Title Seven

CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS

Chapter One
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS

Article 203. Who are public officers. - For the purpose of applying the provisions of this and the
preceding titles of this book, any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election or
appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the
Government of the Philippine Islands, of shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public
duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or class, shall be deemed to be a public
officer.
 Chapter Two
MALFEASANCE AND MISFEASANCE IN OFFICE
Section One. - Dereliction of duty

Article 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. - Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust
judgment in any case submitted to him for decision, shall be punished by prision mayor and perpetual
absolute disqualification.

Government Service Insurance System vs. Executive Judge Maria A. Cancino-

Erum
A.M. No. Rtj-09-2182
September 5, 2012

FACTS:
This administrative complaint emanated from the filing on July 18, 2008 by one
Belinda Martizano (Martizano) of a suit to restrain the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), Land Transportation Office (LTO), Stradcom Corporation
(STRADCOM), Insurance Commission, and Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) from implementing an issuance that constituted the LTO the sole insurance
provider of compulsory third party liability (CTPL) that was required for the registration
of motor vehicles. The suit, docketed as Civil Case No. MC08-3660 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Mandaluyong City, claimed that the implementation of the issuance
would deprive Martizano of her livelihood as an insurance agent. She applied for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO).

On July 21, 2008, Civil Case No. MC08-3660 was raffled and assigned to Branch
213 of the RTC, presided by respondent Judge Carlos A. Valenzuela. On October 2,
2008, GSIS charged Judge Valenzuela with grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the
law, violation of the Rules of Court, and knowingly rendering an unjust order. The
charges against the respondents were both based on the non-raffling of Civil Case
No.MC08-3660.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case against Judge Valenzua should be dismissed

RULING:
The dismissal of the charges of gross ignorance of the law, grave misconduct,
and knowingly rendering unjust judgment, as the OCA recommended, was justified
because the charges were really devoid of merit.

The charge of knowingly rendering unjust orders in Civil Case No. MC08-3660
levelled against Judge Valenzuela was bereft of factual support and legal basis. His
explanations for issuing the assailed orders, which the Court finds to be fully
substantiated by the records and the pertinent laws, are sufficient. In addition, we are
puzzled that GSIS did not resort to any of several adequate remedies, like bringing a
petition for certiorari or taking an appeal in due course, which remedies were available
at its disposal had it really considered the issuance of the orders and Judge
Valenzuela's explanations unwarranted or in contravention of the law.
Article 205. Judgment rendered through negligence. - Any judge who, by reason of inexcusable
negligence or ignorance shall render a manifestly unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for
decision shall be punished by arresto mayor and temporary special disqualification.
Article 206. Unjust interlocutory order. - Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust interlocutory
order or decree shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and suspension; but if he
shall have acted by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance and the interlocutory order or decree
be manifestly unjust, the penalty shall be suspension.

Romeo R. Araullo vs. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. No. 194169
2013-12-04

FACTS:

Romeo Araullo, the petitioner, argues that Arbiter Anni entertained Club Filipino’s
motion to quash despite the fact that only he – and not his counsel – was furnished with
a copy thereof. Arbiter Anni hastily resolved to quash the Writ of Execution and lift the
notices of garnishment even before the motion to quash could be heard. Arbiter Anni
also conspired with his fraternity brothers in Club Filipino to delay the execution of the
decision in the labor case, thus giving unwarranted benefits and advantage to Club
Filipino and causing undue injury to petitioner; and that the respondent Commissioners
improperly affirmed, through their October 29, 2008 Resolution, Arbiter Anni’s order
quashing the Writ of Execution. Petitioner thus concluded that the Ombudsman
committed patent error and grave abuse of discretion in exonerating the respondents
from the charge of grave misconduct.

On the other hand, respondent Commissioners argue that no grave abuse of

discretion exists to warrant a reversal of the Ombudsman’s ruling; that in the absence of
evidence that it acted in a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner, its findings are
entitled to respect; that the elements of grave misconduct are not present in their case;
that they acted lawfully, regularly, and with prudence and caution, in the performance of
their functions; that in issuing the October 29, 2008 Resolution, they merely rectified
Arbiter Anni’s mistake in issuing the Writ of Execution without observing the proper
procedure under the NLRC Rules

ISSUE:
Whether there is substantial evidence to hold respondents liable for grave
misconduct.

RULING:
The Petition is dismissed.

“Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,

more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. x x x [And
when] the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of
established rule [are] manifest,” the public officer shall be liable for grave misconduct.
Evidently, a public officer who acts pursuant to the dictates of law and within the limits of
allowable discretion can hardly be considered guilty of misconduct.
 Finding no irregularity in the acts of respondents, the Ombudsman did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in exonerating them from the administrative charge of
grave misconduct. As a matter of fact, its disposition is correct in every respect. Thus,
the Court’s policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of sound
discretion and judgment stands.
Article 207. Malicious delay in the administration of justice. - The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any judge guilty of malicious delay in the administration of justice.

Ernesto Hebron vs Judge Matias M. Garcia II

A.M. No. RTJ-12-2334
November 14, 2012

FACTS:
Hebron filed the administrative complaint with the OCA, claiming that: Judge
Garcia "distorted the facts" to justify his issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction;
neither Hebron nor his counsel could have agreed on June 8, 2009 to file a position
paper on Simundac's application for injunctive writ, since they were both absent during
the hearing on said date; Judge Garcia was guilty of "ignorance of the rule and
jurisprudence" for ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction without first
conducting a hearing thereon; Judge Garcia had ignored existing jurisprudence,
making his rulings "beyond the permissible margin of error"; and Judge Garcia should
have recused himself from Civil Case No. BSC No. 2009-02, given his bias and
partiality in favor of Simundac.

The OCA then recommended that Judge Garcia be found guilty of undue delay in
rendering an order, and accordingly be fined in the amount of P5,000.00 with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Garcia is guilty of undue delay in rendering an order

RULING:
The Court finds respondent Judge Matias M. Garcia II GUILTY of undue delay in
rendering an order.

The failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period of
ninety (90) days constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanction against the erring judge. This is not only a blatant transgression
of the Constitution but also of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which enshrines the
significant duty of magistrates to decide cases promptly.22 Under Section 9, Rule 140
of the Revised Rules of Court, delay in rendering a decision or order is considered a
less serious offense that is punishable by either (1) suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months, or (2) a fine
of more than P 10,000 but not exceeding P20,000. The sheer volume of Judge Garcia's
work may, at most, only serve to mitigate the penalty to be imposed upon him, as in the
case of Angelia where the fine was reduced to P5,000.00 given therein respondent
judge's 800 pending cases before his sala.

In the present case, we deem a fine of P2,000.00 sufficient, after considering

Judge Garcia's caseload of more than 3,700 pending cases. It is also our view that his
delay in resolving Hebron's motion for reconsideration was not prompted by bad faith or
malice, that even his complainant had later filed with the OCA a letter that sought the
withdrawal of the charges. Finally, we take note of the OCA's observation that the delay
committed by Judge Garcia involves a single motion, and that this is his first
administrative offense.
Article 208. Prosecution of offenses; negligence and tolerance. - The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period and suspension shall be imposed upon any public officer, or officer of the law, who, in
dereliction of the duties of his office, shall maliciously refrain from instituting prosecution for the
punishment of violators of the law, or shall tolerate the commission of offenses.
Article 209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor. - Revelation of secrets. - In addition to the proper
administrative action, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200
to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any attorney-at-law or solicitor ( procurador judicial) who,
by any malicious breach of professional duty or of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall prejudice
his client, or reveal any of the secrets of the latter learned by him in his professional capacity.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon an attorney-at-law or solicitor (procurador judicial) who, having
undertaken the defense of a client or having received confidential information from said client in a case,
shall undertake the defense of the opposing party in the same case, without the consent of his first client.

MA. LUISA HADJULA vs ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA

A.C. No. 6711
2007-07-03

Facts:
Complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they both
worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP), claimed that she approached respondent
for some legal advice and further alleged that in the course of their conversation which
was supposed to be kept confidential she disclosed personal secrets only to be
informed later by the respondent that she (respondent) would refer the matter to a
lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have refused
handling her case only after she had already heard her secrets.

Respondent denied giving legal advice to the complainant and dismissed any
suggestion about the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between them.
Respondent also stated the observation that the supposed confidential data and
sensitive documents adverted to are in fact matters of common knowledge in the BFP.

Issue:
Whether or not the Atty. Madiana breached her duty of preserving the confidence
of a client and violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ruling:
YES. Respondent was reprimanded and admonished.

The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek

legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such
relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of
the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer,
respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential information acquired or
revealed during legal consultations.

The seriousness of the respondent’s offense notwithstanding, the Supreme Court

feels that there is room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that the
respondent acted with ill-will. Without meaning to condone the error of respondent’s
ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former friends becoming bitter enemies
and filing charges and counter-charges against each other using whatever convenient
tools and data were readily available. Unfortunately, the personal information
respondent gathered from her conversation with complainant became handy in her
quest to even the score. At the end of the day, it appears clear to the Court that
respondent was actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the
process of giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule on
confidentiality.
 Section Two. - Bribery

Article 210. Direct bribery. - Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in
connection with the performance of this official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or
present received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty
of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not less than the value of the gift and]
not less than three times the value of the gift in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed
upon, if the same shall have been committed.

If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute
a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in the preceding
paragraph; and if said act shall not have been accomplished, the officer shall suffer the penalties of
prision correccional, in its medium period and a fine of not less than twice the value of such gift.

If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public officer refrain from doing
something which it was his official duty to do, he shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its
maximum period and a fine of not less than the value of the gift and not less than three times the value of
such gift.

In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit shall suffer the penalty of
special temporary disqualification.

The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs shall be made applicable to assessors, arbitrators,
appraisal and claim commissioners, experts or any other persons performing public duties. (As amended
by Batas Pambansa Blg. 871, approved May 29, 1985).

Wendell Barreras-Sulit vs. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa

G.R. No. 196232
2014-01-28

FACTS:
Respondent Cu instructed a BSP Cashied to take money from the vault in the
amount of P30,000.00 and deposit the same to Apelo's bank account in Philippine
National Bank. The reason for the deposit according to Cu was "Professional Fee natin
sa kanya yan". Additional deposits were made to Apelo's bank account on two (2)
separate dates on the orders of Cu and Zate. After the deposits were made, the BSP
Cashier was initially instructed to cover the unofficial and unbooked cash disbursements
in favor of Apelo by placing such amounts in BDBI's books as "Other Cash Items;". In
his defense, Cu denied having ordered or instructed Gomez to make such deposits to
Apelo's bank account. He pointed to the lack of evidence to prove that Apelo was aware
or made aware of any alleged bank deposits made to her bank account

PDIC decided to file the instant criminal complaint against private respondents.
However, the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint for lack of probable cause.
PDIC moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied in an Order. Aggrieved,
PDIC filed the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding no
probable cause to indict private respondents of the crimes charged.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious.

Apelo was accused of committing the crime of Direct Bribery, which has the
following elements: (a) that the accused is a public officer; (b) that he received directly
or through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (c) that such gift, present or
promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act
not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which is his official duty to
do; and (d) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public
officer.

In view of such grave accusations against them, Cu and Zate resorted to mere
denials, while Apelo ignored the complaint by not filing a counter-affidavit despite due
notice, thus, miserably failing to debunk the charges hurled against them. Indubitably,
the foregoing establishes probable cause to believe that private respondents may have
indeed committed such acts constituting the crimes charged against them. As such,
they must defend themselves in a full-blown trial on the merits.
Article 211. Indirect bribery. - The penalties of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,
and public censure shall be imposed upon any public officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by
reason of his office. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 871, approved May 29, 1985).

Timoteo A. Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 155574
November 20, 2006

FACTS:
Timoteo A. Garcia, Gilbert G. Nabo and Nery Tagupa, being then public officers
or employees of the Land Transportation Office (LTO), Cagayan de Oro City, taking
advantage of their respective official positions, and conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another and with intent to gain personal use or benefit, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously borrow One unit Asian Automotive
Center’s Service Vehicle – Fiera Blue KBK-732, in good running condition, spare tire,
tools from Oro Asian Automotive Corporation, which is engaged in the business of
vehicle assembly and dealership in Cagayan de Oro City, knowing that said corporation
regularly transacts with the accused’s LTO Office for the registration of its motor
vehicles, in the reporting of its engine and chassis numbers as well as the submission of
its vehicle dealer’s report and other similar transactions which require the prior approval
and/or intervention of the said accused Regional Director and employees and/or their
said LTO office in Cagayan de Oro City, to the damage and prejudice of and undue
injury to said Oro Asian Automotive Corporation, including complainant Maria Lourdes
Miranda

The Sandiganbayan issued orders for the arrest of the three accused. Petitioner
and accused Tagupa, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded "not guilty" to the charges.
Accused Nabo remains at large. Judgment was rendered finding accused TIMOTEO A
GARCIA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt. With respect to accused NERY TAGUPA,
by reason of the total lack of any evidence against him, he is hereby ACQUITED. As for
accused Gilbert G. Nabo, considering that he remained at large and jurisdiction over his
person had yet to be acquired, let the case as against him be achieved.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner be found guilty of Indirect Bribery?

RULING:
Indirect bribery is committed by a public officer who shall accept gifts offered to
him by reason of his office. The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in
Article 21127 of the Revised Penal Code is that the public officer concerned must have
accepted the gift or material consideration. In the case at bar, was the prosecution able
to show that petitioner indeed accepted a gift from the Company? The alleged
borrowing of a vehicle by petitioner from the Company can be considered as the gift in
contemplation of the law. To prove that petitioner borrowed a vehicle from the Company
for 56 times, the prosecution adduced in evidence 56 delivery receipts28 allegedly
signed by petitioner’s representative whom the latter would send to pick up the vehicle.
 The prosecution was not able to show with moral certainty that petitioner truly
borrowed and received the vehicles subject matter of the 56 informations. The
prosecution claims that petitioner received the vehicles via his representatives to whom
the vehicles were released. The prosecution relies heavily on the delivery receipts. We,
however, find that the delivery receipts do not sufficiently prove that petitioner received
the vehicles considering that his signatures do not appear therein. In addition, the
prosecution failed to establish that it was petitioner’s representatives who picked up the
vehicles. The acquittal of one of the accused (Nery Tagupa) who allegedly received the
vehicles from the Company further strengthens this argument. If the identity of the
person who allegedly picked up the vehicle on behalf of the petitioner is uncertain, there
can also be no certainty that it was petitioner who received the vehicles in the end
Article 211-A. Qualified bribery. - If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains
from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua
and/or death in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the
offense which was not prosecuted.
If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty of death. (As
added by Sec. 4, RA No. 7659).
Article 212. Corruption of public officials. - The same penalties imposed upon the officer corrupted,
except those of disqualification and suspension, shall be imposed upon any person who shall have made
the offers or promises or given the gifts or presents as described in the preceding articles.

Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (pdic) vs. Hon. Orlando C. Casimiro,

Fidel C. Cu, Carmelita B. Zate, and Mary Lou S. Apelo
G.R. No. 206866
2015-09-02

FACTS:
Respondent Cu instructed a BSP Cashied to take money from the vault in the
amount of P30,000.00 and deposit the same to Apelo's bank account in Philippine
National Bank. The reason for the deposit according to Cu was "Professional Fee natin
sa kanya yan". Additional deposits were made to Apelo's bank account on two (2)
separate dates on the orders of Cu and Zate. After the deposits were made, the BSP
Cashier was initially instructed to cover the unofficial and unbooked cash disbursements
in favor of Apelo by placing such amounts in BDBI's books as "Other Cash Items;". In
his defense, Cu denied having ordered or instructed Gomez to make such deposits to
Apelo's bank account. He pointed to the lack of evidence to prove that Apelo was aware
or made aware of any alleged bank deposits made to her bank account

PDIC decided to file the instant criminal complaint against private respondents.
However, the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint for lack of probable cause.
PDIC moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied in an Order. Aggrieved,
PDIC filed the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Omibudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding no
probable cause to indict private respondents of the crimes charged.

RULING:
The petition is meritorious.

Cu and Zate were accused of committing the crime of Corruption of Public

Officials, the elements of which are as follows: (a) that the offender makes offers or
promises, or gives gifts or presents to a public officer; and (b) that the offers or promises
are made or the gifts or presents are given to a public officer under circumstances that
will make the public officer liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.

In view of such grave accusations against them, Cu and Zate resorted to mere
denials, while Apelo ignored the complaint by not filing a counter-affidavit despite due
notice, thus, miserably failing to debunk the charges hurled against them. Indubitably,
the foregoing establishes probable cause to believe that private respondents may have
indeed committed such acts constituting the crimes charged against them. As such,
they must defend themselves in a full-blown trial on the merits.
 Chapter Three
FRAUDS AND ILLEGAL EXACTIONS AND TRANSACTIONS

Article 213. Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses. - The penalty of prision correccional
in its medium period to prision mayor in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 10,000 pesos,
or both, shall be imposed upon any public officer who:
1. In his official capacity, in dealing with any person with regard to furnishing supplies, the making
of contracts, or the adjustment or settlement of accounts relating to public property or funds, shall
enter into an agreement with any interested party or speculator or make use of any other scheme,
to defraud the Government;
2. Being entrusted with the collection of taxes, licenses, fees and other imposts, shall be guilty or
any of the following acts or omissions:
(a) Demanding, directly, or indirectly, the payment of sums different from or larger than
those authorized by law.
(b) Failing voluntarily to issue a receipt, as provided by law, for any sum of money
collected by him officially.
(c) Collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by way of payment or otherwise things or
objects of a nature different from that provided by law.
When the culprit is an officer or employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Customs,
the provisions of the Administrative Code shall be applied.

Aquilino Q. Pimentel, jr. vs. Ma. Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez

G.R. No. 159139
2017-06-06
Article 214. Other frauds. - In addition to the penalties prescribed in the provisions of Chapter Six, Title
Ten, Book Two, of this Code, the penalty of temporary special disqualification in its maximum period to
perpetual special disqualification shall be imposed upon any public officer who, taking advantage of his
official position, shall commit any of the frauds or deceits enumerated in said provisions.
Article 215. Prohibited transactions. - The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period or a fine
ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any appointive public officer who, during
his incumbency, shall directly or indirectly become interested in any transaction of exchange or
speculation within the territory subject to his jurisdiction.

Office Of The Ombudsman vs. Filomena L. Villanueva

G.R. No. 169198
2011-07-06

FACTS:
Petitioner filed an affidavit/complaint before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon charging respondent with violation of Article 215 of the Revised Penal Code.
Graft Investigation Officer II Ismael B. Boco rendered a Decision on the administrative
aspect of petitioner’s complaint. Finding the respondent abused her position when she
solicited a loan from CABMPCI despite the fact that she is disqualified by its by-laws
and when she used her influence to transfer her loan obligation to her husband with no
money being actually paid, the decision was duly approved by Victor C. Fernandez,
Deputy Ombudsman.

Respondent sought reconsideration of the decision. The Deputy Ombudsman

denied the motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for review
before the CA assailing the order of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman. The CA
granted respondent’s petition for review and set aside the September 15, 2004 Order of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. Hence the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is more than enough substantial evidence to prove the
administrative guilt of respondent for misconduct

RULING:
The petition is meritorious.

The ratiocination of the CA that respondent should not have been held liable for
grave misconduct because of the supposed failure of Martinez to show undue influence
is mistaken. The relevant provision under which respondent was charged is Section
7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 which reads:

SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions.- In addition to acts and omissions of

public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. - Public officials and employees shall not
solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan
or anything of monetary value from any person in the course of their official
duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction
which may be affected by the functions of their office
Article 216. Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer. - The penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or
both, shall be imposed upon a public officer who directly or indirectly, shall become interested in any
contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene.
This provisions is applicable to experts, arbitrators and private accountants who, in like manner, shall take
part in any contract or transaction connected with the estate or property in appraisal, distribution or
adjudication of which they shall have acted, and to the guardians and executors with respect to the
property belonging to their wards or estate.
 Chapter Four
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. - Any public officer
who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the
same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit
any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of
the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved
in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is
more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum
period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand
pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved
is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount
exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the
property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds or property to personal use. (As amended by RA 1060).

Cecilia U. Legrama, Petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 178626
2012-06-13

FACTS:
Office of the Provincial Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA), Zambales
directed an Audit Team to conduct an examination of the cash and account of petitioner
Cecilia Legrama, the Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales.
The COA prepared a Special Cash Examination Report on the Cash and Accounts of
petitioner which contained the findings that petitioners cash accountability has a
shortage in the amount of P1,152,900.75. From the total amount of the shortage,
petitioner was able to restitute the initial amount of P60,000.00.

Consequently, petitioner and Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida), the Municipal

Mayor were charged in an Informationwith the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.
Both petitioner and Lonzanida voluntarily surrendered and posted their respective cash
bonds.

Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision acquitting Lonzanida (lack of proof that is

conspired with petitioner). However, the tribunal concluded that petitioner malversed the
total amount of P1,131,595.05 and found her guilty of the crime of Malversation of
Public Funds.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of Malversation
Ruling:
Malversation may be committed by appropriating public funds or property; by
taking or misappropriating the same; by consenting, or through abandonment or
negligence, by permitting any other person to take such public funds or property; or by
being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.
The essential elements common to all acts of malversation under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code are:

1. That the offender be a public officer;

2. That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the
duties of his office;
3. That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was
accountable; and
4. That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented, or through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.

In the case at bar, after the government auditors discovered the shortage and
informed petitioner of the same, petitioner failed to properly explain or justify the
shortage that was subject to her accountability. Petitioner denied that she put the
amount involved to personal use and presented various sales invoice, chits, vale forms,
and disbursement voucher to prove her claim. Petitioner even went further by testifying
that the total amount of P681,000.00 appearing in a disbursement voucher were cash
advances given to the mayor during the height of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption.
Article 218. Failure of accountable officer to render accounts. - Any public officer, whether in the service
or separated therefrom by resignation or any other cause, who is required by law or regulation to render
account to the Insular Auditor, or to a provincial auditor and who fails to do so for a period of two months
after such accounts should be rendered, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum period,
or by a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both.

Aloysius Dait Lumauig vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 166680
2014-07-07

FACTS:
Sometime in January 1998, Commission on Audit (COA) Auditor Florence L.
Paguirigan examined the year-end reports involving the municipal officials of Alfonso
Lista, Ifugao. She came across a disbursement voucher for P101,736.00 prepared for
petitioner as cash advance for the payment of freight and other cargo charges for 12
units of motorcycles supposed to be donated to the municipality. The amount was
covered by Land Bank Check No. 118942007 dated August 29, 1994 wherein the payee
is petitioner. Her further investigation of the accounting records revealed that no
payment intended for the charge was made to Royal Cargo Agencies for the month of
August 1994.

Petitioner admitted having obtained the cash advance of P101,736.00 during his
incumbency as municipal mayor of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao. This amount was intended for
the payment of freight and insurance coverage of 12 units of motorcycles to be donated
to the municipality by the City of Manila. However, instead of motorcycles, he was able
to secure two buses and five patrol cars. He alleged that he was neither informed nor
did he receive any demand from COA to liquidate his cash advances. It was only in
2001 while he was claiming for separation pay when he came to know that he still has
an unliquidated cash advance. And so as not to prolong the issue, he paid the amount
of P101,736.00 to the municipal treasurer on June 4, 2001

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of Failure of Accountable Officer to Render
Accounts under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING:
The accused Aloysius Dait Lumauig is hereby convicted of the felony of Failure
of Accountable Officer to Render Accounts.

The central aspect of petitioner’s next argument is that he was not reminded of
his unliquidated cash advances. The Office of the Special Prosecutor countered that
Article 218 does not require the COA or the provincial auditor to first make a demand
before the public officer should render an account. It is sufficient that there is a law or
regulation requiring him to render an account.

Article 218 consists of the following elements:

 1. that the offender is a public officer, whether in the service or separated
therefrom;
2. that he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property;
3. that he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the Commission
on Audit, or to a provincial auditor; and
4. that he fails to do so for a period of two months after such accounts should be
rendered.

Nowhere in the provision does it require that there first be a demand before an
accountable officer is held liable for a violation of the crime. The law is very clear.
Where none is provided, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions, neither
may it engraft into the law qualifications not contemplated
Article 219. Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts before leaving the country. - Any
public officer who unlawfully leaves or attempts to leave the Philippine Islands without securing a
certificate from the Insular Auditor showing that his accounts have been finally settled, shall be punished
by arresto mayor, or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos or both.
Article 220. Illegal use of public funds or property. - Any public officer who shall apply any public fund or
property under his administration to any public use other than for which such fund or property were
appropriated by law or ordinance shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period or a
fine ranging from one-half to the total of the sum misapplied, if by reason of such misapplication, any
damages or embarrassment shall have resulted to the public service. In either case, the offender shall
also suffer the penalty of temporary special disqualification.
If no damage or embarrassment to the public service has resulted, the penalty shall be a fine from 5 to 50
per cent of the sum misapplied.

Arnold James M. Ysidoro vs People of the Philipines

G.R. No. 192330
2012-11-14

FACTS:
Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte,
operated a Core Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) that provided construction
materials to indigent calamity victims with which to rebuild their homes. When
construction for calamity was 70% done, the beneficiaries stopped reporting for work for
the reason that they had to find food for their families. Lolita Garcia (Garcia), the CSAP
Officer-in-Charge, sought the help of Cristina Polinio (Polinio). Polinio told Garcia that
the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom. And since she
had already distributed food to the mother volunteers, what remained could be given to
the CSAP beneficiaries.

Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro to seek his
approval. After explaining the situation to him, Ysidoro approved the release and signed
the withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to
CSAP. Mayor Ysidoro instructed Garcia and Polinio to consult the accounting
department regarding the matter. The accounting department resolved the matter and
judged that it was an emergency situation justifying the release of the goods.
Subsequently, CSAP delivered those goods to its beneficiaries. However, according to
the former MSWDO head such SFP goods were intended for its target beneficiaries,
Leyte's malnourished children.

ISSUE:
Whether or not he approved the diversion of the subject goods to a public
purpose different from their originally intended purpose

RULING:
Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved the distribution of the
goods to those providing free labor for the rebuilding of their own homes. This is
technical malversation.

The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the

Revised Penal Code4 has three elements: a) that the offender is an accountable public
officer; b) that he applies public funds or property under his administration to some
public use; and c) that the public use for which such funds or property were applied is
different from the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or
ordinance. Ysidoro claims that he could not be held liable for the offense under its third
element because the four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines he gave the CSAP
beneficiaries were not appropriated by law or ordinance for a specific purpose.

But the evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 the Sangguniang Bayan of
Leyte enacted Resolution 00-133 appropriating the annual general fund for 2001.6 This
appropriation was based on the executive budget 7 which allocated P100,000.00 for the
SFP and P113,957.64 for the Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social
Services8 which covers the CSAP housing projects.9 The creation of the two items
shows the Sanggunian's intention to appropriate separate funds for SFP and the CSAP
in the annual budget.

Since the municipality bought the subject goods using SFP funds, then those
goods should be used for SFP's needs, observing the rules prescribed for identifying the
qualified beneficiaries of its feeding programs. The target clientele of the SFP
according to its manual are: 1) the moderately and severely underweight pre-school
children aged 36 months to 72 months; and 2) the families of six members whose total
monthly income is P3,675.00 and below. This rule provides assurance that the SFP
would cater only to the malnourished among its people who are in urgent need of the
government's limited resources.
Article 221. Failure to make delivery of public funds or property. - Any public officer under obligation to
make payment from Government funds in his possession, who shall fail to make such payment, shall be
punished by arresto mayor and a fine from 5 to 25 per cent of the sum which he failed to pay.
This provision shall apply to any public officer who, being ordered by competent authority to deliver any
property in his custody or under his administration, shall refuse to make such delivery.
The fine shall be graduated in such case by the value of the thing, provided that it shall not less than 50
pesos.
Article 222. Officers included in the preceding provisions. - The provisions of this chapter shall apply to
private individuals who in any capacity whatever, have charge of any insular, provincial or municipal
funds, revenues, or property and to any administrator or depository of funds or property attached, seized
or deposited by public authority, even if such property belongs to a private individual.
 Chapter Five
INFIDELITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Section One. - Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Article 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion. - Any public officer who shall consent to the escape
of a prisoner in his custody or charge, shall be punished:
1. By prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and temporary special
disqualification in its maximum period to perpetual special disqualification, if the fugitive shall
have been sentenced by final judgment to any penalty.
2. By prision correccional in its minimum period and temporary special disqualification, in case
the fugitive shall not have been finally convicted but only held as a detention prisoner for any
crime or violation of law or municipal ordinance.

Civil Service Commission vs. Arlic Almojuela

G.R. No. 194368
2013-04-02

FACTS:
At six ’o clock in the morning of December 13, 2003, Ding Cang Hui a.k.a. Tony
Lao / Tony Ling (Lao), a Chinese inmate charged with violation of Republic Act No.
6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act) was discovered to have escaped from his cell at the
Makati City Jail. The following officers of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology
(BJMP) – National Capital Region Office (NCRO) were on third shift custodial duty when
Lao escaped: J/C INSP Pepe Quinones (J/C INSP Quinones); SJO2 Arvie Aquino JMP
(SJO2 Aquino), officer of the day; SJO2 Arlic Almojuela JMP (SJO2 Almojuela), desk
officer / supervisor; SJO1 Jose Rodney Lagahit JMP (SJO1 Lagahit), desk reliever; JO1
Eric Manuel Palileo (JO1 Palileo), duty nurse; JO1 Rommel Robles JMP (JO1 Robles),
gater; JO1 Manuel Loyola, Jr. (JO1 Loyola), gater; JO1 Reynaldo Pascual JMP (JO1
Pascual), cell guard and JO1 Jaime Ibarra (JO1 Ibarra), roving guard.

A BJMP Investigation Report conducted on the incident concluded that SJO2

Almojuela and the rest of the jail officers on third shift custodial duty all colluded to
facilitate Lao’s getaway. Based on the report’s recommendation, the Intelligence and
Investigation Division of the BJMP filed an administrative complaint against the
abovementioned BJMP/NCRO members.29 In Administrative Case No. 04-11, CESO IV
Director Arturo Walit, the BJMP hearing officer.

ISSUES:
1. Whether SJO2 Almojuela connived with JO1 Loyola and JO1 Pascual to facilitate
Lao’s escape from the Makati City Jail; and

2. Whether SJO2 Almojuela’s actions constitute gross misconduct.

RULING:
The circumstantial evidence the CSC presented leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that, at the very least, SJO2 Almojuela consented to Lao’s getaway. The
keys found in SJO2 Almojuela’s room fit the padlock in the maingate, Lao’s most
possible point of egress. The fact that these keys should be in the safekeeping of JO1
Pascual and JO1 Robles does not clear SJO2 Almojuela from liability; on the contrary, it
should convince us of his involvement in Lao’s escape. It leads us to ask why the keys
were found in SJO2 Almojuela’s room, when the last person seen to possess the keys,
and the personnel who were supposed to safekeep them, was not SJO2 Almojuela.
SJO2 Almojuela’s bare allegations that he was set up cannot stand up against the
presumption of regularity in the performance of the investigating officers’ duty. This
presumption, when considered with the following pieces of evidence, leads us to no
other conclusion than SJO2 Almojuela’s implied consent to Lao’s escape.

In consenting to Lao’s escape, SJO2 Almojuela is guilty of gross misconduct in

the performance of his duties as Senior Jail Officer II, we find SJO2 Almojuela guilty of
gross misconduct in the performance of his duties as Senior Jail Officer II. Misconduct
has been defined as “a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.”79
Misconduct becomes grave if it “involves any of the additional elements of corruption,
willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be
established by substantial evidence.”80 In SJO2 Almojuela’s case, we hold it
established by substantial evidence that he consented to Lao’s escape from the Makati
City Jail. Thus, there was willful violation of his duty as Senior Jail Officer II to oversee
the jail compound’s security, rendering him liable for gross misconduct.
Article 224. Evasion through negligence. - If the evasion of the prisoner shall have taken place through
the negligence of the officer charged with the conveyance or custody of the escaping prisoner, said officer
shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period and temporary special disqualification.
Article 225. Escape of prisoner under the custody of a person not a public officer. - Any private person to
whom the conveyance or custody or a prisoner or person under arrest shall have been confided, who
shall commit any of the offenses mentioned in the two preceding articles, shall suffer the penalty next
lower in degree than that prescribed for the public officer.
 Section Two. - Infidelity in the custody of document
Article 226. Removal, concealment or destruction of documents. - Any public officer who shall remove,
destroy or conceal documents or papers officially entrusted to him, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, whenever serious damage
shall have been caused thereby to a third party or to the public interest.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium period and a fine not exceeding
1,000 pesos, whenever the damage to a third party or to the public interest shall not have been
serious.
In either case, the additional penalty of temporary special disqualification in its maximum period to
perpetual disqualification shall be imposed.

Raymundo E. Zapanta vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. Nos. 192698-99
2015-04-22

FACTS:
Zapanta and Atty. Gadia were charged with the crime of Infidelity in the Custody
of Documents under Article 226 of the RPC. Around August 2000, in Davao City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused both public officers causes the removal and disappearance of TCT No.
256662, which public document is under their custody and officially entrusted to them,
thereby causing damage to the mortgagee of TCT No. 256662, in the amount of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) which amount is duly annotated in TCT
No. 256662

The Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed decision finding Atty. Gadia and
Zapanta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Infidelity in the Custody of Documents,
particularly violation of Article 226 of the Revised Penal Code, or removal or
concealment of documents and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment. Zapanta moved for the reconsideration of the
foregoing judgment but his motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in not ruling that the petitioner could not have
"removed" the subject record

RULING:
The petition is impressed with merit.

An accused may be held criminally liable of Infidelity in the Custody of

Documents under Article 226 of the RPC, provided that the following elements are
present:

1. The offender must be a public officer;

2. There must be a document abstracted, destroyed or concealed;
 3. The document destroyed or abstracted must be entrusted to such public
officer by reason of his office; and
4. Damage or prejudice to the public interest or to that of a third person must be
caused by the removal, destruction or concealment of such document

The Sandiganbayan believed that Zapanta took part in the conspiracy to commit
the offenses charged because of the following circumstances: 1] Zapanta was then the
vault keeper and as such had access to the certificates of title kept therein; 2] It was the
official duty of Zapanta to pull out a title from the vault upon request of authorized and
proper officers of the RD; 3] Dr. Ang was informed by Zapanta that the original copy of
TCT No. T-256662 could not be found in the particular volume where it was supposed
to have been filed inside the vault and that he promised to look for the missing title; and
4] Zapanta confirmed during the preliminary hearing at the PAOCTF-Davao Satellite
Office that the subject title was indeed missing.

Clearly, the Sandiganbayan had no basis to convict Zapanta because the

prosecution failed to produce the evidence necessary to overturn the presumption of
innocence. Proof, not mere conjectures or assumptions, should be proffered to indicate
that he had taken part in the alleged conspiracy to commit the crimes charged.
Otherwise, a careless use of the conspiracy theory could send to jail even innocent
persons who may have only been made unwitting tools by the criminal minds really
responsible for those irregularities.
Article 227. Officer breaking seal. - Any public officer charged with the custody of papers or property
sealed by proper authority, who shall break the seals or permit them to be broken, shall suffer the
penalties of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, temporary special disqualification
and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos.
Article 228. Opening of closed documents. - Any public officer not included in the provisions of the next
preceding article who, without proper authority, shall open or shall permit to be opened any closed
papers, documents or objects entrusted to his custody, shall suffer the penalties or arresto mayor,
temporary special disqualification and a fine of not exceeding 2,000 pesos.
 Section Three. - Revelation of secrets
Article 229. Revelation of secrets by an officer. - Any public officer who shall reveal any secret known to
him by reason of his official capacity, or shall wrongfully deliver papers or copies of papers of which he
may have charge and which should not be published, shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods, perpetual special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 2,000
pesos if the revelation of such secrets or the delivery of such papers shall have caused serious damage
to the public interest; otherwise, the penalties of prision correccional in its minimum period, temporary
special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 50 pesos shall be imposed.
Article 230. Public officer revealing secrets of private individual. - Any public officer to whom the secrets
of any private individual shall become known by reason of his office who shall reveal such secrets, shall
suffer the penalties of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
 Chapter Six
OTHER OFFENSES OR IRREGULARITIES BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
Article 231. Open disobedience. - Any judicial or executive officer who shall openly refuse to execute the
judgment, decision or order of any superior authority made within the scope of the jurisdiction of the latter
and issued with all the legal formalities, shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor in its medium period to
prision correccional in its minimum period, temporary special disqualification in its maximum period and a
fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
Article 232. Disobedience to order of superior officers, when said order was suspended by inferior
officer. - Any public officer who, having for any reason suspended the execution of the orders of his
superiors, shall disobey such superiors after the latter have disapproved the suspension, shall suffer the
penalties of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and perpetual special
disqualification.
Article 233. Refusal of assistance. - The penalties of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, perpetual special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 1,000
pesos, shall be imposed upon a public officer who, upon demand from competent authority, shall fail to
lend his cooperation towards the administration of justice or other public service, if such failure shall result
in serious damage to the public interest, or to a third party; otherwise, arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.
Article 234. Refusal to discharge elective office. - The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding
1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who, having been elected by popular election to
a public office, shall refuse without legal motive to be sworn in or to discharge the duties of said office.
Article 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. - The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, in addition to his liability for the physical injuries or damage caused,
shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall overdo himself in the correction or
handling of a prisoner or detention prisoner under his charge, by the imposition of punishment not
authorized by the regulations, or by inflicting such punishment in a cruel and humiliating manner.
If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a confession, or to obtain some information from the
prisoner, the offender shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum period, temporary special
disqualification and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, in addition to his liability for the physical injuries or
damage caused.

The People of the Philippines vs. Francisco Galit

G.R. No. L-51770
1985-03-20

FACTS:
The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He
had been detained and interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He
consistently maintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime.
Obviously, something drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely necessary.
So the investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the
prisoner insisted on his innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be
obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag
and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner could not take
any more. His body could no longer endure the pain inflicted on him and the indignities
he had to suffer. His will had been broken. He admitted what the investigating officers
wanted him to admit and he signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his will,
he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused should be acquitted of the crime charged

RULING:
After a review of the records, We find that the evidence presented by the
prosecution does not support a conviction. In fact, the findings of the trial court relative
to the acts attributed to the accused are not supported by competent evidence. Trial
courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances surrounding the taking of
any confession, especially where the prisoner claims having been maltreated into giving
one. Where there is any doubt as to its voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, set aside, and
another one entered acquitting the accused Francisco Galit of the crime charged. Let
him be released from custody immediately unless held on other charges.
 Section Two. - Anticipation, prolongation and abandonment of the duties and powers of public office.
Article 236. Anticipation of duties of a public office. - Any person who shall assume the performance of
the duties and powers of any public officer or employment without first being sworn in or having given the
bond required by law, shall be suspended from such office or employment until he shall have complied
with the respective formalities and shall be fined from 200 to 500 pesos.
Article 237. Prolonging performance of duties and powers. - Any public officer shall continue to exercise
the duties and powers of his office, employment or commission, beyond the period provided by law,
regulation or special provisions applicable to the case, shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in
its minimum period, special temporary disqualification in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding 500
pesos.
Article 238. Abandonment of office or position. - Any public officer who, before the acceptance of his
resignation, shall abandon his office to the detriment of the public service shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor.
If such office shall have been abandoned in order to evade the discharge of the duties of preventing,
prosecuting or punishing any of the crime falling within Title One, and Chapter One of Title Three of Book
Two of this Code, the offender shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, and by arresto mayor if the purpose of such abandonment is to evade the duty of preventing,
prosecuting or punishing any other crime.

Melquiades A. Robles vs. Aurora A. Salvana

G.R. No. 192074
2014-06-10

FACTS:
Melquiades Robles, then Administrator of the Light Rail Transit Authority, issued
Office Order which revoked Atty. Aurora A. Salvaña’s designation as Officer-in-Charge
(OIC) of the LRTA Administrative Department. It "directed her instead to handle special
projects and perform such other duties and functions as may be assigned to her" by the
Administrator. Instead of complying, Salvaña questioned the order with the Office of the
President. Subsequently, she applied for sick leave of absence on May 12, 2006 and
from May 15 to May 31, 2006. In support of her application, she submitted a medical
certificate issued by Dr. Grace Marie Blanco of the Veterans Memorial Medical Center.

LRTA discovered that Dr. Blanco did not issue this medical certificate. Dr. Blanco
also denied having seen or treated Salvaña on May 15, 2006, the date stated on her
medical certificate. Afterwards, “Salvaña tendered her irrevocable resignation.” None of
the pleadings alleged that this irrevocable resignation was accepted, although the
resolution of the Fact-finding Committee alluded to Administrator Robles’ acceptance of
the resignation letter. The Fact-finding Committee issued a resolution “finding Salvaña
guilty of all the charges against her. Salvaña appealed with the Civil Service
Commission and was granted a favorable decision. Aggrieved, LRTA moved for
reconsideration of the resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Salvana abandoned her office when she resigned

RULING:
Respondent’s continued absence from her post would have been deemed
abandonment from her office. Resignation from public office, to be effective, requires
the acceptance of the proper government authority.

Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or

implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the
acceptance by competent and lawful authority. To constitute a complete and operative
resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the
term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority.
 In our jurisdiction, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer to
be operative and effective. Without acceptance, resignation is nothing and the officer
remains in office. Resignation to be effective must be accepted by competent authority,
either in terms or by something tantamount to an acceptance, such as the appointment
of the successor. A public officer cannot abandon his office before his resignation is
accepted, otherwise the officer is subject to the penal provisions of Article 238 of the
Revised Penal Code. The final or conclusive act of a resignation’s acceptance is the
notice of acceptance. The incumbent official would not be in a position to determine the
acceptance of his resignation unless he had been duly notified therefor
 Section Three. - Usurpation of powers and unlawful appointments
Article 239. Usurpation of legislative powers. - The penalties of prision correccional in its minimum
period, temporary special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, shall be imposed upon
any public officer who shall encroach upon the powers of the legislative branch of the Government, either
by making general rules or regulations beyond the scope of his authority, or by attempting to repeal a law
or suspending the execution thereof.
Article 240. Usurpation of executive functions. - Any judge who shall assume any power pertaining to the
executive authorities, or shall obstruct the latter in the lawful exercise of their powers, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayorin its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period.
Article 241. Usurpation of judicial functions. - The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional in its minimum period and shall be imposed upon any officer of the executive branch of the
Government who shall assume judicial powers or shall obstruct the execution of any order or decision
rendered by any judge within its jurisdiction.

Jose Reyes y Vacio vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. Nos. 177105-06
August 12, 2010

FACTS:
That on or about 16 March 1993, or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, in
Malolos, Bulacan, Philippines, above-named accused Jose V. Reyes, a public officer
being then employed as Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Malolos, Bulacan, while in the performance of his official
function as such and taking advantage thereof, with full knowledge of a Decision in AC-
GR CV-02883 of the Court of Appeals, which declared Belen de Guia as the true owner
of the lands litigated in said case, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
disregard, obstruct and ignore the said final and executory decision of the Court of
Appeals, by rendering a decision in DARAB Case No. 034-Bul-88 thereby favoring and
emboldening the tenants-respondents in said DARAB case to unlawfully continue
occupying the lands of Belen de Guia, the complainant, to her damage and prejudice,
as well as to the public interest.

The Sandiganbayan rendered its assailed decision, finding the petitioner guilty of
both charges; and sentencing him to suffer: (a) in Criminal Case No. 24655 (for violation
of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019), an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment from six years
and one month, as minimum, to 10 years as maximum, with perpetual disqualification
from holding public office; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 24656 (for usurpation of judicial
functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code), imprisonment of four months of
arresto mayor.

ISSUE
Whether the petitioner was guilty of usurpation of judicial functions under Article
241 of the Revised Penal Code

RULING:
Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code states:

xxx The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correcional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any officer of the executive branch of the
government who shall assume judicial powers or shall obstruct the execution of any
order or decision rendered by any judge within his jurisdiction.

In usurpation of judicial function, the accused, who is not a judge, attempts to

perform an act the authority for which the law has vested only in a judge.44 However,
the petitioner’s task as Provincial Adjudicator when he rendered judgment in DARAB
Case No. 034 BUL’88 was to adjudicate the claims of the opposing parties. As such, he
performed a quasi-judicial function, closely akin to the function of a judge of a court of
law. He could not be held liable under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code, therefore,
considering that the acts constitutive of usurpation of judicial function were lacking
herein
Article 242. Disobeying request for disqualification. - Any public officer who, before the question of
jurisdiction is decided, shall continue any proceeding after having been lawfully required to refrain from so
doing, shall be punished by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos.
Article 243. Orders or requests by executive officers to any judicial authority. - Any executive officer who
shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business
coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos.
Article 244. Unlawful appointments. - Any public officer who shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any
public office any person lacking the legal qualifications therefor, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.

Edward Thomas F. Joson VS. The Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. Nos. 210220-21
2016-04-06

FACTS:

Petitioner Edward Thomas F. Joson filed his Affidavit-Complaint before the

Ombudsman charging the respondents - Governor Aurelio M. Umali, Provincial
Administrator Atty. Alejandro R. Abesamis , Consultant Atty. Ferdinand R. Abesamis,
Provincial Treasurer Edilberto M. Pancho, and Officer-in Charge Ma. Cristina G. Roxas
of the Office of the Provincial Accountant, all of the Province of Nueva Ecija, with the
criminal offenses of Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Unlawful Appointment, defined
and penalized under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), docketed as OMB-
L-C-08-0315-D, and offense of Grave Misconduct, docketed as OMB-L-A-08-0245-D.

Joson contended that the appointment of Ferdinand as consultant by Governor

Umali in spite of being disqualified to hold public office, and the payment of his monthly
honorarium from the coffers of the provincial government by the other respondents,
were done with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence,
giving unwarranted benefit to Ferdinand and causing great and irreparable damage and
prejudice to the taxpayers of the Province of Nueva Ecija. Joson submitted that the
private respondents should be made liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Joson added that Governor Umali should also be held liable for violation of Article 244
of the RPC for knowingly extending appointments to Ferdinand as legal consultant
regardless of the latter's lack of legal qualification to the said position. Joson asserted
that Governor Umali's act of illegally and unlawfully hiring the services of Ferdinand
could be reasonably viewed as gross misconduct in office because such act involved
the transgression of some established and definite rules. However the Ombudsman
dismissed the criminal and administrative-complaints against the respondents. Hence
this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the charges
against the respondents

RULING:
The Court agrees with the findings of the Ombudsman that there was no
sufficient evidence to indict the respondents for the crimes of violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019 and unlawful appointment.
 The Ombudsman concluded that there could be no legal basis to support a
finding that Governor Umali violated Article 244 of the RPC considering that Ferdinand
was not appointed to a government office; and that, there could be no finding that the
respondents violated R.A. No. 3019 considering that the alleged irregularity in the
engagements of Ferdinand was not shown by substantial evidence.

The Court stated that a consultancy service is not considered government

service.

Pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 93-1881 dated May 25, 1993, a contract for
consultancy services is not covered by Civil Service Law, rules and regulations because
the said position is not found in the index of position titles approved by DBM.
Accordingly, it does not need the approval of the CSC. A "consultant" is defined as one
who provides professional advice on matters within the field of his specific knowledge or
training.There is no employer-employee relationship in the engagement of a consultant
but that of client-professional relationship
 Section Four. - Abuses against chastity
Article 245. Abuses against chastity; Penalties. - The penalties of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and temporary special disqualification shall be imposed:
1. Upon any public officer who shall solicit or make immoral or indecent advances to a woman
interested in matters pending before such officer for decision, or with respect to which he is
required to submit a report to or consult with a superior officer;
2. Any warden or other public officer directly charged with the care and custody of prisoners or
persons under arrest who shall solicit or make immoral or indecent advances to a woman under
his custody.
If the person solicited be the wife, daughter, sister of relative within the same degree by affinity of any
person in the custody of such warden or officer, the penalties shall be prision correccional in its minimum
and medium periods and temporary special disqualification.
 Title Nine
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY
Chapter One
CRIMES AGAINST LIBERTY
Section One. - Illegal Detention
Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were
present in the commission of the offense.

People of the Philippines vs. Yusop Tadah

G.R. No. 186226
2012-02-01

FACTS:
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga, Branches 15 and 16, convicted
the appellant of five counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention committed
against Gina Yang y Bersañez, 3-year old Princess Jane "Cha-Cha" Yang, Joy
Sagubay, Yang Wang Tao Chiu, and Nicomedes Santa Ana to extorm from them
ransom. Furthermore, in order to accomplish his goal, the appellan made use of
motorized vehicle and motorized watercrafts.

On intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed the RTC's decision, giving full
respect to the RTC's assessment of Nicomedes and Cha-Cha’s testimony and
credibility. However, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346,5 the CA reduced the
appellant’s sentence to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal of the accused for five counts of kidnapping should be
denied

RULING:
We deny the appeal, but modify the penalty and awarded indemnity.

We find no reason to reverse the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA.

Since the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
conspired to kidnap the victims for ransom, and kidnapped and illegally detained them
until they were released by the accused after the latter received the ₱2,000,000.00
ransom, the imposable penalty is death as provided for in the second paragraph of
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
 The aggravating circumstance of using a motorized vehicle and motorized
watercrafts, while alleged and proven, cannot affect the imposable penalty because
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code states that in all cases in which the law prescribes
a single indivisible penalty (like reclusion perpetua and death), it shall be applied
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed.

The CA correctly reduced the appellant’s sentence from death penalty to

reclusion perpetua
Article 268. Slight illegal detention. - The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed upon any private
individual who shall commit the crimes described in the next preceding article without the attendance of
any of circumstances enumerated therein.
The same penalty shall be incurred by anyone who shall furnish the place for the perpetration of the
crime.
If the offender shall voluntarily release the person so kidnapped or detained within three days from the
commencement of the detention, without having attained the purpose intended, and before the institution
of criminal proceedings against him, the penalty shall be prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods and a fine not exceeding seven hundred pesos.
Article 269. Unlawful arrest. - The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, in any case other than those authorized by law, or without reasonable
ground therefor, shall arrest or detain another for the purpose of delivering him to the proper authorities.

People of the Philippines vs. Martin Alagao

G.R. No. L-20721
April 30, 1966

FACTS:
The said accused, being then members of the Manila Police Department,
conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously incriminate or impute to one Marcial Apolonio y
Santos the commission of the crime of bribery through unlawful arrest, in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused without reasonable ground therefor and for the
purpose of delivering said Marcial Apolonio y Santos to the proper authorities, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously arrest said Marcial Apolonio y Santos.

After the said Marcial Apolonio y Santos had been arrested in the manner
aforestated, the said accused did then and there place or commingle a marked P1.00
bill together with the money taken from said Marcial Apolonio y Santos, supposedly
given to the latter by one Emerita Calupas de Aresa, so that he (Marcial Apolonio y
Santos), then an employee of the Local Civil Registrar's Office of Manila, would appear
to have agreed to perform an act not constituting a crime, in connection with the
performance of his (Marcial Apolonio y Santos') duties, which was to expedite the
issuance of a birth certificate, thereby directly incriminating or imputing to said Marcial
Apolonio y Santos the commission of the crime bribery.

ISSUE:
Whether the information filed in the court below alleges the complex crime of
incriminatory machinations through unlawful arrest.

RULING:
It is the view of the court a quo that the information alleges the commission of
two distinct crimes, one, for unlawful arrest, and, the other, for incriminatory
machinations.

We, therefore, held that the information in question in the present case contains
allegations properly charging the commission of the complex crime of incriminatory
machinations thru unlawful arrest.

The crime of unlawful arrest is punishable with arresto mayor or imprisonment of

from one month and one day to six months, and a fine not exceeding P500.00; 5 and
the crime of incriminatory machinations is punishable with arresto mayor, or
imprisonment of from one month and one day to six months. 6 Under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, in complex crimes, the penalty for the most serious offense shall
be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. And so, in the present case,
in the event of conviction, the penalty for the crime of unlawful arrest should be imposed
in its maximum period
 Section Two. - Kidnapping of minors
Article 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who, being entrusted with the custody of a minor person, shall deliberately fail
to restore the latter to his parents or guardians.

People of the Philippines vs. Teresa Bernardo y Tambien

G.R. No. 144316
March 11, 2002

FACTS:
While Rosita was undergoing medical check up inside the hospital, her two
daughters waited at the lobby. Roselle was seating on a bench with her 15-day old
sister on her lap when the appellant sat beside her. Appellant befriended Roselle and
asked her if the baby was a boy or a girl, and Roselle replied that the baby was a girl.
After a while, the appellant gave P3.00 to Roselle and asked her to buy ice water. The
appellant took the 15-day old baby from Roselle and assured her that she would take
care of her sister, while she was buying ice water. Roselle was not able to find ice water
for sale and on her way back to the hospital, she saw the accused running away with
her baby sister. She chased the appellant and when she caught up with her, the
appellant told her that she was running after her mother. Roselle did not believe the
appellant and she held and pulled the appellant’s skirt to prevent her from getting away
with her baby sister, but the appellant persisted in running with Roselle holding on to the
appellant’s skirt. Roselle shouted for help, thereby attracting the attention of Emerento
Torres, a Kagawad.

Torres saw the appellant carrying a child and struggling with Roselle. Torres
accosted appellant, who told him that she was looking for the mother of the baby she
was carrying so that she could return the baby to her, but Roselle begged him to help
her. Torres took the baby from the appellant and entrusted the baby to his wife. Then he
led appellant and Roselle to the hospital to look for the mother of the baby. Torres found
Rosita at the hospital and she confirmed to him that she was the mother of the baby.
Torres requested the hospital’s security guard to blotter the incident, after which, he
turned over the appellant to the police authorities at the WPDC-PNP Headquarters on
U.N. Avenue, Manila. the trial court rendered the assailed decision finding the accused,
Teresa Bernardo y Tambien, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping and failure
to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting the appelant of the crime

Ruling:
The crime committed by appellant in the case at bar falls under Article 270 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides:
 Article 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. – The penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who, being entrusted with the custody of a
minor person, shall deliberately fail to restore the latter to his parents or guardians.

It has two essential elements, namely: (1) the offender is entrusted with the
custody of a minor person; and (2) the offender deliberately fails to restore the said
minor to his parents or guardians (People vs. Bondoc, 232 SCRA 478 [1997]). In People
vs. Ty (263 SCRA 745 [1996]), we stated that the essential element of the crime of
kidnapping and failure to return a minor is that the offender is entrusted with the custody
of the minor, but what is actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but
rather the deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his
parents or guardians. Indeed, the word deliberate as used in Article 270 of the Revised
Penal Code must imply something more than mere negligence – it must be
premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.
Article 271. Inducing a minor to abandon his home. - The penalty of prision correccional and a fine not
exceeding seven hundred pesos shall be imposed upon anyone who shall induce a minor to abandon the
home of his parent or guardians or the persons entrusted with his custody.
If the person committing any of the crimes covered by the two preceding articles shall be the father or the
mother of the minor, the penalty shall be arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding three hundred pesos, or
both.
 Section Three. - Slavery and Servitude
Article 272. Slavery. - The penalty of prision mayor and a fine of not exceeding 10,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon anyone who shall purchase, sell, kidnap or detain a human being for the purpose of
enslaving him.
If the crime be committed for the purpose of assigning the offended party to some immoral traffic, the
penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.
Article 273. Exploitation of child labor. - The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon anyone who, under the pretext of
reimbursing himself of a debt incurred by an ascendant, guardian or person entrusted with the custody of
a minor, shall, against the latter's will, retain him in his service.
Article 274. Services rendered under compulsion in payment of debt. - The penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, in
order to require or enforce the payment of a debt, shall compel the debtor to work for him, against his will,
as household servant or farm laborer.
 Chapter Two
CRIMES AGAINST SECURITY
Section One. - Abandonment of helpless persons and exploitation of minors.
Article 275. Abandonment of person in danger and abandonment of one's own victim. - The penalty
of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon:
1. Any one who shall fail to render assistance to any person whom he shall find in an uninhabited
place wounded or in danger of dying, when he can render such assistance without detriment to
himself, unless such omission shall constitute a more serious offense.
2. Anyone who shall fail to help or render assistance to another whom he has accidentally
wounded or injured.
3. Anyone who, having found an abandoned child under seven years of age, shall fail to deliver
said child to the authorities or to his family, or shall fail to take him to a safe place.

Antonio A. Lamera vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals and The People of the
Philippines
G.R. No. 93475
June 5, 1991

FACTS:
At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985, along Urbano Street,
Pasig, Metro Manila, an owner-type jeep, then driven by petitioner, allegedly "hit and
bumped" a tricycle then driven by Ernesto Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle and
injuries to Ernesto Reyes and Paulino Gonzal. As a consequence thereof, two
informations were filed against petitioner: (a) an Information for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code and (b) an Information for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 275 of
the Revised Penal Code on Abandonment of one's victim.

On June 1987 the MTC of Pasig rendered its decision in finding the petitioner
guilty of the crime of Abandonment of one's victim as defined and penalized under
paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner appealed from said
Decision to the RTC of Pasig. In the meantime, on 27 April 1989, petitioner was
arraigned for violation of Article 365. He entered a plea of not guilty. He filed a petition
for review in the CA but which was denied. He raised before the SC that that he cannot
be penalized twice for an “accident” and another for “recklessness.” He maintained that
since he is facing a criminal charge for reckless imprudence, which offense carries
heavier penalties under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, he could no longer be
charged under Article 275, par. 2, for abandonment for failing to render to the persons
whom he has accidentally injured.

ISSUE:
Whether or not prosecution for negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code is a bar to prosecution for abandonment under Article 275 of the same Code
because it constitutes double jeopardy

RULING:
 No, the SC affirmed that the Articles penalize different and distinct offenses. The
rule on double jeopardy, which petitioner has, in effect, invoked, does not, therefore,
apply pursuant to existing jurisprudence. Hence, the petition should be dismissed for
lack of merit.

Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.

He is charged for two separate offenses under the Revised Penal Code. In
People vs. Doriquez, the SC held that it is a cardinal rule that the protection against
double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. Where
two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to
one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise
from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential
element of the other.

The two informations filed against petitioner are clearly for separate offenses.
The first, for reckless imprudence (Article 365), falls under the sole chapter (Criminal
Negligence) of Title Fourteen (Quasi Offenses) of Book Two of the Revised Penal
Code. The second, for Abandonment of one's victim (par. 2, Art. 275), falls under
Chapter Two (Crimes Against Security) of Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal Liberty
and Security) of Book Two of the same Code.

Quasi offenses under Article 365 are committed by means of culpa. Crimes
against Security are committed by means of dolo.
Article 276. Abandoning a minor. - The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos
shall be imposed upon any one who shall abandon a child under seven years of age, the custody of
which is incumbent upon him.
When the death of the minor shall result from such abandonment, the culprit shall be punished by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods; but if the life of the minor shall have been in danger
only, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
The provisions contained in the two preceding paragraphs shall not prevent the imposition of the penalty
provided for the act committed, when the same shall constitute a more serious offense.
Article 277. Abandonment of minor by person entrusted with his custody; indifference of parents. - The
penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon anyone who, having
charge of the rearing or education of a minor, shall deliver said minor to a public institution or other
persons, without the consent of the one who entrusted such child to his care or in the absence of the
latter, without the consent of the proper authorities.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon the parents who shall neglect their children by not giving them
the education which their station in life require and financial conditions permit.

Roberto P. de Guzman vs. Hernando B. Perez and Shirley F. Aberde

G.R. No. 156013
July 25, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioner Roberto P. De Guzman and private respondent Shirley F. Aberde
became sweethearts while studying law in the University of Sto. Tomas. Shirley became
pregnant and gave birth to Robby in 1987. But, she and Roberto never got married. In
1991, Roberto married another woman with whom he begot two children. Roberto sent
money for Robby’s schooling only twice. Also, when Robby fell seriously ill, Roberto
gave Shirley P7,000. Other than these instances, he never provided any other support
for his son.

In Taiwan, she worked for two years in order to support Robby. However, she
reached the point where she had just about spent all her savings to provide for her and
Robby's needs. The child's continued education thus became uncertain. Despite his
luxurious lifestyle, petitioner Roberto failed to provide support to Robby. On June 15,
2000, Shirley filed a criminal complaint for abandonment and neglect of child under
Article 59(2) and (4) of PD 603.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Roberto alone may be charged for abandonment and neglect of child
under Article 59(2) and (4) of PD 603, contrary to his claim that “only if both parents are
guilty” does criminal liability attach

RULING:
According to PD 603: “Art. 59. Crimes. Criminal liability shall attach to any parent
who: (4) Neglects the child by not giving him the education which the family's station in
life and financial conditions permit.

The crime has the following elements:

1. the offender is a parent;
2. he or she neglects his or her own child;
3. the neglect consists in not giving education to the child and
4. the offender's station in life and financial condition permit him to give an
appropriate education to the child”
 The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any parent. Liability for the
crime does not depend on whether the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The law
intends to punish the neglect of any parent, which neglect corresponds to the failure to
give the child the education which the family's station in life and financial condition
permit. The irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from the consequences of his
neglect by invoking the other parent's faithful compliance with his or her own parental
duties

The "neglect of child" punished under Article 59(4) of PD 603 is also a crime
(known as "indifference of parents") penalized under the second paragraph of Article
277 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, it is excluded from the coverage of RA 7610
Article 278. Exploitation of minors. - The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who shall cause any boy or girl under sixteen years of age to perform any
dangerous feat of balancing, physical strength, or contortion.
2. Any person who, being an acrobat, gymnast, rope-walker, diver, wild-animal tamer or circus
manager or engaged in a similar calling, shall employ in exhibitions of these kinds children under
sixteen years of age who are not his children or descendants.
3. Any person engaged in any of the callings enumerated in the next paragraph preceding who
shall employ any descendant of his under twelve years of age in such dangerous exhibitions.
4. Any ascendant, guardian, teacher or person entrusted in any capacity with the care of a child
under sixteen years of age, who shall deliver such child gratuitously to any person following any
of the callings enumerated in paragraph 2 hereof, or to any habitual vagrant or beggar.
If the delivery shall have been made in consideration of any price, compensation, or promise, the
penalty shall in every case be imposed in its maximum period.
In either case, the guardian or curator convicted shall also be removed from office as guardian or
curator; and in the case of the parents of the child, they may be deprived, temporarily or
perpetually, in the discretion of the court, of their parental authority.
5. Any person who shall induce any child under sixteen years of age to abandon the home of its
ascendants, guardians, curators, or teachers to follow any person engaged in any of the callings
mentioned in paragraph 2 hereof, or to accompany any habitual vagrant or beggar.
Article 279. Additional penalties for other offenses. - The imposition of the penalties prescribed in the
preceding articles, shall not prevent the imposition upon the same person of the penalty provided for any
other felonies defined and punished by this Code.
 Section Two. - Trespass to dwelling
Article 280. Qualified trespass to dwelling. - Any private person who shall enter the dwelling of another
against the latter's will shall be punished by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
If the offense be committed by means of violence or intimidation, the penalty shall be prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable to any person who shall enter another's dwelling for
the purpose of preventing some serious harm to himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third person,
nor shall it be applicable to any person who shall enter a dwelling for the purpose of rendering some
service to humanity or justice, nor to anyone who shall enter cafes, taverns, inn and other public houses,
while the same are open.

The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Perfecto Tayag and Atanasio Morales
G.R. No. L-40512
March 3, 1934

FACTS:
A little after two o'clock on the morning of September 12, 1933, the said two
appellants, armed with a bolo and a screw driver, went to Juan Nicasio Go Cuay's store,
which also served as his dwelling, located, as aforestated, at No. 325-A San Marcelino
Street, of the City of Manila. Believing that they were unnoticed, they proceeded to open
one of the doors of the said store with the tools — bolo and screw driver — which they
then carried and which, of course, were not the proper means for that purpose. After
they had succeeded in loosening one of the bars of the door and upon becoming aware
that the inhabitants of the store had been awakened, they tried to escape but policemen
A. Santos, J. Rubic and G. Malap, who up to that time had been watching them,
detained and placed them under arrest. The said policemen found the bolo in the
possession of the appellant Perfecto Tayag, and the screw driver in the possession of
the other appellant Atanasio Morales.

However, there is absolutely nothing of record to show that the said appellants'
intention on that occasion was to commit robbery, or that they somehow knew that they
would find money amounting to P40 therein.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants are guilty of attempted robbery in an inhabited
house.

RULING:
The act committed by the appellants simply constitutes the crime of attempted
trespass to dwelling, as defined in article 280, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code,
that is, trespass committed by means of violence.

In every criminal proceeding, the guilt of the accused must be proven by means
of competent and conclusive evidence and should never be based on mere inferences,
however reasonable these may be, particularly when there still remains, as in this case,
a sufficient indication of the existence of an intention different from that of committing
robbery. It would be arbitrary, not to say absurd, to suppose that had the appellants
succeeded in entering the store of said Juan Nicasio Go Cuay, they would have carried
away all the goods therein, because they would not have been able to do so by
themselves, not having any vehicle at their disposal.
Article 281. Other forms of trespass. - The penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos,
or both, shall be imposed upon any person who shall enter the closed premises or the fenced estate of
another, while either or them are uninhabited, if the prohibition to enter be manifest and the trespasser
has not secured the permission of the owner or the caretaker thereof.
 Section Three. - Threats and Coercion
Article 282. Grave threats. - Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person,
honor or property of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer:
1. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the crime be threatened to
commit, if the offender shall have made the threat demanding money or imposing any other
condition, even though not unlawful, and said offender shall have attained his purpose. If the
offender shall not have attained his purpose, the penalty lower by two degrees shall be imposed.
If the threat be made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty shall be imposed in its
maximum period.
2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, if the threat shall not have
been made subject to a condition.

Ronnie Caluag vs People of the philippines

G.R. No. 171511
2009-03-04

FACTS:
That on or about the 19th day of March, 2000, in the City of Las Piñas,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together, and both of them mutually helping and
aiding one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
and employ personal violence upon the person of Nestor Purcel Denido, by then and
there mauling him, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which required medical
attendance for less than nine (9) days and incapacitated him from performing his
customary labor for the same period of time

The MeTC ruled against the petitioners, aggrieved they both appealed to the
RTC. However, the RTC affirmed the decisaion of the MeTC. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to this Court
on the ground that the Court of Appeals

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of Grave Threats or Other Light threats

RULING:
Given the surrounding circumstances, the offense committed falls under Article
282, par. 2 (grave threats) since: (1) killing or shooting someone amounts to a crime,
and (2) the threat to kill was not subject to a condition. Article 285, par. 1 (other light
threats) is inapplicable although it specifically states, "shall threaten another with a
weapon or draw such weapon in a quarrel", since it presupposes that the threat to
commit a wrong will not constitute a crime.

Under the Revised Penal Code, there are three kinds of threats: grave threats
(Article 282), light threats (Article 283) and other light threats (Article 285). These
provisions state:
 Art. 282. Grave threats. — Any person who shall threaten another with the
infliction upon the person, honor or property of the latter or of his family of any wrong
amounting to a crime, shall suffer:

1. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the crime he
threatened to commit, if the offender shall have made the threat demanding money or
imposing any other condition, even though not unlawful, and said offender shall have
attained his purpose. If the offender shall not have attained his purpose, the penalty
lower by two degrees shall be imposed.

If the threat be made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty shall be

imposed in its maximum period.

2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, if the threat
shall not have been made subject to a condition.

Art. 285. Other light threats. — The penalty of arresto menor in its minimum
period or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos shall be imposed upon:

1. Any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next preceding
article, shall threaten another with a weapon or draw such weapon in a quarrel, unless it
be in lawful self-defense.
Article 283. Light threats. - Any threat to commit a wrong not constituting a crime, made in the manner
expressed in subdivision 1 of the next preceding article, shall be punished by arresto mayor.

Federico Batolanon and Teodoro V. Nano vs.Hon. Roman A. Leorente

G.R. No. L-17994
August 31, 1963

FACTS:
Chief of Police Jose V. Bosque filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Tagum,
Davao, a complaint charging Federico Batolanon with the crime of light threat under
article 283 of the Revised Penal Code . In an order by the court, it appears that on 29
December 1956 the defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint. They filed a
motion for reconsideration, to wit: 1) that the facts do not constitute an offense of light
threat; 2) that the complaint charges more than one offense: light threat an libel; and 3)
that the offense of light threat charged in the complaint already has prescribed. The
court denied the motion for reconsideration. The defendants filed a second and urgent
motion for reconsideration and was again denied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the facts alleged in the complaint constitute the crime of light threat

RULING:
The crime charged against the appellants is light threat. Article 283 of the
Revised Penal Code provides the following:

A threat to commit a wrong not constituting a crime, made in the manner

expressed in subdivision 1 of the next preceding article, shall be punished by arresto
mayor.

In the case at bar, the offense charged is light threat which is punishable by
arresto mayor under article 283 of the Revised Penal Code and prescribes in five
years.1 The threat was committed on 13 September 1956 and the complaint was filed in
court on 10 December 1956. It was filed well within the period of five years.

The correlation between articles 283 and 282, subdivision 1, of the Revised
Penal Code is confined only to the manner of committing the threat, such as demanding
money or imposing any other condition, without changing or altering the penalties each
imposes. Article 282 refers to threat to commit a wrong amounting to a crime, whereas
article 283, to a wrong not amounting to a crime.
Article 284. Bond for good behavior. - In all cases falling within the two next preceding articles, the
person making the threats may also be required to give bail not to molest the person threatened, or if he
shall fail to give such bail, he shall be sentenced to destierro.
Article 285. Other light threats. - The penalty of arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next preceding article, shall
threaten another with a weapon or draw such weapon in a quarrel, unless it be in lawful self-
defense.
2. Any person who, in the heat of anger, shall orally threaten another with some harm not
constituting a crime, and who by subsequent acts show that he did not persist in the idea involved
in his threat, provided that the circumstances of the offense shall not bring it within the provisions
of Article 282 of this Code.
3. Any person who shall orally threaten to do another any harm not constituting a felony.
Article 286. Grave coercions. - The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another from
doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right
or wrong.
If the coercion be committed for the purpose of compelling another to perform any religious act or to
prevent him from so doing, the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed.

Jorge B. Navarra vs. Office of the Ombudsman, Samuel Namanama, Felixberto

Lazaro and Danilo Medina
G.R. No. 176291
December 4, 2009

FACTS:
Private Respondents prevented Petitioner and his employees from entering their
own premises. They had also compelled Petitioner’s caretakers to leave the premises
against their will. When Private Respondents entered the FENICS compound in the
evening, they had a contingent of about 20-30 armed personnel as against Petitioner’s
two (2) caretakers. They forced their way into the gates, threatened the caretakers and
a driver, admittedly destroyed one padlock and welded the gates to prevent entry. The
possessor of the FENICS compound exhibited its opposition to any takeover. Certainly,
Private Respondents had no right to enter the compound and evict the occupants
against their will. They had no court order to evict the existing occupants.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was grave coercion

RULING:
The Court finds for petitioner.

For grave coercion to lie, the following elements must be established: 1) that a
person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; 2) that the prevention or
compulsion is effected by violence, threats, or intimidation; and 3) that the person who
restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so, or in other words, that the
restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right

In the case at bar, the affidavits of petitioner and his witnesses prima facie show
that the elements of grave coercion are present.
Article 287. Light coercions. - Any person who, by means of violence, shall seize anything belonging to
his debtor for the purpose of applying the same to the payment of the debt, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its minimum period and a fine equivalent to the value of the thing, but in no case less
than 75 pesos.
Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5
pesos to 200 pesos, or both.

People of the Philippines vs. Salvino Sumingwa

G.R. No. 183619
October 13, 2009

FACTS:
Sometime in 1999, appellant showed his desire to touch the victim. He fondled
the victim’s breast. Appellant removed the garments of the victim and fondle his penis
until it ejaculated. Another incident was on August 2000, wherein the appellant grabbed
and lie her down and went top of her and then rubbed her penis into her vaginal orifice,
and partially inserted his penis into her vagina. The acts of the appellant continued
wherein he would successfully rubbed his organ to her genitalia without penetration.
This time, the victim confided to her bestfriend.

On December 20, 2000, when the victim and her bestfriend were doing their
school work, appellant grabbed the victim, pulled her inside the house and kissed her
on the lips. The last incident occurred inside the comfort room of their house on May 27,
2001. When the victim entered, appellant pulled down her short pants and panty,
unzipped his trousers, brought out his penis, then repeatedly rubbed it on her vagina
while they were in a standing position.The victim decided to report the sexual abuses to
her grandmother who forthwith brought her to the National Bureau of Investigation
where she was examined by the medico-legal officer. It was found during the
examination that there were no extragenital physical injuries on the victim’s body but
there were old, healed, and incomplete hymenal lacerations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty of unjust vexation

RULING:
Appellant was charged with Unjust Vexation, defined and penalized by Article
287 of the RPC, which reads:

ART. 287. Light coercions. – Any person who, by means of violence, shall seize
anything belonging to his debtor for the purpose of applying the same to the payment of
the debt, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and a fine
equivalent to the value of the thing, but in no case less than 75 pesos.

Any other coercion or unjust vexation shall be punished by arresto menor or a

fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos, or both.
 The second paragraph of this provision is broad enough to include any human
conduct that, although not productive of some physical or material harm, could
unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person. The paramount question to be
considered is whether the offender’s act caused annoyance, irritation, torment, distress,
or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it was directed.62

Appellant’s acts of embracing, dragging and kissing AAA in front of her friend
annoyed AAA. The filing of the case against appellant proved that AAA was disturbed, if
not distressed by the acts of appellant.

Accordingly, appellant is sentenced to 30 days of arresto menor and to pay a fine

of ₱200.00, with the accessory penalties thereof.
Article 288. Other similar coercions; (Compulsory purchase of merchandise and payment of wages by
means of tokens.) - The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos, or both, shall
be imposed upon any person, agent or officer, of any association or corporation who shall force or
compel, directly or indirectly, or shall knowingly permit any laborer or employee employed by him or by
such firm or corporation to be forced or compelled, to purchase merchandise or commodities of any kind.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon any person who shall pay the wages due a laborer or
employee employed by him, by means of tokens or objects other than the legal tender currency of the
laborer or employee.
Article 289. Formation, maintenance and prohibition of combination of capital or labor through violence or
threats. - The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 300 pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, for the purpose of organizing, maintaining or preventing coalitions or capital or labor, strike of
laborers or lock-out of employees, shall employ violence or threats in such a degree as to compel or force
the laborers or employers in the free and legal exercise of their industry or work, if the act shall not
constitute a more serious offense in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
 Chapter Three
DISCOVERY AND REVELATION OF SECRETS
Article 290. Discovering secrets through seizure of correspondence. - The penalty of prision correccional
in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any
private individual who in order to discover the secrets of another, shall seize his papers or letters and
reveal the contents thereof.
If the offender shall not reveal such secrets, the penalty shall be arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding
500 pesos.
The provision shall not be applicable to parents, guardians, or persons entrusted with the custody of
minors with respect to the papers or letters of the children or minors placed under their care or study, nor
to spouses with respect to the papers or letters of either of them.

Globe Mackay Cable And Radio Corp., and Herbert C. Hendry vs. The Honorable
Court of Appeals and Restituto M. Tobias
G.R. NO. 81262
August 25, 1989

FACTS:
In year 1972 Globe Mackay discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent
transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos. Herbert C. Hendry who was
the Executive President alleged Mr. Restituto M. Torbias as a number one suspect of
the said anomalies since, the latter actually made the report regarding the hot issues in
the company. And the petitioner filed 5cases against the respondent which 4 of those
were estafa through falsification of commercial documents and 5th was for violation Art.
290 of the Revised Penal Code(Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of
Correspondence) but all these cases were dismissed by the Judge of RTC for lack
supporting evidence. The defendant file a civil case for damages anchored on alleged
unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive act of the petitioner and fortunately the
judge decided in favour of the private respondents for payable charges. Petitioners
appealed the RTC decision to CA and on the other hand Torbias appeal as to the
amount of damages. However, in decision dated August 31, 1987 affirmed the RTC
decision in toto. Petitioner questioned the award of moral damages.

ISSUE:

RULING:
Article 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office. - The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any manager, employee, or servant who, in such capacity,
shall learn the secrets of his principal or master and shall reveal such secrets.

Air Philippines Corporation vs. Pennswell, INC

G.R. No. 172835
December 13, 2007

FACTS:
Respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade. Under the
contracts, petitioner’s total outstanding obligation amounted to P449,864.98 with
interest at 14% per annum until the amount would be fully paid. For failure of the
petitioner to comply with its obligation under said contracts, respondent filed a
Complaint for a Sum of Money on 28 April 2000 with the RTC.

During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel respondent
to give a detailed list of the ingredients and chemical components of the following
products. The RTC rendered an Order granting the petitioner’s motion. Respondent
sought reconsideration, contending that it cannot be compelled to disclose the chemical
components sought because the matter is confidential. It argued that what petitioner
endeavored to inquire upon constituted a trade secret which respondent cannot be
forced to divulge. The RTC gave credence to respondent’s reasoning, and reversed
itself. Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. Petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals,
which denied the Petition and affirmed the Order dated 30 June 2004 of the RTC.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Unyielding, petitioner brought the
instant Petition before SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA CA erred in upholding RTC decision denying petitioner’s
motion to subject respondent’s products to compulsory disclosure.

RULING:
No. The products are covered by the exception of trade secrets being divulged in
compulsory disclosure. The Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals which
upheld the finding of the RTC that there is substantial basis for respondent to seek
protection of the law for its proprietary rights over the detailed chemical composition of
its products.

The Supreme Court has declared that trade secrets and banking transactions are
among the recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information as embodied
in the Constitution. SC said that the drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally
affirmed that, aside from national security matters and intelligence information, trade or
industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other related laws) as
well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act), are also
exempted from compulsory disclosure.
 A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound
known only to its owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide
it. The definition also extends to a secret formula or process not patented, but known
only to certain individuals using it in compounding some article of trade having a
commercial value. American jurisprudence has utilized the following factors to
determine if an information is a trade secret, to wit:

1. the extent to which the information is known outside of the employer’s

business;
2. the extent to which the information is known by employees and others
involved in the business;
3. the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the
information;
4. the value of the information to the employer and to competitors;
5. the amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing the
information; and
6. the extent to which the information could be easily or readily obtained through
an independent source
Article 292. Revelation of industrial secrets. - The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon the person in charge,
employee or workman of any manufacturing or industrial establishment who, to the prejudice of the owner
thereof, shall reveal the secrets of the industry of the latter.

Air Philippines Corporation vs. Pennswell, inc

G.R. No. 172835
December 13, 2007