PROGRAM ON NEGOTIATION 1111

HARVARD LAW SCHOOL •

HARBOR CO
FREE TEACHING GUIDE
ROLE-PLAY SIMULATION
 PROGRAM ON NEGOTIATION AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
AN INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM TO IMPROVE THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

HARBORCO

Teaching Notes

This is a six-party, multi-issue, scorable negotiation game involving a dispute over the building
of a deep-water port. It introduces and explores the uses of principled negotiation and coalitions.

Scenario

Harborco is a consortium of development, industrial, and shipping concerns interested in

building and operating a deep-water port. The consortium has already selected a site for the port,
but cannot proceed without a license from the Federal Licensing Agency (FLA). The FLA is
willing to grant Harborco a license but only if it secures the support of at least four other parties
from among the environmental coalition, the federation of labor unions, a consortium of other
ports in the region, the Federal Department of Coastal Resources (DCR), and the governor of the
host state. The parties must deal with several issues: (1) Industry mix - what kinds of industries
will be permitted to locate near the port? (2) Environmental impact - to what extent will potential
environmental damage be mitigated? (3) Employment rules - will organized labor be given
preference in hiring for construction and operation of the port? (4) Federal loan assistance - will
the DCR provide a federal loan to Harborco? (5) Compensation to other ports - should other
ports in the region receive compensation for potential economic losses?

Background Readings

Fisher, Roger and William Ury, Getting to Yes (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1983), pp.
17-99.

Bacow, Lawrence, and Michael Wheeler, Environmental Dispute Resolution, (New York,
NY: Plenum Press, 1984), pp. 21-41, 56-75.

Raiffa, Howard, The Art and Science of Negotiation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1982), pp. 251-274.

These teaching notes were written by Lawrence Susskind and Eileen Babbitt, based on a case was written by Denise Madigan and Thomas Weeks
under the supervision of Professor Lawrence Susskind (M.I.T.), Assistant Professor David Lax and the Negotiation Roundtable. Copies are
available online at www.pon.org, Telephone: 800-258-4406, Fax: 617-495-7818. This case may not be reproduced, revised or translated in whole
or in part by any means without the written permission of the Director of Curriculum Development, Program on Negotiation, Harvard Law School,
518 Pound Hall, Cambridge, MA 02138. Please help to preserve the usefulness of this case by keeping it confidential. Copyright © 1984, 1988,
1989, 1994, 1995, 1996, 2007 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 3/07)
HARBORCO: Teaching Notes

Logistics

This game can be played with either 12 players (two per role) or six players (one per role). A
game manager is needed to conduct periodic votes and to answer questions. Game instructions
require at least 30 minutes to read; more preparation time is helpful. Negotiations require a
minimum of 1½ hours. If possible, distribute the General Instructions at some point prior to the
time of the game to give each player an opportunity to think about the scenario and consider the
interests of the other negotiating parties. Hand out Confidential Instructions ahead of time, too, if
you can be reasonably sure that all the participants will be present for the play of the game.
Otherwise, Confidential Instructions can be distributed just before the game begins, to ensure
that all the roles are filled in each group.

Before starting the game, make sure that everyone understands the General Instructions and the
mechanics of the negotiation. In particular, the following points are important to stress:

- Harborco must be a party to any agreement; indeed, it must be the proposer of any package.

- Only four additional parties (in addition to Harborco) are needed for agreement; DCR must
be among the supporters of a proposed agreement if any federal subsidy is included.

- Three formal votes will be taken during the course of the negotiation; if no alternative
proposal is on the table at the time of a vote, the vote will be taken on the original Harborco
proposal or the previous proposal.

- In order for a party to vote "yes" on any package, the proposal must meet or exceed the
minimum number of points assigned to that party in his or her Confidential Instructions. (This
does not include bonus points).

When handing out the role-specific Confidential Instructions, explain to players that there is a
confidential one-page score sheet attached to the back of their instructions. You may want to
have players in each role caucus with others in similar roles to discuss strategy before the actual
negotiations begin.

After these initial discussions, the negotiating group(s) of six or 12 should convene (ideally, in
separate rooms). If there is more than one group, the game manager should meet with each group
separately to welcome them and start the meeting. Explain your role as FLA scorekeeper in the
context of the story. (You are there to observe the progress of negotiations on behalf of your
superiors at the FLA.) Explain the voting procedures. You will call for a formal vote after the
first 15 minutes, and every 40 to 45 minutes (or so) thereafter. These votes are required by FLA
rules to help monitor the progress of negotiations. Additional informal votes may be carried out
by the groups, but you must conduct the formal votes. No vote is final until you have conducted
it.

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HARBORCO: Teaching Notes

Explain that the FLA will accept no proposal unless at least five of the six parties are on board.
In addition, remind the players that two parties have certain veto power; Harborco can veto any
proposal (because it is the developer), and the Federal DCR can veto any proposal requiring
FEDERAL funding. Remind the groups to calculate their score for each proposed package very
carefully before voting.

You are not there to facilitate or participate in the meeting in any way. Players are free to run the
meeting as they wish. (This means that you are a SILENT, PASSIVE observer, except for those
times when a formal vote is being taken.)

BEGIN THE NEGOTIATIONS. (You may suggest, before moving on to the next group, that
players begin by introducing themselves in their roles and by making brief statements.)

FORMAL VOTE #1: Ask Harborco if it has a proposal it would like to submit for a vote. If a
new proposal is submitted, write the proposal on the flip chart and ask for a simultaneous show
of hands:

IND ECOL EMP LOAN COMP

1 1 2 2 5

If no new proposal is submitted, call for a vote on Harborco's initial proposal. Write the
original proposal on the flip chart and ask for a simultaneous show of hands:

IND ECOL EMP LOAN COMP

1 1 4 2 1

FORMAL VOTE #2 - after 30 to 40 minutes.

FORMAL VOTE #3 - after 30 to 40 minutes.

IF A FIVE-WAY AGREEMENT IS REACHED in any round, ask the parties to try to come up
with a six-party agreement.

NEGOTIATION ENDS

IF NO AGREEMENT IS REACHED: Write down the last proposal and the votes for and against.
Compute two sets of points: a) the points each party would have earned with the last proposal;
and b) the final scores - if the proposal failed, each person receives his or her walk-away, or
minimum, score.

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HARBORCO: Teaching Notes

Notes to Instructor

It is important to stress that the purpose of the game is to get the highest possible individual
score. This is what makes the game similar to real life. You might want to create an incentive for
students to maximize their scores. We don't advise you to base their grades on those scores, but
you should remind them that the scores are in some way an evaluation of their personal
performances. Settling for a score you're not happy with, just to reach a six-way agreement, is
not the best outcome.

Be sure to check the final scores, as reported by the groups, to be sure there are no
miscalculations. Adding mistakes can lead to a group thinking it has an agreement when it really
doesn't.

Be insistent about taking the formal votes during negotiations. Even if the group doesn't want to
vote, push them to put a proposal on the table, or to vote on Harborco's original package. The
reason for doing this is for them to get an idea of how positions are changing.

Commonly Asked Questions

Q: Are the parties allowed to take votes in between the formal voting?

A: Yes - but these are informal votes and not recorded by the game manager.

Q: Can we show our score sheets to each other at the end?

A: Preferably not. Simply comparing the numbers makes it seem too much like a mechanical
process. It is better to believe the arguments made by the other parties, based on the numbers;
this is closer to a real-life situation.

Debriefing

There are 55 possible agreements; only nine are six-way agreements. These are all listed in the
attached Solution Set. The score sheet lists each of these possible agreements, by number of the
option in each issue category. It then lists the points that each party will receive for that
particular package. The highest score possible for each party is circled.

The debriefing should begin with a posting of scores from each group. Typically, 10 percent are
6-way, 70 percent are 5-way, and 20 percent reach no agreement. To begin the debriefing, ask
the following:

1. What happened in the groups that reached agreement, versus the groups that did not reach
agreement?

Copyright © 1984, 1988, 1989, 1994, 1995, 1996, 2007 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 7/07) 4
HARBORCO: Teaching Notes

2. Identify the people who got the highest score for each role. What were their strategies?
3. Identify the person who got the lowest score for each role. What happened?
4. What did the participants learn from the game?

Commonly Asked Questions

1. What happened in the negotiations in the groups that reached "no agreement"?
Usually Harborco, as instructed, had preempted discussion by proposing a package designed to
ensure the greatest return on its investment. The other negotiators protested, and a series of
caucuses began. Harborco, offering various concessions, tried to forge a winning coalition with
at least four other players. Groups opposed to the port caucused simultaneously, seeking to
block any pro-Harborco agreements. Few coalitions were stable. Each player was in something
of a bind -- not wanting to be left out of any settlement that might emerge, but also working to
block packages that offered too few points. Sometimes agreement eluded the players even when
the proposed package permitted five of the parties to vote “yes” (i.e., they were holding out for
more than their minimum scores). They also may have been attempting to deprive others of what
they presumed would be unduly large gains. Often, the exchanges in the groups that fail to reach
agreement become quite heated.

2. What was the negotiation process in the groups reaching five-way agreement?
Typically, there was very little caucusing. Everyone stayed at the table. Harborco began by
asking each group to express its concerns. It sought to build a package incrementally, attempting
to pyramid proposals responsive to each group's concerns. Some players, usually the other ports,
unions, and the environmental coalition, held out for no project at all since their Best
Alternatives To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) were high, thus forming a blocking coalition.
Blocking coalitions dissolved, however, in the face of increasingly attractive offers from
Harborco, aimed at meeting the demands of both the union and the environmentalists. The
representative of other ports continued to vote no.

The following is an example of a five-way agreement that leaves out the Environmental League:

• Industry mix: primarily dirty

• Ecological impact: maintain or repair
• Employment rules: unlimited union preference
• Federal loan: $1 billion over 20 years
• Compensation to other ports: $150 million

This package yields the following scores:

Harborco Environ Unions Ports DCR Governor

56 25 75 40 72 76

The Environmental League has little room to maneuver in the negotiation, because it scores
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HARBORCO: Teaching Notes

points on only two of the five issues. Often it is left out of an agreement after failing to construct
a blocking coalition with the other ports.

3. What strategies could have led the "no-agreement" groups to agreement?

The first step would have been to realize that this was not a zero-sum negotiating situation. Joint
gains were possible because each player attached different importance to the various issues being
negotiated. Such gains could have been realized if they had listened to each other more carefully.

Lessons can also be learned from six-way agreements. Consensus agreements are reached only
when the parties dedicate themselves to building consensus, working hard to respond to each
other's concerns. Usually, one player functions as a process manager even though he or she is an
interested party. While forbidden from revealing his or her confidential point allocations, each
party must find a way to communicate his or her true interests in a manner that is believable to
the others. In effect, the parties create joint gains by trading across issues they value differently,
while developing packages that allocate these joint gains.

4. What are the highest possible scores for each role?

Harborco: 77
Environmental League: 100
Unions: 90
Other Ports: 64
Federal DCR: 100
Governor: 77.
All of these scores are only possible with five-way agreements (one group is always left out).

5. Could we have invented other options?

No. The scoring system is set up to handle only the options described in the game.

6. Is it better to caucus or not?

For this game, it's better to work together at the table. But if it looks as if you may not get your
BATNA, you may want to caucus with someone to form a blocking coalition.

7. What if a party or parties aren't truthful (i.e., agree to vote a certain way, and then don't)?
Aren’t they required to live up to their agreements?
There is no such requirement, which is a problem with coalitions. It is difficult, if not impossible,
to find the means to hold someone to such an agreement.

8. To get a six-way agreement, does someone have to play a mediating role?

Not necessarily a mediating role, but someone does have to perform a facilitative function,
which will be discussed more in a later game.

Explain that negotiation becomes more complicated as more parties and more issues are added.
A BATNA may not be as easy to assess. Integrative bargaining may be more difficult to
establish, as parties may be more protective of their interests in the presence of many would-be
adversaries. The significant issues to discuss after playing this multi-party, multi-issue game are
Copyright © 1984, 1988, 1989, 1994, 1995, 1996, 2007 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 7/07) 6
HARBORCO: Teaching Notes

the elements of principled negotiation and the importance of coalitions.

Elements of Principled Negotiation

In Getting to Yes, Fisher, Ury, and Patton expand the idea of integrative bargaining to include a
checklist of principles. These principles are designed to move any negotiation away from
distributive bargaining to one in which all parties are made better off. The main elements are the
following:

1. Know your BATNA. This principle was explained in the Teaching Notes to the Redstone
game. Knowing one’s BATNA gives each player more power at the negotiating table. He or she
can evaluate options more critically and be clearer with other parties about what he or she needs
to be part of any agreement. In a scorable game, the BATNA is given to each player. These
scores are based on estimates of preference and on expected value of various outcomes.

2. Distinguish interests from positions.– Fisher, et al. distinguish between "interests," which
are the underlying concerns of each party, and "positions," which are the stands taken by each
party on the issues being negotiated. They argue that by focusing on interests rather than
positions, parties can engage in integrative bargaining and find creative ways to make all parties
to the negotiation better off.

Positional bargaining occurs when parties do not focus on interests. In positional bargaining,
each party typically identifies bottom line, opening, and fallback positions before negotiation
begins. After the opening position is offered, each party makes small concessions, based on his
or her fallback strategy. Concessions are made grudgingly, until a compromise position is
found or until the parties reach an impasse. This type of bargaining builds little trust between the
parties, as there is no opportunity to develop a relationship, and no incentive to explore each
other's interests. The result is a process that moves backward from an opening position, rather
than upward toward a creative outcome. Most distributive bargaining follows this positional
approach.

Focusing on interests, by contrast, compels the parties to listen carefully to each other to
discover what each feels is really important. Interests define the problem in a way that allows for
collaboration and creativity in fashioning a solution. The endeavor becomes one of joint problem
solving, rather than adversarial positioning. As discussed in integrative bargaining, the parties
using this approach can explore possibilities for trade offs and joint gains, resulting in a
positive-sum, rather than constant, agreement.

3. Invent options without committing. In order to explore the interests of parties at the table,
the negotiating process should include the opportunity to brainstorm possible approaches to
problems. This encourages the creativity and joint problem solving so essential to integrative
bargaining. Parties are more likely to engage in this process if it doesn't tie their hands and lock
them into agreements before they are ready. Thus the understanding should be that parties will
not be held to options they propose during the inventing period.

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HARBORCO: Teaching Notes

4. Insist on objective criteria: Criteria to evaluate proposed options should be objective, so

each party feels his or her interests are being protected. Sometimes such criteria are principles
that the parties can agree should govern the outcome, such as fairness or efficiency. Sometimes
objectivity is insured by outside expertise, such as when technical models are used. The
objective criteria themselves can be the subject of much negotiation, and this process can
highlight the underlying aspirations of each party. An agreement on such criteria can free up the
parties to invent options more creatively, knowing that the final evaluation will winnow out
those that don't meet the agreed-upon criteria.

5. Separate the people from the problem: By focusing on the problem rather than on the
individuals and personalities at the table, parties can more easily collaborate on joint problem
solving. Parties can work to identify common interests related to the problem, rather than getting
stuck on differences in style and tactics. This approach can also keep the emotions of the
negotiation from getting out of control; it's usually easier to deal with attacks on ideas than to
handle personal confrontations.

The Fisher, et al. work has its limitations, and there are several good articles that critique the
"principled negotiation" approach. A very stimulating class discussion can focus on these
critiques and the pros and cons of principled negotiation in a variety of real and hypothetical
cases.

Additional Articles:

White, James, "The Pros and Cons of Getting to Yes," Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 34,
No. 1 (March 1984).

McCarthy, William, "The Role of Power and Principle in Getting to Yes," Negotiation
Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1, (January 1985).

Fisher, Roger, "Beyond Yes," Negotiation Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1 (January 1985).

Importance of Coalitions

In a multi-party negotiation, the analysis of coalitions becomes crucial in developing strategies

both before and during the negotiation itself. Who are the most likely parties to share your
interests? If such a coalition were to form, would it be strong enough to block agreements that
aren't in accord with its interests? How stable is such a coalition likely to be? Are there other
potential coalitions whose interests are in opposition?

The stability of a coalition is always quite fragile. There's the possibility that an outside party
may be able to lure a coalition member away by offering a bit more than the coalition can
provide. Raiffa (Art & Science, p. 252) illustrates this dynamic with a coalition game, in which
shifting allegiances dominate the play. The key, therefore, to effective coalition building is to
Copyright © 1984, 1988, 1989, 1994, 1995, 1996, 2007 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 7/07) 8
HARBORCO: Teaching Notes

find a way to bind the parties together so that shifting is less likely to occur. To do this, one must
really understand the interests of each party and be creative about appealing to those interests. Or
one can step back from the negotiation a bit and ask what an impartial arbitrator might award to
each coalition member. Sometimes this appeal to principles of fairness can persuade reluctant
coalition members to structure their agreement along mutually beneficial lines.

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HARBORCO: Teaching Notes

Summary of Lessons

1. Inventing options before committing to them is critical to achieving mutually beneficial

outcomes. Unfettered brainstorming often yields creative and surprising solutions.

2. It almost always pays to be honest about the "interests" behind your positions. That way, other
parties will have an easier time constructing proposals that satisfy your most important interests.
Try to suggest "yes-able" propositions.

3. The legitimacy of arguments (and ultimately agreements) is enhanced if supported by

objective and respected sources of data.

4. It almost always pays to maintain cordial working relations with adversaries, even in the face
of substantial disagreement. Focus your energy on solving the problems, not on beating the other
side.

5. Players are exposed to elementary utility analysis in the point-scoring scheme. The importance
of pre-negotiation analysis in evaluating options is illustrated. The players can then explore how
and why different negotiating strategies led to different outcomes.

6. Multi-issue, multi-party negotiations tend to involve the formation of coalitions, especially

blocking coalitions. This game provides an instructive context for exploring coalition strategies.

7. Parties who reveal their true interests do not necessarily do better than those who remain silent
or bluff. The advantages and disadvantages of revealing all of one's concerns are worth pursuing
carefully.

Exam Questions

1. What are the key elements in "principled negotiation"? How does each element move a
negotiation away from distributive, and toward integrative, bargaining?

2. What are some of the limitations of Fisher and Ury's approach? What additional principles
would you add to the original list to address these limitations?

3. How can coalitions help and hinder potential agreement in a multi-party negotiation?

Copyright © 1984, 1988, 1989, 1994, 1995, 1996, 2007 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 7/07) 10
 PROGRAM ON NEGOTIATION AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
AN INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM TO IMPROVE THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

HARBORCO GAME REVIEW

FINAL PROPOSAL FINAL VOTES/SCORES

GROUP Harborco Environment Union Other Ports Federal Government

Industry Eco Employee Federal Money to (55) (50) (50) (31) (65) (30)
Mix Impact Rules Money Other Ports

This case was written by Denise Madigan and Thomas Weeks under the supervision of Professor Lawrence Susskind (M.I.T.), Assistant Professor David Lax and the Negotiation Roundtable. Copies are available at
reasonable cost from the Clearinghouse for the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School (Web site: www.pon.org; telephone: 800-258-4406 or 617-495-1684). This case may not be reproduced, revised, or translated in
whole or in part by any means without the written permission of the Director of Curriculum Development, Program on Negotiation, 513 Pound Hall, Harvard Law School, Cambridge MA 02138. Please help to preserve the
usefulness of this case by keeping it confidential. Copyright © 1984, 1988, 1989, 1994, 1995, 1996, 2002, 2007 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 3/07)
 PROGRAM ON NEGOTIATION AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
AN INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM TO IMPROVE THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

HARBORCO GAME VOTING SHEET

INDUSTRY ECOLOGICAL EMPLOYMENT FEDERAL COMPENSATION

MIX IMPACT RULES LOAN TO PORTS

VOTE 1

VOTE 2

VOTE 3

This case was written by Denise Madigan and Thomas Weeks under the supervision of Professor Lawrence Susskind (M.I.T.), Assistant Professor David Lax and the Negotiation Roundtable. Copies are available at
reasonable cost from the Clearinghouse for the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School (Web site: www.pon.org; telephone: 800-258-4406 or 617-495-1684). This case may not be reproduced, revised, or translated in
whole or in part by any means without the written permission of the Director of Curriculum Development, Program on Negotiation, 513 Pound Hall, Harvard Law School, Cambridge MA 02138. Please help to preserve the
usefulness of this case by keeping it confidential. Copyright © 1984, 1988, 1989, 1994, 1995, 1996, 2002, 2007 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. (Rev. 3/07)
 HARBORCO SOLUTION SET: 55 Possible Agreements*
• 12 6-way agreements (marked with U) • Max points for each party are asterisked (*) • Points below party minimum are in brackets [25]

PARTIES (min required points in bold brackets) PARTIES (min required points in bold brackets)
ISSUES (outcomes) ISSUES (outcomes)
[55] [50] [50] [31] [65] [30] [55] [50] [50] [31] [65] [30]
# IND EC EMP FL COM Har Env Uni Por DCR Gov TOT # IND EC EMP FL COM Har Env Uni Por DCR Gov TOT
1 1 2 1 3 4 56 [25] 75 40 72 76 344 32 2 2 4 1 3 77* [47] 56 34 65 60 339
2 1 2 2 3 3 56 [25] 66 51 77 67 342 33-U 2 3 2 2 4 67 77* 83 35 76 63 401 max points

3 1 2 2 3 4 61 [25] 68 36 74 70 334 34 2 3 2 3 5 56 77 65 [25] 78 59 360

4 1 2 3 2 3 70 [25] 66 44 65 68 338 35-U 2 3 3 1 3 73 77 81 40 65 64 400
5 1 2 3 3 2 56 [25] 54 64* 72 59 330 36-U 2 3 3 2 3 67 77 71 48 81 54 398
6 1 2 3 3 3 61 [25] 56 49 79 61 331 37-U 2 3 3 2 4 72 77 73 33 78 57 390
7 1 2 3 3 4 66 [25] 58 34 76 64 323 38 2 3 3 2 5 70 77 65 [18] 66 60 356
8 1 3 1 3 5 57 55 67 [25] 65 71 340 39 2 3 3 3 5 61 77 55 [23] 80 53 349
9-U 1 3 2 2 3 68 55 76 46 68 66 379 40-U 2 3 4 1 3 80* 77 56 34 70 52 369
10-U 1 3 2 2 4 73 55 78 31 65 69 371 41 2 3 4 1 4 75 77 58 [19] 67 55 351
11 1 3 2 3 5 62 55 60 [21] 67 65 330 42 2 3 4 2 2 59 77 [44] 57 79 40 356
12-U 1 3 3 2 3 73 55 66 44 70 60 368 43 2 3 4 2 3 64 77 [46] 42 86 42 357
13 1 3 3 2 4 68 55 68 [29] 67 63 350 44 2 3 4 3 3 55 77 [36] 47 100* 35 350
14-U 1 3 3 3 4 69 55 58 34 81 56 353 45 2 3 4 3 4 60 77 [38] 32 97 38 342
15 1 3 3 3 5 67 55 50 [19] 69 59 319 46-U 3 2 2 2 4 66 70 63 41 65 63 368
16 1 3 4 2 2 65 55 [39] 53 68 46 326 47 3 2 2 3 5 55 70 [45] 31 67 59 327
17 1 3 4 2 3 70 55 [41] 38 75 48 327 48-U 3 2 3 2 3 66 70 51 54 70 54 365
18 1 3 4 3 2 56 55 [29] 58 82 39 319 49-U 3 2 3 2 4 71 70 53 39 67 57 357
19 1 3 4 3 3 61 55 [31] 43 89 41 320 50 3 2 4 2 2 58 70 [24] 63 68 40 323
20 2 1 2 3 4 59 [22] 73 40 65 68 327 51 3 2 4 2 3 63 70 [26] 48 75 42 324
21 2 1 3 3 3 59 [22] 61 53 70 59 324 52 3 2 4 2 4 68 70 [28] 33 72 45 316
22 2 1 3 3 4 64 [22] 63 38 67 62 316 53 3 2 4 3 4 59 70 [18] 38 86 38 309
23 2 2 1 2 4 59 [47] 90* 39 69 77* 381 54 3 3 4 2 3 56 100* [26] 48 80 34 344
24 2 2 2 2 3 59 [47] 81 50 74 68 379 55 3 3 4 2 4 61 100* [28] 33 77 37 336
25 2 2 2 2 4 64 [47] 83 35 71 71 371
26 2 2 2 3 4 55 [47] 73 40 85 64 364 * Note: While all 55 agreements technically are possible, the 35 5-way agreements in which a party other than
27 2 2 3 2 2 59 [47] 69 63 69 60 367 Other Ports withholds agreement are strategically foolish from Other Ports' perspective. In those cases (i.e.,
28 2 2 3 2 3 64 [47] 71 48 76 62 368 1-7, 16-32, 42-45, 47, and 50-55), even though Other Ports receives more than its 31-point minimum, Other
29 2 2 3 2 4 69 [47] 73 33 73 65 360 Ports would have received even more points (150) by withholding its consent along with the other
30 2 2 3 3 3 55 [47] 61 53 90 55 361 nonconsenting party, and thus scuttling the entire deal. So, assuming Other Ports plays its role strategically
31 2 2 3 3 4 60 [47] 63 38 87 58 353 and never consents to a 5-way deal, there are only 8 possible 5-way agreements (8, 11, 13, 15, 34, 38, 39 &
41), with Other Ports as the lone holdout in each.