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ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMELEC and MONTEJO Older Posts About

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G.R. No. 119976; September 18, 1995 ▼ 2016 (25)

Di
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distinc
► October (3) goes:
Ponente: Kapunan ► September (1) Econo
Lingui
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JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC anythi
and ERASMO it. It w
FACTS: ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS dumpi
vs. COMELEC and digest
MONTEJO school
Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) in the First district of relatin
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS
Leyte in order that she will be able to run for Congress of that district in the 1995 FOUNDATION vs. NTC legal s
and PLDT blog w
elections. Her COC stated that she was a resident of Leyte for seven months. Private about
► July (2) discus
Respondent Montejo, a rival candidate filed a petition to cancel the COC and to things
► May (4)
disqualify Marcos on the ground that she did not meet the one year residency ► April (2)
inform
I can.
requirement as provided for in the Constitution. In response, Marcos amended her ► March (1) View m
COC changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood". Marcos claimed that ► February (3)
"she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence." She further ► January (1)

claimed that she is entitled to the correction of her COC on the ground that her ► 2015 (28)
original entry of "seven months" was the result of an "honest misinterpretation or ► 2014 (37)

honest mistake". ► 2013 (11)

The COMELEC granted the petition to cancel the COC and to disqualify Marcos. It held
that the animus revertendi of Marcos was not Tacloban, but San Juan, Manila, because
that where she chose to live after she went back to the Philippines after her well-
publicized exile in the US. It explained that while Petitioner grew up in Tacloban, after
her graduation, however, she moved to Manila where she became a registered voter,
became a member of the Batasang Pambansa as a representative of Manila and
eventually became Governor of Manila. This, according to the COMELEC debunks her
claim that she was a resident of Leyte 1st District "since childhood".

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Petitioner is a resident of Leyte for election purposes.

2. Whether or not Petitioner lost her domicile after she married and lived with her
husband in Ilocos Norte and in San Juan.

HELD:

1. YES.

The Supreme Court declared in this case that for purposes of election law, residence is
synonymous with domicile. The decision of the COMELEC however, shows that they
confused the concept of "Domicile" with "actual residence".

Domicile versus Residence

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual
residence." In a past case, the Court took the concept of domicile to mean an
individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense
that they disclose intent." Thus, domicile is composed of the two elements of:
 1. The fact of residing/physical presence in a fixed place; and

2. Animus manendi - the intention of returning permanently

Residence on the other hand merely refers to the factual relationship of an individual
to a certain place. It is mere physical presence. Residence involves the intent to
leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. If a
person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon
as his purpose is established it is residence. Domicile is residence coupled with the
intention to remain for an unlimited time.

A person can have different residences in various places, but he can only have a single
domicile. Note however, that a person may abandon a domicile in favor of another.

Domicile of Petitioner is in Tacloban

Petitioner Marcos' domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. The fact that she has a residence in
Manila does not mean that she has lost her domicile in that province. The absence
from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things
of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence.
Applying this doctrine to the case of petitioner, the fact that she has registered to vote
and resided in Ilocos Norte and in San Juan do not unequivocally point to an intention
to abandon her domicile in Tacloban. Even while residing in various places, petitioner
kept close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home
province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and
hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close
relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always
with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin
are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country.
Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the
COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of
petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.

2. NO

The domicile of origin

Note further that when petitioner Imelda Marcos was born, her domicile followed that
of her parents. Hence, her domicile of origin was Tacloban. Once acquired, domicile is
retained until a new one is gained. The domicile of origin is not easily lost. To effect a
change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and

establishing a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of
origin should be deemed to continue.

Effect of marriage as to the domicile of origin

Article 110 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt
the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the
Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to this article or to the concepts of domicile or

residence does not suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of
origin in favor of the husband upon marriage. This article clearly refers to actual
residence and not domicile and merely establishes the default rule in fulfilling the
obligation of the spouses "to live together" in article immediately preceding Art. 110.

When Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was
obliged—by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code—to follow her husband's actual place
of residence fixed by him. Mr. Marcos had several places of residence at the time: San
Juan and Ilocos Norte. Assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the
conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She
did not lose her domicile of origin.

This rule has changed with the advent of the Family code with the introduction of the
common law concept of "matrimonial domicile". This underscores the difference
between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term
residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art.
69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The
provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the
intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement
between the spouses.

Even assuming that Petitioner's domicile was lost, her acts unequivocally show an
intent to reestablish a domicile in Tacloban, Leyte because Petitioner, as early as in
1992, already obtained her residence certificate in Tacloban.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of
Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May
25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.

Posted by Dick S. O'Rosary at 11:21 AM

Labels: case brief, Case Digest, constitutional law, domicile, family law, New Civil Code, residence

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