Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 598 11/30/13 8:57 PM
Notes.·In job contracting, the principal is jointly and

severally liable with the contractor and insolvency or
unwillingness to pay by the contractor or direct employer is
not a prerequisite for the joint and several liability of the
principal. (Development Bank of the Philippines vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, 233 SCRA 250 [1994])
When a company contracted for security services with a
security agency, as it was the latter who hired the security
guards, said company became an indirect employer of the
security guards pursuant to Article 107 of the Labor Code.
(Manila Electric Company vs. Benamira, 463 SCRA 331
[2005])
··o0o··
G.R. No. 164815. September 3, 2009. *
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, petitioner, vs. COURT

OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Motions for Reconsideration;

While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a
prohibited pleading, it is within the sound discretion of the Court
to admit the same, provided it is filed with prior leave whenever
substantive justice may be better served thereby.·After considering
anew ValerosoÊs arguments through his Letter-Appeal, together
with the OSGÊs position recommending his acquittal, and keeping in
mind that substantial rights must ultimately reign supreme over
technicalities, this Court is swayed to reconsider. The Letter-Appeal
is actually in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration.
While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a
prohibited pleading, it is within the sound discretion of the Court to
admit the same, provided it is filed with prior leave whenever
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000142a9153257e1355295000a0082004500cc/p/AAAF5198/?username=Guest Page 1 of 22
substantive justice may be better served thereby.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
42
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Rules of

procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice·courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of
judicial discretion.·Suspension of the rules of procedure, to pave
the way for the re-examination of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law earlier made, is not without basis. We would like
to stress that rules of procedure are merely tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. They are conceived and
promulgated to effectively aid the courts in the dispensation of
justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of
judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as
they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that, on the
balance, technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not
the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would
tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it would always be
within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case
from its operation.
Searches and Seizures; As a general rule, the procurement of a
warrant is required before a law enforcer can validly search or seize
the person, house, papers, or effects of any individual.·The right
against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution which states: SEC. 2. The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons

or things to be seized. From this constitutional provision, it can
readily be gleaned that, as a general rule, the procurement of a
warrant is required before a law enforcer can validly search or seize
the person, house, papers, or effects of any individual.
Same; Warrantless Searches; In the exceptional instances where
a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, what
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely
a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or
seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched,
and the
43
VOL. 598, SEPTEMBER 3, 2009 43
character of the articles procured.·The above proscription is not,

however, absolute. The following are the well-recognized instances
where searches and seizures are allowed even without a valid
warrant: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2.
[Seizure] of evidence in „plain view.‰ The elements are: a) a
prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which
the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; b)
the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have
the right to be where they are; c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent; and d) „plain view‰ justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search; 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly
regulated by the government, the vehicleÊs inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting
to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; 4.
Consented warrantless search; 5. Customs search; 6. Stop
and Frisk; 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. 8.
Search of vessels and aircraft; [and] 9. Inspection of buildings
and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and
building regulations. In the exceptional instances where a
warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, what
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely
a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the

circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or
seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured.
Same; Same; Arrests; Searches Incident to Lawful Arrest; Words
and Phrases; When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the
arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any
weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his
escape, and, in addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting
officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arresteeÊs person in
order to prevent its concealment or destruction; A valid arrest allows
the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of
the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control; The
phrase „within the area of his immediate control‰ means the area
from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.·We would like to stress that the scope of the
warrantless search is not without limitations. In People v. Leangsiri
(252
44
SCRA 213 [1996]), People v. Cubcubin, Jr. (360 SCRA 690 [2001]),
and People v. Estella (395 SCRA 553 [2003]), we had the occasion to
lay down the parameters of a valid warrantless search and seizure
as an incident to a lawful arrest. When an arrest is made, it is
reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in
order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to
resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officerÊs safety might
well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is
entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize
any evidence on the arresteeÊs person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction. Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes
both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct
a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also
in the permissible area within the latterÊs reach. Otherwise stated, a
valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons
either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of
his immediate control. The phrase „within the area of his

immediate control‰ means the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or
in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to
the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person
arrested.
Same; Same; Same; A cabinet which is locked could no longer
be considered as an area within the arresteeÊs immediate control
because there is no way for him to take any weapon or to destroy any
evidence that could be used against him.·We can readily conclude
that the arresting officers served the warrant of arrest without any
resistance from Valeroso. They placed him immediately under their
control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him out of the
room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according
to Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be considered as an „area
within his immediate control‰ because there was no way for him to
take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used
against him. The arresting officers would have been justified in
searching the person of Valeroso, as well as the tables or drawers in
front of him, for any concealed weapon that might be used against
the former. But under the circumstances obtaining, there was no
comparable justification to search through all the desk drawers and
cabinets or the other closed or concealed areas in that room itself. It
is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception (warrantless
45
search as an incident to a lawful arrest) is to protect the arresting

officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be
armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from
destroying evidence within reach. The exception, therefore, should
not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose. In the
case before us, search was made in the locked cabinet which cannot
be said to have been within ValerosoÊs immediate control. Thus, the
search exceeded the bounds of what may be considered as an
incident to a lawful arrest.
Same; Same; Plain View Doctrine; The „plain view doctrine‰
may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate

seizures or to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find
evidence of defendantÊs guilt.·Nor can the warrantless search in
this case be justified under the „plain view doctrine.‰ The „plain
view doctrine‰ may not be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general exploratory search
made solely to find evidence of defendantÊs guilt. The doctrine is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object.
Same; Same; Same; The plain view doctrine does not apply
where the police officers did not just accidentally discover the
subject firearm and ammunition but actually searched for the
evidence.·The police officers were inside the boarding house of
ValerosoÊs children, because they were supposed to serve a warrant
of arrest issued against Valeroso. In other words, the police officers
had a prior justification for the intrusion. Consequently, any
evidence that they would inadvertently discover may be used
against Valeroso. However, in this case, the police officers did not
just accidentally discover the subject firearm and ammunition; they
actually searched for evidence against Valeroso. Clearly, the search
made was illegal, a violation of ValerosoÊs right against
unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, the evidence
obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible in evidence against
him.
Same; Same; Presumption of Regularity; While the power to
search and seize may at times be necessary for public welfare, still it
may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of the citizens, for no enforcement of any
statute
46
is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic

principles of government; Because a warrantless search is in
derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers who conduct it
cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions.·
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which

the constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power
to search and seize may at times be necessary for public welfare,
still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing
the constitutional rights of the citizens, for no enforcement of any
statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government. Those who are supposed to enforce the
law are not justified in disregarding the rights of an individual in
the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of
liberty. Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a
constitutional right, peace officers who conduct it cannot invoke
regularity in the performance of official functions.
Same; Same; Bill of Rights; Constitutional Law; The Bill of
Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government.·The Bill of
Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are
stripped naked of their rights as human beings, democracy cannot
survive and government becomes meaningless. This explains why
the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution,
occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law way above
the articles on governmental power.
Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; It would be
better to set free ten men who might probably be guilty of the crime
charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not
commit.·Without the illegally seized firearm, ValerosoÊs conviction
cannot stand. There is simply no sufficient evidence to convict him.
All told, the guilt of Valeroso was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt measured by the required moral certainty for conviction. The
evidence presented by the prosecution was not enough to overcome
the presumption of innocence as constitutionally ordained. Indeed,
it would be better to set free ten men who might probably be guilty
of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime
he did not commit.
47

LETTER-APPEAL FOR REVIEW of the Decision and

Resolution of the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Pablito A. Carpio and Nicolas P. Lapeña, Jr. for

petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
For resolution is the Letter-Appeal1 of Senior Inspector
(Sr. Insp.) Jerry C. Valeroso (Valeroso) praying that our
February 22, 2008 Decision2 and June 30, 2008 Resolution3
be set aside and a new one be entered acquitting him of the
crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
The facts are briefly stated as follows:
Valeroso was charged with violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
„That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City,

Philippines, the said accused without any authority of law, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her
possession and under his/her custody and control
One (1) cal. 38 „Charter Arms‰ revolver bearing serial no.
52315 with five (5) live ammo.
without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by
the proper authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.‰4
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 229-232.

2 Id., at pp. 148-165.
3 Id., at p. 227.
4 Records, p. 1.
48

When arraigned, Valeroso pleaded „not guilty.‰5 Trial on

the merits ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses:
Senior Police Officer (SPO)2 Antonio Disuanco (Disuanco) of
the Criminal Investigation Division of the Central Police
District Command; and Epifanio Deriquito (Deriquito),

Records Verifier of the Firearms and Explosives Division in
Camp Crame. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., Disuanco received
a Dispatch Order from the desk officer directing him and
three (3) other policemen to serve a Warrant of Arrest,
issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador, against Valeroso for a
case of kidnapping with ransom.6
After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary
surveillance on Valeroso checking his hideouts in Cavite,
Caloocan, and Bulacan. Eventually, the team members
proceeded to the Integrated National Police (INP) Central
Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw
Valeroso about to board a tricyle. Disuanco and his team
approached Valeroso. They put him under arrest, informed
him of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him.
They found a Charter Arms revolver, bearing Serial No.
52315, with five (5) pieces of live ammunition, tucked in his
waist.7
Valeroso was then brought to the police station for
questioning. Upon verification in the Firearms and
Explosives Division in Camp Crame, Deriquito presented a
certification8 that the subject firearm was not issued to
Valeroso, but was licensed in the name of a certain Raul
Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.9
_______________
5 Id., at p. 33.
6 Rollo, p. 149.
7 Id.
8 Exh. „C,‰ Folder of Exhibits.
9 Rollo, pp. 149-150.
49

On the other hand, Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol,

Jr. (Timbol), and Adrian Yuson testified for the defense.
Their testimonies are summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in

the boarding house of his children located at Sagana Homes,
Barangay New Era, Quezon City. He was awakened by four
(4) heavily armed men in civilian attire who pointed their
guns at him and pulled him out of the room.10 The raiding
team tied his hands and placed him near the faucet (outside
the room) then went back inside, searched and ransacked
the room. Moments later, an operative came out of the room
and exclaimed, „Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa loob!‰11
Disuanco informed Valeroso that there was a standing
warrant for his arrest. However, the raiding team was not
armed with a search warrant.12
Timbol testified that he issued to Valeroso a
Memorandum Receipt13 dated July 1, 1993 covering the
subject firearm and its ammunition, upon the verbal
instruction of Col. Angelito Moreno.14
On May 6, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
97, Quezon City, convicted Valeroso as charged and
sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to six (6)
years, as maximum. The gun subject of the case was further
ordered confiscated in favor of the government.15
_______________
10 Id., at p. 39.
11 ValerosoÊs testimony was corroborated by Yuson; id., at p. 151.
12 Rollo, p. 152.
13 Exh. „1,‰ Folder of Exhibits.
14 Rollo, p. 152.
15 The decision was penned by Judge Oscar L. Leviste; id., at pp. 38-
45.
50

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed16 the RTC

decision but the minimum term of the indeterminate
penalty was lowered to four (4) years and two (2) months.
On petition for review, we affirmed17 in full the CA
decision. Valeroso filed a Motion for Reconsideration18

which was denied with finality19 on June 30, 2008.
Valeroso is again before us through this Letter-Appeal20
imploring this Court to once more take a contemplative
reflection and deliberation on the case, focusing on his
breached constitutional rights against unreasonable search
and seizure.21
Meanwhile, as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
failed to timely file its Comment on ValerosoÊs Motion for
Reconsideration, it instead filed a Manifestation in Lieu of
Comment.22
In its Manifestation, the OSG changed its previous
position and now recommends ValerosoÊs acquittal. After a
second look at the evidence presented, the OSG considers
the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense more
credible and thus concludes that Valeroso was arrested in a
boarding house. More importantly, the OSG agrees with
Valeroso that the subject firearm was obtained by the police
officers in violation of ValerosoÊs constitutional right against
illegal search and seizure, and should thus be excluded from
the evidence for the prosecution. Lastly, assuming that the
subject firearm was admissible in evidence, still, Valeroso
could not be convicted of the crime, since he was able to
establish his authority to
_______________
16 Embodied in a decision dated May 4, 2004, penned by Associate

Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Danilo B. Pine and
Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring; Rollo, pp. 16-31.
17 Rollo, pp. 148-165.
18 Id., at pp. 169-177.
19 Id., at p. 227.
20 Supra note 1.
21 Rollo, p. 230.
22 Id., at pp. 239-270.
51

possess the gun through the Memorandum Receipt issued

by his superiors.
After considering anew ValerosoÊs arguments through his
Letter-Appeal, together with the OSGÊs position
recommending his acquittal, and keeping in mind that
substantial rights must ultimately reign supreme over
technicalities, this Court is swayed to reconsider.23
The Letter-Appeal is actually in the nature of a second
motion for reconsideration. While a second motion for
reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited pleading,
it is within the sound discretion of the Court to admit the
same, provided it is filed with prior leave whenever
substantive justice may be better served thereby.24
This is not the first time that this Court is suspending its
own rules or excepting a particular case from the operation
of the rules. In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,25 despite the
denial of De GuzmanÊs motion for reconsideration, we still
entertained his Omnibus Motion, which was actually a
second motion for reconsideration. Eventually, we
reconsidered our earlier decision and remanded the case to
the Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of
petitionerÊs evidence. In that case, we said that if we would
not compassionately bend backwards and flex technicalities,
petitioner would surely experience the disgrace and misery
of incarceration for a crime which he might not have
committed after all.26 Also in Astorga v. People,27 on a second
motion for reconsideration, we set aside our earlier decision,
re-examined the records of the case, then finally acquitted
Benito Astorga of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the
ground of reasonable doubt. And
_______________
23 See De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 326 Phil. 182; 256 SCRA 171

(1996).
24 Astorga v. People, G.R. No. 154130, August 20, 2004, 437 SCRA
152, 155.
25 Supra note 23.
26 De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, id., at p. 191; p. 180.
27 Supra note 24.
52

in Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,28

by virtue of the January 13, 2004 En Banc Resolution, the
Court authorized the Special First Division to suspend the
Rules, so as to allow it to consider and resolve respondentÊs
second motion for reconsideration after the motion was
heard on oral arguments. After a re-examination of the
merits of the case, we granted the second motion for
reconsideration and set aside our earlier decision.
Clearly, suspension of the rules of procedure, to pave the
way for the re-examination of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law earlier made, is not without basis.
We would like to stress that rules of procedure are merely
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They
are conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the courts
in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or
robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In
rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to
be, conscientiously guided by the norm that, on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not
the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules
would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it
would always be within our power to suspend the rules or
except a particular case from its operation.29
Now on the substantive aspect.
The Court notes that the version of the prosecution, as to
where Valeroso was arrested, is different from the version of
the defense. The prosecution claims that Valeroso was
arrested near the INP Central Police Station in Culiat,
Quezon City, while he was about to board a tricycle. After
placing Valeroso under arrest, the arresting officers bodily
searched him, and they found the subject firearm and
ammunition. The defense, on the other hand, insists that he
was arrested inside
_______________
28 G.R. Nos. 112526 and 118838, March 16, 2005, 453 SCRA 432.
29 Astorga v. People, supra note 24, at pp. 155-156.
53

the boarding house of his children. After serving the

warrant of arrest (allegedly for kidnapping with ransom),
some of the police officers searched the boarding house and
forcibly opened a cabinet where they discovered the subject
firearm.
After a thorough re-examination of the records and
consideration of the joint appeal for acquittal by Valeroso
and the OSG, we find that we must give more credence to
the version of the defense.
ValerosoÊs appeal for acquittal focuses on his
constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure alleged to have been violated by the arresting police
officers; and if so, would render the confiscated firearm and
ammunition inadmissible in evidence against him.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is
secured by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which
states:
„SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.‰
From this constitutional provision, it can readily be

gleaned that, as a general rule, the procurement of a
warrant is required before a law enforcer can validly search
or seize the person, house, papers, or effects of any
individual.30
To underscore the significance the law attaches to the
fundamental right of an individual against unreasonable
searches and seizures, the Constitution succinctly declares
in Article III, Section 3(2), that „any evidence obtained in
viola-
_______________
30 People v. Sevilla, 394 Phil. 125, 139; 339 SCRA 625, 635 (2000).
54

tion of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in

evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.‰31
The above proscription is not, however, absolute. The
following are the well-recognized instances where searches
and seizures are allowed even without a valid warrant:
„1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. [Seizure] of evidence in „plain view.‰ The elements are: a)
a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties; b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
who have the right to be where they are; c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and d) „plain view‰ justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicleÊs inherent mobility reduces expectation of
privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes
a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.32
8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]
9. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the
enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations.‰33
_______________
31 Id.
32 People v. Tudtud, G.R. No. 144037, September 26, 2003, 412 SCRA
142, 153-154; Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 263, 277; 373 SCRA
221, 232 (2002); People v. Sevilla, supra note 30, at pp. 139-140; p. 636
People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 879-880; 288 SCRA 626, 638 (1998).
33 Nachura, Antonio Eduardo B., Outline Reviewer in Political Law,

2009, pp. 139-142.
55

In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not

necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, what
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure
is purely a judicial question, determinable from the
uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the
purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of
probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure
was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of
the articles procured.34
In light of the enumerated exceptions, and applying the
test of reasonableness laid down above, is the warrantless
search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition valid?
We answer in the negative.
For one, the warrantless search could not be justified as
an incident to a lawful arrest. Searches and seizures
incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
„SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.·A person lawfully

arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of
an offense without a search warrant.‰
We would like to stress that the scope of the warrantless

search is not without limitations. In People v. Leangsiri,35
People v. Cubcubin, Jr.,36 and People v. Estella,37 we had the
occasion to lay down the parameters of a valid warrantless
search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any
weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or
effect his escape. Otherwise, the officerÊs safety might well be
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is
_______________
34 Caballes v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32, at p. 278; p. 232.

35 322 Phil. 226; 252 SCRA 213 (1996).
36 413 Phil 249; 360 SCRA 690 (2001).
37 443 Phil. 669; 395 SCRA 553 (2003).
56

entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and

seize any evidence on the arresteeÊs person in order to
prevent its concealment or destruction.38
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and
the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a
warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but
also in the permissible area within the latterÊs reach.39
Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of
evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of
the one arrested or within the area of his immediate
control.40 The phrase „within the area of his immediate
control‰ means the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.41 A gun on
a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be
as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the
clothing of the person arrested.42
In the present case, Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a
warrant of arrest allegedly for kidnapping with ransom. At
that time, Valeroso was sleeping inside the boarding house
of his children. He was awakened by the arresting officers
who were heavily armed. They pulled him out of the room,
placed him beside the faucet outside the room, tied his
hands, and then put him under the care of Disuanco.43 The
other police officers remained inside the room and
ransacked the locked cabinet44 where they found the subject
firearm and ammuni-
_______________
38 People v. Estella, id., at p. 685; p. 566.
39 People v. Cueno, 359 Phil. 151, 163; 298 SCRA 621, 632 (1998).
40 People v. Cubcubin, Jr., supra note 36, at p. 271; p. 708; see People
v. Leangsiri, supra note 35.
41 People v. Estella, supra note 37, at p. 685; p. 566.
42 Id.
43 TSN, February 19, 1997, pp. 21-25.
44 TSN, March 17, 1997, p. 27.
57

tion.45 With such discovery, Valeroso was charged with

illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily
conclude that the arresting officers served the warrant of
arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. They placed
him immediately under their control by pulling him out of
the bed, and bringing him out of the room with his hands
tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according to Valeroso,
was locked, could no longer be considered as an „area within
his immediate control‰ because there was no way for him to
take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be
used against him.
The arresting officers would have been justified in
searching the person of Valeroso, as well as the tables or
drawers in front of him, for any concealed weapon that
might be used against the former. But under the
circumstances obtaining, there was no comparable
justification to search through all the desk drawers and
cabinets or the other closed or concealed areas in that room
itself.46
It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception
(warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest) is to
protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the
person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed
weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence
within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be
strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose.47 In the
case before us, search was made in the locked cabinet which
cannot be said to have been within ValerosoÊs immediate
control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what may

be considered as an incident to a lawful arrest.48
_______________
45 Id., at p. 3.
46 People v. Estella, supra note 37, at p. 685; p. 566.
47 Id.
48 Id., at p. 686; p. 567.
58

Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified

under the „plain view doctrine.‰
The „plain view doctrine‰ may not be used to launch
unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures or to extend
a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of
defendantÊs guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a
police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object.49
As enunciated in People v. Cubcubin, Jr.50 and People v.
Leangsiri:51
„What the „plain view‰ cases have in common is that the police
officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in
the course of which[,] he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification·whether it be a warrant for
another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some
other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search
directed against the accused·and permits the warrantless seizure.
Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate
only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have
evidence before them; the „plain view‰ doctrine may not be used to
extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges.‰52
Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding house

of ValerosoÊs children, because they were supposed to serve
a warrant of arrest issued against Valeroso. In other words,

the police officers had a prior justification for the intrusion.
Consequently, any evidence that they would inadvertently
dis-
_______________
49 People v. Cubcubin, Jr., supra note 40, at p. 271; p. 708; People v.

Leangsiri, supra note 35, at p. 249; p. 231.
50 Supra note 40.
51 Supra note 35.
52 People v. Cubcubin, Jr., supra note 36, at p. 272; p. 709; People v.
Leangsiri, supra note 35, at pp. 249-250; p. 231.
59

cover may be used against Valeroso. However, in this case,

the police officers did not just accidentally discover the
subject firearm and ammunition; they actually searched for
evidence against Valeroso.
Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of
ValerosoÊs right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Consequently, the evidence obtained in violation of said
right is inadmissible in evidence against him.
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace
against which the constitutional guarantees afford full
protection. While the power to search and seize may at
times be necessary for public welfare, still it may be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of the citizens, for no enforcement of
any statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference
to the basic principles of government. Those who are
supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding
the rights of an individual in the name of order. Order is too
high a price to pay for the loss of liberty.53
Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a
constitutional right, peace officers who conduct it cannot
invoke regularity in the performance of official functions.54
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional
government. If people are stripped naked of their rights as

human beings, democracy cannot survive and government
becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights,
contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies
a position of primacy in the fundamental law way above the
articles on governmental power.55
Without the illegally seized firearm, ValerosoÊs conviction
cannot stand. There is simply no sufficient evidence to
convict
_______________
53 People v. Aruta, supra note 32, at p. 895; p. 653.

54 People v. Cubcubin, Jr., supra note 36, at pp. 270-271; pp. 707-708.
55 People v. Tudtud, supra note 32, at p. 168.
60

him.56 All told, the guilt of Valeroso was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt measured by the required moral certainty
for conviction. The evidence presented by the prosecution
was not enough to overcome the presumption of innocence
as constitutionally ordained. Indeed, it would be better to
set free ten men who might probably be guilty of the crime
charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did
not commit.57
With the foregoing disquisition, there is no more need to
discuss the other issues raised by Valeroso.
One final note. The Court values liberty and will always
insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a
condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative
and prosecutory powers of the government.58
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February
22, 2008 Decision and June 30, 2008 Resolution are
RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry
Valeroso is hereby ACQUITTED of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Velasco,

Jr. and Peralta, JJ., concur.
Judgment and resolution reconsidered and set aside, Sr.

Insp. Jerry Valeroso acquitted of illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition.
Notes.·Where the accused were lawfully arrested in

Room 504 of a hotel and a warrantless search was conducted
in Room 413, the search is illegal and the evidence obtained
_______________
56 People v. Sarap, 447 Phil. 642, 652; 399 SCRA 503, 511 (2003).
57 Id., at pp. 652-653; p. 512.
58 People v. Januario, 335 Phil. 268, 304; 267 SCRA 608, 643 (1997).
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Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals

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Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 598 11/30/13 8:57 PM

Notes.·In job contracting, the principal is jointly and

G.R. No. 164815. September 3, 2009. *

SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, petitioner, vs. COURT

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Motions for Reconsideration;

substantive justice may be better served thereby.

42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED