EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

People of the Philippines vs Cayat

In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any other liquor outside of their
customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then
charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the
constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal protection afforded by the
constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or “mark them as inferior or less capable race and less
entitled” will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians from Christians.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.

HELD: No. The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable classification. The SC emphasized that it
is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as
an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;

(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical,
distinctions. It is not based upon “accident of birth or parentage.” The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as
“an inferior or less capable race.” On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards
them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian
brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has
endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with
the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality from Drinking Gin

G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994

Ishmael Himagan, petitioner
vs People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Hilario Mapayo, respondents
Ponente: Kapunan

Facts:
Himagan is policeman assigned with the medical company of the PNP Regional Headquarters as Camp Catitigan, Davao City, and was
implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar Jr., and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the infromations were filed,
RTC Davao issued as order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case.

October 11, 1993, Himagan filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension relying on the Civil service Decree that his suspension
should be limited to 90 days. But respondent Judge denied the motion pointing out under section 47 of RA 6975, the accused shall be
suspended from office until his case is terminated. The motion for reconsideration of the order was denied also, hence this certiorari and
mandamus to set aside the orders of respondent Judge.
Held:
First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than
that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more
shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the
same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first
sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time
frame within which the trial should be finished.

Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of
preventive suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in criminal cases, as here. In the instant case. Petitioner is charged
with murder under the Revised Penal Code and it is undisputed that he falls squarely under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 which categorically
states that his suspension shall last until the case is terminated.

The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a member of the PNP charged with grave
felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment and which suspension continues until the case against
him is terminated.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively
insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law
which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on
inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the
instant case. If the classification is based on real and substantial differences; is germane to the purpose of the law; applies to all
members of the same
class; and applies to current as well as future conditions, the classification may not be impugned as violating the Constitution's equal
protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such as that which
exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000]

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs. HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his
capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of
Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the Superintendent of International School-Manila; and
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry
discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The
point is that employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long honored in this jurisdiction. That is a
principle that rests on fundamental notions of justice. That is the principle we uphold today.

Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational
institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.[1] To enable the School
to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the
School to

employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such
personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will
be enacted for the protection of employees.

Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires
and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a
local hire:

a.....What is one's domicile?

b.....Where is one's home economy?

c.....To which country does one owe economic allegiance?

d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible for bringing that individual to the
Philippines?[2]

Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is classified as a local hire; otherwise, he or she is
deemed a foreign-hire.

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes,
and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School
justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor"
and (b) limited tenure. The School explains:

A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his home country, leave his family and friends, and take the risk of
deviating from a promising career path-all for the purpose of pursuing his profession as an educator, but this time in a foreign land. The
new foreign hire is faced with economic realities: decent abode for oneself and/or for one's family, effective means of transportation,
allowance for the education of one's children, adequate insurance against illness and death, and of course the primary benefit of a basic
salary/retirement compensation.

Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is confronted again with the same economic reality after his term: that he will eventually
and inevitably return to his home country where he will have to confront the uncertainty of obtaining suitable employment after a long
period in a foreign land.

The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international level in terms of attracting
competent professionals in the field of international education.[3]

When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner International School Alliance of
Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members"[4] of the School, contested the
difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included
in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.

On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the
parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On June
10, 1996, the DOLE Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in favor
of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an Order
dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.

Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher
salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.

The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members, numbering 38 in all, with nationalities other than
Filipino, who have been hired locally and classified as local hires.[5]The Acting Secretary of Labor found that these non-Filipino local-
hires received the same benefits as the Filipino local-hires:

The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to all, regardless of race. Truth to tell, there are foreigners who
have been hired locally and who are paid equally as Filipino local hires.[6]

The Acting Secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary rates:

The principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find application in the present case. The international character of the School requires
the hiring of foreign personnel to deal with different nationalities and different cultures, among the student population.

We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries and benefits accorded to foreign hired personnel which system is
universally recognized. We agree that certain amenities have to be provided to these people in order to entice them to render their
services in the Philippines and in the process remain competitive in the international market.

Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited contract of employment unlike the local hires who enjoy security of
tenure. To apply parity therefore, in wages and other benefits would also require parity in other terms and conditions of employment
which include the employment contract.

A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the conditions and provisions for salary and professional compensation wherein
the parties agree as follows:

All members of the bargaining unit shall be compensated only in accordance with Appendix C hereof provided that the Superintendent
of the School has the discretion to recruit and hire expatriate teachers from abroad, under terms and conditions that are consistent with
accepted international practice.

Appendix C of said CBA further provides:

The new salary schedule is deemed at equity with the Overseas Recruited Staff (OSRS) salary schedule. The 25% differential is
reflective of the agreed value of system displacement and contracted status of the OSRS as differentiated from the tenured status of
Locally Recruited Staff (LRS).

To our mind, these provisions demonstrate the parties' recognition of the difference in the status of two types of employees, hence, the
difference in their salaries.

The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an established principle of constitutional law
that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A
classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a
substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own
in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of the School.
[7]

We cannot agree.

That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these
evils. The Constitution[8] in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment
of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The
very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."

International law, which springs from general principles of law,[9] likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include
principles of equity,[10] i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable.[11] The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,[12] the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,[13] the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,[14] the Convention against Discrimination in Education,[15] the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation[16] - all embody the general principle
against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this
principle as part of its national laws.

In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by
the employer are all the more reprehensible.

The Constitution[17] specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted to
the physical workplace - the factory, the office or the field - but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.

The Constitution[18] also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code[19]
provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit
and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities,
closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.[20]

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and
penalizes[21] the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work of equal value. Article 248
declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization.

Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra, in Article 7 thereof, provides:

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work,
which ensure, in particular:

a.....Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:

i.....Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed
conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;
x x x.

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work."
Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid
similar salaries.[22] This rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding.

The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires.[23] The Court
finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these
employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than
the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury.
The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.

The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently
or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working
conditions.

The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without
violating the principle of equal work for equal pay.

"Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or recompense for services performed." Similarly, the Philippine
Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the "[c]onsideration paid at regular intervals for the rendering of services." In Songco v.
National Labor Relations Commission,[24] we said that:

"salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or industry in another man's business. Whether it be
derived from "salarium," or more fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it carries with it the fundamental idea of
compensation for services rendered. (Emphasis supplied.)

While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-
hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same
reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates.
The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which
are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.

The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare,"[25] "to afford labor full protection."[26]
The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital.[27] These relations are not merely
contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the
common good.[28] Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down
these stipulations.

In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of
foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-
hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly,
does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.

We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.

A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees,
consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the
collective bargaining provisions of the law."[29] The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of
the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or
similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)
similarity of employment status.[30] The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the
combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.[31]

It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective
bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires
have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working
conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires. These benefits, such as housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify
the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group
the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the
practice of respondent School of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.

SO ORDERED.

GARCIA v. DRILON
G.R. No. 179267
June 25, 2013
699 SCRA 352

FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity emotionally wounded private
respondent which spawned several quarrels that left respondent wounded. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take away their children and deprive
her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from him. After she
confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This deprived her of access to full information about their businesses. Hence,
no source of income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against respondent and her children and
issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA 9262.

Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children
(VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners.

Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause.

RULING: No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against classification. The
non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy
and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed
differences between men and women.
RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of domestic violence,
undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering
women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are
substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or
middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in
the 1987 Constitution.

DUMLAO VS. COMELEC [95 SCRA 392; L-52245; 22 JAN 1980]

Facts: Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52 as discriminatory and contrary to equal
protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Sec. 4 provides that any retired elective provicial or municipal official who
has received payments of retirement benefits and shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he
seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. According to Dumlao, the
provision amounts to class legislation. Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52,
which states that any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including those amounting to subversion,
insurrection, rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any of the offices covered by the act, or to participate in any
partisan activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing
of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie
evidence of such fact.

Issue: Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the Constitution and thus, should be declared null and void

Held: In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains constitutional and valid. The constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. One class can be treated differently from another class. In
this case, employees 65 years of age are classified differently from younger employees. The purpose of the provision is to satisfy the
“need for new blood” in the workplace. In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it should be declared null and void for being
violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused. “Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous
with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running
for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one
is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty
and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person
disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a
person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to
hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).”

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and
present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from
offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.

Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative
body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a
person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be
substituted for a judicial determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable
from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.

Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid and that portion of the second
paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.

Philippine Judges Association vs Pete Prado

Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) to withdraw franking privileges from certain
government agencies. Franking privilege is a privilege granted to certain agencies to make use of the Philippine postal service free of
charge.

In 1992, a study came about where it was determined that the bulk of the expenditure of the postal service comes from the judiciary’s
use of the postal service (issuance of court processes). Hence, the postal service recommended that the franking privilege be withdrawn
from the judiciary. AS a result, the PPC issued a circular withdrawing the said franking privilege.

The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular and questioned the validity of Section 35 of RA 7354. PJA claimed that
the said provision is violative of the equal protection clause.

ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is valid.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The judiciary needs the franking privilege
so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense allotted to the judiciary’s franking needs. The Postmaster
cannot be sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is
untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should
have removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the problem is the loss of revenues from the franking
privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government, including those who do not need it. The problem
is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those
favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the
Constitution.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction (it is true
that the postmaster withdraw the franking privileges from other agencies of the government but still, the judiciary is different because
its operation largely relies on the mailing of court processes). This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for
example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty
of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant
the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of
justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of
Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the
Judiciary for such privilege.

League of Cities v. Comelec

Action:These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the
constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities
from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
Fact: During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not
act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009
amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into
a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel,
“the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact
that they are incapable of fiscal independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to
exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th
Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it
to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a
common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in
February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on
various dates from March to July 2007 without the President’s signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve
of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the
same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application,
because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code
and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national
taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality
into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and
was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed
in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would
still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

.R. NO. 181973 : April 17, 2013

AMELIA AQUINO, RODOLFO TAGGUEG, JR.,* ADELAIDA HERNANDEZ and LEOPOLDO BISCOCHO, JR., Petitioners, v.
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision2 dated 29
August 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91743 be set aside. In the assailed decision, the CA reversed the 10
August 2005 Decision3 and 15 September 2005 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 55, Manila.

Background of the case

The Congress of the Philippines passed on 21 August 19895 Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758 entitled "An Act Prescribing a Revised
Compensation and Position Classification in the Government and for Other Purposes" otherwise known as The Salary Standardization
Law.

Before the law, or on 31 August 1979, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of Implementation No. 97 (LOI No. 97),
authorizing the implementation of standard compensation position classification plans for the infrastructure/utilities group of
government-owned or controlled corporations. On the basis thereof, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) issued Memorandum Circular
No. 57-87 dated 1 October 1987 which granted to its officials holding managerial and supervisory positions representation and
transportation allowance (RATA) in an amount equivalent to 40% of their basic salary.6chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Thereafter, on 23 October 1989, PPA issued Memorandum Circular No. 36-89, which extended the RATA entitlement to its Section
Chiefs or heads of equivalent units, Terminal Supervisors and senior personnel at the rate of 20% of their basic pay.7 And, on 14
November 1990, PPA issued Memorandum Circular No. 46-90, which adjusted effective 1 January 1990, the RATA authorized under
Memorandum Circular No. 36-89, from 20% to 40% based on the standardized salary rate.8chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The continued validity of the RATA grant to the maximum ceiling of 40% of basic pay finds support from the Opinions9 rendered by
the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), Department of Justice.

Finding justification in the increase in salary due these officials brought about by the standardization mandated by R.A. No. 6758, PPA
paid RATA differentials to its officials.
The Commission on Audit (COA) Corporate Auditor, however, in a letter dated 14 November 1990, addressed to PPA, disallowed in
post-audit the payment of the RATA differentials. It likewise disallowed in audit the grant of RATA to PPA Section Chiefs or heads of
equivalent units, Terminal Supervisors and senior personnel occupying positions with salary grades of 17 and above who were
appointed after the effectivity of R.A. No. 6758.

The COA called PPA's attention to Memorandum No. 90-679 dated 30 October 1990 which provides that "LOImp No. 97 series of 1979
implementing Compensation and Position Classification for Infrastructure/Utilities for GOCC is replaced by Section 16 of R.A. No.
6758."10chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In view of the disallowances, the affected PPA officials, represented by the OGCC, filed a petition before the Supreme Court claiming
their entitlement to the RATA provided for under LOI No. 97. The case was docketed as G.R. NO. 100773 entitled "Philippine Ports
Authority v. Commission on Audit, et al."11chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In a decision dated 16 October 1992, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the COA and declared that an official to be entitled to the
continued RATA benefit under LOI No. 97 must be an incumbent as of 1 July 1989 and more importantly, was receiving the RATA
provided by LOI No. 97 as of 1 July 1989.

As a result of the aforesaid ruling, there are at present two categories of managers and supervisors at the PPA. The first category is
composed of PPA officials who were occupying their positions and actually receiving the 40% RATA under LOI No. 97 as of 1 July
1989 and who continue to receive such benefit. The second category consists of officials who were not incumbents as of 1 July 1989 or
were appointed or promoted to their positions only after 1 July 1989. The second category officials therefore receive a lesser RATA
under the General Appropriations Act although they hold the same rank, title and may have the same responsibilities as their
counterparts in the first category.

The Case

On 26 July 2000, petitioners, who are second category PPA officials filed a Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition before the RTC of
Manila, raffled to Branch 55. They claim anew that they are entitled to RATA in the amount not exceeding 40% of their respective basic
salaries. They anchor their petition on recent developments allegedly brought about by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, et al.12 which was decided almost six (6) years after the Court's decision in PPA v. COA, et al.13
They further claim that certain issuances were released by the COA and the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), which in
effect, extended the cut-off date in the grant of the 40% RATA, thus entitling them to these benefits.

PPA filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata under paragraph (f), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. It argued that a case
involving the same parties, subject matter and cause of action had already been resolved by this Court in PPA v. COA, et
al.14chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Finding merit in PPA's motion, the RTC ordered the dismissal of the petition in an Order dated 8 November 2000. The dispositive
portion of the Order reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED, and the Petition in this case is hereby DISMISSED
on the ground that it is already barred by the principle of res judicata.15chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Petitioners elevated the case before the Supreme Court by way of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court,
however, in a Resolution16 dated 28 March 2001 referred the case to the CA for appropriate action. The case was docketed as CA G.R.
SP No. 64702.

On 31 July 2002, a decision was rendered by the CA on the referred case. It declared that the principle of res judicata is not applicable to
the case. The appellate court explained that the existence of DBM and COA issuances which entitle herein petitioners to the grant of
RATA is the pertinent fact and condition which is material to the instant case taking it away from the domain of the principle of res
judicata.17 When new facts or conditions intervene before the second suit, furnishing a new basis for the claims and defenses of the
party, the issues are no longer the same; hence, the former judgment cannot be pleaded as a bar to the subsequent action.18 At the time
judgment was rendered in the previous case, the fact and condition now in existence, which consist of the DBM and COA issuances, has
not yet come about. In view of the issuances, petitioners are faced with an entirely separate facts and conditions, which make the
principle of res judicata inapplicable.19 The decision ordered the remand of the case to the court of origin for continuation of
proceedings.

After due proceedings in the trial court, a decision in favor of petitioners was rendered on 10 August 2005. The dispositive portion of
the decision commanded respondent PPA to pay the claim for RATA equivalent to 40% of petitioners' standardized basic salaries
authorized under LOI No. 97, commencing from their respective dates of appointments or on 23 October 2001 when the case of Irene V.
Cruz, et al. v. COA20 was promulgated by the Supreme Court, whichever is later.

The trial court ratiocinated that "when the Supreme Court En Banc ruled on 23 October 2001 in the IRENE CRUZ case that The date of
hiring of an employee cannot be considered as a substantial distinction, the so-called first (sic) category managers and supervisors
whose appointments thereto were made after 01 July 1989 and who were effectively deprived of the 40% RATA on account of the
Supreme Court's ruling in the PPA v. COA, et al. case have established a clear legal right to claim the 40% RATA under LOI No. 97
commencing on 23 October 2001, and the correlative legal duty of respondent PPA to pay the same; thus, entitling petitioners who are
qualified to avail of the extraordinary remedy of mandamus."21chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

PPA raised the matter before the CA which docketed the case as CA G.R. SP No. 91743. In a decision dated 29 August 2007, the
appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and held:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the August 10, 2005 Decision and the September 15, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 55, National Capital Judicial Region, Manila, are hereby REVERSED. Accordingly, the Amended Petition in Civil Case No. 00-
98161 is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.22chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the appellate court in a resolution dated 29 February 2008.

Hence, this petition assailing the 29 August 2007 decision of the CA and its 29 February 2008 resolution.

Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues for resolution:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE TAKING INTO
CONSIDERATION THE FINAL DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA. G.R. SP NO. 64702.

II. WHETHER OR NOT PPA IN DENYING THE CLAIM OF PETITIONERS FOR 40% RATA HAS COMMITTED A VIOLATION
OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION; AND

III. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO 40% RATA AND SHOULD NOT BE MADE TO REFUND THE
RATA THEY HAD ALREADY RECEIVED.

Petitioners' Argument

Petitioners submit that the decision of the CA in CA G.R. SP No. 64702 adequately cited jurisprudence and authorities on the matter
involving the issue of res judicata. Such decision of the appellate court was not appealed by the PPA and as such, has attained finality. In
view thereof, petitioners allege that the case of PPA v. COA, et al.23 can no longer serve as a ground for the dismissal of the instant case
since such would result in "the sacrifice of justice to technicality."24chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Petitioners further submit that the CA in its decision in CA G.R. SP No. 91743 may have overlooked the significance of the Supreme
Court's ruling in the case of De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, et al.25 which extended the prescribed date of effectivity of R.A. No.
6758 from 1 July 1989 to 31 October 1989, viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In the present case under scrutiny, it is decisively clear that DBM-CCC No. 10, which completely disallows payment of allowances and
other additional compensation to government officials and employees starting November 1, 1989 is not a mere interpretative or internal
regulation. It is something more than that. And why not, when it tends to deprive government workers of their allowances and additional
compensation sorely needed to keep body and soul together. x x x

Petitioners claim that the DBM, which is the agency tasked to implement R.A. No. 6758, amplified this extension in its 4 May 1992
letter to the Administrator of the National Electrification Administration (NEA). The pertinent portion of the letter
reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

DBM has authorized certain GOCCs/GFIs to grant also to officials and employees hired between the period of July 1, 1989 and October
31, 1989 the allowances and fringe benefit enumerated in said Item 5.5 of CCC No. 10.

At this juncture it is pertinent to point out that although the effectivity date prescribed in R.A. No. 6758 is July 1, 1989, said Act and its
implementing circulars were formally promulgated only in the later part of October 1989. The preparation of all required documents,
more particularly the Index of Occupational Services (IOS) and the Position Allocation List (PAL) for the GOCCs/GFIs was completed
at much later date. Thus, within the period of transition from July 1, 1989 up to the date of completion of all the required documents for
the actual implementation by each GOCC/GFI of said salary standardization, flexibility in the interpretation of rules and regulations
prescribed under R.A. 6758 was necessary. DBM felt it illogical to assume that during the period R.A. 6758 was not yet issued all
GOCCs/GFIs were already aware of what implementing guidelines it (DBM) will prescribe and have their personnel actions
accordingly adjusted to said guidelines. Likewise, it is counter-productive if at that time, we advised all GOCCs/GFIs to suspend their
personnel actions as same could be disruptive to their operations and delay the completion of important projects.

Premised on the above considerations, we maintain the position that our action allowing officials and employees hired between the
period of July 1, 1989 and October 31, 1989 to be paid allowances under Item No. 5.5 of CCC No. 10 is logically tenable and
reasonable since same was made during the "transitory period" from the old system to the new system.26chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

They further claim that even the COA took cognizance of this extension in the memorandum27 issued by the officer-in-charge of the
COA Audit Office, to wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Moreover, this office gives much weight to the position of the Secretary, DBM in his letter to the Administrator, NEA, dated October
30, 1993 that the cut-off date of July 1, 1989 prescribed in R.A. 6758/CCC #10 was extended to October 31, 1989 primarily on
consideration that said R.A. 6758/CCC #10 were formally issued/promulgated only in the later part of October 1989. x x x

Petitioners likewise raised as their cause of action the violation of their constitutional right to equal protection of the law. They contend
that this alone would constitute sufficient justification for the filing anew of the instant petition. Contrary to the statement in the assailed
decision of the CA to the effect that they failed to plead or raise such issue in the trial court, they submit that a perusal of their amended
petition would show that paragraphs 30, 31, 32 and 33 thereof were devoted to that issue.

Finally, as regards the matter of refund of the RATA being demanded by COA, petitioners submit that they should not be required to
make such refund since these were received in good faith and on the honest belief that they were entitled to it.
PPA's Argument

Respondent PPA maintains that PPA employees who were appointed to managerial and supervisory positions after the effectivity of RA
No. 6758 are not entitled to the 40% RATA benefit provided under LOI No. 97. Consistent with the ruling of the Court in PPA v. COA,
et al.,28 respondent PPA contends that only the first category officials or those who were granted and were receiving RATA equivalent
to 40% of their salaries prior to 1 July 1989 are entitled to such benefits. Petitioners who are included in the second category officials or
those who are not incumbents as of 1 July 1989 are not entitled to the 40% RATA benefit provided under LOI No. 97.

Our Ruling

There is merit in petitioners' argument that their petition should not be dismissed on the ground of res judicata since this is based on
jurisprudence and issuances not yet in existence at the time of the promulgation of the Court's decision in PPA v. COA, et al.29
Petitioners are, however, incorrect in their contention that the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 64702 which was not
appealed by the PPA has become final and as such, barred the appellate court's subsequent ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 91743.

We note that when the petition was elevated to the CA in the first instance in CA-G.R. SP No. 64702, the matter submitted to be
resolved by the appellate court was simply the issue on whether the trial court was correct in granting the motion to dismiss and in
declaring that the case is barred by the principle of res judicata. Despite the non-appeal by PPA of the appellate court's ruling that res
judicata is not applicable, the case did not attain finality in view of the order of the CA remanding the case to the trial court for
continuation of hearing. The appellate court's ruling in CA G.R. SP No. 91743, therefore, was not barred by the ruling in CA G.R. SP
No. 64702 since the ruling in the second instance was already a ruling after trial on the merits.

Although the principle of res judicata is not applicable, the petition must still fail because our ruling must adhere to the doctrine of stare
decisis. In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation,30 the Court
expounded on the importance of this doctrine in securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle
of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are
substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply
means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially
the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been
put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a
bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. (Emphasis supplied)

The issues raised by petitioners are no longer novel. In a catena of Cases31 promulgated after De Jesus v. COA32 and Cruz v. COA,33
this Court has ruled that the pronouncement it has established in the earlier case of PPA v. COA, et al.34 with regard to the interpretation
and application of Section 12 of RA 6758 is still applicable. The subsequent decisions maintained that allowances or fringe benefits,
whether or not integrated into the standardized salaries prescribed by R.A. 6758, should continue to be enjoyed only by employees who
(1) were incumbents and (2) were receiving those benefits as of 1 July 1989.

In those cases, the Court reiterated that the intention of the framers of the law was to phase out certain allowances and privileges
gradually, without upsetting the principle of non-diminution of pay. The intention of Section 12 to protect incumbents who were already
receiving those allowances on 1 July 1989, when RA 6758 took effect was emphasized thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

An incumbent is a person who is in present possession of an office.

The consequential outcome, under sections 12 and 17, is that if the incumbent resigns or is promoted to a higher position, his successor
is no longer entitled to his predecessor's RATA privilege x x x or to the transition allowance.

Finally, to explain what July 1, 1989 pertained to, we held in the same case as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

x x x. The date July 1, 1989 becomes crucial only to determine that as of said date, the officer was an incumbent and was receiving the
RATA, for purposes of entitling him to its continued grant. x x x.

In Philippine International Trading Corporation v. COA, the Court confirmed the legislative intention in this
wise:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

x x x There was no intention on the part of the legislature to revoke existing benefits being enjoyed by incumbents of government
positions at the time of the passage of RA 6758 by virtue of Sections 12 and 17 thereof. x x x.

The Court stressed that in reserving the benefits to incumbents alone, the legislature's intention was not only to adhere to the policy of
non-diminution of pay, but also to be consistent with the prospective application of laws and the spirit of fairness and justice.35
(Emphasis omitted)

xxx

The disquisition of the Court in Philippine National Bank v. Palma36 is instructive, viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The reliance of the court a quo on Cruz v. COA is misplaced. It was held in that case that the specific date of hiring, October 31, 1989,
had been not only arbitrarily determined by the COA, but also used as an unreasonable and unsubstantial basis for awarding allowances
to employees. The basis for the Court's ruling was not primarily the resulting disparity in salaries received for the same work rendered
but, more important, the absence of a distinction in the law that allowed the grant of such benefits -- between those hired before and
those after the said date.

Thus, setting a particular date as a distinction was nullified, not because it was constitutionally infirm or was against the "equal pay for
equal work" policy of RA 6758. Rather, the reason was that the COA had acted without or in excess of its authority in arbitrarily
choosing October 31, 1989, as the cutoff date for according the allowances. It was explained that "when the law does not distinguish,
neither should the court." And for that matter, neither should the COA.

In consonance with stare decisis, there should be no more misgivings about the proper application of Section 12. In the present case, the
payment of benefits to employees hired after July 1, 1989, was properly withheld, because the law clearly mandated that those benefits
should be reserved only to incumbents who were already enjoying them before its enactment. Withholding them from the others ensured
that the compensation of the incumbents would not be diminished in the course of the latter's continued employment with the
government agency.

It bears emphasis also that in promulgating the Irene Cruz case, there was no intention on the part of the Court to abandon its earlier
ruling in PPA v. COA, et al.37 The factual circumstances in the former case are different from those attendant in the case of herein
petitioners. In fine, the Irene Cruz case is not on all fours with the present case. The petitioners in the former case, who were employees
of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, were able to obtain from the Office of the President a post facto approval or ratification of their
social amelioration benefit. No such authority granted by the Office of the President has been presented by the second category officials
of the PPA.

Petitioners further invoked that the denial of their claim of 40% RATA violated their constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
We note that the Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The
equal protection clause does not prohibit discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited
either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.38chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. x x x. A law is not invalid simply because of simple
inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no
manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that
the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class.39chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

As explained earlier, the different treatment accorded the second sentence (first paragraph) of Section 12 of RA 6758 to the incumbents
as of 1 July 1989, on one hand, and those employees hired on or after the said date, on the other, with respect to the grant of non-
integrated benefits lies in the fact that the legislature intended to gradually phase out the said benefits without, however, upsetting its
policy of non-diminution of pay and benefits.40chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The consequential outcome under Sections 12 and 17 is that if the incumbent resigns or is promoted to a higher position, his successor
is no longer entitled to his predecessor's RATA privilege or to the transition allowance. After 1 July 1989, the additional financial
incentives such as RATA may no longer be given by the GOCCs with the exemption of those which were authorized to be continued
under Section 12 of RA 6758.41chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Therefore, the aforesaid provision does not infringe the equal protection clause of the Constitution as it is based on reasonable
classification intended to protect the rights of the incumbents against diminution of their pay and benefits.42chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Anent the issue of refund, we note that petitioners were referring to the RAT A received by the second category officials pursuant to PPA
Memorandum Circular No. 36-89 dated 23 October 1989 and PPA Memorandum Circular No. 46-90 dated 14 November 1990. We
deem it 110 longer necessary to discuss this issue considering that it was already ruled upon in the earlier PPA case and was even part of
the dispositive portion43 of the decision which became final and executory. Well-settled is the rule that once a judgment becomes final
and executory, it can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified in any respect. It is essential to an effective administration of justice
that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause therein should be laid to rest.44 The arguments of petitioners regarding this
issue should have been raised in that case and not in this present petition.

We conclude this case with the words borrowed from former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

During these tough economic times, this Court understands, and in fact sympathizes with, the plight of ordinary government employees.
Whenever legally possible, it has bent over backwards to protect labor and favor it with additional economic advantages. In the present
case, however, the Salary Standardization Law clearly provides that the claimed benefits shall continue to be granted only to employees
who were "incumbents" as of July 1, 1989. Hence, much to its regret, the Court has no authority to reinvent or modify the law to extend
those benefits even to employees hired after that date.45chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Ce11iorari is DENIED. The Decision dated 29 August 2007 and Resolution dated 29
February 2008 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91743 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ALMARIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 189028
July 16, 2013
701 SCRA 269
FACTS: The National Artists Awards Committee. and the NCCA decided to team up and jointly administer the National Artists Award.
There were three deliberations for determining the nominees and on the final deliberation, a final list of four names was agreed upon
namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos, Lazaro Francisco and Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.

They submitted this recommendation to the President. According to respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of
the President to the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly received nominations from various sectors,
cultural groups and individuals strongly endorsing private respondents.

Acting on this recommendation, a series of Proclamations were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz and private
respondents, Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists.

Hence, the petition. All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her discretion in disregarding
the results of the rigorous screening and selection process for the Order of National Artists and in substituting her own choice for those
of the Deliberation Panels.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the President amounted to grave abuse of discretion with regards to the violation of the right to equal
protection

RULING: Yes. It should be recalled that one of the respondents was disqualified to be nominated for being the Executive Director of the
NCCA at that time while respondents Masa and Caparas did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not
included in the second shortlist.

Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when they were exempted from the rigorous screening process
of the NCCA and the CCP and conferred the Order of National Artists.

The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny. No real and
substantial distinction between respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from the laws, guidelines
and established procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional position.

In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads right to equal protection, an interest that is substantial enough to
confer him standing in this case.

ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (5th Div.) and the PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES

[G.R. No. 152259; July 29, 2004] Constitutional Law| Overbreadth Doctrine| Facial Challenge|

FACTS:

Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)

National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO)
Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO)
The PCGG filed an information before Sandiganbayan charging Alfredo Romualdez of violation of Sec. 5 of the Anti-Graft Law. Said
petitioner is the brother-in-law of former Pres. Ferdinand Marcos, that he allegedly “intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract
between NASSCO, a gov’t owned and controlled corporation and BASECO, a private corporation, the majority stocks of which is
owned by former President Marcos.
Petitioner contends that Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft Law is unconstitutional because its vagueness violates the due process
right of an individual to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him.
ISSUES:

Whether Sec. 5 of RA 3019 is unconstitutional;

Whether the information is vague.
HELD:

Section 5 of the Anti-Graft Law is constitutional. It penalizes certain presidential relatives who “intervene, directly or indirectly, in any
business, transaction, contract or application with the Government.” This provision is not vague or “impermissibly broad,” because it
can easily be understood with the use of simple statutory construction. Neither may the constitutionality of a criminal statute such as this
be challenged on the basis of the “overbreadth” and the “void-for-vagueness” doctrines, which apply only to free-speech cases.
Overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases. They are not appropriate for testing the
validity of penal statutes

ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ,

Petitioners,- versus -COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS GARAY,
Respondents.
G. R. No. 167011

For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Spouses Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez on 26 May
2008 from the Decision of this Court dated 30 April 2008, affirming the Resolutions, dated 11 June 2004 and 27 January 2005 of the
COMELEC En Banc.

We find that petitioner has not raised substantially new grounds to justify the reconsideration sought. Instead, petitioner presents
averments that are mere rehashes of arguments already considered by the Court. There is, thus, no cogent reason to warrant a
reconsideration of this Courts Decision.
Similarly, we reject the contentions put forth by esteemed colleagues Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga in his Dissent, dated 2 September
2008, which are also mere reiterations of his earlier dissent against the majority opinion. Mr. Justice Tingas incessant assertions proceed
from the wrong premise. To be clear, this Court did not intimate that penal statutes are beyond scrutiny. In our Decision, dated 30 April
2008, this Court emphasized the critical limitations by which a criminal statute may be challenged. We drew a lucid boundary between
an on-its-face invalidation and an as applied challenge. Unfortunately, this is a distinction which Mr. Justice Tinga has refused to
understand. Let it be underscored that on-its-face invalidation of penal statutes, as is sought to be done by petitioners in this case, may
not be allowed. Thus, we said:

The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application. However, this Court has imposed certain limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the challenged law
at bar, may be scrutinized. This Court has declared that facial invalidation or an on-its-face invalidation of criminal statutes is not
appropriate. We have so enunciated in no uncertain terms in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, thus:

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in
free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that 'one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or
other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant.'" (underscoring supplied)
"To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity." While mentioned in passing in
some cases, the void-for-vagueness concept has yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, the
Bookkeeping Act was found unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection clause, not because it was vague. Adiong v.
Comelec decreed as void a mere Comelec Resolution, not a statute. Finally, Santiago v. Comelec held that a portion of RA 6735 was
unconstitutional because of undue delegation of legislative powers, not because of vagueness.

Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even
reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of "actual case and controversy" and
permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness. In Younger v. Harris, this evil was aptly pointed
out by the U.S. Supreme Court in these words:

"[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute
is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the
impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line
analysis of detailed statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions,
whichever way they might be decided."

For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes, described as a "manifestly strong medicine" to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort." In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have
allegedly been violated must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant has been charged. (Emphasis supplied.)
[1]

Neither does the listing by Mr. Justice Tinga of what he condemns as offenses under Republic Act No. 8189 convince this Court to
overturn its ruling. What is crucial in this case is the rule set in our case books and precedents that a facial challenge is not the proper
avenue to challenge the statute under consideration. In our Decision of 30 April 2008, we enunciated that the opinions of the dissent
which seek to bring to the fore the purported ambiguities of a long list of provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as a facial
challenge.[2] On this matter, we held:

An appropriate as applied challenge in the instant Petition should be limited only to Section 45 (j) in relation to Sections 10 (g) and (j)
of Republic Act No. 8189the provisions upon which petitioners are charged. An expanded examination of the law covering provisions
which are alien to petitioners case would be antagonistic to the rudiment that for judicial review to be exercised, there must be an
existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, and not conjectural or anticipatory.[3]

In conclusion, I reiterate that the doctrine embodied in Romualdez and Estrada remains good law. The rule established in our
jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case
may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is
permitted, the prosecution of crimes maybe hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial
challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an
existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at
best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in
my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the States ability to deal with crime.
If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as
applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him.

As structured, Section 45 enumerates acts deemed election offenses under Republic Act No. 8189. The evident intent of the legislature
in including in the catena of election offenses the violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, is to subsume as
punishable, not only the commission of proscribed acts, but also the omission of acts enjoined to be observed. On this score, the
declared policy of Republic Act No. 8189 is illuminating. The law articulates the policy of the State to systematize the present method
of registration in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters.

In People v. Gatchalian, the Court had the occasion to rule on the validity of the provision of the Minimum Wage Law, which in like
manner speaks of a willful violation of any of the provisions of this Act. This Court upheld the assailed law, and in no uncertain terms
declared that the provision is all-embracing, and the same must include what is enjoined in the Act which embodies the very
fundamental purpose for which the law has been adopted.

Finally, as the records would show, petitioners managed to set up an intelligent defense against the informations filed below. By clearly
enunciating their defenses against the accusations hurled at them, and denying their commission thereof, petitioners allegation of
vagueness must necessarily be rejected. Petitioners failed to overcome the heavy presumption of constitutionality in favor of the law.
The constitutionality must prevail in the absence of substantial grounds for overthrowing the same.

The phraseology in Section 45(j) has been employed by Congress in a number of laws which have not been declared unconstitutional:

1) The Cooperative Code

Section 124(4) of Republic Act No. 6938 reads:

Any violation of any provision of this Code for which no penalty is imposed shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than six (6)
months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not less than One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) or both at the discretion of the Court.

2) The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act

Section 72 of Republic Act No. 8371 reads in part:

Any person who commits violation of any of the provisions of this Act, such as, but not limited to

3) The Retail Trade Liberalization Act

Section 12, Republic Act No. 8762, reads:

Any person who would be found guilty of violation of any provisions of this Act shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than six
(6) years and one (1) day but not more than eight (8) years, and a fine of at least One Million (P1,000,000.00) but not more than Twenty
Million (P20,000,000.00).

For reasons so stated, we deny the Motion for Reconsideration.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ET AL. v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., G.R. No. 203335, FEBRUARY 18, 2014

Constitutional law; Unsolicited commercial communications, also known as “spam” is entitled to protection under freedom of
expression. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited
commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of
protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. The State
cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are
legitimate forms of expression.
Criminal law; Cyberlibel under Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Law is constitutional. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General
that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from
defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the Penal Code, already
punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes “similar means” for committing libel. But
the Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel
brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the Penal Code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet
media is distinct from that of print.

Criminal law; Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law that punishes “aiding or abetting” libel on the cyberspace is a nullity. The terms “aiding
or abetting” constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments,
and other messages. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom
of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is
more, as the petitioners point out, formal crimes such as libel are not punishable unless consummated. In the absence of legislation
tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on
Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.

MODES OF EXPRESSION
FERMIN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

[G.R. No. 157643; March 28, 2008] Constitutional Law| Freedom of the Press|Freedom of Expression|

FACTS:

Spouses Annabelle Rama and Eduardo (Eddie) Gutierrez, filed a libel suit against Cristinelli S. Fermin and Bogs C. Tugas. Fermin as a
publisher and Tugas as an Editor-in-Chief of Gossip Tabloid printed and circulated an article that depicts Rama as a fugitive from justice
and a swindler.

RTC rendered a decision finding Fermin and Tugas guilty of Libel. On appeal, Tugas was acquitted on account of non-participation in
the publication article. Fermin submits that being similarly situated with Tugas, she is also entitled to an acquittal, as a publisher she did
not participated nor consented to the preparation and publication of the libelous article. Fermin raised that the said article is not libelous
and is protected by the mantle of freedom of the press.

ISSUE:

Whether the questioned article is protected by the mantle of the Freedom of the Press and is within the realm of fair and honest
comment.

HELD:

Petitioner cannot take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press. Although a wide latitude is given to
critical utterances made against public officials in the performance of their official duties, or against public figures on matters of public
interest, such criticism does not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances are false,
malicious or unrelated to a public officer’s performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public figures,
the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability. While complainants are considered public figures for being personalities in the
entertainment business, media people, including gossip and intrigue writers and commentators such as petitioner, do not have the
unbridled license to malign their honor and dignity by indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments, whether in broadcast
media or in print, about their personal lives.
Freedom of expression is man’s birthright – constitutionally protected and guaranteed, and that it has become the singular role of the
press to act as its “defensor fidei” in a democratic society. But it is also worth keeping in mind that the press is the servant, not the
master, of the citizenry, and its freedom does not carry with it an unrestricted hunting license to prey on the ordinary citizen.

In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the conviction of petitioner for libel is upheld.

ERWIN TULFO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ATTY. CARLOS T. SO

[G.R. No. 161032; 2008] Constitutional Law| Freedom of the Press| Freedom of Expression|

FACTS:

Atty. Carlos Ding So of the Bureau of Customs filed and charged petitioners Erwin Tulfo, as author/writer, Susan Cambri, as managing
editor, Rey Salao, as national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor, and Philip Pichay, as president of the Carlo Publishing House, Inc.,
of the daily tabloid Remate, with the crime of libel. That private respondent was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public official,
smuggler and having acquired his wealth illegally.

RTC found petitioners guilty of the crime of Libel. CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Hence, Tulfo appealed and raised that
the said article is a qualified privileged communication and is written without malice.

ISSUE:

Whether the articles of Tulfo are protected as qualified privileged communication or are defamatory and written with malice, for which
he would be liable.

HELD:

Freedom of the press was given greater weight over the rights of individuals however, such freedom is not absolute and unbounded. The
exercise of this right or any right enshrined in the Bill of Rights, indeed, comes with an equal burden of responsible exercise of that
right. The recognition of a right is not free license for the one claiming it to run roughshod over the rights of others.

The exercise of press freedom must be done consistent with good faith and reasonable care. This was clearly abandoned by Tulfo when
he wrote the subject articles. This is no case of mere error or honest mistake, but a case of a journalist abdicating his responsibility to
verify his story and instead misinforming the public. Journalists may be allowed an adequate margin of error in the exercise of their
profession, but this margin does not expand to cover every defamatory or injurious statement they may make in the furtherance of their
profession, nor does this margin cover total abandonment of responsibility.

Petition is dismissed. The CA decision is affirmed with modification.

Chavez vs. Gonzales (2008) (Political Law)

Francisco Chavez vs. Raul M. Gonzales and NTC | G.R. No. 168338 | February 15, 2008

Facts: As a consequence of the public release of copies of the “Hello Garci” compact disc audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile
phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary
Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable
under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense,
subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the NBI to go after media organizations “found to have caused the
spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.” Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned TV and radio stations that their
broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or
cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments. Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65
against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.

Issues: (1) Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech
and of the press? (2) Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a form of content-based prior
restraint that has transgressed the Constitution?

Held: (1) No, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will not justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of
speech and of the press. A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest
scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule.
This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media. Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do
not abridge freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. For this failure of the respondents
alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free
press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.

(2) Yes, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a form of content-based prior restraint that
has transgressed the Constitution. It is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up
with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official
functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on
prior restraint. The concept of an “act” does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise,
the non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.

NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK INC. and CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. CEASAR G. DY, FELICISIMO G. MEER, BAGNOS MAXIMO, RACMA FERNANDEZ-GARCIA and THE CITY OF
CAUAYAN, Respondents.

Facts:

Petitioners operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio broadcast station, and Star FM DWIT Cauayan, an
FM radio broadcast station, in Cauayan Citry, Isabela. Back in 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of its broadcasting station,
management office, and transmitters on propery located in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela.
On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office of the Municipal Planning and Development
Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed and certified that the commercial structure to be constructed conformed to local zoning regulations,
noting as well that the location is classified as a “commercial area”. The radio station was able to fully operate smoothly thereafter.
In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of mayor’s permit, City Zoning Administratior-Designate Bagnos Maximo
refused to issue zoning clearance on the grounds that petitioners were not able to submit conversion papers showing that the agricultural
land was converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked the court to compel the issuance of mayor’s permit but the court denied the
action. In the meantime, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region II office issued to petitioners a formal recognition of
conversion of the property from agricultural to commercial.
In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayor’s permit, attaching the DAR Order. Respondent Felicisimo Meer,
acting City Administrator of Cauayan City denied the same, claiming that it was void on the grounds that they did not have record of the
DAR Order.
The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia, City Legal Officer of Cauayan City,
closed the radio station. Due to the prvosion of Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the closure of radio station during the pendency
of election period, COMELEC issued an order allowing the petitioners to operate before Febuary 17, 2004, but was barred again by
respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy on the grounds that the radio station had no permit. Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them to run again
until June 10, 2004 after elections.
Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayor’s permit but both courts denied the petition.
A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized under the LGC to issue licenses and permits, and suspend or revoke the same for any
violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. In case of Cauayan City,
the authority to require a mayor’s permit was enacted through Ordinance No. 92-004, enacted in 1993. However, nothing in the
ordinance requires an application for a mayor’s permit to submit “either an approved land conversion papers from DAR, showing that
its property was converted from prime agricultural land or an approved resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang
Panglungsod authorizing the reclassification of property from agricultural to commercial land.
In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that classified the property as commercial. Petitioners are also armed with several
certifications stating that the property is indeed a commercial area. Also, petitioners paid real property taxes based on the classification
of property as commercial without objections raised by the respondents.
Petitioners argued that this consistent recognition by the local government of Cauayan of the commercial character of the property
constitutes estoppels against respondents from denying the fact before the courts. The lower courts had ruled that “the government of
Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels, but petitioners classified that this concept is understood to only refer to acts and mistakes of its
official especially to those which are irregular.
Issue:
Whether the lower court is correct in contending that the government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels on the grounds that the
state is immune against suits.
Held:
No. While it is true that the state cannot be put in estoppels by mistake or error of its officials or agents, there is an exception.
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be
invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with
circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the
government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby
thing; and subject to limitations . . ., the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against
private individuals
Thus, when there is no convincing evidence to prove irregularity or negligence on the part of the government official whose acts are
being disowned other than the bare assertion on the part of the State, the Supreme Court have declined to apply State immunity from
estoppel. Herein, there is absolutely no evidence other than the bare assertions of the respondents that the Cauayan City government had
previously erred when it certified that the property had been zoned for commercial use. The absence of any evidence other than bare
assertions that the 1996 to 2001 certifications were incorrect lead to the ineluctable conclusion that respondents are estopped from
asserting that the previous recognition of the property as commercial was wrong.
Respondents were further estopped from disclaiming the previous consistent recognition by the Cauayan City government that the
property was commercially zoned unless they had evidence, which they had none, that the local officials who issued such certifications
acted irregularly in doing so. It is thus evident that respondents had no valid cause at all to even require petitioners to secure “approved
land conversion papers from the DAR showing that the property was converted from prime agricultural land to commercial land.”
Respondents closure of petitioner’s radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motvies. Petitioners have been aggressive in exposing the
widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and his political dynasty. Such statement
manifests and confirms that respondent’s denial of the renewal applications on the ground that property is commercial and merely a
pretext, and their real agenda is to remove petitioners from Cauayan City and suppress the latter’s voice. This is a blatant violation of
constitutional right to press freedom.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan
City, Branch 24, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED and respondents are
directed to immediately issue petitioners’ zoning clearances and mayor’s permits for 2004 to petitioners.
EASTERN BROADCASTING CORP (DYRE) V. DANS JR. [137 SCRA 628; L-59329; 19 JUL 1985]

Facts: A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was “summarily closed” on grounds of national security. The
radio station was allegedly used to incite people to sedition. Petitioner, DYRE contends that they were denied due process. There was no
hearing to establish factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure of the radio station violates freedom of expression. Before
the court could even promulgate a decision upon the Issue raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed a motion to
withdraw the petition. The rights of the station were sold to a new owner, Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in pursuing the
case. Despite the case becoming moot and academic, (because there are no longer interested parties, thus the dismissal of the case) the
Supreme Court still finds that there is need to pass a “RESOLUTION” for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals in
matters as this case.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE.

(2) Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of Freedom of Expression.

Held: The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void. The absence of a hearing is a violation of
Constitutional Rights. The primary requirements in administrative proceedings are laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relation (69 Phil.635). The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed before any broadcast station may be closed. The Ang
Tibay Doctrine provides the following requirements:

(1) The right to hearing, includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence presented.
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
(3) The decision must have something to support itself.
(4) Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to support conclusion)
(5) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing
(6) The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and facts and not simply accept subordinate’s views
(7) Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know the various issued involved and reasons for decisions
rendered.

The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due Process, it gives an unavoidable standard that
government actions must conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty and property is valid.

The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and expression. The court
stresses that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast are entitled to this constitutional right. Although the government still has the
right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the limitation of freedom of
expression is the “clear and present danger” rule. If in the circumstances that the media is used in such nature as to create this danger
that will bring in such evils, then the law has the right to prevent it. However, Radio and television may not be used to organize a
rebellion or signal a start of widespread uprising. The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative
democracy. The people continues to have the right to be informed on public affairs and broadcast media continues to have the pervasive
influence to the people being the most accessible form of media. Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the the special protection given
to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.