Quinao vs.

People

Facts:

Both accused (Conchita Quinao and Salvador Cases) and private complainant Francisco Del Monte
are claiming ownership over the land in question. Accused-appellant presented a tax declaration and
alleged that the land being claimed by the complainant is different from the land litigated in Civil Cases
No. 3561. Trial Court finds accused guilty of the crime of Usurpation of Real Rights in Property. Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this case.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused-petitioner who claims to be owner of the land in question could be
held liable of usurpation of her own property?

Decision:

Contrary to petitioner’s allegation, the decision rendered by the trial court convicting her of the
crime of usurpation of real property was not based on “speculations, surmises and conjectures” but
clearly on the evidence on record and in accordance with the applicable law under Article 312 of Revised
Penal Code.

The requisites of usurpation are that the accused took possession of another’s real property or
usurped real rights in another’s property; that the possession or usurpation was committed with
violence or intimidation and that the accused had animo lucrandi. In order to sustain a conviction for
“usurpacion de derecho reales”, the proof must show that the real property occupied or usurped belongs,
not to the occupant or usurper, but to some third person, and that the possession of the usurper was
obtained by means of intimidation or violence done to the person ousted of possession of the property.

In Castrodes vs. Cubelo, the Court stated that the elements of the offense are (1) occupation of
another’s real property or usurpation of a real right belonging to another person; (2) violence or
intimidation should be employed in possessing the real property or usurping the real right, and (3) the
accused should be animated by the intent to gain. Petitioner failed to give any cogent reason for this
Court to deviate from this salutary principle.

Saddul vs. People

Allied Banking Corporation vs. Ordonez

Nature: This is a special civil action for certiorari to review the decision of the Department of Justice
regarding the interpretation of the penal provision of PD 115.

Facts:

- On January 21, 1981, Philippine Blooming Mills thru Alfredo Ching applied for the issuance of
commercial letters of credit with Allied Banking Corporation’s Makati branch to finance the purchase of
500 M/T Magtar Branch Dolomites and one Lot High Fired Refractory Sliding Nozzle Bricks which would
be utilized in the operation of machinery and equipment.
- ABC issued an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of Nikko Industry Co Ltd by virtue of which the
latter drew 4 drafts which were accepted by PBM and paid by the bank.
- To secure payment of the amount covered by the drafts and in consideration of the transfer by
ABC of the possession of the goods to PBM, Ching executed four Trust Receipt Agreements
acknowledging ABC’s ownership of the goods and its obligation to turn over the proceeds of the sale of
the goods, if sold, or to return the same, if unsold within the stated period.
- Out of the said obligation resulted an overdue amount of P1,475,274.09. Despite repeated
demands, PBM failed and refused to either turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods or to return the
same.
- ABC filed a criminal complaint against Ching for violation of PD 115. After preliminary
investigation, the fiscal found a prima facie case for violation of PD 115 on four counts and filed the
corresponding information. Ching appealed the fiscal’s resolution alleging that the goods subject of the
trust receipt agreements were dolomites which were specifically used for patching purposes over the
surface of furnaces and nozzle bricks which are insulating materials in the lower portion of the ladle
which do not form part of the steel product itself.
- Justice Secretary Ordonez reversed the resolution saying that PD 115 contemplates or covers
only goods, which have, for their ultimate destination, the sale thereof or if unsold, their surrender to the
entruster, this whether the goods are in their original form or in their manufactured or processed state.
Not all transactions covered by trust receipts may be considered as trust receipt transactions defined and
penalized under PD 115.
- ABC filed a motion for reconsideration of the Ordonez’ resolution.

Issue:

WON the penal provision of PD 115 apply when the goods covered by a Trust Receipt do not form
part of the finished products which are ultimately sold but are instead utilized/used up in the operation
of the equipment and machineries of the entrustee-manufacturer.

Held:

Yes

Ratio: - In trust receipts, there is an obligation to repay the entruster. The entrustee binds himself to sell
or dispose of the entrusted goods with the obligation to turn over to the entruster the proceeds if sold, or
return the goods if unsold or not otherwise disposed of, in accordance with the terms and condition
specified in the trust receipt. A violation of this undertaking constitutes estafa under Sec 13 of PD 115.
- The wording of Sec 13 covers failure to turn over the proceeds of the sale of entrusted goods, or
to return said goods, unsold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipts. The non
payment of the amount covered by a trust receipt is an act violative of the entrustee’s obligation to pay.
There is no reason why the law should not apply to all transactions covered by trust receipts, except
those expressly excluded.
- The Court takes judicial notice of customary banking and business practices where trust receipts
are used for importation of heavy equipment, machineries, and supplies used in manufacturing
operations. A construction should be avoided when it affords an opportunity to defeat compliance with
the terms of the statute.
- The penal provision of PD 115 encompasses any act violative of an obligation covered by the
trust receipt; it is not limited to transactions in goods which are to be sold, reshipped, stored, or
processed as a component of a product ultimately sold. To uphold the Justice Department’s ruling would
contravene not only the letter but the spirit of PD 115.

CELINO VS CA

FACTS:

Two separate informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City charging
petitioner with violation of Section 2(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 6446 (gun ban),1[3] and Section 1,
Paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 82942[4] (illegal possession of firearm)
 Petitioner’s remedy to challenge the appellate court’s decision and resolution was to file a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 on or before October 20, 2005 or 15 days after he received a copy
of the appellate court's resolution on October 5, 20053[ 1 9 ] denying his motion for reconsideration.
Instead, petitioner chose to file the present petition under Rule 65 only on December 2, 2005,4[20] a
good 58 days after he received the said resolution.

Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for lost appeal. Certiorari lies only when there is no appeal nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Why the question being raised by
petitioner, i.e., whether the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion, could not have been
raised on appeal, no reason therefor has been advanced.

ISSUE:

WON the when accused of committing a violation of the COMELEC gun ban entitles him to

HELD:

The law is indeed clear. The accused can be convicted of illegal possession of firearms, provided
no other crime was committed by the person arrested. The word “committed” taken in its ordinary
sense, and in light of the Constitutional presumption of innocence,5[32] necessarily implies a prior
determination of guilt by final conviction resulting from successful prosecution or voluntary
admission.6[33]

Petitioner’s reliance on Agote, Ladjaalam, Evangelista, Garcia, Pangilinan, Almeida, and Bernal is,
therefore, misplaced. In each one of these cases, the accused were exonerated of illegal possession of
firearms because of their commission, as shown by their conviction, of some other crime.7[34] In the
present case, however, petitioner has only been accused of committing a violation of the COMELEC gun
ban. As accusation is not synonymous with guilt, there is yet no showing that petitioner did in fact
commit the other crime charged.8[35] Consequently, the proviso does not yet apply.

Lu Hayco vs CA

Facts:

Haycu was a former employee of Units optical with 124 complaints of estafa files against him by
the company with the office of city fiscal of manila. after the procedural PI, fiscal filed 75 cases of estafa
against Haycu, except as to the dates and amounts of conversions, the 75 informations
commonly charge that Haycu having collected and received customers of the company the purchase of
goods has converted the sum of money he collected to his own personal account with a bank.

A civil action for accounting was filed also by the owner of the company against Haycu complaining that
Haycu initiated discharging the business functions and prerogatives of the company thru deceit and
machinations that the owner affixing his signatures to the power of attorney to open account in the bank.
Contention of the accused:
-the 75 criminal cases is not only oppressing but also out of the jurisdiction of the city fiscal of manila.
asserting also that the 75 were mere components of only one crime.
- that there is no estafa since the element of misappropriation or conversion was not proven

Resolution:
The disturbance in property rights caused by misappropriation, though only temporary, is itself
sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of Art. 315(l -b) of the RPC. In U.S. v. Goyenechea (8
Phil. 117), the defendant pledged a typewriter belonging to McCullough & Co. to the American Loan
Company. Because of said act, the typewriter was seized by the police, and taken into court. Throughout
the trial, McCullough & Co. was placed in a doubtful position as to its right over the typewriter. [The SC]
held that: “McCullough & Co. at least suffered disturbance in its property rights in the said typewriter
and in the possession thereof. This fact, by itself, and without it being necessary to deal with any other
considerations of material fact herein, always constitutes real and actual damage, and is positive enough
under rule of law to produce one of the elements constituting the offense, the crime of estafa.”

In the case at bar, there was a disturbance in the property rights of Lu Chiong Sun. While the funds
received by Lu Hayco were deposited in his personal bank accounts, Lu Chiong Sun and Units Optical
could not dispose of the said amounts. At least, this could be considered as a temporary prejudice
suffered by Lu Chiong Sun, which is sufficient to constitute conversion in the context of Art. 315 (1-b) of
the RPC.