a different date has been agreed upon by the
parties. Where ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity clause
is embodied in the treaty, the instrument is deemed effective upon its
signature.

DOCTRINE: HEAD OF STATE/CHIEF ARCHITECT

It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in
the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate,
however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to
the ratification.[20] Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to
submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification,
refuse to ratify it.[21] Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been
signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, [22] such
decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be
encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction
over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official
duties.[23] The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by
the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the
government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.

LIM vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant to
the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith."14 Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to "invoke
the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."15

INTERPRETATION

The first question that should be addressed is whether "Balikatan 02-1" is covered by the Visiting
Forces Agreement. To resolve this, it is necessary to refer to the V FA itself: Not much help can be
had therefrom, unfortunately, since the terminology employed is itself the source of the problem. The
VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in "activities," the exact
meaning of which was left undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of
undertakings subject only to the approval of the Philippine government.8 The sole
encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States
personnel must "abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and
in particular, from any political activity."9 All other activities, in other words, are fair game.

We are not left completely unaided, however. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which
contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements, state:

SECTION 3. INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES

Article 31

General rule of interpretation

1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith ill accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the tenus of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
 2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to
the text, including its preamble and annexes:

(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;

(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to
the party .

3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:

(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation
of the treaty or the application of its provisions;

(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;

(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties.

4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.

Article 32

Supplementary means of interpretation

Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory

work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning
resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the
interpretation according to article 31 :

(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or

(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd unreasonable.

RUBRICO vs ARROYO (occurred 2007)

1. We don’t recognized Customary Intl Law as Sources of Criminal Law

2. 2 Existing Laws of Command Responsibility
a. RA 985 - Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide,
and Other Crimes Against Humanity". – WONT APPLY and NOT YET EFFECTIVE; This
Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in the Official
Gazette or in two (2) newspapers general circulation. July 27, 2009
b. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10353 - Anti-Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance Act of 2012;
July 23, 2012
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the
development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas,
command responsibility, in its simplest terms, means the responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or
other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict.[14] In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal
complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command
responsibility,[15] foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior
accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in
his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is an
omission mode of individual criminal liability, whereby the superior is made
responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or
punish the perpetrators[16] (as opposed to crimes he ordered).
The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statute[17] of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) to which the Philippines is signatory. Sec. 28 of
the Statute imposes individual responsibility on military commanders for crimes
committed by forces under their control. The country is, however, not yet formally
bound by the terms and provisions embodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate
has yet to extend concurrence in its ratification.[18]

While there are several pending bills on command responsibility,[19] there is

still no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine. [20]
[20]
The attempt of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to incorporate said doctrine in the Bill of Rights
that would have obliged the State to compensate victims of abuses committed against the right to life by
government forces was shot down, on the ground that the proposal would violate a fundamental principle
of criminal liability under the Penal Code upholding the tenet nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege (there
is no crime when there is no law punishing it). I Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, pp. 753-
54.