CHAPTER 4.

SECTION 7
EXISTENTIAL IMPORT AND THE INTERPRETATION OF CATEGORICAL
PROPOSITIONS

EXISTENTIAL IMPORT

Categorical propositions are the building blocks of arguments,

and our aim throughout is to analyze and evaluate arguments. To do
this we must be able to diagram and symbolize the A, E, I, and O
propositions. Furthermore, the analysis of syllogisms do not require
that the complications of this controversy be mastered. It does
require that the interpretation of categorical propositions that
emerges from the resolution of the controversy be understood (Copi,
et al.).

What is Existential Import?

It must be seen that some propositions have existential

import, and some do not. A proposition is said to have existential
import if it typically is uttered to assert the existence of objects of
some kind. Existential import is an attribute of those propositions
that normally assert theexistence of objects of some specified kind.
Particular propositions (I and O propositions) always have
existential import; thus the proposition “Some dogs are obedient”
asserts that there are dogs. Whether universal propositions (A and E
propositions) have existential import is an issue on which the
Aristotelian and Boolean interpretations of propositions differ.

It has to be noted that the existential import of a proposition

means that the classes or subject term are not empty, meaning
there is actual existence. Hence, simply put, statement has Existential
import when it implies that one or more things denoted by the subject
term actually exist or if the truth of the proposition requires a belief in the
existence of members of the subject class.

EXAMPLE 1 EXAMPLE 2
SUBJECT TERM: SUBJECT TERM: 1. UNICORNS
Johnny Depp'movies (A) (A)
ACTUAL EXISTENCE? - YES ACTUAL EXISTENCE? - NO
HAS EXISTENTIAL IMPORT HAS NO EXISTENTIAL
 Why should this seemingly abstruse matter be of concern to
the student of logic? Because the correctness of the reasoning in
many arguments is directly affected by whether the propositions of
which those arguments are built do, or do not, have existential
import. We must arrive at a clear and consistent interpretation of
categorical propositions in order to determine with confidence what
may be rightly inferred from them (Copi, et. al).

To Further illustrate, consider the following examples:

1. All Johnny Depp’s movies are hits.

2. All Unicorns are one-horned animals.
Interpretation of Categorical Propositions

There are two rival interpretations of categorical propositions,

the Aristotlean which is traditional and the Boolean which is
recognized by modern logicians.

In Aristotelian logic as discussed and illustrated in the

traditional square of opposition in the preceding chapter, the truth I
and O propositions follow validly from A and E propositions by sub-
alternation. As a result, Aristotelian logic requires A and E
propositions to have existential import, because a proposition with
existential import cannot be derived from a proposition without
existential import.

From the Aristotelian standpoint, a universal proposition

implies existence of its subject, if the proposition is about existing
things (things that everyone recognizes as existing). To illustrate, in
the classic example of a universal proposition, “All unicorns have
horns”, also implies the truth that “Some unicorns have horns”.
Another example would be, "All coyotes are animals," implies that
coyotes exist; but "All werewolves are animals," does not imply that
werewolves exist because there are no werewolves.

For the modern logician or mathematician, this is an

unacceptable result because modern mathematics and logic often
deal with empty or null sets or with imaginary objects. George
Boole, a nineteenth-century English mathematician, argued that we
cannot infer the truth of the particular proposition from the truth of
its universal proposition, because every particular proposition
asserts the existence of its subject class. To say the “Some
unicorns have horns” means that there must be at least one unicorn
because traditional logic permits the inference from the universal
proposition, “All Unicorns have horns”, and that would imply that
there really are unicorns.

Furthermore, the Boolean standpoint, universal propositions

does not imply the existence of the subject. Thus, "All cars are
manually-driven,” does not imply the existence cars or, ”No werewolf
is a lion," does not imply the existence of any werewolf.

The chief difference between these 2 schools of thought is

existential import, mainly for Universal propositions (A and E).
Existential Import is an attribute of those propositions that normally
assert the existence of objects of some specified kind. To say that a
statement has existential import is when its truth depends on
evidence for the existence of things in a certain category. In the
case of categorical prepositions, the existence of things in the
category signified by its subject and predicate terms.

To differentiate both views further, while traditional logic

requires UNIVERSAL PROPOSITION A and E to have existential
import, modern logic does not. However, both views agree that
PARTICULAR PROPOSITION (E and I) make claims about actually
existing things; thus the proposition “Some Lawyers are Nurses”
asserts that there are lawyers.

The table below shows a summary of the comparison between the Aristotlean and
Boolean logic.

The Rejection of Existential Import in Modern Logic

 One of the most significant reasons existential import is
rejected by logicians have to do with the nature of universal claims

ARISTOTLEAN / TRADITIONAL BOOLEAN / MODERN VIEW

VIEW
Both AGREE that Particular Propositions (I and O) have EXISTENTIAL IMPORT
“SOME” denotes EXISTENCE
Universal Propositions carry no
As long as the universal
proposition is about existing existential import; they never imply
things, then the statements the existence of things being talked
have existential import about

EXAMPLES:
1. All eagles are birds.
2. No pinetrees are maples.
3. All fairies have magical abilities.
1.Does not imply existence of
1. Implies existence of eagles.
eagles.
2. Implies existence of pine trees
2.Does not imply existence of

and our understanding of what it means to say of a proposition that

Boolean standpoint does not, even when

when things exist, the the statement is about things that exist
Aristotelian standpoint
recognizes their existence,
We CANNOT infer the truth of a
The truth of the UNIVERSAL
PARTICULAR PROPOSITION from the
implies the truth of the
truth of a UNIVERSAL PROPOSITION
corresponding PARTICULAR

it is false. Starting with the latter, ask yourself what would have to
be the case about the world for you to claim that an A type
proposition is false.

Consider the statement “All offenders are rebels". To claim

that the statement is false, we need to know that there is at least
one non-rebel offender. The one who makes the said claim will
argue that it is true that “All offenders are rebels” and the counter
argument will be “No, not all offenders are rebels, for here is an
offender that is a soldier ." Supposing in the total absence of any
offenders, against the claim that all offenders are rebels, what sort
of evidence would be produced if there are no offenders at all. In the
absence of any evidence for a falsifying instance to the universal
claim, you should accept the claim. Extend that reasoning to
universal claims about empty classes and non-existent objects,
Universal claims about empty sets are all true, because there are no
falsifying instances.

Another reason for adopting the modern approach toward

existential import, related to the previous one, has to do with the
interpretation of a universal claim. Instead of seeing a universal
claim as one about the members of 2 sets, modern logic sees A and
E type propositions as universally quantified conditionals. "All S's
are P's" is understood by the modern logician as saying "For any
object x, if x has property S, then x has property P". Suppose there
are no S's in the universe. Then, no matter what value we assign to
x, "x has property S" will be false. But a conditional with a false
antecedent is true, so a universal conditional whose subject class is
empty is true.

To illustrate:

If A and E validly imply their corresponding I and O

then:
A and O = cannot be contradictories
I and O = cannot be subcontraries

Example: Inhabitants of Venus are beautiful.

CONTRADICTORIES:
A: ALL Inhabitants of Venus are beautiful. (T/F)
O: SOME Inhabitants of Venus are not beautiful. (T/F)
 BUT IF WE ASSERT THEIR EXISTENTIAL IMPORT:

A: ALL Inhabitants of Venus are beautiful. (F)

O: SOME Inhabitants of Venus are not beautiful. (F)

The Blanket Existential Presupposition

The awkward consequences of the traditional square of

opposition is said to be rehabilitated by “presupposition” by
insisting that in ALL propositions, the classes to which they refer to are
NOT EMPTY. It is the assumption of the existence of the entities named by
the speaker.

Example: ”Oscar’s bag is heavy”

(we can presuppose that Oscar exists and that he has a heavy car)

For a proposition to be true or false is for it to have existential

presupposition. That is, questions about the truth or falsehood of
propositions and about the logical relations holding among them,
are inadmissible and may be reasonable answered only if we
presuppose that they never refer to empty classes. In the way, the
relationship set forth in the traditional square of opposition may be
saved: A and E will remain contraries, I and O will remain sub-
contraries, sub-alterns will follow validly from their superalterns and
A and O will remain contradictories as will I and E. According to
Copi, in order to achieve this result, it must be acknowledged that
all classes designated by your terms are not empty.

It is moreover, a presupposition in full accord with the ordinary

use of modern languages such as English in very many cases. To say
that “dinosaurs do not exist anymore”, we can neither say that our
example proposition is true nor is it false but that simply should not
be asserted at all . For another thing, we can do and make
propositions and arguments out of propositions whose existential
presuppositions are never granted. If we would preclude the truth
and falsity of our example proposition and the argument that would
have it as a component. Also, there are presuppositions we make
wherein the terms therein are intended to be empty. If we demand
for existential presupposition for our propositions to be
appropriately made, it will be inconsistent with ordinary discourse.
 For these reasons, modern logicians are not willing the grant
the requirement existential presupposition as a blanket requirement
for the property of propositions.

The problem with the notion of presupposition:

1. The preservation of A, E, I and O relations as NON EMPTY will

reduce their power to formulate assertions that we may need to
formulate.

2. The
ordinary use of
our language is
inconsistent with
the existential

IF WE WILL PRESUPPOSE THAT(T) THERE ARE INHABITANTS OF VENUS

A: ALL Inhabitants of Wakanda are black and beautiful.
THE SQUARE WILL REMAIN:
I: SOME Inhabitants of Wakanda are black and beautiful. (T) A and E = contradictories

E: NO Inhabitants of Wakanda are black and beautiful. (F)

I and O = subcontraries
O: SOME Inhabitants of Wakanda are not black and
beautiful. (F)
A and O / I and E = contradictories

presupposition.

3. In Science and other theoretical spheres, we often wish to reason

without making any presuppositions about existence.

To illustrate presupposition to save the traditional square, we take a

look at the following example:

Some inhabitants of Venus are not beautiful.

All inhabitants of Venus are beautiful.
 BOOLEAN INTERPRETATION OF CATEGORICAL PROPOSITIONS

The Boolean interpretation of categorical propositions, which

is adopted in this chapter, solves the dilemma by denying that
universal propositions have existential import. The idea of
existential import basically means that when S is a subject that
does not exist, the relationships between the different categorical
propositions break down so that the only thing left to differentiate
them is contradiction.
The Boolean
Square of

opposition as presented above is interpreted as follows:

1. Only the particular propositions—“I” and “O”—have existential

import. This means that only “I” and “O” propositions make
existence claims

Examples:
a) “Some courtrooms are new” (I)
b) “Some courtrooms are not new” (O)

Both propositions are FALSE if the S class is empty

2. The Universal Propositions, A and E, are the contradictories of the

particular
propositions, O and I.
 Examples:
a) “All professors are lawyers” (A) contradicts “Some
professors are not
lawyers” (O)
b) “No students are sleepy” (E) contradicts “Some students are
sleepy”

3. Universal propositions are interpreted as having no existential

import. Even when
the class is empty, and “A “proposition can be true as well as an
“E” proposition.

Examples:
“All Trolls are singers” (A) and “No Trolls are singers” (E) may
both be true
even if there are no trolls. But if there are Trolls, the I and O
propositions are
false.

4. In ordinary discourse, we utter a universal proposition with which

we do intend to assert existence. The Boolean Interpretation
requires propositions to assert this.

a) A particular one (I or O) that is existential in force

b) Universal proposition (A or E) that is not existential

Example:
“All planets in our solar system revolve around the sun has
existential import. It says only that if there is a planet in our solar
system, then it revolves around the sun. if we express he
proposition intending also to assert the existence of
planets in our solar system that do so revolve, we would need
to add: “Mars is
a planet in our solar system”.

This proposition has that desired existential force, referring as

it does to
actually existing planets.

5). A and E propositions can be both be true and are therefore not
contraries.
 Example: A proposition “All unicorns have wings” and E
proposition
“No unicorns have wings” can indeed be true if there are no
unicorns.

6). I and O propositions are not subcontraries. The reason is that

corresponding I and O propositions, if they do have existential
import, can both be false if the subject class is empty.

Example: I proposition “Some unicorns have wings” and O

proposition “Some
unicorns do not have wings” can both be false if the subject
class is empty.
Therefore they are not subcontraries.

7.) In subalteration inferring an I proposition from its corresponding

A and O proposition from its corresponding E is not valid. This is
because plainly, one may not validly infer a proposition that has
existential import from one that does not.

8.) Conversion for E and for I proposition is reserved; contraposition

for A and O proposition is preserved; obversion for any proposition is
preserved. But conversion by limitation and contraposition by
limitation are not valid.

9). Relations along the sides of the square are undone, but the
diagonal, contradictory relations remain in force.
 S

Existential Fallacy

The existential fallacy, or existential assumption, is a formal

fallacy. It refers to any mistake in reasoning that arises from
assuming illegitimately that some class has members. In the
existential fallacy, one presupposes that a class has members when
one is not supposed to do so; i.e., when one should not assume
existential import. For example:

Existential Import No Existential Import

There are black swans. There are no ghosts.

"There are black swans" implies that the class of black swans
is not empty, whereas "There are no ghosts" implies that the class
of ghosts is empty. To reason from premisses that lack existential
import for a certain class to a conclusion that has it is to commit
the Existential Fallacy.

Consider another example, "Every unicorn definitely has a horn

on its forehead". It does not imply that there are any unicorns at all
in the world, and thus it cannot be assumed that, if the statement
were true, somewhere there is a unicorn in the world (with a horn on
its forehead). The statement, if assumed true, implies only that if
there were any unicorns, each would definitely have a horn on its
forehead.
CHAPTER 4. SECTION 8

SYMBOLISM AND DIAGRAMS FOR CATEGORICAL PROPOSITIONS

Comparison between the Traditional Square of Opposition and

Modern Square of Opposition:

TRADITIONAL :

MODERN :

In Boolean interpretation, the “All” may refer to possibly

empty classes. For example, if a property owner were to say,
“All trespassers will be prosecuted ” far from presupposing that
the class of trespassers has members, he would be intending
to ensure that the class will become and remain empty. This
statement can be true even if no one is ever prosecuted and
the word “all” in that statement refers to empty class.
 The word “some” is interpreted to mean “at least one” but
never “zero” and that concreteness commits particular
propositions, if they are to be true, to a state of affairs in
which the subject class is not empty. If the property owner,
suppose he had asserted that “Some trespassers will be
prosecuted”. If there were no trespassers, then we would call
his statement false.

Symbolism for Categorical Propositions

• Zero symbol (0) – used to represent an empty class. To say that the class designated by
the term has no members, we write an equal sign between S and O (S=0). Thus, the
equation S=0 says that there are no S’s or that S has no members.

• Inequality sign – symbolize denial. To say that the class designated

by S does have members is to deny that S is empty. To assert that
there are S’s is to deny the proposition symbolized by S=0. Thus
the inequality S0 says that there are S’s by denying that S is
empty.

• SP – used to represent the class of all things that belong to both of

them. For example letter S designates the class of all satires and
the letter P designates the class of all poems, then the class of all
things that are both satires and poems is represented by the
symbol SP, which thus designates the class of all satirical poems.
The common part or common membership of two classes is called
Product orbiter section of the two classes. In the given example
the product is the class of all satirical poems.

The table below shows the symbolic representations for each of the
categorical propositions:

Symbolic Representation of Categorical Proposition

FORM PROPOSITION
SYMBOLIC EXPLANATION
REPRESENTATION

A All S is P
• Says that all members
of class S are also
member of the class P.
That is, there are no
SP = 0
members of the class
S that that are not
members of P or “No S
is non- P”

• Says that no members

E No S is P
of the class S are the
members of class P.
SP = 0 This can be rephrased
by saying that the
product of the two
classes is empty

I Some S is P
• The I proposition
“Some S is P”, says
that at least one
member of S is also a
SP0
member of P.  This
means that the
product of the classes
S and P is not empty.

• “Some S is not P”,

obverts to the logically
O Some S is non P SP 0 equivalent to I
propositions, “Some S
is non-P”.

Diagram for Categorical Propositions: The Venn Diagram

The modern interpretation of categorical logic permits a more

convenient way of assessing the truth-conditions of categorical
propositions, by drawing Venn diagrams, topological representations
of the logical relationships among the classes designated by
categorical terms.

The Venn diagram was first designed in 1880, by John Venn,

who also names the set of logical diagrams. When the Venn diagram
was first published in the paper On the Diagrammatic and
Mechanical Representation of Propositions and Reasoning, John
Venn aimed to show that propositions can be represented, in a new,
very different way, with the use of diagrams. Their format was a
logical one and in fact the whole principle of the Venn diagram is
based on is a logics linked one.
 The Venn diagram actually represents a set of diagrams which
are used to show the logical connections between different sets of
objects. It is a series of circles (most often three) that overlap to
show the possibilities of various data sets. This doesn’t mean that
all of the possibilities exist or that they even have a basis for
existence just that it is theoretically possible for these different
sets to combine in a variety of ways with many different outcomes.

Any class is represented with an unmarked circle, labeled with

the term that designates the class. The class S is diagrammed with
a simple circle, as shown in the figure below. The figure is of a
class, not a proposition. It represents the class S, but it says
nothing about it. The area inside the circle represents the extension
of the categorical term, and the area outside the circle its
complement. Thus, members of the class designated by the
categorical term would be located within the circle, and everything
else in the world would be located outside it.

To diagram the standard-form categorical proposition, two

circles are required. As shown below, it a pair of intersecting circles
 S P

which we may use as the skeleton or framework for diagramming

any standard form categorical proposition whose subject and
predicate terms are symbolised by S and P.

The next figure below shows the 4 regions in a 2 circle Venn

S P

SP (1) SP SP (3)
(2)

SP

Diagram. Regions (1) and (2) represent the extension of the S in the
universe. Regions (2) and (3) represent the extension of the P’s.
Region (4) represents the extension of everything that is neither S
nor P.
 In this diagram, we observe that:
1. The objects in region 1 are S's but not P’s
2. Region 2 are both S's and P’s
3. Those in region 3 are P's but not S’
4. Those in region 4 are neither S's nor P's.

Notice that no matter which terms S and P represent, every

object in the the universe properly belongs in exactly one of the
regions.

To represent categorical propositions using Venn Diagrams, there

are two rules apply:

1) Shading a region indicates that that region

S
is empty, the term in that region has no
extension. This represents the
proposition, “There are no S’s”.

2) Placing a bar or an x in a region indicates that the term in that

region has some extension, the region is not empty. This represents
the proposition, “There are S’s”. An x outside the circle would
indicate that there is at S least one member of the
complementary class.

If a region is neither shaded nor empty you cannot legitimately

draw any inferences about whether the region is occupied or empty.

Using these 2 rules, we get the

following basic Venn diagrams for our 4
basic categorical propositions:

1. A Proposition (All S's are P's)

Region 1 of the diagram is shaded because if "All S's are P's" then
there are no S's that are non-P's, that is, region 1 is empty.

2. E Proposition (No S's are P’s)

Region 2 is shaded because if “No S’s are P’s” then there are no
members of the class S that are members
of class P. There are no things that belong
to both classes.

3. I Proposition (Some S's are P's)

An “x” is placed in Region 2 to indicate that the region is not empty.

That at least one member of of S is also a member of P.

4. O Proposition (Some S's are not P’s)

An “x” is placed in Region 1 to indicate there is at least one thing

inside of S and outside of P.