Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Lamprini Rori
To cite this article: Lamprini Rori (2016): The 2015 Greek parliamentary elections:
from great expectations to no expectations, West European Politics, DOI:
10.1080/01402382.2016.1171577
ELECTIONS IN CONTEXT
The year 2015 was an electorally intense one for the European South, with con-
tests in Spain, Portugal and Greece indicating significant changes in the party
systems and the emergence of new political actors elected in parliament and/or
coming to power.1 Austerity functioned like a structure of political opportunity
Downloaded by [Lamprini Rori] at 02:16 18 May 2016
that altered party competition in a way nobody could have predicted three
years before. Among the left-wing coalition in Portugal, the rise of Podemos
to the third position among Spanish political parties followed by the collapse
of two-partyism and the two consecutive victories of the Coalition of Radical
Left (SYRIZA), the latter certainly provoked the most contradictory feelings
and calamitous economic results.
Between the January 2015 election, in which SYRIZA was the first party of
the radical left to have won power in the history of the EU (Rori 2015a), and
the September 2015 election which confirmed its dominance, extraordinary
events occurred, even for the turbulent politics of crisis-ridden Greece. Change
confirms the course that started with the earthquake elections of May and June
2012 (Voulgaris and Nikolakopoulos 2014), ended the old two-partyism and
brought about a new polarised, two-party system (Dinas and Rori 2013). It
remains to be seen whether the September landslide constitutes the end of a
realignment process which will stabilise the new, weaker two-partyism enacted
by SYRIZA and New Democracy (ND) or whether it will be followed by large
shifts and unsteady electoral performance (Moschonas 2015).
platform whose main objective was to negotiate the terms of the agreement with
the creditors, provided that the negotiations did not undermine the country’s
place in the Eurozone.
The talks held between the government and the so-called troika – European
Commission, European Central Bank, International Monetary Fund – resulted
in a new package of austerity measures and reforms in exchange for an esti-
mated loan of €13.5 billion. The suspended loan tranches would be released as
long as Greece continued to generate a primary surplus. Even though the new
agreement specified better loan terms, the debate on debt relief was postponed
due to the troika’s ambivalent stance. A tranche of €49 billion was released
by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in December. While the
risk of leaving the Eurozone seemed to have abated, the economic downturn
continued.
The ruling coalition was severely tested throughout 2013. Heavy reforms and
Downloaded by [Lamprini Rori] at 02:16 18 May 2016
measures were implemented. In April, the parliament voted for the dismissal
of 15,000 employees by the end of 2014, fostering anger among the opposi-
tion. The government recapitalised the banks for €25 billion and proceeded
to privatisations, an act which was described by SYRIZA as liquidation of the
state’s assets. Law and order issues were also high on the government’s agenda.
Although there was a decline in massive and violent demonstrations, the social
climate remained restless and local violent movements persisted, becoming a
point of conflict between SYRIZA and the government.
The government’s decision to put an abrupt end to the public broadcasting
group (ERT) by decree in June exacerbated government instability. Perceived
as a symbol of authoritarianism, ERT’s ‘black screen’ led to the redundancy of
2,656 workers, which reflected the government’s attempt to meet its commit-
ment to the troika to dismiss 2,000 employees by the end of June. DIMAR, the
opposition parties, ERT employees and international commentators reacted
forcefully, accusing ND and PASOK of an undemocratic decision. The cri-
sis escalated into journalists’ strikes, the occupation of the building by ERT
employees, daily gatherings of several hundreds of citizens outside Radio
Hall. The ground was fertile for the rapprochement of SYRIZA with society
and certain social groups, as well as with the far right, national-populist party
Independent Greeks (ANEL). Both parties accused the government of staging
a coup and promised to reinstate the laid-off employees. The government put
an end to the occupation of the former ERT building by having it evacuated
by force. The failure of negotiations among the coalition partners led DIMAR
to withdraw from the government, further weakening the government major-
ity, hitherto constituted of 153 deputies. The inevitable reshuffle promoted
PASOK President Evangelos Venizelos to Deputy Prime Minister and Minister
of Foreign Affairs, while senior party members joined the government.
Barely a month after the ERT crisis, the parliament voted in new measures,
among which was the ‘mobility plan’ for 25,000 civil servants. Amidst a climate
West European Politics 3
of strong social discontent, SYRIZA initiated a censure motion against the gov-
ernment in November, which was backed by the deputies of ANEL, the Greek
Communist Party (KKE) and the right-wing extremist Golden Dawn (HA).
Although the motion was rejected by 153 votes, the government’s majority
was tested again in December during the vote for the budget of 2014. Despite
numerous reactions from all sides, it was voted for by 153 MPs.
Even though the economy remained in recession, and unemployment had
risen to 28% at the end of 2013, the image of Greece abroad had improved. The
government reduced the deficit and achieved a primary surplus for the first
time. The success of a trial return to the markets in spring 2014 and the positive
feedback from partners on the path taken by Greece constituted the elements
on which the government built the Greek ‘success story’. This was the main
narrative with which it hoped to win the forthcoming European, municipal
and regional elections.
Downloaded by [Lamprini Rori] at 02:16 18 May 2016
Elections took place on 25 May. With the slogan ‘We vote on the 25th,
they leave on the 26th’, SYRIZA tried to convert the European elections into
a referendum on the government, a fact which maximised polarisation and
led to higher levels of turnout than usual (Figure 1). By winning 26.56% of
the vote in the European elections, SYRIZA confirmed the lead that had been
registered in the polls since December 2013. ND came second with 22.72%,
followed by HA. The right-wing extremist party secured 9.39%, despite the fact
that its leader, the majority of MPs and key party members had been in prison
since September 2013, awaiting trial for, among other things, participation in
a criminal organisation after an assassination by a party member.
The difference between the two parties had been widening in the polls in
favour of SYRIZA, which precipitated the forthcoming ballot by taking advan-
tage of the election for the President of the Republic, scheduled for December
2014. The government proposed as a candidate in the presidential election a
former European Commissioner, former Minister and member of ND. SYRIZA
and ANEL used their institutional leeway to provoke early elections: they
refused to vote for any candidate, thus precluding the possibility to agree on a
consensual candidacy. As the candidate proposed by the government majority
received only 168 votes,3 a general election was convened for 25 January 2015.
This would be the fourth anticipated parliamentary election since the outbreak
of the financial crisis.
The stance vis-à-vis the bailout remained the dividing line in party competi-
tion throughout this period, whereas fragmentation of the party system (Dinas
and Rori 2013) persisted.4 The biggest shifts took place in the centre-left of the
political spectrum. Consistent in its pro-bailout stance and a faithful ally to its
erstwhile conservative opponent, PASOK suffered the greatest loss, in terms of
both members and voters. Three splinter parties were founded by ex-cadres,
one of them by former PASOK leader and Prime Minister Giorgos Papandreou.
It was mainly a personalised party, structured around its leader.
DIMAR’s exit from the coalition government and its ambiguous position
towards the bailout caused disturbances in the party. Despite the will of many
prominent party members, its leader refused to cooperate with PASOK under
the initiative of 58 politicians and academics who tried to unify the forces of
the centre-left. DIMAR finally cooperated with the Greens in the January elec-
tions. PASOK backed the ‘Initiative of 58’, which nonetheless did not flourish.
The failure of the alliance between PASOK and DIMAR left a void in the
broader space of the centre and centre-left, which was soon covered by the
River (POTAMI). Created in February 2014 by a popular television journalist,
Stavros Theodorakis, the POTAMI is a cadre party whose candidates came
West European Politics 5
from DIMAR, former liberal parties, and public figures from the media, arts
and letters. It represents a social-liberal trend, committed to Greece’s European
identity, the reform of the state and the economy, as well as the renewal of the
political system. It supported the idea of creating a national negotiating com-
mittee and declared its will to participate in a coalition government.
Acting like a vote-maximiser from June 2012, SYRIZA was arguably the
biggest beneficiary of the financial crisis. The shock of the crisis acted as a
catalyst for its exponential rise (Moschonas 2013). By investing in polarisa-
tion, denunciation and national populism, SYRIZA called for change in Greece
and Europe. It launched the idea of an alliance of the countries of southern
Europe, which was only backed by its sister party in Spain, the newly founded
Podemos. SYRIZA’s march to power was marked by organisational changes
consistent with constitutional requirements: the unification of the party since
the July 2013 congress, which was sealed by the election of Alexis Tsipras as
Downloaded by [Lamprini Rori] at 02:16 18 May 2016
faded after the assassination of Fyssas. Despite the judicial inquiry into the
party’s criminal activities, the lifting of its deputies’ parliamentary immunity,
the imprisonment of its leader, MPs and members and the suspension of party
funding, HA came third in the 2014 elections, both national and European.
The nationalist, populist radical right-wing party of ANEL, on the contrary,
lost terrain in terms of both votes and parliamentary presence: more than half
of its MPs went independent before the end of their mandate. In addition to
their extreme anti-bailout discourse, their rhetoric included populist, anti-
partisan, hyper-nationalist, anti-European, anti-immigration, homophobic and
conspiracy elements (Georgiadou 2015). The common parliamentary strate-
gies of ANEL and SYRIZA from 2012 to 2015 – in the confidence vote and
the presidential election – showed the rapprochement of the two players and
presaged their future collaboration in government.
Downloaded by [Lamprini Rori] at 02:16 18 May 2016
system remained the same: although the number of parties that got over 1% rose
from 9 to 11, parties exceeding the 3% threshold and thus obtaining parliamen-
tary representation remained at 7. ND lost almost 9.5%, whereas HA gained 17
seats and thus secured the third position. The big losers of the elections were the
forces of the centre-left. The balkanisation of PASOK (Anastasakis 2015) that
had started in 2012 resulted in an unprecedented fragmentation of the political
space into four parties. Although they made a total of 13.68%, only PASOK and
POTAMI managed to secure their presence in parliament.
Having augmented its power by 9.5 points since 2012, SYRIZA was the big
winner of the elections (Table 1). SYRIZA succeeded in better mobilising its
electorate,6 as well as attracting voters from all competing political parties. Some
25% of those who voted for PASOK in June 2012 voted for SYRIZA in 2015, along
with 32% from DIMAR, 20% from KKE, 20% from ANEL and 10% from HA,
while direct shifts of June 2012 votes from ND to SYRIZA reached 11–13% (just
over 3% of the electorate). As in the 2012 elections (Nezi and Katsanidou 2014),
the hypothesis of an economic-based voting seems at first glance to be confirmed
at least for those who passed straight onto the ‘other side’: voters who offered their
one-off support to ND in June 2012, in an attempt to avert the potentially nega-
tive economic consequences of a SYRIZA victory, now shifted towards SYRIZA
to punish the incumbent for its economic performance (Konstantinidis 2015).
The advance of SYRIZA among voters who had cast a vote exceeded six
points. Data from the exit polls show that the determinant factor in the vote
for SYRIZA was more the desire for an alternation in government than iden-
tification with the party: 52.4% of voters wishing to condemn the government
moved towards SYRIZA (33% of the entire population), whereas only 28.5%
of those who voted in order to support a particular party chose SYRIZA (36%
of the population).7 The desire to punish the incumbent government and the
candidacy of Alexis Tsipras were the most salient drivers of support for the
party of the radical left.
Downloaded by [Lamprini Rori] at 02:16 18 May 2016
8
Hence the coalition follows the smallest policy distance criterion: both gov-
ernment partners had exactly the same position on a specific political and
economic subject – the rejection of the memorandum – which nevertheless
was the most salient issue for both parties, regardless of important differences
between them on cultural issues. Thus the alliance is not based on a substantial
programme agreement, but on opposition to the memorandum, austerity and
partly to the EU. Through this striking coalition, SYRIZA opted to emphat-
ically and firmly express that negotiations with partners were the core of the
government. Finally, the choice corresponds to the minimum winning coalition
theory: in arithmetical terms the electoral power of ANEL was as much as
SYRIZA needed in order to form a majority, a fact that, among others, guar-
anteed its maximum autonomy in the cabinet. The compatibility of the two
allies was reinforced by the pronounced radical populism they have adopted
throughout the crisis period (Pappas 2014).
The system’s transition towards a new two-partyism (Dinas and Rori 2013) is
advancing but has yet to consolidate. The combined electoral force of SYRIZA
and ND, which increased from 35.6% to 56.5% between May and June 2012,
rose to 64.1% in January 2015. Although the tendency is clear, it remains far
from the pre-crisis levels of two-partyism (77.4% in October 2009). It differs
also in terms of distance between the main antagonists, as well as between
the second and third parties. The 8.5% distance between the first and second
party differs from the symmetric bipartisan system established back in the
1980s, whereas the distance between the second and third parties, which rose
from 3.6% to 14.6% between May and June 2012, increased to 21.5% in 2015.
The distance has widened gradually, but has not yet reached pre-crisis levels
(26% in 2009). It is an imperfect and asymmetric two-partyism on the way to
consolidation.
10 L. Rori
and fragility regarding the Greek economy: bank deposits fell, tax revenue and
the stock market declined, yields rose. A series of contacts between European
officials and the government soon revealed the chasm in their perceptions: the
former insisted on adhering to the existing programme and urged Greece to
resolve the question of its extension, while the latter rejected the programme
and the troika and demanded a new deal and debt relief.
Although Greece remained dependent on external support, the government
persisted with its denunciatory, national-populist aggression against creditors
and political opponents alike. Within the country it adopted the divisive strat-
egy ‘those who are not with us are with the creditors’, and abroad it procras-
tinated, believing that the creditors would ultimately give in. The linchpin of
the rationale behind this delaying tactic was that a Greek bankruptcy would be
financially detrimental to the Eurozone and geopolitically harmful to the EU.
Given the substantial payments the country would have to make in the
next few months, and pressed by the approaching expiry of the extended pro-
gramme on 28 February, the government was forced to take a first step back
from its tough line. On 20 February it acknowledged the memorandum and
the need to finalise the evaluation and asked for a four-month extension to the
lending agreement. In return the government gained time and the change of
the negotiation label from ‘troika’ to the ‘Brussels group’. For all this symbolic
victory – which was handy for domestic use – essentially the negotiation terms
had become tougher and the country was being isolated within the EU.
While many within the country and abroad believed the deal of 20 February
to be the end of the negotiation, all it did was to expose the limits of the gov-
ernment’s capacity and reliability in implementing measures and the difficult
game in which the PM was trying to strike a balance. On the one hand it went
against its commitment not to rescind measures or make unilateral changes,
reopening ERT, allocating funds to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, renegoti-
ating maturing debts, and reinstating or offering tenure to public servants. On
West European Politics 11
the other hand, it had to negotiate simultaneously with its European partners
and within the party, where the dissident voices were getting louder. Resistance
among MPs and within the government meant that the deal was never brought
to Parliament for ratification.
While negotiations went on fruitlessly at all levels, with the creditors claim-
ing that the Greek side’s proposed measures were neither specific nor sufficient,
liquidity within the country was dwindling. A bill was hastily passed in April
for the transfer of all cash reserves held by public organisations, pension funds
and local authorities to the Bank of Greece. Ambivalence and doublespeak
continued: while the government momentarily softened the edge of its dis-
course towards the partners, assuring them that it would fulfil its obligations
and accelerate the evaluation, some of its members pushed for total rupture.
Trapped in its anti-bailout, anti-Western attitude, the government sought in
vain various forms of financing from China, Iran and Russia, which the PM
Downloaded by [Lamprini Rori] at 02:16 18 May 2016
visited twice, while pushing for a political solution on the European level.
As Europe remained adamant about completing the evaluation, uncertainty
reigned and the country was being isolated, the Greek negotiating team was
restructured with the removal of the Minister of Finance. Yet by then the situ-
ation had seriously deteriorated. The exaggerations, insults and threats uttered
from both sides had exacerbated the lack of mutual trust. And while the gov-
ernment assured the Greek public that an agreement was ante portas, Europe
was abuzz with Grexit scenarios.
In the summit of 22 June the Greek government submitted a proposal
with €7.9 billion of measures in order to secure a further extension to the
programme. The creditors proposed some changes in the mix of measures.
Negotiations failed, with European leaders urging Greece to accept the offer
of 25 June, which the Prime Minister described as a humiliating ultimatum
of measures that ‘contravened the founding principles and values of Europe’.
After five months of unfruitful negotiations and only four days before the
bailout was due to expire, Alexis Tsipras shocked his counterparts as well as
the Greek and European public opinion by announcing that the forthcoming
EU/ECB/IMF‒Greek agreement would be put to a referendum. Announced
on 27 June, the referendum was scheduled for 5 July. The results of the vote by
the 62.25% of 9,914,244 registered citizens who participated were 61.31% ‘No’
and 38.69% ‘Yes’.8
The referendum took place in a context of unprecedented polarisation. The
country was quickly divided into two opposed camps: on the one side, the
coalition partners – SYRIZA and ANEL – and the right-wing extremist HA
campaigned against the agreement; on the other, the pro-European parties –
ND, PASOK, DIMAR (moderate left), POTAMI (centre) – campaigned in
favour of the bailout.
The two sides framed the question of the referendum differently. The ‘No’
camp invoked national pride and dignity and maintained that the referendum
12 L. Rori
was not about the currency or belonging in the Eurozone, but a powerful nego-
tiation weapon for the Greek side. In multiple appearances over the campaign
week the Prime Minister insisted, often in dramatic tones, that a win for the
‘No’ camp would put him in a stronger position to negotiate a more favourable
deal. The referendum was presented as an opportunity to assess democracy and
popular sovereignty, according to SYRIZA, or national sovereignty according
to ANEL and GD.
In line with statements by European leaders and counterparts, the ‘Yes’ camp
framed the question as a stance towards Greece’s membership in the Eurozone
and the EU. Using various tones, language and arguments, the ‘Yes’ parties
accused the government of dividing the people and jeopardising the country’s
European orientation. The ‘Yes’ vote was given existential dimensions, equat-
ing the ‘No’ vote with an act of suicide. The government was accused of never
intending to reach an agreement but rather to pull the country out of the euro
Downloaded by [Lamprini Rori] at 02:16 18 May 2016
Figure 2. Vote in the July 2015 referendum on the basis of voting in the January election.
Source: Author’s elaboration of data from ProRata, 1 July 2015, N = 1,000.
Downloaded by [Lamprini Rori] at 02:16 18 May 2016
conducted a day before the referendum, a substantial share of ‘No’ voters wanted
a different status vis-à-vis the EMU and the EU, whilst all ‘Yes’ voters wanted
Greece to stay in the Eurozone. A majority of ‘Yes’ supporters expressed beliefs
that a Grexit would follow a ‘No’ vote, whilst more than 90% of ‘No’ support-
ers expected continued negotiations in the aftermath of the referendum. The
vote was divided along partisan lines (Figure 2), but occupation and education
played only a minimal role in vote intention. Apart from the massive ‘No’ among
the unemployed, small differences were detected between other professional
groups. Rural areas voted overwhelmingly in favour of ‘No’, while results were
more balanced in the urban centres. The referendum revealed an intergenera-
tional divide, with young voters voting massively ‘No’ and older ones supporting
‘Yes’ (Figure 3). Last but not least, the imposed bank holiday affected the vote
intention of about one-fifth of the survey respondents, who mostly switched
their vote in favour of ‘Yes’. Hence, albeit smaller than partisan narratives,
material interests were found to influence vote intentions.10
The resounding ‘No’ in the referendum had unexpected consequences. While
it was seen as an indisputable personal victory for Alexis Tsipras, a Grexit
seemed closer than ever. Given the clear pro-Euro majority in the polls, and the
authorisation to negotiate that he was given by 251 MPs on 11 July,11 Tsipras
isolated his intra-party opposition, fired Varoufakis as Finance Minister and
interpreted the vote as a plebiscite in his favour, for him to do what he wanted.
As a protagonist in the most fateful days in the history of the beleaguered single
currency, yet also faced with the toughest demands stemming from German’s
Finance Minister Schäuble’s plan – among which was a five-year exit from
the Eurozone and a Luxembourg trust fund authorised to sell off Greek state
assets – during a 17-hour session with EU leaders and officials he pulled a
180-degree turn and accepted firstly a series of prior actions that were voted
14 L. Rori
Downloaded by [Lamprini Rori] at 02:16 18 May 2016
Figure 3. Voters’ motives in the July 2015 referendum. Source: Author’s elaboration of data
from ProRata, 1 July 2015, N = 1,000.
through parliament,12 and then a new €86 billion bailout package from the
European Stability Mechanism over the next three years. In return, the agree-
ment extended the fiscal adjustment and structural reforms of previous deals
and provided for extensive supervision by the EC/ECB/IMF/ESM. The Greek
parliament approved this package in mid-August with an unprecedented and
overwhelming majority13 and a striking absence of social unrest. Nonetheless,
the back-down itself and the ‘express’ parliamentary procedure brought one-
third of SYRIZA’s MPs into direct conflict with the rest of the government. Thus
the most unequivocal rejection of austerity directly by the Greek people led
to an even tougher bailout package, leaving ΚΚΕ, HA and a minority within
SYRIZA as the sole anti-bailout forces.
Both the absence of legitimacy, given that SYRIZA had been elected in
January with an anti-austerity mandate, and the intra-party rift which left the
government with just 118 MPs, gave the Prime Minister the excuse to resign
and trigger another snap election. On 20 September, the Greek people would
vote for the third time in 2015.
programme that would benefit the most vulnerable and fight corruption. A
soft communication strategy opposed the new to the old, describing SYRIZA
as the new and arguing that change and reform could not be conducted by the
old political personnel – ‘the establishment’.
The main argument of the opposition on both the left and the right was the
discrepancy between the anti-austerity platform that SYRIZA had defended
in January and the pro-austerity agreement it had voted in parliament. LAE
accused Tsipras of treason and claimed the legacy of the ‘No’ camp’s victory; its
members publicly advocated a return to national currency and exit from the
EU. It brought together the majority of dissident cadres from SYRIZA, among
whom was the President of Parliament Zoe Konstantopoulou, popular for her
combative stance against the creditors and the pro-European parties despite
the authoritarian and formalistic manner she frequently used against the gov-
ernment. SYRIZA’s inconsistency and competition with LAE nourished KKE’s
campaign, which stuck to its permanently anti-European and anti-austerity
stance but avoided any sort of alliance.
Extreme polarisation – partly due to the polls predicting a tight race between
the two major parties – made survival the primary goal for the parties of the
political centre (Rori 2015c). POTAMI, having paid the price of its ambiva-
lence towards SYRIZA at the polls, acted like a policy entrepreneur, counter-
ing the logic of party nomenclature with meritocracy and preselecting the
successful professionals and the policies it would propose should it be asked
to collaborate. Under its new leader Fofi Gennimata, PASOK also altered its
strategy. Focused on returning to the party’s roots, it reclaimed figures and
symbols that SYRIZA had tried to appropriate. Although still advocating for
the convergence of the centre-left forces – which it achieved with the elector-
ally negligible DIMAR – the new scheme adopted an office-seeking strategy
in the run-up to the election, hinting at the possibility of collaborating with
SYRIZA after the election.
16 L. Rori
PASOK as the strong actor within the traumatised space of the centre-left.
ND lost almost 200,000 voters, but maintained its force in terms of seats. HA
remained the third-strongest party, winning almost 7% of the vote. Whilst its
power shrank in urban areas, it rose in islands where refugee flows are more
visible (Georgiadou 2015). A flash party of the centre, Union of Centrists (EK),
managed to pass the threshold and thus become the eighth party in parliament.
Tsipras was undoubtedly the winner of this election. The risky strategy paid
off: not only did he get rid of his internal opposition, but he was also lucky
enough to see ANEL winning 10 seats and thus saving SYRIZA from form-
ing a coalition government with some moderate, pro-European party, which
he described as corrupt. SYRIZA’s penetration is relatively uniform in all age
groups. In geographic terms, SYRIZA is a nationwide party. Sociologically
it remains first among the unemployed, and gets its highest support among
private-sector employees, public servants and women. Its popularity was con-
Downloaded by [Lamprini Rori] at 02:16 18 May 2016
of the government had been underlined, was said to operate as proof of the
immense difficulties Tsipras faced during the negotiations.
Political manoeuvring and blame politics aside, the leadership effect also
affected the electoral outcome. Despite a significant decrease in his popular-
ity, Tsipras remained the most popular and most convincing in the debates
and topped his opponent Meimarakis in almost all personality characteristics
measured in the polls, especially among January’s SYRIZA voters.20 Last but
not least, 66% of those who cast their vote on the basis of whom they preferred
as a Prime Minister voted for SYRIZA, falling to 23% when the total sample is
taken into account (Table 2).
Just as in the referendum SYRIZA successfully sold its partisan narrative to
the majority of the electorate (Jurado et al. 2015), in the September election it
managed to set its core argument as the decisive parameter of choice. The result
sealed the end of the anti-bailout hegemony: 77.62% of the vote supported
parties which had voted for the third bailout agreement.
of government majority and may ultimately force the government to seek new
partners. Furthermore, any convergence with the former opponents will have
an impact on the shape of the party system stemming from institutional reforms
that the new coalition partners might trade off – like an eventual reform of the
electoral system – which is difficult to anticipate. In the second case, hesitation,
temporisation, delays in the implementation of reforms will minimise the losses
of the national-populist realm, Tsipras himself and his party, but will keep the
country in limbo, in a slow but steady decline, perpetuating an artificial polari-
sation and a clientelism based on the redistribution of poverty. Despite electoral
shrinkage, fragmentation and loss of political identity in the opposition camp,
the new leadership in ND after the election of the reformist Kyriakos Mitsotakis
in late 2015 portends a restructuring of the political competition and sets a time
limit to any delaying tactics on the part of government strategy.
Downloaded by [Lamprini Rori] at 02:16 18 May 2016
Notes
1. For other recent contributions in the elections in context series, see for example
André and Depauw (2015), Aylott and Bolin (2015), Arter (2015), Faas (2015),
and Haugsgjerd Allern and Karlsen (2014).
2. The Greek parliament is constituted of 300 seats. The electoral law is a mixed
system of proportional and majority representation, with a bonus of 50 seats
given to the leading party. However useful it may be in order to produce stable
government, this unfair electoral arrangement creates distortions and, thus,
crude deviations from proportionality.
3. The mandate of the President of the Republic came to an end in March 2015.
The parliamentary elections were to be held in June 2016. According to the
Constitution, the President is elected by the parliament with enhanced majority:
two-thirds of the deputies, i.e. 200 out of the 300. If this is not reached in the
first round, a second round takes place within five days. Should no candidate
be elected again, a third round is to be held within five days, this time reducing
the majority to three-fifths, or 180 MPs. In case of failure in all three rounds,
the parliament is dissolved within 10 days and parliamentary elections must
then be held, after which the parliament appoints a President by simple majority.
4. An extended version of the analysis of the January 2015 election was primarily
published in Rori (2015b).
5. Research Unit of the University of Macedonia, 2013–2015.
6. SYRIZA mobilised 89% of its past voters, against 78% for ND and 34% for
PASOK according to data from the Unit of Research for Public Opinion and
the Market of the University of Macedonia (2015).
7. Exit poll conducted by Metron Analysis, Alco, GPO, Marc, MRB, 25 January
2015.
8. Void and blank votes came to 5.80%; official results, Ministry of Interior,
http://ekloges.ypes.gr
9. Survey designed by Stefanie Walter, Elias Dinas, Ignacio Jurado and Nikitas
Konstantinidis, fielded by the University of Macedonia’s Survey Unit on 5 July,
N = 989 (Jurado et al. 2015).
10. Jurado et al. (2015).
20 L. Rori
11. It was voted for by ANEL, ND, PASOK, POTAMI and the majority of SYRIZA,
but the government lost its majority, with only 145 out of 162 government MPs
supporting the Prime Minister.
12. The first set of measures was approved on 14 July by 229 MPs and rejected by
64, while 6 MPs voted ‘Present’. Among SYRIZA delegates 32 voted against,
6 voted ‘Present’ and 1 was absent. On 22 July, the second set got 230 votes in
favour (out of 298 MPs in attendance), 63 votes against and 5 ‘Present’. SYRIZA
had 36 dissidents.
13. The memorandum was voted in on 14 August by 222 MPs, rejected by 64 and
11 MPs voted ‘Present’. SYRIZA had 47 dissidents.
14. ProRata, 17 September 2015.
15. Ibid.
16. Metron Analysis, common exit poll, 20 September 2015.
17. ProRata, 7–9 September 2015, N = 1300.
18. 56% perceive the agreement as worse, whereas 21% perceive it as better, ProRata,
7–9 September 2015.
Downloaded by [Lamprini Rori] at 02:16 18 May 2016
Acknowledgements
I thank Iannis Konstantinidis for providing me with survey data from ProRata. Any
errors or omissions are my own.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Note on contributor
References
Anastasakis, Othon (2015). ‘The Balkanization of Greece’s Centre-Left Politics’, Open
Democracy, 04.02.
André, Audrey, and Sam Depauw (2015). ‘A Divided Nation? The 2014 Belgian Federal
Elections’, West European Politics, 38:1, 228–37.
West European Politics 21
Arter, David (2015). ‘A “Pivotal Centre Party" Calls the Shots: The 2015 Finnish General
Election’, West European Politics, 38:6, 1345–353.
Aylott, Nicholas, and Niklas Bolin (2015). ‘Polarising Pluralism: The Swedish
Parliamentary Election of September 2014’, West European Politics, 38:3, 730–40.
Dinas, Elias (2008). ‘Big Expectations, Small Outcomes: The Impact of Leaders' Personal
Appeal in the 2004 Greek Election’, Electoral Studies, 27:3, 505–17.
Dinas, Elias, and Nikitas Konstantinidis (2015). ‘Tsipras Reaps Benefits of Brinkmanship
Politics’, ekathimerini, 13.10.
Dinas, Elias, and Lamprini Rori (2013). ‘The 2012 Greek Parliamentary Elections: Fear
and Loathing in the Polls’, West European Politics, 36:1, 270–82.
Faas, Thorsten (2015). ‘The German Federal Election of 2013: Merkel’s Triumph, the
Disappearance of the Liberal Party, and Yet Another Grand Coalition’, West European
Politics, 38:1, 238–47.
Georgiadou, Vasiliki (2015). ‘Consolidation and Change Processes: HA in the September
2015 Elections’, Conference of Centre for Political Research, Panteion University,
10.11.
Downloaded by [Lamprini Rori] at 02:16 18 May 2016
Georgiadou, Vasiliki, and Lamprini Rori (2013). ‘Economic Crisis, Social and Political
Impact. The New Right-Wing Extremism in Greece’, in Jaime Pastor and Nicolàs
Rojas Pedemonte (eds.), Anuari del Conflicte Social 2013. Barcelone: Universitat de
Barcelona, 322–39.
Haugsgjerd Allern, Elin, and Rune Karlsen (2014). ‘A Turn to the Right: The Norwegian
Parliamentary Election of September 2013’, West European Politics, 37:3, 653–63.
Jurado, Ignacio, Nikitas Konstantinidis, and Stephanie Walter (2015). Why Greeks Voted
the Way they did in the Bailout Referendum. EUROPP, LSE blogs.
Katsanidou, A., and Simon Otjes (2015). ‘How the European Debt Crisis Reshaped
National Political Space: the Case of Greece’, European Union Politics, doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116515616196.
Konstantinidis, Iannis (2015). ‘Passing on the Opposite Bank: The Direct Transfers
from ND to SYRIZA’, Free Sunday, 07.03 [in Greek].
Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Mary Stegmaier (2007). ‘Economic Models of Voting’,
in Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Russel J. Dalton (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of
Political Behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 518–35.
Moschonas, Gerassimos (2013). ‘A New Left in Greece. Pasok’s Fall and Syriza’s Rise’,
Dissent, 60(4).
Moschonas, Gerassimos (2015). ‘Critical Elections and the Interpretation of Elections
of September 2015’, Sygchrona Themata, 37:130–31, 26–8 [in Greek].
Nezi, Roula, and Alexia Katsanidou (2014). ‘From valence to position: Economic voting
in extraordinary conditions’, Acta Politica, 49:4, 413–30.
Nikolakopoulos, Elias, and Panagiotis Koustenis (2015). ‘Why the Real Abstention
Reached 32%’, Ta Nea, 26–27.09, 22–3.
Pappas, Takis (2014). Populism and Crisis Politics in Greece. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Pappas, Takis (2015). ‘Populist Hegemony’, Open Democracy, 25.09.
Rori, Lamprini (2015a). ‘De la contestation au pouvoir. Les ressorts de l’ascension
électorale de Syriza’, Savoir/Agir, 32, 61–1.
Rori, Lamprini (2015c). ‘Centre-Left: Electoral Shrinking and Lost Coalition
Opportunities’, Makedonia, Political Almanac, 13.12, 5 [in Greek].
Rori, Lamprini (2015). ‘Les élections législatives grecques de 2015: alterner et punir’,
Pôle Sud, 43:2, 137–52.
Voulgaris, Yannis, and Elias Nikolakopoulos (eds.) (2014). 2012. The Double Political
Earthquake. Athens: Themelio [in Greek].