Digests:

Mendoza vs People
G.R. No. 183891October 19, 2011
Facts:
Romarico Mendoza (petitioner) is a company boss/employer convicted for violating a special law known
as the Social SecurityCondonation Law of 2009 for non-remittance of the Social Security Service (SSS)
contributions to his employees. The offense is criminal in nature. Nevertheless, Mendoza admitted his
fault, as he said, he acted in good faith. But still, the Court has to render judgment and apply the proper
penalty how harsh it may be dura lex sed lex).The Court sentenced Mendoza to an indeterminate prison
term. Considering the circumstances, the court the Court transmitted thecase to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, and RECOMMENDS the grant of executive clemency to the
petitioner.
Issue:
Without violating the separation of powers, can the Supreme Court recommend to the President, the
grant of executive clemency to aconvict?
Ruling:
The Court the discretion to recommend to the President actions it deems appropriate but are beyond its
power when it considers the
penalty imposed as excessive. It is clearly stated in the Revised Penal Code which provides; ―Whenever
a court has knowledge
of anyact which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the
proper decision, and shall report to theChief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons
which induce the court to believe that said act should be made thesubject of legislation. In the same
way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statementas
may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement
of the provisions of this Codewould result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into
consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the
offense.

Chua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125837, October 6, 2004.

Facts:

On August 20, 1985, private respondents Andres Paguio, Pablo Canale, Ruel Pangan, Aurelio Paguio,
Rolando Trinidad, Romeo Tapang and Carlos Maliwat filed a petition with the SSC for SSS coverage and
contributions against petitioner Reynaldo Chua, owner of Prime Mover Construction Development,
claiming that they were all regular employees of the petitioner in his construction business.

Private respondents alleged that petitioner dismissed all of them without justifiable grounds, and
without notice to them and to the then Ministry of Labor and Employment. They further alleged that
petitioner did not report them to the SSS for compulsory coverage in flagrant violation of the Social
Security Act.

Petitioner claimed that private respondents were not regular employees, but project employees whose
work had been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion of which was determined at
the time of their engagement. This being the case, he concluded that said employees were not entitled
to coverage under the Social Security Act. Petitioner also claimed that the case has prescribed. The
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the private respondents.

Issue:

Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to compulsory SSS coverage.

Held:

Yes. Well-settled is the rule that the mandatory coverage of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, is
premised on the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the essential elements of which are:
(a) selection and engagement of the employee; (b) payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d)
the power of control with regard to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished,
with the power of control being the most determinative factor. The existence of an employer-employee
relationship between the parties can easily be determined by the application of the “control test.”

It is clear that private respondents are employees of petitioner, the latter having control over the results
of the work done, as well as the means and methods by which the same were accomplished. Suffice it to
say that regardless of the nature of their employment, whether it is regular or project, private
respondents are subject of the compulsory coverage under the SSS Law, their employment not falling
under the exceptions provided under Section 8(j) of the Social Security Act. In addition, private
respondents’ right to file their claim had not yet prescribed at the time of the filing of their petition.
Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, prescribes a period of twenty (20) years, from the time the
delinquency is known or assessment is made by the SSS, within which to file a claim for non-remittance
against employers.

Dycaico v. SSS
G.R. No. 161357
November 30, 2005

FACTS:

Bonifacio S. Dycaico became a member of the SSS on January 24, 1980. In his self-employed data, he
named the petitioner, Elena P. Dycaico, and their 8 children as his beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio
and Elena lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.

In June 1989, Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his monthly pension from the SSS.
He continued to receive the monthly pension until he passed away on June 19, 1997. A few months prior
to his death, however, Bonifacio married the petitioner on January 6, 1997.

Shortly after Bonifacios death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for survivors pension. Her
application, however, was denied on the ground that under the Social Security Law she could not be
considered a primary beneficiary of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement.

The petitioner filed with the SSC a petition alleging that the denial of her survivors pension was
unjustified. She contended that Bonifacio designated her and their children as primary beneficiaries in
his SSS Form RS-1 and that it was not indicated therein that only legitimate family members could be
made beneficiaries.
The SSC promulgated its Resolution affirming the denial of the petitioners claim. The SSC refuted the
petitioner’s contention that primary beneficiaries need not be legitimate family members by citing the
definitions of primary beneficiaries and dependents.

Aggrieved, the petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review of the SSCs February 6, 2002 Resolution.
In the assailed Decision, the appellate court dismissed the petition. The CA declared that since the
petitioner was merely the common-law wife of Bonifacio at the time of his retirement, his designation of
the petitioner as one of his beneficiaries in the SSS Form RS-1 in 1980 is void. The CA further observed
that Bonifacios children with the petitioner could no longer qualify as primary beneficiaries because
they have all reached 21 years of age.

ISSUE:

WON Dycaico can be considered as a beneficiary.

WON there is a violation to equal protection clause of the Constitution.

HELD:

Classifying dependent spouses and determining their entitlement to survivor’s pension based on
whether the marriage was contracted before or after the retirement of the other spouse bears no
relation to the achievement of the policy objective of the law.

Indeed, the SC does not find substantial distinction between spouses whose assignment as a beneficiary
was made after the marriage and spouses whose assignment as a beneficiary was made before the
marriage. The statute violates equal protection clause when it grants surviving pensions only to the
spouses belonging to the former case and not to than the latter.

A statute, to be valid and reasonable, must satisfy the following requirements: must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of
the same class.

As illustrated by the petitioners case, the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of
Rep. Act No. 8282 which qualifies the term primary beneficiaries results in the classification of
dependent spouses as primary beneficiaries into two groups:

(1) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were contracted prior to the
latters retirement; and
(2) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were contracted after the
latters retirement.

Underlying these two classifications of dependent spouses is that their respective marriages are valid. In
other words, both groups are legitimate or legal spouses. The distinction between them lies solely on
the date the marriage was contracted. The petitioner belongs to the second group of dependent
spouses, i.e., her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted after his retirement. As such, she and those
similarly situated do not qualify as primary beneficiaries under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 and,
therefore, are not entitled to survivors pension under the same provision by reason of the subject
proviso.

Further, the classification of dependent spouses on the basis of whether their respective marriages to
the SSS member were contracted prior to or after the latters retirement for the purpose of entitlement
to survivors pension does not rest on real and substantial distinctions. It is arbitrary and discriminatory.
It is too sweeping because the proviso as of the date of his retirement, which effectively disqualifies the
dependent spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS member were contracted after the
latters retirement as primary beneficiaries, unfairly lumps all these marriages as sham relationships or
were contracted solely for the purpose of acquiring benefits accruing upon the death of the other
spouse.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 15, 2003 and Resolution dated
December 15, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69632 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is declared VOID for
being contrary to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. The Social Security
System cannot deny the claim of petitioner Elena P. Dycaico for survivors pension on the basis of this
invalid proviso.

CASE DIGEST: SONIA MACEDA AND GEMMA MACEDA-MACATANGAY V. ENCARNACION DE GUZMAN

VDA. DE MACATANGAY

Published by symba on September 6, 2013 | Leave a response

SONIA MACEDA and GEMMA MACEDA-MACATANGAY v. ENCARNACION DE GUZMAN VDA. DE
MACATANGAY

481 SCRA 415 (2006), THIRD DIVISION

Spouses Sonia Maceda and Bonifacio Macatangay, executed a Kasunduan whereby they agreed to live
separately. Bonifacio soon lived with his common law wife Carmen Jaraza. When Bonifacio died, Sonia
claimed for his Social Security System (SSS) benefit, which was granted to her. However, the Social
Security Commission (SSC) later ordered Sonia to refund the benefits in favor of Encarnacion De Guzman
Macatangay, Bonifacio‘s mother, and his illegitimate children, on the ground that the Kasunduan is a
proof that Sonia is not dependent upon Bonifacio for support.

Sonia filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA). However, the same was dismissed due
to their failure to explain why they failed to personally serve copies of the petition to Encarnacion which
is required in Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In her affidavit, Sonia explains
that they resorted to service by mail due to the distant addresses of Encarnacion‘s lawyer in Lopez,
Quezon and Sonia‘s counsel in Lucena City, thereby making personal service impracticable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the distant addresses made the personal service impracticable making the service by
mail valid

HELD:
If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring
personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to
consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were not resorted to and
no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place. The
exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal service, for Section 11
itself begins with the clause “whenever practicable”.

The Court thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing,
the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the
circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal
service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied
by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In
adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject
matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be
expunged for violation of Section 11.

In the case at bar, the address of Encarnacion‘s counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while Sonia‘s counsel‘s is
Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes personal
service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why service was not done personally
“might have been superfluous.”

Without preempting the findings of the Court of Appeals on the merits of Sonia‘s petition, if Sonia‘s
allegations of fact and of law therein are true and the outright dismissal of their petition is upheld
without giving them the opportunity to prove their allegations, Sonia would be deprived of her rightful
death benefits just because of the Kasunduan she forged with her husband Bonifacio which contract is,
in the first place, unlawful. The resulting injustice would not be commensurate to Sonia‘ counsel‘s
“thoughtlessness” in not explaining why Encarnacion were not personally served copies of the petition.

JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO, ET AL. VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM, G.R. NO. 173846, FEBRUARY 2, 2011
FACTS:
The petitioners are corporate officers of Silahis International Hotel,Inc. (SIHI) who have filed a petition
for Suspension of Payments and Rehabilitation before a commercial court. However, at the time of the
filing of the petition for rehabilitation by the Silahis Hotel, there were a number of criminal charges
pending against the corporate officers for violation of the SSS law. Subsequently, the officers filed with
the criminal court a motion to suspend proceedings arguing that the stay order issued by the
commercial court should also apply to the criminal cases then pending. The criminal court ruled against
the petitioners on the ground that the Stay Order issued by the commercial court does not cover the
prosecution of criminal offenses. On appeal, the Court of Appeals confirmed the criminal court’s ruling.
Hence, the petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Does the suspension of “all claims” as an incident to a corporate rehabilitation also contemplate the
suspension of criminal charges filed against the corporate officers of the distressed corporation?
HELD:
No. The petition is not meritorious.
RATIO:
 Corporate rehabilitation connotes the restoration of the debtor to a position of successful operation
and solvency, if it is shown that its continued operation is economically feasible and its creditors can
recover more, by way of the present value of payments projected in the rehabilitation plan, if the
corporation continues as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated. It contemplates a
continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its
former position of successful operation and solvency, the purpose being to enable the company to
gain a new lease on life and allow its creditors to be paid their claims out of its earnings
 A principal feature of corporate rehabilitation is the suspension of claims against the distressed
corporation.
 The rehabilitation of SIHI and the settlement of claims against the corporation is not a legal ground
for the extinction of petitioners’ criminal liabilities. There is no reason why criminal proceedings
should be suspended during corporate rehabilitation, more so, since the prime purpose of the
criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same
or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to
maintain social order. As correctly observed in Rosario, it would be absurd for one who has engaged
in criminal conduct could escape punishment by the mere filing of a petition for rehabilitation by the
corporation of which he is an officer.
 The prosecution of the officers of the corporation has no bearing on the pending rehabilitation of
the corporation, especially since they are charged in their individual capacities. Such being the case,
the purpose of the law for the issuance of the stay order is not compromised, since the appointed
rehabilitation receiver can still fully discharge his functions as mandated by law. It bears to stress
that the rehabilitation receiver is not charged to defend the officers of the corporation. If there is
anything that the rehabilitation receiver might be remotely interested in is whether the court also
rules that petitioners are civilly liable. Such a scenario, however, is not a reason to suspend the
criminal proceedings, because as aptly discussed in Rosario, should the court prosecuting the
officers of the corporation find that an award or indemnification is warranted, such award would fall
under the category of claims, the execution of which would be subject to the stay order issued by
the rehabilitation court. The penal sanctions as a consequence of violation of the SSS law, in relation
to the revised penal code can therefore be implemented if petitioners are found guilty after trial.
However, any civil indemnity awarded as a result of their conviction would be subject to the stay
order issued by the rehabilitation court. Only to this extent can the order of suspension be
considered obligatory upon any court, tribunal, branch or body where there are pending actions for
claims against the distressed corporation.
 Congress has recently enacted Republic Act No. 10142, or the Financial Rehabilitation and
Insolvency Act of 2010. Section 18 thereof explicitly provides that criminal actions against the
individual officer of a corporation are not subject to the Stay or Suspension Order in rehabilitation
proceedings.
 Furthermore, the Court pointed out that Congress has recently enacted Republic Act No. 10142, or
the Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act of 2010 where Section 18 thereof explicitly provides
that criminal actions against the individual officer of a corporation are not subject to the Stay or
Suspension Order in rehabilitation proceedings.