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Europe's Uncommon PhilipH. Gordon
ForeignPolicy
in earlyFebruary1996,
aftertheUnitedStateshad engineered a peace agreement forformer Yugosla-
via thattheEuropeanshad failedto bringaboutafterfouryearsofinterven-
concludedoutloud whatmanyotherobservershad
tion,a seniorU.S. official
alreadybeguntothink:"UnlesstheUnitedStatesis preparedtoputitspolitical
and militarymusclebehindthe quest forsolutionsto Europeaninstability,
nothingreallygets done."' Only a few days later,aftera successfulU.S.
diplomaticintervention betweenGreeceand Turkeyover
to preventa conflict
an Aegeanisland, thatsame commented
official thatEuropeanswere"literally
sleepingthroughthenight"as PresidentBillClintonmediatedthedisputeon
the phone.2Five yearsafterthe EuropeanUnion (EU) had signeda treaty
announcingthecreationofa commonforeignand security policy(CFSP),the
perceptionhad begun to emerge-not only among Americansbut among
manyEuropeansas well-thattheEU's efforts had failed,and thattheUnited
Stateswas morethaneverthediplomaticand military leaderof theWestern
world.3
ComparingtheEU's foreign and security policyto thatoftheUnitedStates
is, ofcourse,unfair.The CFSP projectis farmorelimitedthanthecreationof
Thisarticlewas first
presentedas partofa Councilon ForeignRelationsStudyGroupon Europe
and TransatlanticRelationsin the 1990s.A differentversionof the paper,focusingmoreon
EuropeanUnioninstitutional thanthisarticle,will be publishedin
issues and less on security
AndrewMoravcsik, ed.,TheProspectsforEuropean Integration:
Deepening,Diversity,Democratization
(Washington,D.C.: Brookings and Councilon ForeignRelations,
Institution forthcoming 1998).I
would liketo thankRosa Alonso,AmayaBloch-Laine, FraserCameron,JohnChipman,Charles
Grant,CharlesKupchan,AndrewMoravcsik, JohnRoper,GideonRose,and theparticipants inthe
CouncilStudyGroupfortheircomments and suggestions; forthearguments
responsibility is of
courseminealone.
International
Security,Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter1997/98),pp. 74-100
? 1997 by the Presidentand Fellows of Harvard College and the MassachusettsInstituteof Technology.
74
Europe'sUncommon
Foreign
Policy| 75
a political-military
capabilitylikethatoftheUnitedStates;CFSP mechanisms
and procedureshave been in place foronlya shorttime;and theobstaclesto
foreignpolicycooperationamong longstanding sovereignstateswiththeir
own histories, perspectives,interests,
and bureaucracies are obvious.Yetthe
comparison-andthedisparaging remarksfromabroad-do servetohighlight
justhow fartheEuropeanUnionis frompossessingthesortofunity, credibil-
ity,and militarypowernecessarytobe an influential actorin globaldiplomatic
and security affairs.
Thosewho had hoped in 1991thattheEU's CFSP would
be worthyof sucha name-and therewereplentyofthemat thetime-have
been largelydisappointed.4
Whetheror not theEuropeanUnionis able to developintoa unifiedand
effectiveforeignand securitypolicyactoris important, not only forthose
Europeansseekingto enhancetheirown influence on theworldstagebutfor
thestructure ofworldpoliticsitself.An EU of nearly400 millionpeople and
a combinedgrossdomesticproduct(GDP) of morethan$8 trillionthatwas
able to uniteits diplomaticand military potentialcould easilychallengethe
UnitedStates'currentstatusas "lone superpower";exertinfluenceover the
Middle East peace processand securityin the PersianGulf;gain increased
economicand commercial leveragefromitsinternationalsecuritypolicy;begin
to play moreof a role in Asian diplomacyand security; and, perhapsmost
important, createa new balance withina NATO alliancethatis currently
dominatedby theUnitedStates.An EU thatremainsweak and fragmented in
foreignpolicy,however,will continueto be thesubordinate partnerthatit is
today-dependenton U.S. leadershipwithintheAtlanticAlliance,a relatively
minordiplomaticactorin thewiderworld,and unableto deal withsecurity
criseseven on itsown periphery.
Fordecades,and in particular sincethe1991Treatyon EuropeanUnion(the
Maastricht Treaty),theEU has been tryingto enhanceitsabilityto act diplo-
maticallyand militarilyabroad.Thisarticleexaminestherecentrecordofthe
EU's effortsto do so and prospectsfordoingso in thefuture. My argument is
thatcontrary to theambitiousrhetoric ofEU officials
and treaties,
theanalyses
(orhopes)ofa numberofscholars,and sometheoriesofEuropeanintegration,
the prospectsfora unifiedand effective EU foreignand securitypolicyare
Theories
ofEuropean and CFSP
Integration
To assesstheprospects forintegration
intheareaofforeignand security
policy,
it is usefulto reflecton past patternsof Europeanintegration,and on the
theoriesthatbestexplaintheconditionsunderwhichintegration proceedsin
differentfunctionalareas.It is alwayspossiblethatthecomingyearswill see
a sharpdeparturefrompreviouspatternsofEuropeanintegration, butthisis
unlikely;in theabsenceof compellingreasonsto believethatthesepast pat-
ternswillnothold,thebestway to knowwhatto expectin thefutureis to try
to understandwhathas happenedin thepast,and why.
Europe'sUncommon
Foreign
Policy| 77
8. Frenchleaders(includingJeanMonnet,ValeryGiscardd'Estaing,FrancoisMitterrand, and
JacquesDelors)have oftenexplicitly
supportedthesetting
up ofinstitutions-like
theEuropean
Coal and SteelCommunity, theEuropeanMonetary System,or theEurocorps-onthegrounds
thattheirveryexistencewouldpropeltheprocessofintegrationforwardand keepthenotionof
"Europe"alive,whereasBritish all ofthe
leadershave tendedto opposeinstitutions-including
above-unless theirimmediateutilitycouldbe demonstrated.
Europe'sUncommon
Foreign
Policy| 79
throughdeals in theexpectationofmutualgain,or,mostsignificantly,
through
bindingdecision-making institutions.
Simplyhappeningto agreeon thesame
policy-say,to supportdemocracyin SouthAfrica-isveryimportant, but it
does notrequirea commonforeignand security policyto bringit about.14
Finally,CFSP can be ambiguousbecause any normativejudgmentof it
dependson theperspective ofthejudge.Dependingon thelevelofanalysis-
the EU itself,one or anotherEU memberstate,outsideactorssuch as the
UnitedStates,or worldorderin general-CFSP willhave different meritsand
drawbacks.Foreignpolicyintegration might,forexample,be in theinterest of
theEU as an organization,or ofsmallmemberstateswithlittleindependence
to lose,butit mightnotbe in theinterest
ofotherstates,or ofoutsideactors.
Ratherthan assertcategorically thatCFSP is or is not a good thing,it is
important to keep in mind the different
ways integration would affectthe
variousactorsin the process,and the way in whichthesedifferences could
affecttheoutcomeofnegotiations. Different
actorswill makedifferent assess-
mentsof whetherCFSP would be in theirinterest, and opposingviews will
notnecessarily be "wrong."
The RecordofCFSP
Atlanticist
enough.Thisintra-European debateoverintegration and Atlanticismwas one of the
mainreasonsfortheinability toagreeon foreign policycooperation forso long,and itstilldivides
Europeanstoday.
16. Foran excellentstudyofEPC written by an "insider,"see SimonJ.Nutall,European Political
Co-operation
(Oxford, U.K.: ClarendonPress,1992).
17. See Delegationde l'Assembl6eNationalepour les Communautes Europeennes, PierreLel-
louche,rapporteur,
L'Europe etsa securit6e:
bilanetavenir 6trangere
dela politique etdese'curite'
commune
de l'UnionEurop6enne(Paris:AssembleeNationale,May31,1994),p. 14.
18. The VeniceDeclaration distinguished EU policyfromU.S. policyby emphasizing the"legiti-
materightsofthePalestinian people"and callingforthePalestineLiberation Organization tohave
a rolein thepeace process.See ConseilEuropeen,"Declarationdu 17e ConseilEuropeensur le
dialogueeuro-arabe, et la situationau Proche-Orient," Venice,June12-13,1980;and Christin
Marschall,"TheEuropeanCommunity and theArabWorld,1972-1991: FromEconomicsto Poli-
tics,"HarvardMiddleEastern andIslamicReview, Vol.1,No. 2 (1994),pp. 56-80.
ForeignPolicyj 85
Europe'sUncommon
October1991aftertheGulfWar,its officialsponsorsweretheUnitedStates
and themoribundSovietUnion,and theEC playedhardlyanyroleat all.
EPC was notwithoutpurposeor effect, and Europeandiplomatsnotedover
the yearsthatregularcontactsled to betterunderstanding of one another's
positionsand facilitated
a commonapproach.19 EPC also helpedharmonizeEC
memberstatepositionson a rangeofissuesin regionslikeLatinAmericaand
Asia,wherelocal actorswereunableto play one EC stateoffagainstanother,
because all memberswerefollowingthe same line.But ifa habitof seeking
commonpositionsexisted,itwas limited;and a commonforeign and security
policydid not result,whichbecamesorelyevidentin Europe'sresponsesto
theGulfWarand theYugoslavcrisis.EC memberstateshad nationalconstitu-
encies and interests,and EPC did not. Nor did the Communityhave the
institutionalmeansto imposea commonpositionor back up its diplomacy
withmilitary force.As the 1990sbegan,Europeanforeignpolicieswere still
nationally made,withEPC playinglittlemorethana consultative function.
CFSP was a responseto EPC's perceivedinadequacyin the face of the
momentous changethattookplacein Europein thelate1980sand early1990s.
Withthe end of theCold Warand Germanunification, Francebecamecon-
vincedthattheEC's foreignpolicyprocesshad to be strengthened, ifonlyto
"tie in" a now fullysovereignGermany;and Germany, longa strongpropo-
nentof all aspectsof Europeanintegration, readilyagreed.20The resultwas
the1990-91EuropeanIntergovernmental Conference (IGC) on politicalunion,
whichwas added to theIGC on monetary unionalreadyscheduledforthat
year,and whichconcludedat theMaastricht summitofDecember1991.
The Maastricht Treatycreateda new,three-pillarstructurefortheEuropean
Union,withthe EuropeanCommunityas the firstpillar,the CFSP as the
second,and Home and Justice as thethird.Onlythefirstpillarwould
Affairs
be governedbytheintegrated community (theEuropeanCommis-
institutions
sion, Parliament,and Court of Justice),while the othertwo-thus CFSP
wouldremainalmostexclusively intergovernmental. Thiswas a disappoint-
mentforthose statesthatsupportedforeignpolicyintegration withinthe
19. See ChristopherHill, "European Foreign Policy: Power Bloc, Civilian Model, or Flop?" in
ReinhardtRummel,ed., The Evolutionofan International Actor:WesternEurope'sNew Assertiveness
(Boulder,Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), p. 33.
20. On the developmentsleading up to the CFSP agreementat theMaastrichtsummitofDecember
1991, see Mathais Jopp, The StrategicImplicationsof EuropeanIntegration, Adelphi Paper No. 290
(London: InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies [IISS], 1994),pp. 6-12; and JamesB. Steinberg,
"An Ever Closer Union": EuropeanIntegrationand Its Implicationsfor the Futureof U.S.-European
Relations(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND), pp. 50-60.
Security22:3 | 86
International
21. The treatydoes allow fora formof "constructiveabstention,"wherebya state could abstain
froma vote,allowing the decision to go ahead but withouthaving to implementit.For the specifics
of what was agreed at Amsterdam,see IntergovernmentalConference,Amsterdam European
Council, An Effectiveand CoherentExternalPolicy,chapter12, "The Common Foreignand Security
Policy,"available fromthe European Union website.
22. See EuropeanCommission,
Intergovernmental
Conference
1996:Commission
Report
fortheReflec-
tionGroup(Brussels: EC, May 1995), p. 63. A recentFrenchanalysis has also admittedthatCFSP
"has not been able to play a determiningrole." See "Quelle identit6politique ext6rieure?"in
InstitutFrancais des RelationsInternationales,Ramses:1996 (Paris: Dunod, 1996), p. 320.
23. On the common positions and joint actions,see European Commission,"List of JointActions
Adopted by the Council since the Entryinto Force of the Treatyon European Union (November
1993-September1996)," and "List of Common Positions Adopted by the Council since the Entry
into Force of the Treatyon European Union (November 1993-September1996)," EuropeanDialogue
(Brussels: European Commission, 1997), pp. 18-20; and Barbara-ChristineRyba, "La politique
6trangereet de s6curit6commune: Mode d'emploi et bilan d'une ann6e d'application,"Revuedu
marchecommunde l'unioneuropeenne, No. 384 (January1995), pp. 15-35.
International
Security22:3 | 88
TheEU as a Military
Actor
36. Full WEU member troop-strength, not including reserves,is 1.79 million.The total forall of
NATO's European members,includingTurkey,is 2.46 million.See IISS, TheMilitaryBalance1997-98
(Oxford,U.K.: OxfordUniversityPress, 1997), pp. 46-73.
37. For a good analysis of European NATO members'logisticaldeficiencies,see Michael O'Hanlon,
"TransformingNATO: The Role of European Forces," Survival,Vol. 39, No. 3(Autumn 1997),
pp. 5-15.
38. For figureson defense spending and comparisons with earlier years, see IISS, The Military
Balance,1997-98,293. See also RickAtkinsonand BradleyGraham,"As Europe Seeks WiderNATO
Role, Its Armies Shrink,"Washington Post,July29, 1996,p. Al.
39. Frenchdefense reformplans are discussed in Jacques Isnard, "Le budget militairesera r6duit
de 100 milliardsde francsen cinq ans," Le Monde,February24, 1996,pp. 6-9. Also see StanleyR.
Sloan, "French Defense Policy: Gaullism Meets the Post-Cold War World," Arms ControlToday
(April 1997), pp. 3-8.
Security22:3 | 94
International
42. The repeated themeof nearlyall European leaders since NATO intervenedmilitarilyin Bosnia
in late 1995 has been "in together(with the Americans),out together."When EU Commissioner
Hans van den Broek suggested in early May 1996 thatperhaps European troops could stay on in
Bosnia withoutthe United States,he was quickly repudiated by FrenchForeign MinisterHerv6
de Charette.See Agence France-Presse,"EU CommissionerSlammed forBosnia Comments,"May
7, 1996.
Security22:3 | 96
International
CFSP in theComingDecades
Prospects:
Longer-Term
If the conditionsare not yetin place fora genuineintegration of European
foreignand security policies,will theyeverbe? Is thecreationofan effective
CFSP only a matterof time,or has foreignand securitypolicyintegration
reacheditslimits?Goingbackto thetheorieswithwhichthisanalysisbegan,
is foreign and securitypolicyjusta "function"thatis takinglongerthansome
to
others be pulled into of
the dynamic Europeanintegration, or is there
something particularaboutit thatmakesit less susceptibleto theforcesand
processesthathave led to integration in so manyotherareas?
This articlehas argued thatstatespool or delegatetheirsovereignty in
particular functionalareasonlyiftheperceivedbenefits ofdoingso outweigh
thecosts.In thearea offoreign policy,becausethegainsofcommonactionare