SECOND DIVISION
when a vehicle blocked their way.12 Another group of suspects helped as
July 26, 2017
G.R. No. 214300
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs.
MANUEL ESCOBAR, Respondent
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This Rule 45 Petition assails the Court of Appeals Decision to grant the
accused's second petition for bail. Res judicata applies only in a final
judgment in a civil case,1 not in an interlocutory order in a criminal case.2 An
order disposing a petition for bail is interlocutory.3 This order does not
attain finality when a new matter warrants a second look on the application
for bail.
Respondent Manuel Escobar (Escobar) filed a petition for bail (First Bail
Petition), which was denied by the Regional Trial Court in the Order4 dated
October 6, 2008 and by the Court of Appeals in the Decision5 dated March 8,
2011. A subsequent development in the accused's case6 compelled him to
file a second petition for bail (Second Bail Petition). On April 26, 2012, the
Regional Trial Court denied7 this on the ground of res judicata. In the
Decision8dated March 24, 2014, the Court of Appeals overturned the
Regional Trial Court Order and granted the Second Bail Petition.
Escobar was suspected of conspiring in the kidnap for ransom of Mary Grace
Cheng-Rosagas (Mary Grace), daughter of Filipino-Chinese businessman
Robert G. Cheng (Robert), and two (2) other victims.9 Robert was the owner
of Uratex Foam, Philippines,10 a manufacturing company of foams and
mattresses.11
On June 18, 2001 at 7:40 a.m., Mary Grace, her bodyguard Valentin B.
Torres (Torres), and her driver Dionisio F. Burca (Burca) were passing by the
front of Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City
lookouts.13
Clad in police uniform, four (4) armed men forced Mary Grace, Burca, and
Torres inside the vehicle.14 The incident happened in broad daylight.
Alleged group leader Rolando Villaver (Villaver) and some of the suspects
then travelled and detained Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres in an
undisclosed location in Batangas.15 Afterwards, the group headed to Club
Solvento, a resort16 in Calamba, Laguna owned by Escobar,17 who personally
served them food.18
Some of the accused19 stayed in Club Solvento to rest or sleep while the
others, namely, Villaver, Cesar Olimpiada, a certain Cholo, and Biboy
Lugnasin, left to negotiate the price for the victims' release.20 Cheng paid
the ransom of ₱15,000,000.00.21
At 7:00 p.m. on the same day, Villaver's group returned to Club
Solvento,22 followed by co-accused brothers Rolando and Harold Fajardo
(the Fajardo brothers), who were alleged advisers of Villaver.23 The group
then locked themselves in a room where Villaver partitioned the ransom
money.24 Cancio Cubillas (Cubillas), the group's driver,25confessed to have
received a total of'₱l,250,000.00 for the kidnapping operation.26
At 10:30 p.m. on the same day, Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres were finally
released.27 They were freed somewhere in Alaminos, Laguna, more than 12
hours since they were abducted.28
Cubillas became a state witness.29 On June 3, 2002, he executed an
extrajudicial confession and implicated respondent Escobar as an adviser for
Villaver.30 Cubillas believed that Escobar was involved after he saw Escobar
talk to Villaver while they were in Club Solvento.31 In his extrajudicial
confession, Cubillas also claimed that Escobar received a portion of the
ransom money from Villaver.32
On February 17, 2004, an Amended Information was filed before the
Regional Trial Court charging Escobar as a co-conspirator33 in the kidnapping
for ransom.34 The charging portion stated:
That on or about June 18, 2001 at around 7:40 in the morning, at Quezon
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another and grouping themselves together, with others not present during
the actual kidnapping but performing some other peculiarly contributory
roles, did, then and there, by force and intimidation, with the use of long
firearms and clad in police uniform, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, carry away and thereafter detain at some undisclosed place, after
having blocked their car in front of Malcolm Hall, Osmena Avenue, UP
Campus, Diliman, Quezon City, MARY GRACE CHENGROSAGAS, her driver
DIONISIO F. BURCA and her bodyguard VALENTIN B. TORRES, against their
will and consent thereby depriving them of their liberty for more than
twelve (12) hours for the purpose of extorting ransom for their release in
the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), and which
amount was in fact paid by Mary Grace's father, Mr. Robert Cheng, owner
of Uratex Foam, Philippines, and have the same delivered at E. Rodriguez
Compound, Calamba, Laguna thereby resulting to the release of the kidnap
victims somewhere in Alaminos, Laguna at about 10:30 p.m. of the same
day all to the damage and prejudice of the three (3) victims and their
families in such amount as may be awarded to them and their families
under the provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.35
Escobar was arrested on February 14, 2008.36
On June 3, 2008, Escobar filed the First Bail Petition before the Regional
Trial Court.37 During the hearing on Escobar's bail application, Cubillas
testified that Escobar and the Fajardo brothers were Villaver's advisers.38
In the Order dated October 6, 2008, the Regional Trial Court
denied39 Escobar's First Bail Petition.1âwphi1 The dispositive portion read:
The Petition for Bail filed by accused Manny Escobar is denied for lack of
merit considering that state witness Cancio Cubillas positively identified said
accused as the owner of Club Solvento located in Calamba, Laguna; that he
was the one who served food to the group of Rolando Villaver, Jun Jun
Villaver, Ning Ning Villaver, Daimy Velasquez, Cholo, Cesar Olimpiada, Mike,
Alan Celebre, Biboy Lugnasin and witness himself, Cancio Cubillas; that it
was also in said Club Solvento where Cancio Cubillas, Jun Jun Villaver, Ning
Ning Villaver, Danny Velasquez, Mike and Alan Celebre rested and slept
after Rolando Villaver, Cholo, Biboy Lugnasin and Cesar Olimpiada left to
negotiate for the ransom of kidnap victim Mary Grace Cheng Rosagas, and
that on the night of June 18, 2001, Cubillas saw accused Rolando Villaver
gave part of the ransom money to him.
SO ORDERED.40
Escobar appealed before the Court of Appeals.41 On March 8, 2011, the
Court of Appeals affinned42 the denial of the First Bail Petition. It recognized
that Cubillas' extrajudicial confession was generally incompetent evidence
against his co-accused and was admissible against himself only43 for being
hearsay and for violating the res inter alias acta rule.44 Nevertheless, the
Court of Appeals invoked an exception to this rule and held that the
Regional Trial Court "did not rely solely on the extrajudicial confession of
Cubillas"; rather, the trial court also relied on Cubillas' testimony during the
bail hearing.45
Escobar moved to reconsider the Court of Appeal March 8, 2011 Decision.46
Pending the proceedings on Escobar's case, the police arrested one (1) of
the co-accused Fajardo brothers, Rolando Fajardo (Rolando),47 who applied
for bail before the Regional Trial Court.48 As in Escobar's bail hearing, the
prosecution relied solely on Cubillas' statements to establish the strength of
Fajardo's guilt.49 In an Order dated September 13, 2011, the Regional Trial
Court denied Rolando's petition for bail.50
However, in an Order dated October 14, 2011, the Regional Trial Court
reversed its previous order and granted Rolando's bail application.51 The
Regional Trial Court stated:
To summarize, the evidence for the prosecution does not establish that
accused Rolando Fajardo participated during the actual abduction of
Rosagas, Burca and Torres or that during the actual abduction, accused
Rolando Fajardo gave advice or instruction to the other accused herein. The
evidence for the prosecution likewise does not establish that accused
Rolando Fajardo acted as adviser to accused Rolando Villaver and his group
in connection with the kidnapping of the victims herein. There is no
testimony as to what advice or instructions were made by accused Rolando
Fajardo in connection with the kidnapping of the victims herein. There is thus
a paucity of evidence establishing the participation of accused Rolando
Fajardo in the kidnapping of Rosagas, Burca and Torres.52(Emphasis
supplied)
The reversal came about after the trial court considered that, according to
Cubillas, "[Rolando] was not present before, during and after the
kidnapping."53 There was paucity of evidence on Rolando's alleged
participation.54
Meanwhile, on October 27, 2011, the Court of Appeals denied Escobar's
motion for reconsideration.55 He no longer appealed before this Court.56
By January 2012, only Escobar was left in detention pending the final
judgment on the merits of the case as all the other accused who had active
participation in the kidnapping had been granted bail.57 Escobar saw
Rolando's release on bail as a new "development which warrant[ed] a
different view" on his own bail application.58
Thus, on January 27, 2012, Escobar filed another petition for bail (Second
Bail Petition) before the Regional Trial Court.59 He noted that Cubillas could
not explain how either Rolando or Escobar advised Villaver and that both
Rolando and Escobar were absent before, during, and after the
kidnapping.60 Hence, if Rolando's petition for bail was granted based on the
unreliability of Cubillas' testimony, Escobar reasoned that the trial court
should likewise grant him provisional release.61
On April 26, 2012, the Regional Trial Court denied62 Escobar's Second Bail
Petition on the ground of res judicata,63reasoning thus: "[i]n deference to
the Decision of the Court of Appeals which has already attained finality,
accused's Petition for Bail which is actually a second petition for bail[,] must
be necessarily denied."64
Escobar moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the Regional Trial
Court.65 On January 14, 2013, he appealed before the Court of Appeals via
Rule 65, arguing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying his Second Bail Petition.66
In the Decision dated March 24, 2014, the Court of Appeals granted67 the
petition for certiorari and ordered the Regional Trial Court to determine the
appropriate bail for Escobar's provisional liberty. The dispositive portion
read:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The April 26, 2012,September 14,
2012, September 17, 2012 and November 6, 2012 Ordersare SET ASIDE. The
trial court is directed to determine the appropriate bail for the provisional
liberty of the petitioner, Manuel Escobar, with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.68
The Court of Appeals denied the prosecution's Motion for
Reconsideration.69 According to the Court of Appeals, Escobar's Second Bail
Petition was not barred by res judicata, which applies only if the former
judgment is a final order or judgment and not an interlocutory order.70 An
order denying a petition for bail is interlocutory in nature.71
On April 4, 2014, the Regional Trial Court fixed72 Escobar's bail at
₱300,000.00. The dispositive portion read:
In view of the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on 24 March 2014,
the bail for the provisional liberty of accused Manuel Escobar is hereby fixed
at Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php300,000.00).
SO ORDERED. 73
In the Resolution dated September 11, 2014, the Court of Appeals
denied74 the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration.
On November 6, 2014, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed a Petition for Review75 via Rule 45 before this Court. In its
Petition, the prosecution does not pray for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order of the Court of Appeals Decision;76 rather, in assailing the
grant of Escobar 's Second Bail Petition, the prosecution avers that the
doctrine of res judicata must be respected.77
On October 19, 2015, Escobar filed his Comment,78 arguing that res
judicata did not apply here,79 that there was no strong evidence of his
guilt,80 and that the Court of Appeals could rectify errors of judgment in the
greater interest of justice.81 According to Escobar:
13. Due to this sudden development of the grant of bail to his co-accused,
[Rolando], and considering that both [Rolando] and [Escobar ]'s alleged
participation in the crime are based on the same court-declared unreliable
"speculations" of the state witness Cubillas, who even admitted he was lying
when questioned during [Escobar]'s own bail hearings, it was in the interest
of justice and fairness to re-open the matter of bail with respect to
[Escobar] and thereby grant the same. And the Honorable Court of Appeals
agreed.82
This Court's program to decongest holding jails led City Jail Warden Randel
H. Latoza (City Jail Warden Latoza) to review Escobar's case.83 In his
manifestation dated August 18, 2016, City Jail Warden Latoza informed this
Court that there was no temporary restraining order against the Regional
trial Court April 4, 2014 Order, which fixed Escobar's provisional liberty at
₱300,000.00. He also acknowledged the Court of Appeals March 24, 2014
Decision granting Escobar the right to bail.84 He mentioned that Escobar had
posted the ₱300,000.00 bail, as ordered by the trial court.85 Thus, he moved
to allow Escobar's provisional release on bail.86
City Jail Warden Latoza alleged that Escobar had paid the necessary surety
bond87 and attached a copy of Traveller's Insurance Surety Corporation's
surety bond undertaking to his manifestation.88 However, the attached
surety bond undertaking was neither notarized nor approved by the
Regional Trial Court judge.89
In a Letter dated May 15, 2017, the Commission on Human Rights wrote to
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio to ask for the speedy resolution of the
case as Escobar was already 78 years old.90
For resolution are the following issues:
First, whether Manuel Escobar's second petition for bail is barred by res
judicata; and
Finally, whether respondent should be granted bail.
I
Bail is the security given for the temporary release of a person who has
been arrested and detained but "whose guilt has not yet been proven" in
court beyond reasonable doubt.91 The right to bail is cognate to the
fundamental right to be presumed innocent. In People v. Fitzgerald:92
The right to bail emanates from the [accused's constitutional] right to be
presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in the custody of the law who
may, by reason of the presumption of innocence he [or she] enjoys, be
allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his [or her]
appearance before any court, as required under specified
conditions.93 (Citations omitted)
Bail may be a matter of right or judicial discretion. The accused has the right
to bail if the offense charged is "not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment" before conviction by the Regional Trial
Court.94However, if the accused is charged with an offense the penalty of
which is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment-"regardless of the
stage of the criminal prosecution"-and when evidence of one's guilt is not
strong, then the accused's prayer for bail is subject to the discretion of the
trial court.95
In this case, the imposable penalty for kidnapping for ransom is
death,96 reduced to reclusion perpetua.97Escobar's bail is, thus, a matter of
judicial discretion, provided that the evidence of his guilt is not strong.98
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states:
Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons in custody shall be
admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on
recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction
by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment.
....
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, not bailable. - No person charged with a capital offense,
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall
be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage
of the criminal prosecution.
The Regional Trial Court denied99 Escobar's Second Bail Petition on the
ground of res judicata. The Court of Appeals overtumed100 this and correctly
ruled that his Second Bail Petition was not barred by res judicata.
In its literal meaning, res judicata refers to "a matter adjudged."101 This
doctrine bars the re-litigation of the same claim between the parties, also
known as claim preclusion or bar by former judgment.102 It likewise bars the
re-litigation of the same issue on a different claim between the same
parties, also known as issue preclusion or conclusiveness of judgement.103 It
"exists as an obvious rule of reason, justice, fairness, expediency, practical
necessity, and public tranquillity."104
Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan105held that "[t]he doctrine of res judicata is
set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39"106 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
thus:
Sec. 47. Effect of Judgments or Final Orders. - The effect of a judgment or
final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
....
(b) [T]he judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment
or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or
which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
Escobar' s Second Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata as this doctrine
is not recognized in criminal proceedings.107
Expressly applicable in civil cases, res judicata settles with finality the
dispute between the parties or their successors-in-interest.108 Trinidad v.
Marcelo109declares that res judicata, as found in Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, is a principle in civil law and "has no bearing on criminal
proceedings."110 Rule 124, Section 18 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
states:
Section 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. -
The provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in
the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and appealed civil
cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
Indeed, while certain provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be
applied in criminal cases,111 Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is
excluded from the enumeration under Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. In Trinidad:112
Petitioner's arguments - that res judicata applies since the Office of the
Ombudsman twice found no sufficient basis to indict him in similar cases
earlier filed against him, and that the Agan cases cannot be a supervening
event or evidence per se to warrant a reinvestigation on the same set of
facts and circumstances - do not lie.
Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal
proceedings.
But even if petitioner's argument[s] were to be expanded to
contemplate "res judicata in prison grey" or the criminal law concept of
double jeopardy, this Court still finds it inapplicable to bar the
reinvestigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman.113 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted).
An interlocutory order denying an application for bail, in this case being
criminal in nature, does not give rise to res judicata. As in Trinidad, even if
we are to expand the argument of the prosecution in this case to
contemplate "res judicata in prison grey" or double jeopardy, the same will
still not apply.114 Double jeopardy requires that the accused has been
convicted or acquitted or that the case against him or her has been
dismissed or terminated without his express consent.115 Here, while there
was an initial ruling on Escobar's First Bail Petition, Escobar has not been
convicted, acquitted, or has had his case dismissed or terminated.
Even assuming that this case allows for res judicata as applied in civil cases,
Escobar’s Second Bail Petition cannot be barred as there is no final
judgment on the merits.
Res judicata requires the concurrence of the following elements:
1. The judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
2. The decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the parties and the subject matter;
3. The disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
4. There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties,
of subject matter, and of causes of action.116
In deciding on a matter before it, a court issues either a final judgment or an
interlocutory order.1âwphi1 A final judgment "leaves nothing else to be
done" because the period to appeal has expired or the highest tribunal has
already ruled on the case.117 In contrast, an order is considered
interlocutory if, between the beginning and the termination of a case, the
court decides on a point or matter that is not yet a final judgment on the
entire controversy.118
An interlocutory order "settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral
matter arising in an action";119 in other words, something else still needs to
be done in the primary case-the rendition of the final judgment.120 Res
judicata applies only when there is a final judgment on the merits of a case;
it cannot be availed of in an interlocutory order even if this order is not
appealed.121 In Macahilig v. Heirs of Magalit:122
Citing Section 49 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, petitioner insists that the
September 17, 1997 [interlocutory] Order of the trial court in Civil Case No.
3517 bars it from rehearing questions on the ownership of Lot 4417. She
insists that said Order has become final and executory, because Dr. Magalit
did not appeal it.
We disagree. Final, in the phrase judgments or final orders found in Section
49 of Rule 39, has two accepted interpretations. In the first sense, it is an
order that one can no longer appeal because the period to do so has
expired, or because the order has been affirmed by the highest possible
tribunal involved. The second sense connotes that it is an order that leaves
nothing else to be done, as distinguished from one that is interlocutory. The
phrase refers to aflnal determination as opposed to a judgment or an order
that settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an
action; for example, an order postponing a trial, denying a motion to dismiss
or allowing intervention. Orders that give rise to res judicata and
conclusiveness of judgment apply only to those falling under the second
category.
....
For example, an Order overruling a motion to dismiss does not give rise
to res adjudicata [sic] that will bar a subsequent action, because such order
is merely interlocutory and is subject to amendments until the rendition of
the final judgment.123 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
124
A decision denying a petition for bail settles only a collateral matter -
whether accused is entitled to provisional liberty-and is not a final judgment
on accused's guilt or innocence. Unlike in a full-blown trial, a hearing for bail
is summary in nature: it deliberately "avoid[s] unnecessary thoroughness"
and does not try the merits of the case.125Thus:
Summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the
purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of the
evidence for purposes of bail. The course of the inquiry may be left to the
discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence
as has reference to substantial matters avoiding unnecessary thoroughness
in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a
reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details
that are not essential to the purpose of the hearing.126 (Emphasis in the
original)
Here, the prosecution itself has acknowledged that "the first order denying
bail is an interlocutory order."127 The merits of the case for kidnapping must
still be threshed out in a full-blown proceeding.
Being an interlocutory order, the March 8, 2011 Court of Appeals Decision
denying Escobar's First Bail Petition did not have the effect of res
judicata. The kidnapping case itself has not attained finality. Since res
judicata has not attached to the March 8, 2011 Court of Appeals Decision,
the Regional Trial Court should have taken cognizance of Escobar's Second
Bail Petition and weighed the strength of the evidence of guilt against him.
In any case, the Court of Appeals may still reverse its Decision,
notwithstanding its denial of the First Bail Petition on March 8, 2011.
Rules of procedure should not be interpreted as to disadvantage a party and
deprive him or her of fundamental rights and liberties. A judgment or order
may be modified where executing it in its present form is impossible or
unjust in view of intervening facts or circumstances:128
[W]here facts and circumstances transpire which render [the] execution [of
a judgment] impossible or unjust and it therefore becomes necessary, "in
the interest of justice, to direct its modification in order to harmonize the
disposition with the prevailing circumstances."129(Emphasis supplied,
citation omitted)
Appellate courts may correct "errors of judgment if blind and stubborn
adherence to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments would involve
the sacrifice of justice for technicality."130 Thus, an accused may file a
second petition for bail, particularly if there are sudden developments or a
"new matter or fact which warrants a different view."131
Rolando's release on bail is a new development in Escobar's case.132 The
Court of Appeals has pointed out that the other alleged co-conspirators are
already out on bail: Rolando, in particular, was granted bail because
Cubillas' testimony against him was weak.133"[Escobar] and [Rolando]
participated in the same way, but [Escobar]'s bail was denied."134 Escobar's
fundamental rights and liberty are being deprived in the meantime.
Article III, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable Escobar may be provisionally released if he indeed has paid the surety bond
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before that must be contained in a public document and approved by the Regional
conviction, be bailable ... (Emphasis supplied) Trial Court judge. Otherwise, he is directed to post bail.

The same evidence used by the trial court to grant bail to Rolando was not SO ORDERED.
used similarly in Escobar's favor. As the Court of Appeals found:135
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
We cannot ignore the allegation of conspiracy and that the other accused Associate Justice
were all granted bail except him. Specifically, [Rolando] was granted bail
due to the weakness of Cubillas' testimony against him.136 WE CONCUR:

In light of the circumstances after the denial of Escobar's First Bail Petition, ANTONIO T. CARPIO
his Second Bail Petition should have been given due course. It should not be Associate Justice
denied on the technical ground of res judicata. Chairperson

II DIOSDADO M. PERALTA JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
The Court of Appeals already approved Escobar's bail petition. Meanwhile,
City Jail Warden Latoza has informed this Court of the absence of any SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
temporary restraining order against the Court of Appeals Decision granting Associate Justice
the Second Bail Petition, as well as the Regional Trial Court Order fixing his
ATTESTATION
bail at ₱300,000.00.137 Thus, the Court of Appeals March 24, 2014 Decision
granting Escobar's provisional liberty can be executed upon the approval of I attest that the conclusions in the above Decisionhad been reached in
his bail bond, if he has indeed paid the surety bond. consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
In closing, no part of this Decision should prejudice the submission of
additional evidence for the prosecution to prove Escobar's guilt in the main ANTONIO T. CARPIO
case. "[A] grant of bail does not prevent the trier of facts ... from making a Associate Justice
final assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits."138 As the Chairperson, Second Division
Court of Appeals correctly ruled:
CERTIFICATION
[T]his determination is only for the purpose of bail[;] it is without prejudice
for the prosecution to submit additional evidence to prove [Escobar]'s guilt Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
in the course of the proceedings in the primary case.139 Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
March 24, 2014 in CA-G.R. SP No. 128189 is AFFIRMED.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 224102, July 26, 2017
RYAN MARIANO Y GARCIA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The state of mind of the accused during an alleged act of self-defense,
defense of a relative, or defense of a stranger must be considered in
determining whether his or her means of repelling an aggressor were
reasonable.
This is a Petition for Review assailing the Decision1 dated August 28, 2015 in
the case docketed as CA-G.R. CR. No. 35590, which affirmed the Decision of
Branch 114, Regional Trial Court, Pasay City. The Regional Trial Court found
petitioner Ryan Mariano (Mariano) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of frustrated homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.2
Petitioner Mariano was charged with Frustrated Homicide in an Information
dated July 23, 2010, which read:
That on or about the 22nd day of July 2010, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, Ryan Mariano y Garcia, with intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one
Frederick Natividad y San Juan, on the vital part of his body with a kitchen
knife, thereby inflicting upon him serious physical injuries, thus performing
all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of homicide
as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason or causes
due to the timely medical assistance rendered to said complainant, at
Manila Adventist Hospital which prevented the latter's death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3 (Citation omitted)
During arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged
and trial ensued.4
The prosecution's version of the events is as follows:
On July 22, 2010, at around 9:45 p.m., Frederick Natividad (Natividad) saw
Yuki Rivera (Yuki) along Vergel Street.5 Yuki punched Natividad's head
thinking that Natividad would tell Yuki's aunt that he was selling
marijuana.6 Natividad went to Yuki's house to report the punching.7 At
Yuki's house, Natividad met petitioner Mariano and his common-law wife,
Pamela Rivera (Pamela). Later, Mariano stabbed Natividad twice, once in
the buttocks and once on the right side of his body.8 A certain Antonio San
Juan (San Juan), who was in his canteen, heard the noise outside. Upon
checking, San Juan saw that Natividad had been stabbed. He asked
barangay tanod Benneth Santos to take Natividad to the hospital. San Juan
noticed Mariano holding a kitchen knife. Mariano voluntarily surrendered
the kitchen knife to San Juan, who then arrested and surrendered him and
the kitchen knife to the police authorities.9
Dr. Archie B. La Madrid was the surgeon who operated on Natividad and
issued the Medical Certificate certifying his "penetrating wound at the right
lobe of the liver caused by a sharp object. There was profuse bleeding from
the liver." The wound in the abdomen punctured the liver, and Natividad
would have died without the timely medical intervention.10
The prosecution presented evidence to prove that Natividad incurred the
amount of P428,375.51 in medical bills.11
On the other hand, the defense's version of the events is as follows:
On July 22, 2010, at around 8:30 p.m., Mariano was in his mother's house.
He then went to Pamela's house, where he saw Natividad and Yuki arguing
because Yuki refused to buy marijuana for Natividad. Natividad went
berserk, slapped Yuki, and kicked Pamela's daughter, Pia Rivera (Pia).
Mariano went inside to tell his mother-in-law and Pamela that Natividad
was hurting Yuki and Pia.12
Pamela confronted Natividad, who then punched Pamela on the face and
shoulder. Mariano pushed Natividad to the ground. Natividad stood back up
and got a piece of wood and kept hitting Mariano. Petitioner Mariano
evaded Natividad's blows because Natividad was drunk and staggering.
Mariano picked up a knife and stabbed Natividad on his buttocks. Due to
Natividad's continuous hitting, Mariano stabbed Natividad again, this time
on the right side of his body.13
Thus, Mariano claimed that he acted in self-defense and in defense of a
relative.14
Pamela testified that Mariano informed her and her mother that Natividad
was hurting Yuki and Pia. When she went outside to confront Natividad, he
punched her face and shoulder. Upon seeing this, Mariano pushed
Natividad to the ground. Pamela, Pia, and Yuki went inside the house while
Mariano stayed outside. Later, they learned that Mariano had stabbed
Natividad.15
Pia and Yuki corroborated Pamela's testimony. None of them witnessed the
stabbing incident because they were already inside the house when it
occurred.16
The trial court found Mariano guilty of frustrated homicide:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused RYAN MARIANO
y GARCIA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged of
Frustrated Homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of Prision
Mayor and to pay complainant Frederick Natividad the amount of
Php428,375.00 as compensatory damages.
SO ORDERED.17 (Emphasis in the original)
The trial court held that Mariano failed to establish his defense with clear
and convincing evidence18 and concluded that Natividad was not an
unlawful aggressor. The trial court found some conflict in Mariano's and
Pia's testimonies, which put into question whether Mariano sensed an
imminent threat from Natividad:
In this case, there is a divergence in the testimonies of defense witnesses as
to whether victim/complainant Frederick Natividad really attack [sic]
accused Ryan Mariano with a piece of wood (2 x 2). Consider the following
testimony of the accused during his direct examination:
Q: What did you do Mr. Witness when you witnessed Frederick Natividad
boxing your wife?
A: I approached him and pushed him, sir.
Q: What happened to Frederick Natividad after you pushed him?
A: He fell to the ground, sir.
Q: And what happened next after Frederick Natividad fell on the ground?
A: He fell and when he was able to rise up, he was able to pick up a piece of
wood, sir "parang dos por dos".
Q: Can you describe the width of this piece of wood picked up by Frederick
Natividad?
A: Two inches by two inches (2" x 2"), sir.
Q: What did Frederick Natividad do after picking up the piece of wood?
A: He hit me with the same, sir.
Q: Where?
A: On the head, sir.
Q: Was he able to hit you on your head Mr. Witness?
A: No sir.
Q: Why Mr. Witness?
A: I was able to parry the blow, sir.
(TSN, Prado, pp. 12-13, July 5, 2011)
Upon the other hand, defense witness Pia Marie Leaño, during her direct
testimony, unequivocally testified as follows:
Q: What happened to you when you were kicked by Frederick Natividad?
A: My stepfather saw me when I was kicked by Sonny.
Q: Who are you referring to as your stepfather?
A: Ryan Mariano.
Q: Where was Ryan Mariano in all those times that Frederick Natividad
banged and kicked the gate and threw mono blocks?
A: He was about to get out of the room.
Q: What did Ryan Mariano do after he saw you being kicked by Mr.
Natividad?
A: He tried to defend me.
Q: What exactly did he do Madam Witness?
A: He was able to pick up a piece of wood and tried to hit Sonny with the
same.
Q: What kind of wood Madam Witness?
A: Small wood only.
Q: Was he able to hit Frederick Natividad with that wood?
A: No.
Q: What happened next when Ryan tried to hit Frederick Natividad with that
piece of wood?
A: I went back to my room because my head was starting to bleed.
(TSN, Tapel, pp. 16-17, January 24, 2012)
With this conflict of who really got hold of a piece of wood and tried to hit
who; emerges the question of whether the accused sensed an imminent
threat to his life. Accused's contention therefore that there was an
imminent threat of bodily harm coming from victim/complainant Frederick
Natividad upon his person is at best illusory . . .
The span of time between the first and second stabbing and the nature of
wounds suffered by victim Frederick Natividad negate any claim of self-
defense or defense of a relative or stranger. Consider the following
testimony of accused Ryan Mariano during his re-cross examination by the
prosecution:
Q: After stabbing Frederick Natividad outside the compound for the first
time, you are saying that 15 minutes more elapsed before you stabbed him
for the second time, is that what you are saying?
A: Yes sir.
Q: And you testified that in 15 minutes interval, there was still a
pagkakagulo?
A: Yes sir.
....
Q: Despite of the fact that you stabbed him already at the buttock, he
stayed in that place for 15 minutes?
A: Yes sir, he did not stop and the more he ran amuck.
Q: And despite the fact that you stabbed him at the buttock, he did not
retaliate against you, is that what you are saying?
A: Because he was being pacified by Benet, sir.
(TSN, Arangonn, pp. 17-19, August 24, 2011)
The Court notes that Frederick Natividad's second wound was fatal as it
affected the vital organ of his body specifically his liver. Had it not been for
the timely and medical assistance rendered, the victim, Frederick Natividad,
would have died. Had accused merely defended himself from the
victim/complainant's unlawful aggression, one (1) stab to the buttock to
immobilize him would have been enough. There was no reason for accused
Ryan Mariano to stab the victim a second time on the abdomen area even
aiming at his vital organs. It bears stressing that the nature of the second
stab wound inflicted by the accused is an indication which disprove[s] a plea
for self-defense or defense of a relative or defense of a stranger because it
demonstrate[s] a determined effort to kill the victim and not just defend
one's self. In the case at bar, Frederick Natividad's wounds serve to tell us
that accused was induced by revenge, resentment or other motive and that
he was bent on killing the victim.19
Thus, in the absence of any unlawful aggression on the part of Natividad,
the trial court ruled that there was no reasonable means employed by
Mariano. Even with unlawful aggression, the means used by Mariano were
unreasonable.20 Natividad was drunk and staggering, which made it easy for
Mariano to evade Natividad's continuous attempts to hit him. Mariano
could have simply shoved Natividad outside the property and secured the
gate, but instead, he chose to stab him twice. The nature and number of the
stab wounds clearly show his intent to kill.21
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court in its
Decision dated August 28, 2015.22
The Court of Appeals held that since Mariano claimed that he acted in self-
defense, defense of a relative, and defense of a stranger when he stabbed
Natividad, the burden of evidence shifted to him, to prove that all the
essential elements of self-defense were present.23 It found these elements,
particularly unlawful aggression, to be absent:24
In this case, the element of unlawful aggression is patently absent. The
records of the case shows [sic] that there is no actual or imminent danger
on the person of the Accused when he stabbed the Complainant. Accused
admitted that he was able to evade each hit by the Complainant because
the latter was drunk and staggering at the time of the alleged unlawful
aggression. The absence of unlawful aggression was even corroborated by
the physical evidence that should clearly defeat the claim of unlawful
aggression on the part of the Complainant because it was only the latter
who was wounded in the assault. It was also testified by the Accused's own
witnesses, i.e. Pamela Rivera, that the Complainant was merely shouting, to
wit:
"Q: What happened after you went out?
A: We just saw Sonny being pacified by Benneth.
Q: Why is Sonny being pacified by Benneth, what was Sonny doing then?
Court: Put it on record verbatim.
A: "Nagwawala po"
Q: What exactly was he doing when you said "nagwawala po["]?
A: She (sic) was shouting sir.
Q: Aside from shouting, what else was she (sic) doing, if any?
A: No more sir, he was just prevented by Benneth from entering the gate
sir."
Clearly, mere shouting cannot be considered, by any standard, as an
unlawful aggression. To reiterate, unlawful aggression must be actual or
imminent threat. It must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor
must it be merely imaginary, but it must be offensive and positively strong.
The claim of Accused that he only acted in defense of relative and of
stranger at the time he stabbed the Complainant was also belied by the
testimonies of his own witnesses. As testified, the witnesses were all inside
the house at the time the Accused stabbed the Complainant. Further, the
defense witnesses admitted that there was no unlawful aggression on the
part of Complainant when the Accused stabbed the former. Hence, there
was no longer any imminent danger on the lives of his relatives as they are
all in the safety of their home. Therefore, the reason for stabbing the
Complainant in defense of Accused's relatives is legally
unavailing.25 (Citations omitted)
The Court of Appeals stressed that unlawful aggression is not merely an
imaginary or threatening attitude, but must be offensive and positively
strong.26 When asked to describe Natividad's acts, Pamela testified that he
was shouting, which the Court of Appeals held could not be considered as
unlawful aggression by any standard.27 Mariano's witnesses testified that
they were all inside the house at the time he stabbed Natividad.28 Thus,
there was no imminent danger on their lives for purposes of defense of a
relative or a stranger.
The Court of Appeals also found that Mariano did not employ reasonable
means to repel Natividad, who was too drunk to pose a real risk:
The second element of the justifying circumstance of self-defense, i.e.,
reasonable means employed to prevent or repel the alleged aggression,
could not have been present in the absence of any unlawful aggression on
the part of the Complainant. However, even granting that there was
unlawful aggression on the part of Complainant, the means employed by
Accused to repel the attack was not reasonable. To note, Complainant was
drunk and staggering. No matter how many times Complainant attempted
to hit Accused, the latter was able to easily evade the blows of Complainant
due to the condition of the latter at that time. Accused could have simply
pushed the Complainant outside the premises and locked the gate and/or
the door of their house. But Accused chose to stab the Complainant not
only once but twice and on a vital part of Complainant's body. Clearly, the
nature and the number of the stab wounds shows [sic] a clear intent to kill
the Complainant, not merely to repel the attack of Complainant.29 (Citation
omitted)
However, the Court of Appeals modified the penalty, considering the
absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Thus, the dispositive
portion of its Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 3, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 114 of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. R-PSY-10-02334-CR is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused RYAN MARIANO y GARCIA is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 2 years
and 4 months of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years and 1 day
of prision mayor as maximum. Accused is ordered to pay to Complainant
Frederick Natividad the amount of Php30,000.00 as moral damages in
addition to the amount of Php428,375.00 as actual damages. Accused is
further ordered to pay Complainant interest on the damages awarded at
the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.30
Thus, petitioner Mariano filed this petition.
Petitioner insists that the elements of self defense were present. Unlawful
aggression on the part of Natividad was present.31 The records established
that Natividad attacked Pia, Yuki, and Pamela.32 Pia and Yuki were both
minors.33 Petitioner only intervened when Natividad started attacking
Pamela.34
Petitioner reiterates that the means employed were
reasonable.35 Reasonable necessity is not absolute necessity. A person who
is assaulted cannot be expected to have the tranquility of mind to make
calculated comparisons on the reasonableness of his reaction to the
assault.36 In this case, petitioner cannot be expected to have acted in a
different manner than to stab Natividad, who had repeatedly struck him
with a piece of wood and had earlier punched Pamela and hit Pia's forehead
with a steel gate.37 Natividad's actions instilled overwhelming fear in
petitioner Mariano, who became frantic.38
Petitioner argues that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part.39

Thus, petitioner prays to be acquitted or, in the alternative, to be held liable
for less serious physical injuries only and that his sentence be reduced
accordingly.
The Office of the Solicitor General argues that unlawful aggression is not
present in this case, considering that there was no actual, sudden, and
unexpected danger on petitioner or his companions.40 Likewise, the means
employed by petitioner to repel Natividad were not reasonably necessary,
considering that Natividad was drunk and staggering at the time of the
altercation.41 The Office of the Solicitor General insists that the Court of
Appeals and the trial court's factual findings are binding on this Court,
considering that no exceptional circumstances exist here to review these
findings.42
This Court grants the petition.
At the very least, petitioner acted in defense of a stranger. Article 11(1) and
(3) of the Revised Penal Code provide:
Article 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any
criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
....
3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger,
provided that the first and second requisites mentioned in the first
circumstance of this article are present and that the person defending be
not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.
To properly invoke the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger, it
must be shown that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim,
that the means employed to repel the victim were reasonably necessary,
and that the accused was not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil
motive.
The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's defense on the ground that there
was no unlawful aggression43and the means employed to prevent or repel
Natividad were not reasonable. However, a reading of the assailed Decision
reveals that the Court of Appeals accepted that it did not reject as false
petitioner's factual allegations or evidence to prove the allegations
presented before the trial court. The Court of Appeals only differed as to
whether the facts, as alleged by petitioner, were sufficient to comprise
unlawful aggression. In fact, the Court of Appeals' conclusion—that no
unlawful aggression was present—relied on the testimony of one (1) of
petitioner's witnesses, Pamela. It summarized Pamela's testimony:
Pamela, testified that on the night of July 22, 2010, while she was watching
TV, the Accused informed her and her mother that the Complainant was
hurting Yuki and Pia. When she went outside the house to confront the
Complainant, the latter punched her on her face and on her shoulder. The
Accused seeing what happened, pushed Complainant to the ground. After
Accused pushed the Complainant to the ground, they all went inside of the
house, except the Accused. Thereafter, they learned that the Accused
stabbed the Complainant.44
In concluding there was no unlawful aggression, the Court of Appeals relied
on Pamela's testimony that she and her companions, except for petitioner,
went inside the house after petitioner pushed Natividad to the ground.
However, the Court of Appeals ignored Pamela's testimony that Natividad
punched her face and shoulder, which was corroborated by the testimony
of Pamela's daughter, Pia. As summarized by the trial court, Pia testified:
[T]hat on July 22, 2010 at around 8:00 P.M., she was in front of their gate
standing by together with her friends; that Sonny tried to request Yuki to
buy marijuana; that Yuki, her cousin refused; that Frederick Natividad got
mad at Yuki for refusing to buy marijuana; that Frederick Natividad slapped
Yuki Rivera two or three times while they were in front of the gate; that she
was beside Yuki Rivera when Frederick slapped him; that Yuki went to their
house and tried to lock the gate; that she also locked the gate; that "si
Sonny po ay kinalampag at tinatadyakan ang gate"; that the steel gate hit
her "pumutok po ang noo ko"; that Sonny threw three (3) mono block chairs
to Yuki; that all the chairs hit her at her back; that Yuki tried to throw the
mono blocks but Sonny kicked her on her right leg thinking that she was
Yuki; that her stepfather, Ryan Mariano, saw her being kicked by Sonny, so,
Ryan Mariano tried to defend her; that Ryan Mariano was able to pick up a
piece of wood and tried to hit Sonny with the same; that she went back to
her room because her head was starting to bleed; that she stayed less than
15 minutes in her room then went outside of the house and saw Sonny
boxing her mother Pamela Rivera on her arm; that her mother cried; that
her mother and Ryan were lived-in partners; that Frederick Natividad boxed
Ryan Mariano on his chest; that Ryan Mariano was just trying to defend
himself and her mom; that she stayed inside their house until the trouble
was finished; that she filed a complaint against Frederick Natividad at the
police station; that she secured a medical certificate as regards to her
injuries as the basis to the child abuse case which she filed against Frederick
Natividad.
On cross-examination, same witness testified; that she did not see when
accused Ryan Mariano stabbed Frederick Natividad because she was then in
her room; that she likewise do not know where was Yuki Rivera and Pamela
Rivera when Ryan Mariano stabbed Frederick Natividad.45
It is significant that Natividad did not deny attacking Pamela or Pia, as he
could not remember these acts.46
An attack showing the aggressor's intention is enough to consider that
unlawful aggression was committed.47 Thus, the attack on Pamela should
have been considered as unlawful aggression for purposes of invoking the
justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger.
The Court of Appeals opined that the means employed by petitioner to
repel Natividad were not reasonable, stressing that Natividad was drunk
and staggering at the time of the altercation.48 This cannot be
countenanced.
The state of mind of the accused during the alleged act of self-defense or
defense of a stranger must be considered in determining whether a person's
means of repelling an aggressor were reasonable. In Jayme v Repe,49 this
Court explained:
Consequently, we rule that petitioner employed reasonable means to repel
the sudden unprovoked attack of which he was the victim.
"Reasonable necessity does not mean absolute necessity. It must be
assumed that one who is assaulted cannot have sufficient tranquility of
mind to think, calculate and make comparisons which can easily be made in
the calmness of the home. It is not the indispensable need but the rational
necessity which the law requires. In each particular case, it is necessary to
judge the relative necessity, whether more or less imperative, in accordance
with the rules of rational logic. The defendant may be given the benefit of
any reasonable doubt as to whether he employed rational means to repel
the aggression."
"The rule of reasonable necessity is not ironclad in its application; it
depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. One who is
assaulted does not have the time nor sufficient tranquility of mind to think,
calculate and choose the weapon to be used. The reason is obvious, in
emergencies of this kind, human nature does not act upon processes of
formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and
when it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it
is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and to hold the actor
irresponsible in law for the consequences."50(Citations omitted)
In United States v. Paras,51 where an accused was knocked to the ground by
an unlawful aggressor who then kicked him, and thus, the accused fired
several shots at the aggressor in self-defense, this Court held:
From the facts proven in these proceedings it is inferred that the three
requisites named in No. 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code are present in the
homicide, inasmuch as without previous provocation on the part of the
accused Paras, he was suddenly and violently assaulted, being struck in the
face, the blows causing blood to flow, and as a result of the aggression he
was laid flat on the ground, where he was kicked; given the rapidity with
which the act was carried out and the imminence of the danger, it is
impossible to affirm that being already prostrate on the ground the assault
of which he was the victim would have ceased. It is reasonable to believe
that the accused, when he defended himself by shooting his assailant, did
not exceed his rights in his defense or employ unnecessary means to repel
an attack already commenced in a cruel and violent manner or to prevent
its continuation, because from the suddenness of the attack, the end
thereof, without risk to his person, could not be assured. It would not be
proper or reasonable to claim that he should have fled or selected a less
deadly weapon, because in the emergency in which, without any reason
whatever, he was placed, and being attacked by a person larger and
stronger than himself, there was nothing more natural than to have made
use of the weapon he held, in order to defend himself; anyone, upon being
assaulted in a similar manner, would have acted likewise. In the natural
order of things, following the instinct of self-preservation, he was compelled
to resort to a proper defense; an impossibility [cannot] be demanded of the
injured person when it [cannot] be affirmed that he could have done less
than he did in defending himself by shooting at his assailant who had
maltreated him and knocked him down.
The reasonable necessity of the means employed in the defense, according
to the jurisprudence of courts, does not de[p]end upon the harm done, but
rests upon the imminent danger of such injury.52
Here, although the offended party was drunk, and therefore, was not able
to land his blows, his attacks were incessant. He had already attacked three
(3) other persons—two (2) minors as well as petitioner's common-law
wife—and was still belligerent. While it may be true that Pamela, Pia, and
Yuki had already gone inside the house at the time of the stabbing, it then
appeared to the petitioner that there was no other reasonable means to
protect his family except to commit the acts alleged. It is unreasonable for
courts to demand conduct that could only have been discovered with
hindsight and absent the stress caused by the threats that the petitioner
actually faced.
Finally, petitioner was not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil
motive. The victim himself, Natividad, testified that he had no issues with
petitioner before the incident.53 Thus, all the elements to invoke the
justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger were present in this case.
Considering that petitioner was justified in stabbing Natividad under Article
11, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, he should be exonerated of the
crime charged.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
August 28, 2015 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 35590 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner RYAN MARIANO y GARCIA is ACQUITTEDof frustrated
homicide. Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, Mendoza, and Martires, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
July 31, 2017
G.R. No. 227038
JEFFREY MIGUEL y REMEGIO, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated
October 21, 2015 and the Resolution3 dated September 5, 2016 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35318, which affirmed the Decision4 dated
October 1, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64 (RTC)
in Criminal Case No. 10-912 convicting petitioner Jeffrey Miguel y Remegio
(petitioner) of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
The Facts
On May 27, 2010, an Information5 was filed before the RTC charging
petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, defined and penalized
under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,6 otherwise known
as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," the accusatory
portion of which reads:
On the 24111 day of May 2010, in the city of Makati, the Philippines,
accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug and
without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control, and
custody a total of one point ten (1.10) grams of dried Marijuana leaves, a
dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
The prosecution alleged that at around 12:45 in the morning of May 24,
2010, a Bantay Bayan operative of Barangay San Antonio Village, Makati
City named Reynaldo Bahoyo (BB Bahoyo) was doing his rounds when he
purportedly received a report of a man showing off his private parts at
Kaong Street. BB Bahoyo and fellow Bantay Bayan operative Mark Anthony
Velasquez (BB Velasquez) then went to the said street and saw a visibly
intoxicated person, which they later identified as herein petitioner,
urinating and displaying his private parts while standing in front of a gate
enclosing an empty lot. BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez approached petitioner
and asked him where he lived, and the latter answered Kaong Street. BB
Bahoyo then said that he also lived in the same street but petitioner looked
unfamiliar to him, so he asked for an identification card, but petitioner
failed to produce one. BB Velasquez then repeated the request for an
identification card, but instead, petitioner emptied his pockets, revealing a
pack of cigarettes containing one (1) stick of cigarette and two (2) pieces of
rolled paper containing dried marijuana leaves, among others. This
prompted BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez to seize the foregoing items, take
petitioner to the police station, and turn him, as well as the seized items,
over to SP03 Rafael Castillo (SPO3 Castillo). SP03 Castillo then inventoried,
marked, and photographed the seized items, all in the presence of BB
Bahoyo and BB Velasquez, and thereafter, prepared an inventory report and
a request for qualitative examination of the seized two (2) pieces of rolled
paper and for petitioner to undergo drug testing. After examination, it was
confirmed that the aforesaid rolled paper contained marijuana and that
petitioner was positive for the presence of methamphetamine but negative
for THC-metabolites, both dangerous drugs.8
Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge, and thereafter, presented a
different version of the facts. According to him, he was just urinating in
front of his workplace when two (2) Bantay Bayan operatives, i.e., BB
Bahoyo and BB Velasquez, approached and asked him where he lived. Upon
responding that he lived in Kaong Street, BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez then
frisked him, took away his belongings, and thereafter, handcuffed and
brought him to the barangay hall. He was then detained for about an hour
before being taken to the Ospital ng Makati and to another office where a
bald police officer questioned him. Thereafter, he was taken back to the
barangay hall where they showed him two (2) sticks of marijuana joints
allegedly recovered from him.9
The RTC Ruling
10
In a Decision dated October 1, 2012, the RTC found petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and, accordingly, sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months, as maximum, and to pay a fine in the amount of
₱300,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.11
The RTC found that BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez conducted a valid
warrantless arrest, as petitioner was scandalously showing his private parts
at the time of his arrest. Therefore, the resultant search incidental to such
arrest which yielded the seized marijuana in petitioner's possession was also
lawful. In this regard, since the prosecution has adequately shown that
petitioner freely and consciously possessed such marijuana without
authority by law, then he must be convicted for violating Section 11, Article
II of RA 9165.12
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed13 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision14 dated October 21, 2015, the CA affirmed petitioner's
conviction.15 It held that the search made on petitioner which yielded the
seized marijuana was validly made as it was done incidental to his arrest for
exhibiting his private parts on public. As such, the said seized marijuana is
admissible in evidence and, thus, sufficient to convict him for the crime
charged.16 The CA likewise held that the rule on chain of custody was duly
complied with and, thus, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
drugs were not compromise d.17
Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration,18 which was, however,
denied in a Resolution19 dated September 5, 2016; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly
upheld petitioner's conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In criminal cases, "an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review
and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the
appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on
grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such
court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law."20
Proceeding from the foregoing, and as will be explained hereunder,
petitioner's conviction must be set aside.
One of the arguments presented in the instant petition is that the search
and arrest made on petitioner were illegal and, thus, the marijuana
purportedly seized from him is inadmissible in evidence.21 In this relation, it
is worth noting that his arresting officers, i.e., BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez,
are mere Bantay Bayan operatives of Makati City. Strictly speaking, they are
not government agents like the Philippine National Police (PNP) or the
National Bureau of Investigation in charge of law enforcement; but rather,
they are civilian volunteers who act as "force multipliers" to assist the
aforesaid law enforcement agencies in maintaining peace and security
within their designated areas.22Particularly, jurisprudence described the
nature of Bantay Bayan as "a group of male residents living in [the] area
organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community[, which is]
an accredited auxillary of the x x x PNP."23In the case of Dela Cruz v.
People24 involving civilian port personnel conducting security checks, the
Court thoroughly discussed that while the Bill of Rights under Article III of
the 1987 Constitution generally cannot be invoked against the acts of
private individuals, the same may nevertheless be applicable if such
individuals act under the color of a state-related function, viz.:
With regard to searches and seizures, the standard imposed on private
persons is different from that imposed on state agents or authorized
government authorities.
In People v. Marti, the private forwarding and shipping company, following
standard operating procedure, opened packages sent by accused Andre
Marti for shipment to Zurich, Switzerland and detected a peculiar odor from
the packages. The representative from the company found dried marijuana
leaves in the packages. He reported the matter to the National Bureau of
Investigation and brought the samples to the Narcotics Section of the
Bureau for laboratory examination. Agents from the National Bureau of
Investigation subsequently took custody of the illegal drugs. Andre Marti
was charged with and was found guilty of violating Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
This court held that there was no unreasonable search or seizure. The
evidence obtained against the accused was not procured by the state acting
through its police officers or authorized government agencies. The Bill of
Rights does not govern relationships between individuals; it cannot be
invoked against the acts of private individuals:
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must
generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality.
However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor
of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at
bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of
private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.
xxxx
The Cebu Port Authority is clothed with authority by the state to oversee
the security of persons and vehicles within its ports. While there is a
distinction between port personnel and port police officers in this case,
considering that port personnel are not necessarily law enforcers, both
should be considered agents of government under Article III of the
Constitution. The actions of port personnel during routine security checks at
ports have the color of a state-related function.
In People v. Malngan, barangay tanod and the Barangay Chairman were
deemed as law enforcement officers for purposes of applying Article III of
the Constitution. In People v. Lauga, this court held that a "bantav
bayan," in relation to the authority to conduct a custodial investigation
under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, "has the color of a state-
related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his
constitutional rights[.]"
Thus, with port security personnel's functions having the color of state-
related functions and deemed agents of government, Marti is inapplicable
in the present case. x x x.25 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this light, the Court is convinced that the acts of the Bantay Bayan - or
any barangay-based or other volunteer organizations in the nature of watch
groups - relating to the preservation of peace and order in their respective
areas have the color of a state-related function. As such, they should be
deemed as law enforcement authorities for the purpose of applying the Bill
of Rights under Article III of the 1987 Constitution to them.26
Having established that the Bill of Rights may be applied to the Bantay
Bayan operatives who arrested and subsequently searched petitioner, the
Court shall now determine whether such arrest and search were validly
made.
"Section 2,27 Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and
seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant
predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which, such search
and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches
and seizures, Section 3 (2),28 Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that
evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other
words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be
excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.29
One of the recognized exceptions to the need [of] a warrant before a search
may be [e]ffected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance,
the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be
made- the process cannot be reversed.30
A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to
the latter, the parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure should - as a general rule - be complied with:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule
112.
The aforementioned provision identifies three (3) instances when
warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a
suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on
personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that
said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed;
and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final
judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.31
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2)
elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand,
Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of the
arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer
had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed
it.32
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the
commission of an offense is essential. Under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the officer himself witnesses the
crime; while in Section 5 (b) of the same, he knows for a fact that a crime
has just been committed."33
In this case, the prosecution claims that the BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez
simply responded to a purported report of a man showing off his private
parts at Kaong Street which led to petitioner's arrest. On the other hand,
petitioner maintains that he was just urinating in front of his workplace
when the Bantay Bayan operatives suddenly approached and questioned
him, and thereafter, frisked and arrested him. BB Bahoyo's testimony on
direct and cross-examinations is enlightening on this matter, to wit:
PROSECUTOR: x x x
xxxx
So, upon seeing Jeffrey Miguel, what did you do?
WITNESS: We approached him and we asked him what was he doing in that
place and he appears to be intoxicated, ma'am.
PROSECUTOR: After questioning him, what did you do?
WITNESS: We asked him from where he is residing and he told us that he is
from Caong Street.
PROSECUTOR: What you do next?
WITNESS: Because I also live in Caong and he is not familiar to me, I asked
for his I.D, ma'am.
PROSECUTOR: Was he able to produce an I.D?
WITNESS: He was not able to produce any I.D., ma'am.
PROSECUTOR: When he failed to produce any I.D., what did you do?
WITNESS: One of my companions asked him if he has any I.D. with him.
PROSECUTOR: Who was this companion of yours?
WITNESS: Mark Anthony Velasquez, ma'am.
PROSECUTOR: What was the response of Jeffrey to the request of Mark
Anthony Velasquez?
WITNESS: He brought out the contents of his pocket and he brought out one
pack of Fortune with one stick inside and another pack, Marlboro light pack
with one stick of cigarette and two sticks of marijuana.
xxxx
[on cross-examination]
ATTY. PUZON: When you saw certain Jeffrey, you were not familiar with
him, is that correct?
WITNESS: No, sir, I am not familiar with him.
A TTY. PUZON: And when you saw him, he was already showing his private
parts, is that correct?
WITNESS: Yes, sir.
A TTY. PUZON: In your "Pinagsanib na Sinumpaang Salaysay" you stated that
when you saw Jeffrey, his back was turned to you and it seemed that he was
peeing.1âwphi1 Do you remember saying that in your "Pinagsanib na
Sinumpaang Salaysay"?
WITNESS: Yes, sir.
A TTY. PUZON: So, is it not true that when you saw him, he was already
showing his private parts?
WITNESS: He was showing his private parts, sir.
ATTY. PUZON: While his back turned to you?
WITNESS: Yes, sir.
ATTY. PUZON: How could you see his private parts if his back was turned
against you?
WITNESS: He faced us, sir.
xxxx
COURT: Did you charge the accused for urinating in a public place or for
showing his private parts?
WITNESS: No, Your Honor.
ATTY. PUZON: And in fact, only a drug case was filed against Jeffrey?
WITNESS: I have no idea, sir. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)34
On the other hand, pertinent portions of petitioner's Judicial
Affidavit35 containing his direct testimony read:
Q: Naaalala mo pa ba ang petsang 24 May 2010?
A: Opo. Iyon po ang araw nang aka ay dakpin ng dalawang bantay-bayan.
Q: Ano ang naaalala mo bago ka mahuli, kung mayroon man?
A: Mga bandang pasado alas dose ng hating gabi aka ay umihi sa tapat ng
pinagtatrabahuhan ko ng may biglang lumapit sa akin na dalawang bantay-
bayan.
Q: Ano ang sumunod na nangvari x x x, kung mavroon man?
A: Nagtanong po sila kung saan ako nakatira at sinagot ko na nakatira ako
sa Kaong St., Brgy. San Antonio Village, Makati City at pagkatapos ay
kinapkapan nila ako.
Q: May nakulta ba sila sa iyo pakatapos kang kapkapan, kung mayroon
man?
A: Opo. Nakulta nila ang aking charger, cellphone, lighter at
sigarilyong Fortune.
Q: Ano ang sumunod na nangyari, kung mayroon man?
A: Pinosasan nila ako at dinala sa barangay.36 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
On cross-examination, petitioner testified, as follows:
PROSECUTOR: x x x Mr. Witness, you said that at past 12:00 in the midnight
of May 24, 2010 you were arrested by two Bantay Bayan, do you affirm that
Mr. Witness?
WITNESS: Yes, ma'am.
PROSECUTOR: And how did you know that they are Bantay Bayan
complement?
WITNESS: They told me that they were Bantay Bayan personnel, ma'am.
PROSECUTOR: What were you doing then, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS: Urinating in front of my place of work, ma'am.
xxxx
PROSECUTOR: And you were working at that time that you were allegedly
arrested by these two Bantay Bayan complement, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS: Not anymore because I was staying in at the company, ma'am.
xxxx
PROSECUTOR: You urinated outside because you do not have a comfort
room inside, is it not a fact, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS: Yes, ma'am.
PROSECUTOR: What is this Fine Home Incorporation doing, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS: I am a caretaker at Fine Home Incorporation I guard the steels,
ma'am.37 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On the basis of the foregoing testimonies, the Court is inclined to believe
that at around past 12 o'clock in the early morning of May 24, 2010,
petitioner went out to the street to urinate when the Bantay
Bayan operatives chanced upon him. The latter then approached and
questioned petitioner, and thereafter, went on to search his person, which
purportedly yielded the marijuana seized from him. Verily, the prosecution's
claim that petitioner was showing off his private parts was belied by the
aforesaid testimonies. Clearly, these circumstances do not justify the
conduct of an in jlagrante delicto arrest, considering that there was no overt
act constituting a crime committed by petitioner in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer. Neither do these circumstances necessitate
a "hot pursuit" warrantless arrest as the arresting Bantay Bayan operatives
do not have any personal knowledge of facts that petitioner had just MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
committed an offense. Chief Justice
Chairperson
More importantly, the Court simply finds highly implausible the
prosecution's claim that a valid warrantless arrest was made on petitioner TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
on account of the alleged public display of his private parts because if it was MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
CASTRO
indeed the case, then the proper charge should have been filed against him. Associate Justice
Associate Justice
However, records are bereft of any showing that such charge was filed aside
from the instant criminal charge for illegal possession of dangerous drugs - ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
thereby strengthening the view that no prior arrest was made on petitioner Associate Justice
which led to a search incidental thereto. As stressed earlier, there must first
CERTIFICATION
be a lawful arrest before a search can be made and that such process
cannot be reversed. Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
All told, the Bantay Bayan operatives conducted an illegal search on the
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
person of petitioner. Consequently, the marijuana purportedly seized from
him on account of such search is rendered inadmissible in evidence MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
pursuant to the exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Chief Justice
Constitution. Since the confiscated marijuana is the very corpus delicti of the
crime charged, petitioner must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated
from criminal liability.38
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 21,
2015 and the Resolution dated September 5, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 35318 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
petitioner Jeffrey Miguel y Remegio is ACQUITTED of the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs defined and penalized under Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections
is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held
for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated
November 24, 2014 and the Resolution[3] dated May 29, 2015 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35293, which upheld the Decision[4] dated
September 6, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch
52 (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. T-5144 and T-5145, finding petitioner
Christopher Fianza a.k.a. "Topel" (Fianza) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
two (2) counts of violation of Section 5 (b),[5] Article III of Republic Act No.
(RA) 7610,[6] otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
The Facts
Fianza was charged with two (2) counts of violation of Section 5 (b), Article
III of RA 7610 under two (2) Informations[7] dated April 6, 2011 filed before
the RTC.[8] The prosecution's version of the incidents are as follows:
Sometime in July 2010,[9] AAA,[10] who was then 11 years old, was called by
Fianza to his house and thereupon, was asked to wash his clothes. After
AAA was finished with the laundry, Fianza asked her to go with him to
the kamalig. Thereat, they proceeded to the second floor where Fianza
removed his pants and briefs, lied down, and ordered AAA to hold his penis
and masturbate him. After ejaculating, Fianza put on his clothes, and gave
P20.00 to AAA who, thereafter, went home.[11]
On November 30, 2010, while AAA was home, Fianza called her to his
house, and asked her to clean the same. After she was done sweeping the
floor, they proceeded to the second floor of the kamalig. Thereat, Fianza
again removed his pants and briefs, lied down, and ordered AAA to fondle
his penis. After the deed, he gave P20.00 to AAA who, thereafter, went
home.[12]
After the second incident, AAA related the matter to her cousin,
CCC,[13] who, in turn, told BBB,[14] AAA's mother, who reported the matter to
the police.[15]
For his part, Fianza interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed
that he lived with his uncle in Andalasi, Pangasinan (Andalasi), while the rest
of his family resided in Sapinit, Pangasinan (Sapinit), and were neighbors
with AAA. He averred that in July 2010, he went to Sapinit to gamble all
night, and went to his parents' house the following morning to sleep before
going home to Andalasi.[16] As for the November 30, 2010 incident, he
maintained that he was in Andalasi drinking with his friends as he had just
sold a carabao. The next day, he went to get the carabao that he sold, and
bought more liquor. He proceeded to Sapinit to have another drinking
session that lasted until December 4, 2010.[17]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[18] dated September 6, 2012, the RTC found Fianza guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of violation of Section 5 (b),
Article III of RA 7610, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporalmedium, as
maximum, and ordered him to pay AAA the amount of P30,000.00 as moral
damages for each count.
The RTC held that for an accused to be convicted of child abuse through
lascivious conduct on a minor below 12 years old, the requisites for acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336[19] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) must be
met in addition to the requisites of sexual abuse under Section 5 of RA
7610,[20] which the prosecution was able to establish. It gave full faith and
credence to the testimony of AAA who remained steadfast in her claim and
who was not shown to have been impelled by any ill-motive to testify falsely
against Fianza.[21] On the other hand, it declared that Fianza's actions
showed that he took advantage of AAA's naivete and innocence to satisfy
his lewd designs.[22]
Aggrieved, Fianza elevated[23] his conviction to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R.
CR No. 35293.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[24] dated November 24, 2014, the CA upheld Fianza's conviction
for two (2) counts of violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610.
The CA observed that while Fianza was charged with violations of Section 5
(b), Article III of RA 7610 (sexual abuse), the proper appellation of the
crimes should be violations of Article 336 of the RPC (Acts of
Lasciviousness), in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610, and found
that the prosecution was able to establish all the requisites for both Acts of
Lasciviousness and sexual abuse. It declared that Fianza, a 35-year old adult,
had moral ascendancy over 11-year-old AAA; hence, his act of coercing AAA
to engage in lascivious conduct falls within the meaning of the term sexual
abuse.[25]
However, the CA reduced the award of moral damages to P25,000.00, and
further ordered Fianza to pay a fine in the amount of P15,000.00 for each
count of sexual abuse, with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum on the amounts due from the finality of judgment until full
payment.[26]
Dissatisfied, Fianza moved for reconsideration,[27] which was, however,
denied in a Resolution[28] dated May 29, 2015; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA
correctly upheld Fianza's conviction.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, the Court deems it appropriate to correct the appellation of
the crime with which Fianza was charged to Acts of Lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the RPC considering that the victim, AAA, was only 11 years
old at the time of the incidents. In instances where the child subjected to
sexual abuse through lascivious conduct is below twelve (12) years of age,
the offender should be prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC, but suffer
the higher penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period in accordance
with Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610, which pertinently reads:
SECTION 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether
male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to
the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited
in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; Provided, That when the victims [sic] is under twelve (12) years of
age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3,
for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That the
penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years
of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period x x x. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, before an accused can be convicted of
child abuse through lascivious conduct on a minor below 12 years of age,
the requisites for Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must
be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse thereunder.[29]
The elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC are: (a)
the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (b) the
lascivious act is done under any of the following circumstances: (i) by using
force or intimidation; (ii) when the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is under twelve
(12) years of age; and (c) the offended party is another person of either
sex.[30] On the other hand, sexual abuse, as defined under Section 5 (b),
Article III of RA 7610 has three (3) elements: (a) the accused commits an act
of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (b) the said act is performed
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
and (c) the child is below eighteen (18) years old.[31]
The term "lewd" is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene; it
is characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an
accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is necessarily a mental
process the existence of which can be inferred by overt acts carrying out
such intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or
lascivious. The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the
nature of the acts themselves and the environmental
circumstances. Hence, whether or not a particular conduct is lewd, by its
very nature, cannot be pigeonholed into a precise definition.[32]
Lascivious conduct, on the other hand, is defined under Section 2 (h) of the
Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse
Cases (Rules on Child Abuse Cases) as:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of
any object into the genitalia, anus, or mouth, of any person, whether of the
same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade,
or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area
of a person;
In the present case, the existence of all the elements of Acts of
Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, as well as
the first and thirdelements of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III of
RA 7610, remains undisputed. Records disclose that on two (2) occasions in
July 2010 and on November 30, 2010, Fianza induced AAA, an 11-year-old
minor, to hold his penis and masturbate him. The only point of dispute is
with regard to the existence of the second element of sexual
abuse, i.e., whether or not the lascivious conduct was performed on a child
subjected to other sexual abuse.
A child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges
in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. Case law
further clarifies that lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of
any adult exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to
intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party's free
will.[33] Corollory thereto, Section 2 (g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases
conveys that sexual abuse involves the element of influence which
manifests in a variety of forms. It is defined as:
[T]he employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of
a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest
with children x x x
The term "influence" means the "improper use of power or trust in any way
that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another's objective." On
the other hand, "coercion" is the "improper use of x x x power to compel
another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it."[34]
With the foregoing parameters considered, the Court finds that Fianza's acts
were attended by coercion or influence within the contemplation of Section
5 (b), Article III of RA 7610.
It is undisputed that AAA was only 11 years old at the time of the incidents,
hence, considered a child under the law. Section 3 (a), Article I of RA 7610
defines children in this wise:
(a) "Children" refers to person below eighteen (18) years of age or those
over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves
from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition[.]
Case law states that a child, such as AAA in this case, is presumed to be
incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act. In Malto v.
People,[35] the Court explained:
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the
rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of
fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The
State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm
to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of
themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection.
The harm which results from a child's bad decision in a sexual encounter
may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the
law should protect her from the harmful consequences of her attempts at
adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a child should not be deemed to have
validly consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act
of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special
protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise,
sexual predators like petitioner will be justified, or even unwittingly
tempted by the law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In other
words, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational
consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.[36]
Records likewise indicate that Fianza was about 35 years old at the time of
the commission of the offense,[37] or 24 years older than AAA, more or less.
The age disparity between them clearly placed Fianza in a stronger position
over AAA which enabled him to wield his will on the latter.[38]
However, Fianza assails his conviction for the prosecution's failure: (a) to
specify in the Information in Criminal Case No. T-5144 the date of the
commission of the offense;[39] and (b) to indicate in the information in both
cases that the complained acts were performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse[40] in violation of his right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him.
In this relation, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court (Rules), which lays
down the guidelines in determining the sufficiency of a complaint or
information, provides:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information
is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
xxxx
As to the sufficiency of the allegation on the date of the commission of the
offense, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules adds:
SEC. 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in
the complaint or information the precise date the offense was
committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The
offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its commission. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Conformably with these provisions, when the date given in the complaint is
not of the essence of the offense, it need not be proven as alleged; thus, the
complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was
committed at any date within the period of the statute of limitations and
before the commencement of the action.[41]
In this case, Fianza had been fully apprised of the charges against him since
the Informations stated the approximate date of the commission of the
offense to be "sometime during the month of July 2010." Indeed, the
precise date and time of the incidents are not among the elements of sexual
abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610.[42]
It is likewise well-settled that it is sufficient that the acts or omissions
constituting the offense be stated in the information in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute, albeit in
terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged and for the court to pronounce judgment.[43]
In the instant case, the Informations not only referred to the specific
section of RA 7610 that was violated, but also stated that: (a) AAA was an
11-year-old minor at the time of the offense; and (b) Fianza committed
lascivious conduct by forcing AAA to masturbate his penis.[44]
To reiterate, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the
child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or intimidation,[45] or
influence of any adult.[46]
Force or intimidation in cases involving prosecutions for Rape and Acts of
Lasciviousness is defined as "power, violence or constraint exerted upon or
against a person."[47] In People v. Maceda,[48] the Court explained the
standards for evaluating the force or intimidation employed in rape, which
equally applies to Acts of Lasciviousness[49] as well as violation of Section 5
(b), Article III of RA 7610:[50]
[I]t is not necessary that the force and intimidation employed in
accomplishing it be so great or of such character as could not be resisted. It
is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to
consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.
The intimidation must be judged in the light of the victim's perception and
judgment at the time of the commission of the crime, and not by any hard
and fast rule.[51] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The allegation that Fianza committed lascivious conduct by forcing AAA to
masturbate his penis was sufficient to apprise him of the nature of the
criminal act with which he was charged to enable him to prepare his
defense. Contrary to his protestations, the Informations sufficiently alleged
the second element of sexual abuse, albeit not employing the exact
language of the law, i.e., that the lewd acts being complained of were
performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse.
Notably, Fianza failed to refute AAA's claim that she was compelled to do as
he instructed because he threatened to humiliate her and her
family.[52] In Amployo v. People,[53] a case involving a similar prosecution for
lascivious conduct committed on an eight-year-old minor, the Court held
that intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible, especially in the case
of young girls, thus:
[I]ntimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient that some
compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise
of the will of the offended party. This is especially true in the case of young,
innocent and immature girls who could not be expected to act with
equanimity of disposition and with nerves of steel. Young girls cannot be
expected to act like adults under the same circumstances or to have the
courage and intelligence to disregard the threat.[54](Emphasis supplied)
It is not hard to imagine 11-year-old AAA being intimidated and cowed into
silence and submission by her neighbor, a full grown adult male old enough
to be her parent,[55] with threat of humiliation, should she not give in to his
dastardly desires. She is still a child not capable of fully understanding or
knowing the import of her actions. Verily, in almost all cases of sexual
abuse, the credibility of the victim's testimony is crucial in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime where only the persons involved can testify as
to its occurrence. Hence, the Court accords a high degree of respect to the
assessment of the trial court which is in the best position to observe the
declarations and demeanor of the witnesses, and evaluate their credibility,
even more so when the same is affirmed by the CA,[56] as in this case.
Accordingly, the Court finds the prosecution to have sufficiently established
Fianza's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for Acts of Lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and absent any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as minimum, to fifteen (15)
years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as maximum.[57] However, in line with recent jurisprudence,
the Court modifies the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages, and
hereby orders Fianza to pay the amounts of P15,000.00 as fine, P20,000.00
as civil indemnity, and P15,000.00 as moral damages, for each count, plus
legal interest thereon at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of this judgment until full payment.[58]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 24,
2014 and the Resolution dated May 29, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 35293 are hereby SET ASIDE and a new one is entered finding
petitioner Christopher Fianza a.k.a. "Topel" (Fianza) GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article
336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of
Republic Act No. 7610. Fianza is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in
its minimum period, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months, and
twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum,
and is ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P15,000.00 as fine, P20,000.00 as
civil indemnity, and P15,000.00 as moral damages, for each count, plus legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this
judgment until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C. J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, and Del Castillo, JJ., concur.
Caguioa, J., See dissenting opinion.
FIRST DIVISION On 27 July 2004, Alid obtained a cash advance of Pl 0,496 to defray his
expenses for official travel. He was supposed to attend the turnover
August 2, 2017 ceremony of the outgoing and the incoming Secretaries of the DA and to
G.R. No. 186329 follow up, on 28 to 31 July 2004, funds intended for the GMA Rice Program.
The turnover ceremony did not push through, however, and Alid's trip was
DR. FRISCO M. MALABANAN, Petitioner, deferred.3
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent On 22 August 2004, Alid took Philippine Airlines (PAL) Flight PR 188 from
Cotabato City to Manila under PAL Ticket No. 07905019614316 (PAL
x-----------------------x Ticket).4 He attended the turn over ceremony at the DA Central Office in
Quezon City on 23 August 2004.5 The following day, or on 24 August 2004,
GR. Nos. 186584-86
he took a flight from Manila to Cotabato City per another ticket issued in
ABUSAMA MANGUDADATU ALID, Petitioner, exchange for the PAL Ticket.6
vs.
On 1 September 2004, Alid instructed his secretary to prepare the necessary
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN - 1st DIVISION, OFF'ICE OF THE SPECIAL
papers to liquidate the cash advance.
PROSECUTOR, HON. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, Respondents. In his Post Travel Report, he declared that his official travel transpired on 28
to 31 July 2004.7
x-----------------------x
He likewise attached an altered PAL Ticket in support of his Post Travel
G.R. No. 198598
Report. The date "22 AUG 2004" was changed to read "28 JULY 2004", and
ABUSAMA M. ALID, Petitioner, the flight route "Cotabato-Manila-Cotabato" appearing on the PAL Ticket
vs. was altered to read "Davao-Manila-Cotabato."8
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
He further attached an undated Certificate of Appearance signed by
DECISION Malabanan as Director of the GMA Rice Program.9 The document stated
that Alid had appeared at the DA Central Office in Quezon City from 28 to 31
SERENO, CJ.: July 2004 for the turnover ceremony and to follow up the status of the
funds intended for the GMA Rice Program.10
These three consolidated petitions stem from a common set of facts.
During post-audit, discrepancies in the supporting documents were found
Abusama M. Alid (Alid) was the Assistant Regional Director of the
and investigated. Thereafter, the Office of the Special Prosecutor charged
Department of Agriculture (DA), Regional Field Office No. XII, Cotabato
Alid and Malabanan before the Sandiganbayan with falsification of public
City.1 Frisco M. !vfalabanan (Malabanan), on the other hand, was the
documents.11
Program Director of the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani Rice Program (GMA
Rice Program) of the DA, Field Operations Office, Diliman, Quezon City.2
In SB-07-CRM-0072, Alid was indicted for falsifying his Post Travel Report, as
follows:
That [on] or about July 2004, and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Cotabato City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, ABUSAMA MANGUDADATU ALID, a high
ranking public officer holding the position of Assistant Regional Director
with salary grade 27 of the Department of Agriculture, Regional Field Office
No. XII, Cotabato City, taking advantage of his official position, with abuse of
confidence, and committing the offense in relation to his office, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified
his Post Travel Report prepared on September 1, 2004, which is an official
document, by making it appear therein that on July 28, 2004, he proceeded
to Davao to take a flight bound for Manila and that he was in Manila up to
July 30, 2004 to attend to the tum-over ceremony of incoming and outgoing
DA Secretaries and to follow up the funds intended for the Ginintuang
Masaganang Ani (GMA) Rice Program projects and that on July 31, 2004, he
took a taxi from his hotel to the airport and boarded a flight back to
Cotabato City, which document he submitted to support his Liquidation
Voucher for Ten Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Six Pesos (₱l 0,496.00)
which he cash advanced [sic] for traveling expenses to Manila for the period
July 28-31, 2004, when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew, he did
not take the aforesaid official trip to Manila for the said period of July 28 to
30, 2004 and that the turn-over ceremony between the incoming and
outgoing DA Secretaries was postponed and moved to August 2004, nor did
the accused follow up the funds for GMA projects in the said month, thus
accused made [an] untruthful statement in a narration of facts, the truth of
which he was legally bound to disclose.
CONTRARY TO LAW.12
In SB-07-CRM-0073, the Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor charged Alid with
falsifying the PAL Ticket. The Information stated:
That on or about July 2004, and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Cotabato City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, ABUSAMA MANGUDADATU ALID, a high
ranking public officer holding the position of Assistant Regional Director
with salary grade 27 of the Department of Agriculture, Regional Field Office
No. XII, Cotabato City, taking advantage of his official position and
committing the offense in relation to his office, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified the Philippine
Airline (PAL) plane ticket No. 07905019614316[,] a genuine document which
he attached and submitted as supporting document to his liquidation
voucher for the purpose of liquidating his cash advance of Ten Thousand
Four Hundred Ninety Six (₱10,496.00) Pesos as traveling expenses for the
period July 28-31, 2004 thereby rendering the said plane ticket a
public/official document, which falsification was committed in the following
manner to wit: that in the upper right corner of the said plane ticket
indicating the date and place of issue, accused inserted the figure/number 8
after the figure/number 2 and erased the original word Aug (August) and
superimposed the [word] July to make it appear that the plane ticket was
purchased/issued on July 28, 2004, when the original date of purchase/issue
was August 2, 2004; that in the portion of the ticket indicating the flight
route, accused also erased the original word "Cotabato" and superimposed
therein the word "Davao" and under the column "Date" of flight, accused
erased the original figure 22 and superimposed the figure "28" and also
erased the word "Aug." and superimposed the word "Jul" to make it appear
that the flight took place on July 28 originating from Davao, thus accused
made alterations and intercalations in a genuine document which changed
its original meaning and perverting the truth to make it appear that he
made an official trip to Manila, originating from Davao on July 28, 2004
using a plane ticket issued/purchased on July 28, 2004 to conform with the
entries in his liquidation voucher when accused knew [full] well that he did
not make such official trip on said date and route as indicated in the
aforesaid falsified PAL plane ticket.
CONTRARY TO LAW.13
In SB-07-CRM-0074, Alid and Malabanan were charged with falsifying the
Certificate of Appearance that the former attached as a supporting
document for the Post Travel Report. The Information reads:
That on or about July 2004, and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused ABUSAMA MANGUDADATU ALID, a high ranking public officer
holding the position of Assistant Regional Director with salary grade 27 of
the Department of Agriculture (DA), Regional Field Office No. XII, Cotabato
City, conspiring and conniving with accused FRISCO MERCADO
[MALABANAN], Chief Science Research Specialist of the Philippine Rice
Research Institute (Philrice) and Program Director of the Ginintuang
Masaganang Ani (GMA) [Rice] Program of the Department of Agriculture,
Field Operations Service, Diliman, Quezon City, holding a salary grade of 26,
taking advantage of their official positions, with abuse of confidence and
committing the offense in relation to their respective offices, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified an
undated Certificate of Appearance issued in the name of ABUSAMA
MANGUDADATU ALID noted by accused FRISCO M. MALABANAN which is
an official/public document and which the former submitted as one of the
supporting document[s] to his liquidation voucher of his cash advance of
Ten Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Six (₱10,496.00) Pesos as traveling
expenses for the period of July 28-31, 2004 by making it appear in the said
Certificate of Appearance that accused Abusama Mangudadatu Alid
appeared in the Office of the DA Central Office, Diliman, Quezon City for the
period of July 28-31, 2004 to attend to the turn-over ceremony of incoming
and outgoing DA Secretaries and to follow-up the funds intended for the
GMA Projects Implementation; when in truth and in fact, as both accused
well knew, accused Abusama Mangudadatu Alid did not travel to Manila on
said date as the tum-over ceremony of the incoming and outgoing DA
Secretaries was postponed and moved to August 2004 nor did accused Alid
follow up with accused Malabanan on the said period the funds intended
for the OMA projects, thus accused made an untruthful statement in a
narration of facts, the truth of which they are legally bound to disclose.
CONTRARYTO LAW.14
Upon arraignment, both Alid and Malabanan entered pleas of "not
guilty."15 While the cases were pending before the Sandiganbayan, the
prosecution filed a Motion to Suspend Accused PendenteLite, praying for
their preventive suspension pending trial.16
In a Minute Resolution dated 29 October 2008, the Sandiganbayan granted
the motion and ordered the suspension pendentelite of Alid and Malabanan
for 90 days.17
Both of the accused sought reconsideration, but the Sandiganbayan denied
their motions in a Minute Resolution dated 30 January 2009.18
Malabanan then filed before this Court a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition19 praying that the order of preventive suspension be set aside,
and that a writ of prohibition be issued against the Sandiganbayan to
forestall the threatened implementation of the Minute Resolutions.20 This
petition was docketed as G.R. No. 186329.
Alid filed a separate Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition21 before
us, likewise praying that the order of preventive suspension be set aside,
and that a writ of prohibition be issued against the Sandiganbayan's
implementation of the Minute Resolution dated 29 October 2008.22 He
further prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order pending
the resolution of the principal case.23 This petition was docketed as G.R.
Nos. 186584-86.
In the meantime, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with the criminal cases and
eventually rendered a Decision convicting Alid of falsification of a private
document for altering the PAL Ticket.24 The Sandiganbayan, however,
acquitted both of the accused of the other charges. The dispositive portion
of its ruling reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows -
1. In SB-07-CRM-0072 - ACQUITTING accused ABUSAMA M. ALID for
insufficiency of evidence, with costs de oficio;
2. In SB-07-CRM-0073 - finding accused ABUSAMA M. ALID GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of a private document under
paragraph 2 of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code and, with the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and without any mitigating
or aggravating circumstance, hereby sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of ONE (1) YEAR and ONE (1) DAY to THREE (3)
YEARS, SIX MONTHS and TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS of prision correccional, as
minimum and maximum, respectively, and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P500.00) with costs against the accused; and
3. In SB-07-CRM-0074 - ACQUITTING accused ABUSAMA M. ALID and
FRISCO M. MALABANAN for insufficiency of evidence, with costs de
SO ORDERED.25
Alid moved for the reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's decision
convicting him of the crime of falsification of a private document under
paragraph 2 of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.26 The prosecution
likewise moved for a partial reconsideration insofar as the acquittals were
concerned.27 However, the Sandiganbayan denied both motions.28
29
Alid thereafter filed the present Rule 45 Petition for Review before this
Court, praying for the reversal of the Decision and the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan insofar as SB-07-CRM-0073 is concerned. This petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 198598.
THE COURT'S RULING
We dismiss the petitions in G.R. Nos. 186329 and 186584-86 for being moot
and academic. However, we grant the petition in G.R. No. 198598 and rule
that the Sandiganbayan committed a reversible error in convicting Alid of
the crime of falsification of a private document under Article 172, paragraph
2 of the Revised Penal Code.
I
The petitions questioning the order of preventive suspension are moot and
academic.
A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events,
it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, such that a declaration
thereon would no longer be of practical value.30 As a rule, courts decline
jurisdiction over such a case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness.31
In GR. Nos. 186329 and 186584-86, Alid and Malabanan pray that the
Sandiganbayan's order imposing preventive suspension be set aside and its
implementation restrained. It appears from the records, however, that the
order of preventive suspension had already been implemented by the DA on
17 March 2009,32 and that Alid had already retired from government service
on 30 June 2009.33 Clearly, therefore, by virtue of supervening events, there
is no longer any justiciable controversy with regard to this matter, and any
pronouncement that we may make upon it will no longer be of practical
value. Thus, we rule that the Rule 45 petitions in G.R. Nos. 186329 and
186584-86 should be dismissed for mootness.
II
The Sandiganbayan erred in convicting Alid of the crime of falsification of
a private document under paragraph 2 of Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code.
In G.R. No. 198598, the Sandiganbayan convicted Alid of falsification of a
private document for altering the PAL Ticket. We disagree with that
conviction for two reasons.
First, a conviction for falsification of a private document under paragraph 2
of Article 172 violates the right of Alid to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him given that his Information charged him
only with falsification of documents committed by a public officer under
Article 171. Second, for falsifying a commercial document, the penal
provision allegedly violated by Alid was paragraph 1, and not paragraph 2,
of Article 172.
Right to Be Informed of the Nature
and the Cause of Accusation
At the outset, we note that the appeal of Alid is grounded on two points: (1)
that he was not the one who altered the plane ticket; and (2) that he had no
intent to cause damage. He has not raised the defense that his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him has been
violated. However, an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole matter for
the review of any question, including those questions not raised by the
parties.34 In this case, a review is necessary because the conviction was
made in violation of the accused's constitutional rights.
One of the fundamental rights of an accused person is the right to be
"informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him."35 This
means that the accused may not be convicted of an offense unless it is
clearly charged in the Information.36 Even if the prosecution successfully
proves the elements of a crime, the accused may not be convicted thereof,
unless that crime is alleged or necessarily included in the Information filed
against the latter .37
Pursuant to this constitutional right, Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, commands:
Section 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. -
When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
Therefore, the accused can only be convicted of an offense when it is both
charged and proved. If it is not charged, although proved, or if it is proved,
although not charged, the accused cannot be convicted thereof.38 In other
words, variance between the allegation contained in the Information and
the conviction resulting from trial cannot justify a conviction for either the
offense charged or the offense proved unless either is included in the other.
As to when an offense includes or is included in another, Section 5 of Rule
120 provides:
Section 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. - An offense
charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
Here, it cannot be overlooked that there is a variance between the felony as
charged in the Information and as found in the judgment of conviction.
Applying the rules, the conviction of Alid for falsification of a private
document under paragraph 2, Article 172 is valid only if the elements of that
felony constituted the elements of his indictment for falsification by a public
officer under Article 171.
Article 171 - the basis of the indictment of Alid - punishes public officers for
falsifying a document by making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine
document which changes its meaning. The elements of falsification under
this provision are as follows:39
1. The offender is a public officer, employee, or a notary public.
2. The offender takes advantage of his or her official position.
3. The offender falsifies a document by committing any of the acts of
falsification under Article 171.40
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code contains three punishable acts. It
reads:
Art. 172. Falsification by Private Individuals and Use of Falsified Documents.
- The penalty of prisioncorreccional in its medium and maximum periods
and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications
enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document
or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to
cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial
proceeding or to the damage of another or who, with the intent to cause
such damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced in the next
preceding article or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall
be punished by the penalty next lower in degree.
Paragraph 2 of Article 172 was the basis of Alid's conviction. Its elements
are as follows:
1. The offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in
Article 1 71 (7).
2. The falsification was committed on a private document.
3. The falsification caused damage or was committed with intent to cause
damage to a third party.41
Comparing the two provisions and the elements of falsification respectively
enumerated therein, it is readily apparent that the two felonies are
different. Falsification under paragraph 2 of Article 172 goes beyond the
elements of falsification enumerated under Article 171. The former requires
additional independent evidence of damage or intention to cause the same
to a third person.42 Simply put, in Article 171, damage is not an element of
the crime; but in paragraph 2 of Article 172, or falsification of a private
document, damage is an element necessary for conviction.
Therefore, not all the elements of the crime punished by paragraph 2,
Article 172 are included under Article 1 71. Specifically, the former offense
requires the element of damage, which is not a requisite in the latter.
Indeed, the Information charging Alid of a felony did not inform him that his
alleged falsification caused damage or was committed with intent to cause
damage to a third party.
Since Alid was not specifically informed of the complete nature and cause of
the accusation against him, he cannot be convicted of falsification of a
private document under paragraph 2 of Article 172. To convict him therefor,
as the Sandiganbayan did, violates the very proscription found in the
Constitution and our Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this ground alone, we
find that the court a quo erred in its decision.
Falsification under Articles 171 and
172 of the Revised Penal Code
Notwithstanding the erroneous conviction meted out by the
Sandiganbayan, this Court proceeds to peruse the nature of the crime
established in the records of this case. In People v. Castillo,43 we emphasized
a basic rule in criminal jurisprudence: that the defendant in a criminal case
may be found guilty of any offense necessarily included in the allegation
stated in the information and fully established by the evidence.
Guillergan v. People 44 declares that the falsification of documents
committed by public officers who take advantage of their official position
under Article 171 necessarily includes the falsification of commercial
documents by private persons punished by paragraph 1 of Article 172. To
reiterate, the elements of Article 171 are as follows:
1. The offender is a public officer, employee, or a notary public.
2. The offender takes advantage of his or her official position.
3. The offender falsifies a document by committing any of the acts of
falsification under Article 171.
In turn, paragraph 1 of Article 172 contains these requisites:
1. That the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee
who did not take advantage of his or her official position.
2. The falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial
document.
3. The offender falsifies a document by committing any of the acts of
falsification under Article 171.
Analyzing these felonies, we find that neither of them include damage or
intent to cause damage as an element of the crime; and that Article 171
encompasses all the elements required in a conviction for falsification under
paragraph 1 of Article 172. Thus, in Daan v. Sandiganbayan,45 we allowed
the accused facing Informations for falsification of public documents under
Article 171 to plead guilty to falsification under Article 172. We specifically
stated that "in the charge for Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner
may plead guilty to the lesser offense of Falsification by Private Individuals
inasmuch as it does not appear that petitioner took advantage of his official
position in allegedly falsifying the time book and payroll of the Municipality
of Bato, Leyte."46
Here, if the records show sufficient allegations that would convict Al id of
paragraph I of Article 172, the Sandiganbayan is bound to sentence him to
that lesser offense.1âwphi1 But, as mentioned, it overlooked this provision
and jumped to convicting him of falsification under paragraph 2 of Article
172. As discussed, the latter felony is not covered by his indictment under
Article 171.
This Court finds that the prosecution has sufficiently alleged all the
elements of paragraph 1 of Article 172. As regards the first element, Alid
was a public officer who did not take advantage of his official position.
Offenders are considered to have taken advantage of their official position
in falsifying a document if (1) they had the duty to make or prepare or
otherwise intervene in the preparation of the document; or (2) they had
official custody of the falsified document.47 Here, the accused definitely did
not have the duty to make, prepare, or intervene in the preparation of the
PAL Ticket. Neither was it in his official custody. Therefore, when he falsified
the PAL Ticket, he did not take advantage of his official position as Assistant
Regional Director of the DA.
Anent the second element, the Sandiganbayan concluded that because the
PAL Ticket was a private document, Alid should not have been charged with
falsifying a public document. However, the PAL Ticket fell under the
category of commercial documents, which paragraph 1 of Article 172
protects from falsification.
Commercial documents or papers are those used by merchants or business
persons to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions. Examples
include receipts, order slips, and invoices.48 In Seaoil Petroleum Corporation
v. Autocorp Group, 49 we considered a sales invoice a commercial document
and explained:
The Vehicle Sales Invoice [Autocorp sold to Seaoil one unit Robex 200 LC
Excavator paid for by checks issued by one Romeo Valera] is the best
evidence of the transaction. A sales invoice is a commercial document.
Commercial documents or papers are those used by merchants or
businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions. Business
forms, e.g., order slip, delivery charge invoice and the like, are commonly
recognized in ordinary commercial transactions as valid between the parties
and, at the very least, they serve as an acknowledgment that a business
transaction has in fact transpired.
In this case, since the PAL Ticket functioned as a sales invoice that
memorialized the consummation of the commercial transaction between
the air carrier and the passenger, the Sandiganbayan should have
considered the fact that Alid had altered a commercial document.
Finally, the accused did not dispute that he had altered a genuine
document. The date "22 AUG 2004" was changed to read "28 JULY 2004";
and the flight route "Cotabato-Manila-Cotabato" appearing on the PAL
Ticket was altered to read "Davao-Manila-Cotabato."50 Hence, the third
element of the felony punished by paragraph 1 of Article 172 is apparent in
this case.
Criminal Liability of the Accused
Criminal intent or mens rea must be shown in felonies committed by means
of dolo, such as falsification.51 Such intent is a mental state, the existence of
which is shown by the overt acts of a person.52 Thus, the acts of Alid must
have displayed, with moral certainty, his intention to pervert the truth
before we adjudge him criminally liable. In cases of falsification, we have
interpreted that the criminal intent to pervert the truth is lacking in cases
showing that (1) the accused did not benefit from the falsification; and (2)
no damage was caused either to the government or to a third person.
In Amora, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,53 the accused construction contractor was
absolved even if he had admittedly falsified time books and payrolls. The
Court appreciated the fact that he did not benefit from the
transaction and was merely forced to adjust the supporting papers in order
to collect the piece of work he had actually constructed. On that occasion,
we explained at length the nuanced appreciation of criminal intent in
falsification of documents, viz.:
Although the project was truly a contract for a piece of work, nevertheless
he used the daily wage method and not the contract vouchers. This was not
his idea but by the municipal mayor and treasurer to prepare a payroll and
list of laborers and their period of work and to pay them the minimum wage
so that the total payment would equal the total contract price. This is the
so-called bayanihan system practiced by former Mayor Bertumen and
Engineer Bertumen of the 2nd engineering district. In the payrolls only some
20 names of the 200 laborers were listed as not all of them could be
accommodated. Those not listed received their wages from those listed. As
all of the utilized laborers were duly paid, not one complained. Neither did
the municipality complain. x x x.
x x x x.
From the foregoing coupled with the fact that the town of Guindulman
suffered no damage and even gained on the project (the cost of the
boulders actually delivered was ₱18,285 .00 but Murillo was paid only
₱13,455.00) plus the additional fact that the alleged complaining witness
mentioned in the informations suffered no damage whatsoever and were in
fact awarded no indemnity, it is obvious that the falsifications made by the
petitioners were done in good faith; there was no criminal intent. x x x. In
other words, although the accused altered a public document or made a
misstatement or erroneous assertion therein, he would not be guilty of
falsification as long as he acted in good faith and no one was prejudiced by
the alteration or error. (Emphasis supplied)54
In Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals,55 the
heirs of the deceased falsified the signature of the latter in a Notice of
Appeal. The Court rejected the imputation of falsification because the
forgery produced no effect:
In the instant case, given the heirs' admissions contained in several
pleadings that Avelino and Pedro are already deceased and their submission
to the jurisdiction of the Regional Adjudicator as the successors-in-interest
of the decedents, the effect would be the same if the heirs did not sign the
decedents' names but their own names on the appeal.56
This Court is well aware that falsification of documents under paragraph 1
of Article 172, like Article 171, does not require the idea of gain or the intent
to injure a third person as an element of conviction. But, as early as People
v. Pacana,57 we have said:
Considering that even though in the falsification of public or official
documents, whether by public officials or by private persons, it is
unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a
third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents,
the principal thing punished is the violation of the solemnly proclaimed, it
must, nevertheless, be borne in mind that the change in the public
document must be such as to affect the integrity of the same or to change
the effects which it would otherwise produce; for unless that happens,
there could not exist the essential element of the intention to commit the
crime which is required by article 1 [now Article 3] of the Penal Code.
(Emphasis supplied)58
Here we find that, similar to Amara, Jr. and Regional Agrarian Reform TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Adjudication Board, there is no moral certainty that Alid benefitted from the Associate Justice
transaction, with the government or any third person sustaining damage
from his alteration of the document. MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice Associate Justice
The peculiar situation of this case reveals that Alid falsified the PAL Ticket
just to be consistent with the deferred date of the turnover ceremony for ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
the outgoing and the incoming Secretaries of the DA Central Office in Associate Justice
Quezon City. Notably, he had no control as to the rescheduling of the event
CERTIFICATION
he had to attend. Neither did the prosecution show that he had incurred
any additional benefit when he altered the document. Moreover, after he Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
submitted the PAL Ticket that he had used to support his liquidation for a Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
cash advance of ₱10,496, the public funds kept by the DA remained intact: Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
no apparent illegal disbursement was made; or any additional expense the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
incurred.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Considering, therefore, the obvious intent of Alid in altering the PAL Ticket - Chief Justice
to remedy his liquidation of cash advance with the correct date of his
rescheduled travel - we find no malice on his part when he falsified the
document. For this reason, and seeing the overall circumstances in the case
at bar, we cannot justly convict Alid of falsification of a commercial
document under paragraph 1 of Article 172.

WHEREFORE, the Rule 65 petitions in G.R. Nos. 186329 and 186584-86 are
hereby DISMISSED for being moot and academic. The Rule 45 Petition for
Review in G.R. No. 198598 is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SETASIDE, and a new
judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING petitioner Abusama M. Alid in
SB-07-CRM-0073.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:
ECOND DIVISION At bar are the consolidated cases assailing the different issuances of the
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division (Sandiganbayan) in Criminal Case Nos.
August 2, 2017 23625-26 both entitled "People of the Philippines versus Venancio R. Nava,
G.R. No. 144760-61 Primo C. Obenza, Exuperia B. Austero, Antonio S. Tan, and Evelyn L.
Miranda," viz:
EVELYN L. MIRANDA, Petitioner,
vs. a) G.R. Nos. 144760-61, filed by Evelyn L. Miranda (Miranda), is a Petition
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents, for Certiorari and Prohibition pursuant to Rule 65, Sections 1, 2 and 4 in
relation to Sec. 1 Rule 58 of the Rules of Court on the 14 August 2000
x-----------------------x Resolution1 of the Sandiganbayan denying her motion to quash the
Informations;
G.R. Nos. 167311-12
b) G.R. Nos. 167311-12 and G.R. Nos. 167625-26, filed by Miranda and
EVELYN L. MIRANDA, Petitioner,
Primo C. Obenza (Obenza),respectively, are Appeals by Certiorari pursuant
vs.
to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on the 10 January 2005 Decision2 of the
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Sandiganbayan finding the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23625-26, except
x-----------------------x Exuperia B. Austero (Austero ), guilty of Violation of Sec. 3(g) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3019, and its 7 March 2005 Resolution3 denying the separate
G.R. Nos.167316-17 Motion for Reconsideration of Obenza, Miranda, and Venancio R.
Nava (Nava); and
VENANCIO R. NAVA, Petitioner,
vs. c) G.R. Nos. 167316-17, filed by Nava, is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN 4TH DIVISION and THE PEOPLE OF THE 65 of the Rules of Court on the above-mentioned 10 January 2005 Decision
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. and 7 March 2005 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan.

x-----------------------x THE FACTS

G.R. Nos. 167625-26 Sometime in August 1990, Nava, the Department of Education Culture and
Sports (DECS) Region XI Director, and his school superintendents met to
PRIMO C. OBENZA, Petitioner,
discuss Allotment Advice No. B-2-0392-90-2-014 (Allotment Advict;) issued
vs.
by DECS-Manila on 21 June 1990. During the meeting, Nava and his school
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
superintendents agreed that the allotment, which was in the amount of
DECISION P9.36 million and intended for the nationalized high schools in the region,
be sub-allotted instead to the divisions and be used to procure science
MARTIRES, J.: laboratory tools and devices (SLTDs ). It was further agreed that the public
bidding be dispensed with for the reason that the procurement had to be
undertaken before the end of calendar year 1990; otherwise, the allotment
would revert to the national fund.
On two separate occasions, the DECS Division of Davao Oriental (DECS-
Davao Oriental) procured SLTDs from D'Implacable Enterprises
(D'lmplacable), owned by Antonio S. Tan (Tan) with business address at
West Capitol Drive, Pasig, Metro Manila.4 The DECS-Davao Oriental paid
D'Implacable, whose sales representative was Miranda, using the allotments
intended as additional miscellaneous operating expenses for the twenty
nationalized high schools of Davao Oriental.
On 8 January 1991, the Commission on Audit (COA) Regional Office No. XI
issued Assignment Order No. 91-174 creating an Audit
Team (team) composed of Laura Soriano (Soriano) and Carmencita Eden T.
Enriquez (Enriquez),as team leader and member, respectively, for the
purpose of conducting a special audit on the releases made by the DECS
Region XI to its different divisions involving the ₱9.36 million allotment.
On 20 May 1991, the COA Region XI Office furnished the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao (OMB-Min) with the Special Audit Report (the
report) of the team on the procurement by the DECS-Davao Oriental of
SLTDs from D'Implacable,5 and the corresponding affidavit of
complaint.6 The team claimed in their affidavit, docketed as OMB-MIN-91-
0202, that the DECS-Davao Oriental procured the SLTDs at prices higher by
64% to 1,175% than the prevailing price causing the government to lose
P398,962.55; hence, a violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, COA Circular
Nos. 78-84 and 85-SSA, and DECS Order No. 100.
After the conduct of preliminary investigation, the OMB-Min found
probable cause against Nava, Obenza, Austero, Tan, and Miranda for two
counts of Violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019,7 and thus filed with the
Sandiganbayan on 8 April 1997, the following Informations:
Criminal Case No. 23625
That sometime on 16 November 1990, in Mati, Davao Oriental, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused VENANCIO R. NAVA,
PRJMO C. OBENZA and EXUPERJA B. AUSTERO, all public officers being then
the Regional Director Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Region
XI Davao City and a high ranking official by express provision of RA 7975,
Division Superintendent of DECS Division of Davao Oriental with salary
grade below 27 and Administrative Officer of DECS Division of Davao
Oriental with salary grade below 27, respectively, committing the offense in
relation to their official duties and taking advantage of the same, conspiring,
confederating, and mutually aiding one another and with accused ANTONIO
S. TAN and EVELYN S. MIRANDA, there and then, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, enter into a contract of purchase grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government, namely: BY PURCHASING from accused
Miranda and Tan, the following goods under Purchase Order dated 16
November 1990 and Check No. 072108, to wit:
350 Units of Test Tube Glass Pyrex for P 9,555.00;
250 Units of Glass Spirit Burner for 40,875.00;
250 Units of Glass Spirit Burner for 71,630.00; and
75 Units of Bunsen Burner for 52,575.00
or a unit price of ₱27.30, P163.50, ₱551.00 and ₱701.00, respectively, when
the actual price of the said items per canvass by the Commission on Audit
after considering the 10% price variance were only ₱14.30, ₱38.50, ₱93.50
and ₱90.75, respectively, thus the above-said procurements were
overpriced by as much as 91 % or ₱4,550.00; 325% or ₱31,250.00; 489% or
₱59,475.00; and 672% or P45,768.75, respectively, thus shortchanging the
government by as much as ₱141,043.75.8
Criminal Case No. 23626
That sometime on 27 December 1990, in Mati, Davao Oriental, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused VENANCIO R. NAVA,
PRIMO C. OBENZA and EXUPERIA B. AUSTERO, all public officers being then
the Regional Director Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Region
XI Davao City, a high ranking official by express provision of RA 7975,
Division Superintendent of DECS Division of Davao Oriental with salary
grade below 27 and Administrative Officer of DECS Division of Davao
Oriental with salary grade below 27; respectively, committing the offense in
relation to their official duties and taking advantage of the same, conspiring
and confederating, and mutually aiding one another and with accused
ANTONIO S. TAN and EVELYN L. MIRANDA, there and then, wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally, enter into a contract of purchase grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government, namely: BY PURCHASING
from accused Miranda and Tan, the following goods under Purchase Order
dated 27 December 1990 and Check No. 073908, to wit:
89 Units of Flusk Brush (Nylon) for ₱ 4,488,00;
444 Units of Graduated Cylinder for ₱316,572.00;
195 Units of Iron Wire Gauge for ₱3,159.00; and
54 Units of Beaker 250 ml. pyrex for ₱ 6,751.00
or a unit price of ₱112.20, ₱713.00, ₱16.20, and ₱125.03, respectively,
when the actual price of the said items per recanvassed by the Commission
on Audit after considering the 10% price variance, were only ₱8.80,
₱159.50, ₱16.20, and ₱125.03, thus, the said purchases were overpriced, by
as much as 1,175% or P8,892.40, 374% or ₱245,754.00, 64% or ₱1,228.50,
and 434% or P2,043.90, respectively, thus shortchanging the government by
as much as ₱257,918.80.9
During the hearing of these cases, the prosecution presented Soriano who
identified the report.
For his defense, Nava testified that the documents pertinent to these
transactions came from the office of Obenza. He claimed that he signed the
documents because the amount involved for each of the two transactions
was more than ₱100,000.00, and therefore within his authority to sign. He
insisted that the transactions complied with the DECS' policies.
Obenza testified that the documents for the transactions with D'Implacable
were already signed by Nava when these were brought to his office.
Prudencio N. Mabanglo, the DECS Division Superintendent for Davao del
Norte, testified that the documents for the procurement of SLTDs for his
division were likewise already signed by Nava when these were brought to
him.
Austero, Tan, and Miranda did not take the witness stand.
RULING OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN
On 10 January 2005, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered –
1. in Criminal Case No. 23625 - finding accused VENANCIO R. NAVA, PRIMO
C. OBENZA, ANTONIO S. TAN and EVELYN M IRANDA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as charged and sentencing each of them to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum to ten
(10) years as maximum, and to suffer perpetual disqualification from public
office, and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines in the amount of P141,043.75 representing the
losses that it suffered and to proportionately pay the costs;
2. in Criminal Case No. 23626 - finding accused VENANCIO R. NAVA, PRIMO
C. OBENZA, ANTONIO S. TAN and EVELYN MIRANDA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as charged and sentencing each of them to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum to ten
(10) years as maximum, and to suffer perpetual disqualification from public
office, and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines in the amount of ₱257,918.80 representing the
losses that it suffered, and to proportionately pay the costs; and
3. in both cases ACQUITTING accused EXUPERIA B. AUSTERO, for
insufficiency of evidence, with costs de officio.10
Obenza, Miranda,11 and Nava12 filed their separate motion for
reconsideration which were denied by the Sandiganbayan in its 7 March
2005 Resolution.13
ISSUES
The following issues were submitted by Miranda for the consideration of
this Court in her petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 144760-61:
1. Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion to quash;
2. The disputed resolution was in great contravention of the principle of
"stare decisis" and settled jurisprudence;
3. The Respondent court should be immediately prohibited or restrained
from further proceedings, in order not to render the subject petition moot
and academic.14
On the other hand, Miranda anchored her petition in G.R. No. 167311- 12
on the ground that "the [Sandiganbayan] had decided questions of
substance in a way not in accord with law and the applicable decisions of
this Honorable Court and/or [had] so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceeding[s] or so far sanctioned such a departure
by the court a quo as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision
vested in this Honorable Court."15
For G.R. Nos. 167316-17, Nava raised the following grounds to support his
petition:
I. THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO A LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN UPHOLDING
THE FINDINGS OF THE SPECIAL AUDIT TEAM THAT IRREGULARLY
CONDUCTED THE AUDIT BEYOND THE AUTHORIZED PERIOD AND WHICH
TEAM FALSIFIED THE SPECIAL AUDIT REPORT.
II.THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO A LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN UPHOLDING
THE FINDINGS IN THE SPECIAL AUDIT REPORT WHERE, IN VIOLATION OF
PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS, THE AUDIT TEAM EGREGIOUSLY
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE MINIMUM STANDARDS SET BY THE SUPREME
COURT AND ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, AND CAME OUT
WITH A REPORT THAT SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE
PETITIONER.
III. THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO A LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN UPHOLDING
THE FINDINGS IN THE SPECIAL AUDIT REPORT CONSIDERING THAT NONE OF
THE ALLEGEDLY OVERPRICED ITEMS FROM THE DIVISION OF DAVAO
ORIENTAL WERE CANVASSED OR PURCHASED BY THE SPECIAL AUDIT TEAM
SUCH THAT THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE FROM WHICH TO
DETERMINE THAT THERE WAS AN OVERPRICE AND THAT THE TRANSACTION
WAS MANIFESTLY AND GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE
GOVERNMENT.
IV. THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO A LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT
PETITIONER WAS ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF THE
SPECIAL AUDIT REPORT.
V. THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO A LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO
REVIEW THE MANNER IN WHICH THE FINDINGS IN THE SPECIAL AUDIT
REPORT CAME ABOUT AS A BASIS FOR THE SANDIGANBAYAN TO
DETERMINE THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF THE PETITIONER.
VI. THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO A LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE SELFSERVING AND PERJURIOUS TESTIMONY OF CO-
ACCUSED PRIMO C. OBENZA THAT THE QUESTIONED TRANSACTIONS
EMANATED FROM THE REGIONAL OFFICE IN SPITE OF THE DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE WHICH PROVE THAT THE TRANSACTIONS EMANATED FROM THE
DIVISION OFFICE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL HEADED BY CO-ACCUSED OBENZA.
VII. THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO A LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT
PETITIONER PRESIGNED THE PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS CONSIDERING
THAT THERE IS NO DOCUMENTARY PROOF OF SUCH PRE-SIGNING AND
WHERE THE TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE IS OBVIOUSLY CONTRIVED.
VIII. THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO A LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO
ABSOLVE THE PETITIONER WHERE CONSPIRACY WAS NOT PROVEN.
IX. THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO A LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CONVICTING
THE PETITIONER IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.16
Obenza, on the one hand, raised the following issues in G.R. No. 167625-26
to justify his prayer for the reversal of the Sandiganbayan's assailed decision
and resolution:
I. The Public Respondent Honorable Sandiganbayan has palpably erred in
ruling that Petitioner committed the crime found in Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019.
II. The Public Respondent Honorable Sandiganbayan has palpably erred in
ruling that there was conspiracy between Venancio R. Nava and the
Petitioner.
III. The Public Respondent Honorable Sandiganbayan has palpably erred in
adamantly refusing to consider in favor of the Petitioner a case with similar
facts arising from similar circumstances which have been finally decided by
them, in consonance with the doctrine of stare decisis.
IV. The Public Respondent Honorable Sandiganbayan seriously erred in
ruling that the Rule on judicial notice of a case decided by the same decision
of the Honorable Sandiganbayan is not authorized in this case, which case is
closely similar if not entirely the same in facts, offense charged and parties
involved.
V. The Public Respondent Sandiganbayan grievously erred in not acquitting
herein Accused.17
THE COURT'S RULING
Discussion on the Petition for Review
on Certiorari assailing the denial of
the Motion to Quash
(GR. Nos. 144760-61)
Miranda assailed through this special civil action of certiorari the 14 August
2000 Resolution18 of the Sandiganbayan denying her motion to
quash.19 Miranda claimed that there was no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy available to her in the ordinary course of law.
She no longer sought from the Sandiganbayan a reconsideration of its ruling
denying her motion because her arraignment was already scheduled on 2
October 2000, thus, her prayer for injunctive relief.20
The petition must fail.
First, the special civil action of certiorari will not lie unless the aggrieved
party has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.21 A recourse affording prompt relief from the injurious effects
of the judgment or acts of a lower court or tribunal is considered "plain,
speedy and adequate" remedy.22 The plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
available to Miranda, which she opted not to avail of, was to file a motion
for reconsideration so as to afford the Sandiganbayan another chance to
review any actual or conjured errors it may have committed when it
resolved her motion to quash.
Miranda could have pleaded in her motion for reconsideration that her
arraignment set on 2 October 2000, be deferred until the resolution of this
motion.1awp++i1 For sure, her arraignment would not have proceeded
unless the Sandiganbayan had resolved her motion for reconsideration
before that date. Her scheduled arraignment was clearly not sufficient
justification to dispense with the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Time
and again, we have ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an
indispensable condition before resorting to the special civil action
for certiorari to afford the court or tribunal the opportunity to correct its
error, if any.23
Second, an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and therefore
not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari.24 The
denial of the motion to quash means that the criminal information remains
pending with the court, which must proceed with the trial to determine
whether the accused is guilty of the crime charged therein.25 If a judgment
of conviction is rendered and the lower court's decision of conviction is
appealed, the accused can then raise the denial of his motion to quash not
only as an error committed by the trial court but as an added ground to
overturn the latter's ruling.26
Continuing accretions of case law reiterate the rationale for the rule:
The reason of the law in permitting appeal only from a final order or
judgment, and not from interlocutory or incidental one, is to avoid
multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which must necessarily suspend the
hearing and decision on the merits of the case during the pendency of the
appeal. If such appeal were allowed, the trial on the merits of the case
should necessarily be delayed for a considerable length of time, and compel
the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses; for one of the parties may
interpose as many appeals as incidental questions may be raised by him and
interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court.27
And third, Miranda failed to bring her petition within the jurisprudentially
established exceptions where appeal would be inadequate and the special
civil action of certiorari or prohibition may be allowed, viz: (1) when the
court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion; (2) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous
and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief;
(3) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice; (4) to
promote public welfare and public policy; and (5) when the cases have
attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch
in the consideration thereof.28
Discussion on the
Sandiganbayan Decision
(G.R. Nos. 167311-12, 167316-17 and 167625-26)
It must be noted that Miranda and Obenza assailed the Sandiganbayan
decision and resolution via a petition for review under Rule 45, while Nava
availed of the special civil action for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
a) The Petition of Nava
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is a
concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or
modifying the proceeding.29
On the first requisite, there is no dispute that the Sandiganbayan had
jurisdiction over Criminal Case Nos. 23625-26 and the person of Nava.
Jurisprudence instructs that where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court alleges grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner should
establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious,
whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as
to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.30 That an abuse in itself to be "grave"
must be amply demonstrated since the jurisdiction of the court, no less, will
be affected.31 Grave abuse of discretion has a well-defined meaning:
An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of
discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use
of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases
wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void."
From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done
with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that
such act was patent and gross. x x x32
Nothing from Nava's petition will confirm the merits of his claim that the
Sandiganbayan had acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic
manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction when it rendered the assailed decision and resolution. Although
Nava arrayed the issues in his petition with the alleged grave abuse of
discretion by the Sandiganbayan, the truth is inescapably evident that these
issues do not concern the resolution of errors of jurisdiction but of the
alleged errors of judgment which the anti-graft court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction over Criminal Case Nos. 23625-26 and the person
of Nava.
Corollary thereto, the alleged misapplication of facts and evidence, and
whatever flawed conclusions of the Sandiganbayan, is an error in judgment,
not of jurisdiction, and therefore not within the province of a special civil
action for certiorari. Erroneous conclusions based on evidence do not, by
the mere fact that errors were committed, rise to the level of grave abuse of
discretion.33 For as long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any supposed
error committed in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than
an error of judgment reviewable and may be corrected by a timely
appeal.34 The rationale of this rule is that, when a court exercises its
jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. Otherwise, every
mistake made by a court will deprive it of its jurisdiction and every
erroneous judgment will be a void judgment.35
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is
not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra
ordinem - beyond the ambit of appeal.36 To stress, certiorari is a remedy
designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment.37 Let us not lose sight of the true function of the writ
of certiorari - "to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction
or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction."38 And to emphasize this point, the
following passage in the 1913 case of Herrera v. Barretto39 is reiterated as it
is still of significance today:
The office of the writ of certiorari has been reduced to the correction of
defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be used for any other
purpose. It is truly an extraordinary remedy and, in this jurisdiction, its use is
restricted to truly extraordinary cases -- cases in which the action of the
inferior court is wholly void; where any further steps in the case would
result in a waste of time and money and would produce no result whatever;
where 1he parties, or their privies, would be utterly deceived; where a final
judgment or decree would be nought but a snare and a delusion, deciding
nothing, protecting nobody, a judicial pretension, a recorded falsehood, a
standing menace. It is only to avoid such results as these that a writ
of certiorari is issuable; and even here an appeal will lie if the aggrieved
party prefers to prosecute it.40
On the second requisite, the remedy available to Nava was to appeal
pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As discussed earlier, the issues
raised by Nava were undoubtedly errors of judgment for which both law
and jurisprudence prescribe the remedy of appeal. Significantly, R.A. No.
8249,41 which governs the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, pertinently
states:
Section 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. - xxx
xxxx
Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of
law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.xxx.
The afore-quoted is complimented by Part II, Rule X42 of the Revised Internal
Rules of the Sandiganbayan, viz:
Section 1. Method of Review. –
(a) In General -A party may appeal from a judgment or final order of the
Sandiganbayan imposing or affirming a penalty less than death, life
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua in criminal cases, and, in civil cases, by
filing with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
As is clearly provided, the sole and proper remedy available to Nava in his
quest to obtain a reversal of the decision and resolution of the
Sandiganbayan was to appeal pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort
to certiorari because a requirement for the latter remedy is there should be
no appeal.43
Nava's assertion that the Sandiganbayan had acted with grave abuse of
discretion in convicting him and that his petition was anchored on questions
of fact and law, did not render futile his remedy of petition for review
on certiorarior sanction his resort to a special civil action on certiorari. This
issue was firmly settled in Estinozo v. Court of Appeals:44
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive
remedies. Certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate
remedy. The nature of the questions of law intended to be raised on appeal
is of no consequence. It may well be that those questions of law will treat
exclusively of whether or not the judgment or final order was rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. This is
immaterial. The remedy is appeal, not certiorari as a special civil
action.45 (citations omitted)
While this Court recognizes the importance of procedural rules in insuring
the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and
speedy administration of justice, we likewise take into consideration that at
stake in these cases are the life and liberty of Nava who, in his earnestness
to seek the reversal of the findings of the Sandiganbayan, filed his petition
on the eleventh day after his receipt of the questioned resolution. Thus, it
would only be proper to relax the rules considering that, in numerous cases,
this Court had allowed the liberal construction of the rules when to do so
would serve the demands of substantial justice and equity46 as amply
discussed in Aguam v. Court of Appeals:47
The court has discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's appeal. It
is a power conferred on the court, not a duty. The "discretion must be a
sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair
play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case."
Technicalities, however, must be avoided. The law abhors technicalities that
impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or
dispense justice. "A litigation is not a game of technicalities." "Lawsuits
unlike duels are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it
deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance
and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." Litigations
must be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every party litigant
must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of
technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of
appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied
in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help
secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent
course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the
parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather
than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the
parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually
resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.48
b) The Petitions of Nava,
Obenza and Mendoza
The Court takes notice of the fact that the transactions entered into by the
DECS Region XI with D'Implacable took place in 1990 when the governing
law was COA Circular No. 85-55A49 requiring public bidding on purchases of
supplies, materials, and equipment in excess of ₱50,000.00 unless the law
or the agency charter provides otherwise.50 Significantly, the need for public
bidding had been clearly acknowledged by Nava and his Division
Superintendents when they met in August 1990, to discuss the Allotment
Advice, only that it was agreed during that meeting to dispense with the
public bidding as there was an alleged need to procure the SLTDs before the
end of calendar year 1990; otherwise, the allotment would revert to the
national fund. Thus, pursuant to what had allegedly been agreed upon
during the meeting, the procurement of SLTDs by the different divisions of
DECS Region VIII proceeded without public bidding and notwithstanding
DECS Order No. 100 dated 3 September 1990, suspending the purchase of
tools and devices, among others, in response to the government's call for
economy measures.
While public bidding was the general rule in COA Circular No. 85- 55A, the
exceptions were clearly identified as follows: emergency purchase,
negotiated purchase, and repeat order.51 The fact is underscored that the
subject transactions in these cases were undertaken through negotiated
purchase but the grounds explicitly mentioned in the COA circular to justify
a resort to this mode of procurement were conspicuously absent, viz: (a)
failure of the required public bidding; (b) purchase is made from reputable
manufacturers or exclusive distributors provided they offer the lowest or
most advantageous price; (c) any purchase made from the Procurement
Service; and (d) on emergency purchase as defined in the circular.52
On 26 July 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No.
30153 which provided, among others, for the decentralization of negotiated
contracts, viz:
A. DECENTRALIZATION OF NEGOTIATED CONTRACTS
Sec. 1. Guidelines for Negotiated Contracts. Any provision of law, decree,
executive order or other issuances to the contrary notwithstanding, no
contract for public services or for furnishing supplies, materials and
equipment to the government or any of its branches, agencies or
instrumentalities shall be renewed or entered into without public bidding,
except under any of the following situations:
a. Whenever the supplies are urgently needed to meet an emergency which
may involve the loss of, or danger to, life and/or property;
b. Whenever the supplies are to be used in connection with a project or
activity which cannot be delayed without causing detriment to the public
service;
c. Whenever the materials are sold by an exclusive distributor or
manufacturer who does not have subdealers selling at lower prices and for
which no suitable substitute can be obtained elsewhere at more
advantageous terms to the government;
d. Whenever the supplies under procurement have been unsuccessfully
placed on bid for at least two consecutive times, either due to lack of
bidders or the offers received in each instance were exorbitant or non-
conforming to specifications;
e. In cases where it is apparent that the requisition of the needed supplies
through negotiated purchase is most advantageous to the government to
be determined by the Department Head concerned;
f. Whenever the purchase is made from an agency of the government.
In the same vein, not one of the aforementioned situations find their
significance in these cases in order to excuse these transactions from public
bidding and to allow resort to a negotiated procurement.
At present, the law governing the procurement activities in the government
is R.A. No. 918454 requiring that all procurement be done through
competitive bidding55 except when the alte1native methods of procurement
would apply, viz: (a) limited source bidding otherwise known as selective
bidding; (b) direct contracting otherwise known as single source
procurement; (c) repeat order; (d) shopping; and (e) negotiated
procurement.56
Consistent with the above issuances is the well-entrenched ruling of this
Court that competitive public bidding may not be dispensed with nor
circumvented; and alternative modes of procurement for public service
contracts and for supplies, materials, and equipment may only be resorted
to in the instances provided for by law.57 A competitive public bidding is not
some token procedure in the government designed to suit the whim of a
public officer. By its very nature and characteristic, a competitive public
bidding aims to protect the public interest by giving the public the best
possible advantages thru open competition. Another self-evident purpose of
public bidding is to avoid or preclude suspicion of favoritism and anomalies
in the execution of public contracts.58 It puzzles the Court therefore why the
charges against the accused in Crim. Case Nos. 23625-26 were solely
anchored on overpricing and failed to include the lack of public bidding
when this was very evident from the case records.
On the several grounds raised by the petitioners to fortify their plea for
acquittal, what caught the attention of this Court was the manner of
canvass undertaken by the team to prove its claim of overpricing. Thus, the
Court will task itself to consider foremost this ground vis-vis the elements of
Violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019:
a) the accused is a public officer;
b) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and
c) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.59
The presence of the first and second elements is settled. As to the third, the
Sandiganbayan primarily anchored on the report and the testimony of
Soriano its declaration that the subject transactions were grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government. It ruled that based on the
recanvass conducted by the team on the eight (8) items involved in the
transactions, the prices of the SLTDs procured from D'Implacable exceeded
the prevailing market prices by as much as 64% to 1,175%; thus, were
overpriced.60
COA Circular No. 85-55A defines "excessive expenditures" as follows:
3.3. EXCESSIVE EXPENDITURES
Definition: The term "excessive expenditures" signifies unreasonable
expense or expenses incurred at an immoderate quantity and exorbitant
price. It also includes expenses which exceed what is usual or proper as well
as expenses which are unreasonably high, and beyond just measure or
amount. They also include expenses in excess of reasonable limits.
The report enumerated the procedure allegedly undertaken by the team in
determining the prices of the SLTDs, viz:
OVERPRICING
1.6. To determine the reasonableness of the prices paid for by the Division
Office on the purchase of SLTDs, the team performed the following audit
procedure:
1.6.1. Obtained samples of each laboratory tool and devices purchased by
the Division of Davao Oriental.1âwphi1 Memorandum Receipts covering all
the samples were issued by the agency to the audit team and are marked as
Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 of this report.
1.6.2. Brought and presented these samples to reputable business
establishments in Davao City like the Mercury Drug Store, Berovan
Marketing Incorporated and Allied Medical Equipment and Supply
Corporation (AMESCO) where these items are also available, for price
verification.
1.6.3. Available items which were exactly the same as the samples
presented were purchased from AMESCO and Bero van Marketing
Incorporated, the business establishments which quoted the lowest prices.
Official Receipts were issued by the AMESCO and Berovan Marketing
Incorporated which are hereto marked as Exhibits 4, 5, 6 and 7,
respectively.61
A review of the exhibits attached to the report readily evinced that, contrary
to the team's claim, no samples of the SLTDs were actually obtained from
DECS-Davao Oriental, the subject of its audit. Exhibits 162 and 263 referred to
in 1.6.1 of the report were the Memorandum Receipt for Equipment, Semi-
Expandable and Expandable Property,respectively, issued by the Schools
Division Superintendent of Digos, Davao del Sur, and Davao City, for the
SLTDs received by the team and which were intended to be used for the
canvass; while Exhibit 364 was the Invoice-Receipt for Property issued by the
Superintendent of Tagum, Davao Province.
Because the sample SLTDs came from the divisions of Davao del Sur, Davao
City, and Tagum, Davao Province, it was implausible to ascertain whether
the tools and devices delivered by D'Implacable to DECS-Davao Oriental
were exactly the same as those that were allegedly canvassed by the team.
Consequently, it was improbable to detennine whether the SLTDs of
D'Implacable would have commanded equivalent or higher prices than
those shown by the team during the "canvass." Significantly, the different
DECS divisions of Region XI procured SLTDs also from Joven's Trading65 thus
reinforcing the doubt as to the sameness of the brand and quality of the
tools and devices delivered by D'Implacable to DECS-Davao Oriental with
those that were presented for "canvassing" by the team.
It must be stressed that, pursuant to COA Circular No. 85-55A, the term
"excessive expenditure" pertains to the variables of price and
quality.1âwphi1 As to the price, the circular provides that it is excessive if "it
is more than the 10% allowable price variance between the price for the
item bought and the price of the same item per canvass of the
auditor."66 Undoubtedly, what was required to be canvassed was the very
same item subject of the assailed transaction. Evaluated against this COA
definition, it cannot be validly maintained that the prices of D'Implacable
were excessive considering that the items bought by DECS-Davao Oriental
were obviously not the very same items "canvassed" by the team.
Soriano confirmed that her team had not prepared the canvass sheet - the
single document that would have shown that a canvass was actually
undertaken, the listing of the comparative prices of the SLTDs and the
availability of the tools and devices from the three establishments. Soriano
forwarded the justification that an actual canvass was undertaken and that
the team had procured particular SLTDs only from the establishments selling
the lowest price as evidenced by the cash invoices.67 Her justification fails to
convince. The cash invoices support only the finding that the SLTDs were
procured by the team from AMESCO and Berovan but, not that a canvass
was undertaken or that these two establishments had offered the lowest
price for particular tools and devices. The absence of the canvass sheets not
only highlights the feebleness of the claim that the prices of the SLTDs
procured from D'Implacable were excessively higher than those that were
"canvassed" but also lends tn1th to the probability that in actuality no
canvass was undertaken.
In a case68 involving the alleged overpriced purchase of walis tingting by
Parañaque City, the Court held that the prosecution failed to provide the
requisite burden of proof in order to overcome the presumption of
innocence in favor of petitioners where the evidence against them would
merely indicate the present market price of walis tingtingof a different
specification purchased from a non-supplier of Parafiaque City, and the
price of walis tingtingpurchased in Las Piiias City. The Court stressed that to
prove its case of overpricing resulting in gross and manifest disadvantage to
the government, the prosecution should have presented evidence of the
actual price of the particular walis tingting purchased by Parafiaque City at
the time of the audited transaction or, at the least, an approximation
thereof.
Similarly, in Buscaino v. Commission on Audit, 69 we reiterated our ruling
in Arriola v. Commission on Audit, et al., 70and in National Center for Mental
Health Management v. Commission on Audit71 that mere allegations of
overpricing are not:
x x x [I]n the absence of the actual canvass sheets and/or price quotations
from identified suppliers, a valid basis for outright disallowance of agency
disbursements/cost estimates for government projects. A more humane
procedure, and totally conformable to the due process clause, is for the COA
representative to allow the members of the Contracts Committee
mandatory access to the COA source documents/canvass sheets. Besides,
this gesture would have been in keeping with COA's own Audit Circular No.
85-55-A par. 2.6, that:
x x As regards excessive expenditures, they shall be determined by place
and origin of goods, volume or quantity of purchase, service
warranties/quality, special features of units purchased and the like x x x
By having access to source documents, petitioners could then satisfy
themselves that COA guidelines/rules on excessive expenditures had been
observed. The transparency would also erase any suspicion that the rules
had been utilized to terrorize and/or work injustice, instead of ensuring a
"working partnership" between COA and the government agency, for the
conservation and protection of government funds, which is the main
rationale for COA audit.
xxxx
We agree with petitioners that COA's disallowance was not sufficiently
supported by evidence, as it was premised purely on undocumented claims,
as in fact petitioners were denied access to the actual canvass sheets or
price quotations from accredited suppliers. x x x
xxxx
It was incumbent upon the COA to prove that its standards were met in its
audit disallowance. The records do not show that such was done in this
case.
x x x [A]bsent due process and evidence to support COA's disallowance,
COA's ruling on petitioner's liability has no basis.72
Obviously, the element that the transaction must be grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government was not sustained by the testimonial
and documentary evidence of the People. "Manifest" means that it is
evident to the senses, open, obvious, notorious, unmistakable,
etc.73 "Gross" means "flagrant, shameful, such conduct as is not to be
excused."74 On the one hand, "disadvantageous" is defined as unfavorable,
prejudicial.75 Assessed against these definitions, we cannot see how the
assailed transactions in these cases could have been disadvantageous to the
government when, at the very least, the evidence of the prosecution only
confirmed that sample SLTDs were secured by the team from three
different divisions of Region XI, but not from DECS-Davao Oriental which
was the subject of its audit; and that SLTDs, at a unit each, were purchased
from Berovan and AMESCO.
In view of these findings, this Court finds it no longer necessary to dwell on
the other issues raised by the petitioners.
The legal teaching in our jurisprudence is that the evidence adduced must
be closely examined under the lens of the judicial microscope and that the
conviction flows only from the moral certainty that guilt has been
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.76 The presumption of
innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional principle
fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden
of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.77 For conviction must rest no less than on hard evidence
showing that the accused, with moral certainty, is guilty of the crime
charged. Short of these constitutional mandate and statutory safeguard -
that a person is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved - the Court
is then left without discretion and is duty bound to render a judgment of
acquittal.78
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 10 January 2005 Decision and 7
March 2005 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in Criminal
Case Nos. 23625-26 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Petitioners
VENANCIO R. NAVA, PRIMO C. OBENZA, and EVELYN L. MIRANDA are
ACQUITTED of the charges against them.
SO ORDERED.

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES,
Associate Justice
MENDOZA, J.:
WE CONCUR:
On appeal is the May 30, 2016 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
ANTONIO T. CARPIO G.R. CR-HC No. 06944, which affirmed the June 26, 2014 Decision[2] of the
Senior Associate Justice
Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Taguig City (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos.
Chairperson 146314-15, finding accused-appellant Dominador Udtohan y Jose (accused-
appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Statutory Rape
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
under Article 266-A (1) (d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and Violation of
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Section 5 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610.
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice In two (2) Informations,[3] dated September 13, 2011, accused-appellant was
charged as follows:
ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decisionhad been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 146314
That, in the month of April 2011, in the City of Taguig, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then the paternal uncle of AAA, a minor, 11 years old, by means of violence
and intimidation and with lewd designs and intent to gratify his sexual
desire, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with said victim against her will and consent, to her damages
and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice CRIMINAL CASE NO. 146315

That, on or about the 11th day of September 2011, in the City of Taguig,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then the paternal uncle of AAA, a minor, 11 years old,
by means of violence and intimidation and with lewd designs and with
intent to gratify his sexual desire, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commit lascivious conduct with said victim, against her will
and consent, by then and there inserting his finger inside her vagina, which
are acts prejudicial to the normal growth and development as a child.
[4]
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On October 18, 2011, accused-appellant was arraigned and he pleaded "not
guilty." Thereafter, trial ensued.
Evidence of the Prosecution
The testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses tended to establish that
AAA, who was then eleven (11) years old, together with her mother, BBB,
and two (2) siblings, stayed for free in the house of her paternal uncle,
accused-appellant herein, located at Block 5, XXX Street, Sitio XXX, Western
XXX, XXX. Because AAA's father, DDD, was in jail for murder, accused-
appellant helped BBB in taking care of her children.
Sometime in April 2011, AAA went with accused-appellant, whom she called
CCC, to the YYY Camp, Sitio XXX, to buy some bananas. Accused-appellant
would buy bananas everyday and AAA helped him in selling banana cue as
she was still on vacation from school.
While on their way to the YYY Camp, accused-appellant suddenly dragged
AAA towards the grassy portion of a vacant lot. Then and there, he had
carnal knowledge with AAA by inserting his penis inside her vagina. After
satisfying his lust, accused-appellant pushed AAA out of the road and
proceeded to buy some bananas. He threatened AAA that should she tell
anyone about the incident, he would eject her family from his house and he
would not feed them. Subsequently, accused-appellant would sexually
abuse AAA almost every day at the same place.
Later, on September 11, 2011, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at the
house of accused-appellant, he molested AAA by caressing and touching her
vagina. AAA did not tell anyone about accused-appellant's bestial acts
against her because she was afraid that the latter would evict them and kill
her.
On the following day, when AAA was at school, she revealed her ordeal to
her teacher who was then suspicious of her odd behavior. On that same
day, accused-appellant's live-in-partner disclosed to BBB that she saw him
insert his finger into AAA's vagina. BBB immediately went to AAA's school to
verify the information. Thereat, BBB sought the help of AAA's teacher and
they went to the barangay to lodge a complaint. The barangay referred
them to the police station.
Thereafter, they proceeded to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame
wherein PCI Shane Lore Detaballi (PCI Detaballi) conducted a genital
examination and found the presence of deep-healed lacerations at the 3, 6
and 9 o'clock positions in AAA's hymen, showing blunt penetrating trauma.
AAA then gave her sworn statement before the Women and Children
Protection Desk to confirm the veracity of her allegations.
Evidence of the Defense
On the other hand, the defense presented accused-appellant as its sole
witness. He vehemently denied the accusations against him. Instead, he
claimed that the charges were fabricated by BBB, AAA's mother, because
she was mad and angry at DDD, her husband and brother of accused-
appellant. He also added that BBB was coaching her children to testify
against him and that she threatened to physically harm them should they
refuse to follow her.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision, dated June 26, 2014, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape under Article 266-A (1) (d) of the
RPC and violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. It found that AAA was
born on October 7, 1999, as shown by in her birth certificate, and that she
was eleven (11) years old when the two separate sexual abuses occurred.
The trial court held that the testimony of AAA was clear, candid,
straightforward, and convincing regarding the sexual abuses she suffered at
the hands of her uncle. The RTC also ruled that the medico-legal certificate
corroborated the testimony of AAA. The RTC disposed the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, finding Dominador Udtohan y Jose guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Statutory Rape and violation of Sec. 5(b) R.A. 7610, this court
hereby sentences him as follows:
In Crim. Case No. 146314 to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to
pay AAA Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php75,000.00 as moral damages
and Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
In Crim. Case No. 146315 to suffer the penalty of 12 years and 1 day of
Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period, as minimum, to 15 years and 6
months of Reclusion Temporal in its medium period, as maximum; and to
pay AAA Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php50,000.00 as moral damages
and Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Aggrieved, accused-appellant elevated an appeal to the CA. He argued that
the testimony of AAA was not credible because there were diverging
statements regarding the number of incidents of rape he allegedly
committed.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed Decision, dated May 30, 2016, the CA denied the appeal. It
held that the testimony of AAA regarding the two sexual abuses was clear
and convincing. The CA underscored that AAA was able to describe each
incident of rape and sexual abuse committed by her uncle, accused-
appellant. Also, it did not give weight to the self-serving denial of accused-
appellant and his claim that AAA's mother, who was mad at his brother,
initiated the charges. The CA added that accused-appellant miserably failed
to establish the ill-will or motive of AAA or her mother. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 26, 2014 of the
Regional Trial Court of XXX City, Branch 69, is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION in that, interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum, shall be imposed on the total monetary awards in the appealed
decision until the same are fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT'S TESTIMONY.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE
THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN HIS FAVOR.[7]
In a Resolution,[8] dated February 27, 2017, the Court required the parties to
submit their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired. In his
Manifestation in Lieu of Supplemental Brief,[9] dated April 5, 2017, accused-
appellant manifested that he was adopting his appellant's brief filed before
the CA as his supplemental brief. In its Manifestation in Lieu of
Supplemental Brief,[10] dated April 12, 2017, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) stated that it was no longer filing a supplemental brief, there
being no significant transaction, occurrence or event that happened since
the filing of the appellee's brief.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 provides:
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual
abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age,
the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for
rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code,
for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the
penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years
of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; [Emphasis
supplied]
As stated above, when the victim of rape or acts of lasciviousness is below
twelve (12) years old, the offender shall be prosecuted under the RPC,
provided that the penalty for lascivious conduct shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period.
Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12
years of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act.
Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary as they are not
elements of statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent is
conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of 12.[11] Moreover,
under Article 266-B of the RPC, there is qualified rape when the victim is
below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree,
or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.[12]
On the other hand, acts of lasciviousness under the RPC has the following
elements: that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
that it is done by using force or intimidation, or when the offended party is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the offended party is
under 12 years of age; and that the offended party is another person of
either sex.[13]
After a judicious scrutiny of the records, the Court finds that accused-
appellant is guilty of qualified rape and acts of lasciviousness under the RPC
in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.
The testimony of AAA showed that the she was able to establish with clear
and candid detail her age at the time of the incident, the identity of
accused-appellant, her relationship with him, and the specific bestial acts
committed by him, to wit:
Q: Who are you complaining against?
A: Tito CCC, Sir.
Q: Do you see Tito CCC in the premises?
A: None, Sir.
Q: If you will go out, will you be able to identify him?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Please go out?
A: Witness pointed to a male man wearing yellow t-shirt when asked for his Q: Ipinakita ko sa iyo ito ay...ano ang tingin mo dito manika?
name, he answered CCC. A: Opo.

Q: AAA, why are you suing Tito CCC? Q: Ngayon, ito ay manika at ang nirerepresent ng manika na ito ay...ano ba
A: Kasi po ni-rape po niya ako. ang tingin mo dito mukha ba siyang lalaki or babae?
A: Lalaki po.
Q: You said you were rape (sic), how many times?
A: Two po. Q: So itong lalaki na ito may mukha, may kamay at paa, meron ding siyang
katulad noong nasa lalaki...maari mo bang ituro sa amin kung ano ang
Q: AAA, when was the first time? ginamit niya?
A: April 2011, Sir.
AAA pointed to the private part of the anatomically correct doll.
Q: About what time?
A: 3:00 P.M. PROSECUTOR DE DIOS:

Q: Where did this happen? Your Honor, can I unbare?

A: At the YYY Camp, Sir.
COURT:
Q: What were you doing at YYY Camp, Sitio XXX at that time?
A: We were about to buy bananas, Sir. Yes pero dahan-dahan lang baka magulat si AAA.

Q: You said "kami" who was with you? Q: AAA, this doll is representing a male person. Now a male person has its
A: Tito CCC, sir. own private parts. I'd like to show to you a depiction of such private part, is
that okay with you?
Q: So what happened while you were going out to buy bananas? A: Opo.
A: He pulled me in the grassy portion, Sir.
Q: I'd like to show to you this portion of the doll, now what do you know
xxxx about this portion? Ano ito?

Q: AAA you said that you were rape? (sic) COURT:

A:Opo Q: Ano ba ang alam mo na tawag sa ganyan? Alam mo ba?
A: Opo.
Q: What happened to your private parts if any?
A: Nasira po. Q: Ano ang tawag diyan, alam mo ba?
A: Witness just pointed the private parts of the anatomical (sic) correct doll xxxx

PROSECUTOR DE DIOS: Q: Do you have any proof AAA to show us that you were indeed born on
October 7, 1999?
Q: AAA, am I correct to say that this was the part of the body used by Tito A: Opo.
CCC in raping you?
A: Opo. Q: I'd like to show to you certificate of live birth, is this your certificate of
live birth?
Q: Now, on September 11, 2011, you also said that you were molested by A: Opo.
Tito CCC, what time?
A: 10:00 P.M. xxxx

Q: Where did this happen? Q: I noticed the first molestation was on (sic) April 2011 and the second was
A: Sa bahay po. on (sic) September 2011, from April up to September why did you not tell
anyone that you were subject of the molestation?
Q: Now, AAA you said that you were molested, how were you molested by A: Natakot po ako.
Tito CCC exactly?
Q: Who are you afraid of?
COURT: A: Kay Tito CCC po.

Q: Gusto mo bang gamitin ulit or ituro...bibigay ko ulit ang doll kay Q: So why are you afraid of Tito CCC?
Prosec.dito mo na lang ituro kung ano ang ginamit sa iyo o may ginamit o A: Baka po kasi palayasin kami at patayin ako.
anong parte ng katawan?
Q: You said "baka" why did you say that you might be evicted or killed? Why
PROSECUTOR DE DIOS: do you say that?
A: Kasi iyon po ang sinabi niya sa akin. x x x[14]
Q: May ginamit ba si Tito CCC anong parte ng...katawan?
A: Kamay po. Qualified Rape

Q: So what did he do with his hands to your persons? It is apparent from the testimony of AAA that she suffered sexual abuses at
A: Hinipo niya ako. the hands of accused-appellant, her own uncle. The first instance occurred
in April 2011, on their way to Camp YYY to buy bananas when accused-
Q: AAA, with the use of Tito CCC's hands, where did he touch you? appellant pushed AAA to the grassy portion and raped her. Despite her
A: Sa ari ko po. tender age and traumatizing experience, AAA was able to describe in open
court, through an anatomically correct doll, that accused-appellant used
and inserted his penis in her vagina which caused her tremendous pain and
injuries.
After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant warned her not to relate the
incident to anybody, otherwise, he would evict her family and he would kill
her. Evidently, accused-appellant used threats and intimidation against AAA,
which caused her to suffer silently in fear until she finally disclosed her
ordeal to her teacher. Further, AAA was only eleven (11) years old at the
time of the rape incident, as evidenced by her birth certificate.
The Court does not give credence to accused-appellant's argument that
AAA's testimony was incredible because there were inconsistent statements
regarding the frequency of the abuses. Inconsistencies in the testimony of
the victim do not necessarily render such testimony incredible. In fact,
minor inconsistencies strengthen the credibility of the witness and the
testimony, because of a showing that such charges are not fabricated. What
is decisive in a charge of rape is the complainant's positive identification of
the accused as the malefactor.[15]
Testimonies of rape victims who are young and of tender age are credible.
The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full
credence.[16] It is a well-settled rule that factual findings of the trial court,
especially on the credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight
and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.[17]
Moreover, the medico-legal report corroborated the testimony of AAA. It
showed the presence of deep-healed lacerations at the 3, 6 and 9 o'clock
positions in AAA's hymen, showing blunt penetrating trauma. Time and
again, the Court held that the slightest penetration of the labia of the
female victim's genitalia consummates the crime of rape.[18]
Nevertheless, the crime committed by accused-appellant must be qualified
under Article 266-B of the RPC. It was indicated in the Informations that
accused-appellant was the paternal uncle of AAA. Also, during trial, AAA
positively identified accused-appellant as her uncle and she established that
it was her uncle who raped her. There is qualified rape when the victim is
below 18 years of age and the offender is an ascendant or relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree. In this case, accused-
appellant, the paternal uncle of AAA, was a relative by consanguinity within
the third civil degree. Hence, the crime of qualified rape was committed by
accused-appellant.
Acts of Lasciviousness
Aside from the qualified rape committed by accused-appellant, AAA
testified positively that he also sexually molested her. She stated that on
September 11, 2011, at his house, around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, the
accused-appellant touched and caressed her genitals. This was confirmed by
his live-in-partner when she reported the incident to BBB.
Section 5 Article III of R.A. No. 7610 provides that when the victim is under
12 years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under the RPC, but the
penalty shall be that provided in R.A. No. 7610.[19] Lascivious conduct is
defined as "[t]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of
the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth of any person,
whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, degrade or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of
a person."[20]
In this case, the conduct of accused-appellant in intentionally touching and
caressing the genitals of AAA constituted an act of lasciviousness. He must
be punished under the prescribed penalty of R.A. No. 7610 as AAA was
below 12 years of age at the time of the incident. The aggravating
circumstance of relationship must also be taken into consideration.
Denial is a weak defense
Accused-appellant interposed a defense of denial by vehemently denying
the accusations against him. It is an established rule, however, that denial is
an inherently weak defense and constitutes self-serving negative evidence,
which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive
declaration by a credible witness.[21]
Indeed, the positive testimony of AAA outweighs the denial proffered by
accused-appellant. Mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it,
can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the child-victim of the
identity of the accused and his involvement in the crime attributed to
him.[22]
Moreover, accused-appellant's assertion that the charges were merely
instituted by BBB because she was mad or angry with DDD, his brother, was
utterly unsubstantiated. Motives such as resentment, hatred or revenge
have never swayed this Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a
minor rape victim.[23] Evidently, no woman, least of all a child, would
concoct a story of defloration, allow examination of her private parts and
subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim
of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her being.[24]
Penalties
In Criminal Case No. 146314, the crime committed was qualified rape under
Paragraph 6(1), Article 266-B of the RPC and the imposable penalty is death.
With the enactment of R.A. No. 9346, however, the imposition of the death
penalty is prohibited and the proper penalty would be reclusion
perpetua without the benefit of parole.
In Criminal Case No. 146315, the crime committed was acts of
lasciviousness. As the victim was below 12 years of age, the penalty
provided under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, reclusion temporal in its
medium period, must be imposed. Further, the aggravating circumstance of
relationship between the accused-appellant and AAA is present. Thus, the
Court finds that the proper imposable penalty is 12 years and 1 day
of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as minimum, to 16 years, 5
months and 10 days of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum.[25]
As to the awards of damages in qualified rape, People v. Jugueta[26] provides
the following awards of damages: P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. In
acts of lasciviousness, People v. Aycardo[27]enumerates the following awards
of damages: P20,000.00 as civil indemnity; P15,000 as moral damages; and
P15,000.00 as exemplary damages. As properly held by the CA, the amounts
of damages awarded shall earn an interest of 6% per annum from the date
of finality of judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the June 26, 2014 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
69, Taguig City, in Criminal Case Nos. 146314-15, is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 146314, finding accused Dominador
Udtohan y Jose GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of QUALIFIED RAPE under
Article 266-A (1) (d) and penalized under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, the Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
without eligibility for parole; and to pay AAA the amounts of P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 146315, finding accused Dominador Udtohan y Jose
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS under Article
336 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized under Section 5 (b), Article III
of R.A. No. 7610, the Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of 12 years
and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as minimum, to 16
years, 5 months and 10 days of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum; and to pay AAA the amounts of P20,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P15,000.00 as moral damages, and P15,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In both cases, the amounts of damages awarded shall earn interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
(SGD)
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA AQUINO
Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, Leonen, and Martires, JJ., concur. TUAZON

Deputy Division Clerk

of Court

August 17, 2017

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sir/Madam:

Please take notice that on August 02, 2017 a Decision, copy attached
herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case,
the original of which was received by this Office on August 17, 2017 at 2:22
p.m.

Very truly yours,

MA. LOURDES C.
PERFECTO

Division Clerk of Court

By:
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 208471, August 02, 201
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERNESTO SAGANA Y DE
GUZMAN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The miniscule quantity of confiscated illicit drugs heightens the importance
of a more stringent conformity to Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.1
This Court resolves this appeal2 filed by Ernesto Sagana y De Guzman
(Sagana) from the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals dated February 26,
2013 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05154.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's ruling4 that Sagana
was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.
On July 22, 2010, two (2) Informations for violation of Article II, Sections
56 and 117 of Republic Act No. 9165 were filed against Sagana.8 The charging
portions of the Informations read:
Criminal Case No. 2010-0390-D
That on or about the 21st day of July 2010, in the City of Dagupan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, ERNESTO SAGANA Y DE GUZMAN @ Nestor, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, sell and deliver to a customer
Methamphetamine Hydrochlori.de contained in one (1) heat[-]sealed plastic
sachet, weighing more or less 0.12 gram in exchange for P500.00, without
authority do so.
Contrary to Article II, Section 5, R.A. 9165.
Criminal Case No. 2010-0391-D
That on or about the 21st day of July 2010, in the City of Dagupan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, ERNESTO SAGANAY [sic] Y DE GUZMAN @ Nestor, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, have in his possession,
custody and control Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) contained in
five (5) heat[-]sealed plastic sachets, weighing more or less 0.59 gram,
without authority to possess the same.
Contrary to Article II, Section 11, R.A. 9165.9 (Emphasis in the original)
Upon arraignment, Sagana pleaded not guilty to the charges.10
Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution's version of the story is as
follows:
On July 21, 2010 at around 2:20 p.m., police officers coordinated with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency to act on a tip by a confidential
informant. P./Insp. Gerardo Macaraeg, Jr., PO3 Lucas Salonga (PO3 Salonga),
PO3 Christian Carvajal (PO3 Carvajal), PO1 Allan Emerson Daus, and PO1
Ferdinand Lopez carried out a buy-bust operation in Sagana's residence at
Muslim Tondaligan, Dagupan City.11
PO3 Salonga posted as the poseur-buyer. Five (5) P100.00 bills served as
buy-bust money, marked with PO3 Salonga's initials, "LCS."12
Allegedly before the operation, PO3 Salonga had arranged the transaction
through a phone call with Sagana, who set the meeting at his house.13
The operation ensued.
Upon arrival at Sagana's house, Sagana invited PO3 Salonga and PO3
Carvajal inside. Once inside, PO3 Salonga informed Sagana that he would
purchase P500 worth of shabu.14
When Sagana asked for the payment, PO3 Salonga gave him the marked
money. After counting the money, Sagana handed him one (1) plastic sachet
of shabu. Thereafter, PO3 Salonga confronted Sagana and introduced
himself as a police officer. PO3 Carvajal apprehended Sagana's wife and
another lady who also peddled him shabu.15
After a body search on Sagana, PO3 Salonga recovered the marked money
and retrieved five (5) more plastic sachets of shabu.16 PO3 Salonga marked
the articles with his initals, "LCS."17 Accordingly, he made the confiscation
receipt before delivering Sagana to the police station.18
At the police station, the incident was entered in the police blotter. They
took photos of Sagana and the confiscated items in the presence of a
representative from the Department of Justice, media representatives, and
an elected barangay official.19
Based on the chemistry reports of P/Sr. Insp. Myma Malojo (P/Sr. Insp.
Malojo), the heat-sealed plastic sachets were positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.20
On the other hand, the defense posed frame-up and extortion21 against the
police officers in their version of the events as follows:
On July 21, 2010 at around 2:00 p.m., Sagana was allegedly washing the
dishes by the deep well next to his house when he heard a commotion in
the yard. He was then prompted to check out what it was. There, he
purportedly saw an armed man attempting to destroy their fence. This man
hurriedly approached him, held his neck, and instructed him not to stand
and to keep quiet because they were searching for someone.22
Allegedly, two (2) men barged inside his house. When the men went out,
they commanded him to direct them to "the money." When Sagana asked
about the money, one (1) of them supposedly hit his left side with a gun and
was told that he would be brought to the police station. His family saw what
the men did, which made his eldest child hysterical.23
Sagana and his wife were taken to the police station where he was asked if
the items on top of the office table were his. Sagana answered in the
negative which prompted the police officers to bring his wife to the
investigating room.24
A police officer allegedly demanded P50,000.00 in exchange for not filing a
case against Sagana, an amount open for bargain. However, when Sagana
told them that they did not have that amount, he was detained and was
taken to the prosecutor's office for inquest the following week.25
On July 19, 2011, the Regional Trial Court found Sagana guilty of the
charges.26It ruled that Sagana "was caught in flagrante
delicto selling shabu to a poseur buyer and possessing another five (5)
plastic sachets of shabu."27 It found that all the elements necessary to
establish the illegal sale and illegal possession of drugs were proven by the
prosecution.28The dispositive portion of the decision
read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused Ernesto Sagana y de Guzman GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in.
Criminal Case No. 2010-0390-D for selling and delivering shabu weighing
0.12 gram to a poseur buyer in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act [No.] 9165, and pursuant to law, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and [a] fine of P500,000.00 and to pay the cost of suit.
In Criminal Case no. 2010-0391-D, the court likewise finds the accused
Ernesto Sagana y de Guzman GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for
Possession of 0.59 gram of Shabu, a dangerous drug, in violation of Section
11, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165 and pursuant to law, he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to twenty (20) years and [a] fine of P400,000.00 and to pay the
cost of suit.
29
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)
On appeal,30 Sagana asserted that the police officers failed to comply with
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 and its implementing rules.31 He argued
that the trial court allegedly erred in finding him guilty of the charges.32
On February 26, 2013, the Court of Appeals affirmed33 the trial court's
ruling. It held that failure to comply with Section 21 of Republic Act No.
9165 did not render Sagana's arrest illegal or the evidence confiscated
inadmissible.34 Strict compliance with the law can be dispensed with
provided that "the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
[were] . . . preserved" by the law enforcers.35
Hence, this appeal before this Court.
On August 28, 201336 the Court of Appeals elevated to this Court the
records of this case pursuant to its Resolution37 dated March 14, 2013. The
Resolution gave due course to the Notice of Appeal38 filed by Sagana.
In the Resolution dated September 30, 201339 this Court noted the records
of this case forwarded by the Court of Appeals. The parties were then
ordered to file their supplemental briefs, should they so desired, within 30
days from notice.
On November 18, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation40 on behalf of the People of the Philippines stating that it
would no longer file a supplemental brief. A similar Manifestation41 was
filed by the Public Attorney's Office on behalf of Sagana.
For resolution before this Court is whether Ernesto Sagana's guilt was
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Subsumed in the resolution of this issue is
whether the police officers complied with Section 21 of Republic Act No.
9165 and its implementing rules in handling the alleged confiscated shabu.
Sagana insists that there are substantial gaps in the chain of custody
presented by the prosecution.42
PO3 Salonga allegedly marked the six (6) sachets of shabu and conformably
prepared the pertinent confiscation receipt.43
At the police station, the confiscated items were allegedly turned to the
desk officer for the incident to be entered in the police blotter and for the
investigator to prepare the corresponding request for examination.
Thereafter, the articles were delivered to the crime laboratory and were
received by P/Sr. Insp. Malojo.44
Given this sequence, Sagana underscores that there are three (3) key
persons involved: an unnamed desk officer, an unnamed police investigator,
and P/Sr. Insp. Malojo, the receiving officer at the crime laboratory. All of
them had contact with the purportedly confiscated illicit drugs. However,
they were not presented as witnesses by the prosecution, for no reasonable
explanation.45
Sagana emphasizes that in spite of making P/Sr. Insp. Malojo's testimony a
subject of stipulation, it does not cover either the circumstances under
which the specimens were received at the laboratory for testing and
analysis or the processes done to these items while in her possession and
custody. He then surmises that there can be no guarantee that the alleged
confiscated shabu were the same ones seized from the buy-bust
operation.46
Moreover, Sagana asserts that the prosecution failed to show that the
marking and preparation of the receipt were made in his
presence.47 Despite the signatures of an elected public official and
representatives from the media and the Department of Justice on the
receipt, there were still infirmities as these signatories were not present in
the operation when the inventory was done.48
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the
prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that all the
essential elements of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabuwere
present.49
PO3 Salonga, as well as the other prosecution witnesses, recounted the
circumstances of the contraband's sale that ended with Sagana's
apprehension.50 The narration made by other witnesses, who were also
police officers, should be given weight with the presumption that they
performed their duties in a regular manner, absent any evidence to the
contrary.51
Furthermore, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the chain of
custody was never broken and that the seized shabu's integrity remained
intact.52 It avers that the drugs seized from Sagana were undoubtedly the
exact specimens examined in the crime laboratory and presented and
identified in court.53
This Court rules in favor of accused-appellant Sagana.
In a criminal case, this Court commences with the law's own standpoint on
the standing of the accused that "in all criminal prosecutions, he
is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contraiy is proven beyond
reasonable doubt."54 The burden of proof lies with the prosecution.55 Thus,
it must depend "on the strength of its case rather than on the weakness of
the case for the defense."56
Moreover, "[p]roof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof
sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the
conscience of those who act in judgment," is necessary to surmount the
presumption of innocence.57
For a plausible conviction under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165
or illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the prosecution must ascertain the
following:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.58
In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the sale transaction
actually happened and that "the [procured] object is properly presented as
evidence in court and is shown to be the same drugs seized from the
accused."59
On the other hand, the following elements must be proven in illegal
possession of prohibited drugs:
[1] the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs; [2] such possession
was not authorized by law; and [3] the accused was freely and consciously
aware of being in possession of dangerous drugs.60
In both cases involving illegal sale and illegal possession, the illicit drugs
confiscated from the accused comprise the corpus delicti of the charges.61
"[I]t is of paramount importance that the existence of the drug, the corpus
delicti of the crime, be established beyond doubt."62 Its identity and
integrity must be proven to have been safeguarded.63 Aside from proving
the elements of the charges, "the fact that the substance illegally
possessed and sold [was] the same substance offered in court as exhibit
must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that
needed to sustain a guilty verdict."64 The chain of custody carries out this
purpose "as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of
the evidence are removed."65
While the definition of chain of custody was not expressly provided for
under Republic Act No. 9165,66 Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board
Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 defined it as follows:
b. "Chain of custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plants sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment at each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and
custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the
person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time
when such transfer of custody w[as] made in the course of safekeeping
and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.]
In compliance with the chain of custody, the prosecution must identify the
persons involved in handling the seized articles from confiscation up to
their presentation as evidence.67Concomitantly, the prosecution should
also offer statements pertaining to each link of the chain "in such a way
that every person who touched the illegal drugs would describe how and
from whom they were received, where they were and what happened to
them while in his or her possession, the condition in which he or she
received them, and their condition upon delivery."68
Mallillin v. People69 explained the importance of acquiescence to the chain
of custody due to the distinctive nature of narcotics.
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily
identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine
their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to
the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the
chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering,
alteration or substitution of substances from other cases—by accident or
otherwise—in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar
evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating
the same, a. standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving
objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting
standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient
completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has
either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered
with.70(Emphasis supplied)
The prosecution in this case offered testimonies corroborating the
narration of the alleged sale of illicit drugs that paved the way for
Sagana's arrest. However, there were apparent lapses in the chain of
custody that cast doubt on the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti.
Hence, the prosecution failed to establish that the miniscule amounts of
0.12 grams and 0.59 grams of dangerous drugs presented as evidence in
court were the very same ones allegedly seized and retrieved from Sagana.
II
In this case, a buy-bust operation was conducted to validate the tip given by
the confidential informant.71 While a buy-bust operation has been known to
be useful in "flush[ing] out illegal transactions that are otherwise conducted
covertly and in secrecy," it has its drawback "that has not escaped the
attention of the framers of the law."72 It is prone "to police abuse, the most
notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion."73 In People v.
Tan,74 courts were urged to be more cautious in dealing with drug
cases:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"[B]y the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment
procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with which
sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets or hands of
unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all
drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great." Thus, the courts have been
exhorted to be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is
made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.75 (Emphasis
provided)
Thus, it is essential that the chain of custody is established in buy-bust
operations. This includes:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered
from the accused by the apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer
to the investigating officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the
forensic chemist to the court.76 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, the then77 prevailing law, provides the
manner in dealing with confiscated articles in drug cases. This mandated
procedure emphasizes "the value of preserving the chain of custody in
relation to the dangerous drugs."78 Hence, the prosecution must prove
compliance to establish the elements of the charges.79
The initial procedural safeguard80 is provided for under Section 21,
paragraph 1 of Republic Act No. 9165, which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of
all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accusedor the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof[.] (Emphasis supplied)
This is further elucidated in its Implementing Rules and Regulations, which
state:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. — ...
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied)
The prosecution's narration of events reveals that the police officers did not
to conform with the chain of custody. This is in contravention to Section 21
of Republic Act No. 9165, which is mandatory in nature, as reflected in the
presence of the word "shall"81 in the provision.
According to the prosecution, the items were immediately marked and
inventoried in Sagana's residence after confiscation.82 However, it failed to
offer any reason why the mandated photographing was not concurrently
done with the inventory and was only made83 when Sagana was already in
the police station.
Similarly, none84 of the required third-party representatives was present
during the seizure and inventory of the dangerous articles. Their
presence in buy-bust operations and seizure of illicit articles in the place of
operation would supposedly guarantee "against planting of evidence and
frame up."85 In other words, they are "necessary to insulate the
apprehension and incriminatiqn proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy
or irregularity."86
To underscore, the prosecution "has the positive duty to establish that
earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives
enumerated under Section 21 . . . or that there was a justifiable ground for
failing to do so."87 In this case, the records were bereft of any explanation
why the third-party representatives were present only during the belated
photographing88 of the confiscated articles. Hence, the very purpose of
their mandated presence is defeated.
While simple procedural irregularities in buy-bust operations are not ipso
facto prejudicial to the claim of the prosecution, provided that the
integrity and evidentiary worth of the confiscated articles were
maintained, courts should still carefully assess and distinguish this kind of
errors from those amounting to "gross, systematic, or deliberate
disregard" of the protections set by law.89Considering that the law
enforcers in this case conducted a briefing before the operation,90 they had
ample time to secure the presence of the needed third-party
representatives before proceeding to Sagana's residence.
Section 21 identifies "matters that are imperative."91 Carrying out acts
which are seemingly compliant but do not actually conform to the
prerequisites laid down in Section 21 is insufficient.92 "This is especially so
when the prosecution claims that the seizure of drugs and drug
paraphernalia is the result of carefully planned operations, as is the case
here."93
Furthermore, pursuant to "the rule that penal laws shall be construed
strictly against the government, and liberally in favor of the accused," the
failure of the police officers to observe the procedure in handling the
seized items provided for under Republic Act No. 9165 and its
implementing rules essentially prejudices the prosecution's claim.94
III
A perusal of PO3 Salonga's testimony shows that the prosecution failed to
establish an unbroken chain of custody.
Q: When you signaled your other companions, what happened next?
A: I frisked them and I was able to confiscate around 5 plastic sachets
of shabu from the said suspect, madam.
....
Q: What markings did you place in the pieces of shabu?
A: My initial (sic) LCS, Madam.
Q: After you have placed [the] marking (sic) on the items, what did you do
next?
A: I prepared the confiscation receipt, madam.
Q: Where did you prepare the confiscation receipt?
A: In the area, madam.
Q: What are you referring to?
A: At the place of the incident, madam.
Q: After you prepared the confiscation receipt, what did you do next?
A: We brought them in our office, madam.
....
Q: Upon arrival at your office, what did you do next?
A: We indorsed them to the desk officer for recording, madam.
Q: Where was it recorded?
A: In the police blotter, Madam.
Q After you have it recorded in the police blotter, what did you do next?
A: We prepared a request for examination, madam.
Q: Who prepared for (sic) the request for examination, what happened
next?
A: The investigator, madam.
Q: After the preparation of the request for examination, what
happened next?
A: I brought the same to the Crime Laboratory, madam.95 (Emphasis
supplied)
"Every person who takes possession of seized drugs must show how it was
handled and preserved while in his or her custody to prevent any switching
or replacement."96 In a number of drug cases,97 this Court ruled that the
failure of the prosecution to offer the testimonies of the persons who had
direct contact with the confiscated items without ample explanation casts
doubt on whether the allegedly seized shabuwere the very same ones
presented in court.
The prosecution has the "burden of establishing the identity of the seized
items."98 Considering the sequence of the people who have dealt with the
confiscated articles, the prosecution failed to justify why three (3) other
significant persons were not presented99 as witnesses. These persons were
the desk officer who supposedly recorded the incident in the police blotter,
the investigator who prepared the request for examination, and the police
officer who received the articles in the laboratory. "In effect, there is no
reasonable guaranty as to the integrity of the exhibits inasmuch as it failed
to rule out the possibility of substitution of the exhibits, which cannot but
inure to its own detriment.100
Furthermore, the prosecution cannot simply rely on the saving clause
provided for under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act
No. 9165. While non-conformity with the strict directive of Section 21 is not
essentially prejudicial to its claim, the lapses committed by the police
officers "must be recognized and explained in terms of
their justifiable grounds and the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved."101
In this case, however, the prosecution failed to offer any justifiable reason
why the police officers failed to strictly comply with Section 21. It also
failed to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
items were maintained despite the failure to conform to the directives of
the law. "The prosecution's sweeping guarantees as to the identity and
integrity of the seized drugs . . . will not secure a conviction."102
IV
To establish "whether there was a valid entrapment or whether proper
procedures were undertaken in effecting the buy-bust operation, it is
incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the details of the
operation are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material and
competent evidence."103More so, as in this case where the seized quantities
of shabu are merely 0.12 grams and 0.59 grams, it is important that all
details are clear. Hence, the miniscule quantities of dangerous drugs
allegedly confiscated magnify the uncertainties with regard their
integrity.104

Further, the courts cannot solely depend "on but must apply with studied
restraint the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by
law enforcement agents."105 This presumption cannot surmount the
accused's presumption of innocence.106
Trial courts should thoroughly take into consideration "the factual
intricacies of cases involving violations of Republic Act No. 9165."107 Thus,
"[c]ourts must employ heightened scrutiny, consistent with the requirement
of proof beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving miniscule
amounts of drugs [for] [t]hese can be readily planted and tampered."108
The miniscule quantity of confiscated illicit drugs heightens the importance
of a more stringent conformity with Section 21,109 which the police officers
in this case miserably failed to do so. The significant lapses committed, as
well as their failure to explain their non-compliance with the directives of
the law, cast doubt on the integrity of the corpus delicti. With these
circumstances, this Court acquits accused-appellant Sagana as his guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In closing, this Court is reminded of its words in People v. Holgado:110
distracting our law enforcers from their more challenging task: to uproot
the causes of this drag menace. We stand ready to assess cases involving
greater amounts of drugs and the leadership of these cartels.111
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 26, 2013 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CR-H.C. No. 05154 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant Ernesto Sagana y De Guzman is hereby ACQUITTED for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is
ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for
any other lawful cause. Let entry of final judgment be issued immediately.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director
of the Bureau of CoiTections is directed to report to this Court within five
days from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken. Copies shall also
be furnished the Director General of the Philippine National Police and the
Director General of the Philippine Drugs Enforcement Agency for their
information.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, Mendoza, and Martires, JJ., concur.

It is lamentable that while our dockets are clogged with prosecutions

under Republic Act No. 9165 involving small-time drug users and retailers,
we are seriously short of prosecutions involving the proverbial "big fish."
We are swamped with cases involving small fry who have been arrested
for miniscule amounts. While they are certainly a bane to our society,
small retailers are but low-lying fruits in an exceedingly vast network of
drug cartels. Both law enforcers and prosecutors should realize that the
more effective and efficient strategy is to focus resources more on the
source and true leadership of these nefarious organizations. Otherwise, all
these executive and judicial resources expended to attempt to convict an
accused for 0.05 gram of shabu under doubtful custodial arrangements
will hardly make a dent in the overall picture. It might in fact be