RULE 73 - VENUE We said in our decision in Reyes vs.
Diaz, supra, that the question
G.R. No. L-48444 June 30, 1943
1. In the matter of the intestate estate of the late Kaw Singco
(alias Co Chi Seng). SY OA, administratrix-appellee, vs. CO HO
oppositor-appellant.
Oppositor-appellant Co Ho seeks the reconsideration of our
resolution which reads as follows:
The question involved in G.R. No. 43444, Sy Oa, administratrix-appellee,
vs. Co Ho, oppositor-appellant, not being one of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter but rather of venue which in turn hinges on a question of
fact, i.e., whether the deceased, at the time of his death, was residing in
Camarines Sur on in the City of Manila, pursuant to the ruling laid down
in Reyes vs. Diaz G.R. No. 48754, November 26, 1941, and
Bernabe vs.Vergara, G.R. No. 48652, September 16, 1942, this case is
hereby certified to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
It is maintained that our interpretation of Article VIII, section 2,
No. 3, of the Constitution, and section 138, No. 3, of the Revised
Administrative Code is erroneous. In Reyes vs. Diaz we said that
the term "jurisdiction" as used in the Constitution and in the
statutes, means jurisdiction over the subject-matter only, unless
an exception is clearly intended by reason of its employment in a
breader sense. Our attention is also directed to a comparison 138
of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259. Said section reads:
Sec. 138. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. — The Supreme Court shall
have such original jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by
the Supreme Court of the Philippines at the time of the approval of this
Act, including cases affecting ambassador, other public ministers, and
consuls.
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise,
reverse, modify or affirm, on appeal certiorari or writ or error, as the
law of rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of
inferior court as herein provided, in —
(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation as in question;
(2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll,
or any penalty imposed in relation thereto;
(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is issue:
(4) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed
is death or life imprisonment, and those involving other offenses which,
although not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which
may have been committed by the accused on the same occasion, as the
giving rise to the more serious offense, regardless of whether the
accused are charged as principals, accomplices, or accessories, or
whether they have been tried jointly or separately.
(5) All civil cases in which the value in controversy exceeds fifty
thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs, or in which the title or
possession of real estate exceeding in value of sum of fifty thousand
pesos to be ascertained by the oath of a party to the cause or by other
competent evidence, is involved or brought in question. The Supreme
Court shall likewise have exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals in civil
cases, even though the value in controversy, exclusive of interests and
costs, is fifty thousand pesos or less, when the evidence involved in said
cases is the same as the evidence submitted in an appealed civil case
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided
herein.
(6) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved.
of jurisdiction referred to in clause 3 of the above-quoted
provision, is one which calls for interpretation and application of
the law of jurisdiction which distributes the judicial power
among the different courts in the Philippines. It is now
maintained that if such issue of jurisdiction is merely question of
law, then clause 3 would be a surplusage, for it would be covered
by clause 6 of the same provision which confers upon the
Supreme Court exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in
which only errors or question of law are involved. This is
certainly a misapprehension. Under clause 6, the Supreme Court
may entertain appellate jurisdiction when absolutely no question
of fact are involved in the appeal. But under clause 3, there may
be issues of fact involved, but if aside from such issues the
question of jurisdiction over the subject matter is properly
raised, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, in
exactly the same manner as under clause No. 1 where the
Supreme Court shall have the same appellate jurisdiction when
the constitutionality or validity of a law is raised regardless of
any question of fact that there might be upon other issues.
We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in
probate cases the place of residence of the deceased is regarded
as a question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter. But we
declined to follow this view because of its mischievous
consequences. For instance, a probate case has been submitted in
good faith to a Court of First Instance of a province whether the
deceased had not resided.
All the parties, however, including all the creditors, have
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the case
is therein completely finished except for a claim of a creditor who
also voluntarily filed it with said court but on appeal from an
adverse decision raises for the first time in this Court the
question of jurisdiction of the trial court for lack of the residence
of the deceased in the province. If we consider such question of
residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court over
the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole proceedings
including all decisions on the different incidents which have
arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same case will
have to be commenced anew before another court of the same
rank in another province. Furthermore, section 600 of Act. No.
190, providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be
settled in the province whether he had last resided could not
have been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate
court over the subject-matter, because such legal provision is
contained in law of procedure dealing merely with procedural
matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure is one
thing and jurisdiction over the subject-matter is another. The law
of jurisdiction — Act No. 136, Section 56, No. 5 — confers upon
Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases
independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Since,
however, there are many courts of First Instance in the
Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes
the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus,
the place of residence of the deceased is not an element of
jurisdiction of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new
Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased
person shall be settled is properly called "venue." (Rule 75,
section 1.) Motion for reconsideration is denied.
G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
2. VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A.
MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna,
Branch Vl, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B.
GARCIA, respondents.
FACTS: On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of
First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, a petition for letters of
administration, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973,
Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died
intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal
properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she
moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix
over the estate. On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted
the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on
May 8, 1973, contending that the order appointing Virginia G.
Fule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction,
since no notice of the petition for letters of administration has
been served upon all persons interested in the estate. Preciosa B.
Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be appointed special
administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as
regular administratrix after due hearing.
A motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix
alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in the motion
for reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her appointment was
obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete
misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest
against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as
administratrix and as officer of the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of
administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and
31, 1973, in the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general
circulation in Southern Luzon. On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B.
Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental
petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of
jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate
of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as
special administratrix. However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar
and already issued an order, received by Preciosa B. Garcia only
on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to
reconsider the order of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule
as special administratrix, and admitting the supplementation
petition of May 18,1973. On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia
moved to dismiss the petition.
Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the
powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in
Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court. Regarding the motion to
dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had
already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying
Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of
Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the
failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for
letters of administration in the place of residence of the decedent
at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that
Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court
and had waived her objections thereto by praying to be
appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate.
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc.
27-C) before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death
certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the
time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia
presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973
showing that three months before his death his residence was in
Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia
was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that
he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the
first district of Laguna. On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and
Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari
and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court
of Appeals, primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge
Malvar. On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment annulling the proceedings for lack of jurisdiction. On
March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the
proceedings before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the
court of the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of
Appeals.
HELD: We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition
for certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons and
considerations hereinafter stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If
the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate,
shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal
from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to
letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules
of Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively
show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment
sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death,
the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and
situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and
the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin,
creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the
intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation
facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the
administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not
an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no
assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to
grant letters of administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1),
specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in
reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates:
"Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and
Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to define the
jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision
is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the
subject matter is another.
A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of
estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration
does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this
reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the
province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as
"venue." 6
2. What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual
residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death?
We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides"
connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from
"legal residence or domicile." In the application of venue statutes
and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of
such nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing
venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning
as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term
means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile. 9Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one's domicile. 10 No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be
more than temporary. 11
3. We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado
G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon
City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible
to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death.
Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for
Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna.
Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper
venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules
of Court states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a
motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case before Us the
Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did
not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue
assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but
availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert
her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement
of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last
residence of the decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the appointment as
surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen
there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration by any cause including an appeal from the
allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint
a special administrator to take possession and charge of the
estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are
decided and executors or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly,
the appointment of a special administrator was only proper when
the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new
Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such
appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting
letters testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties
cannot agree among themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion
to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate
court. Under the law, the widow would have the right of
succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such
reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of
kin.
We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the
appointment of special administratrix. The preference of Preciosa
B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos
executed by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in
favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is
married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for
the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the
First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote
therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced
with these documents and the presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be
reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado
G. Garcia.
5. Venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and
transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice
and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's
exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special
administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and
authorized and the Court of First Instance of Laguna be
disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be
required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia
Garcia Fule are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973
3. ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO,
respondents.
FACTS: On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died
at the Manila Doctors' Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his
widow, the herein petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, and
by his children of the first marriage, respondents herein, all of
legal age and residing in Cebu. Respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed
a Petition for Letters of Administration with the court of first
instance of Cebu. On the same date, the Cebu court issued an
order setting the petition for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing
that due notice be given to all the heirs and interested persons,
and ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA PRENSA, a
newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of
Cebu.
In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after
the filing of the Cebu petition) herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano
Cuenco filed a petition with the court of first instance of Rizal
(Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased's last will and
testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her
favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last will
and testament. Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the
Cebu court, petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu
court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, as well as an
Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator.
Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition
and Motion to Dismiss, opposing probate of the will and assailing
the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain
petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as executrix
in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition
in the Cebu court .
In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the
motion to dismiss, giving as a principal reason the "precedence of
probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding."4 The said
court further found in said order that the residence of the late
senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta.
Mesa Heights, Quezon City. Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion
for reconsideration of the Quezon City court's said order of 11
April 1964 asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the probate
proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court was denied. The
Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of
the notice of the hearing had been duly complied with and that all
the heirs had been duly notified of the hearing, the Quezon City
court in its said orde of 15 May 1964 admitted to probate the late
senator's last will and testament as having been "freely and
voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all formalities of
the law" and appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his
estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his
will as probated.
Respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of
respondents (petitioners therein) and against the herein
petitioner. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in
a resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated 8 July 1965;
hence the herein petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES: whether the appellate court erred in law in issuing the
writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court ordering it to
refrain perpetually from proceeding with the testate proceedings
and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions,
particularly its admission to probate of the decedent's last will
and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix
thereof without bond in compliance with the testator's express
wish in his testament.
Whether the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming
exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings filed with it.
HELD: The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the
appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition
against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate
proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and
actions, particularly its admission to probate of the deceased's
last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as
executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased
testator's express wish, for the following considerations: —
1. The Judiciary Act7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon
all Courts of First Instance over "all matter of probate, both of
testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section
of the Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue, as the very
caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict
among the different courts which otherwise may properly
assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts." The cited Rule provides:
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is
an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
Province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of the
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so
far as it depends on the place of residence, of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)8
It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the
location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the
subject matter but merely of venue. It should be noted that the
Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate
or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.
The court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise
jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
2. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss
Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance
its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon
City court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before
that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will
was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court, then it
would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate
petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper,
and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to
the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its act of deference,
the Cebu court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the
question between the parties whether the decedent's residence at
the time of his death was in Quezon City where he had his
conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed by
respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline
to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead
defer to the Quezon City court, unless the latter would make a
negative finding as to the probate petition and the residence of
the decedent within its territory and venue.
3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in
declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and
deferring to the Quezon City court. Necessarily, neither could the
Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction
in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since
under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take
cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise
jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court
declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays
down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had
at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate
petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with
the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City
court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule
73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to
the Quezon City court their opposition to probate of the will, but
failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice, the
Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the appellate court did,
to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the
decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix
thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary
disposition.
4. In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of
probate proceedings over intestate proceedings in this wise:
It cannot be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the
distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance
with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a
"probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is
equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in
this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same
purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the
decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter
should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that state an
administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to
render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the
executor subsequently appointed. This however, is understood to be
without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is
disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already
adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a
will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City
court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on
the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-
widow and finding that Quezon City was the first choice
of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and
domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly given by
the Cebu court — could not be contested except by appeal from
said court in the original case. The last paragraph of said Rule
expressly provides:
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record. (Rule 73)
The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record" could probably be properly invoked, had
such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City
court not appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise
shown that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of the petition
before it and assumed jurisdiction.
6. In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take
cognizance of the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred
to the testate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and in
effect asked the Quezon City court to determine the residence of
the decedent and whether he did leave a last will and testament
upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate
proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having
thus determined in effect for both courts — at the behest and with
the deference and consent of the Cebu court — that Quezon
City was the actual residence of the decedent who died testate
and therefore the proper venue.
7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be
upheld when it is taken into consideration that Rule 76, section 2
requires that the petition for allowance of a will must show: "(a)
the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional facts" in probate
proceedings, are the death of the decedent, his residence at the
time of his death in the province where the probate court is
sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left
his estate in such province." "(T)he probate of a will is a
proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as a pre-requisite to
the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole
world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court
is binding upon everybody, even against the State. The probate of
a will by a court having jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its
due execution and validity." 19 The Quezon City court acted
regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were to be conceded
that Quezon City was not the proper venue notwithstanding the
Cebu court's giving way and deferring to it,) in admitting the
decedent's last will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as
executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's action
should not be set aside by a writ of prohibition for supposed lack
of jurisdiction as per the appellate court's appealed decision, and
should instead be sustained in line with Uriarte, supra, where the
Court, in dismissing the certiorari petition challenging the Manila
court's action admitting the decedent's will to probate and
distributing the estate in accordance therewith in
the second proceeding, held that "it must be remembered that
this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a
lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue
therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings
repeated in "some other court of similar jurisdiction.”
9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-
widow, who under all the applicable rules of venue, and despite
the fact that the Cebu court (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco
had filed an intestate petition in the Cebu court earlier by a
week's time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the Quezon City court
where petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12, 1964)
after the decedent's death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the
decedent's last will and petitioned for letters testamentary and is
admittedly entitled to preference in the administration of her
husband's estate, 20 would be compelled under the appealed
decision to have to go all the way to Cebu and submit anew the
decedent's will there for probate either in a new proceeding or by
asking that the intestate proceedings be converted into
a testate proceeding — when under the Rules, the
proper venue for the testate proceedings, as per the facts of
record and as already affirmed by the Quezon City court is
Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-widow had their
conjugal domicile.
Under the appealed decision, notwithstanding that petitioner
resides in Quezon City, and the proper venue of the testate
proceeding was in Quezon City and the Quezon City court
properly took cognizance and exercised exclusive jurisdiction
with the deference in comity and consent of the Cebu court, such
proper exercise of jurisdiction would be nullified and petitioner
would have to continually leave her residence in Quezon City and
go to Cebu to settle and liquidate even her own community
property and conjugal estate with the decedent.
10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that
the Cebu court did not act without jurisdiction nor with grave
abuse of discretion in declining to take cognizance of
the intestate petition and instead deferring to the testate
proceedings filed just a week later by petitioner as surviving
widow and designated executrix of the decedent's last will, since
the record before it (the petitioner's opposition and motion to
dismiss) showed the falsity of the allegation in the intestate
petition that the decedent had died without a will. It is
noteworthy that respondents never challenged by certiorari or
prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964
deferring to the probate proceedings before the Quezon City
court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's
order of deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit the
decedent's will to probate.
For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held
to have acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of
discretion in admitting the decedent's will to probate and
appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance with its
testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled doctrine that
the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of venue,
not of jurisdiction. The said order of probate has long since
become final and can not be overturned in a special civic action of
prohibition.
11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's
exercise of its supervisory authority over all inferior courts, 22 it
may properly determine, as it has done in the case at bar,
that venue was properly assumed by and transferred to the Quezon
City court and that it is the interest of justice and in avoidance of
needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due
deference and consent of the Cebu court) and its admission to
probate of his last will and testament and appointment of
petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of
the decedent's express will and all its orders and actions taken in
the testate proceedings before it be approved and authorized
rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had and to
repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court
only to revert once more to the Quezon City court should the
Cebu court find that indeed and in fact, as already determined by
the Quezon City court on the strength of incontrovertible
documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal
residence of the decedent. ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby
rendered reversing the appealed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction originally filed by respondents with
the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered dismissed.
No costs.
G.R. No. L-44042 August 23, 1935
4. REMEDIOS BONGON VIUDA DE MANZANERO, petitioner, vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, FORTUNATO
MANZANERO, and FILIPINAS LIFE ASSURANCE CO.,
respondents.
FACTS: Esteban M. Manzanero, then assistant district engineer of
the Province of Albay, died in the provincial hospital of said
province on February 15, 1935. On March 7, 1935, his brother,
Fortunato Manzanero, filed in the Court of First Instance of
Batangas a sworn application alleging that his deceased brother,
Esteban M. Manzanero, in life, had his legal residence in Santo
Tomas, Batangas; that he had left no property except a life
insurance policy of P5,000 with the Filipinas Life Assurance Co.,
of Manila; that his said deceased brother owed him the sum of
P500; that he was survived by a widow, the herein petitioner,
Remedios Bongon, residing in Tabaco, Albay; and praying for a
summary settlement of his estate. A copy of said application was
sent by ordinary mail to said widow.
On March 11, 1935, the herein respondent, Court of First Instance
of Batangas, issued an order setting said application for hearing
at 8:30 o'clock in the morning of April 11, 1935, and directing the
publication of the notice for the time fixed by law in Kayumangui,
a newspaper published in Lipa, Batangas, and of general
circulation in the province. When the application was called for
hearing on April 11, 1935, only the applicant Fortunato
Manzanero appeared through his attorney, Epitacio Panganiban.
On April 23, 1935, the case was called for hearing without the
petitioner having appeared to oppose the application. On the
same date, Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David issued an order
stating, among other things, that the evidence presented by said
applicant disclosed that Esteban M. Manzanero was a resident of
Santo Tomas, Batangas, with temporary residence in Tabaco,
Albay, where he was assistant district engineer, and directing the
summary distribution of the sum of P5,000, after payment of the
sum of P500 which said deceased supposedly owed his brother,
Fortunato Manzanero, and after the filing of a bond of P3,500 by
the alleged heirs, said distribution to be subject to any valid claim
that might be presented within two years against said
distribution.
In an order of May 4, 1935, Eduardo Gutierrez David, vacation
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, required the
Filipinas Assurance Company to pay to the heirs of the deceased
Esteban M. Manzanero the proceeds of his insurance policy.
Pursuant to said order, said insurance company sent the net
proceeds of the policy amounting to P4,276.03 to the clerk of said
court. Having been informed that the proceeds of the policy had
been distributed among the heirs of her deceased husband, the
petitioner, on June 21, 1935, filed a motion praying for the return
and delivery to her of the money.
ISSUE: whether or not the question of jurisdiction of a court to
take cognizance of a summary settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, by reason of residence, may be raised by means
of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
Section 603 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 603. Jurisdiction, when may be contested. — The jurisdiction
assumed by a Court of First Instance, for the settlement of an estate, so
far as it depends on the place of residence of a person, or of the location
of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record.
HELD: According to the above cited legal provision, the
jurisdiction assumed by a Court of First Instance, for the
settlement of an estate, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of a person, or of the location of his estate, cannot be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record. From the pleadings before us, the want of
jurisdiction of said court does not clearly appear. It not appearing
from the orders of the lower court, as disclosed by the copies
thereof attached to the record of these certiorari proceedings,
that said court lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
application for summary settlement by reason of the legal
residence of the deceased, Esteban M. Manzanero, certiorari does
not lie, an appeal being specially provided in such case by section
603 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Furthermore, it appears of record that there is a motion in the
special proceeding for the summary settlement of the estate
under consideration, praying that the heirs of the deceased
Esteban M. Manzanero, who received the latter's property, be
ordered to return it to the court for delivery to the herein
petitioner, Remedios Bongon Viuda de Manzanero, as the only
alleged beneficiary named in the insurance policy of her deceased
husband. This motion is pending decision and is in accordance
with the reservation made by Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David in
his order of April 23, 1935, directing the distribution of the net
proceeds of the insurance policy among the brothers and sisters
of the deceased, after payment of the only indebtedness of P500.
Said reservation is in accordance with the provision of section
598 of said Code of Civil Procedure.
Under the law and under said order, the petitioner, therefore, has
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy for the enforcement of her
rights, and consequently, this petition for certiorari does not lie.
For the foregoing considerations, it is held that the petition
for certiorari filed by the petitioner Remedios Bongon Viuda de
Manzanero does not lie and it is ordered dismissed, with costs to
the petitioner.
G.R. No. L-8409 December 28, 1956
5. In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres
Eusebio. EUGENIO EUSEBIO, petitioner-appellee, vs. AMANDA
EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE
EUSEBIO, and CARLOS EUSEBIO,oppositors-appellants.
FACTS: This case instituted on November 16, 1953, when
Eugenio Eusebio filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a
petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his
father, Andres Eusebio, who died on November 28, 1952,
residing, according to said petition, in the City of Quezon. On
December 4, 1953, Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and
Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to said petition, stating
that they are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the
latter was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and praying,
therefore, that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue
had been improperly filed. By an order, said court overruled this
objection and granted said petition. The appeal hinges on the
situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on November 28, 1952,
for Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, provides:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizens
or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted,
and his estate, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had
estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall
not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record.
It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres
Eusebio was, and had always been, domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga, where he had his home, as well as some other
properties. Inasmuch as his heart was in bad condition and his
son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P.
Florentino St., Quezon City, on October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio
bought a house and lot at 889-A España Extention, in said City.
While transferring his belongings to this house, soon thereafter,
the decedent suffered a stroke (probably heart failure), for which
reason Dr. Eusebio took him to his (Dr. Eusebio's)
aforementioned residence, where the decedent remained until he
was brought to the UST Hospital, in the City of Manila, sometimes
before November 26, 1952. On this date, he contracted marriage
in articulo mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion
Villanueva, in said hospital. Two (2) days later, he died.
It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of
the decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for
over seventy (70) years, the presumption is that he retained such
domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory
proof to the contrary, for it is well-settled that "a domicile once
acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained".
Under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if Andres
Eusebio established another domicile, it must have been one of
choice, for which the following conditions are essential, namely:
(1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical
presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein
permanently. Admittedly, the decedent was juridically capable of
choosing a domicile and had been in Quezon City several days
prior to his demise.
ISSUE: whether he intended to stay in that place permanently.
HELD: There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does
the decedent appears to have manifested his wish to live
indefinitely in said city. This notwithstanding, the lower court
held that the decedent's intent to stay permanently in Quezon
City is "manifest" from the acquisition of said property and the
transfer of his belonging thereto. This conclusion is untenable.
The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent
because he had been adviced to do so "due to his illness". It is
well settled that "domicile is not commonly changed by presence
in a place merely for one's own health", even if coupled with
"knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of
illness, to return home."
Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in
San Fernando, Pampanga. Then, again, in the deed Exhibit 2, by
virtue of which said property at No. 889-A España Extention,
Quezon City, was conveyed to him, on October 29, 1952, or less
than a month before his death, the decedent gave San Fernando,
Pampanga, as his residence. Similarly, the "A" and "B" residence
certificates used by the decedent in acknowledging said Exhibit 2,
before a notary public, was issued in San Fernando, Pampanga.
Lastly, the marriage contract Exhibit 1, signed by the deceased
when he was married, in articulo mortis, to Concepcion
Villanueva, at the UST Hospital, on November 26, 1952, or two
(2) days prior to his demise, stated that his residence is San
Fernando, Pampanga. At any rate, the presumption in favor of the
retention of the old domicile 1— which is particularly strong
when the domicile is one of the origin 2as San Fernando,
Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said decedent — has not
been offset by the evidence of record.
Moreover, in granting the court first taking cognizance of the case
exclusive jurisdiction over the same, said provision of the Rules
of Court evidently refers to cases triable before two or more
courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not possibly have
intended to deprive a competent court of the authority vested
therein by law, merely because a similar case had been
previously filed before a court to which jurisdiction is denied by
law, for the same would then be defeated by the will of one of the
parties. More specially, said provision refers mainly to non-
resident decedents who have properties in several provinces in
the Philippines, for the settlement of their respective estates may
undertaken before the court of first instance of either one of said
provinces, not only because said courts then have concurrent
jurisdiction — and, hence, the one first taking cognizance of the
case shall exclude the other courts — but, also, because the
statement to this effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of
the Court immediately follows the last part of the next preceding
sentence, which deals with non-resident decedents, whose estate
may settled the court of first instance of any province in which
they have properties.
In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing
that:
. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place
of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
 contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from that court,
in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record.
if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
resident are instituted in two or more courts, and the question of
venue is raised before the same, the court in which the first case
was filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue. In
conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his
death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the Court of
First Instance of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an
administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having
been laid improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have
sustained appellants' opposition and dismissed appellee's
petition. Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed
and appellee's petition is dismissed.
G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970
VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial District)
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IV,
respondents.
FACTS: It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with
the Negros Court a petition for the settlement of the estate of the
late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special Proceeding No. 6344)
alleging therein, inter alia, that, as a natural son of the latter, he
was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of said decedent,
petitioner had instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court
for his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son. Upon
petitioner's motion the Negros Court appointed the Philippine
National Bank as special administrator on November 13, 1961
and two days later it set the date for the hearing of the petition
and ordered that the requisite notices be published in accordance
with law. The record discloses, however, that, for one reason or
another, the Philippine, National Bank never actually qualified as
special administrator.
On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private
respondents herein, filed an opposition to the above-mentioned
petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan
Uriarte y Goite who had "executed a Last Will and Testament in
Spain. On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other
private respondent, commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in
the Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged to be the
last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the same
date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a
motion to dismiss.
Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending
that, as the Negros Court was first to take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it
had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over same pursuant to Rule
75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. On April 19, 1963, the Negros
Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to dismiss and
dismissed the Special Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it. His
motion for reconsideration of said order having been denied on
July 27, 1963, petitioner proceeded to file his notice of appeal.
It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in Special
Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court, Vicente Uriarte filed in
the same court, during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte y Goite, Civil
Case No. 6142 to obtain judgment for his compulsory
acknowledgment as his natural child. Clearly inferrable from this
is that at the time he filed the action, as well as when he
commenced the aforesaid special proceeding, he had not yet been
acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte y Goite. Up to this
time, no final judgment to that effect appears to have been
rendered. On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after proper
proceedings were had in Special Proceeding No. 51396, the
Manila Court admitted to probate the document submitted to, it
as the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite, the petition for probate
appearing not to have been contested.
ISSUES: (a) whether or not the Negros Court erred in dismissing
Special Proceeding No. 6644, on the one hand, and on the other,
(b) whether the Manila Court similarly erred in not dismissing
Special Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding proof of the prior
filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros Court.
HELD: Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph
(e)], Courts of First Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction
over "all matters of probate," that is, over special proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of deceased persons — whether they
died testate or intestate. While their jurisdiction over such
subject matter is beyond question, the matter of venue, or the
particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding
should be commenced, is regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1
of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules
of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant
of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in
which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any
province in which he had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to
be settled is that of a non-resident alien — like the deceased Juan
Uriarte y Goite — the Courts of First Instance in provinces where
the deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the proper special proceeding for the
settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these Courts of
First Instance are the Negros and the Manila Courts — province
and city where the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite left considerable
properties.
It cannot be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect
the distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in
accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance
with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the
settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in
accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate
proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same
purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of
intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is
found it hat the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the
probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings
even if at that stage an administrator had already been
appointed, the latter being required to render final account and
turn over the estate in his possession to the executor
subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be
without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or
is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy.
The following considerations and the facts of record would seem
to support the view that he should have submitted said will for
probate to the Negros Court, either in a separate special
proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in
the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344. But the fact is
that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to
the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the
purpose with the Manila Court. We cannot accept petitioner's
contention in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction
to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper
venue therefor. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong
venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the light of
the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the
opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to raise
such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is
enough to consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the
existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since
December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to
the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that
petitioner likewise was served with notice of the existence
(presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the
filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court since
August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for
the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these
notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with
the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus
motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and
annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus
enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator
with the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more
than five months earlier.
RULES 75-77: PRODUCTION,
ALLOWANCE/DISALLOWANCE OF WILLS, WILLS
PROVED OUTSIDE
G.R. No. L-12207 December 24, 1959
1. JUAN PALACIOS, petitioner-appellant, vs. MARIA
CATIMBANG PALACIOS, oppositor-appellee.
Juan Palacios executed his last will and testament on June 25,
1946 and availing himself of the provisions of the new Civil Code,
he filed on May 23, 1956 before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas a petition for its approval. In said will, he instituted as
his sole heirs his natural children Antonio C. Palacios and Andrea
C. Palacios. On June 21, 1956, Maria Catimbang filed a opposition
to the probate of the will alleging that she is the acknowledged
natural daughter of petitioner but that she was completely
ignored in said will thus impairing here legitime.
After the presentation of petitioner's evidence relative to the
essential requisites and formalities provided by law for the
validity of a will, the court on July 6, 1956 issued an order
admitting the will to probate. The court, however, set a date for
the hearing of the opposition relative to the intrinsic validity of
the will and, after proper hearing concerning this incident, the
court issued another order declaring oppositor to be the natural
child of petitioner and annulling the will insofar as it impairs her
legitime, with costs against petitioner.
It should be noted that petitioner instituted the present
proceeding in order to secure the probate of his will availing
himself of the provisions of Article 838, paragraph 2, of the new
Civil Code, which permit a testator to petition the proper court
during his lifetime for the allowance of his will, but to such
petition on Maria Catimbang filed an opposition alleging that she
is the acknowledged natural daughter of petitioner but that she
was completely ignored in the will thus impairing her object to
the probate of the will insofar as it due execution is concerned or
on the ground that it has not complied with the formalities
prescribed by law; rather she objects to its intrinsic validity or to
the legality of the provisions of the will.
We hold that such opposition cannot be entertained in this
proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the
will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of
the law, much less if the purpose of the opposition is to show that
the oppositor is an acknowledged natural child who allegedly has
been ignored in the will for issue cannot be raised here but in a
separate action. This is especially so when the testator, as in the
present case, is still alive and has merely filed a petition for the
allowance of his will leaving the effects thereof after his death.
This is in line with our ruling in Montañano vs. Suesa, wherein we
said: "The authentication of the will decides no other questions
than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of a will. It does not determine nor
even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the
provisions; that may be impugned as being vicious or null,
notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to
these points remain entirely un-affected, and may be raised even
after the will has been authenticated."
On the other hand, "after a will has been probated during the
lifetime of a testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot
alter or revoke the same before he has had a chance to present
such petition, the ordinary probate proceedings after the
testator's death would be in order". The reason for this comment
is that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent (Article 777, new Civil
Code.). It is clear that the trial court erred in entertaining the
opposition and in annulling the portion of the will which
allegedly impairs the legitime of the oppositor on the ground
that, as it has found, she is an extraneous matter which should be
treshed out in a separate action. Wherefore, the order appealed
from is set aside.
2. GUEVARRA vs GUEVARRA (1956)
3. MERCADO vs. SANTOS (1938)
G.R. No. 38050 September 22, 1933
4. In the matter of the will of Donata Manahan. TIBURCIA
MANAHAN, petitioner-appellee, vs. ENGRACIA MANAHAN,
opponent-appellant.
FACTS: On August 29, 1930, Tiburcia Manahan instituted special
proceedings No. 4162, for the probate of the will of the deceased
Donata Manahan, who died in Bulacan, Province of Bulacan, on
August 3, 1930. The petitioner herein, niece of the testatrix, was
named the executrix in said will. The court set the date for the
hearing and the necessary notice required by law was
accordingly published. On the day of the hearing of the petition,
no opposition thereto was filed and, after the evidence was
presented, the court entered the decree admitting the will to
probate as prayed for. The will was probated on September 22,
1930. The trial court appointed the herein petitioner executrix
with a bond of P1,000. One year and seven months later, that is,
on My 11, 1932, to be exact, the appellant herein filed a motion
for reconsideration and a new trial, praying that the order
admitting the will to probate be vacated and the authenticated
will declared null and void ab initio. The appellee herein,
naturally filed her opposition to the petition.
In this instance, the appellant assigns seven (7) alleged errors as
committed by the trial court. Instead of discussing them one by
one, we believe that, essentially, her claim narrows down to the
following: (1) That she was an interested party in the
testamentary proceedings and, as such, was entitled to and
should have been notified of the probate of the will; (2) that the
court, in its order of September 22, 1930, did not really probate
the will but limited itself to decreeing its authentication; and (3)
that the will is null and void ab initio on the ground that the
external formalities prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure
have not been complied with in the execution thereof.
The appellant's first contention is obviously unfounded and
untenable. She was not entitled to notification of the probate of
the will and neither had she the right to expect it, inasmuch as
she was not an interested party, not having filed an opposition to
the petition for the probate thereof. Her allegation that she had
the status of an heir, being the deceased's sister, did not confer on
her the right to be notified on the ground that the testatrix died
leaving a will in which the appellant has not been instituted heir.
Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did not acquire any
successional right.
The second contention is puerile. The court really decreed the
authentication and probate of the will in question, which is the
only pronouncement required of the trial court by the law in
order that the will may be considered valid and duly executed in
accordance with the law. The words authentication and probate
are synonymous in this case. All the law requires is that the
competent court declared that in the execution of the will the
essential external formalities have been complied with and that,
in view thereof, the document, as a will, is valid and effective in
the eyes of the law.
The last contention of the appellant may be refuted merely by
stating that, once a will has been authenticated and admitted to
probate, questions relative to the validity thereof can no more be
raised on appeal. The decree of probate is conclusive with respect
to the due execution thereof and it cannot impugned on any of
the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any
separate or independent action or proceedings.But there is
another reason which prevents the appellant herein from
successfully maintaining the present action and it is that
inasmuch as the proceedings followed in a testamentary case
are in rem, the trial court's decree admitting the will to probate
was effective and conclusive against her, in accordance with the
provisions of section 306 of the said Code of Civil Procedure
which reads as follows:
SEC. 306. EFFECT OF JUDGMENT. — . . . .
1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to
the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased
person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or
relation of a particular person the judgment or order is conclusive upon
the title of the thing, the will or administration, or the condition or
relation of the person: Provided, That the probate of a will or granting of
letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death
of the testator or intestate; . . . .
After due hearing, the court found that the will in question was
valid and effective and the order admitting it to probate, thus
promulgated, should be accepted and respected by all. The
probate of the will in question now constitutes res judicata.
Wherefore, the appeal taken herein is hereby dismissed.
G.R. No. L-23638 October 12, 1967
5. DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA
REYES, petitioners, vs. ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
FACTS: OnJanuary 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent,
submitted to the Court of First Instance a petition for the probate
of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed
on October 22, 1930. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole
heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition was set for
hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and
Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and
Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate of
the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked. Grounds
advanced for the opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the
testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of
the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the
estate made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent.
The Court of First Instance, by decision of June 20, 1958, found
that the will was genuine and properly executed. On January 11,
1960, the Court of First Instance appointed Ricardo Cruz as
administrator for the sole purpose of submitting an inventory of
the estate. The trial Court resolved against the oppositors and
held the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and
unrevoked by the deeds of sale." Whereupon, the oppositors
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate Court
held that the decree of June 20, 1958, admitting the will to
probate, had become final for lack of opportune appeal.
ISSUES: (a) whether or not the decree of the Court of First
Instance allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of
appeal; (b) whether or not the order of the Court of origin dated
July 27, 1959, overruling the estoppel invoked by oppositors-
appellants had likewise become final; and (c) whether or not the
1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly revoked
by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the
proponent on March 26, 1943 and April 3, 1944.
HELD: As to the first point, oppositors-appellants contend that
the order allowing the will to probate should be considered
interlocutory, because it fails to resolve the issues of estoppel and
revocation propounded in their opposition. We agree with the
Court of Appeals that the appellant's stand is untenable. It is
elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles
all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper
execution and witnessing of his last will and testament,
irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable
or otherwise. As such, the probate order is final and appealable.
Appellants argue that they were entitled to await the trial Court's
resolution on the other grounds of their opposition before taking
an appeal, as otherwise there would be a multiplicity of recourses
to the higher Courts. This contention is without weight, since
Rule 109, section 1, expressly enumerates six different instances
when appeal may be taken in special proceedings. There being no
controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not
appealed on time, the same had become final and conclusive.
Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor
review the evidence upon which it is made to rest.
As to the issue of estoppel, we have already ruled in Guevara vs.
Guevara, 98 Phil. 249, that the presentation and probate of a will
are requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to
protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to
respect as a consequence of the decedent's ownership and right
of disposition within legal limits. The last issue, that of
revocation, is predicated on paragraph 2 of Article 957 of the
Civil Code of 1950 (Art. 869 of the Code of 1889), which recites:
Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect:
(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing
bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter
case the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to the
part thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing should again belong
to the testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the contract, the
legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition
shall have been effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of
repurchase;
As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such
change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix,
expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the
circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944
were executed in favor of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba.
In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals in its decision annulling
these conveyances, "no consideration whatever was paid by
respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, thereby
rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying the
property to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply
in advance with what she had ordained in her testament, rather
than an alteration or departure therefrom.1 Revocation being an
exception, we believe, with the Courts below, that in the
circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar. In view of the
foregoing considerations, the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby affirmed.
G.R. No. 14851 September 13, 1919
6. ANTONIA RIERA Y BOTELLAS, petitioner, vs. VICENTE
PALMAROLI, Consul General for Spain, VICENTE PALMAROLI,
Administrator of the Estate of Juan Pons y Coll, and the
Honorable Pedro Concepcion, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila, respondents.
G.R. No. L-21993 June 21, 1966
7. ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET
AL., petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, ANATOLIA
PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN, respondents.
FACTS: It is alleged in the motion to dismiss filed by Angela,
Maria, Abelardo and Antonio Rodriguez, through counsel, that
this Court "has no jurisdiction to try the above-entitled case in
view of the pendency of another action for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal.
The records show that Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February
12, 1963 in the City of Manila; that on March 4, 1963, Apolonia
Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of
Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez; that
on March 8, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez,
through counsel filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to
examine the alleged will; that on March 11, 1963 before the Court
could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn; that on March
12, 1963, aforementioned petitioners filed before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate
estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr.
Rodriguez was a resident of Parañaque, Rizal, and died without
leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as
Special Administratrix of the estate. It was stipulated by the
parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Parañaque, Rizal; that he
was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan,
from the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he
was buried in Parañaque, and that he left real properties in Rizal,
Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.
The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12,
1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate.
The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take
the stand that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired
jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the
Clerk of Court. The Court of First Instance, as previously stated
denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that a difference of a
few hours did not entitle one proceeding to preference over the
other,
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of
any province which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, as
far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
HELD: We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the
delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March
4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later,
because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu
proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the
will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is
prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court
(Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules):
SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be
published. — When a will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance
of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a
time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to
contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of such time and
place to be published three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time
appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for
probate has been filed by the testator himself.
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered
to OR a petition for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly
indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of
a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as
yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit
of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when
the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was
submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4,
while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the
precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is
incontestable.
We cannot disregard Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as
parish priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan (1930-1963); but even if we do
so, and consider that he retained throughout some animus
revertendi to the place of his birth in Parañaque, Rizal, that detail
would not imply that the Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction. As
ruled in previous decisions, the power to settle decedents' estates
is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and the
domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the
jurisdiction of the Court.
The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court
of First Instance ahead of any other, that court is entitled to
assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it
were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old
Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins that:
The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
(Sec. 1)
Of them only one could be of proper venue, yet the rule grants
precedence to that Court whose jurisdiction is first invoked,
without taking venue into account. In our system of civil law,
intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the
testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid
operative will. Says Article 960 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines:
ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has
subsequently lost its validity;
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the
property belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall
take place only with respect to the property in which the testator has
not disposed;
(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does
not happen or is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or
repudiates the inheritance, there being no substitution, and no right of
accretion takes place;
(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases
provided in this Code.
The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus
proceed while the probate of the purported will of Father
Rodriguez is pending. We rule that the Bulacan Court of First
Instance was entitled to priority in the settlement of the estate in
question, and that in refusing to dismiss the probate.
proceedings, said court did not commit any abuse of discretion. It
is the proceedings in the Rizal Court that should be discontinued.
Wherefore, the writ of certiorari applied for is denied.
8. PEREZ vs PEREZ (1959)
G.R. No. L-42226 July 26, 1935
9, In re estate of the deceased Ines Basa de
Mercado. JOAQUINA BASA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs.
ATILANO G. MERCADO, respondent-appellee.
By virtue of an order dated June 27, 1931, the Honorable
Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, allowed and probated the last will and testament of
Ines Basa, deceased. On January 30, 1932, the same judge
approved the account of the administrator of the estate, declared
him the only heir of the deceased under the will and closed the
administration proceedings. On April 11, 1934, the herein
petitioners-appellants filed a motion in which they prayed that
said proceedings be reopened and alleged that the court lacked
jurisdiction to act in the matter because there was a failure to
comply with requirements as to the publication of the notice of
hearing prescribed in the following section of the Code of Civil
Procedure:
SEC. 630. Court to appoint hearing on will. — When a will is delivered
to a court having jurisdiction of the same, the court shall appoint a time
and place when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance of
the will, and shall cause public notice thereof to be given by publication
in such newspaper or newspapers as the court directs of general
circulation in the province, three weeks successively, previous to the
time appointed, and no will shall be allowed until such notice has been
given. At the hearing all testimony shall be taken under oath, reduced to
writing and signed by the witnesses.
In this motion the appellants claim that the provisions of section
630 of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with
in view of the fact that although the trial judge, on May 29, 1931,
ordered the publication of the required notice for "three weeks
successively" previous to the time appointed for the hearing on
the will, the first publication was on June 6, 1931, the third on
June 20, 1931, and the hearing took place on the 27th of that
month, only twenty-one days after the date of the first
publication instead of three full weeks before the day set for the
hearing.
In view of the foregoing, it is held that the language used in
section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the
notice, referred to therein, should be published for three full
weeks before the date set for the hearing on the will. In other
words the first publication of the notice need not be made
twenty-one days before the day appointed for the hearing. The
appellants also contend that the trial court erred in ruling that
the weekly newspaper, Ing Katipunan, in which the notice of
hearing was published, was a newspaper of general circulation in
the Province of Pampanga.
The record shows that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general
circulation in view of the fact that it is published for the
dissemination of local news and general information; that it has
a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is
published at regular intervals and that the trial court ordered the
publication to be made in Ing Katipunan precisely because it was
a "newspaper of general circulation in the Province of
Pampanga." The fact that there is another paper published in
Pampanga that has a few more subscribers (72 to be exact) and
that certain Manila dailies also have a larger circulation in that
province is unimportant. The law does not require that
publication of the notice, referred to in the Code of Civil
Procedure, should be made in the newspaper with the largest
numbers is necessary to constitute a newspaper of general
circulation. The assignments of error of the appellants are
overruled and the appealed order of the trial court is affirmed
with costs in this instance against the appellants.
G.R. No. L-8954 March 21, 1916
10. DOROTEA CABANG, petitioner-appellees, vs. MARTIN
DELFINADO, respondent-appellant.
G.R. No. L-23061 March 6, 1925
11. Estate of the deceased Salome Avila. VICENTE
ALDANESE, petitioner-appellant, vs. CANUTO SALUTILLO, ET
AL., objectors-appellees.
FACTS: The deceased, a widow and a resident of the municipality
of Silbonga, Province of Cebu, died on May 4, 1924, in the
municipality of San Juan del Monte, Province of Rizal. The will is
dated May 3, 1924, appears to be executed in due form and is
witnessed by R.M. de Moreta, Jose U. Borromeo and Estanislao
Rafols, all residents of the City of Manila. The deceased left no
ascendants or descendants and under the dispositions of the will
the greater part of the estate will go to the petitioner Vicente
Aldanese and his sister Enriqueta.
The petition for the probate of the will was presented to the
Court of First Instance of Cebu on May 22, 1924, and was by
order of the court set down for hearing on June 21, 1924. After
due publication of the order Canuto, Teodora, Feliciano and
Raymundo Salutillo and Valeria Llanos appeared as opponents.
The petitioner presented a motion asking the court to authorize
the taking of the depositions of the witnesses to the will on the
ground that being residents of the City of Manila said witnesses
were unable to appear personally before the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. In an order of the same date Auxiliary Judge
Recto granted the motion and at the same time continued the
hearing of the petition for the probate of the will until July 14,
1924.
On June 19, 1924, the opponents presented a motion asking that
the order authorizing the taking of the depositions be revoked.
The court, Judge Wislizenus presiding, granted the motion and on
July 11, 1924, revoked the order in question on the ground that it
had not been sufficiently shown that it was impossible for the
witnesses to appear personally before the court and that
therefore their depositions would be inadmissible in evidence.
The depositions of all three witnesses were taken at the time and
place stated in the notification, the opponents failing to appear.
The petition for probate was finally heard on August 22, 1924.
The depositions were duly presented but were ruled out by the
court on the ground stated in its order of July 11th and there
being no other sufficient evidence of the execution of the will, the
petition was denied and this appeal brought. In our opinion the
court below erred in holding that the depositions in question
were inadmissible in evidence in the probate proceedings. It is
true that the rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is that when a will
is contested the attesting witnesses must be called to prove the
will or a showing must be made that they cannot be had, but that
does not necessarily mean that they must be brought bodily
before the court. It is their testimony which is needed and not
their actual personal presence in the court room. As far as we can
see, there is nothing in the leading case, Cabang vs.
Delfinado (34 Phil., 291), cited by the appellees, to justify a
different conclusion; in that case no effect was made to produce
the testimony of the two subscribing witnesses though their
abode was known to the proponent of the will.
The Code of Civil Procedure seems very clear upon the subject. its
section 274 provides that "the rules of evidence shall be the same in all
courts of the Islands, and upon every trial, unless otherwise expressly provided by
statute."
Section 355 reads in part as follows:
The testimony of a witness in the Philippine Islands may be taken by
deposition, in an action, any time after the service of the summons or
the appearance of the defendant, and, in a special proceeding, after the
question of fact has arisen therein, in the following cases:
2. When the witness resides out of the province in which his testimony
is to be used.
Section 361 reads:
Either party may have the deposition taken of a witness in the
Philippine Islands, in either of the cases mentioned in section three
hundred and fifty-five, before any judge, justices of the peace, or notary
public, on serving on the adverse party previous notice of the time and
place of examination, together with a copy of an affidavit showing that
the case is within section three hundred and fifty-five. Such notice must
be served at least two days before the time is fixed for taking the
deposition, and must in all cases give the party reasonable time after
notice to be presented at the taking thereof, and without a notice of such
reasonable length of time the deposition shall not be admissible in
evidence. The court shall determine, if the deposition is offered in
evidence, whether a reasonable notice of taking has been given.
Section 406 of the same Code reads:
A witness is not obliged to attend as a witness in a civil action before
any court, judge, justice, or other officer out of the province in which he
resides, unless the distance be less than thirty miles from his place of
residence to the place of trial by the usual course of travel, but his
testimony may be taken in such case in the form of a deposition.
In the present case, the will was presented for probate in Cebu;
the attesting witnesses were living in Manila and were beyond
the process of the court for compulsory attendance. They were
called to testify and produced before an officer legally authorized
to take their testimony in the form of depositions. The notice
required by section 361, supra, was duly given and the opponents
given the opportunity to be present and to cross-examine the
witnesses. In the circumstances, this must certainly be
considered a sufficient "calling" of the witnesses and satisfies the
law.
The depositions in question appear to be in due form and would
ordinarily be admissible, but the record indicates that the failure
of the opponents to be presented at the examination of the
witnesses was due to the fact that they were misled by the
petitioner's action in seeking special authorization from the court
for the taking of the depositions. In the interest of justice we
therefore think that the depositions should be retaken and the
opponents given another opportunity to examine the witnesses.
In the second assignment of error the appellant maintains that
the court below erred in excluding the testimony of the
photographer Luis G. Calderon in regard to the identity of a
photographic copy of the will, which copy had been used in
connection with the taking of the aforementioned depositions. It
is well settled that when depositions of subscribing witnesses to
a will are taken, a photographic copy of the will, which copy had
been used in connection with the settled that when depositions of
subscribing witnesses to a will are taken, a photographic copy of
the will may be presented to the witnesses on their examination
and that they may be asked the same original will. It follows that
if the depositions are admitted the testimony as to the identity of
the photographic copy shown to the witnesses is also admissible.
The order appealed from is reversed and the case remanded to
the court below for further proceedings in accordance with the
indications hereinbefore given.
G.R. No. L-40804 January 31, 1978
12. ROSARIO FELICIANO VDA. DE RAMOS, MIGUEL DANILA,
RAYMUNDO A. DANILA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
MARCELINA (MARTINA) GUERRA and THE HEIRS OF
BUENAVENTURA GUERRA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-26317 January 29, 1927
13. Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased. FRANCISCO
GAGO, petitioner-appellant, vs. CORNELIO
MAMUYAC,AMBROSIO LARIOSA, FELICIANA BAUZON, and
CATALINA MAMUYAC, opponents-appellees.
FACTS: on or about the 27th day of July, 1918, the said Miguel
Mamuyac executed a last will and testament (Exhibit A). In the
month of January, 1922, the said Francisco Gago presented a
petition in the Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union
for the probation of that will. The probation of the same was
opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana
Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac. After hearing all of the parties
the petition for the probation of said will was denied upon the
ground that the deceased had on the 16th day of April, 1919,
executed a new will and testament.
On the 21st day of February, 1925, the present action was
commenced. Its purpose was to secure the probation of the said
will of the 16th day of April, 1919. Upon the issue thus presented,
the Honorable Anastacio R. Teodoro, judge, after hearing the
respective parties, denied the probation of said will of April 16,
1919, upon the ground that the same had been cancelled and
revoked in the year 1920. Judge Teodoro, after examining the
evidence adduced, found that the following facts had been
satisfactorily proved:
That Exhibit A is a mere carbon of its original which
remained in the possession of the deceased testator
Miguel Mamuyac, who revoked it before his death as
per testimony of witness Jose Fenoy, who typed the will
of the testator on April 16, 1919, and Carlos Bejar, who
saw on December 30, 1920, the original Exhibit A (will
of 1919) actually cancelled by the testator Miguel
Mamuyac, who assured Carlos Bejar that inasmuch as
he had sold him a house and the land where the house
was built, he had to cancel it (the will of 1919),
executing thereby a new testament. Narcisa Gago in a
way corroborates the testimony of Jose Fenoy,
admitting that the will executed by the deceased
(Miguel Mamuyac) in 1919 was found in the possession
of father Miguel Mamuyac. The opponents have
successfully established the fact that father Miguel
Mamuyac had executed in 1920 another will. The same
Narcisa Gago, the sister of the deceased, who was living
in the house with him, when cross-examined by
attorney for the opponents, testified that the original
Exhibit A could not be found. For the foregoing
consideration and for the reason that the original of
Exhibit A has been cancelled by the deceased father
Miguel Mamuyac, the court disallows the probate of
Exhibit A for the applicant." From that order the
petitioner appealed.
The appellant contends that the lower court committed an error
in not finding from the evidence that the will in question had
been executed with all the formalities required by the law; that
the same had been revoked and cancelled in 1920 before his
death; that the said will was a mere carbon copy and that the
oppositors were not estopped from alleging that fact. With
reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that there is
positive proof, not denied, which was accepted by the lower
court, that will in question had been cancelled in 1920. The law
does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of
a will to be preserved. Where a will which cannot be found is
shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last
seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent
evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same
presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready
access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. In view of
the faCt that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the
death of the testator Miguel Mamuyac and in view of the positive
proof that the same had been cancelled, we are forced to the
conclusion that the conclusions of the lower court are in
accordance with the weight of the evidence. In a proceeding to
probate a will the burden of proofs is upon the proponent clearly
to establish not only its execution but its existence. Having
proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the
contestant to show that it has been revoked. After a careful
examination of the entire record, we are fully persuaded that the
will presented for probate had been cancelled by the testator in
1920. Therefore the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed.
G.R. No. L-12190 August 30, 1958
14. TESTATE ESTATE OF FELICIDAD ESGUERRA ALTO-YAP
deceased. FAUSTO E. GAN, petitioner-appellant, vs. ILDEFONSO
YAP, oppositor-appellee.
FACTS: Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in the
University of Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan,
Bulacan, and in the City of Manila. On March 17, 1952, Fausto E.
Gan initiated theN proceedings in the Manila court of first
instance with a petition for the probate of a holographic will
allegedly executed by the deceased.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap
asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any
testament during her lifetime. After hearing the parties and
considering their evidence, the Hon. Ramon R. San Jose,
Judge,1 refused to probate the alleged will. Sometime in 1950
after her last trip abroad, Felicidad Esguerra mentioned to her
first cousin, Vicente Esguerra, her desire to make a will. She
confided however that it would be useless if her husband
discovered or knew about it. Vicente consulted with Fausto E.
Gan, nephew of Felicidad, who was then preparing for the bar
examinations. The latter replied it could be done without any
witness, provided the document was entirely in her handwriting,
signed and dated by her. Vicente Esguerra lost no time in
transmitting the information, and on the strength of it, in the
morning of November 5, 1951, in her residence at Juan Luna
Street, Manila, Felicidad wrote, signed and dated a holographic
will substantially of the tenor above transcribed, in the presence
of her niece, Felina Esguerra (daughter of Vicente), who was
invited to read it. In the afternoon of that day, Felicidad was
visited by a distant relative, Primitivo Reyes, and she allowed him
to read the will in the presence of Felina Esguerra, who again
read it.
Nine days later, he had other visitors: Socorro Olarte a cousin,
and Rosario Gan Jimenez, a niece. To these she showed the will,
again in the presence of Felina Esguerra, who read it for the third
time. When on November 19, 1951, Felicidad was confined at the
U.S.T. Hospital for her last illness, she entrusted the said will,
which was contained in a purse, to Felina Esguerra. But a few
hours later, Ildefonso Yap, her husband, asked Felina for the
purse: and being afraid of him by reason of his well-known
violent temper, she delivered it to him. Thereafter, in the same
day, Ildefonso Yap returned the purse to Felina, only to demand it
the next day shortly before the death of Felicidad. Again, Felina
handed it to him but not before she had taken the purse to the
toilet, opened it and read the will for the last time.
The trial judge refused to credit the petitioner's evidence for
several reasons, the most important of which were these: (a) if
according to his evidence, the decedent wanted to keep her will a
secret, so that her husband would not know it, it is strange she
executed it in the presence of Felina Esguerra, knowing as she did
that witnesses were unnecessary; (b) in the absence of a showing
that Felina was a confidant of the decedent it is hard to believe
that the latter would have allowed the former to see and read the
will several times; (c) it is improbable that the decedent would
have permitted Primitivo Reyes, Rosario Gan Jimenez and
Socorro Olarte to read her will, when she precisely wanted its
contents to remain a secret during her lifetime; (d) it is also
improbable that her purpose being to conceal the will from her
husband she would carry it around, even to the hospital, in her
purse which could for one reason or another be opened by her
husband; (e) if it is true that the husband demanded the purse
from Felina in the U.S.T. Hospital and that the will was there, it is
hard to believe that he returned it without destroying the will,
the theory of the petitioner being precisely that the will was
executed behind his back for fear he will destroy it.
In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept
the oppositor's evidence that Felicidad did not and could not
have executed such holographic will. In the probate of a
holographic will" says the New Civil Code, "it shall be necessary
that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and
signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the
signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is
contested, at least three such witnesses shall be required. In the
absence of any such witnesses, (familiar with decedent's
handwriting) and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony
may be resorted to."
ISSUE: May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of
witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare that it was
in the handwriting of the testator? How can the oppositor prove
that such document was not in the testator's handwriting?
HELD: courts will not distribute the property of the deceased in
accordance with his holographic will, unless they are shown his
handwriting and signature.7 Taking all the above circumstances
together, we reach the conclusion that the execution and the
contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be
proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or
read such will.
Turning now to the evidence presented by the petitioner, we find
ourselves sharing the trial judge's disbelief. In addition to the
dubious circumstances described in the appealed decision, we
find it hard to believe that the deceased should show her will
precisely to relatives who had received nothing from it: Socorro
Olarte and Primitivo Reyes. These could pester her into
amending her will to give them a share, or threaten to reveal its
execution to her husband Ildefonso Yap. And this leads to another
point: if she wanted so much to conceal the will from her
husband, why did she not entrust it to her beneficiaries?
Opportunity to do so was not lacking: for instance, her husband's
trip to Davao, a few days after the alleged execution of the will. In
fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and
probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence submitted
by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and
inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that "clear and
distinct" proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6. Wherefore, the
rejection of the alleged will must be sustained.
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
15. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE
WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA deceased, MARCELA
RODELAS, petitioner-appellant, vs. AMPARO ARANZA, ET
AL., oppositors-appellees,
FACTS: On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate of the holographic
will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary
in her favor. The petition, was opposed by the appellees on the
following grounds:
(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a
will by failing to produce the will within twenty days of the death
of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of
Court;
(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not
contain a disposition of property after death and was not
intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will
(3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged copy
thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect,
as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and
(4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or
otherwise, executed and attested as required by law.
On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the cases,
the appellees moved again to dismiss the petition for the probate
of the will. They argued that:
(1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an
instruction as to the management and improvement of the
schools and colleges founded by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and
(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by
secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.
Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was
denied and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will of
Ricardo B. Bonilla. MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged
holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo
B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. In view of the lapse of more than
14 years from the time of the execution of the will to the death of
the decedent, the fact that the original of the will could not be
located shows to our mind that the decedent had discarded
before his death his allegedly missing Holographic Will.
Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an
appeal to the Court of Appeals in which it is contended that the
dismissal of appellant's petition is contrary to law and well-
settled jurisprudence.
ISSUE: whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be
found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy.
HELD: Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of
holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its
due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested
or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required
and, if no witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If
contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required.
However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and
no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated because
the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in
said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between
sample handwritten statements of the testator and the
handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the
holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be
made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of
Gan vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution
and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not
be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen
and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented;
otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the
document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in
Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved
by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or
carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited
and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic
or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be
admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the
deceased can be determined by the probate court. WHEREFORE,
the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying
appellant's motion for reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of
the Order dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to approve
the will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982
16. RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L.
MANINANG, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO S. ASENETA, respondents.
FACTS: On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the
Manila Sanitarium Hospital at age 81. She left a holographic will.
On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for
probate of the Will of the decedent with the Court of First
Instance-Branch IV, Quezon City (Sp. Proc. No. Q-23304,
hereinafter referred to as the Testate Case). On July 25, 1977,
herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son,
claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta,
instituted intestate proceedings with the Court of First Instance-
Branch XI, Pasig, Rizal (Sp. Proc. No. 8569, called hereinafter the
Intestate Case" for brevity). Respondent Bernardo then filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the
holographic will was null and void because he, as the only
compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should
ensue.
In her Opposition to said Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Soledad
averred that it is still the rule that in a case for probate of a Will,
the Court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and
resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will; and that
respondent Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the
decedent. On September 8, 1980, the lower Court ordered the
dismissal of the Testate Case.
On December 19, 1980, the lower Court denied reconsideration
for lack of merit and in the same Order appointed Bernardo as
the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased
Clemencia Aseneta "considering that he is a forced heir of said
deceased while oppositor Soledad Maninang is not, and
considering further that Bernardo Aseneta has not been shown to
be unfit to perform the duties of the trust. " Petitioners Maninang
resorted to a certiorari Petition before respondent Court of
Appeals alleging that the lower Court exceeded its jurisdiction in
issuing the Orders of dismissal of the Testate Case (September 8,
1980) and denial of reconsideration (December 19, 1980).
On April 28, 1981, respondent Court 3 denied certiorari and ruled
that the trial Judge's Order of dismissal was final in nature as it
finally disposed of the Testate Case and, therefore, appeal was the
proper remedy, which petitioners failed to avail of. We find that
the Court a quo a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it
dismissed the Testate Case. Generally, the probate of a Will is
mandatory. Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its
intrinsic validity. Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of
the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in Probate
proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the
will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of
the law.
The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the exception rather
than the rule. The intrinsic validity of the Wills in those cases was
passed upon even before probate because "practical
considerations" so demanded. Moreover, for the parties in
the Nuguid case, the "meat of the controversy" was the intrinsic
validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that case "shunted aside
the question of whether or not the Will should be allowed
probate." Not so in the case before us now where the probate of
the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on the
extrinsic validity of the Will demanded.
In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is
whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private
respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter,
whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and
disinheritance are two diverse concepts. The effects of
preterition and disinheritance are also totally different.
By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination
of that controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered.
We gather from the assailed Order of the trial Court that its
conclusion was that respondent Bernardo has been preterited
We are of opinion, however, that from the face of the Will, that
conclusion is not indubitable.
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987
17. CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner, vs. HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases
Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON,
respondents.
FACTS: On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch XIII, a petition for
the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the
issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary, on the
premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which
petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his
sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as
heirs.
The will allegedly executed by Nemesio Acain on February 17,
1960 was written in Bisaya (Rollo, p. 27) with a translation in
English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by petitioner without objection
raised by private respondents. The will contained provisions on
burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain
Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament.
oppositors (respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally
adopted daughter of tile deceased and the latter's widow Rosa
Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the following
grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these
proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow
and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158).
Said motion was denied by the trial judge.
Respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was
subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court by
Resolution of the Court. Respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court granted private respondents' petition and ordered the trial
court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of
Nemesio Acain. His motion for reconsideration having been
denied, petitioner filed this present petition for the review of
respondent Court's decision.
ISSUE: whether or not private respondents have been pretirited.
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not; inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
institution shall he effectual, without prejudice to the right of
representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the
widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply
as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she
is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving
spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is
omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.
However, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent
Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has
not been questioned by petitioner. Under Article 39 of P.D. No.
603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives
to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a
legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a
legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally
omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both
adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their
legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly
disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally
adopted child.
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment
throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance. The
universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and
sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally
abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of
universal heirs-without any other testamentary disposition in the
will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.
Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a
legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of
any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is
called upon to receive (Article 782, Civil Code). At the outset, he
appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under
Article 782 of the Civil Code as a person called to the succession
either by the provision of a will or by operation of law. However,
intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent
adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is
in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to
petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased.
As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to
the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the
testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity
of the will normally comes only after the Court has declared that
the will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of
the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity
or efficacy of the provisions of the will.
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. In the instant
case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition. It
was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 21, 1985
for the reason that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are
matters properly to be resolved after a hearing on the issues in
the course of the trial on the merits of the case. For private
respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed
the case to progress when on its face the will appears to be
intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were
instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that
one of the private respondents had been preterited would have
been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have
denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the
extrinsic validity of the will was resolved. The remedies of
certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private
respondents. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 24168 September 22, 1925
18. FLORENCIO MANALO, as guardian of the minors Lazaro
Mendieta and Daria Mendieta, petitioner, vs. Honorable
ISIDRO PAREDES, Judge of First Instance of Laguna, and
PHILIPPINE FOOD COMPANY,respondents.
FACTS: On March 22, 1924, Laureana Hidalgo, surviving spouse
of Francisco Villegas, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Laguna an application for letters of administration of the estate
left by her deceased husband, who, according to the application,
died intestate. Justina Mendieta, Lazaro Mendieta, Daria Mendieta
and Melecio Fule, supposed testamentary executor, through their
attorney, Mr. Eusebio Lopez, filed a motion with the court,
praying for the probate of the supposed will of Francisco Villegas,
wherein most of his property was given as a legacy to said Justina
Mendieta, the latter's children and the legitimate wife of the
deceased Francisco Villegas. On August 8, 1924, Messrs. E.M.
Lopez and V.F. Reyes, attorneys, on behalf of the executor Melecio
Fule, filed a motion (Exhibit 3) wherein they stated that the
attesting witnesses, Exequiel Evidente and Albino Villegas, had
assured them that the supposed will had not been executed by
Francisco Villegas in accordance with law, and that the executor
Melecio Fule no longer took interest in the case.
The court, on September 3, 1924, ordered the publication in the
newspaper El Debate, of Manila, of the application of Melecio Fule
and of Justina Mendieta, Lazaro Mendieta, and Daria Mendieta for
the probate of the supposed will of the deceased Francisco
Villegas, setting said application for hearing on the 3rd day of
October, 1924.
At the trial which was held October 16, 1924, the court below
appointed Justina Mendieta, natural mother of said minors, as
their guardian ad litem. Laureana Hidalgo entered her objection
to the probate of the will. By an order dated October 25, 1924, the
court approved said stipulation and rendered judgment, holding
that the supposed will of Francisco Villegas could not be
probated, and awarding to the heirs of the deceased the estate
left by Francisco Villegas in accordance with said agreement (rec.
No. 4031, file 2, fol. 173). From this order no appeal has been
taken.
On January 7, 1925, one Gelacio Malihan, who claimed to be first
cousin of the deceased Francisco Villegas, filed with the court a
new application for the probate of the same supposed will of the
deceased Francisco Villegas. The proceeding for the probate of a
will is a proceeding in rem, and the court acquires jurisdiction
over all the persons interested through the publication of the
notice prescribed by section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
and any order that may be entered is binding against all of them.
Through the publication ordered by the Court of First Instance of
Laguna of the application for the probate of the supposed will of
Francisco Villegas, said court acquired jurisdiction over all such
persons as were interested in the supposed will, including
Gelacio Malihan. The court having tried said application for
probate, hearing all the testimony of the attesting witnesses of
the said supposed will, the applicant Justina Mendieta for herself
and as guardian ad litem of her minor children, represented by
their attorneys, Messrs. Marcelino Lontok and Marcial Azada, on
the one hand, and Laureana Hidalgo, widow of Francisco Villegas,
represented by her attorney, Jesus. E. Blanco, on the other, having
submitted a stipulation wherein the former withdrew her
application and the latter reserved certain rights over the estate
left by Francisco Villegas in favor of Justina Mendieta and her
minor children; and the court having approved said stipulation
and declared that Francisco Villegas died intestate according to
said agreement, all the parties became bound by said judgment;
and if any of them or other persons interested were not satisfied
with the court's decision, they had the remedy of appeal to
correct any injustice that might have been committed, and cannot
now through the special remedy of mandamus, obtain a review of
the proceeding upon a new application for the probate of the
same will in order to compel the respondent judge to comply
with his ministerial duty imposed by section 330 of the Code of
Civil Procedure; because this remedy, being extraordinary,
cannot be used in lieu of appeal, or writ of error , especially when
the parties interested have agreed to disregard the testamentary
provisions and divide the estate as they pleased, each of them
taking what pertained to him. For all the foregoing, the petition
for mandamus is denied with the costs against the petitioner. So
ordered
G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088 July 31, 1954
19. In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY.
SILVINO SUNTAY, petitioner-appellant, vs. In re: Intestate
Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY, FEDERICO C.
SUNTAY, administrator-appellee.
G.R. No. L-3677 November 29, 1951
20. In the Matter of the Testate Estate of BASIL GORDON
BUTLER; MERCEDES LEON, petitioner-appellant, and ADA
LOGGEY GHEZZI, administratrix-appellant, vs.
MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO., thru Philippine
Branch, oppositor-appellee.
FACTS: Basil Gordon Butler, formerly a resident of the
Philippines, died in Brooklyn, New York City, in 1945, leaving a
will which was duly probated in the Surrogate's Court of New
York County on August 3 of the same year, and of which James
Ross, Sr., James Madison Ross, Jr. and Ewald E. Selph were named
executors. The estate having been settled, the proceedings were
closed on July 17, 1947. The will contained this residuary clause:
After payment of these legacies and my just debts, including funeral
expenses, I devise, give and bequeath all of my remaining estate and
personal effects of which I may die possessed to Mercedes de Leon, of
Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal, to wit: the personal effects to be delivered to
her for her use and profit; the moneys, securities and other valuable
property, not personal effects, to be held in trust for her benefit by my
executors, at their absolute discretion, to be administered for her
permanent benefit in whatever way they may consider most
advantageous in the circumstances existing. Since the said Mercedes de
Leon is not of sound judgment, and discretion in the handling of money,
it is not my wish that she be given any sums of money other than for her
current needs, except as my executors in their judgment deem
advantageous to her. In case the amount available for this bequest be
sufficient to purchase an adequate annuity, the executors in their
discretion may do so. And I attest and direct that I do not wish to intend
that the action of my executors upon their discretion in this matter be
questioned by anyone whatsoever.
For the purpose of carrying out that testamentary provision,
James Madison Ross was appointed trustee by the New York
County Surrogate's Court on February 4, 1948. Once appointed,
and with the beneficiary signing the application with him, Ross
bought an annuity from the Manufacturer's life Insurance Co. at
its head office in Toronto, Canada, paying in advance $17,091.03
as the combined premiums. The contract stipulates for a monthly
payment of $57.60 to Mercedes Benz during her lifetime, with the
proviso that in the event of her death, the residue, if any, of the
capital sum shall be paid in one sum to James Madison Ross or his
successor as trustee. And beginning May 27, 1948, Mercedes de
Leon has been receiving the stipulated monthly allowance
through the Insurance Company's Manila Office.
After having qualified, the administratrix filed the motion which
Judge Amparo has denied. The administration of Butler's estate
granted in New York was the principal or domiciliary
administration while the administration taken out in the
Philippines is ancillary. The important thing to inquire into is the
Manila court's authority with respect to the assets herein
involved. The general rule universally recognized is that
administration extends only to the assets of a decedent found
within the state or country where it was granted, so that an
administrator appointed in one state or country has no power
over property in another state or country. This principle is
specifically embodied in section 4 of Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court:
Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court shall
grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will
annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall
extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate,
after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be
disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon
it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in
cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are
inhabitants of another state or country.
It is manifest from the facts before set out that the funds in
question are outside the jurisdiction of the probate court of
Manila. Having been invested in an annuity in Canada under a
contract executed in the country, Canada is the suits of the
money. There is no showing or allegation that the funds have
been transferred or removed to the Manila Branch.

Even if the money were in the hands of the Manila Branch, yet it
no longer forms part of butler's estate and is beyond the control
of the court. It has passed completely into the hands of the
company in virtue of a contract duly authorized and validly
executed. Whether considered as a trust or as simple
consideration for the company's assumed obligation, which it has
been religiously performing, of paying periodical allowances to
the annuitant, the proceeds of the sale cannot be withdrawn
without the consent of the company, except, upon the death of
the annuitant, the residuary legatee may claim the remainder, if
there be any. Neither the domiciliary or ancillary executor of
Butler's will, nor the trustee, nor the annuitant has disposition of
any of these funds beyond the amounts and except upon the
conditions agreed upon in the contract for annuity.

In the third place, the power of the court to cite a person for the
purpose stated in the administratrix's motion is defined in
section 7 of Rule 88, which provides.

Person entrusted with estate compelled to render account.—The

court, on complaint of an executor or administrator, with any part the
estate of the deceased to appear before it, and may require such person
to render a full account, on oath, of the money, goods, chattels, bonds,
accounts, or other papers belonging to such estate as came to his
possession in trust for such executor or administrator, and for his
proceedings thereon; and if the person so cited refuses to appear to
render such account, the court may punish him for contempt as having
disobeyed a lawful order of the court.

The appellant administratrix did not entrust to the appellee the

money she wants the latter to account for, nor did the said money
come to the appellee's possession in trust for the administratrix.
In other words, the administratrix is a complete stranger to the
subject of the motion and to the appellee. There being no
creditors, the only subject of the motion, we incline to believe, is
to enable Mercedes de Leon to get the legacy in a lump sum in
complete disregard of the wishes of the testator, who showed
deep concern for her welfare, and of the annuity contract which
the annuitant herself applied for in conjunction with the trustee.
All in all, from every standpoint, including that of the annuitant's
financial well-being, the motion and the appeal are utterly
groundless and ill-advised. The appealed order therefore is
affirmed with costs against the appellants.