[G.R. No. L-41631. December 17, 1976.

HON. RAMON D. BAGATSING, as Mayor of the City of Manila; ROMAN G. GARGANTIEL, as Secretary to
the Mayor; THE MARKET ADMINISTRATOR; and THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF
MANILA, petitioners, vs. HON. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XXX and the FEDERATION OF MANILA MARKET VENDORS, INC., respondents.

Santiago F . Alidio and Restituto R. Villanueva for petitioners.

Antonio H . Abad, Jr. for private respondent.

Federico A. Blay for petitioner for intervention.

D E C IS IO N

MARTIN, J : p

The chief question to be decided in this case is what law shall govern the publication of a tax ordinance enacted by the
Municipal Board of Manila, the Revised City Charter (R.A. 409, as amended), which requires publication of the
ordinance before its enactment and after its approval, or the Local Tax Code (P.D. No. 231), which only demands
publication after approval. cd

On June 12, 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, "AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
OPERATION OF PUBLIC MARKETS AND PRESCRIBING FEES FOR THE RENTALS OF STALLS AND PROVIDING

ADMIN VI-VIII 1
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." The petitioner City Mayor, Ramon D. Bagatsing,
approved the ordinance on June 15, 1974.

On February 17, 1975, respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. commenced Civil Case 96787 before the
Court of First Instance of Manila, presided over by respondent Judge, seeking the declaration of nullity of Ordinance
No. 7522 for the reason that (a) the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila has not
been complied with; (b) the Market Committee was not given any participation in the enactment of the ordinance, as
envisioned by Republic Act 6039; (c) Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act has been violated; and
(d) the ordinance would violate Presidential Decree No. 7 of September 30, 1972 prescribing the collection of fees and
charges on livestock and animal products. prLL

Resolving the accompanying prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, respondent Judge issued an
order on March 1, 1975, denying the plea for failure of the respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. to
exhaust the administrative remedies outlined in the Local Tax Code.

After due hearing on the merits, respondent Judge rendered its decision on August 29, 1975, declaring the nullity of
Ordinance No. 7522 of the City of Manila on the primary ground of non-compliance with the requirement of
publication under the Revised City Charter. Respondent Judge ruled:

"There is, therefore, no question that the ordinance in question was not published at all in two daily newspapers of
general circulation in the City of Manila before its enactment. Neither was it published in the same manner after
approval, although it was posted in the legislative hall and in all city public markets and city public libraries. There
being no compliance with the mandatory requirement of publication before and after approval, the ordinance in
question is invalid and, therefore, null and void."

ADMIN VI-VIII 2
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the adverse decision, stressing that (a) only a post-publication is required by
the Local Tax Code; and (b) private respondent failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before instituting an action
in court.

On September 26, 1975, respondent Judge denied the motion.

Forthwith, petitioners brought the matter to Us through the present petition for review on certiorari.

We find the petition impressed with merits.

1. The nexus of the present controversy is the apparent conflict between the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and
the Local Tax Code on the manner of publishing a tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila. For, while
Section 17 of the Revised Charter provides:

"Each proposed ordinance shall be published in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city, and shall not
be discussed or enacted by the Board until after the third day following such publication. . . . Each approved
ordinance . . . shall be published in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city, within ten days after its
approval; and shall take effect and be in force on and after the twentieth day following its publication, if no date
is fixed in the ordinance."

Section 43 of the Local Tax Code directs: Cdpr

"Within ten days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city, municipal and barrio ordinances
levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges shall be published for three consecutive days in a newspaper or
publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction of the local government, or posted in the local legislative hall
or premises and in two other conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government. In either
case, copies of all provincial, city, municipal and barrio ordinances shall be furnished the treasurers of the respective
component and mother units of a local government for dissemination."

ADMIN VI-VIII 3
In other words, while the Revised Charter of the City of Manila requires publication before the enactment of the
ordinance and after the approval thereof in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city, the Local Tax
Code only prescribes for publication after the approval of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges"
either in a newspaper or publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction of the local government or by posting the
ordinance in the local legislative hall or premises and in two other conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction
of the local government. Petitioners' compliance with the Local Tax Code rather than with the Revised Charter of the
City spawned this litigation.

There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of
Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code is a general lawbecause it applies universally to all local governments. Blackstone
defines general law as a universal rule affecting the entire community and special law as one relating to particular
persons or things of a class. 1 And the rule commonly said is that a prior special law is not ordinarily repealed by a
subsequent general law. The fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special is to
be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a
particular case. 2 However, the rule readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general,
which the general statute treats in particular. The exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. Section 17
of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope
thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other
charges" in particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is
doubtless dominant, but, that dominant force loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of "ordinances levying
or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. There, the Local Tax Code controls. Here, as always, a general
provision must give way to a particular provision. 3 Special provision governs. 4 This is especially true where the law
containing the particular provision was enacted later than the one containing the general provision. The City Charter

ADMIN VI-VIII 4
of Manila was promulgated on June 18, 1949 as against the Local Tax Code which was decreed on June 1, 1973. The
law-making power cannot be said to have intended the establishment of conflicting and hostile systems upon the same
subject, or to leave in force provisions of a prior law by which the new will of the legislating power may be thwarted
and overthrown. Such a result would render legislation a useless and idle ceremony, and subject the law to the reproach
of uncertainty and unintelligibility. 5

The case of City of Manila v. Teotico 6 is opposite. In that case, Teotico sued the City of Manila for damages arising from
the injuries he suffered when he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catchbasin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. The
City of Manila denied liability on the basis of the City Charter (R.A. 409) exempting the City of Manila from any liability
for damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of the city officers to enforce the provisions of the
charter or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of the City Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while
enforcing or attempting to enforce the provisions of the charter or of any other law or ordinance. Upon the other hand,
Article 2189 of the Civil Code makes cities liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any persons by
reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control
or supervision. On review, the Court held the Civil Code controlling. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application
is concerned, the Revised City Charter is a special law and the subject matter of the two laws, the Revised City Charter
establishes a general rule of liability arising from negligence in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas the Civil
Code constitutes a particular prescription for liability due to defective streets in particular. In the same manner, the
Revised Charter of the City prescribes a rule for the publication of "ordinance" in general, while the Local Tax
Code establishes a rule for the publication of "ordinance levying or imposing taxes fees or other charges in particular. LibLex

In fact, there is no rule which prohibits the repeal even by implication of a special or specific act by a general or broad
one. 7 A charter provision may be impliedly modified or superseded by a later statute, and where a statute is controlling,
it must be read into the charter notwithstanding any particular charter provision. 8 A subsequent general law similarly

ADMIN VI-VIII 5
applicable to all cities prevails over any conflicting charter provision, for the reason that a charter must not be
inconsistent with the general laws and public policy of the state. 9 A chartered city is not an independent sovereignty.
The state remains supreme in all matters not purely local. Otherwise stated, a charter must yield to the constitution
and general laws of the state, it is to have read into it that general law which governs the municipal corporation and
which the corporation cannot set aside but to which it must yield. When a city adopts a charter, it in effect adopts as
part of its charter general law of such character. 10

2. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is strongly asserted by petitioners as having been violated by
private respondent in bringing a direct suit in court. This is because Section 47 of the Local Tax Code provides that any
question or issue raised against the legality of any tax ordinance, or portion thereof, shall be referred for opinion to the
city fiscal in the case of tax ordinance of a city. The opinion of the city fiscal is appealable to the Secretary of Justice,
whose decision shall be final and executory unless contested before a competent court within thirty (30) days. But, the
petition below plainly shows that the controversy between the parties is deeply rooted in a pure question of law: whether
it is the Revised Charter of the City of Manila or the Local Tax Code that should govern the publication of the tax
ordinance. In other words, the dispute is sharply focused on the applicability of the Revised City Charter or the Local
Tax Code on the point at issue, and not on the legality of the imposition of the tax. Exhaustion of administrative
remedies before resort to judicial bodies is not an absolute rule. It admits of exceptions. Where the question litigated upon
is purely a legal one, the rule does not apply. 11 The principle may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. It may and should be relaxed when its application may cause great and irreparable
damage. 12

ADMIN VI-VIII 6
3. It is maintained by private respondent that the subject ordinance is not a "tax ordinance," because the imposition
of rentals, permit fees, tolls and other fees is not strictly a taxing power but a revenue-raising function, so that the
procedure for publication under the Local Tax Code finds no application. The pretense bears its own marks of fallacy.
Precisely, the raising of revenues is the principal object of taxation. Under Section 5, Article XI of the New Constitution,
"Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such
provisions as may be provided by law." 13 And one of those sources of revenue is what the Local Tax Code points to in
particular: "Local governments may collect fees or rentals for the occupancy or use of public markets and
premises . . ."14 They can provide for and regulate market stands, stalls and privileges, and, also, the sale, lease or
occupancy thereof. They can license, or permit the use of, lease, sell or otherwise dispose of stands, stalls or marketing
privileges. 15

It is a feeble attempt to argue that the ordinance violates Presidential Decree No. 7, dated September 30, 1972, insofar
as it affects livestock and animal products, because the said decree prescribes the collection of other fees and charges
thereon "with the exception of ante-mortem and post-mortem inspection fees, as well as the delivery, stockyard and
slaughter fees as may be authorized by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources." 16 Clearly, even the
exception clause of the decree itself permits the collection of the proper fees for livestock. And the Local Tax Code (P.D.
231, July 1, 1973) authorizes in its Section 31: "Local governments may collect fees for the slaughter of animals and
the use of corrals . . ."

4. The non-participation of the Market Committee in the enactment of Ordinance No. 7522 supposedly in accordance
with Republic Act No. 6039, an amendment to the City Charter of Manila, providing that "the market committee shall
formulate, recommend and adopt, subject to the ratification of the municipal board, and approval of the mayor,
policies and rules or regulation repealing or maneding existing provisions of the market code" does not infect the
ordinance with any germ of invalidity. 17The function of the committee is purely recommendatory as the underscored

ADMIN VI-VIII 7
phrase suggests, its recommendation is without binding effect on the Municipal Board and the City Mayor. Its prior
acquiescence of an intended or proposed city ordinance is not a condition sine qua non before the Municipal Board could
enact such ordinance. The native power of the Municipal Board to legislate remains undisturbed even in the slightest
degree. It can move in its own initiative and the Market Committee cannot demur. At most, the Market Committee
may serve as a legislative aide of the Municipal Board in the enactment of city ordinances affecting the city markets
or, in plain words, in the gathering of the necessary data, studies and the collection of consensus for the proposal of
ordinances regarding city markets. Much less could it be said that Republic Act 6039 intended to delegate to the Market
Committee the adoption of regulatory measures for the operation and administration of the city markets. Potestas
delegata non delegare potest. prcd

5. Private respondent bewails that the market stall fees imposed in the disputed ordinance are diverted to the exclusive
private use of the Asiatic Integrated Corporation since the collection of said fees had been let by the City of Manila to
the said corporation in a "Management and Operating Contract." The assumption is of course saddled on erroneous
premise. The fees collected do not go direct to the private coffers of the corporation. Ordinance No. 7522 was not made
for the corporation but for the purpose of raising revenues for the city. That is the object it serves. The entrusting of
the collection of the fees does not destroy the public purpose of the ordinance. So long as the purpose is public, it does
not matter whether the agency through which the money is dispensed is public or private. The right to tax depends upon
the ultimate use, purpose and object for which the fund is raised. It is not dependent on the nature or character of the
person or corporation whose intermediate agency is to be used in applying it. The people may be taxed for a public
purpose, although it be under the direction of an individual or private corporation. 18

Nor can the ordinance be stricken down as violative of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because
the increased rates of market stall fees as levied by the ordinance will necessarily inure to the unwarranted benefit and
advantage of the corporation. 19 We are concerned only with the issue whether the ordinance in question is intra vires.

ADMIN VI-VIII 8
Once determined in the affirmative, the measure may not be invalidated because of consequences that may arise from
its enforcement. 20

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the court below is hereby reversed and set aside. Ordinance No. 7522 of the City of
Manila, dated June 15, 1975, is hereby held to have been validly enacted. No. costs. cdasia

SO ORDERED.

||| (Bagatsing v. Ramirez, G.R. No. L-41631, [December 17, 1976], 165 PHIL 909-920)

[G.R. No. L-38429. June 30, 1988.]

CARLOS BALACUIT, LAMBERTO TAN and SERGIO YU CARCEL, petitioners-appellants, vs. COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, Branch II, and the CITY OF
BUTUAN, respondents-appellees.

Romeo B. Sanchez, Eduardo Deza Mercado and Wilfred D. Asis for petitioners.

The City Legal Officer for respondents-appellees.

D E C IS IO N

GANCAYCO, J : p

ADMIN VI-VIII 9
 At issue in the petition for review before Us is the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed
by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, the title and text of which are reproduced below:

"ORDINANCE — 640

ORDINANCE PENALIZING ANY PERSON, GROUP OF PERSONS, ENTITY OR CORPORATION ENGAGED IN THE
BUSINESS OF SELLING ADMISSION TICKETS TO ANY MOVIE OR OTHER PUBLIC EXHIBITIONS, GAMES,
CONTESTS OR OTHER PERFORMANCES TO REQUIRE CHILDREN BETWEEN SEVEN (7) AND TWELVE (12) YEARS
OF AGE TO PAY FULL PAYMENT FOR TICKETS INTENDED FOR ADULTS BUT SHOULD CHARGE ONLY ONE-HALF
OF THE SAID TICKET.

xxx xxx xxx

Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan in session assembled, that:

SECTION 1 — It shall be unlawful for any person, group of persons, entity, or corporation engaged in the business
of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests, or other performances to
require children between seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for admission tickets intended
for adults but should charge only one-half of the value of the said tickets. cdrep

SECTION 2 — Any person violating the provisions of this Ordinance shall upon conviction be punished by a fine of
not less than TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00) but not more than SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00) or an
imprisonment of not less than TWO (2) MONTHS or not more than SIX (6) MONTHS or both such fine and
imprisonment in the discretion of the Court.

If the violator be a firm or corporation the penalty shall be imposed upon the Manager, Agent or Representative of
such firm or corporation.

SECTION 3 — This ordinance shall take effect upon its approval."

ADMIN VI-VIII 10
 Petitioners are Carlos Balacuit, Lamberto Tan, and Sergio Yu Carcel, managers of the Maya and Dalisay
Theaters, the Crown Theater, and the Diamond Theater, respectively. Aggrieved by the effect of Ordinance No. 640,
they filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as Special
Civil Case No. 237 on June 30, 1969 praying, inter alia, that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and,
therefore, void and unenforceable.1

Upon motion of the petitioners, 2 a temporary restraining order was issued on July 14, 1969 by the court a
quo enjoining the respondent City of Butuan and its officials from enforcing Ordinance No. 640. 4

On January 30, 1973, the litigants filed their stipulation of facts. 5 On June 4, 1973, the respondent court
rendered its decision, 6 the dispositive part of which reads:

"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby adjudges in favor of the respondents and against the
petitioners, as follows:

1. Declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan constitutional and valid: Provided, however, that the fine for
a single offense shall not exceed TWO HUNDRED PESOS, as prescribed in the aforequoted Section 15 (nn) of Rep.
Act No. 523;

2. Dissolving the restraining order issued by this Court; and

3. Dismissing the complaint, with costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED." 7

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration 8 of the decision of the court a quo which was denied in a
resolution of the said court dated November 10, 1973. 9

Hence, this petition.

ADMIN VI-VIII 11
 Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra
vires and an invalid exercise of police power.

Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the power of the Municipal Board to enact as
provided for in Section 15(n) of Republic Act No. 523, the Charter of the City of Butuan, which states:

"Sec. 15. General powers and duties of the Board. — Except as otherwise provided by law, and subject to the
conditions and limitations thereof, the Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:

xxx xxx xxx

"(n) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following; . . . theaters, theatrical performances,
cinematographs, public exhibitions and all other performances and places of amusements . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent City of Butuan, on the other hand, attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by invoking
the general welfare clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the cited law, which provides:

"(nn) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of
the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare
of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred by this Act, and to fix the penalties for the violation of the ordinances, which shall not exceed
a two hundred peso fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense."

We can see from the aforecited Section 15(n) that the power to regulate and fix the amount of license fees for
theaters, theatrical performances, cinematographs, public exhibitions and other places of amusement has been
expressly granted to the City of Butuan under its charter. But the question which needs to be resolved is this: does

ADMIN VI-VIII 12
 this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of admission to these places of exhibition
and amusement whether under its general grant of power or under the general welfare clause as invoked by the City?

This is the first time this Court is confronted with the question of direct interference by the local government
with the operation of theaters, cinematographs and the like to the extent of fixing the prices of admission to these
places. Previous decisions of this Court involved the power to impose license fees upon businesses of this nature as a
corollary to the power of the local government to regulate them. Ordinances which required moviehouses or theaters
to increase the price of their admission tickets supposedly to cover the license fees have been held to be invalid for
these impositions were considered as not merely license fees but taxes for purposes of revenue and not regulation
which the cities have no power to exact, 11

Applying the ruling in Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, 12 where the word "regulate" was interpreted to include
the power to control, to govern and to restrain, it would seem that under its power to regulate places of exhibitions
and amusement, the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan could make proper police regulations as to the mode in
which the business shall be exercised. llcd

While in a New York case, 13 an ordinance which regulates the business of selling admission tickets to public
exhibitions or performances by virtue of the power of cities under the General City Law "to maintain order, enforce
the laws, protect property and preserve and care for the safety, health, comfort and general welfare of the
inhabitants of the city and visitors thereto; and for any of said purposes, to regulate and license occupations" was
considered not to be within the scope of any duty or power implied in the charter. It was held therein that the power
of regulation of public exhibitions and places of amusement within the city granted by the charter does not carry with
it any authority to interfere with the price of admission to such places or the resale of tickets or tokens of admission.

ADMIN VI-VIII 13
 In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public
exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by the local
government. 14 Thus, in People v. Chan, 15 an ordinance of the City of Manila prohibiting first run cinematographs
from selling tickets beyond their seating capacity was upheld as constitutional for being a valid exercise of police power.
Still in another case, the validity of an ordinance of the City of Bacolod prohibiting admission of two or more persons
16

in moviehouses and other amusement places with the use of only one ticket was sustained as a valid regulatory police
measure not only in the interest of preventing fraud in so far as municipal taxes are concerned but also in accordance
with public health, public safety, and the general welfare.

The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to enact the ordinance in question under its
power to regulate embodied in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power as delegated to it under the general
welfare clause to justify the enactment of said ordinance.

To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires
an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 18

Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due process clause of the Constitution for being
oppressive, unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade, and violative of the right of persons to enter
into contracts, considering that the theater owners are bound under a contract with the film owners for just
admission prices for general admission, balcony and lodge.

In Homeowners' Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Municipal Board of the City of Manila, 19 this Court held:

ADMIN VI-VIII 14
 "The authority of municipal corporations to regulate is essentially police power. Inasmuch as the same generally
entails a curtailment of the liberty, the rights and/or the property of persons, which are protected and even
guaranteed by the Constitution, the exercise of police power is necessarily subject to a qualification, limitation or
restriction demanded by the regard, the respect and the obedience due to the prescriptions of the fundamental law,
particularly those forming part of the Constitution of Liberty, otherwise known as the Bill of Rights — the police
power measure must be reasonable. In other words, individual rights may be adversely affected by the exercise of
police power to the extent only — and only to the extent — that may be fairly required by the legitimate demands
of public interest or public welfare."

What is the reason behind the enactment of Ordinance No. 640?

A reading of the minutes of the regular session of the Municipal Board when the ordinance in question was
passed shows that a certain Councilor Calo, the proponent of the measure, had taken into account the complaints
of parents that for them to pay the full price of admission for their children is too financially burdensome. cdll

The trial court advances the view that "even if the subject ordinance does not spell out its raison d'etre, in all
probability the respondents were impelled by the awareness that children are entitled to share in the joys of their
elders, but that considering that, apart from size, children between the ages of seven and twelve cannot fully grasp
the nuance of movies or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances, the admission prices with
respect to them ought to be reduced." 19a

We must bear in mind that there must be public necessity which demands the adoption of proper measures to
secure the ends sought to be attained by the enactment of the ordinance, and the large discretion is necessarily vested
in the legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are
necessary for the protection of such interests. 20 The methods or means used to protect the public health, morals,
safety or welfare, must have some relation to the end in view, for under the guise of the police power, personal rights

ADMIN VI-VIII 15
 and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded by the legislative
department. 21

We agree with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. The police
power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means. 22 The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part
of parents who have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for
themselves. A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the
petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners
suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners point
out, there will be difficulty in its implementation because as already experienced by petitioners since the effectivity
of the ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to avail of the
benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such,
the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the
age of children. This is, however, not at all practicable. We can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not
unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance
and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare.

Respondent City of Butuan claims that it was impelled to protect the youth from the pernicious practice of
movie operators and other public exhibitions promoters or the like of demanding equal price for their admission
tickets along with the adults. This practice is allegedly repugnant and unconscionable to the interest of the City in
the furtherance of the prosperity, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and the general well-being of its
inhabitants.

ADMIN VI-VIII 16
 There is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both children and adults. The petitioners are merely
conducting their legitimate businesses. The object of every business entrepreneur is to make a profit out of his venture.
There is nothing immoral or injurious in charging the same price for both children and adults. In fact, no person is
under compulsion to purchase a ticket. It is a totally voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if he buys a ticket
to such performances.

Respondent City of Butuan claims that Ordinance No. 640 is reasonable and necessary to lessen the economic
burden of parents whose minor children are lured by the attractive nuisance being maintained by the petitioners.
Respondent further alleges that by charging the full price, the children are being exploited by movie house operators.
We fail to see how the children are exploited if they pay the full price of admission. They are treated with the same
quality of entertainment as the adults. The supposition of the trial court that because of their age children cannot
fully grasp the nuances of such entertainment as adults do fails to convince Us that the reduction in admission ticket
price is justifiable. In fact, by the very claim of respondent that movies and the like are attractive nuisances, it is
difficult to comprehend why the municipal board passed the subject ordinance. How can the municipal authorities
consider the movies an attractive nuisance and yet encourage parents and children to patronize them by lowering
the price of admission for children? Perhaps, there is some truth to the argument of petitioners that Ordinance No.
640 is detrimental to the public good and the general welfare of society for it encourages children of tender age to
frequent the movies, rather than attend to their studies in school or be in their homes.

Moreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie house and theater operators will be discouraged from
exhibiting wholesome movies for general patronage, much less children's pictures if only to avoid compliance with the
ordinance and still earn profits for themselves. For after all, these movie house and theater operators cannot be
compelled to exhibit any particular kind of film except those films which may be dictated by public demand and those

ADMIN VI-VIII 17
 which are restricted by censorship laws. So instead of children being able to share in the joys of their elders as
envisioned by the trial court, there will be a dearth of wholesome and educational movies for them to enjoy.

There are a number of cases decided by the Supreme Court and the various state courts of the United States
which upheld the right of the proprietor of a theater to fix the price of an admission ticket as against the right of
the state to interfere in this regard and which We consider applicable to the case at bar. LibLex

A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license, revocable at the will of the proprietor of the
theater or it may be evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable consideration, the purchaser has acquired the right
to enter the theater and observe the performance on condition that he behaves properly. 23 Such ticket, therefore,
represents a right, positive or conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale.
This right is clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of property.
As such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary in the contract by which he obtained it,
has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases and at such price as he can obtain. 24 So that an act
prohibiting the sale of tickets to theaters or other places of amusement at more than the regular price was held invalid
as conflicting with the state constitution securing the right of property. 25

In Collister vs. Hayman, 26 it was held:

"The defendants were conducting a private business, which, even if clothed with a public interest, was without a
franchise to accommodate the public, and they had the right to control it, the same as the proprietors of any other
business, subject to such obligations as were placed upon them by statute. Unlike a carrier of passengers, for instance,
with a franchise from the state, and hence under obligation to transport anyone who applies and to continue the
business year in and year out, the proprietors of a theater can open and close their place at will, and no one can
make a lawful complaint. They can charge what they choose for admission to their theater. They can limit the
number admitted. They can refuse to sell tickets and collect the price of admission at the door. They can preserve

ADMIN VI-VIII 18
 order and enforce quiet while the performance is going on. They can make it a part of the contract and condition
of admission, by giving due notice and printing the condition in the ticket that no one shall be admitted under 21
years of age, or that men only or women only shall be admitted, or that a woman cannot enter unless she is
accompanied by a male escort, and the like. The proprietors, in the control of their business, may regulate the terms
of admission in any reasonable way. If those terms are not satisfactory, no one is obliged to buy a ticket or make
the contract. If the terms are satisfactory, and the contract is made, the minds of the parties meet upon the
condition, and the purchaser impliedly promises to perform it."

In Tyson and Bro.- United Theater Ticket Officers, Inc. vs. Banton, 27 the United States Supreme Court held:

". . . . And certainly a place of entertainment is in no legal sense a public utility; and quite as certainly, its activities
are not such that their enjoyment can be regarded under any conditions from the point of view of an emergency.

"The interest of the public in theaters and other places of entertainment may be more nearly, and with better reason,
assimilated to the like interest in provision stores and markets and in the rental of houses and apartments for
residence purposes; although in importance it fails below such an interest in the proportion that food and shelter
are of more moment than amusement or instruction. As we have shown there is no legislative power to fix the prices
of provisions or clothing, or the rental charges for houses and apartments, in the absence of some controlling
emergency; and we are unable to perceive any dissimilarities of such quality or degree as to justify a different rule
in respect of amusements and entertainment . . ."

We are in consonance with the foregoing observations and conclusions of American courts. In this jurisdiction,
legislation had been passed controlling the prices of goods, commodities and drugs during periods of
emergency, 28 limiting the net profits of public utility 29 as well as regulating rentals of residential apartments for a
limited period, 30 as a matter of national policy in the interest of public health and safety, economic security and the

ADMIN VI-VIII 19
 general welfare of the people. And these laws cannot be impugned as unconstitutional for being violative of the due
process clause.

However, the same could not be said of theaters, cinematographs and other exhibitions. In no sense could these
businesses be considered public utilities. The State has not found it appropriate as a national policy to interfere with
the admission prices to these performances. This does not mean however, that theaters and exhibitions are not
affected with public interest even to a certain degree. Motion pictures have been considered important both as a
medium for the communication of ideas and expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perceptions by
our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits are
considerable. 31 People of all ages flock to movie houses, games and other public exhibitions for recreation and
relaxation. The government realizing their importance has seen it fit to enact censorship laws to regulate the movie
industry. 32 Their aesthetic entertainment and even educational values cannot be underestimated. Even police
measures regulating the operation of these businesses have been upheld in order to safeguard public health and
safety. llcd

Nonetheless, as to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police power, the same must
be resolved in the negative. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation
must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot
be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful
business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of
police power. 33 A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not
encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. 34 The right of the owner
to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such,
within the protection of the due process clause. 36

ADMIN VI-VIII 20
 Respondent City of Butuan argues that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of the ordinance. This
may be the rule but it has already been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or
reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or
unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence. 38

Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if We could assume
that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it
is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable
and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

||| (Balacuit v. Court of First Instance of Agusan Del Norte and Butuan City, Br. II, G.R. No. L-38429, [June 30, 1988],
246 PHIL 189-211)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 129093. August 30, 2001.]

HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON. CALIXTO
CATAQUIZ, petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAÑO and TONY CALVENTO, respondents.

ADMIN VI-VIII 21
Office of the Provincial Legal Officer for petitioners.

Edgardo B. Arellano for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Private respondent applied for a mayor's permit to operate a lotto outlet in San Pedro, Laguna. It was denied on the
ground that an ordinance entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 dated September 18, 1995 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna prohibited gambling in the province, including the operation of lotto. With the denial of his
application, private respondent filed an action for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent enjoining petitioners
from implementing or enforcing the subject resolution. Motion for its reconsideration was denied. Hence, this recourse.
Petitioners contended that "the resolution is a policy declaration of the provincial government of Laguna on its vehement
opposition and/or objection to the operation of and/or all forms of gambling including the lotto operation" and thus
it is valid. On the other hand, private respondent argued that the same curtailed the power of the state since the
legislature itself had declared lotto as legal and permitted its operation around the country.

The Court found that the questioned ordinance merely stated the "objection" of the council to all forms of gambling
including lotto. It is a mere policy statement and could not serve as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of lotto,
which is a legitimate business activity duly authorized by the national government through an Act of Congress. In our
system of government, the power of the local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is
merely a delegated power coming from Congress and these should not contravene an existing statute enacted by
Congress as the delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. Petition
was denied and the assailed order was affirmed. STHAID

ADMIN VI-VIII 22
 SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; ORDINANCE; POLICY STATEMENT IN RESOLUTION EXPRESSING

OBJECTION TO LOTTO, VALID; CASE AT BAR. — The ordinance, Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna, merely states the "objection" of the council to the operation of lotto. It is but a mere policy
statement on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit
the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. Even petitioners admit this in their petition. As a policy
statement expressing the local government's objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local
government's autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national government's. However, this
freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against
laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be
interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto. To conclude our resolution of the first issue,
respondent mayor of San Pedro cannot avail of Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna
as justification to prohibit lotto in his municipality. For said resolution is nothing but an expression of the local legislative
unit concerned. The Board's enactment, like spring water, could not rise above its source of power, the national
legislature.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; GAME OF LOTTO MADE LEGAL BY LAW; CANNOT BE
PROHIBITED BY ORDINANCE PASSED BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT. — The game of lotto is a game of chance duly
authorized by the national government through an Act of Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries. This statute
remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a game of chance, the national government deems it wise and proper to permit
it. Hence, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot issue a resolution or an ordinance

ADMIN VI-VIII 23
that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows by law, such as lotto,
a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.

3. ID.; ID.; DELEGATED POWER OF LEGISLATION; ORDINANCES SHOULD NOT CONTRAVENE EXISTING STATUTE
ENACTED BY CONGRESS. — In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact
ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. Ours is still a unitary form of government,
not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be limited and
confined within the extent allowed by the central authority. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987
Constitution simply means "decentralization." It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an
"imperium in imperio."

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties
Corp. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated
legislative powers conferred upon them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior
to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government
units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere
ordinance the mandate of the statute.

5. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE;PRIOR CONSULTATION REQUIRED IN SECTIONS 2(C) AND
27 THEREOF APPLY TO NATIONAL PROGRAMS OR PROJECTS IMPLEMENTED BY LOCAL COMMUNITY; LOTTO NOT
EMBRACED THEREIN. — As for the second issue, we hold that petitioners erred in declaring that Sections 2 (c) and
27 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, apply mandatorily in the setting
up of lotto outlets around the country. From a careful reading of said provisions, we find that these apply only to
national programs and/or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Lotto is neither a

ADMIN VI-VIII 24
program nor a project of the national government, but of a charitable institution, the PCSO. Though sanctioned by the
national government, it is far fetched to say that lotto falls within the contemplation of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the
Local Government Code.

D E C IS IO N

QUISUMBING, J : p

For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision 1 dated February 10, 1997
of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93, enjoining petitioners from implementing or
enforcing Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and its subsequent
Order 2 dated April 21, 1997 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro,
Laguna, for a mayor's permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February
19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna
entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 which was issued on September 18, 1995. The ordinance reads:

ISANG KAPASIYAHAN TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA "ILLEGAL GAMBLING" LALO NA ANG LOTTO SA LALAWIGAN
NG LAGUNA

SAPAGKA'T, ang sugal dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna ay talamak na;

SAPAGKA'T, ang sugal ay nagdudulot ng masasamang impluwensiya lalo't higit sa mga kabataan;

ADMIN VI-VIII 25
 KUNG KAYA'T DAHIL DITO, at sa mungkahi nina Kgg. Kgd. Juan M. Unico at Kgg. Kgd. Gat-Ala A. Alatiit,
pinangalawahan ni Kgg. Kgd. Meliton C. Larano at buong pagkakaisang sinangayunan ng lahat ng dumalo sa pulong;

IPINASIYA, na tutulan gaya ng dito ay mahigpit na TINUTUTULAN ang ano mang uri ng sugal dito sa lalawigan ng
Laguna lalo't higit ang Lotto;

IPINASIYA PA RIN na hilingin tulad ng dito ay hinihiling sa Panlalawigang pinuno ng Philippine National Police (PNP)
Col. [illegible] na mahigpit na pag-ibayuhin ang pagsugpo sa lahat ng uri ng illegal na sugal sa buong lalawigan ng
Laguna lalo na ang "Jueteng". 3

As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional
Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995;
(2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto
outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.

On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners
from implementing or enforcing resolution orKapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. The dispositive portion of said decision
reads: TAIEcS

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants, their agents and representatives are hereby enjoined from
implementing or enforcing resolution or kapasiyahan blg.508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Laguna
prohibiting the operation of the lotto in the province of Laguna.

SO ORDERED. 4

ADMIN VI-VIII 26
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied in an Order dated April 21, 1997, which
reads:

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by defendants Jose D. Lina, Jr. and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Laguna, thru counsel, with the opposition filed by plaintiff's counsel and the comment thereto filed by counsel for
the defendants which were duly noted, the Court hereby denies the motion for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 5

On May 23, 1997, petitioners filed this petition alleging that the following errors were committed by the respondent
trial court:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENJOINING THE PETITIONERS FROM IMPLEMENTING KAPASIYAHAN BLG. 508,
T. 1995 OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF THE LOTTO
IN THE PROVINCE OF LAGUNA.

II

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE ARGUMENT POSITED BY THE PETITIONERS THAT BEFORE
ANY GOVERNMENT PROJECT OR PROGRAM MAY BE IMPLEMENTED BY THE NATIONAL AGENCIES OR OFFICES,
PRIOR CONSULTATION AND APPROVAL BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS CONCERNED AND OTHER
CONCERNED SECTORS IS REQUIRED.

Petitioners contend that the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna of
its vehement objection to the operation of lotto and all forms of gambling. It is likewise a valid exercise of the provincial

ADMIN VI-VIII 27
government's police power under the General Welfare Clause of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991.6 They also maintain that respondent's lotto operation is illegal because no prior
consultations and approval by the local government were sought before it was implemented contrary to the express
provisions of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of R.A. 7160. 7

For his part, respondent Calvento argues that the questioned resolution is, in effect, a curtailment of the power of the
state since in this case the national legislature itself had already declared lotto as legal and permitted its operations
around the country. 8 As for the allegation that no prior consultations and approval were sought from the sangguniang
panlalawigan of Laguna, respondent Calvento contends this is not mandatory since such a requirement is merely stated
as a declaration of policy and not a self-executing provision of the Local Government Code of 1991. 9 He also states that
his operation of the lotto system is legal because of the authority given to him by the PCSO, which in turn had been
granted a franchise to operate the lotto by Congress. 10

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the State, contends that the Provincial Government of Laguna has no
power to prohibit a form of gambling which has been authorized by the national government. 11 He argues that this is
based on the principle that ordinances should not contravene statutes as municipal governments are merely agents of
the national government. The local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers which have been conferred on them
by Congress. This being the case, these councils, as delegates, cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher
than those of the latter. The OSG also adds that the question of whether gambling should be permitted is for Congress
to determine, taking into account national and local interests. Since Congress has allowed the PCSO to operate lotteries
which PCSO seeks to conduct in Laguna, pursuant to its legislative grant of authority, the province's Sangguniang
Panlalawigan cannot nullify the exercise of said authority by preventing something already allowed by Congress.

ADMIN VI-VIII 28
The issues to be resolved now are the following: (1) whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial of a mayor's permit based thereon are valid; and (2) whether prior consultations
and approval by the concerned Sanggunian are needed before a lotto system can be operated in a given local
government unit.

The entire controversy stemmed from the refusal of Mayor Cataquiz to issue a mayor's permit for the operation of a
lotto outlet in favor of private respondent. According to the mayor, he based his decision on an existing ordinance
prohibiting the operation of lotto in the province of Laguna. The ordinance, however, merely states the "objection" of
the council to the said game. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing.
Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. Even
petitioners admit as much when they stated in their petition that: DISHEA

5.7. The terms of the Resolution and the validity thereof are express and clear. The Resolution is a policy declaration
of the Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement opposition and/or objection to the operation of and/or all
forms of gambling including the Lotto operation in the Province of Laguna. 12

As a policy statement expressing the local government's objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the
local government's autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national government's. However, this
freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against
laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be
interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.

The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government through an Act of Congress. Republic
Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a franchise to the PCSO and allows it to
operate the lotteries. The pertinent provision reads:

ADMIN VI-VIII 29
 SECTION 1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. — The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, hereinafter
designated the Office, shall be the principal government agency for raising and providing for funds for health
programs, medical assistance and services and charities of national character, and as such shall have the general
powers conferred in section thirteen of Act Numbered One thousand four hundred fifty-nine, as amended, and shall
have the authority:

A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities, in such frequency and
manner, as shall be determined, and subject to such rules and regulations as shall be promulgated by the Board of
Directors.

This statute remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a game of chance, the national government deems it wise and
proper to permit it. Hence, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot issue a resolution
or an ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows
by law, such as lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.

In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is
merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac, 13 ordinances should not contravene an
existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated inMagtajas v. Pryce Properties
Corp. 14

Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative
powers conferred upon them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units
can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere
ordinance the mandate of the statute.

ADMIN VI-VIII 30
 Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It
breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may
destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might,
by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all
of the municipal corporations in the state, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on
the right so far as the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of
the legislature (citing Clinton vs. Ceder Rapids, etc. Railroad Co., 24 Iowa 455).

Nothing in the present constitutional provision enhancing local autonomy dictates a different conclusion.

The basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the
new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from
that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly
reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy.
The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the
Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax (citing Art. X, Sec. 5,
Constitution), which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is
still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. 15

Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted to local
governments will necessarily be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central authority. Besides, the
principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization". It does not make local
governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio". 16 CDEaAI

To conclude our resolution of the first issue, respondent mayor of San Pedro, cannot avail of Kapasiyahan Bilang 508,
Taon 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna as justification to prohibit lotto in his municipality. For said resolution

ADMIN VI-VIII 31
is nothing but an expression of the local legislative unit concerned. The Board's enactment, like spring water, could not
rise above its source of power, the national legislature.

As for the second issue, we hold that petitioners erred in declaring that Sections 2 (c) and 27 of Republic Act 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, apply mandatorily in the setting up of lotto outlets around
the country. These provisions state:

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — . . .

(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations
with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned
sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions.

SECTION 27. Prior Consultations Required. — No project or program shall be implemented by government
authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Section 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval
of the sanggunian concerned is obtained; Provided, that occupants in areas where such projects are to be
implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution.

From a careful reading of said provisions, we find that these apply only to national programs and/or projects which
are to be implemented in a particular local community. Lotto is neither a program nor a project of the national
government, but of a charitable institution, the PCSO. Though sanctioned by the national government, it is far fetched
to say that lotto falls within the contemplation of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the Local Government Code.

Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 thereof. 17 Section 26 reads:

ADMIN VI-VIII 32
 SECTION 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. It shall be the duty
of every national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation authorizing or involved in the planning
and implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of
non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species,
to consult with the local government units, nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and
explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the people and the community in terms
of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse
effects thereof.

Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean projects and programs whose
effects are among those enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring
about climatic change; (3) may cause the depletion of non-renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land,
range-land, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal or plant species from the face of the planet; and (6) other
projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where these
will be implemented. Obviously, none of these effects will be produced by the introduction of lotto in the province of
Laguna.

Moreover, the argument regarding lack of consultation raised by petitioners is clearly an afterthought on their part.
There is no indication in the letter of Mayor Cataquiz that this was one of the reasons for his refusal to issue a permit.
That refusal was predicated solely but erroneously on the provisions of Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon 1995, of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna.

In sum, we find no reversible error in the RTC decision enjoining Mayor Cataquiz from enforcing or implementing
the Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna. That resolution expresses merely a
policy statement of the Laguna provincial board. It possesses no binding legal force nor requires any act of

ADMIN VI-VIII 33
implementation. It provides no sufficient legal basis for respondent mayor's refusal to issue the permit sought by private
respondent in connection with a legitimate business activity authorized by a law passed by Congress.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna
enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing Resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the
Provincial Board of Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

||| (Lina, Jr. v. Paño, G.R. No. 129093, [August 30, 2001], 416 PHIL 438-451)

[G.R. No. 118127. April 12, 2005.]

CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA,
in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, HON.
ERNESTO A. NIEVA, HON. GONZALO P. GONZALES, HON. AVELINO S. CAILIAN, HON. ROBERTO C.
OCAMPO, HON. ALBERTO DOMINGO, HON. HONORIO U. LOPEZ, HON. FRANCISCO G. VARONA, JR.,
HON. ROMUALDO S. MARANAN, HON. NESTOR C. PONCE, JR., HON. HUMBERTO B. BASCO, HON.
FLAVIANO F. CONCEPCION, JR., HON. ROMEO G. RIVERA, HON. MANUEL M. ZARCAL, HON. PEDRO S.
DE JESUS, HON. BERNARDITO C. ANG, HON. MANUEL L. QUIN, HON. JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, HON. CHIKA
G. GO, HON. VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, HON. ERNESTO V.P. MACEDA, JR., HON. ROLANDO P. NIETO,
HON. DANILO V. ROLEDA, HON. GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., HON. MA. PAZ E. HERRERA, HON. JOEY
D. HIZON, HON. FELIXBERTO D. ESPIRITU, HON. KARLO Q. BUTIONG, HON. ROGELIO P. DELA PAZ, HON.
BERNARDO D. RAGAZA, HON. MA. CORAZON R. CABALLES, HON. CASIMIRO C. SISON, HON.
BIENVENIDO M. ABANTE, JR., HON. MA. LOURDES M. ISIP, HON. ALEXANDER S. RICAFORT, HON.
ADMIN VI-VIII 34
 ERNESTO F. RIVERA, HON. LEONARDO L. ANGAT, and HON. JOCELYN B. DAWIS, in their capacity as
councilors of the City of Manila, petitioners, vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC,
Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

D E C IS IO N

TINGA, J : p

I know only that what is moral is what you feel good after and what is immoral is what you feel bad after.

Ernest Hemingway
Death in the Afternoon, Ch. 1

It is a moral and political axiom that any dishonorable act, if performed by oneself, is less immoral than if performed
by someone else, who would be well-intentioned in his dishonesty.

J. Christopher Gerald
Bonaparte in Egypt, Ch. I

The Court's commitment to the protection of morals is secondary to its fealty to the fundamental law of the land. It
is foremost a guardian of the Constitution but not the conscience of individuals. And if it need be, the Court will not
hesitate to "make the hammer fall, and heavily" in the words of Justice Laurel, and uphold the constitutional guarantees
when faced with laws that, though not lacking in zeal to promote morality, nevertheless fail to pass the test of
constitutionality.

ADMIN VI-VIII 35
The pivotal issue in this Petition 1 under Rule 45 (then Rule 42) of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure seeking the
reversal of the Decision 2 in Civil Case No. 93-66511 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 18 (lower
court), 3 is the validity of Ordinance No. 7783 (the Ordinance) of the City of Manila. 4

The antecedents are as follows:

Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of
operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. 5It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed
as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. 6 On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed
a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order 7 (RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo
S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that
the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional. 8

Enacted by the City Council 9 on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993, the
said Ordinance is entitled —

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN

FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. 10

The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:

SECTION 1.Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, no person, partnership,
corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr. Street in the North, Taft
Avenue in the East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the West, pursuant to P.D. 499be allowed

ADMIN VI-VIII 36
 or authorized to contract and engage in, any business providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment,
services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community,
annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community, such as but not limited
to:

1.Sauna Parlors EDSAac

2.Massage Parlors

3.Karaoke Bars

4.Beerhouses

5.Night Clubs

6.Day Clubs

7.Super Clubs

8.Discotheques

9.Cabarets

10.Dance Halls

11.Motels

12.Inns

SEC. 2.The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf of the said officials are prohibited from
issuing permits, temporary or otherwise, or from granting licenses and accepting payments for the operation of
business enumerated in the preceding section.

ADMIN VI-VIII 37
 SEC. 3.Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in, or devoted to, the businesses enumerated in Section
1 hereof are hereby given three (3) months from the date of approval of this ordinance within which to wind up
business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other
kinds of business allowable within the area, such as but not limited to:

1.Curio or antique shop

2.Souvenir Shops

3.Handicrafts display centers

4.Art galleries

5.Records and music shops

6.Restaurants

7.Coffee shops

8.Flower shops

9.Music lounge and sing-along restaurants, with well-defined activities for wholesome family entertainment that
cater to both local and foreign clientele.

10.Theaters engaged in the exhibition, not only of motion pictures but also of cultural shows, stage and theatrical
plays, art exhibitions, concerts and the like.

11.Businesses allowable within the law and medium intensity districts as provided for in the zoning ordinances for
Metropolitan Manila, except new warehouse or open-storage depot, dock or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline
service station, light industry with any machinery, or funeral establishments.

ADMIN VI-VIII 38
 SEC. 4.Any person violating any provisions of this ordinance, shall upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment
of one (1) year or fine of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, or both, at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED,
that in case of juridical person, the President, the General Manager, or person-in-charge of operation shall be liable
thereof; PROVIDED FURTHER, that in case of subsequent violation and conviction, the premises of the erring
establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.

SEC. 5.This ordinance shall take effect upon approval.

Enacted by the City Council of Manila at its regular session today, March 9, 1993.

Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on March 30, 1993. (Emphasis supplied)

In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of
prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court considering that these were not
establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment" and they were not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor did
they use women as "tools for entertainment," and neither did they "disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants"
or "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community." 11

MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) The City
Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv) 12 of the Local Government Code of
1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council only the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance
of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments; (2) The Ordinance is void as it
is violative of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 499 13 which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as
a commercial zone with certain restrictions; (3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power
as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought
to be protected; (4) The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the operation of Victoria Court which

ADMIN VI-VIII 39
was a legitimate business prior to its enactment; (5) The Ordinance violates MTDC's constitutional rights in that: (a) it
is confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's property rights; (b) the City Council has no power to find as a
fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it have the power to extrajudicially destroy it; and (6)
The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law as no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the
operation of motels and inns, but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments, and for
prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. 14

In their Answer 15 dated 23 July 1993, petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City Council had the
power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community"
as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code, 16 which reads, thus:

Section 458.Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. — (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative
body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(4)Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to promote the
general welfare and for said purpose shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(vii)Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities,
including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna
baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or

ADMIN VI-VIII 40
 activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy
the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of amusement
or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community. cDIaAS

Citing Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, 17 petitioners insisted that the power of regulation spoken of in the above-quoted
provision included the power to control, to govern and to restrain places of exhibition and amusement. 18

Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social and
moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power as found in Article III, Section 18(kk) of Republic
Act No. 409, 19 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (Revised Charter of Manila)20 which reads,
thus:

ARTICLE III
THE MUNICIPAL BOARD

xxx xxx xxx

Section 18.Legislative powers. — The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(kk)To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred
pesos fine or six months' imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense.

Further, the petitioners noted, the Ordinance had the presumption of validity; hence, private respondent had the
burden to prove its illegality or unconstitutionality. 21

ADMIN VI-VIII 41
Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between P.D. 499 and the Ordinance as the latter simply
disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed the Ermita-Malate area to remain a commercial
zone. 22 The Ordinance, the petitioners likewise claimed, cannot be assailed as ex post facto as it was prospective in
operation. 23 The Ordinance also did not infringe the equal protection clause and cannot be denounced as class
legislation as there existed substantial and real differences between the Ermita-Malate area and other places in the City
of Manila. 24

On 28 June 1993, respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. (Judge Laguio) issued an ex-parte temporary restraining
order against the enforcement of the Ordinance. 25And on 16 July 1993, again in an intrepid gesture, he granted the
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC. 26

After trial, on 25 November 1994, Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision, enjoining the petitioners from
implementing the Ordinance. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads: 27

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 778[3], Series of 1993, of the City of Manila
null and void, and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction that had been issued by this Court against
the defendant. No costs.

SO ORDERED. 28

Petitioners filed with the lower court a Notice of Appeal 29 on 12 December 1994, manifesting that they are elevating
the case to this Court under then Rule 42 on pure questions of law. 30

On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were committed by the
lower court in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair,
unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power; (2) It erred in holding that the

ADMIN VI-VIII 42
questioned Ordinancecontravenes P.D. 499 31 which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except
those specified therein; and (3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional. 32

In the Petition and in its Memorandum, 33 petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the lower
court. They contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the inherent and plenary power of the
State and the general welfare clause exercised by local government units provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the
Revised Charter of Manila and conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code. 34 They allege that the Ordinance is
a valid exercise of police power; it does not contravene P.D. 499; and that it enjoys the presumption of validity. 35

In its Memorandum 36 dated 27 May 1996, private respondent maintains that the Ordinance is ultra vires and that
it is void for being repugnant to the general law. It reiterates that the questioned Ordinance is not a valid exercise of
police power; that it is violative of due process, confiscatory and amounts to an arbitrary interference with its lawful
business; that it is violative of the equal protection clause; and that it confers on petitioner City Mayor or any officer
unregulated discretion in the execution of the Ordinance absent rules to guide and control his actions.

This is an opportune time to express the Court's deep sentiment and tenderness for the Ermita-Malate area being its
home for several decades. A long-time resident, the Court witnessed the area's many turn of events. It relished its glory
days and endured its days of infamy. Much as the Court harks back to the resplendant era of the Old Manila and yearns
to restore its lost grandeur, it believes that the Ordinance is not the fitting means to that end. The Court is of the opinion,
and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and
void.

The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost every sentence thereof violates a constitutional
provision. The prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress the cardinal rights of persons enshrined by the Constitution.
The Court is called upon to shelter these rights from attempts at rendering them worthless.

ADMIN VI-VIII 43
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid,
it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according
to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy;
and (6) must not be unreasonable. 37

Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution and to the
laws. 38 The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the
test of consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the
supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the
precept that local government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation
of legislative power from the national legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers
higher than those of the latter. 39

This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new
provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. The national legislature is still the principal
of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. 40

The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City Council acting
as agent of Congress. Local government units, as agencies of the State, are endowed with police power in order to
effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. 41 This delegated police power is found in
Section 16 of the Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz:

ADMIN VI-VIII 44
 SECTION 16.General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment
of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support
the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals,
enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace
and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. STCDaI

Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies; in this case, the sangguniang
panlungsod or the city council. The Code empowers the legislative bodies to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16
of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the province/city/municipality provided under the
Code." 42 The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

The Ordinance contravenes

the Constitution

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations
thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. 43 In the case at
bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant
to general laws.

The relevant constitutional provisions are the following:

ADMIN VI-VIII 45
 SEC. 5.The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy. 44

SEC. 14.The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before
the law of women and men. 45

SEC. 1.No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of laws. 46

SEC. 9.Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. 47

A.The Ordinance infringes

the Due Process Clause

The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "(N)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law. . . ." 48

There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action
should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. This standard
is aptly described as a responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice, 49 and as such
it is a limitation upon the exercise of the police power. 50

The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of
individuals; to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government, unrestrained by the
established principles of private rights and distributive justice; to protect property from confiscation by legislative
enactments, from seizure, forfeiture, and destruction without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial
procedure; and to secure to all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law. 51

ADMIN VI-VIII 46
The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and private corporations and partnerships are
"persons" within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned. 52

This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called "procedural due process"
and "substantive due process."

Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it
deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of
notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action. 53

Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away
a person's life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient
justification for the government's action. 54 Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a
justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used. 55 For example, if a law is in an area where only rational
basis review is applied, substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government
will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government
purpose.56

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of
the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or
despotically 57 as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard
due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights,
it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands

ADMIN VI-VIII 47
of public interest or public welfare. 58 Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights
of the person to his life, liberty and property. 59

Requisites for the valid exercise

of Police Power are not met

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it
from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 60 It must
be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to
private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. 61

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights 62 — a violation of the due process clause. aSDHCT

The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the establishments in the
Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer of legitimate, licensed and tax-paying
nightclubs, bars, karaoke bars, girlie houses, cocktail lounges, hotels and motels. Petitioners insist that even the Court
in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila 63 had already taken
judicial notice of the "alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great
part to existence of motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus
become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." 64

ADMIN VI-VIII 48
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the
community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City
Council's police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.

It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of Manila to make all reasonable regulations looking to the
promotion of the moral and social values of the community. However, the worthy aim of fostering public morals and
the eradication of the community's social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be
attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses
or their conversion into businesses "allowed" under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment
of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote
the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution,
adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

Conceding for the nonce that the Ermita-Malate area teems with houses of ill-repute and establishments of the like
which the City Council may lawfully prohibit, 65 it is baseless and insupportable to bring within that classification sauna
parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels
and inns. This is not warranted under the accepted definitions of these terms. The enumerated establishments are lawful
pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.

That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as venues to further the illegal prostitution
is of no moment. We lay stress on the acrid truth that sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in
the most innocent of places that it may even take place in the substitute establishments enumerated under Section
3 of the Ordinance. If the flawed logic of the Ordinance were to be followed, in the remote instance that an immoral
sexual act transpires in a church cloister or a court chamber, we would behold the spectacle of the City of Manila

ADMIN VI-VIII 49
 ordering the closure of the church or court concerned. Every house, building, park, curb, street or even vehicles for
that matter will not be exempt from the prohibition. Simply because there are no "pure" places where there are
impure men. Indeed, even the Scripture and the Tradition of Christians churches continually recall the presence
and universality of sin in man's history. (Catechism of the Catholic Church, Definitive Edition, p. 101; ECCE and
Word & Life Publications, Don Bosco Compound, Makati)

The problem, it needs to be pointed out, is not the establishment, which by its nature cannot be said to be injurious to
the health or comfort of the community and which in itself is amoral, but the deplorable human activity that may occur
within its premises. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone
be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked
assumption. If that were so and if that were allowed, then the Ermita-Malate area would not only be purged of its
supposed social ills, it would be extinguished of its soul as well as every human activity, reprehensible or not, in its every
nook and cranny would be laid bare to the estimation of the authorities.

The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as the Ordinance may to
shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it because immorality is not a thing,
a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men. The City Council instead should regulate human conduct that
occurs inside the establishments, but not to the detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants, premiums and
blessings of democracy.

While petitioners' earnestness at curbing clearly objectionable social ills is commendable, they unwittingly punish even
the proprietors and operators of "wholesome," "innocent" establishments. In the instant case, there is a clear invasion
of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of owning, operating and patronizing

ADMIN VI-VIII 50
those motels and property in terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. If
the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose
reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses
or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; 66 and it may even
impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.

Means employed are

constitutionally infirm

The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day
clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns in the Ermita-Malate area. In Section 3 thereof,
owners and/or operators of the enumerated establishments are given three (3) months from the date of approval of
the Ordinance within which "to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside the Ermita-Malate area
or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area." Further, it states in Section 4 that in
cases of subsequent violations of the provisions of the Ordinance, the "premises of the erring establishment shall be closed
and padlocked permanently."

It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the governmental
interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person's fundamental right to liberty and property. HCEcAa

Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right
to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint
of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been
endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." 67 In accordance with

ADMIN VI-VIII 51
this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn
his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty. 68

The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, 69 sought to clarify the meaning of "liberty." It said:

While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free
people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed.

In another case, it also confirmed that liberty protected by the due process clause includes personal decisions relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. In explaining the respect the
Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person in making these choices, the U.S. Supreme Court explained:

These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central
to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart
of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of universe, and of the mystery of human
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood where they formed under compulsion
of the State. 70

Persons desirous to own, operate and patronize the enumerated establishments under Section 1 of the Ordinance may
seek autonomy for these purposes.

Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their bonds in intimate
sexual conduct within the motel's premises — be it stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does not contravene

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any fundamental state policy as contained in the Constitution. 71 Adults have a right to choose to forge such
relationships with others in the confines of their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. The liberty
protected by the Constitution allows persons the right to make this choice. 72 Their right to liberty under the due process
clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government, as long as they do
not run afoul of the law. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception.

Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it must include privacy
as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is the beginning of all freedom — it is the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. 73

The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. As
the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, 74 borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:

Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible;
indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon
the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out
of that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by
the will of others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is
in any real sense free.

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified
by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification
with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. 75

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There is a great temptation to have an extended discussion on these civil liberties but the Court chooses to exercise
restraint and restrict itself to the issues presented when it should. The previous pronouncements of the Court are not
to be interpreted as a license for adults to engage in criminal conduct. The reprehensibility of such conduct is not
diminished. The Court only reaffirms and guarantees their right to make this choice. Should they be prosecuted for their
illegal conduct, they should suffer the consequences of the choice they have made. That, ultimately, is their choice.

Modality employed is
unlawful taking

In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use
of its property. 76 The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the enumerated businesses in the
Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to wind up business operations or to transfer
outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed businesses. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use
of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking
of the property without just compensation. 77 It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals. EHTCAa

The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that "private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation." The provision is the most important protection of property rights in the Constitution. This
is a restriction on the general power of the government to take property. The constitutional provision is about ensuring
that the government does not confiscate the property of some to give it to others. In part too, it is about loss spreading.
If the government takes away a person's property to benefit society, then society should pay. The principal purpose of
the guarantee is "to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. 78

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There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A "possessory" taking occurs when the government
confiscates or physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the government's regulation leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of the property. 79

In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 80 it was held that a taking also could be found if government
regulation of the use of property went "too far." When regulation reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases
there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to support the act. While property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. 81

No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is too far and when regulation becomes a taking.
In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that it was "a question of degree and therefore cannot be disposed of by general
propositions." On many other occasions as well, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that the issue of when regulation
constitutes a taking is a matter of considering the facts in each case. The Court asks whether justice and fairness require
that the economic loss caused by public action must be compensated by the government and thus borne by the public
as a whole, or whether the loss should remain concentrated on those few persons subject to the public action. 82

What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. 83 A
regulation that permanently denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land is, from the owner's point of
view, equivalent to a "taking" unless principles of nuisance or property law that existed when the owner acquired the
land make the use prohibitable. 84When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a
taking. 85

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A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land will require compensation under the
takings clause. Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use,
a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect
on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations and
the character of government action. These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the takings clause which is to prevent
the government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole. 86

A restriction on use of property may also constitute a "taking" if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a
substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct investment-backed expectations of the
owner. 87

The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the "prohibited" establishments three (3) months from its approval
within which to "wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert
said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area." The directive to "wind up business operations"
amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless
the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an "allowed" business, the structure which housed the previous
business will be left empty and gathering dust. Suppose he transfers it to another area, he will likewise leave the entire
establishment idle. Consideration must be given to the substantial amount of money invested to build the edifices which
the owner reasonably expects to be returned within a period of time. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.

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The second and third options — to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed
businesses — are confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in Section
4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a "taking" of private property.

The second option instructs the owners to abandon their property and build another one outside the Ermita-Malate
area. In every sense, it qualifies as a taking without just compensation with an additional burden imposed on the owner
to build another establishment solely from his coffers. The proffered solution does not put an end to the "problem," it
merely relocates it. Not only is this impractical, it is unreasonable, onerous and oppressive. The conversion into allowed
enterprises is just as ridiculous. How may the respondent convert a motel into a restaurant or a coffee shop, art gallery
or music lounge without essentially destroying its property? This is a taking of private property without due process of
law, nay, even without compensation.

The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking that should be compensated by the government. The burden
on the owner to convert or transfer his business, otherwise it will be closed permanently after a subsequent violation
should be borne by the public as this end benefits them as a whole.

Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid
exercise of police power, which limits a "wholesome" property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes
the taking of such property without just compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious
purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of
justice as we know them. The police powers of local government units which have always received broad and liberal
interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.

Distinction should be made between destruction from necessity and eminent domain. It needs restating that the
property taken in the exercise of police power is destroyed because it is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose while

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the property taken under the power of eminent domain is intended for a public use or purpose and is therefore
"wholesome." 88 If it be of public benefit that a "wholesome" property remain unused or relegated to a particular purpose,
then certainly the public should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for the condemnation of private property for
public use. 89

Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners' actions. It in no way controls or
guides the discretion vested in them. It provides no definition of the establishments covered by it and it fails to set forth
the conditions when the establishments come within its ambit of prohibition. The Ordinanceconfers upon the mayor
arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in
its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of
the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid.
The Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. 90

Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid and constitutional, specify
the rules and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid; and must not admit of the exercise, or of an opportunity
for the exercise, of unbridled discretion by the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions. 91

Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 92 as cited in People v. Nazario, 93 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an
ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves
in a manner annoying to persons passing by." The ordinance was nullified as it imposed no standard at all "because one
may never know in advance what 'annoys some people but does not annoy others.'"

Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments "tend to disturb the
community," "annoy the inhabitants," and "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community." The cited

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case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in
carrying out its provisions. EATCcI

Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due process
clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. This is a
sweeping exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of imagination on the part of the City Council and which
amounts to an interference into personal and private rights which the Court will not countenance. In this regard, we
take a resolute stand to uphold the constitutional guarantee of the right to liberty and property.

Worthy of note is an example derived from the U.S. of a reasonable regulation which is a far cry from the
ill-considered Ordinance enacted by the City Council.

In FW/PBS, INC. v. Dallas, 94 the city of Dallas adopted a comprehensive ordinance regulating "sexually oriented
businesses," which are defined to include adult arcades, bookstores, video stores, cabarets, motels, and theaters as well
as escort agencies, nude model studio and sexual encounter centers. Among other things, the ordinance required that
such businesses be licensed. A group of motel owners were among the three groups of businesses that filed separate suits
challenging the ordinance. The motel owners asserted that the city violated the due process clause by failing to produce
adequate support for its supposition that renting room for fewer than ten (10) hours resulted in increased crime and
other secondary effects. They likewise argued than the ten (10)-hour limitation on the rental of motel rooms placed
an unconstitutional burden on the right to freedom of association. Anent the first contention, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the reasonableness of the legislative judgment combined with a study which the city considered, was adequate
to support the city's determination that motels permitting room rentals for fewer than ten (10) hours should be
included within the licensing scheme. As regards the second point, the Court held that limiting motel room rentals to
ten (10) hours will have no discernible effect on personal bonds as those bonds that are formed from the use of a motel

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room for fewer than ten (10) hours are not those that have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the
nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs.

The ordinance challenged in the above-cited case merely regulated the targeted businesses. It imposed reasonable
restrictions; hence, its validity was upheld.

The case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, 95 it needs pointing out,
is also different from this case in that what was involved therein was a measure which regulated the mode in which
motels may conduct business in order to put an end to practices which could encourage vice and immorality. Necessarily,
there was no valid objection on due process or equal protection grounds as the ordinance did not prohibit motels.
The Ordinance in this case however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. 96

The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of property and personal
rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, even under the guise of exercising
police power, be upheld as valid.

B.The Ordinance violates Equal

Protection Clause

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor
to some and unjustly discriminate against others. 97 The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be
denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances. 98 The "equal

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protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." 99 It limits governmental discrimination. The equal
protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned. 100

The Court has explained the scope of the equal protection clause in this wise:

. . . What does it signify? To quote from J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration: "The ideal situation is for
the law's benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance
and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very
essence of the idea of law." There is recognition, however, in the opinion that what in fact exists "cannot approximate
the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation.
The constitutional guarantee then is not to be given a meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact exist. To
assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights
to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause
only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common
weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason."
Classification is thus not ruled out, it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew "that the laws operate
equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same
manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism
and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every
person under circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or
charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in
the group equally binding on the rest. 101

Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the law may operate
only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause. 102 The classification must, as an
indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:

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 1)It must be based on substantial distinctions. IEAacS

2)It must be germane to the purposes of the law.

3)It must not be limited to existing conditions only.

4)It must apply equally to all members of the class. 103

In the Court's view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or
other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and
other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging
houses or other similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions
bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.

The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area
but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.

The standard "where women are used as tools for entertainment" is also discriminatory as prostitution — one of the
hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banish — is not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have an equal
propensity to engage in prostitution. It is not any less grave a sin when men engage in it. And why would the assumption
that there is an ongoing immoral activity apply only when women are employed and be inapposite when men are in
harness? This discrimination based on gender violates equal protection as it is not substantially related to important
government objectives. 104 Thus, the discrimination is invalid.

Failing the test of constitutionality, the Ordinance likewise failed to pass the test of consistency with prevailing laws.

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 C.The Ordinance is repugnant
to general laws; it is ultra vires

The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local government units to regulate, and
not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the establishment, operation, and maintenance of motels, hotels
and other similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a) 4 (iv), which provides that:

Section 458.Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. — (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative
body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(4)Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to promote the
general welfare and for said purpose shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(iv)Regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels,
inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and
transports. . . .

While its power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities,
and to prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment is provided under Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code,
which reads as follows:

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 Section 458.Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. — (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative
body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(4)Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to promote the
general welfare and for said purpose shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(vii)Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities,
including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna
baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or
activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy
the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of amusement
or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community.

Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other
similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote
the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment,
operation and maintenance of such establishments. It is well to recall the rulings of the Court in Kwong Sing v. City of
Manila 105 that:

The word "regulate," as used in subsection (l), section 2444 of the Administrative Code, means and includes the
power to control, to govern, and to restrain; but "regulate" should not be construed as synonymous with "suppress"

ADMIN VI-VIII 64
 or "prohibit." Consequently, under the power to regulate laundries, the municipal authorities could make proper
police regulations as to the mode in which the employment or business shall be exercised. 106

And in People v. Esguerra, 107 wherein the Court nullified an ordinance of the Municipality of Tacloban which
prohibited the selling, giving and dispensing of liquor ratiocinating that the municipality is empowered only to regulate
the same and not prohibit. The Court therein declared that:

(A)s a general rule when a municipal corporation is specifically given authority or power to regulate or to license and
regulate the liquor traffic, power to prohibit is impliedly withheld. 108

These doctrines still hold contrary to petitioners' assertion 109 that they were modified by the Code vesting upon City
Councils prohibitory powers.

Similarly, the City Council exercises regulatory powers over public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths,
massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement as found in the first clause of Section 458 (a) 4
(vii). Its powers to regulate, suppress and suspend "such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment,
particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" and to "prohibit certain forms of
amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" are stated in the
second and third clauses, respectively of the same Section. The several powers of the City Council as provided in Section
458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, it is pertinent to emphasize, are separated by semi-colons (;), the use of which indicates that
the clauses in which these powers are set forth are independent of each other albeit closely related to justify being put
together in a single enumeration or paragraph. 110 These powers, therefore, should not be confused, commingled or
consolidated as to create a conglomerated and unified power of regulation, suppression and prohibition. 111

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The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or entertainment subject to
regulation among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar
establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)), public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and
other places for entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This enumeration therefore cannot be included
as among "other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the
community or annoy the inhabitants" or "certain forms of amusement or entertainment" which the City Council may
suspend, suppress or prohibit. AEDcIH

The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily
implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited powers and the nature thereof, said powers are
to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said powers must
be construed against the City Council. 112 Moreover, it is a general rule in statutory construction that the express
mention of one person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterium. This maxim is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of human mind. It is particularly
applicable in the construction of such statutes as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or punishments, or
otherwise come under the rule of strict construction. 113

The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact the Ordinance by virtue of the general welfare clause of the
Code and of Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila is likewise without merit. On the first point, the ruling
of the Court in People v. Esguerra, 114 is instructive. It held that:

The powers conferred upon a municipal council in the general welfare clause, or section 2238 of the Revised
Administrative Code, refers to matters not covered by the other provisions of the same Code, and therefore it can
not be applied to intoxicating liquors, for the power to regulate the selling, giving away and dispensing thereof is
granted specifically by section 2242 (g) to municipal councils. To hold that, under the general power granted by

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 section 2238, a municipal council may enact the ordinance in question, notwithstanding the provision of section
2242 (g), would be to make the latter superfluous and nugatory, because the power to prohibit, includes the power
to regulate, the selling, giving away and dispensing of intoxicating liquors.

On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code being a later expression of the legislative will must necessarily prevail
and override the earlier law, the Revised Charter of Manila. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant, or later
statute repeals prior ones which are repugnant thereto. As between two laws on the same subject matter, which are
irreconcilably inconsistent, that which is passed later prevails, since it is the latest expression of legislative will. 115 If
there is an inconsistency or repugnance between two statutes, both relating to the same subject matter, which cannot
be removed by any fair and reasonable method of interpretation, it is the latest expression of the legislative will which
must prevail and override the earlier. 116

Implied repeals are those which take place when a subsequently enacted law contains provisions contrary to those of an
existing law but no provisions expressly repealing them. Such repeals have been divided into two general classes: those
which occur where an act is so inconsistent or irreconcilable with an existing prior act that only one of the two can
remain in force and those which occur when an act covers the whole subject of an earlier act and is intended to be a
substitute therefor. The validity of such a repeal is sustained on the ground that the latest expression of the legislative
will should prevail. 117

In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that "All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the
provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." Thus, submitting to petitioners' interpretation that
the Revised Charter of Manila empowers the City Council to prohibit motels, that portion of the Charter stating such
must be considered repealed by the Code as it is at variance with the latter's provisions granting the City Council mere
regulatory powers. ESCacI

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It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement
of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate
safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said
that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If
it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a
nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.118

Notably, the City Council was conferred powers to prevent and prohibit certain activities and establishments in another
section of the Code which is reproduced as follows:

Section 458.Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. — (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative
body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

(1)Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and in this
connection, shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(v)Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in
public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling
and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug addiction,
maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or
pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities inimical to the welfare and morals of the
inhabitants of the city;

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 xxx xxx xxx

If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the power to prohibit the establishments enumerated
in Section 1 of the Ordinance, it would have so declared in uncertain terms by adding them to the list of the matters
it may prohibit under the above-quoted Section. The Ordinance now vainly attempts to lump these establishments with
houses of ill-repute and expand the City Council's powers in the second and third clauses of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of
the Code in an effort to overreach its prohibitory powers. It is evident that these establishments may only be regulated
in their establishment, operation and maintenance.

It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the establishments themselves. That these establishments are
recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another Section of the Code. Section 131 under the Title on Local
Government Taxation expressly mentioned proprietors or operators of massage clinics, sauna, Turkish and Swedish
baths, hotels, motels and lodging houses as among the "contractors" defined in paragraph (h) thereof. The same Section
also defined "amusement" as a "pleasurable diversion and entertainment," "synonymous to relaxation, avocation,
pastime or fun;" and "amusement places" to include "theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of
amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances." Thus, it can
be inferred that the Code considers these establishments as legitimate enterprises and activities. It is well to recall the
maxim reddendo singula singulis which means that words in different parts of a statute must be referred to their
appropriate connection, giving to each in its place, its proper force and effect, and, if possible, rendering none of them
useless or superfluous, even if strict grammatical construction demands otherwise. Likewise, where words under
consideration appear in different sections or are widely dispersed throughout an act the same principle applies. 119

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Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly
argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The
decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or open
storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral
establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the
powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law. 120 As
succinctly illustrated in Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority: 121

The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able
to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that
the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are
mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local
government units cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the
enactment in question, which are merely local in origin cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and
effect of a statute. 122

Petitioners contend that the Ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity. While this may be the rule, it has already
been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such
presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance
itself or is established by proper evidence. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it
contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is
unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. 123

Conclusion

ADMIN VI-VIII 70
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is
constitutionally infirm. The Ordinancecontravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is
not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten,
the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void. cHCSDa

Concededly, the challenged Ordinance was enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the public for the
cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police power legislation of such character deserves the full
endorsement of the judiciary — we reiterate our support for it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of
the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City
Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their transfer
or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws — not even
under the guise of police power.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the Ordinance void
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

||| (City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, [April 12, 2005], 495 PHIL 289-338)

[G.R. No. 93252. August 5, 1991.]

RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUIS T.
SANTOS, respondents.

ADMIN VI-VIII 71
 [G.R. No. 93746. August 5, 1991.]

MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner, vs. HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Local Government, NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the
Department of Local Government, and SALVADOR CABALUNA, JR., respondents.

[G.R. No. 95245. August 5, 1991.]

RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUIS T. SANTOS, in
his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Local Government, respondents.

Nicolas P. Sonalan for petitioner in 93252.

Romeo A. Gerochi for petitioner in 93746.

Eugenio Original for petitioner in 95245.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; LOCAL AUTONOMY, NATURE OF; LOCAL OFFICIALS REMAIN
ACCOUNTABLE TO CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. — Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere
decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central government
in the manner the law may provide. Autonomy does not contemplate making mini-states out of local government units.
Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the

ADMIN VI-VIII 72
legislative responsibility under the Constitution — and as the "supervision clause" itself suggests — is to wean local
government units from overdependence on the central government. It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local
autonomy" is not instantly self executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code,
a local tax law, income distribution legislation, and a national representation law, and measures designed to realize
autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local
governments under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress
to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggests that Congress may
exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEW CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PRESCRIBE FEDERALISM. — As the Constitution itself declares, local
autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization." The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national
government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments
from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and
interdependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of
federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to
regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CHANGED SUPERVISION CLAUSE DOES NOT EXEMPT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FROM LEGISLATIVE
REGULATION. — The 1987 Constitution provides in Art. X, Sec. 4 that "[T]he President of the Philippines shall exercise
general supervision over local governments." It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the1935 Constitution, Art.
VII, Sec. 10(1), stating that "[T]he President shall . . . exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be
provided by law." It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional
language, the Charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right — or the President of her prerogative as

ADMIN VI-VIII 73
conferred by existing legislation — to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the
omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from
Congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for
the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular,
concerning discipline. The change in constitutional language did not exempt local governments from legislative
regulation provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATIONAL AUTHORITY CAN DISCIPLINE LOCAL OFFICIALS. — Since local governments remain
accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary
action against local officials. In the case at bar, the Secretary of Local Government, the President's alter ego, in
consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the existing Local Government Code, can suspend
petitioner Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252and 95245) and petitioner member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod
(G.R. No. 93746).

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "SUPERVISION" NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY. — "Supervision" is not
incompatible with disciplinary authority. As this Court held in Ganzon vs. Cayanan, 104 Phil. 484, "in administration
law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make
them perform their duties."

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER TO SUSPEND LOCAL OFFICIALS MUST NOT BE EXERCISED OPPRESSIVELY. — While the
respondent Secretary of Interior, as alter ego of the President, under the existing Local Government Code, has the Power
to suspend the petitioner Iloilo City Mayor, such power cannot be exercised oppressively. Ten administrative cases have
been successively filed against the City Mayor. The Mayor has been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension for

ADMIN VI-VIII 74
the first two cases and the respondent Secretary has issued another order preventively suspending the former for
another 60 days, the third time in twenty months. We are allowing the Mayor to suffer the duration of his third
suspension. Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the Department of Local Government,
upon finality of this decision, to undertake steps to expedite the same, subject to the Mayor's usual remedies of appeal,
judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting
out further suspensions based on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facieevidence.

D E C IS IO N

SARMIENTO, J : p

The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the Secretary of Local Government),
to suspend and/or remove local officials.

The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member of the Sangguniang
Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively. cdasia

The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed
against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority,
oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution,
and arbitrary detention. 1 The personalities involved are Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health office;
Salvador Cabaluna, her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor,
Vice-Mayor; Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Peña Redondo, members of the

ADMIN VI-VIII 75
 Sangguniang Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod. The complaints against the Mayor are set forth in
the opinion of the respondent Court of Appeals. 2 We quote:

xxx xxx xxx

In her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk assigned to the City Health, Office of Iloilo City charged
that due to political reasons, having supported the rival candidate, Mrs. Rosa O. Caram, the petitioner City Mayor,
using as an excuse the exigency of the service and the interest of the public, pulled her out from rightful office where
her qualification are best suited and assigned her to a work that should be the function of a non-career service
employee. To make matters worse, a utility worker in the office of the Public Services, whose duties are alien to the
complainant's duties and functions, has been detailed to take her place. The petitioner's act are pure harassments
aimed at luring her away from her permanent position or force her to resign.

In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitioner handpicked her to perform task not befitting
her position as Assistant City Health Officer of Iloilo City; that her office was padlocked without any explanation or
justification; that her salary was withheld without cause since April 1, 1988; that when she filed her vacation leave,
she was given the run-around treatment in the approval of her leave in connivance with Dr. Rodolfo Villegas and
that she was the object of a well-engineered trumped-up charge in an administrative complaint filed by Dr. Rodolfo
Villegas (Annex B).

On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duty elected Vice Mayor of Iloilo City and complainants Rolando Dabao,
Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong and Eduardo Peña Redondo are members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod
of the City of Iloilo. Their complaint arose out from the case where Councilor Larry Ong, whose key to his office was
unceremoniously and without previous notice, taken by petitioner. Without an office, Councilor Ong had to hold
office at Plaza Libertad. The Vice-Mayor and the other complainants sympathized with him and decided to do the
same. However, the petitioner, together with his fully-armed security men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza
Libertad. Councilor Ong denounced the petitioner's actuations the following day in the radio station and decided to

ADMIN VI-VIII 76
 hold office at the Freedom Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so many people who gathered to witness the
incident. However, before the group could reach the area, the petitioner, together with his security men, led the
firemen using a firetruck in dozing water to the people and the bystanders.

Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod, appointed by former mayor Rosa O.
Caram. On March 13, 1988, without the benefit of charges filed against him and no warrant of arrest was issued,
Erbite was arrested and detained at the City Jail of Iloilo City upon orders of petitioner. In jail, he was allegedly
mauled by other detainees thereby causing injuries. He was released only the following day. 3

The Mayor thereafter answered, 4 and the cases were set for hearing. The opinion of the Court of Appeals also set forth
the succeeding events:

xxx xxx xxx

The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for hearing on June 20-21, 1988 at the Regional
Office of the Department of Local Government in Iloilo City. Notices, through telegrams, were sent to the parties
(Annex L) and the parties received them, including the petitioner. The petitioner asked for a postponement before
the scheduled date of hearing and was represented by counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing officers, Atty.
Salvador Quebral and Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come all the way from Manila for the two-day hearings but
was actually held only on June 20, 1988 in view of the inability and unpreparedness of petitioner's counsel.

The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27, 1988 in the same venue — Iloilo City. Again, the petitioner
attempted to delay the proceedings and moved for a postponement under the excuse that he had just hired his
counsel. Nonetheless, the hearing officers denied the motion to postpone, in view of the fact that the parties were
notified by telegrams of the scheduled hearings (Annex M).

ADMIN VI-VIII 77
 In the said hearings, petitioner's counsel cross-examined the complainants and their witnesses.

Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspension order on August 11, 1988 to
last until October 11, 1988 for a period of sixty (60) days.

Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the petitioner again asked for a postponement to
September 26, 1988. On September 26, 1988, the complainants and petitioner were present, together with their
respective counsel. The petitioner sought for a postponement which was denied. In these hearings which were held
in Manila, the petitioner testified in Adm. Case No. C-10298 and 10299.

The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case and the complainants testified including their witnesses.

On October 10, 1988, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Onginal moved for a postponement of the October 24, 1988
hearing to November 7 to 11, 1988 which was granted. However, the motion for change of venue was denied due
to lack of funds. At the hearing on November 7, 1988, the parties and counsel were present. Petitioner reiterated
his motion to change venue and moved for postponement anew. The counsel discussed a proposal to take the
deposition of witnesses in Iloilo City so the hearing was indefinitely postponed. However, the parties failed to come
to terms and after the parties were notified of the hearing, the investigation was set to December 13 to 15, 1988.

The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his witnesses were sick or cannot attend the
investigation due to lack of transportation. The motion was denied and the petitioner was given up to December 14,
1988 to present his evidence. LexLib

On December 14, 1988, petitioner's counsel insisted on his motion for postponement and the hearing officers gave
petitioner up to December 15, 1988 to present his evidence. On December 15, 1988, the petitioner failed to
present evidence and the cases were considered submitted for resolution.

In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary detention case filed by Pancho Erbite
so the respondent ordered the petitioner's second preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty

ADMIN VI-VIII 78
 (60) days. The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City. The second preventive suspension was not enforced. 5

Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent
Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining
a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in the
respondent Court of Appeals.

Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon
for another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as
acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of Appeals, a petition for
prohibition, 6 (Malabor, it is to be noted, is one of the complainants, and hence, he is interested in seeing Mayor Ganzon
ousted.)

On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 16417. On July 5, 1990,
it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued
a Resolution certifying the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similarly charged by the respondent Secretary,
to this Court.

On June 26, 1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent Secretary from implementing
the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of the Court of Appeals' two decisions.

In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we
gave due course thereto.

ADMIN VI-VIII 79
Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (G.R. No. 93252), that the Department of Local Government in hearing the ten
cases against him, had denied him due process of law and that the respondent Secretary had been "biased, prejudicial
and hostile" towards him 7 arising from his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino party 8 and the running political rivalry they maintained in the last congressional and local elections; 9 and his
alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. 10 He also alleges that he requested the Secretary to lift his suspension
since it had come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay elections of November 14, 1988), 11 notwithstanding
which, the latter proceeded with the hearing — and meted out two more suspension orders — of the aforementioned
cases. 12He likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were held in Manila) in order to reduce
the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his request. 13 He states that he asked for postponement on 'valid
and justifiable" 14 grounds, among them, that he was suffering from a heart ailment which required confinement; that
his "vital" 15 witness was also hospitalized 16 but that the latter unduly denied his request. 17

Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary of Local Government is devoid,
in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials, an argument reiterated by the petitioner Mary Ann
Rivera Artieda (G.R. No. 93746).

As to Mayor Ganzon's charges of denial of due process, the records do not show very clearly in what manner the Mayor
might have been deprived of his rights by the respondent Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary Luis Santos were
(are) political rivals and that his "persecution" was politically motivated are pure speculation and although the latter
does not appear to have denied these contentions (as he, Mayor Ganzon, claims), we can not take his word for it the
way we would have under less political circumstances, considering furthermore that "political feud" has often been a
good excuse in contesting complaints.

ADMIN VI-VIII 80
The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-so's that Secretary Santos had attempted to seduce him to
join the administration party and to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut his
allegations, we can not accept them at face value, much more, as judicial admissions as he would have us accept
them, 18 for the same reasons above-stated and furthermore, because his say-so's were never corroborated by
independent testimonies. As a responsible public official, Secretary Santos, in pursuing an official function, is presumed
to be performing his duties regularly and in the absence of contrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed to him.

As to Mayor Ganzon's contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to defer the hearing on account of
the ninety-day ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas Blg. 337, the Court finds the question to be moot and academic
since we have in fact restrained the Secretary from further hearing the complaints against the petitioners. 19

As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not given any compelling reason why we
should overturn the Court of Appeals, which found no convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his
requests. Besides, postponements are a matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based on Mayor
Ganzon's above story, we are not convinced that the Secretary has been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.

The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos' actuations deprived Mayor Ganzon of due
process of law.

We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can
suspend and or remove local officials.

It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution 20 no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to both
petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting

ADMIN VI-VIII 81
the phrase "as may be provided by law," 21 to strip the President of the power of control over local governments. It is
a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission.

The provision in question reads as follows:

SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with
respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays
shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. 22

It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote:

SECTION 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. 23

The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant, as their argument goes, since:
(1) the power of the President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer. LLphil

It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of Local Government acted in
consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, we quote:

SECTION 62. Notice of Hearing. — Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the Minister of Local Government,
or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within
seven days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and investigation of the case within ten days
after receipt of such answer of the respondent. No investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately prior
to an election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed within the said period. If preventive suspension has been
imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the preventive suspension shall be lifted. 24

ADMIN VI-VIII 82
 SECTION 63. Preventive Suspension. — (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local
Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective
municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official.

(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground
to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is
strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases,
preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.

(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to
the continuation of the proceedings against him until its termination. However, if the delay in the proceedings of
the case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of
suspension. 25

The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase
"as may be provided by law" intend to divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and or
remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3) What
is the significance of the change in the constitutional language?

It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter
did not intend to divest the legislature of its right — or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing
legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be
provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and to break
Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local
autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.

ADMIN VI-VIII 83
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federal
governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared
municipal corporations euphemistically to "small republics". 26 Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the
guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution — and as
the "supervision clause" itself suggest — is to wean local government units from over dependence on the central
government.

It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other
things, the passage of a local government code, 27 a local tax law, 28 income distribution legislation, 29 and a national
representation law, 30 and measures 31 designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite
of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive. It is
noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of
local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code
has done, delegate its exercise to the President. Thus:

SECTION 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms
of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation
of the local units. 32

As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress, sub silencio, the objective
of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court
of Appeals, like the power of local legislation. 33 The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing

ADMIN VI-VIII 84
legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials
administratively, the Constitutioncontains no prohibition.

The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which
supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority.
It is a mistaken impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court has
held, 34 thus:

xxx xxx xxx

It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, this Court had occasion to discuss this
scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power
of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms,
control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. Thus in
that case the Court has made the following digression: "In administration law supervision means overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control,
on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." But
from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local
government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service
so requires, as postulated in Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code. . . . 35

xxx xxx xxx

"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter." 36

ADMIN VI-VIII 85
"Supervision" on the other hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties." 37 As we held, 38 however, "investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a
lesser power than "altering".

The impression is apparently exacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in at least three cases, Lacson
v. Roque, 39 Hebron v. Reyes, 40 and Mondano v. Silvosa, 41 and possibly, a fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor
General. 42 In Lacson, this Court said that the President enjoyed no control powers but only supervision "as may be
provided by law," 43 a rule we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the President "may
not . . . suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal
from a decision of the corresponding provincial board." 44 However,
neither Lacson nor Hebron nor Mondanocategorically banned the Chief Executive from exercising acts of disciplinary
authority because she did not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority.
Thus, according to Lacson:

The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers is without doubt not
well taken. Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its
proper construction subject to constitutional limitations. 45

In Hebron, we stated:

Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same must be deemed
mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of express or clear provision to the contrary — which does not
exist with respect to municipal officers. . . . 46

In Mondano, the Court held:

ADMIN VI-VIII 86
 . . . The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the
provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal
officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by
final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written
charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either
personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer)
pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge by one effecting the official integrity of the officer in
question." Section 86 of the Revised Administration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised
by the Department Head over the administration of . . . municipalities. . . . If it be construed that it does and such
additional power is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79(c) of the Revised
Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by Section 110(1), Article
VII, of the Constitution." 47

xxx xxx xxx

In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinary measures on local officials except on appeal from
the provincial board pursuant to the Administrative Code. 48

Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend remove) it was not because we did not
think that the President can not exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power
elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v.Kayanan, found little
difficulty in sustaining him. 49

The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional Commission to
defeat the President's powers. The Court believes that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although

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Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President, 50Commissioner Blas Ople would
not. 51

The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code, Batas
Blg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other
notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite
of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect. 52

As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization." 53 The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than
to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political
adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end
the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local government units, or
otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments,
under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit
paradoxically, to enhance self-government.

As we observed in one case, 54 decentralization means devolution of national administration — but not power — to the
local levels. Thus:

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization

of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order
to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and
accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central

ADMIN VI-VIII 88
 government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according
to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own
destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional
author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government
becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its contituency. 55

The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers the Court,
and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is
in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie findings. The
Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but
it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of
office. As we held: 5 6

2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not expire until
1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such
municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic
assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of
elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against
administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established. Moreover, if
there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may
be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if

ADMIN VI-VIII 89
 thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be
in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people
of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to
paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bonds of
reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an
unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted. 57

The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons, 58 and so also, because it
is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, 59 is
simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority
over possible witnesses" 60 or to keep him off "the records and other evidence." 61 It is a means, and no more, to assist
prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not
exceed sixty days, 62 which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient,
and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.

Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the accused is held to insure his presence
at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found
guilty. cdphil

Suspension finally is temporary, and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more than sixty
days. As we held, 63 a longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.

As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension — which is not a remote possibility — on Mayor Ganzon is to
all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and
purposes, his suspension permanent.

ADMIN VI-VIII 90
It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayor's guilt has not been proven. Worse, any
absolution will be for naught because needless to say, the length of his suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated,
wiped out his tenure considerably.

The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent Secretary to see that justice is done in Iloilo
City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict on Mayor Ganzon successive suspensions when apparently, the respondent
Secretary has had sufficient time to gather the necessary evidence to build a case against the Mayor — without
suspending him a day longer. What is intriguing is that the respondent Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak,
on the Mayor piecemeal — apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent Secretary, could
have pursued a consolidated effort.

We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power,
yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with
a grave abuse of discretion.

The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under question, and that any talk of future suspensions is in fact
premature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension
and the possibility of sixty days more is arguably around the corner (which amounts to a violation of the Local
Government Code) — which brings to light a pattern of suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor the rest of his
natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a concerted effort of the State to perpetuate an
arbitrary act.

As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs.

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We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third suspension and lifting, for the
purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued. Insofar as the seven pertaining charges are concerned, we are
urging the Department of Local Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake steps to expedite the same,
subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and
meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those remaining complaints,
notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence.

In resumé, the Court is laying down the following rules:

1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in which
local officials remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide;

2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;

3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny legislative
control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent
with the fundamental premise of autonomy;

4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner
set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials;

5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not signify "control" (which the
President does not have);

6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be suspended for
the offenses he was charged originally; provided:

ADMIN VI-VIII 92
 a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shall
not be counted in computing the time of suspension." [Supra, sec. 63(3)]

b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner commits another or other
crimes and abuses for which proper charges are filed against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous
suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63
of the Local Government Code.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued is LIFTED.
The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be
made to serve future suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for
acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative
cases pending against Mayor Ganzon. cdasia

The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

||| (Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93252, 93746, 95245, [August 5, 1991], 277 PHIL 311-334)

[G.R. No. 93252. November 8, 1991.]

RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND LUIS T. SANTOS, respondents.

[G.R. No. 93746. November 8, 1991.]

ADMIN VI-VIII 93
 MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner, vs. HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Local Government, NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the
Department of Local Government and SALVADOR CABALUNA, JR., respondents.

[G.R. No. L-95245. November 8, 1991.]

RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his
capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Local Government, respondents.

Manuel Lazaro and Vincent Rondaris for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 93252 & 95245.

SYLLABUS

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION; SIMULTANEOUS SERVICE OF OVERLAPPING SUSPENSIONS;

LESSENS THE HARSH EFFECTS OF WHATEVER MOTIVE BEHIND SUCCESSIVE SUSPENSION ORDERS. — Petitioner
raises the issue of whether he could or should be allowed to serve the third and the fourth orders "simultaneously". It
will be recalled that, in the main decisions, noting that successive suspensions have been inflicted on Mayor Ganzon, we
stated that what "is intriguing is that respondent Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor
piecemeal — apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent Secretary could have pursued
a consolidated effort." Surely, allowing petitioner to serve simultaneously the overlapping third and fourth suspensions
will favor him, (and presumably the local constituency) and certainly lessen if not offset the harsh effects of whatever
motive may be behind the intriguing action of the respondent Secretary in issuing those successive suspension orders.

ADMIN VI-VIII 94
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ELECTIVE OFFICIALS CAN NOT BE PREVENTIVELY SUSPENDED FOR MORE THAN 90 DAYS. — We
may already take judicial notice of the recently-approved Local Government Code of 1991 (recently signed into law
by the President) which provides (as to imposition of preventive suspensions) as follows: "SEC. 63. Preventive
Suspension . . . b) . . . that, any single preventive suspension of local elective official shall not extend beyond sixty (60)
days: Provided, further that in the event that several administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot
be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing
and known at the time of the first suspension." (emphasis ours)

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALLOWED UNDER THE BIZARRE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AT BAR. — The main decision refers
to the three (3) suspension orders — the first, the second and the third. As shown earlier, the first and the third orders
have already been served. It is only the second order which seems to have been unserved. If we follow the decision which
states that the three (3) suspensions are affirmed, there appears to be no reason why the second order should not be
served for another 60-day period. However, there is no cogent reason why, under the bizarre circumstances of this case
— where the respondent Secretary has chosen to impose preventive suspensions piecemeal, instead of consolidating the
several administrative cases of similar nature and close vintage — we cannot allow the concept of simultaneous service
to apply to the second order (as we did in the third order). It would follow then that the second order is also fully served
to this date for the service of said second order would have started on 5 August 1991 (when the main decision was
rendered as this was the time when this Court found and affirmed the validity of the three (3) suspensions orders,
including the second order). The 60-day period from 5 August 1991 expired on 4 October 1991.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SERVICE OF SUSPENSION RENDERS ISSUE ON VALIDITY OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION MOOT AND
ACADEMIC. — It appears that as to the second preventive suspension, petitioner manifested that there is still an existing
preliminary injunction issued by the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 33 in Special Civil Action No. 18312, entitled Ganzon
vs. Santos, et al. One may ask as to the status of the case pending with the RTC, Iloilo City, Branch 33 insofar as the

ADMIN VI-VIII 95
said case involves the issue on the validity of the second preventive suspension order. Under the main decision of this
Court, dated 5 August 1991, the second preventive suspension has been affirmed; under the present resolution, said
second preventive suspension has been served. Consequently, Special Civil Action No. 18312 before the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City has been rendered moot and academic, insofar as the second preventive suspension order is concerned.
As to the petition (docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 25840) filed with the Court of Appeals, which involves the question of the
validity of the fourth order, and which has clearly been served, petitioner admitted that he filed it, on the belief that
it was the proper remedy for his reinstatement to office; thinking that his suspensions have been served and ended. As
we have ruled that petitioner has served the suspension orders decreed in the main decision and in the light of the finding
of this Court that the fourth preventive suspension order has been served, the issues raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 25840,
have also become moot and academic, warranting dismissal thereof.

R E S O L U T IO N

PADILLA, J : p

Before the Court for resolution are the various issues raised by Rodolfo T. Ganzon's urgent motion, dated 7 September
1991, wherein he asks the court to dissolve the temporary restraining order (TRO) it had issued, dated 5 September
1991, against the TRO earlier issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 25840 entitledGanzon vs. Santos, et
al.

On 5 August 1991, the Court's decision in the present case was promulgated, upholding the validity of the orders of
preventive suspension issued by respondent Secretary Santos, the dispositive part of which decision reads:

ADMIN VI-VIII 96
 "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued is
LIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may
not be made to serve future suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against
him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such
administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon. cdphil

The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED No costs." 1

A brief summary of the facts that led to this Court's decision of 5 August 1991 ("main decision", for brevity) is as follows:

1. Sometime in 1988, a series of ten (10) administrative complaints were filed by various city officials, against
petitioner Ganzon, the elected City Mayor of Iloilo City, on various charges such as abuse of authority, oppression,
grave misconduct and others.

2. In the course of the hearing of the administrative cases, respondent Secretary Santos issued against petitioner
Ganzon three (3) separate orders of preventive suspension dated 11 August 1988, 11 October 1988, and 3 May
1990, each of the orders to last for a 60-day period.

Petitioner assailed the validity of the said orders by filing with the Court of Appeals two (2) separate petitions for
prohibition docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 16417 and CA-G.R. SP No. 20736. On 7 September 1988 and 5 July 1990,
the appellate court rendered the decision in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 16417 and 20736 dismissing the petitions for lack
of merit. Hence, petitioner Ganzon filed with this Court two (2) separate petitions assailing the decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 16417 (subject of G.R. No. 93252), and that in CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 (subject of G.R. No. 95245). 2

3. On 26 June 1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order barring the respondent Secretary from
implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of the Court of Appeals' two (2) decisions.

ADMIN VI-VIII 97
However, it appears that even before the promulgation on 5 August 1991 of the main decision, respondent Secretary
Santos had issued on 3 July 1991 against petitioner Ganzon another order of preventive suspension in connection with
Administrative Case No. 51-90 filed by complainant Octavius J. Jopson, which order states:

"It appearing from a perusal of the complaint as well as the answer in Administrative Case No
51-90, entitled Octavius J. Jopson, Complainant, versus, Mayor Rodolfo T. Ganzon, Respondent, for Oppression,
etc., that there is reasonable ground to believe that Respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, as
prayed for by Complainant Jopson, you are hereby preventively suspended from office for a period of sixty (60)
days effective immediately." (Emphasis ours)

On 6 July 1991, petitioner Ganzon filed his "extremely urgent motion" (with supplemental motions later filed)
questioning the validity of the said last mentioned suspension order. This Court issued a resolution dated 9 July 1991,
requiring respondents to comment on petitioner's urgent motion.

After the main decision in the present petitions was rendered by the Court on 5 August 1991, respondents filed motions
dated 9 and 29 August 1991 alleging therein that the issued raised in petitioner's motion (6 July 1991) were rendered
moot and academic by the said decision, and seeking clarification on whether it was still necessary to comply with this
Court's resolutions requiring respondents to file comment on petitioner's said motion of 6 July 1991.

Meanwhile, on 29 August 1991, respondent Santos issued a memorandum addressed to petitioner Ganzon, in
connection with the 5 August 1991 main decision, stating therein that the third order of preventive suspension issued
against petitioner on 3 May 1990 shall be deemed in force and effect. The memorandum states:

"The Supreme Court, in its Decision in the above-referred cases, which affirmed the authority of the Secretary of
Local Government to discipline local elective officials, explicitly states that,

ADMIN VI-VIII 98
 'We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third suspension and
lifting for the purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued . . . '

In view thereof, the third preventive suspension imposed on you, photo copy of which is hereto attached, is hereby
deemed in force."

On 30 August 1991, petitioner Ganzon filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for mandamus, docketed CA-G.R.
SP No. 25480 against respondents. On the same day, petitioner filed in these petitions his "manifestation and
compliance," alleging that he had already fully served the suspension orders issued against him, in compliance with the
main decision of 5 August 1991, and that he should be allowed to re-assume his office starting 4 September 1991.

Meanwhile, in reaction to the memorandum dated 29 August 1991 issued by respondent Santos, petitioner filed in
CA-G.R. SP No. 25840 a motion praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, which motion was granted
by the Court of Appeals, when on 3 September 1991, it (CA) issued the said TRO. On 4 September 1991, respondents
filed with this Court a motion asking for the issuance of a restraining order addressed to the Court of Appeals and
against the TRO issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 25840. Granting respondents' motion, this Court on 5 September 1991
issued a temporary restraining order directing the Court of Appeals to cease and desist from implementing the TRO
it had issued dated 3 September 1991 immediately suspending the implementation of the order of the Secretary of
Interior and Local Government dated 29 August 1991. On 9 September 1991, petitioner Ganzon filed a motion to
dissolve this Court's restraining order dated 5 September 1991.

The records show that petitioner Ganzon, to this date, remains suspended from office (as the elected Mayor of Iloilo City)
and since the order of preventive suspension dated 3 July 1991 (the fourth suspension order 3 ) was issued against him
by respondent Secretary; in other words, he has been serving the said fourth suspension order which is to expire after
a period of 60 days, or on 4 September 1991.

ADMIN VI-VIII 99
Similar to the argument raised in his petition filed with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 25840, petitioner
Ganzon, in support of his plea for the lifting of the TRO dated 3 September 1991 issued by this Court, in re: TRO dated
3 September 1991, issued by Court of Appeals, contends that inasmuch as he has already served fully the suspension
orders issued against him, in compliance with the mandate of this Court's decision dated 5 August 1991, coupled with
the fact that he had also completely served by 4 September 1991 the fourth order of preventive suspension dated 3
July 1991, he should therefore be allowed to re-assume his office starting 4 September 1991.

On the other hand, respondent Secretary maintains that petitioner Ganzon can be allowed to return to his office (as
Mayor of Iloilo City) only after 19 October 1991, as it is only after such date when petitioner may be said to have fully
served the preventive suspension orders as decreed in the main decision and in the order dated 3 July 1991 (fourth
suspension).

The question then is when petitioner Ganzon may be allowed to re-assume his position and duties as mayor of Iloilo City.
Is it only after 19 October 1991 as claimed by respondents, or at some earlier date? The answer to this question would
depend on how petitioner has served the preventive suspension orders issued against him.

We note that the main decision refers to three (3) orders of preventive suspension each to last for 60 days. The first,
dated 11 August 1988, was admittedly fully served by petitioner. The second order dated 11 October 1988 was not
served because its enforcement was restrained by am order of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City upon petition of
petitioner himself. 4 As to the third order dated 3 May 1990, the main decision states that petitioner is allowed to serve
the duration of said third suspension order. It would seem, therefore, that after petitioner has served in full the third
suspension order as decreed in the main decision, he can then return to his official duties as Iloilo City Mayor. cdphil

However, we must also take note of the supervening 3 July 1991 order, again suspending petitioner from office for
another 60 days, which order was issued even before the main decision of 5 August 1991 was promulgated. (The

ADMIN VI-VIII 100

records show, however, that petitioner has in fact fully served the fourth suspension order, as admitted by respondents
no less. This will be discussed shortly; but any issue on its validity is now moot and academic. 5 Besides, it is clear that
this fourth suspension order is not one of the three orders covered by and subject of the main decision).

Considering, nonetheless, the necessity of serving the third and fourth orders of suspension, there is need to look into
when petitioner started to serve these orders so as to determine when their service expires.

Petitioner contends that the following are the periods within which he stayed out of his office as he was serving the
orders of preventive suspension issued against him.

FROM Up to and Including

May 4, 1990 May 18, 1990 6

June 9, 1990 June 26, 1990 7

July 5, 1991 September 3, 1991 8

Petitioner argues that for the periods of 4 May 18 May 1990, and 9 June to 26 June 1990, he was serving the third
suspension order; whereas for the period of 5 July to 3 September 1991, he was then serving the fourth suspension
order.

On the other hand, respondent Secretary contends that as to the third order of preventive suspension, dated 3 May
1990, petitioner served it only from 4 May 1990 to 19 May 1990. 9 Respondent denies that from 11 June to 30 June
1990 10 petitioner had served again the third suspension order.

As to the fourth suspension order, respondent Secretary confirms that petitioner served it starting from 5 July 1991
to 3 September 1991. 11

ADMIN VI-VIII 101

As regards the third suspension order, it is noted that though both parties admit that petitioner started serving it on
4 May 1990, they however differ as to when the service ended (Petitioner claims he served it even after 18 May 1990,
whereas, respondent claims it ended 19 May 1990.) In view of this divergence, the Court rules that the third order was
served by petitioner from 4 May 1990 up to 18 May 1990 only, the latter date being the date when the Court of
Appeals issued a TRO in CA-G.R. SP No. 20736, 12 and thus, interrupted petitioner's service of the suspension orders
and enabled him re-assume his office as Iloilo City Mayor.

We also do not accept petitioner's contention that from 9 June 1990 up to 26 June 1990 13 he again started to serve
the third suspension order, inasmuch as during the period of 9 June 1990 to 26 June 1990, the records show that
he was then in office discharging the functions of the Mayor of Iloilo City. 14 In sum, we rule that petitioner served the
third suspension order only from 4 May 1990 up to 18 May 1990.

The period from 4 May 1990 to 18 May 1990 is equivalent to fourteen (14) days. 15 Hence, as to the third suspension
order (3 May 1990), petitioner having served fourteen (14) days of the 60-day preventive suspension imposed in the
order, 46 days still remained to be served by him as decreed in the main decision. If we follow the mandate of such main
decision which ordained that the third order be served and that the temporary restraining order 16 against it be lifted,
it would follow that the remaining 46 days should be served starting 5 August 1991 (date of promulgation of main
decision) until fully served. Another way to serve the 46 days would be to begin serving it only on 4 September 1991
(the day after 3 September 1991 which was the last day of service for the fourth suspension order), or until 20 October
1991 (the 46th day from 4 September 1990). prLL

However we take note of the fact that petitioner has already fully served the 60-day fourth order of preventive
suspension which started 5 July 1991 (that is, even before the main decision was rendered) and ended on 3 September
1991. Petitioner raises the issue of whether he could or should be allowed to serve the third and the fourth orders

ADMIN VI-VIII 102

"simultaneously". If we allow his submission and accept "simultaneous service", it would mean the following: that from
5 August 1991 (the date the TRO issued by this Court was lifted) up to 3 September 1991 (the last day for serving
the fourth order), twenty-nine (29) days have elapsed; that these twenty-nine (29) days which form part of his service
for the fourth order can be also credited to his favor by treating said twenty-nine (29) days as forming part of his service
of the third order; if this were so, he would need to serve only seventeen (17) days more to complete the service of the
third order; said seventeen (17) days from 3 September 1991 will expire on 20 September 1991, which would be the
last day for serving the third suspension order.

Respondents however object to adopting the idea of "simultaneous service," of preventive suspensions as, according of
them, this is not allowed under the Local Government Code.

We agree with petitioner that he can be allowed the benefit of simultaneous service of the third and fourth suspension
orders, for the following reasons.

If simultaneous service of two (2) suspension orders is allowed, this would work in favor of the petitioner (an elective
local official) as the balance of his third preventive suspension would, in effect, be reduced from 46 days to 17 days.

It will be recalled that, in the main decision, noting that successive suspensions have been inflicted on Mayor Ganzon,
we stated that what "is intriguing is that respondent Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor
piecemeal — apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent Secretary could have pursued
a consolidated effort." 17 Surely, allowing petitioner to serve simultaneously the overlapping third and fourth
suspensions will favor him, (and presumably the local constituency) and certainly lessen if not offset the harsh effects
of whatever motive may be behind the intriguing action of the respondent Secretary in issuing those successive
suspension orders.

ADMIN VI-VIII 103

Furthermore, we may already take judicial notice of the recently-approved Local Government Code of 1991 (recently
signed into law by the President) 18 which provides (as to imposition of preventive suspensions) as follows:

"SECTION 63. Preventive Suspension. —

xxx xxx xxx

b) . . . that, any single preventive suspension of local elective official shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided,
further that in the event that several administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot be
preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing
and known at the time of the first suspension." (emphasis ours)

Since we can allow, as we here allow, under the bizarre circumstances of this case, petitioner to serve the third and
fourth orders simultaneously (insofar as they overlap), this means that, as explained earlier, petitioner shall serve only
17 days more (not 46 days) to complete the service of the third order, that is, starting from 3 September 1991 and
ending on 20 September 1991. Hence, as of this latter date, petitioner has complied with the mandate of the main
decision for he has already fully served the third preventive suspension which ended on 20 September 1991.

But then another issue is raised by respondents, i.e. that considering that the main decision refers to the first, second
and third orders of preventive suspension (as far as Mayor Ganzon is concerned), petitioner, apart from serving the third
order (the first one having been fully served), should also serve the second order (for another 60 days) as the latter has
admittedly not been serve yet due to a restraining order issued by a trial court, 19 and considering that the dispositive
portion of the main decision decreed that "suspensions of petitioners (including the other petitioner Artieda in G.R. No.
93746) are affirmed."

We agree with the respondents on this point.

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The main decision refers to the three (3) suspension orders — the first, the second and the third. As shown earlier, the
first and the third orders have already been served. It is only the second order which seems to have been unserved. If
we follow the decision which states that the three (3) suspensions are affirmed, there appears to be no reason why the
second order should not be served for another 60-day period. However, there is no cogent reason why, under the bizarre
circumstances of this case — where the respondent Secretary has chosen to impose preventive suspensions piecemeal,
instead of consolidating the several administrative cases of similar nature and close vintage — we cannot allow the
concept of simultaneous service to apply to the second order (as we did in the third order). It would follow then that
the second order is also fully served to this date for the service of said second order would have started on 5 August
1991 (when the main decision was rendered as this was the time when this Court found and affirmed the validity of
the three (3) suspension orders, including the second order). The 60-day period from 5 August 1991 expired on 4
October 1991. LLphil

It appears that as to the second preventive suspension, petitioner manifested that there is still an existing preliminary
injunction issued by the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 33 in Special Civil Action No. 18312, entitled Ganzon vs. Santos, et
al. 20

One may ask as to the status of the case pending with the RTC, Iloilo City, Branch 33 insofar as the said case involves
the issue on the validity of the second preventive suspension order. Under the main decision of this Court, dated 5 August
1991, the second preventive suspension has been affirmed; under the present resolution, said second preventive
suspension has been served. Consequently, Special Civil Action No. 18312 before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City
has been rendered moot and academic, insofar as the second preventive suspension order is concerned.

As to the petition (docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 25840) filed with the Court of Appeals, which involves the question of the
validity of the fourth order, and which has clearly been served, petitioner admitted that he filed it, on the belief that

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it was the proper remedy for his reinstatement to office; thinking that his suspensions have been served and ended. 21 As
we have ruled that petitioner has served the suspension orders decreed in the main decision and in the light of the finding
of this Court that the fourth preventive suspension order has been served, the issues raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 25840;
have also become moot and academic, warranting dismissal thereof.

WHEREFORE, the urgent motion of petitioner, dated 7 September 1991 is hereby GRANTED. The temporary
restraining order dated 5 September 1991 is hereby LIFTED. Respondents are ordered to allow petitioner to re-assume
his office as elected Mayor of Iloilo City effective immediately.

The Court of Appeal is directed to dismiss CA-G.R. SP No. 25840 for having become moot and academic. The Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33 before which petitioner's action for prohibition (Special Civil Action No. 18312)
is pending is also ordered to dismiss the said case for having become moot and academic insofar as petitioner prays
therein to enjoin his (second) preventive suspension.

This resolution is without prejudice to the administrative cases (where the first, second, third and fourth preventive
suspension orders were issued) proceeding on the merits thereof Also, as decreed in the main decision of 5 August 1991.

" . . . petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on account of any of the
remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. . . . ."

SO ORDERED.

||| (Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93252, 93746, L-95245 (Resolution), [November 8, 1991], 280 PHIL
431-444)

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