POLI - 17
W/N the COC of Jalosjos should be cancelled [YES]
JALOSJOS v. COMELEC (2013 (JUNE))
To be an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place where one resides
no matter how modest and regardless of ownership. The mere purchase of a parcel of land does not
make it one’s residence.
The temporary stay in a stranger’s house cannot amount to residence.
At best, the approval of her registration as a voter carries a presumption that the registrant will be
able to meet the six-month residency requirement for the elections in which the registrant intends to
vote, not that registrant has resided in the locality for more than one year prior to the election.
The finding, that contrary to the declaration in the COC, the candidate does not satisfy the residency
requirement reveals a false material representation that justifies the cancellation of the COC.
COMELEC is not ousted of jurisdiction to decide a petition for cancellation of COC after the winner is
proclaimed.
Cancellation of COC renders the ineligible candidate a de facto officer. The proper person to assume
office after his ouster is the second-placer.
Facts:
On 20 November 2009, Svetlana Jalosjos (Jalosjos) filed her Cert of Candidacy (COC) for
mayor of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for the 10 May 2010 elections. She indicated that her place of
birth and residence as Brgy. Tugas. The private respondents (resp) filed against her a Petiion to Deny
Due Course to or cancel the COC arguing that she has falsely represented her place of birth and
residence. On the other hand, Jalosjos averred that she had established her residence since December
2008 when she purchased two parcels of land in Brgy. Tugas, and that she had been staying in the
house of a certain Mrs. Yap (Yap) while the former was overseeing the construction of her house. She
added that the same is not a material misrepresentation that would lead to disqualification.
On 10 May 2010, Jalosjos was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor. However, on 04 June
2010, the COMELEC rendered a resolution disqualifying her from running for the position of mayor.
The Supreme Court affirmed the resolution of the COMELEC. Furthermore, in its decision, it
pronounced that the vice-mayor shall occupy the vacancy.
The resp filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration stating that the second-placer should
occupy the seat. Jalosjos also filed a Motion for Reconsideration averring the following:
1. Court erred in hilidng that there are inconsistensies in the Joint Affidavit of the witnesses
she presented;
2. Her stay with Mrs. Yap should be considered in determining the one-year residency
requirement
3. Her registration as voter presupposes that she has stayed in the municipality at least 6
months prior to her registration
4. Her COC should not be cancelled, absent any finding that there was a deliberate attempt
to deceive the electorate
5. COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction to decide on the question of qualification after
she was proclaimed the winner.
Issue/s:
1. W/N Jalosjos has satisfied the residency requirement [NO]
2.
3. W/N COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide on the question of qualification after the
proclamation of the winner [YES]
4. W/N the vice-mayor should occupy the seat [NO]
Held/Ratio:
1. Jalosjos was not able to satisfy the residency requirement.
 The claim of actual and physical residence in Brgy. Tugas since 2009 is contradicted by statements
that petitioner was staying in Mrs. Yap’s house while her residential unit is under construction.
According to the witnesses of Jalosjos, they know her to be an actual and physical resident of
Brgy. Tugas. However, this was contradicted by their statements that: 1) they have started the
construction of the house since January 2009, 2) until present (until December 2009 when
affidavits were executed), the construction is still on-going, and 3) at times when Jalosjos is in
Baliangao, she used to stay with Mrs. Yap in Brgy. Punta Miray.
 To be an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place where one
resides no matter how modest and regardless of ownership. The mere purchase of a parcel of
land does not make it one’s residence. The fact that the residential structure where Jalosjos
intends to reside was still under construction on the lot she purchased means that she has not
yet established actual and physical residence in the barangay, contrary to the declaration of her
witnesses that she has been an actual and physical resident of Brgy. Tugas since 2008.
 The claim that what is still being constructed is not the residential structure is belied by the fact
that Jalosjos was not able to present any evidence that her residential unit was completed. The
absence of any photograph of the alleged residence bolsters the Court’s conclusion.
 The temporary stay in a stranger’s house cannot amount to residence since the same is only
temporary and intermittent. There was no intention on the part of Jalosjos to stay in Brgy. Punta
Miray and Jalosjos also falied to show by what right she stayed in Mrs. Yap’s house.
 The approval of registration as a voter does not and cannot carry with it an affirmation of the
falsehood and misrepresentation as to the period of her residence in Brgy. Tugas. At best, the
approval of her registration as a voter carries a presumption that the registrant will be able to
meet the six-month residency requirement for the elections in which the registrant intends to
vote.
2. The COC of Jalosjos should be cancelled.
The finding of the COMELEC that Jalosjos lacks the one year residency requirement to run for local
elective position directly contradicts her sworn declaration that she is eligible to run for public office.
The fact that she failed to prove that she has been a resident of the locality for at least one year prior
to the elections reveals the falsity of her assertion in her COC that she is qualified to run for a local
elective position. This false material representation justifies the cancellation of her COC.

3. COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide on the question of qualification after the proclamation of
the winner in the election.

Even after the elections the COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 1 in relation to Section 7 of RA 6646
to continue to hear and decide questions relating to qualifications of candidates. As such, not only is a
disqualification case against a candidate allowed to continue after the election (and does not oust the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction), but his obtaining the highest number of votes will not result in the
suspension or termination of the proceedings against him when the evidence of guilt is strong. This
provision applies to cases under Section 68 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 2
4. The proper person to occupy the seat is the second-placer.

 Decisions holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is
disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the certificate of
candidacy of the first placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled
because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the
filing of the certificate of candidacy. In this case, since the candidacy is void ab initio, the votes
would be considered as stray votes and should not be counted.

 The ineligible candidate who assumed office is considered a de facto officer. The rule on
succession under Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code (LGC) does not apply since the ouster of
a de facto officer cannot create a permanent vacancy as contemplated under the LGC. There is no
vacancy to speak of as the de jure officer, the rightful winner in the elections, has the legal right
to assume the position.

Digested by: Leaño, Ofelia

1
Effect of Disqualification Case
2
citing Section 7 of RA 6646