Mehmed The Conqueror (1432-1481) and His Time

Medieval Academy of America
Mehmed the Conqueror (1432-1481) and His Time

Author(s): Halil Inalcik
Source: Speculum, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Jul., 1960), pp. 408-427
Published by: Medieval Academy of America
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MEHMED THE CONQUEROR (1432-1481)
AND HIS TIME
By HALIL INALCIK
ON theoccasionof the five-hundredth anniversaryof the conquestof Constanti-

nopleby the OttomanTurksthereappeared a numberofpublicationson thelast
days of Byzantiumand on the risingempireof the Ottomans.(A bibliography
of the publicationsin westernlanguagescan be foundin the 1950-1956issuesof
ByzantinischeZeitschrift; Turkishpublicationsare listed in Istanbul Enstitilsil
Dergisi, 1955-1956.) Foremostamong all these new publicationsis thework'of
ProfessorFr. Babinger,the well-knownGermanorientalist.His work deserves
special attentionbecause ofits scope and the greatvarietyofsourcesand studies
utilized.One reasonwe have not had a detailedreviewof the book untilnow is
probablythattheauthorpromisedin his prefaceto publisha secondvolumewith
the sourcematerialand bibliographyon the subject. But I believe it is not too
difficultfora studentof the periodto findout whichsourcesare used in it and
whichare not.
ProfessorBabingerhas clearlyused the best knownsources,such as Ducas,
Sphrantzes,Chalcocondyles,Kritovoulos,G. M. Angielello,and the collections
of documentsfromthe archivesin Ragusa, Venice, and the Vatican, as well as
the classic worksby Jirecek,Kretschmayr,Von Pastor, Zinkeisen,and Jorga.
But it is not easy to explain why he completelyoverlookedsome of the most
essentialcontemporary Ottomansourcesof the period,available in printedform
fora long time,whichhe himselfdescribedin his book on the Ottomansources,
der Osmanenund ilre Werke(Leipzig,1927). These particular
Geschichtsschreiber
sourcescould have saved him fromvarious mistakes.I shall tryto reviewthe
book withthehelp ofthesesourcesand also add somenew data fromthe archive
materialto supportthem.
Let us firstexaminetheOttomansourceswhichwereavailable but insufficiently
or not at all used by the author.The most importantones are Tursun Beg's
Tadrkh-iAbu'l-Fath(publishedin TOEM in 1921),Envert'sDilsturndme(ed. M.
Halil Yinanc, Istanbul, 1928); and Kemhl Pasha-zade's Tawdrikh-iAl-i Osman
(facsimileeditionof the manuscriptin FdtihKiltiip.,No. 4205, by Dr 6. Turan,
Ankara,1954).2 Tursun'sworkhas a particularinterest.A memberof a veryin-
1 Franz Babinger,MehmedderErobererund seine Zeit, Weltendtiirner einerZeitenwende. Munich,

Germany:F. Bruckmann,1953. Pp. xiv,592. - MahometII le Conqurantetson temps(1432-1481),
La GrandePeur du Monde au tournantde rhistoire.Trad. H. E. del Medico, revue par l'auteur.
Paris: Payot, 1954. Pp. 636. - Maomettoil Conquistatore
e il suo tempo(Turin,Italy, 1957).
2 Hereafterabbreviatedas Tursun,Enveri, and KemAlPasha, respectively. Due to the different
formsin the old and new scriptTurkishformsof nameshave not been reproducedhereconsistently.
ModernTurkishundottedi is reproducedhereas 1.The specialistin thefieldshouldhave no difficulty
in recognizingthe propernouns.
408

MehmedtheConqueror(1432-1481) 409
fluentialfamily(his unclewas governorofBursa) and an expertin statefinances,
Tursun served firstas governmentsurveyorin Constantinople,and then as a
secretaryin the officeofthe grandvizierMahmud. Later he was a commissioner
of land and populationsurveysin Anatolia and finallyhe was made a defterddr.
Based exclusivelyon his personalexperience,his workis a firsthand sourcefor
Mehmed's reign.His position gave him access to valuable informationabout
militaryas well as financialmatters.His storyof the siege of Constantinopleis
the most detailed Turkishaccount by a contemporaryOttoman. Tursun says
explicitlythat he accompaniedthe grandvizierMahmud on his expeditionsin
Serbia (1458), Trebizond (1461), and Bosnia (1463 and 1464). As a secretaryin
Mahmud's servicehe wrotethe surrenderultimatumto the rulerof Kastamonu
in 1461,and he was sentby Mahmud to informthe Sultan ofthe successagainst
the Venetiansin the Morea in 1463. He also accompaniedMahmud Pasha in his
expeditionagainstthe Venetiansin Midilli (Mytilene)in 1462.Tursun'saccount
especiallyof the militaryoperationsin Serbia and Bosnia in 1458-1464includes
many interesting detailsnot foundin othersources.Being in the serviceof this
statesmanforyears, Tursun is the only source givinginterestinginformation
about rivalriesamongthe highdignitaries.Writinghis historyafterthe death of
MehmedII, whosepoliciesweresharplyrejectedby his successor,Tursuncould
feelfreeto be criticalwhendealingwithMehmed'smeasures.Tursun'simportant
book was not used widelyby later Ottomanhistorians.KemAlPasha skilfully
combinedTursun'saccountwithNeshrt'swell-known workand withanonymous
chroniclesas wellas withoral traditionsfromreliablepersons.The latterincluded
his own father,a vizierof Mehmed II, and the officialsand soldierswho took
part in the Sultan's expeditions(e.g., he recordsan interesting
narrativeof the
conquestof Otrantoin Italy by a soldierwho tookpart in the operation).Kemal
Pasha's work,recentlypublishedand knownto Babingerby title (see GOW,61-
63), is undoubtedlythe mostimportantOttomanhistorywrittenon the reignof
Mehmed II.
Anothergreatcompilationis Jdris-iBidlist'sHasht Behisht,writtenby Baye-
zid's order.Althoughmostlydependenton Neshrt,theanonymouschronicles, and
ROht (or, moreprobably,a sourceRthi used), it gives some originalaccounts,
especiallyof events in Anatolia. Hasht Behishtgives a detailed descriptionof
Mehmed'sarmyand administration in a longseparatechapterunique amongthe
contemporarysources. Sa'deddin utilized Idris, Neshrt,and the anonymous
chroniclesas his main sourcesin his Tdj at-Tawarikh.This was translatedinto
Italian by V. Bratuttiand has been considereda standardOttomansourcein the
West,but - apart fromthe factthat he did not use Tursun,KemAlPasha, and
Envert- his compilationmustalwaysbe checkedwithhis originalsources.
Envert'sDusturndme(see I. Melikoff-Sayar, Le destand'Umur Pacha [Paris,
1954],pp. 23-42) is also dedicated to Mahmud Pasha and in its last chapters,
dealingwiththereignofMehmedII, Envertrecordsinformation ofcertainevents
to whichhe was an eye-witness and whichare to be foundin no othersource.
ROtht's work(see J. H. Mordtmann,MOG,ii, 129) is also of greatimportance
for the reign of Mehmed II because it reproducesan unknownindependent

410 MehmedtheConqueror(1432-1481)
sourcewithchronologicaldata whichare oftenaccurate.It is utilizedby Neshrt,
Idris, and Kemal Pasha. We have also the officialcalendars called Takv?m-i
Hiumdyunof the middleof the fifteenth century,arrangedforthe Sultan's use,
whichcontainchronologiesof the importantbygoneevents (see my FdtihDevri
[Ankara,1954],p. 23).
Taking as a basis Ashlk Pasha-zade's fundamentalcompilationof Ottoman
historyin the firsttwo centuriesNeshrtinterpolatedintoit ROht'schronicleand
the data fromthe Takvims.His interpolationsmade Asblk's already confused
chronologyeven moreconfused.Kemal Pasha seemsto knowRMThonlythrough
Neshrt'scompilation(cf.VolumeI ofFr. Taeschner'sedition,Leipzig,1951).
My intentionhereis not to describeall the Ottomansourcesofthisperiod3but
to show the relative importanceof the basic ones which were overlookedby
Babingerin his book.
Babinger's chief Ottoman sources are Neshrt, Sa'deddtn, Uruj, and the
anonymouschronicles.He has not utilized,as it appears,Tursun,Envert,KemAl
Pasha, Rtht, and Idris. The firsttwowerecompletelyunknownto the chronicles
whichBabingerused.
The worksof Ashlk,Neshrt,Rtht, Idrts, and Kemal Pasha are all general
historiesof the Ottomanhouse writtenin the reignof the Bayezid II. When
Bayezid came to the throne,aftera widespreadsocial and political reaction,
he wantedto presenthimselfas a promoterof a new era and orderedthe scholars
of his timeto make a generalaccountof the Ottomandynastybeforehis acces-
sion. This comes out clearlyfromthe prefaceswhichRMTh,KemAlPasha, and
Idris put in theirworks.In themthe reactionto Mehmed's policiescan be seen
in many details,especiallyin financialmattersand in the rehabilitationof the
Chandarl' family.
A determining factorin all themajor politicaldevelopmentsof Ottomanhis-
torybetween1444 and 1453 was the struggleforsupremepowerbetweenChan-
darliKhalil Pasha, the all powerfulgrandvizier since1436 or 1437,and a group
ofambitiousmilitaryleadersincludingShahabeddinShahin,Zaganos,and Tura-
khan,whowereseekingto seize the controlof the government by claimingto be
protectorsoftheyoungSultan's rights(he was onlytwelvein 1444). By repudiat-
ing Chandarli'speace policytheybecame responsiblefor Mehmed's aggressive
expansionistpolicyfromthe outsetand revivedthe idea of the conquestof Con-
stantinople.By thispolicytheyhopedto securetheirownauthorityas wellas the
youngSultan's. Having failed in 1446, when Chandarlimanaged to bringback
Murad II to the throne,they finallygained the upper hand afterMehmed's
restorationin 1451,and caused ChandarlW"s dismissaland executionimmediately
aftertheconquestofConstantinoplein 1453.Babingerrelatesthepopularstories
about Chandarli'sso-calledcooperationwith the enemybut does not look for
3 For example,the workscomposed in verse and dedicated to the Sultan by KAshiftand Mu'Alt
may be mentionedherein additionto the workswhichBabingerincludedin his GOW. These sources
occasionallygive quite importantinformation missingin othersources(see FdtihDevri,p. 107), but
they have never been systematicallyutilized. KivAml'swork,discoveredand edited by Babinger
(Istanbul, 1955) can be classifiedamong such works.

therealsourceand meaningofit. Such rumorswereobviouslyservingthepurpose

of his opponents.In the formationof Mehmed's personalityand imperialistic
policytheinfluence ofShahinand especiallyofZaganos can notbe overestimated.
Babinger is justifiedin giving considerablespace to the strugglebetween
Hungaryand the Ottomansforcontrolof the lowerDanube fromBelgrade to
Kilia. This actuallyappears to have determinednot onlythefutureofthisregion
but also that of Byzantium.Wallachia's positionin this rivalryis not clearly
depictedby Babinger.Culminatingin the years 1443-1448,the Ottoman-Hun-
garian struggleinvolvedWallachia vitallyduringthis entireperiod. We know
thatChandarli'sdiplomacyand thevictoryat Varna in 1444had securedat least
the neutralityof the Serbian Despot; but Wallachia, always under Hungarian
influence,continuedto be a constantthreatto the Ottomans.In the springof
1446 the defeatofDavitd Beg by Vlad I, who had seized Giurgiufromthe Otto-
mans the precedingwinter,appears to have been consideredas a most serious
event in Adrianople.It was afterthe Ottomanvictoryover the Hungariansat
Kossova in 1448 that the OttomansrecapturedGiurgiu (Yerkogu) on the left
side of the Danube and put Vlad II on the throneas a loyal vassal (see Fdtih
Devri,p. 98). This meantforthe Ottomansa furtherstep forthe controlof the
lowerDanube.
Mehmed'sweddingwithSitt-KhAtfin was the subject of considerableresearch
by Babinger; see his long article,"Mehmed's II. HeiratmitSitt-Chatun,1449,"
Der Islam, xxix, 2 (1949). The exact date of thisweddingceremonyis givenby
Envert(Diistu'rname, p. 93) as Shawwal-Dhulka'de,854 of the Hijra (the winter
of 1450-1451),whichis in agreementwithDucas, Chalcocondyles,and the Otto-
man anonymouschronicles.Also overlookedby Babingerwas Tursun'saccount
ofthe conquestofConstantinople.
Tursun is in completeagreementwith Westernand Greek sourceswhen he
describesthereactionofthe Ottomanarmyto the naval failureon 920April1453,
theeffectofthedivisionbetweenthe Greekand Latin defendersduringthe siege,
the panic resultingfromthe retreatof the wounded Giustiniani,and the deci-
sive role of the Ottoman artilleryin the conquest. The conflictingviews of
Chandarli and his opponentsresulted in dramaticcollisionstwice duringthe
siege,once afterthenaval failureon 920April1453 and thenon 926May whenthe
rumorsof a Westernmilitaryintervention spreadamongstthearmy.The second
crisismade the Sultan decideon a generalattack,whichresultedin theconquest.
Here is a partial translationof a letterof Shaykb Ak-Shemseddinto the Sultan
(theoriginalis in theTopkapl-saraylMuseum,No. 5584; see also my FdtihDevri,
p. 9217)testifying to the difficultsituationin the Ottomancamp after920April:
This failureon thepartofthenavycauseda lot of disappointment and sorrow;there
seemedto havebeenan opportunity thelossofwhichcreateda newactivity. In thefirst
placethereligious rejoicedand madefuss;in thesecondplacepeople
one:theChristians
in ourcampascribedthisto yourmisjudgment and lack of authority.... Underthese
circumstances you have to makeproperinquirieson thisdissensionand neglect,and
punishseverelythosewhowereresponsible forit, lesttheycommitthe sameneglect
whenthetimecomesto attackthewallsand to fillthetrenches.

Even beforethediscoveryofthisdocument,thiscriticalmomentwas emphasized
by Tursun: "This event[navalfailure]caused despairand disorderin theranksof
the Muslims . . . the armywas splitinto groups"(see FdtihDevri,p. 1927).From
Babinger'sbook one gets a confusedpictureof Mehmed II's activitiesbetween
the conquest of Constantinopleand his expeditioninto Serbia in the springof
1454. To discuss these chronologicalproblemslet me start by what Babinger
says about Chandarl''s execution:"The thirdday afterthe conquest Chandarll
was imprisonedand thefortiethday afterhis arrest,that is, 10 July1453,he was
executedin Adrianople,wherehe had been transferred" (Germanedition,p. 108;
but theFrenchedition,p. 1928, has 10 June).We read in Uruj's chronicle:"Khalil
Pasha was executedfortydays afterthe conquest of Enos" (Babinger'sedition
[Hanover, 1925], pp. 66-67). From various sources (Ducas and Kritovoulos)
we knowthat Enos was conqueredtoward the end of January1456. Now was
the executionof Chanderllso long delayed,or do we have to put the name of
Constantinopleinstead of Enos (Inez) in Uruj's sentence,as Babingerseemsto
do? The apparentcontradictioncomesfromthe confusionin Uruj of the actual
conquestofEnos in 1456withits earliersubmissionin the summerof 1453. More
expliciton thispoint,an anonymousOttomanchronicle(Manuscriptin Topkapl
Sarayl,Revan K6t. K., No. 1099) reads: "Afterthe conquest of Constantinople
Sultan Mehmed was about to send forcesagainst Inez. When the tekvour(lord)
of the fortresslearned this he immediatelysent to the thresholdof the Sultan
the keys,thus surrendering it and submittingto the Sultan." Kritovoulos,who
was directlyconcernedin the affair,informsus that when,afterthe conquestof
Constantinoplein 1453,the Sultan returnedto Adrianoplein "the harvesttime"
he receivedtherea delegationfromthe islandsunderthe Gattilusiand entrusted
Imbrosto Palamedes,lordofEnos. Kritovoulosbeginsthenextchapter:"During
the same period the Sultan arrestedKhalti,one of his firstrank men and very
powerfuland put himin prison.And aftertorturing himin manywayshe put him
to death" (trans. Ch. T. Riggs [Princeton,1954], p. 87). Now, accordingto
Ducas (Bonn edition,pp. 313-314), Mehmed II leftIstanbul forAdrianopleon
18 June1453 and enteredthe cityon the nightof 921June.This date agreesnot
onlywith "the harvesttime" of Kritovoulosbut also withthe date givenin the
contemporaryOttomanregistersof timarswhich show Karaja Beg, the gover-
nor-general of Rumeli,in Injigiz,a small townon Istanbul-Adrianoplerouteon
18 June.SubmissionofEnos obviouslytookplace afterthat date in the midsum-
mer of 1453, and, if we followUruj's statement,the executionof Chandarli
Khalil in Augustor even later in September.
Once assertingthe Sultan's arrival in Adrianopleto have taken place on 921
June1453 (Germanedition,p. 107; Frenchedition,p. 127)4Babingercontradicts
himselfwhenhe says that MehmedII spent35 days in Anatoliaduringthe sum-
merof 1453and returnedto Adrianoplein August(p. 1192;p. 1392).Beforeleaving
Constantinople,afterthe conquest of 1453, Mehmed had sent ordersto every
4 Hereafterpage referenceswill be firstto the Germaneditionand second to the Frenchedition,

witha semi-colonseparatingthe two numbers.

part ofhis realm . . . that as manyinhabitantsas possiblebe transferred to the

City" (Kritovoulos,p. 93; accordingto Ducas, p. 313,he had asked 5,000settlers
to be sent by September1453; cf. Jorga,Noteset extraits, iv, 67.) Accordingto
Kritovoulos(p. 89), the Sultan returnedfromAdrianopleto Constantinoplein
the autumn of 1453. His main concernat this time seemsto have been the re-
populationand defenseof Constantinoplebeforeembarkingon a new expedition
in the West. In the autumn of 1453 his purposeseems to have been to inspect
the repairworkand the progressin repopulation.He acted so as to attractthe
Greeksforhis purpose of resettlementof the city and on 6 January1454 ap-
pointed Gennadius patriarch (Kritovoulos,pp. 93-95). "Having thus settled
affairsin thecity(Constantinople)theSultan crossedoverintoAsia." He arrived
in Bursa, put in good orderall the affairsin Asia and appointednew governors
"and all in the space of thirty-five
days" (Kritovoulos,p. 95). This tripwas not
forrest,afterthe hardshipsofthe siegeof 1453,as Babingersuggests(p. 1192;p.
139.).Obviouslyhe misunderstood the information in Kritovoulos.Firstofall, the
tripwas made in the winterof 1454; the severemeasurestaken were probably
motivatedby the failureof the officialsthere to send the orderednumberof
settlers.The resistenceof the well-to-doto emigrationfor the settlementof
Istanbul is testifiedto by Tursun (p. 60). The recordbooks ofthe kadtsofBursa
ofMehmed'stimeprovethat the emigrationfromthis city to Istanbul actually
tookplace. At any rate,Mehmed II returnedfromBursa to Istanbul,wherehe
remainedonly a shorttime, and set out forAdrianoplein the winterof 1454
(Kritovoulos,p. 95). There he could make his preparationsforthe expedition
againstSerbia in thespringof 1454withoutworrying muchabout Istanbul.
The successionin the vizierate after the downfallof Chandarl' has always
been a problemforhistorians,and here Babinger adds nothingnew. He first
maintainsthat " . .,. afterthe executionof GrandVizierChandarll-oghluKhalil
Pasha thehighestpost in the government remainedvacant forone year" (p. 117;
p. 138). But in anotherplace he adds: "Kritovoulosis the onlysourceto say that
the vacant post of grandvizierwas occupied by Ishak Pasha fora shorttime.
In the summerof 1453 Mehmed II entrustedthis officeto one of the most re-
markablefiguresin Ottomanhistory,Mahmud Pasha" (p. 118; p. 139). Now let
me at once say that beforeMahmud's appointment,Zaganos Pasha was grand
vizier,and onlyin 1456 was Mahmud promotedto the grandvizierate.This date
is wellestablishedby Ottomansources.As to the theorythat the grandvizierate
was vacant forone year,thereis nothingin the basic sourcesto supportit. Then,
who was the immediatesuccessorof Chandarliin the grandvizierate,Ishak or
Zaganos?Ishak, who had collaboratedwithChandarliin deposingMehmed II in
1446,was dismissedfromthe vizierate(he was thenthirdvizier;see Fatih Devri,
pp. 1092-103)and sent to Anatolia as its Beglerbeg immediatelyafterthe second
accession of Mehmed II in 1451 (see Ducas, p. 92927). Ishak was mentionedas
BeglerbegofAnatoliaduringthe siegeofConstantinoplein 1453 (see Kritovoulos,
p. 41; Kemal Pasha, p. 46) in 1454 and in 1456 (see Kemal Pasha, pp. 1192-1922;
Uruj, p. 792).All this does not supportthe theorythat he succeeded Chandarl'
as grandvizier in 1453. As forKritovoulos'statement,let me quote it in full:

"In the place of this man [Chandarli]the Sultan substitutedIshak, a man of
the wisestsort,experiencedin many spheresbut especiallya militaryleader and
a man ofcourage.Aftera fewdays he also dismissedZaganos," and Mahmud was
appointedgrandvizier(Riggstrans.,p. 88). Here thepersonwhoseappointment,
dismissal,and replacementby Mahmud is mentionedin sequence must be logi-
cally one and the same person,Ishak or Zaganos. (Whetherthe names of Ishak
and Zaganos in Greekweremixedup or thiswas merelythe editor'smistakecan
be determinedonly by examiningthe originalmanuscriptin Topkapl Sarayi
Museum,Istanbul.)
Kemal Pasha asserts(pp. 114, 192.2,146) that in 1456 Zaganos was grandvizier
and Ahmed Pasha (Veliyyllddin-oghlu) second vizier. Accordingto the same
source,Mahmud replaced Zaganos as grand vizier only afterthe Belgrade ex-
peditionin 1456 (cf. Uruj, p. 72). That Zaganos was grandvizier fromChan-
darli's executionin 1453 up to 1456 can be furtherrecalled fromthese facts:
Zaganos was the second vizier toward 1453 (Sphrantzes,p. 9286;Fatih Devri,p.
134), and it was a rulegenerallyapplied in the Ottomangovernment to promote
viziersone rankhigherwhenthefirstvizieratebecamevacant. Thus, whenChan-
darli was eliminatedit was natural for the second vizier,Zaganos, to become
firstvizier,i.e., grandvizier.On the otherhand, as the chiefopponentof Chan-
darl', Zaganos was responsiblemorethan anyoneelse for the conquestof Con-
stantinople(see FdtihDevri,pp. 128-133),whichmade hima naturalsuccessorto
Chandarl'. It is also significantto findZaganos' signatureat the bottomof the
imperialdecree(amdn-name)givento the GenoeseofPera on 1 June1453. (This
documentis now in the BritishMuseum; see Echos d'Orient,XXXIX [19492],161-
175,and T. C. Skeat,in TheBritishMuseumQuarterly xviii [19592],71-73; it must
be notedthat thisis not a treaty.)
UsingNeshriand Sa'deddin always as his chiefsources,Babingersuggests(p.
9291;p. 3927)that upon Mahmud's dismissal(1468) Rum MehmedPasha was ap-
pointedgrandvizierand thendismissedand executedabout 1470, whenhe was
succeededby Ishak (p. 306; p. 343).
In 1468 the successorofMahmud in the grandvizieratewas not Rum Mehmed
but Ishak, whomwe findas secondvizierin 1461 and 1464 (Tursun,p. 125, and
Fatih MehmedII Vakfiyeleri, ii [Ankara,1938], p. 339). During and afterthe
Euboea (Agriboz) expeditionin 1470 he was mentionedby Rfihtand Kemal
Pasha (p. 39.5;also see H. Hlisameddin,Amasya Tarihi,iiij 927) as grandvizier.
When the Ottomanarmywas in action in Euboea Kasim Beg, the Karamanid
prince,took the offensive and advanced as faras Ankara.In the summerof 1471
Ishak,Dustur-ia'zam (grandvizier)was sentagainsthim (Kemal Pasha, p. 307).
Failingito suppresshim,he was dismissed(Kemal Pasha, p. 339.) and his place
givento Rum Mehmed (1471), alreadya vizierin the DitvAn.Rum Mehmedhad
distinguished himselfduringtheexpeditionofEuboea in 1470 (Fetihname, Fatihve
IstanbulDergisi,i, 981). But accordingto Babingerhe was not even alive at that
time. The inscriptionson the buildingshe erectedwith endowmentsbear the
date 876 of the Hijra, 1471-14792A.D. (E. H. Ayverdi,Fatih devrimimarisi,p.
9210). Rum Mehmed Pasha was dismissedat the alarmingnews fromthe East

that the Akkoyunluforceshad capturedand sacked Tokat in the summerof

14792(Kemal Pasha, p. 350). Babinger'sconfusionseems to stemfromthe fact
that he reliedon theAshlkand Neshrinarratives,the chronologiesof whichare
oftenmisleading,especially on the events about Karaman. Accordingto the
LfashtBehisht,a wellinformedsourceon the eventsin Karaman, Rum Mehmed
appears to have been activeas Atabeg to youngJemSultan in his governorship
in Karaman as late as 1474. In Babinger'ssource,Neshrt(p. 9205),thiscampaign
is mixedup with Rum Mehmed's earlieractivitiesthere.Rum Mehmed's dis-
astrouscampaignagainst Varsaks in the Taurus mountainshad taken place in
1474 (HashtBehisht)and thiscaused his finaldismissaland execution.Babinger
(p. 9273;p. 307) adopts also the judgmentsofAsblk,againstRum Mehmed,judg-
mentswhichseem to me completelybiased.
Upon the Akkoyunlu-Karamanid invasionin 14792MehmedII decidedthathe
should entrustthe governmentagain to the able Mahmud Pasha. But at the
end of the campaign against the AkkoyunlusMahmud was arrestedand his
officewas given to Gedik Ahmed Pasha, who finallycrushedthe Karamanid
resistanceand thusensuredOttomanruleincentraland southernAnatolia(1474).
In one passage Babinger doubts whetherGedik Ahmed had ever been grand
statesthathe was.
vizier(p. 361; p. 403), but in another(p. 397; p. 4492)definitely
At thesame timehe suggeststhat Khoja Sinan mighthave been grandvizierbe-
tween 1474-1476 or in the winterof 1476-1477. That toward 1471 Sinan may
have been one of the viziersin the Divan can be establishedby varioussources
(see Shakayik-iNu'maniyye,p. 165; Neshrt,p. 9231;T. Gokbilgin,PaEa Livast,p.
75), but forhis grandvizieratewe have no evidencewhatsoever.The Sinan Beg
who is mentionedas "Commanderover the othercommanders"in May 1476
(p. 397; p. 4492)must be anotherSinan, most probablythe Sinan Beg who was
the Beglerbegof Anatolia toward the end of Mehmed's reign,whereas Kihoja
Sinan,a notedscholar,had no recordofmilitaryleadership.As forGedikAhmed,
he was the beglerbegof Anatolia in 1461, a vizierin 1470, and secondvizierin
14792,and, so, appears to have been promotedto firstvizierateafterMahmud's
fall (November 1473). Gedik Ahmed is mentionedin lasht Behishtas grand
vizier (Veztr-ia'zam). Mehmed'slast grandvizierwas KaramantMehmed,who
held thisofficeforfiveyears.
The grandviziersof Mehmed II were: Chandarli Khalil, February1451-30
May 1453; Zaganos, 1453-Augustor September1456; Mahmud,1456-July1468;
Ishak, 1468-1471; Rum Mehmed, 1471-Summer,14792;Mahmud, second time,
1472-November1473; GedikAhmedbetweenwinter1473-1474and winter1476-
1477; KaramAntMehmed between1476-1477 and May 1481.
Bahingercould not findin his sourcesmuch about the keen competitionbe-
tween Mehmed's viziers- especiallybetween Rum Mehmed, Gedik Ahmed,
and Ishak on the one hand, and KaramAntMehmed on the other- whichaf-
fected the whole administrationand internalpolicy of the Sultan (see my
"Mehmed II" in IslamAnsiklopedisi [Istanbul],VII, p. 533).
One looksin vain foran answerin Babinger'sbook to the questionwhyforover
fiveyears afterthe conquestof ConstantinopleMehmed II had to concentrate

his effortson the Serbian question.BabingerfollowschieflyC. Jirecek'saccount
on the subject (GeschichtederSerben,ii, [Gotha,1918],9201-216)withsome addi-
tional details fromNeshri. But he has left out significant points, such as the
agreementsbetweenGeorgeBrankovicand Mehmed II in 1455 and the King of
Bosnia and MehmedII in 1459.
From Babinger's disconnectedstoryof the Ottoman campaignsin Serbia in
1454-1459one may getthe impressionthat theyall originatedas a merewhimof
MehmedII. But it appearsthateventsdictatedhis courseofaction,as I shalltry
to show.
First,it mustbe remembered thateversince14927, whenthe Hungariansseized
Belgradefromthe Serbians,the most importantquestionforthe Ottomanswas
how to ensurecontrol of the Danube. This was essentialforprotectionof their
positionin Rumeli(theBalkans). Duringthefirstdifficult monthsafterMehmed's
accession to the thronein 1451,when Anatolia was in the youngSultan
turmoil,
had to yieldto the demandsof the ByzantineEmperorand the SerbianDespot
and returnto the lattersome territory in the upper Morava valley (Krushevac-
Alaja-hisarand its dependencies,in Kemal Pasha, p. 110; Toplica and Glubocica
around Leskovac, accordingto C. Jirecek,p. 194). The Sultan had also to
guaranteethe Despot's rightsin the armisticewith JohnHunyadi, concluded
some monthslater,whichmeant a furtherincreaseof the Hungarianinfluence
in this region(see Jirecek,p. 194). Upon the fall of Constantinopleconditions
changed radicallyand the time for the restorationof Ottoman controlof the
Danube againstHungaryhad come.It is significant thattheDespot immediately
surrendered what he had taken fromMehmed II in 1451 (Kemal Pasha, p. 110;
Rithi; Neshrt,p. 183). The Diusturname reads: "With the instructionof the
Hungarian King, Vilk-oghlu[GeorgBrankovic]returnedthe countrywhichhe
had taken [fromthe Ottomans]."
The LfashtBehishtsays thattheDespot had not thensurrendered all theplaces
claimed by the Sultan. Accordingto one Dalmatian document (see Jirecek,p.
9201),theseplaces mightbe Smederevo(Semendere)and Golubac (Gugercinlik)
on theDanube. Now the so-calledultimatumcitedby Ducas has a specialmean-
ingwhichclarifiesthe courseofeventsin 1454-1455.In it MehmedII claimedhis
priorityofrightsagainstGeorgeBrankovicto the heritageof StephanLazarevic
(1389-149.7),whichincludedSmederevo,Golubac,and Belgrade.He wouldagree
only to leave to George a part of the countryof his fatherVuk (Vllk). Inci-
dentally,"Sofia" mentionedas part of the lands of Vilk in Ducas (p. 315) must
certainlybe a cityotherthanSofiain Bulgaria,mostprobably"Scopia" (Skoplje),
whichwas indeeda part of Vilk's country(see Jirecek,p. 1927).
In short,Mehmed's campaigninto Serbia in 1454 should be discussedin the
contextof thesefacts.During this expeditionhe did not make a seriouseffort to
captureSmederevo.Accordingto Raht, he did not even pitchhis pavilionbefore
it. Ducas himselfdoes not speak of any seriousfightingthere.Mehmed's main
militaryachievementwas the capture of "Omol." WhenDucas givesdetailsof
Mehmed's siegeof a "castle" on his way back fromSmederevo,the authormust
have meantOmol (Ostrovicathenwas undersiegeby Ishak Pasha; see ROhtand

Kemal, p. 1192).Babingermakes no mentionof Omol (and neitherdoes Jirecek)

but he mistakenlytakes all the details of the siegeof the "castle" mentionedin
Ducas and shiftsthemto theso-calledsiegeofSmederevo.The conquestofOmol,
along withthat of Ostrovica,is termedthe mostimportantresultof thisexpedi-
tionby all the Ottomansources(accordingto Ducas, p. 317, the "castle" did not
surrender;Diisturndme, p. 97, which gives an originalaccount of the siege of
Omol fromapparentlyan eye-witness, says that,absorbedin looting,the Otto-
man soldiersleftthe Sultan alone to fightin personand finallyforcethe enemy
back into theircastle). Sphrantzes(p. 384) mentionsas the principalconquest
in thisexpeditiona citynamed "Homobrydum"(Omolridon?).Later on Omolre-
mainedan importantOttomanfortresswithits Serbianvoiniksin the Ottoman
vilQyet(county) of Braniceva southeast of Smederevo (BaEvek1letArchives,
Istanbul,Tapu No. 16).
Babingerasserts(p. 113; p. 134) that theSultanwas back in Istanbul afterthis
expeditionon 18 April 1454. In fact,he startedthe expeditionin this month
rightaftermakingthe treatywiththe Venetians.He spentthe summerof 1454
in Serbia to consolidatehis new conquests(Neshri,p. 183; Kemal Pasha, p. 114,
and chronologicaldata froma contemporaryregister).The militarygovernor
appointedby the Sultan therewas not "Firuz beg" as statedby Jirecek(p. 9202)
and Babinger(p. 114; p. 134) but his son (HLasht Behisht).
It should be emphasizedthat Mehmed II shiftedthe militaryoperationsto
Vilk-eli(the land of VIlk) in the followingsummer.He conqueredand organized
it as a new province.The firstofficialsurvey(tahrir)of thisprovince,made im-
mediatelyafterthe conquest in 1455, and preservedin Ba*vekalet Archives,
Istanbul (Tapu Defteri,No. 2 M.), gives a good idea of the conditionsat that
time (see FdtihDevri,pp. 151-1592). Its richsilvermineswerevitally important
forthe expandingeconomyand financesofthe Ottomanempire,and MehmedII
triedto securethis importantsourceof silversupplyforthe empireby special
regulations(see my "Tturkiyenin Iktisadi Vaziyeti . . .", Belleten,No. 60 [1951]
pp. 651-660). Strategicallythis regionwas most importantfor the controlof
Kossovopolje,connectingMacedonia withSerbia. In view of thislast point,dis-
turbancesby the Serbiansofthe communications betweenPrishtinaand Skoplje
(Uskub), givenby Rfihtand Neshrt(p. 183) as the main cause of the campaign,
mustbe noted. In fact,the Serbianshad made counter-attacks in thisregionin
the fallof 1454 (see Jirecek,p. 9209;mentionof it is also made in HashtBehisht).
The most importantsourcesforthe 1455 expeditionare Kemal Pasha (pp. 114-
120) and a letterto the Sultan ofEgypt fromMehmedII whichtellsofhis con-
quests. The letter,dated 13 November 1455, has been published in Istanbul
Enstitiisiu
Dergisi,ii (1956), 170-173.
Justaftertakingpossessionof Vllk-eli,Mehmed II made a peace treatywith
GeorgeBrankovicin the summerof1455. Babingernot onlyseemsto be unaware
of the informationin the Ottoman sources of this agreement(Rfiht,Neshrt,
Idris and Kemal Pasha) but ignoresJirecek'sgood accountofit (p. 205). Jirecek
citesa Venetiandocumentof20 February1456 whichleaves no doubtabout such
an agreement.The Despot, now in conflictwiththe Hungarianstoo (see Jirecek,

pp. 204-205), had no choicebut to accept Mehmed'sterms.Here is the Ottoman
versionof the agreementby Kemal Pasha (pp. 115): "Vllk-oghlu[GeorgeBran-
kovic]will possesshis old territoryand obeytheSultan's orders;he will also get
possessionof the castles and citieswhichhe had before,but he is to pay to the
imperialtreasurya yearlytributeat theamountof threemilliondirhem-iOsmarni
(akJa)." Kemal Pasha also notesthattheconclusionofthisagreementwas chiefly
due to the insistanceof Mahmud Pasha. The amount of the tributeis thirty
thousandfloris(Venetiangoldducats) in Rthi (Neshrt,p. 183,says thirtythou-
sand akcYawhichis obviouslya mistake); in a Christiansource,dated February
1457, it is givenas 40,000 gold ducats (see Jirecek,p. 208, n. 3). One Venetian
ducat was 36 ak&a (Ottoman silvercoin) in 1436, and 45 in 1477 (see Iktisat
FakiiltesiMecmuasi,xi [1954],63). Kritovoulos'statement(pp. 102-103) about
the treatyis consistentwithKemal Pasha. Thus, by the agreementGeorgehad
obtainedtherecognition ofhisrightson Stephen'sheritagewhichwerechallenged
by the Sultan in 1453; moreover,Omol and Ostrovicain thisregionseemto have
been returnedto him,as the Ottomanshad to conquerthemagain in 1458 (see
Kemal,pp. 149,154). In returnGeorgehad to give up all VIlk-eli,his patrimony,
to Mehmed II. Finally, the Despot's ties to the Ottoman Sultan were greatly
strengthened at the expenseof the Hungarians.Thus Mehmed II appeared to
have achieved the objectives which he had been aiming at ever since 1453.
WithSerbianneutralityas secureas it had been in 1444 he could now attemptto
drivetheHungariansfromBelgrade.
It is truethat duringthe campaignof 1456 againstBelgradethe Serbians,still
suspicious,took strongdefensemeasuresagainst the Ottomansand the Sultan
sent a divisionto watch Lazar, the Despot's son, in Rudnik (Kemal Pasha, pp.
124-126). But thepassage oftheOttomanarmythroughSerbianterritory caused
no seriousfighting exceptsomeinevitableskirmishes beforeSmederevo.Mehmed
stayed thereonly one day. Jirecek'sstatementabout the Ottoman defeat"mit
grossenVerlusten"(p. 206) beforethe city is apparentlyan exaggeration.To
keeptheSerbsneutralit was in Mehmed'sowninterestto standby theagreement
of 1455.It is significant
that afterthe OttomanretreatfromBelgradetheDespot
himselftwicesentGeorgeGolemovicto Adrianopleto "renew" (Jirecek,p. 207)
the agreement.
On the siege of Belgrade two importantGerman reportsare utilized by
Babinger (cf. Jorga,Noteset Extraits,iv, 145-147). Let me add thisdetail from
Kemal Pasha (p. 128): To completetheencirclement ofBelgradeMehmedII had
transportedoverland a small fleetfromthe Danube to the Sava. Among the
causes oftheOttomanfailurein thissiegeare disagreement in the Ottomanarmy
and discontentamong the Janissariesbecause of the hardshipsexperiencedin
the expeditionagainst Enos in the winterof 1456. Furthermore, Mehmed had
declinedthe advice of the moreexperiencedmilitarychiefs(see Tursun,p. 74).
During thefiercefighting againstHunyadi's counterattackthe Sultan receiveda
wound on his forehead,accordingto Kemal Pasha (p. 138). Three weeks after
George Brankovic'sdeath, on 15 January1456, his son Lazar succeeded in re-
newingthe agreementwith the Sultan. Two years later, on 20 January1458,

whenLazar died withouta male descendant,the questionof the Serbiansucces-
sionput Hungaryand theOttomansin conflict again.This newcrisisdid notallow
the Despotate to continueits role of bufferstate betweenthe two powers.There
was a strongpro-Ottomangroupin the countrywhichappeared to includemany
ofthenobilityand a greatnumberofmilitarymen.They had reasonto hope that
theirstatus would be maintainedunderthe Ottomanregime(cf. Fatih Devri,p.
144). The Serbs in generalfearedCatholicdomination.Thus the Ottomanswere
able to establishtheirrule withoutseriousresistanceby the Serbs. It is safe to
say that in 1458 and 1459 theOttomanshad to face HungarianratherthanSer-
bian resistance(cf. Jirecek,pp. 210-216, and L. von Thalloczy,Studien,pp. 95-
100).
Let me give some furtherevidence fromOttoman sources which were not
utilized.Tursun,who because ofhis personalcontactwiththe grandvizieris our
best informant, says that towardthe springof 1458 the Serbs "sent theirenvoys
withlettersinvitingthe Sultan to come and take possessionof the country.As
theirdesireto submitto the Sultan was so obvious,it was decidedthat he need
not go personally;insteadhe set out forMorea, the conquestof whichhad also
becomenecessary."Apparentlythepersonwhosentthisdelegationto theSultan
was Michail Angelovic,brotherof the grandvizierMahmud. Michail was one of
the threemembersof the regencyand the leader of the pro-Ottomanfactionin
Serbia (see Thalloczy,pp. 96-99; JireZcek,pp. 210-211). In March 1458 Mahmud
Pasha leftAdrianopleforSmederovowitha relativelysmall armyaccompanied
by blindGregory,now a pretenderto the Serbianthrone.Aftera shorttimethe
Sultan startedforMorea. Mahmud had fixedhis headquartersin Sofia. There
he receiveda newdelegationfromtheSerbsinforming himthattheyhad changed
theirmindsabout surrenderof the citiesbecause the Sultan did not come him-
selfand that theyhad acceptedthe morefavorabletermsoffered by theHungar-
ians. Tursun adds that: ". . . the Hungarianshad offeredseveralhundredthou-
sand gold coins as well as the castles on the otherside of the Danube." This is
consistentwith what we learn fromChristiansources (Thalloczy, p. 98). This
suddenchangein the attitudeof the Serbs is a directresultof the revolutionin
Smederevo,whichhad takenplace at the end of March. The Hungarianfaction
revoltedand imprisonedMichail and thensenthimto Hungaryabout themiddle
ofApril(Thalloczy,p. 104). Now the grandvizierwas in a dilemma.Tursun (p.
85) testifies:
In Sofiathecommanders argued:"The Sultanis farawayin anothercampaignand the
Serbiancastlesdo notsurrender to us easily.Furthermore,thearmydoesnothavethe
meansfora siegeready.Underthesecircumstances all thatwe shoulddo is to go only
as faras Sofia.Besidesit is, as well,a greatserviceto protecttheOttomanterritory.
The enemywithwhomwe contend[forSerbia]is powerful and barstheway.If they
everattackto preventouradvancewe maynotbe able to withstand them,whichcan
causethefailureoftheSultan'spurposes."
Mahmud Pasha, however,decided to take quick action and invaded Serbia.
Taking Omol and Resava, he quicklyreached Smederovoand foughthis way
into the outer part of the city but could not take the castle. The besieged

threatenedhim by sayingthat the Hungarianarmywould come in threedays.
Mahmud gave up thesiegeand enteredMacva, southofShabac on theSava, took
Havale or Gtizelje-hisaroverlookingBelgrade,as wellas Sifrice-hisar
(Ostrovica)
and Rudnik.He returnedto Yelli-yurd,a summerheadquartersnearNish,where
he passed the sacredmonthof RamadAn(it startedon 13 July1458). He was in
contactwitha pro-Ottomangroupin Golubac,who surrenderedthe cityto him,
but he had to use forceto reducethe innercastle. The operationof an Ottoman
fleeton the Danube at that time is witnessedby the Western(see N. Jorga,
GOR, ii, 106) as well as the Ottoman sources. The termsof the surrenderof
Golubac are preservedin an officialOttoman record-bookof Mehmed II's
chancery(today in BaavekAletArchives,Istanbul,Tapu No. 16). It reads:
The cityofGugercinlik [Golubac]has an imperial
charterto theeffect thatpeopleshall
havefullpossessionoftheirvineyards
andgardens as wellas fieldsand be exemptedfrom
the taxationof Khara;,Ispenje and 'Ushr [thebasic Ottomantaxes]and also from
militaryservicesand charges;nobodyshallinterferewiththeirsonsand daughters and
cattle,or attemptto takeanything takenby the [Serbian]
by force;prisoners Martolos
shallnotbe detainedunduly,buttheseinreturnshallfulfill
devotedly theservices
required
andtheboats[ontheDanube]....
forthefortresses
The nativeChristiansoldierssuchas pronija-holders, Martolos,Voiniks,Eflaks
(Vlachs), musketeers(Turkish Tiifekji)wereincorporatedin the local Ottoman
forces(see Fatih Devri,pp. 144-148). It is to be recalledthat theyhad already
experiencedOttomanadministration between1427-1444.
The second invasionof Serbia by Mahmud Pasha is not mentionedby Ba-
binger.He thoughtthat Golubac was surrenderedbeforeMahmud's siege of
Smederevo.Babinger writes (p. 165; p. 190) "Wann Mahmfid-Paschawieder
nach Osten abzog und warumer von der EinnahmeSemendriasAbstand nahm
oder nehmenmusste,bedurftederKlhirung." He could have foundtheanswersto
his questionsin Tursun's account of this expedition.The threat of the Hun-
garianarmyunderMatthias Corvinuson the Sava river(see L. von Thalloczy,
Studien zur GeschichteBosniens und Serbiensim Mittelalter[Munich-Leipzig,
1914],p. 99) made Mahmud decideto retreatagain to Nish and he sent wordto
the Sultan,who was returning fromhis successfulcampaignin Morea. Mehmed
II thenappeared in the city of Usktib(Skoplje) in upper Macedonia. Mabmud
joined him there.Babingerthinks(p. 171; p. 196) "Usktib,worunterindessen
sichernichtdie Stadt in Mazedonien (Skoplje), sondernwohl der gleichnamige
Ort im Istrandscha-Gebirge (o. von Qyrq Kilise, heute Klrklareli)zu verstehen
ist.Um diese JahreszeitpflegteMehmed II. mitVorliebedie frische11ohenluft
balkanischerLandschaftenzu geniessen."Now let us see what Neshrt (p. 187)
says: "In tUsktibthe Sultan was planningto dismissthe army,but Mahmud
Pasha warnedhim sayingthat the Hungarianshad collectedan army.And then
it was learned that the Hungarianswere crossingthe Danube at Belgrade. So
Sultan Mehmed distributedsalaries in advance to the provincialcavalry of
Anatolia [to keep themin field]."The same source,givingdetailsabout bow the
forcessent by the Sultan checkedthe advance of the Hungarians,furtheradds
that afterthat the Sultan came to Adrianople.These militaryoperationsare

confirmedthroughthe Christiansources also (see Jirecek,p. 212). Now "the
city of tUskub"mentionedin the Ottoman sources as the meetingplace of
Mehmedand the grandviziermustbe Uskub (Skoplje) in upperMacedonia. It is
definitely not the tYskUbin the Istranja mountains.What misled Babinger is
apparentlythe statementby Kritovoulos(p. 137) that aftersome days of rest
in "Pherae in Macedonia" the Sultan arrivedin Adrianopleabout the middleof
the autumn.It is bard to imaginewhyMehmedII and his grandvizierwould go
to the Istranja mountains,to the east of Adrianople,for freshair while the
Hungarianarmywas threatening to invade Serbia.
On the expeditionof 1459 Babinger (followingJirecek,Jorga,and Zinkeisen)
writes(p. 174; p. 199) "InzwischennachteMehmed II. ungehindertmit seinem
Heerbannden Mauern und Tuirmenvon Semendria.... "In fact,he came only
to Shehirkoy(Pirot), and the keys of Smederevowere handed to him by the
Serbian envoysin Sofia (cf. Diistu'rname, p. 98; Tursun,p. 96; Kemal Pasha, p.
181; also Mon. Hung. Hist.,ActaExetera,iv, 46, No. 32). Then theSultan sentan
imperialorder to the Sanjakbeg of that regionto take over Smederevo (see
Tursun,p. 96). This Sanjakbeg was probablyAli Beg, who had been blockading
the citybeforethe Sultan's expedition(see Kritovoulos,pp. 118, 126).
Tballoczy (p. 102) pointsout that the ease withwhichSmederevowas taken
by the Ottomansremainsunexplained.It is truethat the HungarianKing was
thentoo busy in the west withthe Germanemperor.A greatnumberof people
in Smederevowere on the side of the Turks (letterof Barbuci,who had visited
Smederevoon 927May 1459,Thalloczy,p. 107). StephanTomasevicwas urgently
askingmilitaryaid fromhis father,the kingof Bosnia, so that be could hold out
there (Stephan had married,under Hungarianauspices, the daughterof Lazar
and had himselfsettledin Smederevoin the springof 1459). The positionof the
King of Bosnia was thus of primaryimportancein the whole matterand the
Sultan made an agreementdirectlywiththe king.The importanceof thisagree-
ment for Smederevohas never been stressedenough. Rthi says: "When the
Sultan startedout for Sofia the envoys of Bosnia foundhim on the way and
proposed the exchange of Smederevofor Srebrnica. The Sultan agreed to it
and took possession of Smederevo" (see also Neshrl, p. 189; the anonymous
chroniclesays "The King of Bosnia gave up Smederevoofhis own will"). When
the Ottomanstook possessionofSmederevotheylet StephanTomasevic go home
unmolested.Srebrnicaand its districton the Serbo-Bosnianborderhad long
been an object of disputebetweenthe two countries(see Jirecek,pp. 184-9211;
Thall6czy,p. 91).
It must be emphasizedthat the Ottomanrule did not cause an upheaval in
Serbia,as is oftensaid. Despite itsincorporation (as thesanjak ofSemendere)into
the empire,Serbia maintainedits own legal and financialsystemto a consid-
erable degree,as well as its basic social structure,with its nobilitypossessing
lands as pronija (now timar)or bashtina(see Fatih Devri,pp. 144-184, forthe
recordbooksand documentsofthisperiodin theTurkishArchives).
An eye-witness, Tursun,says that the Sultan came back to Istanbul afterthe
surrenderof Smederevo; "but, encouragedby his good fortuneand the long

timeavailable (fora new expedition),he wishedto add a new conquest." So he
startedout againstAmastris(Amasra),a Genoesecastle on the Black Sea coast.
The date in ROht and Neshri (p. 190) is given correctly,as 863 of the Hijra
(XI. 1458-IX. 1459 A.D.). But Babingerthinks:"Mehmed II., dessen Aufent-
halte nach dem Sturze von Semendria sich schwerverfolgenlassen, durfte
gegenSommerendewiederin Stambul eingetroffen sein." He then says (p. 203;
p. 231) thatAmastriswas takenby theOttomans"im September,jedenfallsaber
in Spiatherbst1460." Finally he seemsto admit that Amastriswas taken during
the campaignof 1461 againstKastamonu-Sinopand Trebizond(p. 209; p. 236).
Tursun,whomwe knowto have beenpresentin thiscampaign,does not mention
the name ofAmastrisin 1461. And all theprincipalsources(Rohi, Idris,Tursun,
pp. 97-98, Neshrl,p. 191) unanimouslyassert that in 1461 the Sultan came to
Bursa, and then moved to Ankara, whence he startedhis expeditionagainst
Kastamonu and Sinop and tookTrebizond.
In May 1461 Mehmed II was in Ankara.There the auxiliaryforcesofKasta-
monuunderHasan Chelebi,son of Ismail Beg, and the Karamanid forcesunder
Kasim, son ofIbrahimBeg, joined the Ottomanarmy(Babingerdoes not men-
tion KAslm).They weresent by theirfathers,who had pledgedto do so by the
treatiesof vassality (see the text of the treatywithIbrahim Beg in Belleten,i,
1920).Mehmed II actually wanted these princeswith him as hostages to safe-
guardhis rearwhilehe was in remoteTrebizond.These pointsare missingfrom
Babinger'saccount,whichseemshereto dependentirelyon Ducas (pp. 241-242).
When speakingof the motivesof the expeditionagainst Trebizond,Kemal
Pasha (p. 186) makesa remarkworthquotinghere:
The GreeksusedtoliveonthecoastsoftheBlackandtheMediterranean Seas inthegood
habitableareaswhichwereprotectedbythesurrounding naturalobstacles.In eacharea
theywereruledby a tekvour, a kindof independent
ruler,and theygave himregular
taxesand militarydues.SultanMehmeddefeatedand expelledsomeofthesetekvours
and wantedto do thesamewiththerest.The goalwas to takeawayfromthesepeople
all sovereignty.
Thushe first thetekvour
destroyed ofConstantinople;he wasconsidered
as theprincipal
tekvourand headofthispeople.Lateron he had subduedsuccessively
the tekvoursof Enos, Morea,Amasria(Amastris)and annexedtheirterritories to the
empire.FinallytheSultan'sattention
was drawnto thetekvourofTrebizond.
This view of the famousOttoman scholarwho lived his early life in the Con-
queror'stimeis surelymorethan his own interpretation and seemsto reflectone
significantaspect in Mehmed's conquests: reunificationaround Istanbul of the
old Byzantineterritorieswhichwereportionedunderthelocal dynasties.
During Mehmed's long absence in 1461 Ishak Pasha, thensecondvizier,who
was leftin Adrianople,triedto safeguardRumeli with a small forcestationed
there,but he could not cope with the situation(Diistu'rname,
p. 99; Neshrt,p.
195), since Wallachia and Mytilene,withthe supportof thewest,werein rebel-
lion. Vlad Drakul, Voivod of Wallachia,had taken the offensivealreadyin the
summerof1461whentheSultanwas in Anatolia (Tursun,p. 103; Diistu'rname, p.
99). In MytileneNiccolo Gattilusiohad eliminatedhis brotherwiththe accusa-
tionofbeingfriendlytowardthe Ottomans(Kritovoulos,p. 180) and openedhis

portsto the Catalan corsairswho infestedthe Ottomancoasts. It was thissitua-
tion that in 1462 induced Mehmed to undertakehis twin expeditionsagainst
Wallachiaand Mytilene.Emphasis shouldbe put on the interrelation ofall these
eventsin 1461-1462.Envert(Diistu'rndme, pp. 99-100), who tookpart in the ex-
peditionsof 1462,mustbe consideredas an importantsourceon them.
As to the expeditionsof Mehmed II to Bosnia in 1463 and 1464, Tursun is
again most importantas an eye-witnesssource (other importantOttoman
sources on this event are Asblk Pasha, Neshrl, and ROhhi).Many details in
Babinger could be modifiedor supplementedby a comparativeuse of these
sources.Let me onlypoint out that immediatelyafterthe occupationof Bosnia
was appointedfirstgovernor.However,blamed
'Isa, son of Ishak Beg of tYsktib,
for the flightof Hersek Stephan, 'Isa was soon replaced by Mehmed, son of
Minnet Beg (in Babinger,p. 9240;p. 9271;Minnet Beg, the firstgovernorof
Bosnia).
The Venetiandefeatin Corinthin thefallof1463appearsto be theresultofthe
concertedoperationof OmerBeg, governorof Thessaly,and Sinan Beg (son of
Elvan) governorof Morea, who,besiegedin Corinth,had suddenlyfallenon the
Venetians.No mentionis made of SinAnBeg by Babinger,who seems to follow
onlyChalcocondyles'partialstory(pp. 545-551). Babingeralso does notmention
theSultan's presencein Thessaly,wherehe receivedfromTursunnewsofvictory
fromMahmud Pasha, whichcaused MehmedII to returnto the capital.
It should be stressedthat duringthe period of 1464-1473 the developments
in Anatolia preoccupiedMebmed II increasinglymore than the events of the
west. Babinger'streatmentof these developmentsin the east is unsatisfactory.
He claims (pp. 9261;p. 9294)that ". . . wie auch uber die Beziehungen Mehmeds
II. zum Sultanshofin Kairo bisherso gut wie alle Angaben fehlen."However,
one cannotquite agreewithhimwhen one discoversthathe did not utilizesuch
contemporaryArabic sources givingimportantinformationon the Ottoman-
Mamelukrelationsas Hawddithad-duh'rby Ibn Tagribirdi,editedby W. Popper
(Berkeley,California,1930-492)and Badai'al-zuhu'rby Ibn Iyas (ed. Bulak,
1311-1312).The Persian chroniclesconcerningthisperiod,particularly Ahsanat-
tawarilkhby Hassan Beg Rumlf,are essentialto understandMehmed's oriental
policy. A good bibliographyof the subject can be found in M. Halil Yinanc,
"Akkoyunlular"in Islam Ansiklopedisi(Istanbul, 1941), ctiz 4, 9268-269;also
C. A. Storey,Persian Literature(London, 19927-1939).We must also mention
herenumerousstate papers and diplomaticcorrespondence on orientalaffairsin
Topkapl Sarayl Archives, Istanbul; see AriivKilavuzu, 1-2 (Istanbul, 1938) and
in the miin~eats(forthesecollectionsof statepapers see M. H. Yinanc, "Akkoy-
unlular,"and A. Erzi, "Akkoyinluve Karakoyunlu.. . " Belleten,No. 70).
Pressed by Mebmed II, Ishak Beg, the Karamanid prince,agreed in 1464 to
give the Ottoman Sultan the Akshehir-Beyshehir region,but he was asked to
surrenderalso the territory west of the Charshambariver.There is no explana-
tion of this in Babinger (see pp. 289-291; p. 324). Actually,the Ottomanshad
had to abandon the Akshehir-Beyshehir regionto Ibrahim Beg in 1444 and
Mehmed II had been forcedto confirmthis in 1451. On the otherhand the

Charshambariverwas fixedas the Ottoman-Karamanborderin 1391 and was
changedto the advantageof the Karamanidsin 1402.
IbrahimBeg, the Karamanid,and Uzun Hasan, the rulerof the Akkoyunlus,
had made an allianceagainstthehouse ofDulgadlrs (Zulkadir)whichin turnhad
been an Ottomanally since the end of the fourteenth century.Whenin 1464 the
question of the Karamanid successiontended to upset the balance in central
Anatolia, Uzun Hasan took action against Arslan Beg of Dulgadlr and then
enteredKaraman to installIshak Beg on the throne.When Ishak was expelled
fromKaraman in 1465 he took refugein Uzun Hasan's court; and as beforehe
also soughtthe protectionof the Mameluk Sultan of Egypt. Ishak died in the
summerof 1466 in exile (Ibn Tagribirdi,Hawddith,iii, 631). This is the most
reliablesource,as Ibn Tagribirdiwas able to see personallythe reportscoming
to theMamelukSultan on Anatolianaffairs.WhenBabingershowsIshak stillac-
tive in 1468 and even later (pp. 289, 290, 324, 325, 327, 363) it is obvious that
he has confusedIshak withhis brotherPir Ahmed,who also ended by opposing
Mehmed II, his suzerain,in 1468. It is not correctthat in 1468 the Ottomans
occupied the whole territoryof the Karamanids (pp. 290-291; p. 327). The
mountainouspart ofKaraman on theTaurus rangeand the Mediterraneancoast
was thenout of Ottomancontrol.Only in 1471,and thenforthe secondtimein
1474,did the Ottomanssucceedin bringingthispart of the countryintosubmis-
sion. Afterthe Conqueror'soccupationof the Konia plain in 1468 Pir Ahmed
attacked and routed the rear of the departingOttomanarmyunder Mahmud
Pasha and capturedlarge quantitiesof supply.Pir Ahmedwroteof his success
to the Mameluk Sultan and asked his protection(Hawddith,iii, 631, 651, 684).
The failureof Grand VizierMahmud in the Karaman affairseemsto be the real
cause ofhis dismissalin July1468 (Tursun,p. 139). What we findin Babingeron
that is a simplerepetitionof AshlkPasha-zade's storythat Mahmud Pasha was
dismissedbecause he had spared the rich in Karaman frombeing deportedto
Istanbul. The Ottoman sources conceal or misplace the Karamanid success.
Mehmed II was back in Istanbul alreadyin August1468 (in Babinger,German
ed., p. 291,November1468).
Since at thattimetheSultan ofEgypt consideredPir Ahmedand Uzun Hasan
as his protegesand Dulgad'r as his vassal, Ottoman intervention in Karaman
and in Dulgad&raffairscaused tensionbetweenCairo and Istanbul. That is why
not onlyVenetiansourcesbut also Tursun (p. 138) assertthat the campaignof
1468 was originallyplannedagainstthe Mameluks.But whenlaterUzun Hasan
attemptedto occupythe territory ofDulgad'r and thusthreatenedthe Mameluk
dominionson the upper Euphrates, friendlyrelationsbetween the Mameluks
and the Ottomanswere rapidlyrestored.In late 14791,when Uzun Hasan laid
siege to Bira, a Mameluk crossroadtown (see Ibn Iyas, ii, 144-145), the two
state even made an alliance againsthim. Mehmed's peace negotiationswiththe
Venetiansin 1470-1471werealso, to a greatextent,determinedby the growing
dangerin Anatolia.
In 1473,when Mehmed II was away in Eastern Anatolia,his son JemSultan
was leftnot in Istanbul (p. 330; p. 369) but in Adrianople(see Tursun,p. 150;

MagyarDiplomacziaiEmlekek,iI, 246-248; Thuasne, Djem Sultan [Paris,1892],
p. 6). The battle againstUzun Hasan in 1473 was the mostcriticalone Mehmed
everwaged. Victorynot onlysolvedtheAnatolianquestionbut also deprivedthe
ChristianWest of its most efficient ally. Babinger does not mentionthe peace
treatybetweenMehmed II and Uzun Hasan, who had senlthis envoy Ahmed
Bekridjtfirstto Karahisar in Septemberand then to Istanbul in Novemberin
1473 (Hasht Behisht;Rdii; Kemal Pasha, p. 404, and especiallyUzun Hasan's
letterto MehmedII, in Topkapl Archives,No. 4476). SeeingUzun Hasan stillin
close relationshipwith the Venetians,who were pressinghim for a new war
againstthe Ottomans,MehmedII proposedto theTimuridsin CentralAsia that
theytake a commonaction againstUzun Hasan (see the letterin FertdfinBeg,
Munsheat-iSaldt,n,i [Istanbul,1274], 284). Mahmud's failurein handlingthe
Uzun Hasan affairappears to be the essentialcause of his secondfall fromthe
grandvizierate(forotherreasonssuch as the intrigueofhis personalenemies,see
Kemal Pasha, pp. 411-412).
The militaryoperationsin theeasternBlack Sea in 1479are leftin completeob-
scurityby Babinger(pp. 441-442; pp. 489-490). He does not localize the places
mentionedin these expeditionsand givesthe wrongdate of 1480 forthem.The
lord of "Torul" as well as the Georgianprinceswereprotectedand even incited
by Uzun Hasan againstthe Ottomans.On Uzun Hasan's death in 1478 it seems
that MehmedII thoughtit was timeforhimto completehis unfinished workon
the easternboundariesof the empire.He sent ordersto his son, Bayezid (in
Amasia), who had under his controlall the territoriesas far as the Georgian
border,to invade Torul and Georgia.The formerwas a tinyprincipalitywitha
castlecalled Torul (today a nahiyewiththe same name) on the strategicalmoun-
tain pass betweenGumushhaneand Trebizond.Under the protectionof Uzun
Hasan a local Greeklordmaintainedpossession(detailsare providedin a survey
of the provinceof Trebizond made in 1487,Ba*vek. Archives,Maliyeden def.
828). Bayezid's vizier,MehmedPasha, son ofHlzlrPasha, and Rakkas Sinan Beg
annexed it and a stripof land in westernGeorgia called "Mathahalyet," most
probablyMathakhal'et("The land of Mathakhel"). It seemsthat the name has
survivedin the village name of Machakhelin the countyof Borchka near the
Turkish-Georgianborder.
Babingeralso doubts that any expeditionto Kuban and Anapa in Circassia
tookplace, consideringthe greatdistancebetweenAmasia (Amasya) and Anapa
(p. 441; p. 490). In factthiswas an independentmaritimeexpeditionmade in the
same year.The HashtBehishtis clearenough:"Afterthe conquestofKaffa,Kopa
was stillin thehands ofthe remainingFranks,because of somenaturalobstacles
(that preventedits conquest). Now the Sultan sent therethirtyshipsunderthe
governorof Koja-eli (Izmit, Nicomedia)" (we use the manuscriptin Nurios-
maniyeK. Istanbul No. 3209, 485 b; cf. Kemal Pasha, pp. 520-522).
On Mehmed's relationswith the Khans of the Crimea and the Genoese the
interesting correspondence betweenMehmedII and MengliGirei (Giray,Kirey)
and Eminek Mirza should have been consulted(fora bibliographyand correc-
tionssee Belleten,viii, 30 [1944],205-229). Mehmed'srelationswiththe Golden

Horde are not touched upon by Babinger. It must also be emphasized that
Crimean affairsinvolved Mehmed in the significantdevelopmentsin eastern
Europe, inasmuchas he supportedthe Crimean-Russianbloc againstthe Golden
Horde-Jagellonian alliance. Even Moldavia had directinterestsin the Crimea;
toward 1475 its Voivod had sent a small forceto Crimea to capturethe prin-
cipalityofMangupforhisbrother-in-law (A. A. Vasiliev, The Gothsin theCrimea
[Cambridge,Massachusetts,1936], pp. 244-252). Brieflyspeaking,Mehmed's
activitiesin the Crimeaand Moldavia mustbe studiedin the broadercontextof
his northernpolicy.
The treatmentof Mehmed's internalpolicy is probablythe most superficial
part ofthe book. Generallyspeaking,Mehmed'stremendousefforts to buildup a
unifiedand centralizedempirestrainedthe countryto the utmost.He neededin-
creasinglylarge resources,especiallyto make his unendingmilitaryexpeditions
and to increasehis armyand naval forces.The unusuallyradicalfinancialmeas-
ureswhichhe had to introducecreateda verytenseatmospherein thecountryin
his later years. These measureswere: (1) The issue of new silvercoin, forcing
people to exchangethe old coin at its metal value withthe new one at its face
value. The difference at therate ofone sixthmeanta heavytax on thepossessors
of cash in silver.He used this hated device threetimesafter1471 (see further
details,Belleten,No. 60 [1951],pp. 676-679). (2) The extensionofstateproprietor-
shipovermostofthe agriculturallands in thepossessionoftheold familiesin the
formsofmiilkor wakf.Thus, accordingto Tursun,who was a highofficialin the
financedepartment,over twentythousandvillagesor estatescame underdirect
statecontrol,whichmeanta newheavytaxation.Appliedin thesameperiodafter
1471,thisreformalienatedthe old land-owningclasses,especiallyin centraland
northernAnatolia,as well as many large religiousgroups.(3) The extensionof
the monopolistictax-farming systemto many necessitiesof lifeand the imple-
mentationwithan unusual strictnessof the laws governingthese monopolies(a
collectionofsuchlawshas beenpublishedby R. Anhegger-H. Inalcik,Kanuname-.i
Sultan? ber miceb-i 'orf-iOsmdni [Ankara,1956], also see H. Inalcik, "F. S.
Mehmed in Fermanlarl,"Belleten,No. 44).
Toward 1481 the state treasuryhad in its chestsabout threeand a halfmillion
ducats worthof readymoney(Topkapl Sarayl Archives,No. E. 9713).
On Mehmed'sunusualcentralizing policyand its far-reaching social and politi-
cal consequences,whichsurelypreparedtheway forthereactionarypolicyintro-
duced underBayezid II upon his accession,Babingerpresentslittlesave a trans-
lation of some biased hintsin Ashlk'schronicle.
In thisconnectionit shouldbe added that the Janissaries(Yeni-cheri)always
dislikedMehmed II and showed theirdiscontenton several occasions. Their
numberwas increasedfromfouror fivethousandto ten or twelvethousandby
MehmedII. On his death theyburstintoa fearfulrevoltand wereinstrumental
in bringingto powera reactionaryadministration.
That the Ottomanexpansionin the Levant caused the Westernersto discover
thenewmaritimeroutesacrosstheAtlanticOcean (p. 377; p. 421) is a theorysub-
ject to muchcontroversy today. I hope to supplementLybyer'scriticalviewsof

this theory(AmericanHistoricalReview,XIX, 141) in a separate paper on the
basis ofnew data providedby the Ottomanarchives.
In the last chaptersof the book are somemistakesin names. The commander
wholaid siegeto Croia (Akehahisar)in 1476 and was orderedto blockadeScutari
in 1478was not GedikAhmedPasha (pp. 390; 401; pp. 435; 446) but Sarl Ahmed
Beg, son of Evrenos, governorof Albania in this period (see Kemal Pasha, pp.
509,607; cf.Donado da Lezze [G. M. Angiolello],HistoriaTurchesca,publishedby
J. Ursu at Bucarest in 1909). During the incursionof 1479 intoTransylvaniait
was 'Isa Beg, son of Hasan, who was the sanjak-begof Silistre (Silistria) and
not (p. 411; p. 458) "Hassan Beg and 'Isa Beg" (cf.Kemal Pasha, p. 466). The
invasionof Carniolin 1479 was commandedby Davfid,thengovernorofBosnia.
For thelarge-scaleincursionsintoStyriaand Hungaryin theyearsof 1477-1479,
Kemal Pasha (pp. 477-481 and 527-562) givesdetailedaccountswhichare com-
pletelyoverlookedin Babinger'sbook.
Mehmed died at Hunkiar-chaylrl, whichis betweenPendik and Maltepe (see
FerIdfOn Beg, I, 297).
In generalit can be said thatinformationdrawnfromthe sourceson individual
events is usually summarizedby ProfessorBabinger in a simplechronological
orderwithoutmuch criticalanalysis and withoutseekingto establishthe real
relationshipand sequence of the actual historicaldevelopments.On the other
hand, Babinger sometimesuncriticallyaccepts the biased statementsof his
sourcesas truth.One ofthemainconcernsofBabingerappearsto be to establisha
correctchronology oftheevents,whichis certainlythefirstimportantthingto do.
He has been successfulin clarifying
manychronological data, butas we have seen,
thereremainssome confusion.*
UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA
* I am indebted
to Mr S. Vryonis
forchecking
someGreektexts.


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Medieval Academy of America

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ON theoccasionof the five-hundredth anniversaryof the conquestof Constanti-

1 Franz Babinger,MehmedderErobererund seine Zeit, Weltendtiirner einerZeitenwende. Munich,

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therealsourceand meaningofit. Such rumorswereobviouslyservingthepurpose

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4 Hereafterpage referenceswill be firstto the Germaneditionand second to the Frenchedition,

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part ofhis realm . . . that as manyinhabitantsas possiblebe transferred to the

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that the Akkoyunluforceshad capturedand sacked Tokat in the summerof

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Kemal, p. 1192).Babingermakes no mentionof Omol (and neitherdoes Jirecek)

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