Article 80

People vs. Sarcia

GR No. 169641

September 10, 2009

Facts:

Five year old AAA together with her cousin and two other playmates were playing in the yard near a
mango tree. Appellant Richard Sarcia, who was alleged to be a minor at the time of the commission of
the crime, appeared and invited AAA to go with him at the backyard, whereupon appellant removed
AAA’s shorts and underwear, made her lie on her back and after removing his own trousers and brief
laid on top of AAA and made up-and-down movements which caused AAA to feel pain in her genital
area and in her stomach. Unknown to appellant, AAA’s cousin followed them and watched the whole
incident from a distance. AAA’s cousin reported such incident to AAA’s mother. AAA’s father filed a
complaint for acts of lasciviousness which upon review of evidence was upgraded to rape by the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.

Issue:

Whether or not the sentence of conviction of the accused-appellant should be suspended

Ruling:

No. Under Section 38 of the Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006),
suspension of sentence of minors can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is
already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. Sec. 40
of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age
of 21. To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had been
promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to
the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic. However, accused-appellant shall be entitled
to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of
convicted children in agricultural camps and other training facilities.

Article 89

People vs. Bayotas

GR No. 102007

September 2, 1994

Facts:
Rogelio Bayotas was charged with Rape and was eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991.
Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital
due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma
gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the
criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with
regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.

Issue:

Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish both his criminal
and civil liability

Ruling:

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the
civil liability based solely thereon. The death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." Corollarily, the claim for civil liability
survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, the SC holds that the
death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the
act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.

Article 91

Sermonia v. CA

GR No. 109454

June 14, 1994

Facts:

Petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was charged with bigamy for contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes
Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid and
subsisting. He contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has been obliterated by prescription. He
avers that since the second marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar
in 1975, such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record and thus constitutes notice to the
whole world. The offended party therefore is considered to have had constructive notice of the
subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription commenced to run on the day the marriage
contract was registered. For this reason, the corresponding information for bigamy should have been
filed on or before 1990 and not only in 1992.

Issue:

Whether or not the crime of bigamy has prescribed

Ruling:

No. To compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof would
amount to almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the
bigamous marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by its registration, the offender
however is not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority and those concerned the
existence of his previous subsisting marriage. It is therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period
for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was
discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agency.