CHAP III- POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES administrative law that unless expressly empowered, administrative agencies
expressly empowered, administrative agencies are bereft of
13) Makati Stock Exchange, Inc v Securities and Exchange Commission 14 SCRA 620 (1965)
FACTS: The SEC in its resolution, denied the Makati Stock Exchange, Inc permission to
operate a stock exchange unless it agreed not to list for trading on its board, securities
already listed in the Manila Stock Exchange. Objecting to the requirement, Makati Stock
Exchange, Inc. contends that the Commission has no power to impose it and that anyway, it
is illegal, discriminatory and unjust. The Commission’s order or resolution would make
impossible, for all practical purposes, for the Makati Stock Exchange to operate, such that its
―permission amounted to ―prohibition. The SEC argues that said rule was approved by the
Department Head before the war and it is not in conflict with the provisions of the Securities
Act.
Issue: W/N the Commission have the authority to promulgate the rule in question
Held: None. 1. Test for determining the existence of authority ―The commission cites no
provision of law expressly supporting its rule against double listing. It suggests that the
power is necessary for the execution of the functions vested in it. The approval of the
Department, by itself, adds no weight in judicial litigation. The test is not whether the Act
forbids Commission from imposing a prohibition but whether it empowers the Commission
to prohibit. Commission is without power to impose prohibition or condition of the rule
which results in discrimination and violation of constitutional rights. It is fundamental that an
administrative officer has such powers as are expressly granted to him by statute, and those
necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. Accordingly, the Supreme Court ruled that the
license of Makati Stock Exchange is approved without such condition against double listing.
14) TAULE vs. SANTOS August 12, 1991 G. R. No. 90336
Facts: An election for the officers of the Federation of Associations of Barangay Council
(FABC) was held on June 18, 1989 despite the absence of other members of the said council.
Including Ruperto Taule was elected as the president. Respondent Verceles sent a letter of
protest to respondent Santos, seeking its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities
in the manner it was conducted. Petitioner denied the allegations of respondent Verceles
and denouncing respondent for intervening in the said election which is a purely non-
partisan affair. And requesting for his appointment as a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected President of the FABC in Catanduanes.
Respondent DILG Secretary Santos issued a resolution on August 4, 1989 nullifying the
election and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to be presided by the
Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but it was denied by respondent Santos in his resolution on
September 5, 1989. Thus this petition before the Supreme Court.
Issue:W/N the respondent Santos has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving
the election of the officers of the FABC.
Held: No. The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain any
protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. It is a well settled principle of
quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of administrative authorities is dependent entirely
upon the provisions of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon
themselves. Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their determinations. There is
neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by necessary implication
conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an
election protest involving officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay.
15) Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79 (1989)
FACTS: Teresita Payawal is a buyer of a certain subdivision lot who filed a complaint against
Solid Homes for failure to deliver the certificate of title despite her complete payment of the
purchase price. The complaint was filed with the RTC. Solid Homes filed a motion to dismiss
that jurisdiction is with the National Housing Authority (NHA) pursuant to PD 957, as
amended by PD 1344 granting exclusive jurisdiction to NHA.
ISSUE: W/N NHA has jurisdiction to try the case and the competence to award damages
HELD: SC held that NHA (now HLURB) has jurisdiction . On the competence of the Board to
award damages, we find that this is part of the exclusive power conferred upon it by PD 1344
to hear and decide ―claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
“Any other claims" is, we believe, sufficiently broad to include any and all claims which are
incidental to or a necessary consequence of the claims/cases specifically included in the grant
of jurisdiction to the National Housing Authority under the subject provisions. Statutes
conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to enable
them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose. 8 The
Court sustained the competence of the respondent administrative body, in the exercise of
the exclusive jurisdiction vested in it by PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344, to determine the rights
of the parties under a contract to sell a subdivision lot.
16) HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO vs. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991
PRINCIPLES: (1) The grant of investigatory power does not imply the grant of
judicial or quasi-judicial power.
(2) Matters relating to discipline of teachers are under the original Jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Education, and may be appealed to the Civil Service Commission, and lastly to
the Supreme Court (Note: Under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, appeals from
the Civil Service Commission must first go through the Court of Appeals).
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers, among them
members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of
Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to
"dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public
authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's
attention. The teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the
Secretary of Education (Hon. Isidro Cariño) to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal,
and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings
against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives
notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in
the days that followed.
For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents)
were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to
answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to
Section 41 of P.D. 807" (the Civil Service Decree) and temporarily replaced.
The MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against
petitioner Secretary Cariño, which was dismissed. Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme
Court on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the alleged violation
of the striking teachers’ right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No.
95445, supra. After their petitions were denied, respondent teachers thereafter submitted
sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to
complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned
of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons
completely unknown to them. The Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990,
and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cariño requiring his attendance therein. Otherwise, the
Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence.
The Commission on Human Rights had earlier made clear its position that it does not feel
bound by the Supreme Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, making plain
its intention to hear and resolve the case on the merits. Hence, this petition for certiorari and
prohibition.
ISSUE: Where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction
of a court or other government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudication, may
the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same
purposes of hearing and adjudication?
RULING: No. The CHR has no such power. It was not meant by the fundamental law to be
another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.
The CHR may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed
human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication,
and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of
a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty
of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied
by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to
such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function the Commission
does not have.
It cannot try and decide cases as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To
investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge.
"Investigate," means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study.
The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain
information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
"Adjudicate," means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle,
to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues
raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to
decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant
judicially in a case of controversy . . . ."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate,"
cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" the matters involved. These are
matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education,
being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law,
and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. Indeed, the
Secretary of Education had already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, and it
appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service
Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. The
Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business
intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service
Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and
making its own judgment on the questions involved.
Reversal can only be done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by the Supreme Court.
The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cariño was in error, is to
refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would
be the Civil Service Commission. It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission.
Petition GRANTED; CHR Order ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent CHR and the Chairman
and Members thereof PROHIBITED from hearing and resolving the case (Striking Teachers
HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits.
17) Ruben Villaluz vs Calixto Zaldivar
15 SCRA 710 – Political Law – Control Power – Removal Power – Appointees
Ruben Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office in 1958. In
1960, Congressman Joaquin Roces alleged that Villaluz was an ineffective leader and had
caused losses to the government. He indorsed the removal of Villaluz. Consequently,
Executive Secretary Calixto Zaldivar suspended Villaluz and ordered a committee to
investigate the matter. After investigation, it was recommended that Villaluz be removed.
The president then issued an Administrative Order removing Villaluz from his post. Villaluz
averred that the president has no jurisdiction to remove him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to be removed
considering that he is an appointee of the president.
HELD: Yes. The president has jurisdiction and not the Civil Service. The President of the
Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he is a presidential appointee
who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under Sec 5 of Republic Act No.
2260; being a presidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified
service of the government and as such he can only be investigated and removed from office
after due hearing by the President of the Philippines under the principle that “the power to
remove is inherent in the power to appoint” .
There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may extend
to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the
executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified
service for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in
the power to appoint but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the
classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with
the provision of our Constitution which says that “the Congress may by law vest the
appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of
department”.
18) DR. ELISEO L. RUIZ, President of Central Luzon State University (CLSU), Muñoz, Nueva
Ecija, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his
capacity as DECS Secretary; ATTY. RENO CAPINPIN, Director III, DECS, in his capacity as
Chairman, Investigating Committee; DALMACIO CASISON, in his capacity and as Member,
Investigating Committee; EDUARDO PARAY, LUIS CASTRO, HIPOLITO MALAMUG, NEMESIO
TORRES and NOLASCO HIPOLITO, respondents.
No. 103570 June 9, 1992
DR. ELISEO L. RUIZ, President, Central Luzon State University (CLSU), Muñoz, Nueva Ecija,
petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as DECS Secretary;
MARINA S.J. PANGAN, in her capacity as Asst. Secretary of DECS and DR. FORTUNATO
BATTAD, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:p
FACTS: The Court NOTED the sixth motion for extension of time to submit a comment to the
petition for certiorari and prohibition, (G.R. No. 101666) filed by the Solicitor General on
behalf of the public respondents Executive Secretary and the Secretary of the DECS, and
Resolved to DISPENSE with the comment required of the public respondents, considering
that the pleadings and other papers already filed by the other parties in this case are
adequate to enable the Court to act upon the present petition.
On 6 May 1991, President Corazon Aquino issued AO No. 218 dismissing petitioner Eliseo
Ruiz for cause from his office as President of the Central Luzon State University (CLSU). 1
In 2 orders dated 2 July 1991 and 3 September 1991, the Executive Secretary, acting by
authority of the President, denied petitioner's first and second MR therefrom, the first for
lack of merit and the second for being pro forma. Consequently, AO No. 218 became final
and executory. 2
On 1 October 1991, petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for a TRO with the
CA. Petitioner there sought to annul President Aquino's order dated 13 September 1991
appointing Dr. Fortunato Battad as the new CLSU President, as well as DECS Undersecretary
Marina Pangan's order dated 24 September 1991 directing petitioner to turn-over the CLSU
Presidency to Dr. Battad. CA issued the TRO prayed for by petitioner. 4
On 9 October 1991, petitioner filed with SC the present petition (G.R. No. 101666) for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a TRO for the purpose of annulling, for alleged
grave abuse of discretion, the issuance of AO No. 218 as well as of the orders of the
Executive Secretary denying his motions for reconsideration therefrom. 5 The Court did not
issue the TRO prayed for by petitioner. 6 This petition made no mention of the petition for
prohibition with prayer for TRO filed 8 days earlier with CA.
On 9 January 1992, the Court's Circular No. 28-91 dated 3 September 1991 having gone into
effect on 1 January 1992, petitioner filed a manifestation and compliance dated 6 January
1992, where for the first time, he disclosed to this Court the other judicial proceedings which
he had commenced in connection with the issuance of AO No. 210. 7
On 29 January 1992, after due proceedings, the CA promulgated its decision in CA-G.R. No.
SP-26165, dismissing the petition for lack of merit and finding the same to be a case of forum
shopping. 8 Petitioner sought review of this decision by way of a petition for review under
Rule 45 with the Supreme Court, which petition was docketed as G.R. No. 103570 and
assigned to the Second Division. 9 This case was consolidated with G.R. No. 101666, by this
time pending with the Court En Banc, by a resolution dated 2 April 1992.
Meanwhile, on 28 January 1992, the Court issued a resolution requiring petitioner to show
cause why the petition in G.R. No. 101666 should not be dismissed as an apparent case of
forum shopping, considering that the parties involved, issues raised and the reliefs sought
therein are substantially identical with those in CA-G.R. No. SP-26165. 10
Petitioner submitted a manifestation and compliance dated 6 January 1992 obviously in
anticipation of the 29 January 1992 Resolution of the Court, as well as an undated
compliance filed on 2 March 1992 in response to the same resolution. He denies having
engaged in forum shopping and contends: (1) his cause of action in CA-G.R. No. SP-26156
consists of the illegality of the actions taken by the Office of the President and by the DECS in
implementing AO No. 218, which may render moot the Court's review of the intrinsic merits
of AO No. 218, an entirely different cause of action in itself; and (2) he never attempted to
hide the fact, either before this Court or the Court of Appeals, that he had instituted both
actions "for separate reasons, apart though related from each other," such candor being "an
elementary consideration in the determination of the issue whether he committed forum
shopping or not." 11
ISSUE: Whether petitioner committed forum shopping or not.
HELD: The Court finds the explanations proffered by petitioner and his counsel as
justifications for the procedural maneuvers undertaken in this case to be completely
unsatisfactory and considers the Petitions to be clear cases of deliberate forum shopping.
The Court views with considerable disfavor the legal maneuvers undertaken by petitioner
and his counsel of record, Atty. Crispulo S. Esguerra, to defeat his removal from office. It is
evident that petitioner, in violation of Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, had split a
single cause of action consisting of the alleged illegality of his removal from office by the
President through AO No. 218, by seeking judicial review of (1) AO 218 with the Court and at
the same time (2) having the enforcement aspect of the President's action and the filling up
of the resulting vacancy reviewed by CA. It also appears that petitioner carried out these acts
in order to obtain a TRO (albeit with a limited twenty-day lifetime) from CA, issued as a
matter of course, in order to stop the execution and implementation of AO No. 218, and
afterwards, to try to get a TRO with an indefinite lifetime from this Court for the same
purpose, in case his petition in the main action of CA-G.R. No. SP-26165 would be dismissed
on the merits by CA.
Moreover, during the period when the proceedings in G.R. No. 101666 and CA-G.R. No. SP-
26165 were simultaneously pending action before two (2) different for a petitioner created
for himself a situation where he could hope to get (after the 20-day life of the Court of
Appeals TRO) a judicial order from either forum which could stop the execution of AO No.
218 with more permanency (i.e., either a TRO with an indefinite lifetime from the Supreme
Court or the grant of his petition for prohibition by the Court of Appeals). Thus CA, aware of
the institution of G.R. No. 101666, 12 committed no reversible error in considering the action
before it as another, independent case and as an instance of forum shopping.
Forum shopping effected by a party litigant through the deliberate splitting of causes of
actions and appeals in the hope that even as one case (in which a particular remedy is
sought) is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open, is a
deplorable practice because it results in the unnecessary clogging of the already heavily
burdened dockets of the courts. 13
Section 17 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by the Court on 11 January 1983,
relative to the implementation of section 9 of BP 129, granting the IAC (now CA) equal
original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, etc., whether or
not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, provides that if such a petition is filed before CA and is
still pending therein, a similar petition cannot be filed in SC. A violation of this rule has also
been considered a clear case of forum shopping, an act of malpractice proscribed as trifling
with the courts and abusing their processes. The Rule itself provides that a violation thereof
constitutes: (1) cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions; and (2) contempt of court
for which the party or counsel concerned may be held accountable. 14
The pretended candor of petitioner and his counsel here does not persuade. Petitioner never
informed the Court of the existence of CA-G.R. No. SP-26165 when he filed his petition in
G.R. No. 101666, the first opportunity available to him to be completely candid with the
Court. It is obvious that petitioner filed his subsequent manifestation because he was no
longer able to deny the existence of the proceeding before the CA.
Petitioner has failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or any act without or in excess of
jurisdiction on the part of public respondents in rendering the assailed administrative orders.
Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any
investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only
to an administrative decision that is based on substantial evidence made of record and a
reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him and the evidence presented
against him during the hearings of the investigating committees. 17 There is no doubt that he
has been accorded his rights.
AO No. 218 made certain findings of fact on the basis of which petitioner was removed from
office. Those findings included the facts that (a) petitioner terminated the CLSU's Executive
Vice-President, offered new academic courses, undertook unprogrammed projects resulting
in wastage of university property, all without the necessary approval of the Board of Regents;
(b) he directed the purchase at uncanvassed prices of chemicals unsuitable for the required
school purposes from a firm owned by him; (c) he executed, on behalf of CLSU, a crop
harvest sales agreement in favor of a company where he was holding a directorship; and (d)
he collected financial contributions from the faculty and students in disregard of the
provisions of R.A. No. 5546. 18 These acts constitute dishonesty and grave misconduct, and
furnish legal basis for dismissal from the public service.
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in G.R. No. 101666, as well as the Petition for Review in
G.R. No. 103570, are DISMISSED as clear cases of forum shopping and for lack of merit. CA
decision in C.A,-G.R, No. SP-26165 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Petitioner's counsel, Atty. Crispulo S. Esguerra. is hereby ADMONISHED and WARNED that
repetition of the same or similar acts of forum shopping will be more severely punished. A
copy of this Resolution shall be attached to the personal record of Atty. Crispulo S. Esguerra
in the office of the Bar Confidant.
CHAPTER IV- INVESTIGATORY POWERS
19) Secretary of Justice v. Lantion
FACTS:
The Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request from
the United States for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States pursuant to PD
No. 1609 prescribing the procedure for extradition of persons who have committed a crime
in a foreign country. Jimenez requested for copies of the request and that he be given ample
time to comment on said request. The petitioners denied the request pursuant to the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.
ISSUE: Whether or not treaty stipulations must take precedence over an individual’s due
process rights
HELD: The human rights of person and the rights of the accused guaranteed in the
Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting party, the
doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with
situation where there is conflict between a rule of the international law and the constitution.
Efforts must first be made in order to harmonize the provisions so as to give effect to both
but if the conflict is irreconcilable, the municipal law must be upheld. The fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the
primacy of international law over municipal law in the municipal speher. In states where the
constitution is the highest law of the land, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if
they are in conflict with the constitution.
20) Alcantara vs. Pefianco [A.C. No. 5398. December 3, 2002]
FACTS: The complainant, Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, is the incumbent District Public Attorney
of the Public Attorney’s Office in San Jose, Antique. On May 18, 2000, while Atty. Ramon
Salvani III was conferring with a client in the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), a woman
approached them. Complainant saw the woman in tears, whereupon he went to the group
and suggested that Atty. Salvani talk with her amicably as a hearing was taking place in
another room. Respondent Atty. Mariano Pefianco stood up and shouted at Atty. Salvani
and his client. Complainant said he was surprised at respondent Pefianco’s outburst and
asked him to cool off, but respondent continued to fulminate at Atty. Salvani. As head of the
Office, complainant approached respondent and asked him to take it easy and leave Atty.
Salvani to settle the matter. Respondent at first listened, but shortly after he again started
shouting at and scolding Atty. Salvani. This caused a commotion in the office.
Respondent later explained and said that he was moved by the plight of the woman whose
husband had been murdered as she was pleading for the settlement of her case because she
needed the money.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Pefianco violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD: YES. Respondent was a imposed fine of P1,000.00.
RATIO: Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility admonishes lawyers to conduct
themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty
bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and
candidly toward each other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all times.
Respondent ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the
legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it. Whatever moral
righteousness respondent had was negated by the way he chose to express his indignation.
An injustice cannot be righted by another injustice.
Brief Fact Summary. An inspector from the Department of Health entered a home to
investigate possible violations of a City’s housing code without a warrant.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. “[A]dministrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant
intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, that such searches when
authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure lack the traditional safeguards which
the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual, and that the reasons put forth in [Frank
v. Maryland] and in other cases for upholding these warrantless searches are insufficient to
justify so substantial a weakening of the Fourth Amendment’s protections.”
21) Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco
Facts. “On November 6, 1963, an inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San
Francisco Department of Public Health entered an apartment building to make a routine
annual inspection for possible violations of the city’s Housing Code.” The inspector was
informed that the Appellant was using part of his leasehold as a personal residence. The
inspector confronted the Appellant and demanded to inspect the premises because
residential use was not allowed on the first floor of the apartment building. The Appellant did
not allow the inspector to enter because he did not have a warrant.
The inspector attempted to obtain access to Appellant’s apartment a second time two days
later, and again the Appellant refused to grant him access. The Appellant then was sent a
summons ordering him to appear at the district attorney’s office. The Appellant did not
appear and a few weeks later two other inspectors attempted to gain access to his
apartment and were again refused because they did not have a search warrant.
A complaint was then filed against the Appellant for violation of the Housing Code. His
demurrer was denied and he filed a writ of prohibition. The court of Appeals held the
housing section “does not violate Fourth Amendment rights because it ‘is part of a regulatory
scheme which is essentially civil rather than criminal in nature, inasmuch as that section
creates a right of inspection which is limited in scope and may not be exercised under
unreasonable conditions.’ ”
Issue. “[W]hether administrative inspection programs, as presently authorized and
conducted, violate Fourth Amendment rights as those rights are enforced against the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment?”
Held. Yes. “[Frank v. Maryland], to the extent that it sanctioned such warrantless inspections,
must be overruled.”
“In [Frank v. Maryland], [the Supreme Court] upheld the conviction of one who refused to
permit a warrantless inspection of private premises for the purposes of locating and abating
a suspected public nuisance.” “[T]he Frank opinion has generally been interpreted as carving
out an additional exception to the rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.”
The majority here observed, “[t]he practical effect of this system is to leave the occupant
subject to the discretion of the official in the field. This is precisely the discretion to invade
private property which we have consistently circumscribed by a requirement that a
disinterested party warrant the need to search. We simply cannot say that the protections
provided by the warrant procedure are not needed in this context; broad statutory
safeguards are no substitute for individualized review, particularly when those safeguards
may only be invoked at the risk of a criminal penalty.”
“Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness [of a search]
other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails. But
[the majority thought] that a number of persuasive factors combine to support the
reasonableness of area code-enforcement inspections. First, such programs have a long
history of judicial and public acceptance. Second, the public interest demands that all
dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other canvassing
technique would achieve acceptable results. Many such conditions – faulty wiring is an
obvious example – are not observable from outside the building and indeed may not be
apparent to the inexpert occupant himself. Finally, because the inspections are neither
personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively
limited invasion of the urban citizen’s privacy.”
Further, “[after] concluded that the area inspection is a ‘reasonable’ search of private
property within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, [the majority observed] it is obvious
that ‘probable cause’ to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a
particular dwelling. Such standards, which will vary with the municipal program being
enforced, may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the building (e. g., a multi-
family apartment house), or the condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily
depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling. It has been
suggested that so to vary the probable cause test from the standard applied in criminal cases
would be to authorize a ‘synthetic search warrant’ and thereby to lessen the overall
protections of the Fourth Amendment.”
Moreover, “[t]he warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to search
private property is justified by a reasonable governmental interest. But reasonableness is still
the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then
there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant. Such an approach
neither endangers time-honored doctrines applicable to criminal investigations nor makes a
nullity of the probable cause requirement in this area. It merely gives full recognition to the
competing public and private interests here at stake and, in so doing, best fulfills the historic
purpose behind the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable government invasions
of privacy.”
Discussion. The majority was careful not to limit all searches in emergency circumstances. It
observed: “Since our holding emphasizes the controlling standard of reasonableness, nothing
we say today is intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even without a warrant, that the
law has traditionally upheld in emergency situations. On the other hand, in the case of most
routine area inspections, there is no compelling urgency to inspect at a particular time or on
a particular day. Moreover, most citizens allow inspections of their property without a
warrant. Thus, as a practical matter and in light of the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that
a warrant specify the property to be searched, it seems likely that warrants should normally
be sought only after entry is refused unless there has been a citizen complaint or there is
other satisfactory reason for securing immediate entry. Similarly, the requirement of a
warrant procedure does not suggest any change in what seems to be the prevai
ling local policy, in most situations, of authorizing entry, but not entry by force, to inspect.”
22) SALAZAR V. ACHACOSO
FACTS: This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of
arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.
On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA a complaint against petitioner.
Having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public
respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE
ORDER.

The POEA brought a team to the premises of Salazar to implement the order. There it was
found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the
team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily
allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie
Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to
show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon
twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting
outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs.
Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
A few days after, petitioner filed a letter with the POEA demanding the return of the
confiscated properties. They alleged lack of hearing and due process, and that since the
house the POEA raided was a private residence, it was robbery.
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to
be barred are already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the
petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.
ISSUE: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor)
validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code?
HELD: PETITION GRANTED. it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest.
Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or
arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent,
we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and
effect.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it
was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant. We have held that a warrant
must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void.
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other,
who may issue warrants of arrest and search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom
the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a
final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
23) CATURA V. CIR
FACTS: A complaint was lodged against Catura and Salvador, the President and Treasurer,
respectively, of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees Association, a
legitimate labor organization. The principal complainants are respondent Tabaniag as well as
other employees constituting more than ten percent of the entire membership of such labor
organization. It was charged that during the tenure of office of petitioners, they were
responsible for "unauthorized disbursement of union funds". Complainants filed a case with
the DOLE. Associate Judge Salvador of the CIR required and directed Catura and Salvador to
deliver and deposit to the Court all the said Association's book of accounts, bank accounts,
pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other documents related to the finances of
the said labor union at the hearing.There was a motion for reconsideration by petitioners on
the ground that they were not heard before such order was issued, which moreover in their
opinion was beyond the power of the CIR. With Associate Judge Paredes dissenting, the
order was sustained in a resolution by the Court en banc.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CIR had the power to issue such Order..
HELD: YES. Paragraphs (b), (h), and (l) of Section 17 of the Industrial Peace Act provide: "The
members shall be entitled to full and detailed reports from their officers and representatives
of all financial transactions as provided in the constitution and by-laws of the organization."
... "The books of accounts and other records of the financial activities of a legitimate labor
organization shall be open to inspection by any officer or member thereof."
All that the challenged order did was to require petitioners, as President and Treasurer of the
labor organization, to "deliver and deposit" with respondent Court all of its book of accounts,
bank accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other documents related to
its finances at the hearing of the petition. On its face, it cannot be said that such a
requirement is beyond the statutory power conferred. If it were otherwise, the specific
provisions of law allegedly violated may not be effectively complied with. The authority to
investigate might be rendered futile.
To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the power to investigate, to be conscientious and rational at
the very least, requires an inquiry into existing facts and conditions. The documents required
to be produced constitutes evidence of the most solid character as to whether or not there
was a failure to comply with the mandates of the law. It is not for this Court to whittle down
the authority conferred on administrative agencies to assure the effective administration of a
statute, in this case intended to protect the rights of union members against its officers.
The matter was properly within its cognizance and the means necessary to give it force and
effectiveness should be deemed implied unless the power sought to be exercised is so
arbitrary. No such showing has been made; no such showing can be made. To repeat, there
should be no question about the correctness of the order herein challenged. Nor is the
validity of the order in question to be impugned by the allegation that there was a denial of
procedural due process. If the books and records were the private property of petitioners,
perhaps the allegation of the absence of due process would not be entirely lacking in
plausibility. Such is not the case however.
The pertinent section of the Industrial Peace Act makes clear that such books of accounts and
other records of the financial activities are open to inspection by any member of a labor
organization. For the court to require their submission at the hearing of the petition is, as
above noted, beyond question, and no useful purpose would be served by first hearing
petitioners before an order to that effect can be issued. Moreover, since as was shown in the
very brief of petitioners, there was a motion for reconsideration, the absence of any hearing,
even if on the assumption purely for argument's sake that there was such a requirement, has
been cured.
What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence
thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard. The hearing on a motion for reconsideration
meets the strict requirement of due process.
24) EVANGELISTA V. JARENCIO
FACTS: This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction,
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent
Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec.
Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative
Code, the President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and
Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966.
Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following functions and responsibilities:
1. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and
corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all
other activities which are prejudicial to the government and the public interests,
and to submit proper recommendations to the President of the Philippines.
2. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos.
1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of
graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth ... .
3. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn
complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee
and to file and prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency.
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the
powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena
duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.
Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the
Agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of
Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the
Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then
and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein."
ISSUE: Whether or not the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue
subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.
HELD: YES. It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of
fact, the gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. Investigations are useful
for all administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also
for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for
recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure
areas to find out what if anything should be done. An administrative agency may be
authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature,
but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future
action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken and may require the attendance of
witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries
into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make
recommendations for actions.
We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from
Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon
witness, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation" with the
authority "to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or
otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in
judicial proceedings of a similar character." Such subpoena power operates in extenso to all
the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b),(e), and (h). It
is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial
or adjudicatory function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions enumerated in all these sub-
paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal aim of
meeting the very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode
nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the subpoena power of the
Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions would therefore imperil
or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under sub-paragraphs (e) and (h).
More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no
distinction when and in what function should the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly,
We see no reason to depart from the established rule that forbids differentiation when the
law itself makes none.
There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon
sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in
anomalous transactions fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that the information
sought to be .
25) OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. SYLVIA CANQUE
FACTS: The instant case stemmed from the Investigation Report of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI)-Region VII on the entrapment operation on Sylvia R. Canque, Clerk of
Court, 12 Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Moalboal-Badian-Alcantara-Alegria, Cebu.
The Investigation Report showed that on June 1, 2004, Marissa Y. Ypanto of Barangay Polo,
Alcantara, Cebu filed a letter-complaint before the NBI alleging that Canque asked from her
the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos in exchange for the release of the formers
common-law husband, Jovencio Patoc, and the dismissal of his criminal cases in court. Patoc
was charged with violation of Republic Act No. 9165 before the sala of Judge Victor R. Teves
of the said court.
The NBI operatives conducted an entrapment operation on June 3, 2004 at about 9:30 A.M.
in the sala of Judge Teves. They arrested Canque after she received the amount of
P40,000.00, previously marked with invisible ink and dusted with fluorescent powder, from
Ypanto in the presence of NBI Investigator Jedidah S. Hife. Canque was brought to the
Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI for laboratory examination. Forensic Chemist Rommel
D. Paglinawan, in his Physics Report found that the right and left hands of Canque were
positive for the presence of fluorescent powder.
ISSUE: WON Canque was not informed of her right to be heard by herself and counsel during
the investigation which allegedly amounted to a denial of her right to due process
RULING: The Court does not agree with the finding of the Office of the Court Administrator
in its first Report dated June 13, 2006 recommending that the Investigation Report of
Investigating Judge Dumdum be set aside and that the complaint be investigated anew since
Canque was not informed of her right to be heard by herself and counsel during the
investigation an omission allegedly amounting to a denial of her right to due process. The
essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and
to present any evidence he may have in support of his defense. Technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative proceedings. Thus, administrative due
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. A formal or trial-
type hearing is not required.
In the case at bar, despite respondents protestations, the records readily show that
she was afforded the opportunity to present her side as she was directed to file her comment
on the complaint. She was notified of the hearing and was in fact present during the entire
proceedings. As to the issue on the legality of her arrest, respondent has failed to submit
evidence in support of her bare claims.
26) Carmelo vs. Ramos
Facts: Mayor of Manila issued an executive order creating a committee "to investigate the
anomalies involving the license inspectors and other personnel of the License Inspection
Division of the Office of the City Treasurer and of the License and Permits Division. Mr. Jesus
L. Carmelo was chairman of the said committee.
The committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos, a private citizen working
as a bookkeeper in the Casa de Alba, requiring him to appear in connection with an
administrative case against Crisanta Estanislao but that Ramos, on whom the subpoenas
were duly served, refused to appear.
Petitioner filed a petition to declare Ramos in contempt. The court dismissed the
petition and held that there is no law empowering committees created by municipal mayors to
issue subpoenas and demand that witnesses testify under oath.
Issue: WoN Camelo (committee) has the power to subpoena witnesses to appear before it
and to ask for their punishment in case of refusal.
Held: No. The rule of Contempt (Rules of Court) applies only to inferior and superior courts
and does not comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies like
the one in this case, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as
contempt of court.
Petitioner invokes Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides as follows:
Powers incidental to taking of testimony. — When authority to take testimony or evidence
is conferred upon an administrative officer or upon any nonjudicial person, committee, or
other body, such authority shall be understood to comprehend the right to administer
oaths and summons witnesses and shall include authority to require the production of
documents under
a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions
and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character.
Saving the provisions of section one hundred and two of this Act, any one who, without
lawful excuse, fails to appear upon summons issued under the authority of the preceding
paragraph or who, appearing before any individual or body exercising the power therein
defined, refuses to make oath, give testimony, or produce documents for inspection, when
thereunto lawfully required, shall be subject to discipline as in case of contempt of court and
upon application of the individual or body exercising the power in question shall be dealt
with by the judge of first instance having jurisdiction of the case in the manner provided by
law.
However, one who invokes this provision of the law must first show that he has
"authority to take testimony or evidence" before he can apply to the courts for the
punishment of hostile witnesses. There is nothing said in the executive order of the
Mayor creating the committee about such a grant of power. All that the order gives to
this body is the power to investigate anomalies involving certain city employees.
27) BENJAMIN MASANGCAY v. COMELEC
FACTS: Benjamin Masangcay, with several others, was on October 14, 1957 charged before
the Commission on Election with contempt for having opened three boxes bearing serial
numbers l-8071, l-8072 and l-8073 containing official and sample ballots for the
municipalities of the province of Aklan, in violation of the instructions of said Commission
embodied in its resolution promulgated September 2, 1957, and its unnumbered resolution
date March 5, 1957, inasmuch as he opened said boxes not the presence of the division
superintendent of schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the authorized
representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the Citizens' Party, as
required in the aforesaid resolutions, which are punishable under Section 5 of the Revised
Election Code and Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Masangcay was then the provincial treasurer
of Aklan designated by the Commission in its resolution in Case CE-No. 270, part II 2 (b)
thereof, to take charge of the receipt and custody of the official ballots, election forms and
supplies, as well as of their distribution, among the different municipalities of the province.
ISSUE: WON Comelec may punish Masangcay for contempt
RULING: No. Under the law and the constitution, the Commission on Elections has only the
duty to enforce and administer all laws to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try,
hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the
elections. In this sense, said, the Commission, although it cannot be classified a court of
justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an
administrative body, may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies
that by express provision law come under its jurisdiction. The difficulty lies in drawing the
demarcation line between the duty which inherently is administrative in character and a
function which calls for the exercise of the quasi-judicial function of the Commission. In the
same case, we also expressed the view that when the Commission exercises a ministerial
function it cannot exercise the power to punish contempt because such power is inherently
judicial in nature, as can be clearly gleaned from the following doctrine: “In proceeding on
this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such
being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the
law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature.” In this sense, the Commission has
exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing him for contempt, and so its decision is null and void.
28) LINTANG BEDOL v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 179830
FACTS: As Chair of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) for the province of
Maguindanao, the respondent [petitioner] discharged his official functions and was able to
ensure the PBOC’s performance of its ministerial duty to canvass the Certificates of Canvass
coming from the twenty two (22) city and municipalities in the province.
At that time, respondent [petitioner] also was charged with the burdensome and
gargantuan duty of being the concurrent Provincial Elections Supervisor for the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan a neighboring province of Maguindanao. Respondent [petitioner] Bedol
failed to attend the scheduled canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of
Maguindanao of which he is the Provincial Election Supervisor which was slated on May 22,
2007.
On May 25, 2007, respondent appeared before the Commission, en banc sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers (NBOC) for the election of senators to submit the provincial
certificate of canvass for Maguindanao, pursuant to his functions as Provincial Elections
Supervisor and chair of the PBOC for Maguindanao. Due to certain ‘observations’ on the
provincial certificates of canvass by certain parties, canvassing of the certificate was held in
abeyance and respondent was queried on the alleged fraud which attended the conduct of
elections in his area.
He was already informed of the resetting of the canvassing for May 30, 2007, but failed to
appear despite prior knowledge.
Respondent’s [petitioner] contention:
Bedol explained before the Task Force during its June 11, 2007 fact finding activity that,
while in his custody and possession, the election paraphernalia were stolen sometime on
May 29, 2007, or some fifteen (15) days after the elections. This was the first time such an
excuse was given by the respondent [petitioner] and no written report was ever filed with
the Commission regarding the alleged loss.
Due to absences in the next scheduled investigative proceedings and due to failure and
refusal to submit a written explanation of his absences, respondent [petitioner] was issued a
contempt charge by COMELEC.
Petitioner was later arrested by members of the Philippine National Police on the basis of an
Order of Arrest issued on June 29, 2007 by the COMELEC after petitioner repeatedly failed to
appear during the fact-finding proceedings before Task Force Maguindanao.
Petitioner questioned the COMELEC’s legal basis for issuing the warrant of arrest and its
assumption of jurisdiction over the contempt charges. Nevertheless, he was declared in
contempt by COMELEC.
 Petitioner, then, filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the COMELEC
in the other assailed Resolution dated August 31, 2007.
ISSUE: Whether or not the initiation and issuance of contempt order is within the
constitutional powers of the COMELEC.
RULING:
Powers of COMELEC
The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to its
constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election laws, by virtue of the explicit
provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx
(6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution
and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and
quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve
controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all
pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to
implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be
delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and
administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6,
Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue
rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus
Election Code.
The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the
same law.
The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or
administrative duties, and the performance of and administrative or ministerial duties, may,
in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the
exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of
parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with
that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.
The language of the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is
broad enough to allow the initiation of indirect contempt proceedings by the COMELEC motu
proprio. Furthermore, the above-quoted provision of Section 52(e), Article VII of the
Omnibus Election Code explicitly adopts the procedure and penalties provided by the Rules
of Court.
Findings of guilt of indirect contempt
Petitioner was found guilty of contempt on four (4) grounds.
First, he repeatedly failed to attend, despite notice of the scheduled[12] canvassing of
the Provincial Certificates of Canvass, the hearing of the Task Force Maguindanao; and
refused to submit his explanation for such absences, which he had undertaken to submit, in
violation of paragraphs (b) and (f) of Section 2, Rule 29 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Second, he unlawfully assumed custody of accountable election documents, which
were lost while in his possession, and consequently failed to deliver the same, in violation of
paragraphs (a), (c) and (d) Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules.
Third and fourth, he publicly displayed disrespect for the authority of the COMELEC
through the media (interviews on national television channels, and in newspapers and
radios) by flaunting an armory of long firearms and side arms in public, and posing for the
front page of a national broadsheet, with a shiny pistol tucked in a holster, in violation of
paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs.
29) FLORIAN R. GAOIRAN v. HON. ANGEL C. ALCALA, ET AL.
GR No. 150178
FACTS: On October 29, 1997, a letter-complaint was filed with CHED against Florian Gaoiran
(petitioner), Head Teacher III in the High School Department of the Angadanan Agro-
Industrial College (AAIC), a state-supervised school in Angadanan, Isabela. Edmond M.
Castillejo, Administrative Officer II of the same school, charged petitioner of mauling him
while he was performing his duties. Appended to the letter-complaint were the verified
criminal complaint filed by Castillejo against petitioner and the sworn statements of his
witnesses. The criminal complaint for assault to a person in authority was filed with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Angadanan-San Guillermo.
The letter-complaint was referred to the Legal Affairs Service of the CHED. Atty. Felina
S. Dasig, then OIC of the Office of the Director III, Legal Affairs Service, conducted a fact-
finding investigation on the mauling incident. After the fact-finding investigation was
terminated, and upon finding of a prima facie case against the petitioner for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, Atty. Dasig issued the
Formal Charge and Order of Preventive Suspension dated July 27, 1998. The petitioner did
not submit his written counter-affidavit or answer to the charges against him. Instead, he
filed with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, a petition for certiorari and prohibition to
restrain enforcement of the preventive suspension order. Having served the suspension, the
case was dismissed for being moot and academic.
Petitioner then sought reconsideration of the formal charge and preventive suspension
order, contending that the letter-complaint was not under oath and that he was not
informed nor apprised of the complaint against him. Joel Voltaire V. Mayo, who was later
appointed Director of the Legal Affairs Service of CHED, issued a Resolution dated February
20, 1999, dismissing the administrative complaint against the petitioner on the ground that
the letter-complaint was not under oath. However, Hon. Angel C. Alcala, then Chairman of
CHED, unaware of the existence of Mayoâs resolution, issued another Resolution dated June
3, 1999, finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. Petitioner was dismissed form service.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and injunction. He alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of
Alcala in issuing the Resolution despite that a previous Resolution already dismissed the
administrative complaint against him. The RTC sided with the petitioner and declared the
Resolution of Alcala null and void. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of
RTC. It declared as valid Alcalaâs Resolution. Hence, this petition for review. The petitioner
continuously argued that the letter-complaint is inexistent because it was not made under
oath and does not contain a certification of non-forum shopping. Petitioner cites Section 2,
Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO No. 292 and Section 4(d) of Civil
Service Commission Resolution No. 94-0521 (Uniform Rules of Procedure in the Conduct of
Administrative Legislation).Hence, the formal charge and order of preventive suspension
stemming from it is likewise null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the letter-complaint should be deemed inexistent as it was not made
under oath.
HELD: The Court is not persuaded. The pertinent provisions governing the initiation of
administrative complaints against civil service officials or employees are provided in Book V
of EO No. 292, Sections 46 (c) and 48 (1) and (2), Chapter 6, Subtitle A.
It must be pointed out that, while the letter-complaint was not verified, appended
thereto were the verified criminal complaint that Castillejo filed against the petitioner, as
well as the sworn statements of his witnesses. These documents could very well be
considered as constituting the complaint against the petitioner. In fact, this Court, through
the Court Administrator, investigates and takes cognizance of, not only unverified, but also
even anonymous complaints filed against court employees or officials for violations of the
Code of Ethical Conduct.
It is not totally uncommon that a government is given wide latitude in the scope and
exercise of its investigative powers. Administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied. In any case, the letter-complaint of Castillejo is not a
âcomplaintâ within the meaning of the provisions cited. The letter-complaint did not by itself
commence the administrative proceedings against the petitioner. It merely triggered a fact-
finding investigation by CHED. The Court cannot uphold the petitionerâs contention as it
would result to an absurd and restrictive interpretation of EO No. 292. It was the formal
charge and order of preventive suspension filed by Atty. Dasig that constituted the
complaint. Atty. Dasig signed the formal charge in her capacity as the OIC. As the complaint
was initiated by the appropriate disciplining authority under EO No. 292, the same need not
be subscribed and sworn to. Neither is it required that the same contain a verification of non-
forum shopping. Jurisdiction was properly acquired over the case. Petition is denied.
30) ANG TIBAY v. CIR
G.R. No. L-46496
FACTS: Ang Tibay was a manufacturer of rubber slippers. There was a shortage of leather
soles, and it was necessary to temporarily lay off members of the National Labor Union.
According to the Union however, this was merely a scheme to systematically terminate the
employees from work, and that the shortage of soles is unsupported. It claims that Ang Tibay
is guilty of unjust labor practice because the owner, Teodoro, is discriminating against the
National Labor Union, and unjustly favoring the National Workers Brotherhood, which was
allegedly sympathetic to the employer. The Court of Industrial Relation decided the case and
elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the
Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.
The motion for new trial was raised because according to NLU, there are documents
that are so inaccessible to them that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not
be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations. That these documents, which NLU have now attached as exhibits are of such far-
reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment rendered therein.
ISSUE: WON the union was denied due process by CIR.
HELD: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a
special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the
Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated
judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the
government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant,
the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider,
investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between,
and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-
laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the
provisions of CA 103.

SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical
rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence
but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it,
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in
trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights
which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and
submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision
in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue
involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

SC said there was a failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved due to failure to
receive all relevant evidence. Thus, the motion for a new trial was granted and the entire
record of this case is remanded to the CIR.