LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY.

IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent

A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000

FACTS:

Facts of the case:

Leslie Ui filed an administrative case for disbarment against Atty. IrisBonifacio on grounds of
immoral conduct. Atty. Bonifacio allegedly is having an illicit relationship with Carlos Ui,
husband of Leslie Ui, whom they begot two children. Accordingto petitioner, Carlos Ui admitted
to him about the relationship between them and Atty.Bonifacio. This led Leslie Ui to confront
said respondent to stop their illicit affair but to no avail. According however to respondent, she is
a victim in the situation. When respondent met Carlos Ui, she had known him to be a bachelor
but with children to an estranged Chinese woman who is already in China. Moreover, the two got
married in Hawaii, USA therefore legalizing their relationship. When respondent knew of the
real status of Carlos Ui, she stopped their relationship. Respondent further claims that she and
Carlos Ui never lived together as the latter lived with his children to allow them to gradually
accept the situation.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent can be disbarredon the ground of immorality.

RULING:
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of
the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked,
subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal
ethics.
That one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good
moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a
requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a
ground for the revocation of such privilege.
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she
knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and
as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true
civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him. Circumstances existed which should have at least aroused
respondents suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved
her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had
children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest
effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their
marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that
is simply incomprehensible considering respondents allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in
courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in
managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui,
clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered
immoral.
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain
from adulterous relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards."
Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil
status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting
the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession.
The complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality,
is hereby DISMISSED.
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to
1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

FACTS:
Congress passed Republic Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act in 1952. The
title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and
including 1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-1951…………. 70%
1952……………….. 71%
1953……………….. 72%
1954……………….. 73%
1955……………….. 74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “ A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject
shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/s shall be included in the
computation of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A No. 972 is unconstitutional.

RULING:

Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title
of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar
examinations. Section 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck
down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take into account of the fact that laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary.

Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the
legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because
they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and
third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has
already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
In re application of MARIO GUARIÑA for admission to the bar.
G.R. No. L-1179 January 8, 1913
FACTS:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks
admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the
office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
The applicant took and failed to pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining
board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the
various branches of legal learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of
the required percentage of 75.
It is contended that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of
right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion before
the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the office
of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes.
The clause "may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without and
examination" should be construed so as to mean "shall be licensed to practice law in the
Philippine Islands without an examination." It is contended that this mandatory construction is
imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the
candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.

ISSUE: Whether section 2 of Act No. 1597 is mandatory.

Ruling:

"In construing a doubtful or ambiguous statute, the courts will presume that it was the intention
of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible, and just law, and one which should change the prior
law no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the act in question.
The construction should be in harmony with this assumption whenever possible."
The word "may" may be construed as either mandatory or permissive in its effect. But to
construe it as mandatory would bring it in direct conflict with the Act of Congress, and we
conclude therefore, despite the contentions of the applicant as to the apparent intention of the
legislator, that it should be given its permissive and not its mandatory effect, and that the true
intention of the legislator was to leave it within the discretion of the court to admit to the bar
without examination the officials mentioned in the Act in any case wherein the court is otherwise
satisfied that they possess the necessary qualifications.
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and
never had been a practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his
appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the
required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his deficiency on that occasion, we do not think that his
appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof of his possession of the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for
license to practice in the courts of the Philippines should be denied.
In the matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee, Haron S. Meiling in the 2002 bar
examinations and for disciplinary action as member of Philippine Shari'a Bar, Melendrez.

FACTS:

Melendrez filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S.
Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate
disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
Alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has
three (3) pending criminal cases both for Grave Oral Defamation and for Less Serious Physical
Injuries.
i. Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez
and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people.
ii. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’
wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his communications, as Secretary to
the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
MELING explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases because retired Judge Corocoy
Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle misunderstanding. Believing in good faith
that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them,
considered the three cases that arose from a single incident as “closed and terminated.”
i. Denies the charges and added that the acts do not involve moral
turpitude.
Use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the
word “Attorney” as they were typed by the office clerk. Office of Bar Confidant disposed of the
charge of non-disclosure against Meling:
Meling should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a
retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending. Even
if these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to
ascertain his good moral character.

ISSUE:
WON Meling’s act of concealing cases constitutes dishonesty. YES.

HELD:
PETITION IS GRANTED. MEMBERSHIP IS SUSPENDED until further orders from the
Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron
S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the
Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic (Meling did not
pass the bar).

Rule 7.01: “A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing
a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.”
He is aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as
“attorney” whoever may have typed the letters. Unauthorized use of the appellation “attorney”
may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.
PRACTICE OF LAW IS A HIGH PERSONAL PRIVILEGE. Limited to citizens of good moral
character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. Requirement of
good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper
administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
Application form of 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant that applicant to aver that he
or she “has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation
before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by
any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending
case or charge against him/her.”
Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes
concealment, done under oath at that.
Zoreta v. Simpliciano
A.C. No. 6492. November 18, 2004.

FACTS:
Complainant Melanio L. Zoreta alleged that he filed a complaint for Breach of COntract and
Damaes against Security Pacific Assurance COrporation (SPAC) dated 22 June 2001 due to the
latter’s failure to honor SPAC’s Commercial Vehicle Policy No. 94286, where respondent Atty.
Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano was the latter’s counsel. In said cases, respondent who was not a
dully commissioned Notary Public in 2002 per Certifications issued by teh CLerk of Court of
Quezon City Mercedes S. Gatmaytan, performed acts of notarization, as evidenced by presented
documents.
ISSUE:
WON respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility under the Rules of Court.
RULING:
Yes. For one, performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath
to obey the laws (i.e. Notarial Law). Then, too, b making it appear that he is duly commissioned
when he is not, he is indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly
proscribes. “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct,
“Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility). The lawyer violates,
likewise, Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and
CRISPULO DUCUSIN, respondents.
A.C. No. 3910. August 14, 2000

FACTS:
Complainant alleged that on October 29, 1991, respondent Villalon, as counsel for the family of
complainant, spoke to the father of complainant and asked that he be given the title over a
property owned by complainant located in Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal and covered by TCT No. M-
3023, Emancipation Patent No. 410414, because he allegedly had to verify the proper
measurements of the subject property. However, complainant and his family were surprised
when several people entered the subject property and, when confronted by the companions of
complainant, the latter were told that they were workers of Canares and were there to construct a
piggery.

Complainant then filed a case for ejectment against respondent Canares. In his Reply however,
the latter answered that the subject property was already sold by complainant to respondent
Canares in the amount of P450,000.00 as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property .
Jose Ducat, Jr. wrote[5] to this Court and averred that he neither signed the Deed of Sale covering
the subject property nor did he appear before the notary public Crispulo Ducusin, who notarized
the same. He averred that respondents Villalon and Ducusin should be disbarred from the
practice of law and respondent Villalon be imprisoned for forging his signature and selling the
subject property without his consent.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be disbarred.

RULING:
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be
disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor,
thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily
reposed by clients require in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to them. To
this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to
lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the
profession.
It has been established that the subject parcel of land, with an area of five (5) hectares located in
Barrio Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal, is owned by and registered in the name of complainant herein,
Jose Ducat, Jr. Respondent Villalon insists nonetheless that the property was orally given to him
by complainants father, Jose Ducat, Sr., allegedly with the complete knowledge of the fact that
the subject property belonged to his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. It is basic law, however, that conveyance
or transfer of any titled real property must be in writing, signed by the registered owner or at
least by his attorney-in-fact by virtue of a proper special power of attorney and duly
notarized. Respondent Villalon, as a lawyer, is presumed to know, or ought to know, this
process.
Respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct,
and he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
MARILI C. RONQUILLO, ALEXANDER RONQUILLO and JON ALEXANDER
RONQUILLO, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact SERVILLANO A.
CABUNGCAL, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. HOMOBONO T. CEZAR, Respondent.

A.C. No. 6288 June 16, 2006

FACTS:

Complainants seek the disbarment or suspension of respondent from the practice of law for
unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. They allege that respondent sold them a
piece of property over which he has no right nor interest, and that he refuses to return to them the
amount they have paid him for it.
Complainants and respondent entered into a Deed of Assignment. Respondent received from
complainants P750,000.00 upon execution of the Deed of Assignment. The balance was to be
paid by complainants in four equal quarterly installments of P187,500.00 each. Thus,
complainants issued in favor of respondent four postdated checks in the amount of P187,500.00
each. Respondent was able to encash the first check dated August 17, 1999.

Complainants subsequently received information from Crown Asia that respondent has not paid
in full the price of the townhouse at the time he executed the Deed of Assignment. Respondent
also failed to deliver to complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell he allegedly executed with
Crown Asia.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be disbarred.

RULING:

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court; and (7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority. Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
In the instant case, respondent may have acted in his private capacity when he entered into a
contract with complainant Marili representing to have the rights to transfer title over the
townhouse unit and lot in question. When he failed in his undertaking, respondent fell short of
his duty under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent was likewise guilty of dishonest and deceitful conduct when he concealed this lack
of right from complainants. He did not inform the complainants that he has not yet paid in full
the price of the subject townhouse unit and lot, and, therefore, he had no right to sell, transfer or
assign said property at the time of the execution of the Deed of Assignment.
Respondent Atty. Homobono T. Cezar is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately.
VICTORIA V. RADJAIE, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE O. ALOVERA, respondent.

A.C. No. 4748. August 4, 2000

FACTS:
On July 2, 1992, the heirs of the late Faustina Borres, Segundina Borres, Felisa Borres, Micaela
Borres, Maria Bores, and Sixto Borres (hereinafter "Borres heirs") through their counsel, Atty.
Alberto A. Villaruz, filed an action for Partition and Accounting, docketed as Civil Case No. V-
6186, with the Regional Trial Court, Br. 15, Roxas City, against herein complainant, Victoria V.
Radjaie, who was presumably an heir of the late Faustina Borres. The action sought, among
others, the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-24150 in the name of herein
complainant covering a parcel of land with an area of 215,777 square meters situated in Panay,
Capiz, and the declaration of the said parcel of land as property commonly owned by the Borres
heirs.
Judge Alovera presided over the hearing in the presence of Teresita Bauzon, court stenographer
of Br. 17, Atty. Villaruz, who presented the evidence ex parte. After hearing, Judge Alovera
rendered a decision in favor of the heirs of Borres the lease property which is the subject of this
case.
Mrs. Teresita V. Bauzon, court stenographer of Br. 17 since 1993, was asked to type the
draft decision in Civil Case No. V-6186 in Judge Alovera's house. When she inquired if he can
still do it, Judge Alovera told her that he had one (1) year more to decide cases. With this
assurance, she typed the draft decision on a single bond paper without a duplicate as Judge
Alovera was dictating it.
Complainant who was in Tokyo, Japan, learned of what happened to her property and she
was thus prompted to come back to the Philippines.
Judge Julius L. Abela took cognizance of Civil Case No. V-6186 as he was the acting
presiding judge of Br. 17 at the time of the filing of said petition for relief from order. He
observed that there was no order in Civil Case No. V-6186 submitting the same for decision,
except for the order made by Judge Alovera on December 10, 1993 during the "simulated
proceedings" inside his chambers, where he directed the counsel for the plaintiffs to file his offer
of exhibits.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Alovera should be disbarred.

RULING:

Under the Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes. Rule 1.01 - A lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall
not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system. Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage
in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
In the case at bar, Civil Case No. V-6186 was not tried on December 10, 1993. What transpired
was a mock or simulated trial inside the chamber of Judge Alovera where only Atty. Alberto
Villaruz, the plaintiffs and Mrs. Rosa Dapat, a court stenographer from another court, were present.
No Judge or RTC Branch 17 court personnel were present as there was actual court session in open
court going on at that time.

The records of Civil Case No. V-6186 were with Judge Jose O. Alovera and remained with him
even after his retirement on January 31, 1995. He did not return the record to Mrs. Concepcion
Alcazar, Court Clerk III in Charge of Civil Cases.
The record of Civil Case No. V-6186 turned up on the table of Mrs. Alcazar together with the
"Offer of Exhibits" of Atty. Villaruz dated January 20, 1995 and the "Order" dated January 25,
1995, after the retirement of Judge Alovera. Both the Offer and the Order admitting the exhibits
were not properly filed and do not bear markings of having been received by the court.
The "decision" of Judge Jose O. Alovera, though dated January 30, 1995, was filed with the
court on August 1, 1995 by former Judge Alovera himself and because he was no longer a judge
his submission was refused.
This Court has been nothing short of exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral
character from members of the Bar. By swearing the lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes a
guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial
administration of justice - a vital function of democracy a failure of which is disastrous to
society. Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of
his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority for there is perhaps
no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative
than that of law.
Respondent JOSE O. ALOVERA is hereby DISBARRED.
REMEDIOS F. EDRIAL, MAURO EDRIAL JR., MARYLENE EDRIAL, ILDEFONSO
EDRIAL, ROSALIND EDRIAL, MARY JEAN EDRIAL, and SUSAN EDRIAL-
VALENZUELA, petitioners, vs. PEDRO QUILAT-QUILAT, GABRIELA QUILAT-QUILAT,
ISIDRA QUILAT-QUILAT, and ESTANISLAO QUILAT-QUILAT, respondents.
G.R. No. 133625. September 6, 2000

FACTS:
Respondents Pedro, Gabriela, Isidra and Estanislao - all surnamed Quilat-Quilat filed an action
for recovery of a parcel of land against Petitioners Remedios, Mauro Jr., Marylene, Idelfonso,
Rosalind, Mary Jean -- all surnamed Edrial -- and Susan Edrial-Valenzuela. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 6315 and raffled to Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dumaguete City.
The case was submitted for decision for fourth time due to non-appearance of petitioner’s
counsel and for repeated motion for extension.
Petioner’s counsel filed a motion to reopen the case however the court denied the said motion.
Counsel for petitioners alleges that the addresses of his clients on file in his law firm were
incorrect; hence, the notices and other forms of communication he had sent to them were not
received. He allegedly discovered this fact only after he had filed his withdrawal as their
counsel. He also argues that the denial of the Motion to Reopen Trial was "plainly capricious
and oppressive" because private respondents were equally guilty of delay and
procrastination. Finally, he maintains that allowing petitioners to present their remaining
evidence would be "in the interest of substantial due process and humane justice."

ISSUE: Whether or not a motion to reopen the case is proper.

RULING:
The court frowns on lawyer’s practice of repeatedly seeking extensions of time to file
pleadings and thereafter simply letting the period lapse without submitting any pleading or even
any explanation or manifestation of the failure. The same principle applies more forcefully to
motions for continuance. Postponement is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion.
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time
to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, shall not let the period lapse without submitting the same
or offering an explanation for their failure to do so. Moreover, they should avoid any action that
would unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.
In the case at bar, counsel’s excuses are unsatisfactory and unacceptable. The CA ruled
that petitioners were given “more than enough time” to complete their representation of
evidence.
QUINGWA VS. ARMANDO PUNO
Adm Case No. 389- February 28, 1967

FACTS:
Flora Quingwa filed a complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of Bar, with gross
immorality and misconduct. Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school
teacher for a number of years. She testified that the respondent took her to the Hotel, registered
as Mr. and Mrs. Puno and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. And
when the complainant got pregnant, the respondent refused to fulfil his promise. Thereafter, the
complainant gave birth to a baby boy whom the respondent disowns to be his child. The complainant used
to give money to the lawyer whenever hea sked from her.
The respondent denied all the allegations of the complaint, and therein allegations do not
constitutegrounds for disbarment or suspension under Section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules
of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent be disbarred from the practice of his profession.

RULING:
Section 25 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court- it is already a settled rule that the enumeration
of grounds of disbarment or suspension is not taken as a limitation on the general power of
courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. Supreme court held that an attorney be removed not only for malpractice
and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for
the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.
Section 2, Rule 127 of the old rules of court- now Section 2, Rule 138 of Rules of Court –
One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar is that the applicant must
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character.
Legal and Judicial Ethics by Malcolm – When integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not
enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator
and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all
times is expected of him.
Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court – grossly immoral conduct is one of the grounds for
suspension or disbarment.
Paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics – profession of law must conform themselves
in accordance with the highest standards of morality.
WHEREFORE, respondent Armando Puno is hereby DISBARRED and, as a consequence, his
name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.
A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963

Facts:
Royong, the niece it the common-law wife of Oblena, filed a rape case against the latter.
In her complaint, Royong alleged that in 1958 Oblena forced her to have intercourse with
her and that she refrained to report the incident because Oblena threatened to kill
her family. As a result if the sexual intercourse, Royong gave birth to a child. Oblena denied all
the allegations and argued that he and Royong had a relationship and Royong consented to have
intercourse with him.
The Solicitor General recommended that Oblena be permanently removed from the roll
of attorney eventhough the acts of the Royong before and after the rape incident showed that
she is more of a sweetheart than a victim because of the circumstances behind the incident
The Solicitor General also charged Oblena of falsifying and deliberately alleging in his
application in the bar in1958 that he is a person of good moral character while having an illicit
and adulterous relationship with Angeles who is not only the aunt of Royong but also has a
legal husband in the province
Oblena moved to dismiss the case because the offenses charged are different from
those originally charged in the complaint but the court overruled his petition
After the hearing, the investigators concluded that A.) Oblena used his knowledge in law
to commit immoral acts without incurring any criminal liability; B.) he committed gross
immorality by continuously cohabiting with Angeles, his common-law wife, even after
he became a lawyer and C.) Oblena falsified the truth as to his good moral character in his
application to take the bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not the illicit relationship with Royong and the open cohabitation with
Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause Oblena’s disbarment.

RULING:
Yes. Although Oblena is not yet convicted of the crime of rape, seduction or adultery and
he is not guilty of any of the grounds for disbarment enumerated in Sec 25, Rule 127 of the Rules
of Court, the enumeration is not exclusive and the power of the court to exclude
unworthy members of the bar is inherent and is a necessary incident to the proper administration
of justice and can be exercised even without any statutory authority, in all cases unless
properly prohibited by statutes.
American jurisprudence provides that the continued possession of a good moral character is
a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law. The loss
requires suspension or disbarment eventhough the statues do not explicitly specify that as
a ground of disbarment.
Oblena’s argument that he believed himself to be a person with good moral character when
he filed his application to take the bar examination is wrong. One’
s own approximation of himself is not a gauge of his moral character. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what the
person really is and not what he other people thinks he is. His pretension to wait for the
18th birthday of Royong before having carnal knowledge with her shows the scheming mind of
Oblena and his taking advantage of his knowledge of the law.
Respondent did not possess a good moral character at the time of his applied for his admission to
the bar. Therefore, he is disbarred.
CONCEPCIONBOLIVAR,complainant,
vs.
ABELARDO SIMBOL Y MANUEL, respondent.

A.C. No. 377 April 29, 1966

FACTS:
Concepcion Bolivar lived with and financially supported Abelardo Simbol y Manuel in his
studying for law school and other personal necessities since he promised marriage to Bolivar.
But as soon as Simbol finished his studies he married another woman while keeping it a secret
from Bolivar and continuing to get money from her. But when Bolivar found his secret, Simbol
still tried to ask money from her and persuade her to continue their relationship. This prompted
Bolivar to file a Civil Case of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court against Simbol but this
did not prosper since Atty. Simbol and Miss Concepcion had executed a compromise agreement.
But the Sol Gen filed for disbarment proceedings on moral grounds against Atty. Simbol. So, on
October 31, 1963, the Clerk of Court sent a mail to respondent thru Atty. Valentino G. Castro,
his counsel of record, a letter with a copy of the foregoing complaint. Atty. Castro replied that
after the execution of the compromise agreement between Bolivar and Atty. Simbol, he no
longer heard from Atty. Simbol. He further stated that he tried to get in touch with the
respondent but was unable to do so and he requested that copy of the complaint be sent directly
to said respondentâs address. So the Court did as what was requested but the letter returned with
the notation on the envelope that said respondent was no longer in that city. At the hearing set by
the Court on February 3, 1964, Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo and Atty. Tomas Yumul for
complainant appeared and they submi

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Simbol is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27,
Rule 138, Rules of Court.

RULING:
Respondent's acts of making a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her to
spend for his schooling and other personal necessities while dangling before her the mirage of a
marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a
secret while continuing to demand money from complainant, and trying to sponge on her and
persuade her to resume their broken relationship after the latter's discovery of his immoral acts,
are indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar. The fact that complainant has
withdrawn her complaint against respondent does not wipe out the grievous offense he had
committed. Respondent "has failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and
required of a member of the barâ. Therefore, he is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" within the
meaning of Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.
Respondent, we are persuaded to say, "has failed to maintain the highest degree of morality
expected and required of a member of the bar." He is, indeed, guilty of "grossly immoral
conduct" within the meaning of Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.
Respondent Abelardo Simbol y Manuel is suspended from the practice of law for a period of five
(5) years.
PILAR ABAIGAR, complainant,
vs.
DAVID D.C. PAZ, respondent.
A.M. No. 997 September 10, 1979

FACTS:
The verified complaint alleged that sometime in March 1970, the complainant, Pilar Abaigar
sought the aid of a legal counsel regarding her divorce case filed by her husband in the Superior
Court of California, County of Alameda, U.S.A. That respondent volunteered his legal services
to the complainant which the latter accepted; that after the termination of the divorce case, the
respondent became exceedingly friendly with the complainant and started to profess his love for
her.
Respondent made complainant believe that the former has no legal impediment and can
therefore marry the latter although he was living with another woman, his relations with said
woman were no impediment that the respondent convinced the complainant that he had been
compelled to contract a civil marriage with the woman and that since it was not a marriage under
the church laws, it was no bar for him to get married under the church laws with the complainant.
Respondent proposed marriage to the complainant. Complainant accepted the proposal in
good faith. Thereafter, they acted as husband and wife which resulted to the pregnancy of
complainant but the pregnancy was lost due to causes beyond her control.
Virginia Paz was introduced to the complainant by the respondent; that said Virginia Paz was the
woman previously referred to by the respondent as his wife with whom he had contracted a
forced civil marriage. She informed the complainant that there had been actually two marriages
between her and the respondent, one under the civil law and one under the church law, which the
latter did not deny upon confrontation.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent be disbarred.

RULING:
In her complainant for disbarment, she pictured the respondent as morally perverse.
However, in the aforementioned letter, she states that there never was an illicit relationship
between her and the respondent, Atty. David D.C. Paz, and that their relationship was
aboveboard just like any engaged couple. And finally, she avers that she was only after the
collection of the loan which the respondent got from her and not for revenge for his deception.
The Court has held that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant and the charge against the lawyer must be established by convincing proof. The
record must disclose as free from doubt a case which compels the exercise by this Court of its
disciplinary powers. The corrupt character of the act done must be clearly demonstrated.
Moreover' considering the serious consequences, of the disbarment or suspension of a member of
the Bar, We have consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of either penalty. This Court likewise held that where there is no proof that
respondent lawyer was guilty of any unethical conduct, harassment and malpractice, the
disbarment case against him should be dismissed.
The evidence adduced by the complainant has failed to establish any cause for
disciplinary action against the respondent. As the Solicitor General said in his report, "From all
indications, there is little room for doubt that she filed his disbarment case not in redress of a
wrong, for there was no wrong committed. It was a voluntary act of indiscretion between two
consenting adults who were fully aware of the consequences of their deed and for which they
were responsible only to their own private consciences."
The administrative complaint for disbarment is hereby DISMISSED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant
vs.
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.
A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990

FACTS:
Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the
suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals. In
1983, Atty. Fe Tuanda received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry with a
total value of P36,000 for sale on commission basis. In 1984, instead of returning the unsold
pieces of jewelry worth P26,250, she issued 3 checks. These checks were dishonored by the
drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the
notice of dishonor, Tuanda made no effort to settle her obligation. Criminal cases were filed,
wherein she was acquitted of estafa but was found guilty of violation of BP 22 (The Anti-
Bouncing CheckLaw).
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and imposed further
suspension against Tuanda in the practice of law, on the ground that the offense involves moral
turpitude. Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted arguing
that her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in violation of the
aforementioned law. Arguing further that she intends no damage to the plaintiff-appellee
(Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not guilty of the offense charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Tuanda be lifted.

RULING:
NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty
involved moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide
as follows:
 Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of
the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)
 Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. —
The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for
any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such
attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the
premises.
 Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects the good moral
character of a person convicted of such offense. Herein, BP 22 violation is a serious criminal
offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. The effects of the issuance
of a worthless check transcends the private interest of parties directly involved in the transaction
and touches the interest of the community at large. Putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. The crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her
attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound
to "obey the laws of the land."
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension.
Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court.
MARIA ELENA MORENO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA, respondent.
A.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005

FACTS:
Ernesto Araneta issued two checks to Elena Moreno for his indebtedness which amounts
to P11, 000.00, the checks were dishonored. It was dishonored because the account against
which is drawn is closed. Thereafter the case was forwarded to the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. The Commission recommended the
suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months. On 15 October 2002, IBP Director for
Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted the records of this case back to this Court
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court. Thereafter, the Office of the Bar
Confidant filed a Report regarding various aspects of the case. The Report further made mention
of a Resolution from this Court indefinitely suspending the respondent for having been convicted
by final judgment of estafa through falsification of a commercial document.

Issue: Whether or not Araneta should be disbarred due to the issuance of checks drawn against a
closed account.

RULING:
The Court held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the
issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral turpitude. In Co v.
Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we held that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be
sanctioned with one year’s suspension from the practice of law, or a suspension of six months
upon partial payment of the obligation. In the instant case, however, herein respondent has,
apparently been found guilty by final judgment of estafa thru falsification of a commercial
document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been indefinitely suspended.
Considering that he had previously committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that this case
likewise involves moral turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more severe penalty. In fact,
we have long held that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of
a crime involving moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v.
Narciso N. Jaramillo, “the review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The
judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary
to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar.
Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the
administration of justice.”
A-1 FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC
v.
ATTY. LAARNI N. VALERIO,
A.C. No. 8390

FACTS:
Atty. Valerio obtained a loan from complainant and secured the payment of the loan
obligation by issuing a postdated check. However, upon its maturity date, the check was
dishonored due to insufficient funds. As of the filing of the instant case, despite repeated
demands to pay her obligation, Atty. Valerio failed to pay the whole amount of her obligation.
After repeated demands by the trial court Atty. Valerio failed to give any response. After an
administrative case had been filed by complainant against Atty. Valerio with the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), the latter’s mother explained that her daughter had
been diagnosed with schizophrenia; thus, could not properly respond to the complaint against
her. IBP-CBD recommended Atty. Valerio be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) years, having found her guilty of gross misconduct. IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved with modification of the period of suspension for one (1) year.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

RULING:
Supreme Court sustains the findings and recommendation of IBP-CBD.
“They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and
to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct
themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in
the Code of Professional Responsibility.”
The Court finds Mrs. Valerio’s justification unmeritorious. The court cannot take the
“medical certificate” on its face, considering Mrs. Valerio’s failure to prove the contents of the
certificate or present the physician who issued it.
Supreme Court deems it reasonable to affirm the sanction imposed by IBP-CBD, because
aside from issuing worthless checks and failing to pay her debts, she has also shown wanton
disregard of the IBP’s and Court orders in the course of proceedings.
In RE ABESAMIS
Robert Soriano v. Atty. Manuel Dizon
A.C No. 6792
January 25, 2006

FACTS:
Atty. Manuel Dizon was driving his car under the influence of liquor when along Abanao
Street, Baguio City, a taxi driver overtook him. Incensed, Dizon tailed the taxi, pulled it over,
and berated Roberto Soriano, the taxi driver, and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression,
Soriano forced open his door, causing Dizon to fall to the ground. Soriano tried to help Dizon get
up, but the latter was about to punch him so Soriano punched Dizon first to fend off an
impending attack. Soriano prevented another attempt by Dizon to hit him. Dizon went back to
his car and got his revolver with the handle wrapped in a handkerchief. As Soriano was handing
Dizon’s eyeglasses, which he just picked up from the pavement, Dizon fired and shot him.
Soriano fell on the thigh of the accused, and the latter merely pushed him out and sped off. The
bullet hit Soriano’s neck and lacerated his carotid artery. According to the doctors who treated
him, he would have died if not for the timely medical assistance. Soriano sustained spinal cord
injury causing the left side of his body to be paralyzed, disabling him for his job as a taxi driver.

Dizon was eventually convicted for frustrated homicide but was allowed probation,
conditioned on payment of civil liabilities. However, four years after judgment was rendered,
Dizon has not yet fulfilled his civil obligation.

Soriano filed a complaint before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP for
Dizon’s disbarment. The Commissioner of the CBD recommend that respondent be disbarred for
having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP adopted the recommendation of the CBD
and sent their resolution to the Supreme Court for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s guilt warrants his disbarment.

RULING:
The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the CBD that the crime of frustrated
homicide committed by Atty. Dizon involved moral turpitude. The Supreme Court held that
Dizon also violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that “A
lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes.” Dizon failed to obey the laws of the land through his illegal possession of an
unlicensed firearm. He failed to respect legal processes through his unjust refusal to satisfy his
civil liabilities, the condition for his probation.
Dizon also violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides
that “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” Dizon’s
violation was exhibited when he tried to reach an out-of-court settlement with the family Soriano
but when negotiations failed, he made it appear as if it was the family who approached him to get
a referral to a neurosurgeon. In addition, Dizon fabricated a story that it was Soriano and two
other persons who mauled him. According to the three doctors who examined Dizon, his injuries
were so minor that his allegation was impossible.
In re FELIPE DEL ROSARIO

FACTS:
Felipe Del Rosario took the bar in 1925 for the second time and he failed. He again took it in
1926 and he failed again. In 1927, he filed a motion before the Supreme Court in which he alleged
that there was a mistake in the computation of his exam results in the 1925 bar exams. He was then
admitted to the bar.
However, a subsequent investigation by the city fiscal uncovered that Del Rosario, together
with one Juan Villaflor – a former employee of the Supreme Court, falsified some documents to
make it appear that Del Rosario actually passed the 1925 bar exams. The two were subsequently
charged with falsification. Villaflor was convicted as he pleaded guilty but Del Rosario was
acquitted for lack of evidence. The fiscal however recommended Del Rosario to surrender his
certificate of attorney.
ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation by the fiscal is correct.

RULING:
Yes. The mere fact that Villaflor was convicted proves that Del Rosario is unworthy of the
certificate of attorney. The crime which Villaflor is proven guilty of has benefited only Del Rosario
and it is impossible that the latter has no knowledge of this illegal machination.
But shouldn’t the Supreme Court just allow Del Rosario to take the bar exams again?
No. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted everyone who demands it,
but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. The standards of
the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties
of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is
questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and
then to permit him to hold himself out as a duly authorized member of the bar.
SOLEDAD NUEZ, Represented by ANANIAS B. CO, Attorney-in-Fact for
Complainant, petitioner, vs. ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT, respondent.
A.C. No. 5054. May 29, 2002

FACTS:
An administrative complaint was by Soledad Nuñez, a septuagenarian represented by her
attorney-in-fact Ananias B. Co, Jr., seeking the disbarment of Atty. Romulo Ricafort on the
ground of grave misconduct.
Sometime in October 1982, Soledad authorized Atty. Ricafort to sell her two parcels of land
located in Legazpi City for P40,000. She agreed to the lawyer 10% of the price as commission.
Atty. Ricafort succeeded in selling the lots, but despite Soledad’s repeated demands, he did not
turn over the proceeds of the sale. This forced Soledad to file an action for a sum of money
before the RTC, Quezon City.
The court rendered its decision ordering the Atty. to pay Soledad the sum of P16,000 as
principal obligation, with at the legal rate from the date of the commencement of the action.
An appeal to the CA was made. However, the appeal was dismissed for failure to pay the
required docket fee within the reglementary period despite notice.
Soledad filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution. But it appears that only
a partial satisfaction of the P16,000 judgment was made, leaving P13,800 unsatisfied. In
payment for the latter, Atty. issued four postdated checks but was dishonored because the
account against which they were drawn was closed.
Hence, Soledad was forced to file four criminal complaints for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
before the MTC, Quezon City.
In a joint affidavit, Atty. Ricafort admitted having drawn and issued said four postdated
checks in favor of Soledad. Allegedly believing in good faith that said checks had already been
encashed by Soledad, he subsequently closed his checking account in China Banking
Corporation, Legazpi City, from which said four checks were drawn. He was not notified that the
checks were dishonored. Had he been notified, he would have made the necessary arrangements
with the bank.
The court required Atty. to comment on the complaint. But he never did despite the
favorable action on his three motions for extension of time to file the comment. His failure to do
so compelled Soledad to file a motion to cite Atty. in contempt on the ground that his strategy to
file piecemeal motions for extension of time to submit the comment “smacks of a delaying tactic
scheme that is unworthy of a member of the bar and a law dean.”
The IBP findings show that the Atty. had no intention to “honor” the money judgment
against him. It recommended that Atty. be declared “guilty of misconduct in his dealings with
complainant” and be suspended from the practice of law for at least one year and pay the amount
of the checks issued to the complainant.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with
complainant.

RULING:
YES. There is a blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
diminished public confidence in the law and the lawyers. Instead of promoting such confidence
and respect, he miserably failed to live up to the standards of the legal profession.
His act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money
judgment rendered by the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His failure
to make good the checks despite demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
showed his continued defiance of judicial processes, which he, as an officer of the court, was
under continuing duty to uphold.
To further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes, he even had the
temerity of making a mockery of the court’s generosity to him. We granted his three motions for
extension of time to file his comment on the complaint in this case. Yet, not only did he fail to
file the comment, he as well did not even bother to explain such failure notwithstanding our
resolution declaring him as having waived the filing of the comment. To the SC, Atty. openly
showed a high degree of irresponsibility amounting to willful disobedience to its lawful orders.
Atty. Ricafort then knowingly and willfully violated Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility stating that:
Lawyers should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes; and that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, should not let the period lapse without submitting the same or
offering an explanation for their failure to do so.
The SC indefinitely suspended Atty. Ricafort from the practice of law and directed to pay
Soledad P13,800.
Re: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS
B.M. No. 1222. February 4, 2004

FACTS:
The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in Mercantile Law during the
2003 Bar Examinations. Petitioner at that time was employed as an assistant lawyer in the law
firm of Balgos & Perez, one of whose partners, Marcial Balgos, was the examiner for Mercantile
Law during the said bar examinations. The Court had adopted the findings of the Investigating
Committee, which identified petitioner as the person who had downloaded the test questions
from the computer of Balgos and faxed them to other persons.
This treats the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated November 10, 2008
filed by petitioner Danilo de Guzman. He prays that this Honorable Court in the exercise of
equity and compassion, grant petitioners plea for judicial clemency, and thereupon, order his
reinstatement as a member in good standing of the Philippine Bar.
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably recommended the reinstatement of
petitioner in the Philippine Bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not Danilo de Guzman is worthy of clemency.

RULING:
We deem petitioner worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting his penalty to seven
(7) years suspension from the practice of law, inclusive of the five (5) years he has already
served his disbarment.
Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. While the
Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show
compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose.
In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of disbarment
imposed on the lawyer, we have taken into account the remorse of the disbarred lawyer and the
conduct of his public life during his years outside of the bar.
Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him considering the
gravity of his transgressions. Even more to his favor, petitioner has redirected focus since his
disbarment towards public service, particularly with the Peoples Law Enforcement Board. The
attestations submitted by his peers in the community and other esteemed members of the legal
profession, such as retired Court of Appeals Associate Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge Hilario
Laqui, Professor Edwin Sandoval and Atty. Lorenzo Ata, and the ecclesiastical community such
as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas testify to his positive impact on society at large since the unfortunate
events of 2003.
The Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The
disbarment of DANILO G. DE GUZMAN from the practice of law
is hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7) YEARS SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF
LAW, reckoned from February 4, 2004.
MARINA C. GONZALES, Complainant, v. ATTY. CALIXTO B. RAMOS, Respondent.
A.C. NO. 6649 : June 21, 2005

FACTS:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Marina C. Gonzales against Atty. Calixto B.
Ramos because of the latter's alleged misconduct in notarizing a Deed of Absolute Sale involving
the complainant. In her Affidavit-Complaint filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the complainant alleged that the respondent lawyer notarized a
Deed of Sale on March 27, 1996, where the complainant and her husband, Francisco T. Gonzales,
allegedly sold in favor of the spouses Henry and Mila Gatus a piece of land with a building thereon
located at Paranaque City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T.) No. (30643) 17223.
Due to the execution of the Deed of Sale, T.C.T. No. (30643) 17223 was cancelled and T.C.T. No.
108589 was issued in the name of spouses Henry and Mila Gatus.
The complainant, however, maintained that she and her husband never appeared before the
respondent to acknowledge the Deed of Sale on March 27, 1996.
The respondent lawyer countered that the complainant's act was motivated by malice.
Francisco went to respondent’s office together with the spouses Gatus and showed him a Deed of
Sale consisting of two (2) pages and requested him to notarize it. However, he noticed that the
Deed of Sale did not contain a technical description of the property being sold, so he prepared
another set of Deed of Absolute Sale. Thereafter, Francisco Gomez and spouses Gatus together
with a witness, Ms. Eva Dulay, signed the second Deed of Absolute Sale in his presence. He then
instructed Francisco to bring his wife, herein complainant, to his office so she can sign the Deed
of Absolute Sale in his presence.
When Francisco returned to his office, he brought with him the Deed of Absolute Sale
signed by Marina C. Gonzales. At first, he was hesitant to notarize the document because he did
not see the complainant sign the same, but due to Francisco's insistence and knowing them
personally, he eventually notarized the deed.
During the mandatory conference before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, the
respondent admitted that the complainant never appeared before him to affirm the genuineness and
authenticity of her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 27, 1996

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s act is a ground for disbarment.

RULING:
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same
are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before the said notary public to
attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed
making the acknowledgment will enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the affiant. A notary public is enjoined from notarizing a fictitious or spurious
document. The function of a notary public, is among others, to guard against any illegal deed.
A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgement
executed before a notary public and appended to a private instrument. Hence, a notary public must
discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and
fidelity
 The respondents act of notarizing the acknowledgment of a deed of sale even if one of the
signatories therein did not personally appear before him clearly falls short of the yardstick of
accuracy and fidelity referred to above.
He also committed falsehood and misled or allowed the Court to be misled by any artifice.
As a lawyer, respondent breached the Code of Professional Responsibility. By notarizing
the questioned deed, he engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. He also
committed falsehood and misled or allowed the Court to be misled by any artifice.
For breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility, the notarial
commission of respondent Atty. Calixto B. Ramos, if still existing, is REVOKED effective
immediately and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two
(2) years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective
immediately.
VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners,
vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975

FACTS:
PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005

FACTS
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation
causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank. Despite the mega
loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution
declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors,
creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s
assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito
Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in
GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino
established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family
and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for
reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several
writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al
are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to
disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was
alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the
liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which
subsequently became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers from
accepting “engagement” or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to
disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between
respondent Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the
Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The
prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.”

HELD:
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza,
it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of
respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of whether there exists
a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing
respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of “matter” and the metes and bounds of
“intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent
Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how
to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of
Manila. The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate
GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that “drafting,
enforcing or interpreting government or agencyprocedures, regulations and laws, or briefing
abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and
cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to
liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The
legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the
jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his
alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved
in the Civil case of sequestration. In the metes and boundsof the “intervention”. The applicable
meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who
has the power to influence the subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do
not exist where the government lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous such as
“ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or agencyprocedures, regulations or laws or
briefing abstract principles of law.” The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not
significant and substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the liquidation of
GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central
Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that
of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
OMAR P. ALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent.

A.C. No. 4018. March 8, 2005

FACTS:
It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed
by complainant against respondent.

In said case, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA),
complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821in the names of Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah,
Ambobae Bauduli Datu, Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mocamadali Bauduli Datu, and Amenola
Bauduli Datu; and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu
and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law.
It appears from the records that the Bauduli Datus are relatives of respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Bubong violated Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

RULING:
Yes. In the case at bar, respondent’s grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the
President and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer.
By taking advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing
his knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent
had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but
also to retain his membership to the bar.
Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter: “A lawyer
in the government shall not use his public function to promote or advance his private interests,
nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.”
Respondent’s conduct manifestly undermined the people’s confidence in the public office
he used to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession.
The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less
than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.
THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant, vs. ESTANISLAO R.
BAYOT, respondent.
A.C. No. L-1117 March 20, 1944

FACTS:
In June 1943, Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps people in securing marriage licenses;
that he does so avoiding delays and publicity; that he also makes marriage arrangements; that legal
consultations are free for the poor; and that everything is confidential. The Director of Religious
Affairs took notice of the ad and so he sued Bayot for Malpractice.
Bayot initially denied having published the advertisement. But later, he admitted the same and
asked for the court’s mercy as he promised to never repeat the act again.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.
HELD:
Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that “the practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.” The advertisement he caused to be published is a brazen solicitation of business
from the public. .” It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares. The Supreme Court again emphasized that best advertisement for
a lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust. But because of Bayot’s plea for leniency and his promise and the fact that he did not earn
any case by reason of the ad, the Supreme Court merely reprimanded him.