Fire Safety Journal 34 (2000) 297}309

Accommodating perceptions of risk in

performance-based building "re safety code
development
Armin Wolski , Nicholas A. Dembsey
*, Brian J. Meacham
Schirmer Engineering Corporation, 1850 Gateway Blvd, Concord, CA 94520, USA

Center for Fire Safety Studies, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, 100 Institute Road, Worcester, MA 01609, USA
Society of Fire Protection Engineers, 390 Main Street, Worcester, MA 01608, USA
Received 14 May 1999; received in revised form 15 December 1999; accepted 6 January 2000

Abstract

Di!ering perceptions of risk by various stakeholders have long played a role in in#uencing
the development of prescriptive-based building "re safety codes. As performance-based build-
ing "re safety codes are developed, di!ering perceptions of risk will continue to be a signi"cant
in#uence. In this paper, the concepts of revealed preference, risk factors, risk adjustment factors
and risk conversion factors are discussed, and two methods to address risk perceptions in
a performance-based building "re safety code are introduced. The "rst method proposes the use
of risk factors to classify buildings in terms such as low, medium, and high risk. Each class of
building would be assigned a risk adjustment factor. Similar to safety factors, risk adjustment
factors would be applied during deterministic building "re safety design to provide an increased
level of safety in buildings where the risk perceptions would mandate greater safety. The second
method would be used with a probabilistic-based building "re safety design approach, and uses
risk factors to develop risk conversion factors (RCFs). In the probabilistic approach, a max-
imum expected-risk-to-life (ERL) value would be established by the code, with appropriate
RCFs being applied to adjust maximum ERL values depending on how the building's "re safety
risk is perceived.  2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

In a democratic society, regulation is intended to address and satisfy the public

mandate for managing risks and bene"ts of a technology. Human values and

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: ndembsey@wpi.wpi.edu (N.A. Dembsey).

0379-7112/00/$ - see front matter  2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PII: S 0 3 7 9 - 7 1 1 2 ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 0 3 - 5
298 A. Wolski et al. / Fire Safety Journal 34 (2000) 297}309

perceptions in#uence the public mandate. How people perceive a risk in#uences their
preferences and risk tolerance levels. Preferring, or choosing one risky option over
another is an exercise in resolving a problem, known as a `risk-problema [1]. The
strategy taken to manage a problem is in#uenced by the perceived impact. Risk-
problems with rare but catastrophic potential, for example, are perceived much
di!erently than frequent but ordinary risk-problems [2]. Regulators ought to be
cognizant of how such varied perceptions can a!ect public preferences [3,4].
Building "re safety regulation establishes a standard for building design that is
intended to provide an acceptable level of risk from "re in buildings. In order to
provide an acceptable level of risk that meets the public mandate, a building "re safety
code should accommodate social perceptions of risk. The concept of `revealed
preference,a an assessment of the risks people have accepted in the past, can assist in
understanding and addressing di!ering perceptions of risk [5].
Although some have indicated that the concept of revealed preference has some
shortcomings [6], this paper proposes that it can provide a starting point in address-
ing and accommodating perceptions of risk in the development of a performance-
based building "re safety code. In this paper, following a discussion on perceptions of
risk and building "re safety, two methods are suggested for building code developers
in order that perceptions of risk in a performance-based building "re safety code are
addressed.

2. Perceptions of risk

Risk-problems are "ltered through human perceptions [7]. People react di!erently
to di!erent types of risk-problems. Catastrophic "res are perceived di!erently than
ordinary "res. When in a given year, 10 occupants die in a single "re, the event is
perceived as less acceptable than when 10 independent "res cause the death of one
individual at each occurrence. In addition, risk-problems with a clear perception of
bene"t di!er from those with hidden bene"ts. Voluntary risk-problems di!er from
non-voluntary risk-problems. At least 40 di!erent risk factors that describe the spec-
trum of risk perception have been identi"ed [8,9]. These perceptions of risk in#uence
society and the public mandate for regulation, including building "re safety regula-
tions.

2.1. Perceptions of risk in prescriptive building xre safety

Through trial and error, the evolutionary process in prescriptive building "re
safety regulations has adjusted to balance the various perceived risks and bene"ts of
building innovations. For example, as catastrophes have occurred, the prescriptive
building code system has been pressured to adjust code requirements to re#ect new
social mandates [10]. This trial and error approach, characteristic of the prescriptive
codes, is referred to in the literature as a `bootstrappinga approach to an acceptable
risk-problem [1]. In bootstrapping-type approaches to risk-problems, the level of
implied risk tolerated in the past is a basis to evaluate the acceptability of proposed
 A. Wolski et al. / Fire Safety Journal 34 (2000) 297}309 299

risk-problems. As new risks, new bene"ts, new technology or new hazards are realized,
adjustments are made (to the regulations) to manage the new characteristics. The
prescriptive bootstrapping approach to building "re safety has indirectly accommod-
ated di!erent risk perceptions by adjusting or changing the regulations over time.
Characteristic of the bootstrapping approach, amendments to the prescriptive
building "re safety model codes are published every year [11]. The amendments are
part of the evolutionary approach to managing the building "re safety risk-problem.
New code sections are introduced or existing sections are modi"ed over the years
based on perceived risks and bene"ts of innovations, new knowledge, or a change in
values. For example, internal #oor openings were traditionally assumed to add to
the risk of building "re spread. With the introduction of architectural design concepts
such as atria (an aesthetic bene"t), #oor-opening hazards were balanced with new
`innovativea protective strategies that included sprinkler and smoke control systems
[12]. E!ectively, the risk of the #oor openings was managed di!erently based on new
information and new technology. The perceived risks presented by the atrium were
balanced with the perceived architectural bene"t and (bene"cial) reliability provided
by "re safety technology. Those elements are indirect and direct considerations in the
development of requirements and allowances for atria.
Generally, the representative bootstrapping system of the prescriptive code in-
herently accommodates perceptions of risk. Compare single family home require-
ments to high-rise building "re safety requirements in the Uniform Building Code
[13]. For new single-family homes, the codes require few "re protection measures. The
codes permit (from a "re safety viewpoint) almost any building material to be used,
minimal levels of `locala smoke detection, and only in some cases a second exit from
an upper #oor. In comparison, high-rise o$ce buildings over 75 ft in height require
protection features including "re resistive building materials, a "re alarm and occu-
pant noti"cation system, a sprinkler system, smoke control equipment, a special
elevator control system, and emergency power. Although much attention is given to
the high-rise o$ce building "re protection, approximately 60% of civilian "re deaths
occur in homes and garages [10]. Why is there so much more safety in high-rise
buildings when there is so much more risk in single family homes? The discrepancy of
the level of protection is due to perceptions of risk. The single-family home "re risk is
perceived as ordinary and the high-rise "re risk is perceived as catastrophic [14]. The
public demands greater risk reduction from catastrophic risks. Requiring signi"cantly
more safety (less risk) in high-rise buildings than in detached homes is evidence of the
prescriptive code accommodating perceptions of risk.
Perceived control [15] is another human factor that can help explain how the code
addresses risk perceptions. Single family homes have less regulated "re safety because
owner/occupants are willing to accept higher risks; the owner/occupants perceive
control. The owner/occupants have control of the amount and type of smoke detec-
tion they install, and perceive control of common ignition sources [16] such as
heating systems and cigarette smoking. On the other hand, in rental properties such as
apartments, occupants have less control. A renter cannot easily change the "re
protection system in his/her building, nor do they have control of the "re safety
`practicesa of a neighbor. Prescriptive regulations accommodate this lack of control
300 A. Wolski et al. / Fire Safety Journal 34 (2000) 297}309

through more rigorous "re protection provisions. Apartment houses often require
more protection (detection, sprinklers) than do single-family homes [17].
A third example is the sprinkler retro"t regulations in many major US cities. In the
1970s and 1980s, many major jurisdictions (i.e., Los Angeles, Boston) required the
retro"t of automatic "re sprinkler systems in high-rise occupancies such as o$ces and
hotels [18]. High-rise condominiums were exempted. Occupants in high-rise o$ce
buildings and hotels have no control of their building's design. Occupants in condo-
miniums own their units, and, as an association, have collective control of the "re
safety systems installed in their building. The issue of control may explain why society
did not see a `needa to regulate and increase safety in condominiums.

3. Quantifying perceptions of risk in a performance-based building 5re safety code

The system of prescriptive codes has indirectly accommodated social values and
risk perceptions in the attempt to provide an acceptable solution to the building "re
safety risk-problem. In order to accommodate the society's desire for the appropriate
level of risk, a performance-based building "re safety code should also accommodate
perceptions of risk. Because a performance-based code is anticipated to be based on
a quanti"able approach, human perceptions of risk should be quanti"ed.

3.1. Quantifying human perceptions with risk factors

Risk-problems can be described in terms of human attitudes. A risk can be

categorized in terms of human factors, or risk factors such as `controla or `volitiona or
`severitya [17]. As one example, `severitya is a risk factor that describes how the
consequence of a risk is perceived. A risk can be perceived to be associated with
ordinary (small) consequences. For example, an ordinary risk may entail minor
injuries to one person. The "re risk in a single family home may be considered as
ordinary. Alternatively, a given risk could be perceived to have catastrophic conse-
quence potential. The "re risk of a high-rise building may be perceived as potentially
catastrophic, and, of course there are risks that fall somewhere between these two
cases such as a low-rise apartment building "re risk. Risk factors can also be
combined to describe a risk-problem: a "re risk-problem can involve catastrophic
and voluntary factors (visiting a crowded nightclub) or involuntary and ordinary
factors (living in public housing next door to a smoker). It has been suggested that
these factors: `control,a `severity,a `volition,a etc., can be narrowed. Litai [8] re-
duced/simpli"ed the original forty factors to nine, see Table 1.
Each risk factor is associated with a scale. The endpoints for each risk factor scale
are described in the right-hand side of Table 1 and can be thought of as opposite ends
of the scale. Any single risky action could have one or more risk factors associated
with it. In characterizing a risky action with the risk factors, the action would fall at
one end or the other on each risk factor scale. For example, if one is driving a car,
several risk factors come into play. Among them are controllability and severity.
These two risk factors are also associated with being a commercial airline passenger.
 A. Wolski et al. / Fire Safety Journal 34 (2000) 297}309 301

Table 1
Risk factors. Nine risk factors that can be used to describe the public attitude towards di!erently perceived
risks [8,9]

Risk factors Scale

Volition Voluntary}involuntary
Severity Ordinary}catastrophic
E!ect manifestation Immediate}delayed
Familiarity Common (old)}dread (new)
Controllability Controllable}uncontrollable
Bene"t Clear}unclear
Necessity Necessary}luxury
Exposure pattern Continuous}occasional
Origin Natural}man}made

When driving a car, one perceives signi"cant control of the risk. As far as the risk
factor controllability is concerned, driving a car is on the controllable end of the
scale. As a passenger in an airplane one perceives almost no control of the risk
which would be considered an uncontrollable risk, at the other end of the scale.
Furthermore, the risk of accident in a car is perceived as `ordinarya severity while
that of airplane transportation is perceived as potentially catastrophic severity. In
this way risk factors can be used to characterize and help explain how risks are
perceived.
The relative di!erences of how people feel about these risk factors explain why
people desire more or less safety. In Anatomy of Risk, Rowe suggests that the relative
di!erences can be proportioned mathematically [2]. One could say that the accept-
able level of risk for automobile transportation is `xa times more acceptable than that
of being a passenger in a commercial plane. In a building "re safety example, it is
expected that people want more safety when in a high-rise hotel, where they perceive
less control and a greater potential for catastrophic consequences, than in their
single-family homes. Therefore, the level of acceptable "re life safety risk in a single-
family home will be `ya times greater than in a high-rise hotel.
Litai furthered the idea of proportioning the spectrum of risk factors. He used
historical data to develop an `acceptable risk distributiona for the risk factors in
Table 1 [8]. Activities that represented the extremes on the spectrum of each risk
factor were analyzed. The data collected represented what levels of risk society have
historically accepted. For example, the risk of death from earthquakes and the risk of
an industrial plant accident were collected. These two risks represent the two extremes
associated with the factor `Origin.a One risk is at one end of the scale (Natural) and
the other is at the other end of the scale (Man-Made). As another example, ordinary,
voluntary risks such as surgery were compared to ordinary, involuntary risks, such as
homicide. The data were reduced to terms of the mortality-probability per person per
year. By using risk activities that were very distinct and on opposite ends of risk factor
scales, Litai could identify mean-accepted-risk levels on a risk factor basis. They are
shown in matrix form in Table 2.
 302

Table 2
Mean-accepted-risk levels for various risk factors [8]. This table is intended to be used as a matrix. Depending on what risk factors are associated with a given
risk, the mean-acceptable-risk-of-death per person per year can be identi"ed. For example, risk factors for an assumed risk to life from "re in an o$ce building
can be described as: uncontrollable, catastrophic, immediate, man-made, voluntary and old. From the table, the mean-acceptable-risk-level for this type of risk is
1;10\

Controllable risk Uncontrollable risk

Ordinary Catastrophic Ordinary Catastrophic

Immediate Delayed risk Immediate Delayed risk Immediate Delayed risk Immediate Delayed risk
risk risk risk risk

Man made Involuntary Old risk 1.3;10\ 4;10\ 5;10\ 1.5;10\ 3;10\ 1;10\ 1;10\ 1;10\
hazard
Man made Involuntary New risk 1.3;10\ 4;10\ 5;10\ 1.5;10\ 3;10\ 1;10U 1;10\ 3;10\
hazard
Man made Voluntary Old risk 1.3;10\ 4;10\ 5;10\ 1.5;10\ 3;10\ 1;10\ 1;10\ 3;10\
hazard
Man made Voluntary New risk 1.3;10\ 4;10\ 5;10\ 1.5;10\ 3;10\ 1;10\ 1;10\ 3;10\
hazard
A. Wolski et al. / Fire Safety Journal 34 (2000) 297}309

Natural Involuntary Old risk 1.3;10\ 1;10\ 1;10\ NA 6;10\ 2;10\ 2;10\ NA
hazard
 A. Wolski et al. / Fire Safety Journal 34 (2000) 297}309 303

Table 3
Risk conversion factors (RCFs) [8,9]. RCF values provide a mathematical means to convert between the
opposite ends of risk factor scales. For example, a voluntary risk is 100 times more acceptable than an
involuntary risk

Risk factors and their scales RCF values

Voluntary}involuntary 100
Ordinary}catastrophic 30
Immediate}delayed 30
Common (old)}dread (new) 10
Controllable}uncontrollable 5}10
Clear bene"t}unclear bene"t Risk is roughly proportional to the third power of its bene"t. [26]
Necessary}luxury 1
Continuous}occasional 1
Natural}man-made 20

Litai suggested that the matrix (Table 2) can be used to compare di!erently
perceived risks, using the values in the matrix, he calculated a set of risk conversion
factors (RCFs). The RCF is the mathematical di!erence from one end of a risk
factor scale to the opposite end. For example, reading from Table 2, the accepted
mean value of a controllable, ordinary, immediate, man-made, involuntary old risk is
1.3;10\. Comparing this risk to one that is characterized as controllable, cata-
strophic, immediate, man-made, involuntary old risk provides a mean value of
5;10\. (The only di!erence between the two risks is severity.) The di!erence
between these two risks can be compared. The ordinary risk is roughly 30 times
[(1.3;10\)/(5;10\) "26] more `acceptablea than the catastrophic risk. Litai and
Rasmussen [9] approximated risk conversion factors (RCFs) for each category of risk
factor. See Table 3.
In order to understand RCFs, one should envision that each risk factor is asso-
ciated with its own scale. The RCF for the risk factor `describesa the distance between
the extreme and opposite ends of each scale. Take the risk factor `volitiona scale as an
example. At one end of the scale is `a very voluntary risk,a and at the other end is `a
very involuntary risk.a A very voluntary risk is 100 times more acceptable than a very
involuntary risk. The RCFs can provide a quantitative di!erence as to how one risk is
perceived when compared to another.
As discussed previously, in the realm of building "re safety, people desire di!erent
levels of risk from di!erent types of occupancies. Because the various occupancies
re#ect di!ering risk factors, the RCFs have application to typical building occu-
pancies. This suggests that a 5}10 times greater level of risk will be accepted from an
occupancy where a person perceives control than from an occupancy where the
person lacks control. In a performance-based building "re safety code, RCFs can
assist in quantifying the relative levels of safety required in di!erent types of buildings
or occupancies based on perception.
304 A. Wolski et al. / Fire Safety Journal 34 (2000) 297}309

4. Two proposed methods for using risk factors in a performance-based

building 5re safety code

Regulatory developers can include the concept of risk factors either qualitatively or
quantitatively in a performance-based building "re safety code. Two methods are
suggested for how this might be accomplished.

4.1. Method 1

Prescriptive code requirements are currently grouped by building occupancy type;

in a performance-based code, di!erent occupancies and di!erent buildings can be
distinguished in terms of risk factors. For example, analogous to the Performance
Requirements for Fire Safety by the Nordic Committee on Building Regulations,
occupancies can be "rst categorized, then grouped in safety classes [19]. In the Nor-
dic document, the safety classes are de"ned as: low, normal, high, and extra high.
The performance requirements for stability of a building are based on safety class.
A building with a low safety class is required to retain its stability and load bearing
capacity for at least the time required for escape whereas a building classi"ed as extra
high is required to maintain its load bearing capacity during an entire "re sequence.
The risk factors can be used to categorize the safety class of the building. A building
can be designated in the low safety class if the "re risk to the occupants can be
represented by factors such as non-catastrophic and controllable. A building desig-
nated as a high safety class would be one in which the "re safety system is out of the
occupant's control, and the building's character presents a potentially catastrophic
"re consequence. For example, a one-story o$ce building would be considered in
a normal safety class because the risk is perceived as ordinary, uncontrollable, but
voluntary. An opera house may be considered in a high safety class because the "re
risk is perceived as catastrophic, uncontrollable, and voluntary. A performance-based
code can either establish guidelines for classifying buildings in terms of safety classes
(which may be necessary for multi-use buildings) or, like in the nordic code, establish
classes based on current occupancy groups and perceived risk factors.
This classi"cation system can be used to establish risk adjustment factors to be used
in deterministic designs. These factors can be applied to the results of evacuation or
"re modeling in the performance-based analysis of a building. A deterministic exiting
analysis from a high safety class occupancy will require a greater factor of safety than
a low safety class occupancy. For example, a typical deterministic performance-based
design analysis indicates time required for occupants to escape and compares this to
time to reach untenable conditions for those occupants. In a successful design, the
time to escape is less than time to reach untenable conditions. This can be mathemat-
ically expressed as
t #t #t (t , (1)
   
where t is the time to manual or automatic "re detection, t is the waiting time or
 
occupant delay time, t is the occupant required exiting time, t is the time to reach
 
untenable conditions.
 A. Wolski et al. / Fire Safety Journal 34 (2000) 297}309 305

Depending on the class that a given building falls into, a risk adjustment factor
b can be established and applied to the formula
b(t #t #t )(t . (2)
   
As an example, a building that is deemed as Low Safety Class b"1.0, and for
a building in a high safety class b'1.0. In a higher safety class building, for increased
safety, occupants would require quicker noti"cation time and more e$cient exiting
capacity. A higher safety building is likely therefore to have smoke or "re detection
systems and increased number of exits. The risk adjustment factor could be further
combined with uncertainty factors associated with the deterministic tools to provide
the appropriate overall safety factor.

4.2. Method 2

In a more sophisticated approach, where a probabilistic-based calculation is used

to determine the level of safety provided in a building design, RCFs may be directly
incorporated into the building code. In terms of probability, the building code would
document the maximum risk to life allowed in buildings. The Australia Fire Engineer-
ing Guidelines provides a discussion on how a probabilistic approach may be used in
a performance-based building "re safety design [20]. The guidelines suggest a method
for building designers to calculate the expected-risk-to-life (ERL) for a given building.
Under such a probabilistic approach, the design team is responsible for designing
a building with the appropriate safety features such that the ERL is less than a given
maximum. Assume that a high-rise o$ce building is designed with one exit stair and
a complete automatic "re sprinkler system. The designers would perform an ERL
analysis and compare their results to the maximum ERL allowed in the code. If the
risk in their building design exceeds the maximum ERL allowed, then additional
safety features such as smoke detection may need to be added.
In this approach, various types of buildings would be required by the code to have
di!erent maximum ERLs. The ERL would be established mathematically using the
RCFs. For example, a baseline goal of risk to life from "res in buildings can be set at
1;10\ person/yr for single-family homes. Single-family homes are deemed to have
controllable "re risk. A single-story o$ce building, where occupants do not have
control, according to Table 3 would require an ERL that is ten times less risky than
single-family homes. This translates to an acceptable risk of 1;10\. The ERL for
auditoriums or high-rise buildings that are deemed to have other risk characteristics
such as `catastrophica can be further adjusted based on the RCFs in Table 3.
For example, assume a high-rise o$ce building "re risk may be characterized
by the authorities as: catastrophic, uncontrollable, and dreaded. How many times
riskier is the high-rise building risk perceived over a single family home? Dividing the
base case by the various RCFs taken from Table 3 gives an ERL for a high-rise o$ce
building:
ER¸"(Base Risk)(RCF Catastrophic)\(RCF ;ncontrollable)\(RCF Dread)\
. (3)
306 A. Wolski et al. / Fire Safety Journal 34 (2000) 297}309

This translates to
ER¸"(1;10\)(30)\(10)\(10)\"3;10\. (4)
The ERL is considered the maximum code required ERL and is compared to the
designer's calculated ERL. (The ERL would be calculated based on framework
provided by engineering design guidelines.) The design team would be required to
design a high-rise building such that its ERL is less than 3;10\. If the design ERL is
less than the required ERL, the building satis"es the code.
There are two ways that code developers can implement the concept of RCFs
in the performance-based code system. As the building code is written, the authors
of the code can establish maximum ERLs for di!erent building types and occupancies,
much like occupancy groups. The maximum ERLs would therefore be published
as `codea. Another option is less stringent and perhaps even more `performance-
based designa oriented. Instead of setting ERLs, the building code can guide autho-
rities (building and "re departments) such that they may apply the risk factors
and establish an ERL on a case-by-case basis. This would require the autho-
rities having jurisdiction to evaluate every proposed performance-based designed
building for each of the nine risk factors. Or in special cases, where a variety of
occupancies are considered in a given building, the required ERL may be discussed
and agreed upon in pre-design meetings between authorities having jurisdiction and
design teams.

5. Potential criticisms and additional work necessary

Not surprisingly, the methods that rely on relative risk perceptions have limitations.
Potential criticisms would be similar to those in the revealed preference literature. The
following outlines some potential criticisms and some additional work necessary to
increase viability for direct use in developing performance-based building "re safety
codes:

1. The use of revealed preference to establish accurate perceptions of risk today can
only provide an estimate in the level of acceptable risk. The data collected and
reduced by Litai [8] in 1980, conceptually similar to methods used by Starr [23],
are based on historic data, and do not re#ect necessarily the perceptions of today.
In fact, human values will change with education, standard of living, and the
introduction of new technologies. For example, it may be argued that the successful
history of sprinkler systems has altered people's perceptions and expectations of
"re safety.
2. The studies on expressed preference by Slovic [21] have shown that, when ques-
tioned explicitly, people may request a di!erent level of protection than shown
by the method of revealed preference. However, the use of expressed preference is
also problematic. The public may not be aware when asked expressly what level of
risk they want because they do not consider all of the bene"ts or all of the
options. In building "re safety, the media has been faulted for misrepresenting
 A. Wolski et al. / Fire Safety Journal 34 (2000) 297}309 307

building "re safety risks and bene"ts [22]. Media misrepresentations of risk-
problems have been shown, by Kasperson and others [23,24] to also a!ect people's
judgment.
3. Some may argue that the proposed method generalizes the acceptable level of risk
across the entire society. An individual may choose a level of risk di!erent than
society. This discrepancy is a limitation for any regulation. In acknowledging
controllable versus uncontrollable risks and dread versus familiar, the proposed
methods alleviate some issues of individual versus society risk criticism better than
the current methods.
4. The risk values in Table 2 are incomplete. Additional work is necessary to
quantitatively account for remaining risk conversion factors. Some factors may
be more easily incorporated into building "re safety regulation than others. The
impact of perceived bene"t is important in any risk-problem including building
"re safety. For example, building codes in the United States often require that as
building renovations are performed, a buildings' "re protection and exiting systems
require improvement. In providing such "re protection improvements, the archi-
tectural integrity may be negatively impacted. In some historic buildings, this can
be a severe issue. Therefore, US prescriptive codes have often permitted historic
buildings to be exempt. This helps retain the architectural aesthetic bene"ts often at
the `expensea of higher risk. As a more concrete example, it can be argued that
there is clearer bene"t to retain the architectural integrity of a historical structure
(such as the House of Congress in Washington, DC) than it would be on a random
#oor in the World Trade Center in New York. Assume that additional "re
protection features a!ect the aesthetics of both buildings. When deciding on how
much "re protection is necessary, a higher life safety risk may be accepted as part of
the renovation program of the Houses of Congress than during a renovation
program in the World Trade Center.
5. The basis for the methods stems from historical mortality data. There is more to life
than just not dying. The building "re safety risk-problem has unique complexities.
In building "re safety, occupants are subject to injury and property is subject to
damage. The proposed method is currently limited to a code that regulates
occupant safety from mortal "res. Future work may include investigation on how
a life safety-based code can incorporate issues of injury or institutional property
protection requirements.
6. Classi"cation of buildings or occupancies may be di$cult. How voluntary is
a workplace? This can become even more complex when comparing an employee
to a customer. In a public building, an employee may perceive more control
regarding the "re risks than a customer may. Yet, a higher degree of volition may
be associated with a customer. The de"nition of catastrophe is contentious. Rowe
[2] and others have suggested that an event with 10 or more deaths is considered
`catastrophic.a The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has suggested
that a catastrophic "re is one that causes 5 or more deaths in residential properties
or three or more deaths in non-residential properties [25].
7. For Method 1, no speci"c risk adjustment factors have yet been de"ned. Further
work is necessary in this area to develop a classi"cation system and the risk
308 A. Wolski et al. / Fire Safety Journal 34 (2000) 297}309

adjustment factors. Relative di!erence between the RCFs may provide guidance in
developing di!erent adjustment factors for the di!erent types of buildings.
8. Method 2 assumes that there is an agreed upon `basea ERL already established.
Further work may be necessary to develop a socially agreeable base ERL and
a reliable way for designers to calculate an ERL for all types of buildings, including
mixed-use buildings.

Just as Starr noted in the 20-yr retrospective on introducing the concept of revealed
preference, with new methods come limitations and criticisms. These proposed
methods hopefully open the door to addressing building "re safety as a risk-problem
that is a!ected by human perceptions [26].

6. Conclusions and summary

Perceptions of risk in#uence regulations. Just as prescriptive building "re safety

codes have an indirect method to accommodate perceptions of risk, a quantitative
performance-based building "re safety code should also have a method. The concept
of revealed preference [5] as presented in the literature on acceptable risk is useful for
developing quanti"able methods to accommodate perceptions of risk in a perfor-
mance-based building "re safety code. Two methods outline di!erent ways percep-
tions of risk can be incorporated into a performance-based building "re safety code.
The "rst method, analogous to a proposal by the Nordic Committee on Building
Regulations [19], uses human risk attitudes (risk factors) to classify buildings based
on risk perceptions. Depending on the building's classi"cation, the proposed method
suggests the use of di!erent risk adjustment factors when applying deterministic "re
modeling results to a building analysis. A `highera safety class means that a `highera
risk adjustment factor is applied to the results. This in turn results in a safer building
environment where a safer environment is perceived as necessary. The second method
is useful in probability/risk-based approaches where the expected-risk-to-life (ERL) is
calculated and compared to a maximum ERL established by the building code. Risk
conversion factors [8], mathematical means to accommodate human attitudes to-
wards risk, are suggested as a means to adjust maximum code-prescribed ERLs
depending on how the occupancy type or building risk is perceived. With some
re"nement, a performance-based code framework based either on deterministic tools
or risk analyses can use these methods to address social perceptions of risk.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to express thanks to the Society of Fire Protection
Engineers (SFPE) Educational and Scienti"c Foundation for partial support in this
e!ort. The authors would also like to thank Professor Robert Fitzgerald at Worcester
Polytechnic Institute for his assistance and Jeanne Kasperson at Marsh Library,
Clark University for help in navigating through the risk literature.
 A. Wolski et al. / Fire Safety Journal 34 (2000) 297}309 309

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