The Politics of Identity in Myanmar The Rohingya, Kachin & Wa Ethnic Minorities

The politics of identity in
Myanmar: the Rohingya, Kachin

& Wa ethnic minorities
03 July 2017
Mahalia Gaskin McDaniel

Arts internship
Mr John Leake
Host supervisor
The Institute for International Development
Dr Thomas Wanner
Academic supervisor
The University of Adelaide
Acknowledgements
I would like to offer my thanks to Mr John Leake for allowing me to benefit from the wealth
of formal and personal knowledge and experience represented by both himself and IID. His
thoughtful guidance has made for an invaluable internship experience.
Additionally, Dr Thomas Wanner has been of great help navigating the vastness of available
literature and directing my research towards a cohesive report.
From the day, she accompanied me to the IID office, Amanda Phillis and her colleague Robert
Ewers have been greatly supportive. I will always be appreciative for the opportunity to be
involved with IID and such absorbing research.
03 July 2017
Cover photo: Men walk at a Rohingya village outside Maugndaw in Rakhine state. Source:
(Rueters/Tun SZ 2016)
Page 1 of 40
Table of Contents
Table of Figures ............................................................................................................................ 3
List of Abbreviations..................................................................................................................... 4
Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................... 5
Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 6
Methodology ................................................................................................................................. 8
Background.................................................................................................................................11
Rohingya ..............................................................................................................................16
Kachin ...................................................................................................................................20
Wa ...........................................................................................................................................24
Discussion ..................................................................................................................................26
Racial dimens ion ..............................................................................................................26
Socio-economic dimension ...........................................................................................28
Geopolitical dimension ..................................................................................................31
Politica l dimension ..........................................................................................................32
Military dimens ion ...........................................................................................................34
Conclusions & Recommendations ............................................................................................35
References..................................................................................................................................37
Page 2 of 40
Table of Figures
Figure 1: Map depicting the states, regions, zones and divisions of Myanmar. Source:
(MIMU 2013) ................................................................................................................................ 9
Figure 2: Map depicting the topography of Myanmar. Source: (MIMU 2013) ....................... 10
Figure 3: Map depicting IDP sites in Kachin and northern Shan States (August 2016).
Source: (UNOCHA 2016) ............................................................................................................ 20
Figure 4: Ethnic militant groups of Myanmar. Source: (Colling 2016).................................... 23
Figure 5: Graphs of religion statistics according to the 2014 census. Data source: (Ministry
of Immigration and Population 2016) ...................................................................................... 30
Figure 6: Regional map of Myanmar. Source: (Google 2017) ................................................. 31
Figure 7: United Wa State Army (UWSA) soldiers march during a media display in
Panghsang, Wa territory in northeast Myanmar October 4, 2016. Source: (Reuters/Tun SZ
2016) .......................................................................................................................................... 34
Figure 8: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) cadets follow drills at a training school in the
Burmese town of Laiza, on the border with China. Source: (Vrieze 2016)............................. 34
Page 3 of 40
List of Abbreviations
ANP Arakan National Party
ARIF Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front
IDP International Displaced Person
KIA/~O Kachin Independence Army/~Organisation
KDA Kachin Defence Army
RNDP Rakhine Nationalities Development Party
RSO Rohingya Solidarity Organisation
SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council
SPDC State Peace and Development Council
TRC Temporary Registration Certificate
Ma Ba Tha Patriotic Association of Myanmar
MIMU Myanmar Information Management Unit
MPC Myanmar Peace Centre
NDAK New Democratic Army-Kachin
NLD National League for Democracy
NGOs Non-governmental organisations
NSAG Non-state armed groups
UNFC United Nationalities Federal Council
UNHCR United Nations Refugee Agency
UWSP/~A United Wa State Party/~Army
Page 4 of 40
Executive Summary
This report was written in collaboration with the Institute for International Development
(IID)’s John Leake and the University of Adelaide’s Dr. Thomas Wanner in fulfilment of the
requirements of its Arts Internship program. It attempts to address a gap in studies offering
a deeper insight into the situation of the persecuted Rohingya minority in Myanmar, by
comparatively researching them against the Kachin and Wa. Entirely secondary sources, via
the University of Adelaide’s database academic database resource, and the personal
collection of John Leake were relied upon in collecting research material to cross-analyse. At
least six broad, interrelated dimensions of difference were found to underlie the
disproportionate persecution of the Rohingya compared to the Kachin and the Wa: race,
religion, socioeconomics, geopolitics, politics and military force. Perceived differences in
racial attributes correlating with a threatening form of Islam distinguish the Rohingya from
the Kachin, Wa and other Muslim minorities that enjoy an official status. These differences
are compounded by geographical ties to South Asian states of India and Bangladesh as
opposed to enduring bilateral ally, the East Asian state of China. Their status as a political
target for influential Buddhist movements is heightened by their lack of political agency, both
due to an absence of citizenship rights, and a lack of a coordinated, strong military force.
These findings were used to create a set of recommendations moving forward for the
Myanmar and Bangladesh governments, multilateral institutions and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), including online hate speech mitigation strategies, forums hosted by
the government in which a) representatives of the Rohingya and recognised Muslim groups
can discuss the role of Islam in Myanmar, and b) representatives of the ethnic Rakhine and
Rohingya can discuss key gripes and come to an agreement, the strengthening of policies
and documentation provisions for immigrant minorities, and the formulation of a
Myanmar/Bangladesh cooperative solution regarding the Rohingya.
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Introduction
The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, colloquially known as Myanmar, and formerly
as Burma, is a country of interest for the Institute for International Development (IID). The
organisation has a branch office in the capital of Yangon, and IID members have had over 30
years of experience conducting a range of development work there, from disaster risk
reduction to HIV/AIDS prevention. Myanmar has a history of weak governance and capacity,
which are attempting to be addressed through recently implemented reforms, and
aspirations for democratization. Multi and bilateral aid donors, as well as NGOs like IID are
increasingly active in Myanmar, coordinated by the Myanmar Information Management Unit
MIMU (Dugay 2015). After over 50 years of military dictatorship, the transition to civilian rule
began with the enactment of the 2008 Constitution (UNDP 2017). In November 2015, the
first free and fair general elections were held across the country. Aung Sun Suii Kyi led the
NLD to victory. Hailed as a momentous step towards democracy, the new government was
expected to initiate an upward trajectory of economic development. Within its first year, it
implemented economic reform, strategies for the health and education sectors, affirmed its
priorities for nutrition and rural development, and accelerated peace process efforts (World
Bank 2017). However, the country continues to face considerable development challenges,
including poverty, malnourishment, low education rates, and internal displacement which are
reinforced by a complex array of social, cultural and historical factors. DFAT (2017)
recognizes 3 mutually reinforcing objectives for its aid program in Myanmar: enhancing
human development, promoting peace and stability, and promoting inclusive economic
growth and government management. The second, peace and stability, is crucial for the
achievement of inclusive and equitable growth. A primary barrier to such is the complex
ethnic politics and armed conflict that continues to divide the country (Farrelly 2014: 251).
Most recently, the case of the Rohingya has emerged as a barrier to sustainable peace.
The Rohingya are a Muslim ethnic population whom are disputably indigenous to
Rakhine State, formerly Arakan. The state and non-state armed group (NSAG) inflicted
persecution of the Rohingya is now an established fact worldwide. Since the Burma
Citizenship Law of 1982 rendered them stateless, the Rohingya have become vulnerable to
systemic persecution, with substantial implications for international development activities.
International media and human rights bodies have heavily documented pivotal crises
affecting the Rohingya, as they occur. There have been many ‘ethnic conflicts’ in Myanmar
since decolonisation, yet none have garnered such concentrated international attention.
Identifying the uniqueness of the Rohingya problem is vital in pursuing long-term solutions.
The situation of this ethnic minority in relation to others is relatively unexplored.
IID has conducted work in Kachin and northern Shan States, areas home to the Kachin
Page 6 of 40
and Wa ethnic minorities which both share with the Rohingya cultures that are distinct from
the majority Bamar, complex histories of conflict, and a high level of cross-border mobility.
Unlike the Rohingya, the Kachin and Wa are recognized ethnic minorities. These groups are
the focus of this research report. The broad objective of this report is to provide a preliminary
answer into the question: what are the factors that underlie the disproportionate treatment
of the Rohingya in contrast to the Kachin and Wa? Both the Kachin, Wa, and most recently
the Rohingya, have recently been involved in armed struggles against the Tatmadaw
(Myanmar Armed Forces), which tend to be branded as ‘ethnic conflict’. This report aims to
transcend this generalisation to explore interrelated dimensions between ethnic groups. The
research will be presented in the form of an overview of the methodology, a background of
ethnicity in Myanmar, and findings structured as three sub-sections on the Rohingya, Kachin
and Wa respectively. The discussion will analyse and expand upon key findings in relation to
the research question. Finally, conclusions and recommendations will be made, extrapolating
the information presented to the broader aims of IID, the international development field,
and key stakeholders.
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Methodology
This research is qualitative as it seeks to uncover underlying reasons rather than
drawing definitive conclusions. It is pragmatic, using whatever sources are both readily
available and relevant. The limited time and nature of the internship on which this report is
based did not allow primary research. Instead, secondary research was relied upon, reviewing
available work. This took the form of texts found through the University of Adelaide’s online
library database resource. Academic journal articles, factual and anecdotal books, online
news media, and government publications were used in addition to the personal
understandings of John Leake. The academic work of Mikael Gravers of Aarhus University,
Denmark and the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies was particularly useful in informing this
report, as was a book, published by Thaksin University and edited by Trevor Gibson et al
(2016), that sparked IID’s initial interest into this research.
This research is intended to be both preliminary, seeking to determine what is already

known. It is also exploratory, addressing a problem lacking an established research base. It
utilises abductive reasoning as it takes the initial observation of disproportionate persecution
and seeks to establish the most likely causes. A comparative approach was adopted in the
discussion by identifying similarities and differences across the case studies of three, intra-
national ethnic minorities.
There are significant limitations to this research including the absence of primary
research, a general scarcity of literature available on the Wa, and the inability to engage with
sources written in Burmese, including many government and local media sources.
Page 8 of 40
Figure 1: Map depicting the states, regions, zones and divisions of Myanmar. Source: (MIMU 2013)
Page 9 of 40
Figure 2: Map depicting the topography of Myanmar. Source: (MIMU 2013)
Page 10 of 40
Background
Myanmar’s geography, bordering Bangladesh, India, China, Laos, and Thailand, has
lent itself to a high level of ethnic diversity (Smith 1994: 17) (see Figure 1). Its subnational
political structure consists of seven regions and seven states based on ethnic identity (Burke
2016: 262; Holliday 2014: 118). The majority Burman or Bamar comprise 60 – 70% of the
population and reside predominantly in the Yangon, Mandalay, Ayarwaddy, Sagaing, Magway,
Bago, and Tanintharyi regions (Walton 2013: 6) (see Figure 1). Additionally, there are seven
‘dominant’ ethnic groups: Shan, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon and Rakhine, who mainly
occupy their semi-autonomous, respectively named states. Five self-administered zones and
one self-administered division (Wa Self-Administered Division) exist for “national races with
a suitable population” (Gravers & Ytzen 2014: 79) (see Figure 1). While the Bamar
dominated regions are central, the states, zones and divisions assigned to the minority ethnic
groups constitute the mountainous borderlands (IWGIA n.d.).
This heterogeneity has significantly featured in Myanmar’s political history. Renard

(1987) describes their minority problems as some of the “most perplexing” and notes that,
prior to colonisation by the British from 1824 to 1886, ethnic identity was not as correlated
with political identity (Renard 1987: 255). While pre-colonial wars were fought between
kingdoms, Walton (2013: 7) refrains from describing them as ethnically driven. Many argue
that the politicization of ethnicity arose during colonialism, when policies were pursued upon
ethnic lines (Taylor 2005: 269; Holliday 204: 117). It was the colonial rulers that traversed
the country, documenting cross-ethnic cultural differences for the purposes of effective
population management. This strategy has been described as ‘divide and rule’ (Gravers
2015: 7). A two-tiered administration system was established, separating ‘Ministerial Burma’
inhabited mainly by Bamar, from the hilly ‘Frontier Areas’, occupied by ethnic minorities
(Walton 2013: 7). In Ministerial Burma, a form of parliamentary Home Rule was
implemented, while the Frontier Areas were left to the devices of traditional authorities. This
resulted in an ‘ethnic division of labour’, had implications for their relative rates of
development, but most relevantly recast ethnic identities that were previously more
fluctuating and contingent (Lichter 2007; Smith 1994: 22).
The opposition to British rule in the early decades of the twentieth century was largely
in the form of Bamar nationalism (Walton 2013: 8). For example, during the anti-colonial
strikes of 1938, the Dobama (We Burmans) movement adopted the slogans ‘Burma for
Burmans and ‘Master Race We Are, We Burmans (Gravers 2015: 8). By 1942, a Bamar group
allied the Japanese invasion that forced the British, and their Indian and non-Bamar ethnic
group forces, out of Myanmar. By the end of WWII, Bamar, non-Bamar ethnic groups and
British officers then joined to expel the Japanese (Walton 2013: 9). During independence
Page 11 of 40
negotiations, the Panglong Conference and Agreement of 1947 was supposed to represent
an inclusive forum for ethnic groups to determine their united political objectives for
independence. However, the resulting quasi-federal arrangements in the 1947 Constitution
were largely unsatisfactory (Holliday 2014: 117). In addition to the Bamar General Aung San,
only the Shan, Kachin, and Chin minority groups were present, lacking Karen and Mon
representation (Wilson 2017: 142). Ethnic unrest, exacerbated by ‘Burmanisation’ policies,
erupted in Kayin State during the late 1940s (see Figure 1). It was also around this time that
the 1948 Citizenship laws came into effect, defining the indigenous races of Burma as (see
Table 1). By the turn of the 1950s, ethnic discord was extensive, and by 1962, the perception
that insurgent ethnic groups seeking to secede were going to divide the Union, contributed
to the military coup of General Ne Win (Holliday 2014: 118; Gravers & Ytzen 2014: 63).
Tension between ethnic groups continued from the 1962 coup to the State Law and Order
Restoration Council/State Peace and Development Council (SLORC/SPDC) military
government lasting from 1988 to 2011.
In 1982, the new nationality law replaced that of 1948, asserting the right of the State
Council to determine who qualifies as a ‘national race’. The law demarcates 135 ‘national
races’, or taing – yin – thar meaning ‘sons/offspring of the geographical division’– an
estimate typically cited for which there is no reliable evidence (Smith 1994: 18;
Thawnghmung 2016: 528). This figure is disputed as a likely residual of the aforementioned
‘divide and rule’ strategy, which functioned to diminish the presence and impact of larger
groups and discourage unity between distinct ones (Walton 2013: 6). Those belonging to
these 135 races are entitled to de jure citizenship and the entailed rights, however the extent
to which those on the periphery can access de facto citizenship is questionable (Holliday
2014: 404). Descendants of migrants is not included as a category nor is mixed ethnicity
(Burke 2016: 262). In any case, it has been argued that in Myanmar, the Bamar hold a
structurally privileged position in society akin to “whiteness” in Western societies. (Walton
2013: 18). Religion plays a substantial role in this identity, evidenced by the common adage
“to be Bamar is to be a Buddhist” and most of the population subscribing to Buddhism (see
Figure 5) (Taylor 2005: 264). fe
It is important to clarify what relevant terms mean in the Myanmar context, as

interpretations differ across academia. The word ‘ethnic’ originates from the Greek ethnos –
“a constituent of a nation” (Gibson et al. 2016: 49). Various criteria have been postulated as
composing ethnicity. Burke (2016: 261) employs the term in a constructivist sense, meaning
that features and distinctions between ethnic groups are socially created. While enduring,
they are changeable. This holds true in Myanmar, as evidenced by the previously detailed
influence of the British. The flexibility and hybridity often underlying individual ethnic
Page 12 of 40
identities are well documented (Taylor 2005: 263). Intermarriage has contributed to an
absence of ethnic ‘purity’, yet mixed race is not assigned a separate category (Holliday 2013:
408). Thus, self-identifying with ethnicity plays a critical role in the sense of belonging to a
community with a common culture and history (Gravers 2016: 2). The distinction between
concepts of race and ethnicity is important, with race generally describing a more permanent,
category founded in physical features (Holliday 2014: 415). ‘Indigenous’ is a descriptive
category that Myanmar’s government and civil society refrains from using, in favour of the
135 ‘national races’ including the Bamar. Thus, everyone is regarded as ‘indigenous, bar the
Indian and Chinese majorities, rendering the terms unhelpful (IGWIA n.d.: 341; Smith 1994:
36). Instead, non-Bamar ethnic groups are labelled ‘ethnic minorities’. Renard (1987: 257)
explains how, although minority is technically defined as a group different from the larger
group it is part of, either racially, religiously, politically, etc., it implies more than mere
numbers, inferring a level of disadvantage or antagonization. Thus, as Smith (1994: 36) also
concludes, the term ‘ethnic minority’ will be used to denote all other groups distinct from the
Bamar majority, including the case-studies of the Rohingya, Kachin and Wa.
Another important note concerns the theoretical status of the Rohingya, Kachin and
Wa as ethnic minorities. Renowned liberal political theorist Will Kymlicka distinguishes
between minorities that are immigrant groups, historic national minorities such as the Welsh
and Scottish in Britain, and indigenous peoples such as the Aboriginal people of Australia.
While the extent to which this framework, which was developed as a model for
multiculturalism in liberal democratic societies, is appropriate for Myanmar is arguable, it is
useful for clarifying the variations within the term ‘minority’. In Myanmar’s case, the national
minority and indigenous categories are synonymous, and describe the status of the Kachin
and Wa (Holliday 2014: 414). He also identifies a fourth ‘metic group’, whom are typically
established but denied citizenship and stigmatized. The Rohingya are given as example of
‘metics’ (Kymlicka & He 2005: 53).
People Main language Language family Native speakers (million)

Bamar Burmese Tibeto-Burman 33.0
Rohingya Rohingya Indo-Aryan/European 1.80
Kachin Jingpho Tibeto-Burman 0.94
Wa Wa Austro-Asiatic 0.90
Table 1: The main language (families) of the Bamar majority and Rohingya, Kachin and Wa minorities. Data
source: (Simon & Fennig 2017).
Page 13 of 40
Figure 3: Map depicting main spoken languages of Myanmar. Source: (MIMU 2015).
Page 14 of 40
Legislation Implications for case studies

Date Name Relevant clause(s) Rohingya Kachin Wa
1947 Panglong 5. “Though the Governor's Executive
Council will be augmented as agreed
NA Promised full
autonomy
Unclear
Agreement above, it will not operate in respect of

the Frontier Areas in any manner which
would deprive any portion of those
Areas of the autonomy which it now
enjoys in internal administration Full
autonomy in internal administration for
the Frontier Areas is accepted in
principle.”
1948 Union III) 1. “For the purposes of section 11 of

the Constitution the expression ‘any of
Not classified as
an indigenous
Classified as an
indigenous race
Classified as an
indigenous race
Citizenship the indigenous races of Burma’ shall race but entitled and granted and granted
Act mean the Arakanese, Burmese, Chin, to citizenship, if in citizenship citizenship
Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon or Shan possession of the
race and such racial group as has correct
settled in any of the territories included documentation
within the Union as their permanent (Gibson et al
home from a period anterior to 1823 A. 2016)
D. (1185 B.E.)”
4. “Any person, who under sub-section

(i), (ii) and (iii) of section 11 of the
Constitution, is a citizen of the Union or
who, under sub-section (iv) of section
11 of the Constitution, is entitled to
elect for citizenship and who has been
granted under the Union Citizenship
(Election) Act, 1948 a certificate of
citizenship, or who has been granted a
certificate of naturalization or a
certificate of citizenship or who has
otherwise been granted the status of a
citizen under this Act, shall continue to
be a citizen of the Union, until he or she
loses that status under the provisions of
this Act.”
1982 Burma II) 3. “Nationals such as the Kachin,
Kayah, Karen, Chin, Burman, Mon,
Not classified as
an indigenous
As above As above
Citizenship Rakhine or Shan and ethnic groups as race but legally

Law have settled in any of the territories should be granted
included within the State as their citizenship
permanent home from a period anterior according to the
to 1185 B.E., 1823 A.D. are Burma 1948 Citizenship
citizens.” Act.
6. “A person who is already a citizen on

the date this Law cones into force is a
citizen. Action, however shall be taken
under section 18 for infringement of the
provision of that section”
2015 Race and Monogamy Law: Criminalises having

more than one spouse or living with an
Prohibited from
practising the
NA NA
Religion unmarried partner other than the Muslim custom of

Protection spouse polygamy
Laws Religious Conversion Law: Requires Limits freedom of Limits freedom of Limits freedom of
(Equality citizens to undergo an interview, religion religion religion
undertake religious study and finally
Myanmar obtain a certificate from Registration
2016) Board to change their religion.
Interfaith Marriage Law: Regulates the

marriage of Buddhist women to non-
Buddhist men.
Table 2: Past and current Myanmar government legislation and its implications for the Rohingya, Kachin, and
Wa.
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Findings
Rohingya
The Rohingya comprise
approximately 800 thousand people,
concentrated in the Maungdaw,
Buthidaung and Rathedaung
townships (Mayu Frontier) of Rakhine
State (see Figure 4). Another 300
thousand reside in Bangladesh
(Kipgen 2014: 237). Rakhine State is
in southwest Myanmar, bordering
Bangladesh, Chin State, Magway and
Bago Regions and the Bay of Bengal
(Thawnghmung 2016: 529).
Historically, it has been relatively
autonomous due to the mountainous
buffer between it and the centre (see
Figure 2). The dominant ethnic group
are the Rakhine ethnic minority and
various other groups, including the
Kaman Muslims, are recognised as Figure 4: Map depicting townships of Rakhine State. Source:
sub-groups. The Rohingya claim to be (MIMU 2016)
a national minority, yet are regarded by the State and their adversaries as immigrants, and
treated as a ‘metic’ group. (Gibson 2016: 2). The term ‘Rohingya’ is itself politically charged.
It is a historical term, derived from Rohang—the old word for Rakhine State. Despite being
accepted in 1950s and 1960s, its validity is now rejected by the government, ethnic
Rakhines and other Buddhists (Ahsan Ullah 2016: 286; Dapice 2015: 7). Instead, the
government identifies this group as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, passing through via
the northern Mayu Frontier (Kipgen 2014: 236-7; Thawnghmung 2016: 527). Leaders of the
Rohingya community have promoted the ethnic label to foster group solidarity and assert
their identity as a legitimate minority. Resultantly, the international community has adopted
the name, yet many Muslims in Rakhine do not use the term (Burke 2016: 265). Rohingyas
described as distinctive due to their religion, customs and physical features (Holliday 2010:
121). They practice a “Sufi-inflected” (CFR 2017) version of Sunni Islam and their ‘Rohingya’
language is the only spoken in Myanmar, belonging to the Indo-European language (see Table
1 and Figure 3). Literature on their cultural traditions is sparse, however Farzana’s fieldwork
Page 16 of 40
(2015: 299), notes the taranas or songs played with traditional tabla and juri instruments
that are common among the Rohingya refugees. Physically, linguistically and culturally they
are like South Asians (Bengalis), and the majority are purportedly descended from Bengali
immigrants (Parnini 2013: 281; Thawnghmung 2016: 527). This has contributed to
widespread negative stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination (Gibson 2016). As a result,
their history is marked by episodes of forced displacement (Ahsan Ullah 2016: 287). Many
have crossed into Bangladesh, where they are also not recognised as indigenous (see
refugee camps in Figure 5). Thousands also attempt to flee to Thailand or Malaysia on boats
each year, in 2013, approximately 35,000, many not surviving the journeys (Southwick 2015:
141). Thawnghmung (2016) has written an entire paper on the contested historical
narratives regarding the Rohingya, which is a primary point of difference between them and
the Kachin and Wa. Nevertheless, a basic history is given below:
Timeline of key historical junctures:
Pre-modern period: There is evidence

of a great diversity of ethnic origins and
social backgrounds of Muslims in
Rakhine State (Thawnghmung 2016;
531). Allies of the Rohingya believe that
they settled in Myanmar during the
seventh, eighth, or ninth century and
mixed with Bengalis, Persians, Moghuls,
Turks and Pathans (Ahsan Ullah 2016:
Figure 5: Rohingya refugee camps in Chittagong, 286; Thawnghmung 2014: 535).
Bangladesh. Source: (Joyce/Getty Images 2017)
1823: Proponents of the Rohingya
cause cite evidence of their presence in Myanmar prior to this date, qualifying them for
recognition as an indigenous minority. Such evidence includes “eighth century Rohingya
stone monuments” conducted by Australian National University (ANU) and linguistic work
conducted by a colonial scholar (Green 2013: 9).
1920s: Significant numbers of Muslim Bengalis migrate to Rakhine State from Chittagong,
following British annexation, where they settle with the existing Muslim population (Smith
1994: 55).
Page 17 of 40
1942: According to some Rakhines and others in Myanmar, and in the context of ethnic
polarization, Muslims conduct a massacre, although it is unclear towards whom it is directed
(Burke 2016: 264).
1946: A Muslim delegation visits Pakistan to discuss the incorporation of the Mayu Frontier
into territory that now belongs to Bangladesh (Thawnghmung 2014: 335). Their request was
not supported due to prior reassurance given by General Aung San (Gibson et al. 2016: 67)
1947: Rohingya activists create The Mujahid Party for the purposes of demanding an
autonomous Muslim state of ‘Arakanistan’ in Rakhine State, recognition as a national
minority and resettlement of Muslim refugees in Rakhine State. Their requests are ignored
1948: Local mujahedeen are involved in the ‘Mujahid Rebellion’, taking to arms to advance
their separatist cause (Yegar 1972: 98).
1948: The first independent government of U Nu recognises the Rohingya’s legitimacy and
awards temporary citizenship to Muslims in Buthiaung and Maungdaw townships through the
issuing of temporary registration certificates (TRCs), which allow them to vote (Thawnghmung
2016: 531; Parnini 2013: 282)
1962: The military coup led by General Ne Win, imposes restrictive policies for foreigners,
including the Rohingya. Trade and education is nationalised and ‘illegal’ immigration
curtailed (Thawnghmung 2016: 531). Mayu Frontier Muslims once again propose an
autonomous Muslim state (Thawnghmung 2014: 335).
1978: The Tatmadaw carry out the Nagamin (operation Dragon King) campaign. It involves
wides-spread identity card checks targeted at Muslims, causing mass deaths and expulsion
of Rohingya, and triggering the movement of 200, 000 to Bangladesh (Smith 1994: 56;
Parnini 2013: 286).
1979: Pressure from the UN causes the government to initiate UNHCR-led operation Shwe
Hintha, taking back Rohingya refugees and sparking initial debates about their origins
1982: The enactment of a new Citizenship Law denies Rohingya both full and associated
citizenship (the Kaman Muslims were awarded and continue to enjoy full citizenship) (see
Table 2).
1991 to 1992: The SLORC military junta implements a border development program that
Muslim leaders claim aimed to eradicate the Muslim population. This triggers a fresh exodus
Page 18 of 40
of around 250,000 more Rohingya to Bangladesh. Some are unable to register and take their
own shelters in Chittagong (Parnini 2013: 281, 291) (see Figure 5).
1994: The government issues TRCS to Rohingyas (Jones 2015:70).
1995: By July, 75% of Rohingyas who fled to Bangladesh in 1991/2 have been repatriated
to Myanmar due to negotiations with the UNHCR (Parnini 2013: 291).
2008: Once again, the government issues TRCs to Rohingyas, granting them the right to vote
in the 2008 referendum and 2010 election (Gibson et al. 2016).
2012: Two major incidences of anti-Muslim violence take place in Rakhine State,
perpetrated by Buddhist networks, ethnic Rakhine political networks, and in some cases
supported by government forces (Holliday 2014: 409). On June 3rd, it is sectarian clashes in
4 townships, and on October 23rd, it is a more methodical effort launched against both the
Rohingya and Kaman Muslims in 9 townships. In both cases, it results in the killing of over
200 and the internal displacement of around 125,000 (Holliday 2014: 409; Southwick
2015: 139). The Bangladesh government cuts off all humanitarian assistance to Rohingya
to minimise ‘pull factors’ (Southwick 2015: 141).
2013: The government implements policies that restrict Rohingya couples in Buthidaung
and Maungdaw townships without citizenship to two children (Kipgen 2014: 244).
2014: The government conducts the Population and Housing Census, requiring Rohingya to
either identify as ‘Bengalis’ or not be counted (Southwick 2015: 140).
2015: The government introduces four so-called ‘race and religion’ laws targeting Muslims
(Thwanghmung 2016: 532) (see Table 2). They also revoke the previously administered
TRCs.
Page 19 of 40
Kachin
The Kachin are a group of 1 to
1.5 million people that reside
predominantly in the hilly areas of
Kachin State and Northern Shan State
(see Figure 1 & 2). They are thus
referred to as one of the ‘hill’ or
‘frontier peoples’ of Myanmar. Their
traditional heartland is called ‘The
Triangle’ in English and is located
around the upper reaches of the
Irawaddy River, with a comparable
level of isolation to the centre as the
Rohingya. Due to the Kachin’s border
location, they have close ties with
communities in India and China (Moe
2014: 262). Following the
establishment of China and the former
Burma in 1949 and 1948, the Kachin
Figure 3: Map depicting IDP sites in Kachin and northern Shan
population was essentially divided into States (August 2016). Source: (UNOCHA 2016)
both sides. As such, the boundary
between China, specifically the Dai-Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture of Yunnan, is linked to the
Kachin through social, religious, political, and business networks (Dean 2005: 810). Unlike
the Rohingya, the Kachin are recognised as a group in their neighbouring State, albeit under
different names and groupings. After fieldwork with the Kachin, Dean (2005: 810) concludes
that they have dealt with the physical national border that divides their homeland by
constructing intangible ethnic borders and networks. Kachin run all manner of businesses
both in Yunnan and other Chinese areas and the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO)
has liaison offices there (Moe 2014: 263). Within this group there are six sub-groups:
“Jinghpaw, Lawngwaw, Lachik, Zaiwa, Lisu and Nun-Rawng”, which have have come to form
a strong collective political identity, connected by a clan system (Moe 2014: 263; Smith
1994: 38). Most Kachin speak the Jingpho language or a dialect of it (see Table 1). Unlike
the Rohingya, there is no question about the Kachin’s legitimacy as an ethnic minority—
indeed they belong to the same Tibeto-Burman ethnolinguistic family as the Bamar. This
legitimacy is further demonstrated by the prevalence of Kachin society as a subject of
anthropological studies, notably in the work of Edmund Leach and Jonathon Friedman
(Nugent 1982). Despite initial resistance, many Kachin people converted to Christianity
Page 20 of 40
during the colonial period, and two thirds of their population now identify with the religion
(Smith 1994: 38). Although Aung-Thwin & Aung-Thwin (2013:50) suggest that most
indigenous Christians still believe in some form of animism. A notable feature of the Kachin
is their political group (KIO) and associated military branch, the Kachin Independence Army
(KIA), that were established in 1961 in response to perceived infringements on their
autonomy (Gravers & Ytzen 2014: 167). While the capital of Kachin State is controlled by the
central government, various areas on the fringes are under KIO/KIA control (Ho 2016: 89).
Like the Rohingya, the Kachin have actively pursued an independent nation-state. Their
nationalist desires were recognized in the 1947 Constitution with the designation of the
89,042km of territory for Kachin State. However, their situation is largely characterized by a
vying for power with the central government, with period of protracted conflict and
intermittent ceasefires. Within Myanmar, this sporadic conflict has internally displaced tens
of thousands of Kachin (see Figure 5). Not unlike that of the Rohingya, the ‘Kachin’ dilemma
also has significant regional cross-border implications, mainly for the Chinese who do not
recognize internally displaced persons (IDPs) on their side of the border (Diantan & Yanjing
2013). The Kachin’s history is complex and spans back centuries. However, a brief picture is
given below:
British rule: The colonial army and military police prefer recruiting Kachin (along with Karen
and Chin) over the Bamar and create ethnic regiments (Smith 1994: 23). This fosters a
heightened sense of pride and loyalty to the British.
WWII: The ‘Northern Kachin Levies’ Special Forces are created to fight for Britain against the
Japanese.
1947: Six Kachin delegates attend the Panglong Conference and sign the resulting Panglong
Agreement to form the Union of Burma (Kipgen 2015: 22).
In the drafting of the 1948 Constitution, the Kachin are denied the right to succession given
to the Shan and Kayah (Gravers & Ytzen 2014: 183).
1960/1: The KIO and KIA insurgent army are formed, partly due to the nullification of the
Panglong agreement, and establishment of Buddhism as the official religion (Kipgen 2015:
22)). They commence their armed movement against the government and form their own
government near the Chinese border (Ho 2016: 89).
Page 21 of 40
1991: SLORC carry out large-scale attacks on KIO bases, leading to the defection of the KIO’s
4th Brigade and a peace agreement (Smith 1994: 40).
1988 to 1992: One hundred thousand Kachin are displaced because of counter-insurgency
efforts, with around 11,000 escaping to China.
1994: A ceasefire is agreed upon, leaving the KIO and KIA controlling essentially
independent territory in Kachin State (Moe 2014: 262). Other Kachin NSAGs the New
Democratic Army-Kachin (NDAK) and Kachin Defence Army (KDA) also sign on (Kipgen 2015:
23).
2008: In response to pressure from the government to participate in the Border Guard Force,
Kachin and Wa leaders send a letter to Beijing, asking for support in establishing a similar
autonomy such that Hong Kong has within China (Moe 2014: 217).
2009: The KIA refuses to join the state’s Border Guard Force Scheme, established under the
new constitution (Moe 2014: 265).
2011: The cease-fire is broken, due to confusion over construction of the Myitsone dam in
Kachin territory. Over 100,000 Kachin are displaced, with many fleeing to Yunnan, China.
Churches and schools are destroyed (Moe 2014: 265).
In response to resistance from civil society and anti-Chinese tensions, President Thein Sein
suspends the US/Chinese $3.6 billion hydroelectric dam project that would have caused
environmental damage in Northern Kachin State (Lintner 2014: 96; Kiik 2016).
2012: There is sporadic conflict in Kachin state. The Tatmadaw attacks KIO HQ to ‘give it a
lesson’. Some artillery fire lands on Chinese soil, sparking Chinese involvement in 2013
facilitating peace talks. There are 5,000 government troops reportedly killed during KIA
conflict during this year (Moe 2014: 266).
2013: More peace talks occur in Myitkyina, capital of Kachin state. There is no real outcome
for peace, due to disagreement regarding the term ‘ceasefire agreement’. They do agree to
form a ‘Peace Technical Team’ composed of members of the MPC and KIO officers (Moe
2014: 267).
There is an altercation between Tatmadaw and KIA forces in Machanpaw Township.

Tatmadaw/KIA clashes during 2013 and 2014 were over deployment territories and
management of natural resources and trade.
New peace talks are held in Myitkyina. The UNFC outline conditions for previously agreed
upon ceasefire (Moe 2014: 267).
Page 22 of 40
2014: The KIO announce they will not be participating in the census due to their exclusion
from discussions with census officials and because of the armed conflicts in KIO territory
(Moe 2014: 269).
Figure 4: Ethnic militant groups of Myanmar. Source: (Colling 2016)
Page 23 of 40
Wa
The Wa are a group totalling 1 to 200 thousand that mainly reside in the autonomous
Wa State in the hills of Shan State, eastern Kachin State and Yunnan Province in China
(Gravers & Ytzen 2014: 158). They speak one of three (Parauk or Baraog, Vo, Awa) varieties
of Wa (see Table 2), but their working language is Mandarin. Like the Kachin, the Wa are
perceived by the majority Bamar and the international community as ‘hill peoples’, inhabiting
the mountainous land east of Mandalay and Lashio, north of the prior Kengtung and west of
Puer in China (Fiskesjö 2015: 1). The war-time practice of ‘headhunting’ or kieb ndoung, or
maog came to characterise outsiders’ early perceptions of the Wa, such as Winnington’s
1962 account. It was regarded both as primitive and ‘grotesque’, as well as a cultural
spectacle. In China, Wa headhunting paraphernalia features in themes parks for tourists
(Fiskesjö 2015: 509). Anthropological-style studies and accounts on the Wa’s cultural history
have documented their ancient rock art, deep oral traditions, and writing system which was
‘perfected’ by American missionaries to better represent the spoken language (Fiskesjö
2013). During colonialism, their geographical isolation meant that they were largely left alone
by the British, who did not control their land nor outline their border with China. This also
meant that they were not exposed to the same level of Christian missionary engagement,
and thus have retained their traditional Animist beliefs. Instead, from the period of
approximately 1971 to 1989, they were highly involved with the communist insurgency led
by the Chinese-supported BCP with whom they formed a strong alliance, even crediting them
with the eradication of their feudalist system, headhunting practices, and tribal conflicts.
Their presence also had the effect of uniting the multiple, distinct Wa groups in the region,
who had previously been loosely dispersed tribes (Renard 2013: 146-7).
Along with subsistence agriculture, they have an extended history of poppy cultivation,
exporting both opium and mining products (Fiskesjö 2015: 2). Their NSAG, the United Wa
State Army (UWSA), has played a large role in drug production. It is also comparable to that
of the Kachin, but is three times larger, making it the largest private army in the world (see
Figure 6). Their links with China are also comparable, having also had their independent land
divided into two because of the creation of the formerly Burmese and Chinese states
(Fiskesjö 2015: 2). While not recognised as one of the eight national races, they are
recognised as one of the 135 indigenous races, and furthermore, as having a large enough
population to warrant their own self-administered division (Gravers & Ytzen 2014: 79). They
are regarded by the neighbouring ethnic groups in Shan State as indigenous and having lived
there before the rest (Fiskesjö 2015: 2). In China, they are also recognised as an ethnic
minority, with similar arrangements of limited autonomy. While knowledge is sparse of the
Page 24 of 40
Wa’s early history, they are believed to have inhabited Myanmar since “the beginning of time”
(Fiskesjö 2013: 3).
1946: The Wa are represented in the Panglong Conference via the attendance of Shan
princes (Gravers & Ytzen 2014: 183).
1947: Wa leaders are interviewed by the ‘Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry’, in

preparation for the drafting of the 1948 Constitution, during which they state their
independence requests, and allegedly repeat the statement “we are wild people” (Fiskesjö
2013: 3).
Early 1960s: Traditional Wa land is split by the newly demarcated border between China
and Myanmar (Fiskesjö 2015: 499).
Late 1960s: The Burmese Communist Party (BCP), which is heavily supported by China,
loses its headquarters in central Myanmar, turning its attention to Wa land instead (Renard
2013: 146).
1967: Anti-Chinese riots take place in Rangoon, due to protestation in a school over Chinese
students wearing Chairman Mao badges (Smith 1994: 26).
1969: The BCP joins forces with guerrilla Wa militia leaders (Renard 2013: 147).
1989: The Wa split with the BCP, and agree upon a ceasefire with Myanmar’s military junta.
The UWSP/A is formed and the Wa Special Region 2 is created (Fiskesjö 2013: 3).
1990s: The UWSA is involved in heroin production
1993: The Wa Self-Administered Division is created. 1 of 6 of its kind, special status (Kramer
2015: 358) (Smith 2014: 60)
1994: Displacement due to political and economic crises (Smith 1994: 30).
2005: The UWSA imposes a ban on poppy cultivation, slowing opium production. However,
production has been increasing in recent years, funding NSAGs (Gravers 2014b: 150).
However, Chinese objections seemingly influenced the UWSA to not participate in the UNFC.
The Kachin are active participants (Moe 2014: 272).
Page 25 of 40
2008: In response to pressure from the government to participate in the Border Guard Force,
Kachin and Wa leaders send a letter to Beijing, asking for support in establishing a similar
autonomy as Hong Kong has within China (Moe 2014: 217).
Discussion
Racial dimension
A foremost and most palpable dimension underlying the disproportionate treatment of
the Rohingya in contrast to the Kachin and Wa, is the physical dissimilarities signalling racial
difference, that may create a visual trigger for underlying prejudices towards the Rohingya.
Farrelly (2014: 264) notes the extra hate directed towards the Rohingya over any other ethnic
minority. In the collective conscious of ethnic Rakhines, there is a stereotype of Rohingya
perceiving them as of disparate physical appearance. The accuracy of this is disputed,
according to Gibson et al (2016). However, it does appear that the distinction between
ethnicity and race is pertinent. Although the Rohingya, Kachin, and Wa are all ethnically
different from the majority Bamar, the Rohingya are perceived as the most racially different.
The South Asian origins of the Rohingya, who are typically darker in skin colour, are seen to
distinguish them from the Bamar in a way that the Kachin and Wa. Although in China, the Wa
ethnicity has been ‘commodified’ for tourists as “dark exotics” due to their darker tones
(Thwanghmung 2016: 528; Fiskesjö 2015: 512). The hate speech directed towards the
Rohingya by nationalist Buddhist movements are varied in nature, with insults including
“crude and savage”, and “a most dangerous and fearful poison” (Southwick 2015: 139).
However, many of the terms they use have distinctly racist undertones including “Muslim
dogs”, and the racial slur “kala” or “black foreigners from India” (Gravers 2015: 13). Such
language is often propagated through online forums, including Facebook (Holland 2014). The
government itself has even referred to the Rohingya as ‘kala’ in a publication (Hindstrom
2012). This issue is exacerbated by the method of self-identification which means there is
no objective way to distinguish the Rohingya identity, fostering racial wide-spread profiling.
Religious dimension
As evidenced by the term “Muslim dogs” the racial dimension is heavily correlated with
that of religion. As Taylor (2005: 269) notes, perceptions of religion and ethnicity coincide in
Myanmar. Since pre-colonial times, religion has been an institution through which ethnic
elites have built political bases. Buddhism is the dominant religion, comprising the
overwhelming majority (see Figure 5). Prime minister U Nu declared it the state religion, and
the Buddhist monks are politically authoritative, touting the phrase “to be Burman is to be
Page 26 of 40
Buddhist” (Ahsan Ullah 2016: 289; Gravers 2015: 8). As shown in Table 2, recently
implemented and heavily condemned ‘Race and Religion Protection Laws’ evidence the
saliency of religion in Myanmar society. There has been a tendency for international
organisations and media to blame Buddhist discrimination, driven by nationalist movements
like Buddhist 969 and the Ma Ba Tha using their influence as a platform to spread anti-
Muslim propaganda. As shown in Figure 5, although the total number of Muslims is actually
higher in Kachin State, and the Muslim percentage of all states similar in Rakhine State the
Buddhist percentage in Rakhine State is markedly higher. However, anti-Muslim violence in
Myanmar is not a new occurrence (Green 2013: 95). It was supposedly sparked around
1931 when a book was published by a Muslim disparaging Buddhism (Gravers 2015: 7).
However, if it is the religion of the Rohingya that is a primary factor separating them from the
Christian Kachin and Animist Wa, the question arises of: what sets apart the Rohingya from
other Muslim groups?
The ‘Kaman’ are another Muslim group who inhabit southern Rakhine state. Their
appearance is Burmese, whereas Rohingya appear more South Asian. Their presence in
Myanmar dates to the 17th century when they were invited by the Arakan monarchy to work
in the palace guard. They differ from the Rohingya in that they are recognized as an ethnic
group and thus have citizenship status. (Dapice 2015: 7). They have also been subject to
racist state-sponsored violence, but not to the same extent (Green 2013: 95; Burke 2016:
265). The ‘Panthays’ or ‘Chinese Muslims’ are a group who inhabit the south-western
Chinese province of Yunnan, and along the border with Myanmar in the Shan Hills. They are
typically Chinese in appearance but some resemble Arabs/Turks. Proud of their Arab origins,
many speak in Arabic, and have mosques. They have a verifiable 150-year history in
Myanmar, and maintained valuable, Chinese-Burman trade routes during British rule (Yegar
1966). Like the Rohingya, they do not hold citizenship yet are not subject to comparable
persecution. There is a tendency for younger generation to assimilate with Burmese Buddhist
majority, thus are seeking recognition as an official ethnic group to protect their ethnic
identity (Mullins & Aye 2014). The ‘Pashu’ or ‘Burmese Malays” are a Muslim group who
inhabit Tanintharyi Region in the south (Hunter 2014: 89), and the ‘Zerbadi’ Muslims refer
to those people with foreign Muslim fathers and mothers from Myanmar.
Thus, while religion is relevant, it is the historical narrative locating Muslim groups in
Myanmar’s history, classifying them as indigenous, that is most important. The histories of
the Kaman, Panthays, and Pashu have excluded them from the previously mentioned
negative associations of Islam that the Rohingya are conflated with. Instead, the specific
history of the Rohingya is tied to a problematic, extremist version of Islam. There is a local
Muslim maxim: "If the Burmese army sees a Muslim in the village he is an alien; if he is fishing
Page 27 of 40
on the river he is a smuggler; and if he is working in the forest he is an insurgent." (Smith

1994: 56). It seems that the Rohingya, identifiable through their physical features, have
become the scapegoat for a general fear of Islam.
Additionally, considering the hegemonic status of Buddhism in majority ethnic identity,

the question exists: why haven’t the Buddhists campaigned against other ethnic groups with
a religion, other than Buddhism—namely, the Christian Kachin and Animist Wa. It is obvious
that these religions do not carry with them comparable implications of mujahedeen and
Islamic State-building. However, these religions have historically also been perceived as an
attack on Bamar culture, at least in the case of the Kachin (Gravers 2014a: 144). The spread
of Christianity under colonialism saw Christian networks, in addition to the monkhood,
gaining importance in the civil society sector, establishing schools and churches (Gravers &
Ytzen 2014: 88). Since 1721, Christian missionaries representing a range of denominations
have played a significant role, as evidenced by their influence on the Kachin (Green 2015:
182). However, there could be a significant distinction to be made between the importance
of Islam in the Rohingya’s culture, and that of the Kachin and Wa. The Kachin converted to
Christianity, and the Wa’s Animist beliefs were also watered down during their stint with
communism. Renard (1987: 260) notes the tendency for Wa or Kachin to convert to
Buddhism when becoming a state ruler. Thus, the dimension of religion seems to underlie
the disproportionate persecution of the Rohingya, because their religion is perceived to pose
a challenge to Buddhism in a way that the Kachin and Wa’s religions do not.
Socio-economic dimension
Another relevant dimension that distinguishes the Rohingya from the Kachin and Wa
relates to the socio-economic level in Rakhine State, where the Rohingya live along with the
predominantly Buddhist Rakhine ethnic group. This state has one of the highest (44%)
incidences of poverty in the country, with extremely poor infrastructure and limited availability
of electricity (Ditlevsen 2014: 121; Dapice 2015: 8). The religious-based grievances that the
Buddhist Rakhine economic have with the Rohingya are largely to do with socioeconomic
factors that have becomes associated with religion. That is, the common stereotypes that
Muslims have higher birth rates, placing a strain on resources, and only trade amongst
themselves, shutting other people out, has led to the development of a siege mentality in
Rakhine State (Burke 2016: 264; (Gravers 2014c: 311). Fishing is a primary source of
income in Rakhine State. Burke (2016: 267) describes the common complaint made by local
ethnic Rakhine that Muslim fisherman do not abide by informal arrangements. This
resentment is augmented by the international attention that the plight of the Rohingya have
procured, leading to support from large international aid agencies like the UNDP. Thus, in an
Page 28 of 40
already socio-economically unstable landscape, the Rohingyas are resented for being
supported by international agencies, and Muslim bodies like Al-Qaeda and have become a
political scapegoat (Gravers 2015: 3).
Page 29 of 40
Figure 5: Graphs of religion statistics according to the 2014 census. Data source: (Ministry of
Immigration and Population 2016)
Page 30 of 40
Geopolitical dimension
Figure 6: Regional map of Myanmar. Source: (Google 2017)
Geopolitics is one factor that has not been given due attention within the Rohingya
discussion, and is significant in relation to the Kachin and Wa. A concern primarily cited by
the Myanmar government is illegal immigration from Bangladesh, and the national security
threat that immigrating Islamists pose, making it a transboundary problem (Thawnghmung
2014:323). However, as the findings have shown, the Kachin and Wa are also by definition,
ethnic minorities with a high number of cross-border engagement. Notably, according to
Kymlicka’s minority classification framework which describes the Rohingya as metics, the
government’s preoccupation with illegal immigration would more suitably place them in the
‘immigrant’ category, if not the national minority/indigenous. The Rohingya are physically and
symbolically tied to India, and Bangladesh, i.e. South Asian states (see Figure 8). The Kachin
and Wa are mainly tied to China, an East Asian state. Myanmar’s relation with Bangladesh
has largely been characterised and strained by the Rohingya problem, hindering the potential
to foster a bilateral friendship (Parnini 2013: 292). There is also the historical memory of
Page 31 of 40
mass migration of Indian labourers starting from the 19th century, which was protested by
the majority Bamar due to the perceived threat, ultimately leading to the separation of Burma
and British India (Green 2015: 175). On the other hand, the shared history of Myanmar and
China is far more intertwined, comprising a tight, yet complex bilateral relationship described
as pauk-phaw, meaning brothers of siblings (Ganesan 2011: 103). Myanmar was an early
recogniser of communist China, and the latter has been an important supplier of arms. China
represents Myanmar’s closest ally since independence and is the international actor that
exerts the most military and economic influence, despite isolated incidences of anti-Chinese
sentiment, such as that 1967 riots (Graves & Ytzen 2014: 109).
The geography within Myanmar is also relevant. As the findings illustrate, the Rohingya,
Kachin and Wa share a location relatively removed from the Bamar dominated centre, with
the Rohingya residing in Rakhine State, and the Kachin and Wa occupying their own assigned
territories. However, the fact that the Rohingya reside in a State assigned to another
recognized ethnic group means that they are essentially a minority within a minority.
Contrastingly, the Kachina and Wa are the majority groups of their own states, and, as their
status as ‘hill people’s entails, have historically ‘kept to themselves’. According to Scott (13),
the borderlands of Myanmar have historically been non-state spaces, where the centre has
been hard-pressed to maintain authority, allowing groups like the Kachin and Wa to organise
themselves relatively indecently. While Rakhine State is somewhat isolated due to the
mountainous divide from the centre, the presence of the majority ethnic Rakhine means they
are perceived as infringing upon physical and metaphorical ‘Rakhine space’.
Political dimension
Political factors play a significant role in the disproportionate persecution of the
Rohingya, in contrast to the Kachin and Wa. In terms of the political climate, avenues for
participation have greatly increased since the military allowed elections in 2010, allowing
pre-existing prejudices, such as that based on race and religion, to come to the fore (Gravers
2015: 3). It is likely that, after years of military rule, the relaxation of media restrictions
exacerbated anti-Rohingya propaganda to gain traction (Gravers & Ytzen 2014: 39). The
political clout of Buddhist monks is also significant. Monks have long had immense political
and social influence. They effectively controlled Mandalay at one point, opposed the military
rule, and aided in steps towards democracy (Gravers 2015: 9). Thus, the Buddhist
monkhood’s gripes with the Rohingya is not only significant in terms of the religious
dimension, but also has political ramifications that further distinguish the Rohingya from the
Kachin and Wa. The government’s affinity with Buddhist monks, in combination with general
prejudice among the polity has created a double-edged sword as such that the Rohingya have
Page 32 of 40
been unequipped to combat. Kymlicka identifies 4 main avenues by which minorities may
gain political traction: mass emigration, integration into majority culture, self-government to
defend the minority culture, or permanent marginalisation (Holliday 2010: 114). While the
Kachin and Wa have relatively sophisticated organisational structures and political parties,
namely the KIO, KDSP, UWSP and WNUP that can represent their interests, as well as varying
levels of self-government, the Rohingya have been restricted, largely due to their lack of
citizenship, from accessing these avenues, leaving them with permanent marginalisation. In
addition, the Kachin and Wa do not face opposition from a ‘majority minority’ like the ethnic
Rakhine to actively campaign against them. For example, in Rakhine State during the 2015
elections, the ethnic nationalist Arakan National Party’s (ANP) ethnic nationalist discourse
arguably encouraged violence towards Muslims, also benefitting their campaigns by isolating
Muslim voters (Burke 2016: 269). While parties like the ANP coalition could represent the
ethnic Rakhine’s wishes to limit Muslim’s electoral rights, the Rohingya themselves were
unable to vote for their oppositions, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) or
National League for Democracy (NLD), because they were not permitted to vote (Burke 2016:
268). The administering and subsequent withdrawal of citizenship and other civil
documentation from the Rohingya suggests they have been taken advantage of as a political
tool. This is especially so given Gibson et al’s argument that the Rohingya are legally entitled
to citizenship given Citizenship law provisions (see Table 2).
Articles of the 2008 Constitution Stipulations

Executive
232 The ministers of defence, home affairs and border
affairs are to be active military personnel nominated
by the commander-in-chief of the defence services
201 The commander-in-chief, deputy commander-in-chief
and all three ministers are to be in the 11-member
National Defence and Security Council
Legislature
109, 141, 161 One quarter of the members in the bicameral
national parliament, and 14 regional and state
assemblies are to be military personnel nominated
by the commander-in-chief
40 Direct authority is given to the commander-in-chief in
the provisions for declarations of a state of
emergency
Militaristic duties
383 Duty to uphold three national causes of:
1) Non-disintegration of the union
2) Non-disintegration of national solidarity
3) Perpetuation of sovereignty
386 “Every citizen has the duty to undergo military
training… and to serve in the Armed Forces to defend
the Union”
387 Duty to enhance national unity
Table 3: Instances of militarization in the 2008 Constitution of Myanmar. Source: (Holliday 2014: 407)
Page 33 of 40
Military dimension
The last dimension underlying
the disproportionate persecution of
the Rohingya in comparison to the
Kachin and the Wa, relates to the
political dimension and is that of
military power in the form of NSAGs.
This is especially so given the history
of military rule and the extent to
which the military still retains political
influence under the current 2008
Figure 7: United Wa State Army (UWSA) soldiers march during a
Constitution. This constitution refers media display in Panghsang, Wa territory in northeast Myanmar
October 4, 2016. Source: (Reuters/Tun SZ 2016)
to “a genuine disciplined multi-party
democratic system”, and this emphasis on discipline is evidenced in Table 3. Even now,
discipline and order remain characteristic values of the state of Myanmar, which, as the
cases of the Kachin and Wa show, is manifested beyond the state level through the presence
of highly organised private armies or NSAgs. Figure 6 shows the relative sizes of the KIO and
UWSA, depicted in Figures 7 and 8, which are the 2 largest militias in the country. On the
other hand, the Rohingya do not possess a comparable army, travelling back and forth across
the Bangladeshi border instead of participating in relatively balanced armed conflicts (Kipgen
2015). The 2 small Mujahid groups that are associated with the Rohingya, the Rohingya
Solidarity Organisation (RSO) and Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF) do not begin to
compare in terms of scale and action (Smith 1994: 56). The KIO and UWSA have been central
to these groups respective demands for autonomy and representation. Parnini (2013: 292)
notes that the high level of organisation within groups like the Kachin have meant that have
the capacity to defend themselves against the power of the centre. In Myanmar, wherein
military power has historically been
a significant source of authority and
legitimacy, it is likely that the
Rohingya’s lack of a coordinated
military force has significantly
contributed to their
disproportionately experienced
persecution.
Figure 8: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) cadets follow drills

at a training school in the Burmese town of Laiza, on the
border with China. Source: (Vrieze 2016).
Page 34 of 40
Conclusions
International development and human rights attention towards Myanmar has largely
been dominated by the situation of the Muslim Rohingya, the persecuted group who claim
the status of ethnic minority yet are identified by the government as an immigrant group, and
treated as a metic group. This report sought to offer preliminary insight into the question:
what are the factors that underlie the disproportionate treatment of the Rohingya in contrast
to the Kachin and Wa –two recognised ethnic minorities that have simultaneously been
involved in conflictual situations, without a comparable level of attention. Through secondary
research and the application of a comparative line of reasoning, it has been made clear that
is reductive to merely distinguish the Rohingya by their adherence to Islam. A complex,
historically based, nexus of dimensions exist that continue to work against the Rohingya in a
way that the Kachin and Wa do not experience. To some extent, the uniqueness of the
Rohingya in the context of Myanmar lies in perceived physical differences demarcating race,
associated more with South Asia than East Asia, to whom Myanmar maintains strong bilateral
ties. Although the Kachin and Wa also practice religions other than the majority Buddhism,
they are possibly not as central to their ethnic identity and autonomy demands and thus are
not perceived as a threat. And while Islam is tolerated in other ethnic groups, the Rohingya
have borne the brunt of negative stereotypes of this religion, tied to now familiar broader
fears of extremism. The respective geographical location of the groups means that while the
Kachin and Wa occupy assigned spaces, the Rohingya occupy the assigned space of an
antagonistic ethnic group whom, amid socio-economic hardship look to the Rohingya’s
disparate race and religion as problematic. These dimensions are exacerbated by the strong
relationship between political and military power that exclude the Rohingya from both
adequate physical defence and political representation – which - in the Kachin and Wa’s
case, have aided in establishing them as a legitimate collective and political agent.
Considering these nuances, the following recommendations are set forward to key
stakeholders, including local and international NGOS, the governments of Myanmar and
Bangladesh, and multilateral institutions in the interests of promoting peace and stability:
Page 35 of 40
Recommendations
1: Local and international NGOs should continue to implement online hate speech
mitigation initiatives such as that promoted by USIP (2017) both at the civilian level,
particularly in Rakhine State and, if possible, within the ranks of the Tatmadaw and higher
levels of government.
2: In the pursuit of the religious freedom necessary in true democratic societies, the
government should provide opportunities for discussion between recognised Muslim
minorities such as the Kaman and Panthays as well as the Rohingya to better understand
the constructive role that Islam can play in Myanmar.
3: A multilateral institution like the UN should aid the government in establishing a

supervised forum for Rohingya and Rakhine representatives, akin to peace agreements
participated in by the Kachin and Wa.
4: In the short term, regardless of their current position regarding the Rohingya’s origins,
the government of Myanmar should recognise their duty to facilitate rights for immigrant
minorities through the re-administering of TRCs and other relevant documentation to the
Rohingya. In the long term, they should take steps towards establishing a more informed
account of the Rohingya’s status based on objective facts.
5: The governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh should learn from the cases of the Kachin
and Wa on the Chinese border to work towards a cooperative solution to the Rohingya
problem and immigration more generally that provides the simultaneous benefit of
strengthening bilateral relations and relaxing their dependence on China.
Page 36 of 40
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The Politics of Identity in Myanmar The Rohingya, Kachin & Wa Ethnic Minorities

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The politics of identity in

Myanmar: the Rohingya, Kachin

Mahalia Gaskin McDaniel

Mahalia Gaskin McDaniel

Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................... 5

Conclusions & Recommendations ............................................................................................35

ARIF Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front

IDP International Displaced Person

KIA/~O Kachin Independence Army/~Organisation

KDA Kachin Defence Army

RNDP Rakhine Nationalities Development Party

RSO Rohingya Solidarity Organisation

SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council

SPDC State Peace and Development Council

TRC Temporary Registration Certificate

Ma Ba Tha Patriotic Association of Myanmar

MIMU Myanmar Information Management Unit

MPC Myanmar Peace Centre

NDAK New Democratic Army-Kachin

NLD National League for Democracy

NGOs Non-governmental organisations

NSAG Non-state armed groups

UNFC United Nationalities Federal Council

UNHCR United Nations Refugee Agency

UWSP/~A United Wa State Party/~Army

This research is intended to be both preliminary, seeking to determine what is already

Figure 2: Map depicting the topography of Myanmar. Source: (MIMU 2013)

This heterogeneity has significantly featured in Myanmar’s political history. Renard

It is important to clarify what relevant terms mean in the Myanmar context, as

People Main language Language family Native speakers (million)

Legislation Implications for case studies

Agreement above, it will not operate in respect of

1948 Union III) 1. “For the purposes of section 11 of

4. “Any person, who under sub-section

Citizenship Rakhine or Shan and ethnic groups as race but legally

6. “A person who is already a citizen on

2015 Race and Monogamy Law: Criminalises having

Religion unmarried partner other than the Muslim custom of

Interfaith Marriage Law: Regulates the

Timeline of key historical junctures:

Pre-modern period: There is evidence

1994: The government issues TRCS to Rohingyas (Jones 2015:70).

Timeline of key historical junctures:

There is an altercation between Tatmadaw and KIA forces in Machanpaw Township.

Figure 4: Ethnic militant groups of Myanmar. Source: (Colling 2016)

Timeline of key historical junctures:

1947: Wa leaders are interviewed by the ‘Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry’, in

1990s: The UWSA is involved in heroin production

on the river he is a smuggler; and if he is working in the forest he is an insurgent." (Smith

Additionally, considering the hegemonic status of Buddhism in majority ethnic identity,

Figure 6: Regional map of Myanmar. Source: (Google 2017)

Articles of the 2008 Constitution Stipulations

Figure 8: Kachin Independence Army (KIA) cadets follow drills

3: A multilateral institution like the UN should aid the government in establishing a

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