1. REPUBLIC ACT No.

4200

AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER RELATED VIOLATIONS OF
THE PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using
a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape
recorder, or however otherwise described:

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the
next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other
such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after
the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other
person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of
such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses
mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.

Section 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done
any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the preceding section or who violates the provisions of the
following section or of any order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation shall,
upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than six months or more than six
years and with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office if the
offender be a public official at the time of the commission of the offense, and, if the offender is an
alien he shall be subject to deportation proceedings.

Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or punishable for any
peace officer, who is authorized by a written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to
be unlawful in the two preceding sections in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage,
provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to
sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No.
616, punishing espionage and other offenses against national security: Provided, That such written
order shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or
is being committed or is about to be committed: Provided, however, That in cases involving the
offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition,
conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior
proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being
committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained essential
to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any of such crimes;
and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.

The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identity of the person or persons whose
communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard, intercepted, or
recorded and, in the case of telegraphic or telephonic communications, the telegraph line or the
telephone number involved and its location; (2) the identity of the peace officer authorized to
overhear, intercept, or record the communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words; (3)
the offense or offenses committed or sought to be prevented; and (4) the period of the authorization.
The authorization shall be effective for the period specified in the order which shall not exceed sixty
(60) days from the date of issuance of the order, unless extended or renewed by the court upon being
satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest.
All recordings made under court authorization shall, within forty-eight hours after the expiration of the
period fixed in the order, be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed package, and
shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the peace officer granted such authority stating the number of
recordings made, the dates and times covered by each recording, the number of tapes, discs, or
records included in the deposit, and certifying that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part
thereof have been made, or if made, that all such duplicates or copies are included in the envelope or
package deposited with the court. The envelope or package so deposited shall not be opened, or the
recordings replayed, or used in evidence, or their contents revealed, except upon order of the court,
which shall not be granted except upon motion, with due notice and opportunity to be heard to the
person or persons whose conversation or communications have been recorded.

The court referred to in this section shall be understood to mean the Court of First Instance within
whose territorial jurisdiction the acts for which authority is applied for are to be executed.

Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect,
or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured
by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in
any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Section 5. All laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or accordingly
amended.

Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: June 19, 1965

2. LAW ON SECRECY OF BANK DEPOSITS

LAW ON SECRECY OF BANK DEPOSITS

REPUBLIC ACT NO.1405

AN ACT PROHIBITING DISCLOSURE OF OR INQUIRY INTO, DEPOSITS WITH ANY BANKING

INSTITUTION
AND PROVIDING PENALTY THEREFOR

SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give encouragement to the
people to deposit their money in banking institutions and to discourage private hoarding so that the
same may be properly utilized by banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic development of
the country.

SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines
including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions
and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be
examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon
written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court
in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation.

SECTION 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to disclose to any
person other than those mentioned in Section two hereof any information concerning said deposits.

SECTION 4. All Acts or parts of Acts, Special Charters, Executive Orders, Rules and Regulations which
are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.

SECTION 5. Any violation of this law will subject offender upon conviction, to an imprisonment of not
more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of the
court.

SECTION 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, September 9, 1955

3. WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC
January 22, 2008

THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

RESOLUTION

Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court
submitting for this Courts consideration and approval the proposed Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data,
the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same. chanrobles virtual law library

This Resolution shall take effect on February 2, 2008, following its publication in three (3) newspapers
of general circulation.

January 22, 2008.

(Sgd.)
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

(Sgd.)
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

(Sgd.)
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

(Sgd.)
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

(Sgd.)
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
 Associate Justice

(Sgd.)
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

(Sgd.)
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

(Sgd.)
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

(Sgd.)
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

(Sgd.)
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

(Sgd.)
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO JR.
Associate Justice

(Sgd.)
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

(Sgd.)
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

(Sgd.)
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

Section 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing
of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

Sec. 2. Who May File. - Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However,
in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:

(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and
parents;

(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph;

Sec. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial Court where the petitioner or
respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is
gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner.

The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan
when the action concerns public data files of government offices.

Sec. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. - When the writ is issued by a Regional Trial Court or any
judge thereof, it shall be returnable before such court or judge.

When issued by the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, it may be returnable
before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the
petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or
information is gathered, collected or stored.

When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such Court or
any justice thereof, or before the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, or to
any Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has
jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored.

The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

Sec. 5. Docket Fees. - No docket and other lawful fees shall be required from an indigent petitioner.
The petition of the indigent shall be docked and acted upon immediately, without prejudice to
subsequent submission of proof of indigency not later than fifteen (15) days from the filing of the
petition. chanrobles virtual law library

Sec. 6. Petition. - A verified written petition for a writ of habeas data should contain:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty
or security of the aggrieved party; chanrobles virtual law library
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;

(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge,
in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of
the database or information or files kept by the respondent.

In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and

(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.

Sec. 7. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall
immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue
the writ under the seal of the court and cause it to be served within three (3) days from the issuance;
or, in case of urgent necessity, the justice or judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and
may deputize any officer or person serve it.

The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later
than ten (10) work days from the date of its issuance.chanrobles virtual law library

Sec. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. - A clerk of court who refuses to issue the writ
after its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the
court, justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary actions. chanrobles virtual
law library

Sec. 9. How the Writ is Served. - The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a judicial officer or
by a person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a return
of service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules on substituted
service shall apply.

Sec. 10. Return; Contents. - The respondent shall file a verified written return together with
supporting affidavits within five (5) working days from service of the writ, which period may be
reasonably extended by the Court for justifiable reasons. The return shall, among other things,
contain the following:

(a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets, privileged communications,
confidentiality of the source of information of media and others;

(b) In case of respondent in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information subject of
the petition;

(i) a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner, the nature of such data or information,
and the purpose for its collection;
(ii) the steps or actions taken by the respondent to ensure the security and confidentiality of the data
or information; and chanrobles virtual law library

(iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held; and,

(c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding.

A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.

Sec. 11. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may punish with imprisonment or fine a respondent
who commits contempt by making a false return, or refusing to make a return; or any person who
otherwise disobeys or resist a lawful process or order of the court.

Sec. 12. When Defenses May be Heard in Chambers. - A hearing in chambers may be conducted
where the respondent invokes the defense that the release of the data or information in question shall
compromise national security or state secrets, or when the data or information cannot be divulged to
the public due to its nature or privileged character.

Sec. 13. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings and motions are prohibited:

(a) Motion to dismiss;

(b) Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and other
pleadings; chanrobles virtual law library

(c) Dilatory motion for postponement;

(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;

(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;

(f) Third-party complaint;

(g) Reply;

(h) Motion to declare respondent in default;

(i) Intervention;

(j) Memorandum;

(k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and

(l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order.

Sec. 14. Return; Filing. - In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court, justice or judge shall
proceed to hear the petition ex parte, granting the petitioner such relief as the petition may warrant
unless the court in its discretion requires the petitioner to submit evidence. chanrobles virtual law
library
Sec. 15. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court,
justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the
possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties. chanrobles virtual law library

Sec. 16. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition
is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the
court shall enjoin the act complained of, or order the deletion, destruction, or rectification of the
erroneous data or information and grant other relevant reliefs as may be just and equitable;
otherwise, the privilege of the writ shall be denied.

Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any lawful officers as may be
designated by the court, justice or judge within five (5) working days.

Sec. 17. Return of Service. - The officer who executed the final judgment shall, within three (3) days
from its enforcement, make a verified return to the court. The return shall contain a full statement of
the proceedings under the writ and a complete inventory of the database or information, or
documents and articles inspected, updated, rectified, or deleted, with copies served on the petitioner
and the respondent.

The officer shall state in the return how the judgment was enforced and complied with by the
respondent, as well as all objections of the parties regarding the manner and regularity of the service
of the writ.

Sec. 18. Hearing on Officer-s Return. - The court shall set the return for hearing with due notice to the
parties and act accordingly. chanrobles virtual law library

Sec. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme Court under
Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both. chanrobles virtual law library

The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of the judgment or final
order.

The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus and amparo cases.

Sec. 20. Institution of Separate Actions. - The filing of a petition for the writ of habeas data shall not
preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions.

Sec. 21. Consolidation. - When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a petition for the
writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.

When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for a writ of
habeas data, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action.

After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to govern the disposition of the reliefs
in the petition.

Sec. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. - When a criminal action has been commenced, no
separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The relief under the writ shall be available to an aggrieved
party by motion in the criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of
habeas data.

Sec. 23. Substantive Rights. - This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

Sec. 24. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. - The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily
insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule. chanrobles virtual law library

Sec. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on February 2, 2008, following its publication in three
(3) newspapers of general circulation.
4. RAMIREZ V CA

G.R. No. 93833 | September 28, 1995 | J. Katipunan

Facts:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that the
private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and
personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought damages.
The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation
made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations
of private communication, and other purposes.”

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.

The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s MR, hence the instant
petition.

Issue:

W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation

Held:

Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using
a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape
recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by
all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.
The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the
use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a
(person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court’s conclusion
that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape
recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by
third persons.

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same
need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
“Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of
the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed.”

Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point
of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to
impart.” In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or
signifies the “process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a
common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)”

These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of “meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the
latter’s office. Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the phrase “private communication”
are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were
interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.

Socorro Ramirez vs. CA and Garcia [G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995]

FACTS:

Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and
personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”. Private respondent filed a criminal
case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other
purposes.” Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information. The trial court granted the said motion.
The private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which
referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated
its decision declaring the trial court’s order as null and void, after subsequently denied the motion for
reconsideration by the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.

HELD:
NO. Petition denied. Costs against petitioner.

RATIO:

Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications.
Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

[P]etitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point
of absurdity.
5. GANAAN V IAC

G.R. No. L-69809 | October 16, 1986 | J. Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:

Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant’s
residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed
with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the
proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. That same morning, Laconico
telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the
direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.

When complainant called, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation
through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Twenty minutes later, complainant called again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the
conditions. Laconico answered ‘Yes’. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where
to deliver the money.

Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the
then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the
Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should
receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested
by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand
P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant
to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened
to the telephone conversation without complainant’s consent, complainant charged appellant and
Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No.
4200, which prompted petitioner to appeal. The IAC affirmed with modification hence the present
petition for certiorari.

Issue:

W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term “device or arrangement” under Rep. Act No. 4200

Held:

No. The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or arrangement” for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a
physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in
order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the
other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
“tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed
for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.
Gaanan vs IAC

GR L69809, October 16, 1986

Statutory Construction, Criminal Law

Facts:

Montebon filed a direct assault case against Leonardo Lanconico, which he later decided to withdraw.
His lawyer was Atty. Pintor, who called Lanconico initially to inform him about his client’s proposal to
withdraw the complaint. Lanconico then requested Atty. Gaanan, another lawyer, to secretly listen to
the conversation through a telephone extension. When Atty. Pintor called again to discuss the terms,
Atty. Gaanan heard the former enumerate the conditions which later served as the basis of a
robbery/extortion case against him. Atty. Pintor and Lanconico agreed that the former himself will
receive an amount of money at a certain place. Atty. Pintor was arrested by the time he received the
money.

Lanconico filed a case of robbery/extortion against Atty. Pintor, with an attached affidavit of Atty.
Gaanan stating what he heard. Atty. Pintor in turn charged the two with violation of the Anti -
Wiretapping law for listening to the telephone conversation without his consent.

Lanconico's Contention:

Pintor's Argument:

Issue: W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term “device or arrangement” under
RA 4200

Held:

No. A rule in statutory construction states that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature,
the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of
its parts.

The phrase “device or arrangement” in Section 1, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein,
should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments
the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. Hence, an extension
telephone is not in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in
RA 4200 because its use cannot be deemed as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. The
telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use.

Second, penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt such
as in this case, the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone.
6. In Re: Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Wenceslao Laureta and Contempt Preoceedings
Against Eva Maravilla Illustre GR No 68635 12 March 1987

Facts: Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent letters to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani
A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division. Ilustre using contemptuous
language claimed that members of the court rendered unjust decision on the case GR 68635: Eva
Maravilla Ilustre vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. Ilustre claimed that the Court acted unjustly when
Justice Pedro Yap failed to inhibit himself from participating when in fact he is a law-partner of the
defense counsel Atty Sedfrey Ordonez. On 27 October 1986, the Court en banc reviewed the history of
the case and found no reason to take action, stating that Justice Yap inhibited himself from the case
and was only designated as Chairman of First Division on 14 July 1986 after the resolution of dismissal
was issued on 14 May 1986. Petitioner again addressed letters to Justices Narvasa, Herrera and Cruz
with a warning of exposing the case to another forum of justice, to which she made true by filing an
Affidavit-Complaint to Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) on 16 Decemeber 1986. Atty. Laureta himself
reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the press. Tanodbayan dismissed petitioner’s
Complaint

Issue:

Decision: Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt and Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty
of grave professional misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law until further Orders.

Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak for
themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under
the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. The supremacy of the Supreme
Court’s judicial power is a restatement of the fundamental principle of separation of powers and
checks and balances under a republican form of government such that the three co-equal branches of
government are each supreme and independent within the limits of its own sphere. Neither one can
interfere with the performance of the duties of the other.
7. OPLE VS TORRES

[G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998]293 SCRA 141FACTS: Petitioner Senator Blas F. Ople assailed the
constitutionality of the

Administrative Order No. 308 entitled “Adoption of Computerized Identification Reference System” on
the following grounds:

1.) The administrative order issued by the executive is deemed to be a law and not a mere
administrative order thus it is a usurpation of legislative power of the congress to make laws, and

2.) It impermissibly intrudes the citizen’s constitutional right of privacy.

ISSUE: Does the Administrative Order No. 308 violates the constitutional right toprivacy?

HELD: Yes, the Administrative Order violates the constitutional right to privacy because its scope is
too broad and vague that will put people‟s right to privacy in clear and present danger if implemented.
The A.O. 308 also lacks of proper safeguards for protecting the information that will be gathered from
people through biometrics and other means. Thus, A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual‟s
liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable
unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-
incrimination; it may pave the way for “fishing expeditions” by government authorities and evade the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
8. Marquez vs. Disierto

G.R. No. 135882 June 27, 2001

FACTS: Respondent Ombudsman Desierto ordered petitioner Marquez to produce several bank
documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank
of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner is the branch manager.

The order is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado
Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture
Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI.

Petitioner wanted to be clarified first as to how she would comply with the orders without her breaking
any law, particularly RA. No. 1405.

ISSUE:
Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned account is
allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A. No.1405).

HELD: No.
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a
court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited
to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank
personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such
inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.
9. KMU v. The Director General (NEDA)
Validity of the Executive ID System The Facts President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order
(EO) No. 420 on April 13, 2005, directing all government agencies and government-owned and -
controlled corporations to adopt uniform data collection and format for their existing identification (ID)
systems. The Issues The issues were as follows: 1. Whether EO 420 was a usurpation of legislative power
by the President 2. Whether EO 420 infringed on the citizen’s right to privacy The Court’s Ruling First
Issue: Alleged Usurpation of Legislative Power Alleged Usurpation of Legislative Power Prior to the
issuance of EO 420, various government entities -- like the GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, Mayor’s Office, LTO and
PRC -- had already been recording data and issuing ID cards as part of their functions. The data they
collected and recorded were, however, disparate; and the IDs they issued, dissimilar. EO 420 directed all
government entities “issuing ID cards to their members or constituents” to “adopt a unified multi-
purpose ID system.” It enumerated the purposes of the uniform data collection and format; namely, to
reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, ensure compatibility, and provide convenience to the
people served by these entities. Under the uniform ID system, the data to be collected and recorded
would be limited to only 14 specific items: (1) name, (2) home address, (3) sex, (4) picture, (5) signature,
(6) date of birth, (7) place of birth, (8) marital status, (9) names of parents, (10) height, (11) weight, (12)
two index fingers and two thumbmarks, (13) any prominent distinguishing features like moles or others,
and (14) Tax Identification Number. Unifying the data collection and recording, as well as standardizing
the ID formats, would admittedly achieve substantial benefits; specifically, savings in terms of
procurement of equipment and supplies, compatibility in systems as to hardware and software, ease of
verification and thus increased reliability of data, and userfriendliness of a single ID format for all
government entities. The Supreme Court found that the achievement of a unified ID system for all the
entities concerned was purely an administrative matter that would not involve the exercise of legislative
power. It pointed to Section 17 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, according to which the “President
shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices.” The same section also mandated
the Chief Executive to “ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.” Certainly, under that constitutional
power of control, the President could direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions
under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format to achieve savings, efficiency,
reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. Of course, the President’s power of control is
limited to the executive branch of government and does not extend to the judiciary or to the
independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the judiciary; or to the
Comelec which, under existing laws, is also authorized to issue voter’s ID cards. This fact only shows that
EO 420 does not establish a national ID system, because legislation is needed to establish a single ID
system that will be compulsory for all branches of government. What will require legislation are three
aspects of a government-maintained ID card system: first, when the implementation of that system
requires a special appropriation, because there is none existing for the purpose; second, when the
system is compulsory for all branches of government, including the independent constitutional
commissions, as well as for all citizens whether or not they have any use for the ID card; third, when the
system requires the collection and recording of personal data beyond those routinely or usually required
for the purpose, such that the citizen’s right to privacy would be infringed. Second Issue: The Right to
Privacy The Right to Privacy All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities
have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their governmental functions. There have been no
complaints from citizens that these ID cards violate their right to privacy. Neither have there been
complaints of abuse by government entities in the collection and recording of personal identification
data. In fact, petitioners in the present cases did not claim that the ID systems of government entities
prior to EO 420 violated their right to privacy. Thus, they had even less basis for complaining against a
unified ID system under the executive order in question. The data collected and stored under EO 420
were to be limited to only 14 specific data, and the ID card itself would show only 8 of these. The right to
privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities. With the exception
of the eight specific data to be shown on an ID card, the personal data to be collected and recorded
under EO 420 shall be treated as “strictly confidential” under Section 6(d) of the executive order. These
data are to be considered not only strictly confidential, but also personal matters. As such, they shall be
exempt or outside the coverage of the people’s right to information, under Section 7 of Article III of the
Constitution on matters of public concern. Being matters that are private and not of public concern, the
data treated as “strictly confidential” under EO 420 cannot be released to the public or the press.
Compared with the personal medical data required for disclosure to the New York State in Whalen (cited
in the Dissent), the 14 specific data required for disclosure to the Philippine government under EO 420
are far less sensitive and far less personal. They are, in fact, routine for ID systems, unlike the sensitive
and potentially embarrassing medical records of patients taking prescription drugs. Whalen, therefore,
carries persuasive force for upholding the constitutionality of EO 420 as non-violative of the right to
privacy. Indeed, compared with the disclosures of personal data that the U.S. Supreme Court upheld in
Whalen, those required under EO 420 are far more benign. Hence, they cannot constitute any violation
of the right to privacy or be used to embarrass or humiliate anyone. Ople v. Torres was not the proper
authority on which to base the argument that EO 420 would violate the right to privacy. In that case the
assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground
that the subject matter required legislation. EO 420 applies only to government entities that, pursuant
to their regular functions under existing laws, already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards. It does not
grant these entities any power that they do not already possess under existing laws. Dissenting Opinion
In her Dissent, Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, joined by Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna, said that EO 420
constituted a usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch of government; infringed on
the citizenry’s right to privacy; and completely disregarded and violated the Decision of this Court in
Ople v. Torres. She said that Section 1 of Article VII of the Constitution, which respondents used as basis
for the issuance of EO 420, merely declared that “the executive power shall be vested in the President of
the Philippines.” The provision did not in any way permit a delegation of legislative power.
Notwithstanding respondents' avowal that EO 420 was merely an internal regulation to promote
efficiency in government operations and greater convenience for those transacting business with the
government, the unrestricted and unrestrained impact of a unified multipurpose ID system divested
itself of the pretensions of being an internal management issuance. As the term denoted, the
multipurpose ID card system could be utilized in any and all conceivable situations involving
governmental or even private transactions, as stated by the “Whereas” clause. The scope of its usage
was staggering and all-encompassing. With its ubiquitous application, its legal and practical
repercussions would not be confined solely to the corridors of the executive departments, but would
overflow even beyond. EO 420 vis-à-vis AO 308 EO 420 vis-à-vis AO 308 In Ople v. Torres, the Court
struck down Administrative Order (AO) 308 for being unconstitutional. It rejected the argument that the
Administrative Code of 1987 was merely being implemented by AO 308, which had established for the
first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. This system required a delicate
adjustment of various contending state policies: the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy
interest against dossier-gathering by the government, and the choice of policies, among others. Justice
Santiago, pointed out that, although AO 308 and EO 420 were couched differently, they were similar in
their effects and intent. As all government instrumentalities were required to adopt the proposed ID
system, its reach and extent became practically inescapable. In the words of Ople v. Torres, “no citizen
will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as
daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges.”
Right to Privacy Right to Privacy The right to privacy is the inalienable right of an individual to be let
alone. As a legal precept, it takes its bearing from common law, which recognizes a man’s house as his
castle -- impregnable, often even to its own officers engaged in the execution of its commands. In
Griswold v. Connecticut, [1] the U. S. Supreme Court laid down the constitutional foundations of the
right to privacy. Recognizing the need to protect basic constitutional rights, the U.S. Court applied them
against the states under the “Due Process” clause. It mandated a stricter scrutiny of laws interfering
with “fundamental personal rights” than for those regulating economic relations. In Whalen v. Roe, [2]
the US Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a law requiring physicians to identify patients
obtaining prescription drugs enumerated in the Controlled Substance Act of 1972 -- those with medical
application, but with potential for abuse. The names and addresses of the patients were required to be
recorded in a centralized computer file of New York State’s Department of Health. The law was found to
have complied with certain safeguards to the right to privacy, as follows: (1) while a person’s interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters was an aspect of the right to privacy, the law did not pose any
grievous threat of becoming violative of the Constitution; (2) the statute was necessary to assist in the
enforcement of a law designed to minimize the misuse of dangerous drugs; (3) the patient-identification
requirement was the product of an orderly and rational legislative decision made upon recommendation
by a commission, which had conducted hearings on the matter; (4) the law had been narrowly drawn
and contained several safeguards against indiscriminate disclosure; (5) it laid down the procedure for
the gathering, storage, and retrieval of the information to be collected; (6) it enumerated who were
authorized to access the data; and (7) it prohibited public disclosure of the data by imposing penalties
for its violation. Philippine jurisprudence on the right to privacy is at its infancy. With the exception of
Ople v. Torres, the more notable case is Morfe v. Mutuc in which the Court first recognized the
constitutional right to privacy as laid down in Griswold v. Connecticut. Justice Santiago noted that, as
computer technology and advanced information systems accelerated the erosion of personal privacy,
the individual’s ability to control the use of the information thus collected diminished. Aside from the
chilling prospect that one’s profile was being formed from the data gathered from various sources, there
was also the unsettling thought that those data might be inaccurate or outdated or, worse, misused.
There was therefore a pressing need to define the parameters for the use of electronic files or
information, to be properly initiated by a legislative act and not formulated in a mere executive order as
in the case of EO 420. Even granting that EO 420 constituted a valid exercise of executive power, Justice
Santiago opined that it must still be struck down. It had no specific and foolproof provision against the
invasion of the right to privacy, particularly that which dealt with indiscriminate disclosure. Neither did
the executive order contain any procedure for the gathering, storage, and retrieval of information;
enumeration of the persons who would be authorized to access the data; or sanctions to be imposed
against unauthorized use and disclosure. It failed to provide guidelines for handling subsequent and
additional data that would be accumulated when the ID was used for future governmental and private
transactions.
10. People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006
[FACTS]
This is a case of child who allegedly raped by her own father. The mother of the child abuse victim sent a
letter addressed to the Chief Justice expressing anxiety over the posting of full text decisions of the
Supreme Court on its Internet Web Page. The mother submitted that confidentiality and the best
interest of the child must prevail over public access to information and pleaded that her daughter’s case,
as well as those of a similar nature, be excluded from the Web Page. The Court required the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), National Press Club (NPC),
Philippine Press Institute (PPI), Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) and the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to comment on the issue:
The position of the OSG in its Comment is noteworthy. The OSG submits that the posting of the full text
of decisions in cases involving child abuse on the Supreme Court Web Page violates the right to privacy of
the aggrieved parties. In order to determine whether the subject matter upon which the right to privacy
being invoked falls within the constitutionally-protected zone of privacy, it must be shown that the
person’s expectation of privacy is reasonable. The reasonableness of such expectancy depends on a two–
part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2)
whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.
According to the OSG, the fact that the aggrieved child may have consented, through a parent or
guardian, to a public hearing of the case does not negate the expectation of privacy which the child may
later invoke because child victims cannot be presumed to have intended their initial agreement to extend
beyond the termination of their case to the posting of the decision reached by the Court on the Web
Page. Moreover, such an expectation of privacy is reasonable considering the various statutes and rules
which reveal the intention of the State to maintain the confidentiality of information pertaining to child
abuse cases.
The DSWD imparted the same sentiment. It submits that the court records of child abuse cases should be
treated with strict confidentiality not only throughout the court proceedings, but even after the
promulgation of the decision in order to protect the right to privacy of the child and her family and to
preclude instances where undue disclosure of information may impair the treatment and rehabilitation
of the child-victim.
The Court likewise appreciates the separate comments of the KBP and NPC. The KBP informs the Court
that its members have agreed not to identify in their broadcasts the names of children who are victims of
abuse or are in conflict with the law. The NPC, on the other hand, tells us that the prevailing media
practice is to inquire whether these individuals wish to have their names appear in the report. If they do
not, media would normally take off the names and merely provide a very general description of the
individual in recognition of the need to carefully balance the right to information with the welfare of the
parties involved.
ISSUE
Whether or not it is proper to post the full text of decisions of similar cases on the Supreme Court Web
Page in cases involving child sexual abuse.
HELD
This case presents an opportunity for the Court not only to once again dispense due requital for the
sufferings of a child who has been defiled by her own father, but also to effectuate the provisions of
Republic Act No. 7610 (RA 7610), otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, and its implementing rules, RA 9262, otherwise known as
the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, and its implementing rules, and our
own Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children.
The provisions on confidentiality of these enactments uniformly seek to respect the dignity and protect
the privacy of women and their children. Sec. 29 of RA 7610 provides:
Sec. 29. Confidentiality. — at the instance of the offended party, his name may be withheld from the
public until the court acquires jurisdiction over the case.
It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter or columnist in case of printed materials,
announcer or producer in the case of television and radio broadcasting, producer and director in the case
of the movie industry, to cause undue and sensationalized publicity of any case of a violation of this Act
which results in the moral degradation and suffering of the offended party.
Sec. 44 of RA 9262 similarly provides:
Sec. 44. Confidentiality.—All records pertaining to cases of violence against women and their children
including those in the barangay shall be confidential and all public officers and employees and public or
private clinics or hospitals shall respect the right to privacy of the victim. Whoever publishes or causes to
be published, in any format, the name, address, telephone number, school, business address, employer,
or other identifying information of a victim or an immediate family member, without the latter’s consent,
shall be liable to the contempt power of the court.
Any person who violates this provision shall suffer the penalty of one (1) year imprisonment and a fine of
not more than Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
Likewise, the Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children states:
Sec. 40. Privacy and confidentiality of proceedings.—All hearings of cases of violence against women and
their children shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the dignity of women and their children and
respect for their privacy.
Records of the cases shall be treated with utmost confidentiality. Whoever publishes or causes to be
published, in any format, the name, address, telephone number, school, business address, employer or
other identifying information of the parties or an immediate family or household member, without their
consent or without authority of the court, shall be liable for contempt of court and shall suffer the
penalty of one year imprisonment and a fine of not more than Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00)
Pesos.
Taking all these opinions into account and in view of recent enactments which unequivocally express the
intention to maintain the confidentiality of information in cases involving violence against women and
their children, in this case and henceforth, the Court shall withhold the real name of the victim-
survivor and shall use fictitious initials instead to represent her. Likewise, the personal circumstances of
the victims-survivors or any other information tending to establish or compromise their identities, as
well those of their immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed.
11. Camilo Sabio vs Richard Gordon

504 SCRA 704 – Political Law – Inquiry in aid of legislation – public officers

On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455 “directing
an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their
operations by their respective Board of Directors.” Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard
Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource persons in
the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior
commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the
Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose
is to ensure PCGG’s unhampered performance of its task. Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was
repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.

HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and
expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v.
Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the
executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of
government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and that
“the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate”. Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.

Article III, Section 7

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the
operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to
exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can
participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective
implementation.
12. EJERCITO v. SANDIGANBAYAN Case Digest

The Ombudsman has the power to issue subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum in relation
to cases pending before it.

FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman requested the Sandiganbayan to issue subpoena duces tecum
against the Urban Bank relative to the case against President Joseph Estrada.

Ms. Dela Paz, receiver of the Urban Bank, furnished the Office of the Ombudsman certified copies of
manager checks detailed in thesubpoena duces tecum. The Sandiganbayan granted the same.

However, Ejercito claims that the subpoenas issued by the Sandiganbayan are invalid and may not be
enforced because the information found therein, given their ―extremely detailed‖ character and could
only have been obtained by the Special Prosecution Panel through an illegal disclosure by the bank
officials. Ejercito thus contended that, following the ―fruit of the poisonous tree‖ doctrine, the
subpoenas must be quashed. Moreover, the ―extremely-detailed information obtained by the
Ombudsman from the bank officials concerned during a previous investigation of the charges against
him, such inquiry into his bank accounts would itself be illegal.

ISSUE: Whether or not subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum may be issued to order the
production of statement of bank accounts even before a case for plunder is filed in court

HELD: The Supreme Court held that plunder is analogous to bribery, and therefore, the exception to
R.A. 1405 must also apply to cases of plunder. The court also reiterated the ruling in Marquez v.
Desierto that before an in camera inspection may be allowed there must be a pending case before a
court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited
to the subject matter of pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction.

As no plunder case against then President Estrada had yet been filed before a court of competent
jurisdiction at the time the Ombudsman conducted an investigation, he concludes that the information
about his bank accounts were acquired illegally, hence, it may not be lawfully used to facilitate a
subsequent inquiry into the same bank accounts. Thus, his attempt to make the exclusionary rule
applicable to the instant case fails.

The high Court, however, rejected the arguments of the petitioner Ejercito that the bank accounts
which where demanded from certain banks even before the case was filed before the proper court is
inadmissible in evidence being fruits of poisonous tree. This is because the Ombudsman issued the
subpoenas bearing on the bank accounts of Ejercito about four months before Marquez was
promulgated on June 27, 2001. While judicial interpretations of statutes, such as that made in
Marquez with respect to R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, are deemed part of the
statute as of the date it was originally passed, the rule is not absolute. Thus, the Court referred to the
teaching of Columbia Pictures Inc., v. Court of Appeals, that: It is consequently clear that a judicial
interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, subject only to
the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and
more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should
not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith.
13. Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, 18 October 2011

Facts

Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter complaint alleging of an

anomaly taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent then formed a team and
issued a memo directing the team “to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan
Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”

Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers
were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSC’s
Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files
copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42
documents, were draft pleadings or lettersin connection with administrative cases in the CSC and
other tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order,
requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-
affidavit within five days from notice.

In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC Officials of
“fishing expedition” when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer.

He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees). He assailed the formal charge and filed an Omnibus Motion ((For Reconsideration, to
Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal
search which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court.

The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the petitioner’s answer to the charge.
In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution,
petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation which then proceeded ex
parte.

The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the CA which was dismissed by the
latter on the ground that it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. He filed
a motion for reconsideration which was further denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition.

Issue

WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the petitioner constituted an illegal search
and was a violation of his constitutional right to privacy
Ruling

The search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files was lawful and did
not violate his constitutional right.

Ratio Decidendi

In this case, the Court had the chance to present the cases illustrative of the issue raised by the
petitioner.

Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in
electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth
violated his right to privacy and constituted a “search and seizure”. Because the petitioner had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. Moreso, the concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Harlan noted that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold
requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).

Mancusi v. DeForte 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed2d 1154 (1968),thus “recognized that
employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police.”

O’Connor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court categorically declared that “[i]ndividuals do not
lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a private
employer.” In O’Connor the Court recognized that “special needs” authorize warrantless searches
involving public employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under
which government interests are weighed against the employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
This reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant requirement, which are
related to law enforcement.

Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and 161658,
November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 427, (citing Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 293
SCRA 141, 169), recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the
workplace.

The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and
computer files.

As to the second point of inquiry, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search authorized by the
CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer reasonable in its
inception and scope.

The Court noted that unlike in the case of Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales,
Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila A.M. Nos. P-08-2519 and P-08-2520, November 19,
2008, 571 SCRA 361, the case at bar involves the computer from which the personal files of the
petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government property the use of
which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor.