1. G.R. No.
193161 August 22, 2011 beyond the reglementary period and was not considered by the MTC. Thus,
DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS, Petitioner,
vs.
MARGARITA AVILA LORETO and FLORENCIA AVILA
PARREÑO, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks the reversal of the
April 30, 2009 Decision1 and July 21, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 74531-MIN, entitled Margarita Avila Loreto
and Florencia Avila Parreño v. Hon. Erasto D. Salcedo, Acting Presiding
Judge, RTC (Branch 2), Tagum City, and Diosdado Salinas (Manungas). The
CA Decision set aside as null and void the Order dated November 4,
20023 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2 in Tagum City, Davao del
Norte, in Special Proceedings No. 708 entitled In the Matter of the Intestate
Estate of the Deceased Engracia N. Vda de Manungas, Diosdado
Manungas, petitioner, wherein the RTC reversed its appointment of
respondent Florencia Avila Parreño (Parreño) as the special administrator of
the estate of Engracia Manungas and appointed petitioner Diosdado Salinas
Manungas (Diosdado) in her stead.
The Facts
Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They had no
children. Instead, they adopted Samuel David Avila (Avila) on August 12,
1968. Florentino Manungas died intestate on May 29, 1977, while Avila
predeceased his adoptive mother.4 Avila was survived by his wife Sarah
Abarte Vda. de Manungas.
Thereafter, Engracia Manungas filed a Motion for Partition of Estate on
March 31, 1980 in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas,
of which she was the administratrix. There, she stated that there are no other
legal and compulsory heirs of Florentino Manungas except for herself, Avila
and a Ramon Manungas whom she acknowledged as the natural son of
Florentino Manungas.5 Meanwhile, Avila’s widow executed a Waiver of
Rights and Participation on October 29, 1980, renouncing her rights over the
separate property of her husband in favor of Engracia Manungas. Thereafter,
a Decree of Final Distribution was issued in the intestate estate proceedings
of Florentino Manungas distributing the properties to Engracia Manungas
and Ramon Manungas, the surviving heirs.6
On October 25, 1995, the RTC, Branch 4 in Panabo City, appointed Parreño,
the niece of Engracia Manungas, as the Judicial Guardian of the properties
and person of her incompetent aunt.7
Engracia Manungas, through Parreño, then instituted Civil Case No. 5196-96
against the spouses Diosdado Salinas Manungas and Milagros Pacifico for
illegal detainer and damages with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Panabo
City. In their answer, the spouses Salinas claimed that Diosdado is the
illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas. However, the answer was filed
the MTC issued a summary judgment in favor of Engracia Manungas,
ordering the spouses to vacate the premises and to restore possession to
Engracia Manungas. The Decision was appealed by the spouses Salinas to
the RTC of Tagum, Davao City which affirmed in toto the Decision of the
MTC.8 On appeal to this Court, defendants’ petition was denied for having
been filed out of time in a Resolution which became final on April 20, 1998.9
Thereafter, on August 7, 1998, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration over the Estate of Engracia Manungas (Estate of
Manungas) in his favor before the RTC, Branch 2 in Tagum City, Davao. He
alleged that he, being an illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas, is an heir
of Engracia Manungas.10 The petition was opposed by Margarita Avila Loreto
(Loreto) and Parreño alleging that Diosdado was incompetent as an
administrator of the Estate of Manungas claiming that he was not a
Manungas, that he was not an heir of Engracia Manungas, he was not a
creditor of Engracia Manungas or her estate and that he was in fact a debtor
of the estate having been found liable to Engracia Manungas for PhP
177,000 by virtue of a Decision issued by the MTC in Civil Case No. 5196-
96. On May 15, 2002, the RTC issued an Order appointing Parreño as the
administrator of the Estate of Manungas, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Florencia A. Parreño is hereby
appointed as Special Administrator of the property of the late Engracia N.
Vda. de Manungas. The Special Administrator is hereby directed to post a
bond in the amount of P200,000.00 pursuant to Sec. 4 of Rule 81.
SO ORDERED.11
Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.12 In his motion, Diosdado
argued that Parreño’s appointment as special administrator of the Estate of
Manungas was by virtue of her being the judicial guardian of the latter but
which relation ceased upon Engracia Manungas’ death, concluding that her
appointment as special administrator was without basis. He added that
Parreño was not fit to become a special administrator having already been
fined by the court for failing to render a timely accounting of Engracia
Manungas’ property as her judicial guardian. Diosdado also reasoned that
Parreño is a mere niece, a collateral relative, of Engracia Manungas, while
he is the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas.
On November 4, 2002, the RTC issued an Order reversing itself and ordering
the revocation of its earlier appointment of Parreño as the administrator of
the Estate of Manungas while appointing Diosdado as the Special
Administrator.13
Parreño and Loreto appealed the ruling of the RTC to the CA. The CA issued
its assailed April 30, 2009 Decision finding that the RTC acted with grave
abuse of discretion in revoking its earlier appointment of Parreño as the
administrator of the Estate of Manungas and appointing Diosdado instead.
The CA further reinstated Parreño as the special administrator of the estate.
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Order
dated November 4, 2002 setting aside the appointment of Florencia Parreño
as special administrator of the estate of the late Engracia Vda. de Manungas,
and denying the property bond posted by Florencia Parreño [is] hereby
declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE as having been issued by Public
Respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, Davao
del Norte with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.14
Diosdado assailed the CA Decision in a Motion for Reconsideration dated
May 15, 200915 which the CA denied in the July 21, 2010 Resolution.
Hence, We have this petition.
The Issues
Diosdado raises the following issues:
The Court a Quo utterly disregarded the jurisprudence that certiorari cannot
be a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available.16
The Court a Quo in denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration grossly
violated the rule that once a decision or order is final and executory, it
becomes immutable and unalterable.17
The Court a Quo committed a grave error when it ruled to annul the
appointment of petitioner, Diosdado Manungas as judicial administrator and
reinstating the appointment of Florencia Parreño as special administrator. 18
The Court a Quo gravely erred in [giving] due course to oppositors’ petition
that is flawed.19
The Court’s Ruling
The petition must be denied.
The RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 is an interlocutory order
The first two issues raised by Diosdado revolve around the issue of whether
the RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 is an interlocutory order.
Diosdado alleges that, following the ruling of this Court that Certiorari cannot
be the substitute for a lost appeal, Parreño should have appealed the RTC
Order dated November 4, 2002 to the CA through a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Diosdado contends that the
Order dated November 4, 2002 became final and executory, Parreño having
failed to file the petition within the reglementary period; thus, the Order
cannot be the subject of review even by this Court. However, Diosdado’s
position assumes that the RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 is a final
order instead of an interlocutory order.
In Philippine Business Bank v. Chua,20 the Court stated what an interlocutory
order is:
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not
end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining
their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that
other things remain to be done by the Court, is "interlocutory", e.g., an order
denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules x x x. Unlike a final
judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an
interlocutory order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of
an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in
the case.
The Court has considered an appointment of a special administrator as an
interlocutory or preliminary order to the main case for the grant of letters of
administration in a testate or intestate proceeding. In Ocampo v.
Ocampo,21 the Court succinctly held, "The appointment or removal of special
administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be assailed
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court."
With such categorical ruling of the Court, the Order dated November 4, 2002
is clearly an interlocutory order. As such, the order cannot be the subject of
an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as argued by petitioner. The
proper remedy is the filing of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Thus,
Section 1(c) of Rule 41 states:
Section 1. Subject of appeal.
An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxxx
(c) An interlocutory order;
xxxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action
under Rule 65.
Verily, respondents made use of the proper mode of review by filing a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. Respondents filed the
petition well within the prescribed period under this rule.
There was no necessity to file a motion for reconsideration
As properly noted by petitioner, the general rule is that a motion for
reconsideration is required before a decision may be appealed through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Under the rule, there must be no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as a
motion for reconsideration, to justify the filing of a petition for certiorari. Thus,
petitioner argues that respondent’s failure to move for the reconsideration of
the Order dated November 4, 2002 is fatal to an appeal from it. Such general
rule, however, admits of exceptions as explained in Delos Reyes v. Flores: 22
We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari
and mandamus are available only when there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as a motion for
reconsideration. The writ of certiorari does not lie where another adequate
remedy is available for the correction of the error. x x x However, there are
several exceptions where a petition for certiorari will lie without the prior filing
of a motion for reconsideration, to wit:
xxxx
i. where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved. (Emphasis supplied.)
The instant case is clearly an exception to the general rule. An examination
of the issues raised by respondents in appealing the Order dated November
4, 2002, reveals that the issues are only questions of law. Ergo, there is no
need for a motion for reconsideration.
In addition, the Court has even allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari
despite the existence of an appeal or other appropriate remedy in several
instances, including when the court a quo acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed order.23
Thus, while respondent failed to move for the reconsideration of the
November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC, a petition for certiorari may still
prosper, as in this case.
The RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion
The lower court stated in its November 4, 2002 Order that:
After carefully scrutinizing the arguments and grounds raised by both
petitioner and oppositors, this Court finds merit in the contention of petitioner.
In the case of Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 324, the Supreme
Court ruled:
The presence of illegitimate children precludes succession by collateral
relatives to his estate;
Diosdado Manungas, being the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas
inherits the latter’s property by operation of law;
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the order appointing Florencia
Parreño as special administrator of the estate of the late Engracia Vda. de
Manungas is ordered set aside.
Such reasoning is a non sequitur.
The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does
not mean that he is entitled or even qualified to become the special
administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special administrator lies
within the discretion of the court. In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v.
Lacuata-Gabriel,24 it was stated that:
It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right
of certain persons to the appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule
81, as well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an
executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2,
Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. x x
x As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator
and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has
discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which
must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity.
(Emphasis supplied; citation omitted.)
This principle was reiterated in the Ocampo case, where the Court ruled that:
While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their
deceased parents in their appointment as joint special administrators, this is
not a mandatory requirement for the appointment. It has long been settled
that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the
rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. The
probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on
grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that
the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and
the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as
would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As long
as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason,
equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is
unwarranted.25 (Emphasis supplied.)
While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special
administrator of the estate, such discretion must be exercised with reason,
guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It may,
therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special administrator is
to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed. As stated in
Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules:
Section 2. Powers and duties of special adminsitrator. — Such special
administrator shall take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights,
credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executors
or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence
and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and
other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be
liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the
court.1avvphi1
Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be
prudent and reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the
estate for its eventual distribution to the heirs. Such choice would ensure that
such person would not expose the estate to losses that would effectively
diminish his or her share. While the court may use its discretion and depart
from such reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint a person who
is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the deceased. To do so
would be tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, the CA ruled that the trial court erred in issuing the November 4,
2002 Order, acting with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as
the special administrator of Engracia Manungas’ estate:
In any case, the trial court erred in revoking the appointment of Florencia
Avila Parreño as Special Administrator on the ground that it found merit in
Diosdado’s contention that he is the illegitimate child of the late Florentino
Manangus. The evidence on record shows that Diosdado is not related to the
late Engracia and so he is not interested in preserving the latter’s estate. On
the other hand, Florencia, who is a former Judicial guardian of Engracia
when she was still alive and who is also the niece of the latter, is interested in
protecting and preserving the estate of her late aunt Engracia, as by doing so
she would reap the benefit of a wise administration of the decedent’s estate.
Hence, the Order of the lower court revoking the appointment of Florencia
Avila Parreño as special administrator constitutes not only a reversible error,
but also a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In the instant case, the lower court exercised its power in a
despotic, arbitrary or capricious manner, as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law.26 (Emphasis supplied.)
To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia
Manungas. It must be remembered that the estate of Florentino Manungas
was already the subject of intestate proceedings that have long been
terminated with the proceeds distributed to the heirs with the issuance of a
Decree of Final Distribution.27 With the termination of the intestate estate
proceedings of Florentino Manungas, Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of
Florentino Manungas, is still not an heir of Engracia Manungas and is not
entitled to receive any part of the Estate of Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a
debtor of the estate and would have no interest in preserving its value. There
is no reason to appoint him as its special administrator. The trial court acted
with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as special
administrator of the Estate of Manungas. The CA correctly set aside the
November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC.
Consequently, with the setting aside of the November 4, 2002 Order of the
trial court, reversing its May 15, 2002 Order and appointing Diosdado as the
special administrator of Engracia Manungas’ estate, the May 15, 2002 Order
is necessarily reinstated and Parreño’s appointment as special administrator
is revived.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The CA’s April 30, 2009
Decision and July 21, 2010 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 74531-MIN
declaring as null and void the November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC in Special
Proceedings No. 708 are AFFIRMED. Consequently, the Order dated May
15, 2002 of the RTC is hereby REINSTATED and Florencia Avila Parreño is
REINSTATED as the special administrator of the estate of Engracia
Manungas.
SO ORDERED.
2. G.R. No. 193161 August 22, 2011
DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS, Petitioner,
vs.
MARGARITA AVILA LORETO and FLORENCIA AVILA
PARREÑO, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks the reversal of the
April 30, 2009 Decision1 and July 21, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 74531-MIN, entitled Margarita Avila Loreto
and Florencia Avila Parreño v. Hon. Erasto D. Salcedo, Acting Presiding
Judge, RTC (Branch 2), Tagum City, and Diosdado Salinas (Manungas). The
CA Decision set aside as null and void the Order dated November 4,
20023 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2 in Tagum City, Davao del
Norte, in Special Proceedings No. 708 entitled In the Matter of the Intestate
Estate of the Deceased Engracia N. Vda de Manungas, Diosdado
Manungas, petitioner, wherein the RTC reversed its appointment of
respondent Florencia Avila Parreño (Parreño) as the special administrator of
the estate of Engracia Manungas and appointed petitioner Diosdado Salinas
Manungas (Diosdado) in her stead.
The Facts
Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They had no
children. Instead, they adopted Samuel David Avila (Avila) on August 12,
1968. Florentino Manungas died intestate on May 29, 1977, while Avila
predeceased his adoptive mother.4 Avila was survived by his wife Sarah
Abarte Vda. de Manungas.
Thereafter, Engracia Manungas filed a Motion for Partition of Estate on
March 31, 1980 in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas,
of which she was the administratrix. There, she stated that there are no other
legal and compulsory heirs of Florentino Manungas except for herself, Avila
and a Ramon Manungas whom she acknowledged as the natural son of
Florentino Manungas.5 Meanwhile, Avila’s widow executed a Waiver of
Rights and Participation on October 29, 1980, renouncing her rights over the
separate property of her husband in favor of Engracia Manungas. Thereafter,
a Decree of Final Distribution was issued in the intestate estate proceedings
of Florentino Manungas distributing the properties to Engracia Manungas
and Ramon Manungas, the surviving heirs.6
On October 25, 1995, the RTC, Branch 4 in Panabo City, appointed Parreño,
the niece of Engracia Manungas, as the Judicial Guardian of the properties
and person of her incompetent aunt.7
Engracia Manungas, through Parreño, then instituted Civil Case No. 5196-96
against the spouses Diosdado Salinas Manungas and Milagros Pacifico for
illegal detainer and damages with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Panabo
City. In their answer, the spouses Salinas claimed that Diosdado is the
illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas. However, the answer was filed
beyond the reglementary period and was not considered by the MTC. Thus,
the MTC issued a summary judgment in favor of Engracia Manungas,
ordering the spouses to vacate the premises and to restore possession to
Engracia Manungas. The Decision was appealed by the spouses Salinas to
the RTC of Tagum, Davao City which affirmed in toto the Decision of the
MTC.8 On appeal to this Court, defendants’ petition was denied for having
been filed out of time in a Resolution which became final on April 20, 1998.9
Thereafter, on August 7, 1998, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration over the Estate of Engracia Manungas (Estate of
Manungas) in his favor before the RTC, Branch 2 in Tagum City, Davao. He
alleged that he, being an illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas, is an heir
of Engracia Manungas.10 The petition was opposed by Margarita Avila Loreto
(Loreto) and Parreño alleging that Diosdado was incompetent as an
administrator of the Estate of Manungas claiming that he was not a
Manungas, that he was not an heir of Engracia Manungas, he was not a
creditor of Engracia Manungas or her estate and that he was in fact a debtor
of the estate having been found liable to Engracia Manungas for PhP
177,000 by virtue of a Decision issued by the MTC in Civil Case No. 5196-
96. On May 15, 2002, the RTC issued an Order appointing Parreño as the
administrator of the Estate of Manungas, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Florencia A. Parreño is hereby
appointed as Special Administrator of the property of the late Engracia N.
Vda. de Manungas. The Special Administrator is hereby directed to post a
bond in the amount of P200,000.00 pursuant to Sec. 4 of Rule 81.
SO ORDERED.11
Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.12 In his motion, Diosdado
argued that Parreño’s appointment as special administrator of the Estate of
Manungas was by virtue of her being the judicial guardian of the latter but
which relation ceased upon Engracia Manungas’ death, concluding that her
appointment as special administrator was without basis. He added that
Parreño was not fit to become a special administrator having already been
fined by the court for failing to render a timely accounting of Engracia
Manungas’ property as her judicial guardian. Diosdado also reasoned that
Parreño is a mere niece, a collateral relative, of Engracia Manungas, while
he is the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas.
On November 4, 2002, the RTC issued an Order reversing itself and ordering
the revocation of its earlier appointment of Parreño as the administrator of
the Estate of Manungas while appointing Diosdado as the Special
Administrator.13
Parreño and Loreto appealed the ruling of the RTC to the CA. The CA issued
its assailed April 30, 2009 Decision finding that the RTC acted with grave
abuse of discretion in revoking its earlier appointment of Parreño as the
administrator of the Estate of Manungas and appointing Diosdado instead.
The CA further reinstated Parreño as the special administrator of the estate.
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Order
dated November 4, 2002 setting aside the appointment of Florencia Parreño
as special administrator of the estate of the late Engracia Vda. de Manungas,
and denying the property bond posted by Florencia Parreño [is] hereby
declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE as having been issued by Public
Respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, Davao
del Norte with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.14
Diosdado assailed the CA Decision in a Motion for Reconsideration dated
May 15, 200915 which the CA denied in the July 21, 2010 Resolution.
Hence, We have this petition.
The Issues
Diosdado raises the following issues:
The Court a Quo utterly disregarded the jurisprudence that certiorari cannot
be a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available.16
The Court a Quo in denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration grossly
violated the rule that once a decision or order is final and executory, it
becomes immutable and unalterable.17
The Court a Quo committed a grave error when it ruled to annul the
appointment of petitioner, Diosdado Manungas as judicial administrator and
reinstating the appointment of Florencia Parreño as special administrator. 18
The Court a Quo gravely erred in [giving] due course to oppositors’ petition
that is flawed.19
The Court’s Ruling
The petition must be denied.
The RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 is an interlocutory order
The first two issues raised by Diosdado revolve around the issue of whether
the RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 is an interlocutory order.
Diosdado alleges that, following the ruling of this Court that Certiorari cannot
be the substitute for a lost appeal, Parreño should have appealed the RTC
Order dated November 4, 2002 to the CA through a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Diosdado contends that the
Order dated November 4, 2002 became final and executory, Parreño having
failed to file the petition within the reglementary period; thus, the Order
cannot be the subject of review even by this Court. However, Diosdado’s
position assumes that the RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 is a final
order instead of an interlocutory order.
In Philippine Business Bank v. Chua,20 the Court stated what an interlocutory
order is:
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not
end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining
their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that
other things remain to be done by the Court, is "interlocutory", e.g., an order
denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules x x x. Unlike a final
judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an
interlocutory order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of
an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in
the case.
The Court has considered an appointment of a special administrator as an
interlocutory or preliminary order to the main case for the grant of letters of
administration in a testate or intestate proceeding. In Ocampo v.
Ocampo,21 the Court succinctly held, "The appointment or removal of special
administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be assailed
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court."
With such categorical ruling of the Court, the Order dated November 4, 2002
is clearly an interlocutory order. As such, the order cannot be the subject of
an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as argued by petitioner. The
proper remedy is the filing of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Thus,
Section 1(c) of Rule 41 states:
Section 1. Subject of appeal.
An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxxx
(c) An interlocutory order;
xxxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action
under Rule 65.
Verily, respondents made use of the proper mode of review by filing a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. Respondents filed the
petition well within the prescribed period under this rule.
There was no necessity to file a motion for reconsideration
As properly noted by petitioner, the general rule is that a motion for
reconsideration is required before a decision may be appealed through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Under the rule, there must be no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as a
motion for reconsideration, to justify the filing of a petition for certiorari. Thus,
petitioner argues that respondent’s failure to move for the reconsideration of
the Order dated November 4, 2002 is fatal to an appeal from it. Such general
rule, however, admits of exceptions as explained in Delos Reyes v. Flores: 22
We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari
and mandamus are available only when there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as a motion for
reconsideration. The writ of certiorari does not lie where another adequate
remedy is available for the correction of the error. x x x However, there are
several exceptions where a petition for certiorari will lie without the prior filing
of a motion for reconsideration, to wit:
xxxx
i. where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved. (Emphasis supplied.)
The instant case is clearly an exception to the general rule. An examination
of the issues raised by respondents in appealing the Order dated November
4, 2002, reveals that the issues are only questions of law. Ergo, there is no
need for a motion for reconsideration.
In addition, the Court has even allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari
despite the existence of an appeal or other appropriate remedy in several
instances, including when the court a quo acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed order.23
Thus, while respondent failed to move for the reconsideration of the
November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC, a petition for certiorari may still
prosper, as in this case.
The RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion
The lower court stated in its November 4, 2002 Order that:
After carefully scrutinizing the arguments and grounds raised by both
petitioner and oppositors, this Court finds merit in the contention of petitioner.
In the case of Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 324, the Supreme
Court ruled:
The presence of illegitimate children precludes succession by collateral
relatives to his estate;
Diosdado Manungas, being the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas
inherits the latter’s property by operation of law;
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the order appointing Florencia
Parreño as special administrator of the estate of the late Engracia Vda. de
Manungas is ordered set aside.
Such reasoning is a non sequitur.
The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does
not mean that he is entitled or even qualified to become the special
administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special administrator lies
within the discretion of the court. In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v.
Lacuata-Gabriel,24 it was stated that:
It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right
of certain persons to the appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule
81, as well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an
executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2,
Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. x x
x As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator
and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has
discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which
must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity.
(Emphasis supplied; citation omitted.)
This principle was reiterated in the Ocampo case, where the Court ruled that:
While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their
deceased parents in their appointment as joint special administrators, this is
not a mandatory requirement for the appointment. It has long been settled
that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the
rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. The
probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on
grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that
the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and
the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as
would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As long
as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason,
equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is
unwarranted.25 (Emphasis supplied.)
While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special
administrator of the estate, such discretion must be exercised with reason,
guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It may,
therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special administrator is
to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed. As stated in
Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules:
Section 2. Powers and duties of special adminsitrator. — Such special
administrator shall take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights,
credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executors
or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence
and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and
other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be
liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the
court.1avvphi1
Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be
prudent and reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the
estate for its eventual distribution to the heirs. Such choice would ensure that
such person would not expose the estate to losses that would effectively
diminish his or her share. While the court may use its discretion and depart
from such reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint a person who
is a debtor of the estate and otherwise a stranger to the deceased. To do so
would be tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, the CA ruled that the trial court erred in issuing the November 4,
2002 Order, acting with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as
the special administrator of Engracia Manungas’ estate:
In any case, the trial court erred in revoking the appointment of Florencia
Avila Parreño as Special Administrator on the ground that it found merit in
Diosdado’s contention that he is the illegitimate child of the late Florentino
Manangus. The evidence on record shows that Diosdado is not related to the
late Engracia and so he is not interested in preserving the latter’s estate. On
the other hand, Florencia, who is a former Judicial guardian of Engracia
when she was still alive and who is also the niece of the latter, is interested in
protecting and preserving the estate of her late aunt Engracia, as by doing so
she would reap the benefit of a wise administration of the decedent’s estate.
Hence, the Order of the lower court revoking the appointment of Florencia
Avila Parreño as special administrator constitutes not only a reversible error,
but also a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In the instant case, the lower court exercised its power in a
despotic, arbitrary or capricious manner, as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law.26 (Emphasis supplied.)
To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia
Manungas. It must be remembered that the estate of Florentino Manungas
was already the subject of intestate proceedings that have long been
terminated with the proceeds distributed to the heirs with the issuance of a
Decree of Final Distribution.27 With the termination of the intestate estate
proceedings of Florentino Manungas, Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of
Florentino Manungas, is still not an heir of Engracia Manungas and is not
entitled to receive any part of the Estate of Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a
debtor of the estate and would have no interest in preserving its value. There
is no reason to appoint him as its special administrator. The trial court acted
with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as special
administrator of the Estate of Manungas. The CA correctly set aside the
November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC.
Consequently, with the setting aside of the November 4, 2002 Order of the
trial court, reversing its May 15, 2002 Order and appointing Diosdado as the
special administrator of Engracia Manungas’ estate, the May 15, 2002 Order
is necessarily reinstated and Parreño’s appointment as special administrator
is revived.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The CA’s April 30, 2009
Decision and July 21, 2010 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 74531-MIN
declaring as null and void the November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC in Special
Proceedings No. 708 are AFFIRMED. Consequently, the Order dated May
15, 2002 of the RTC is hereby REINSTATED and Florencia Avila Parreño is
REINSTATED as the special administrator of the estate of Engracia
Manungas.
SO ORDERED.
3. G.R. No. 183053 October 10, 2012
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner,
vs.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-much-stretched imbroglio
over the estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay has continued. We issued a
Decision in the dispute as in Inter Caetera.1 We now find a need to replace
the decision.
Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay (respondent Isabel) of our Decision2 in G.R. No. 183053
dated 16 June 2010, directing the issuance of joint letters of administration to
both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent. The
dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters
of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall
issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding
Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan
is likewise directed to make a determination and to declare the heirs of
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu as
proven by the parties, and all other persons with legal interest in the subject
estate. It is further directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.3
We are moved to trace to its roots the controversy between the parties.
The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June
1990. Cristina was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico)
and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein
respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner
Emilio III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio
I), who predeceased his parents.
The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from
infancy by the spouses Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate grandchildren,
Isabel and her siblings, Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother Isabel
Cojuangco, following the separation of Isabel’s parents, Emilio I and Isabel
Cojuangco. Isabel’s parents, along with her paternal grandparents, were
involved in domestic relations cases, including a case for parricide filed by
Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was eventually acquitted.
In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife,
charging her among others with infidelity. The trial court declared as null and
void and of no effect the marriage of Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco on the
finding that:
From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the
Veterans memorial Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide case
(September 8, 1967) the patient was already out of the hospital, he continued
to be under observation and treatment.
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental
aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest
even as early as 1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when
he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that
even if the subject has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of
adequate understanding of right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected
on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would
justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil
Code which provides:
Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes after
(sic) existing at the time of the marriage:
xxxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to
reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about
the mental condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to
be without sound reason. The charges in this very complaint add emphasis
to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff
really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia
(sic).4
Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico and
Isabel filed a complaint for visitation rights to spend time with Margarita,
Emilio II, and Isabel in the same special lower court. The Juvenile Domestic
Relations Court in Quezon City (JDRC-QC) granted their prayer for one hour
a month of visitation rights which was subsequently reduced to thirty minutes,
and ultimately stopped, because of respondent Isabel’s testimony in court
that her grandparents’ visits caused her and her siblings stress and anxiety. 5
On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristina’s death,
Federico adopted his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over Cristina’s estate docketed as Special Proceeding Case
No. 117-M-95. Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that: (1) as the
surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed administrator of
the decedent’s estate; (2) as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties
left by the decedent, he must be accorded preference in the administration
thereof; (3) Isabel and her siblings had been alienated from their
grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; (4) the enumeration of heirs in
the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son,
Emilio III and Nenita; (5) even before the death of his wife, Federico had
administered their conjugal properties, and thus, is better situated to protect
the integrity of the decedent’s estate; (6) the probable value of the estate as
stated in the petition was grossly overstated; and (7) Isabel’s allegation that
some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.
Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of
administration on the ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the
estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result
of Isabel’s parents’ marriage being declared null and void. However, in
Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that Isabel and her
siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void
marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate
children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of their legitimate
grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.
Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the
decedent’s estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration issues to
Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-Intervention,
echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s opposition, alleging that Federico,
or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer
and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
On 13 November 2000, Federico died.
Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered a
decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate
estate:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is DENIED and the
Opposition-in-Intervention is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III (sic) is hereby appointed
administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who
shall enter upon the execution of his trust upon the filing of a bond in the
amount of ₱ 200,000.00, conditioned as follows:
(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete
inventory;
(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees,
and charge on the same, or dividends thereon;
(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any other
time when required by the court, and
(4) To perform all orders of the Court.
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration be
issued in his favor.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed
respondent as administratrix of the subject estate:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated
November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in
SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the letters of
administration issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are
consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is hereby
appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay.
Let letters of administration be issued in her favor upon her filing of a bond in
the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (₱ 200,000.00) Pesos.7
As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set aside
the ruling of the appellate court. We decided to include Emilio III as co-
administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving weight to his interest in Federico’s
estate. In ruling for co-administration between Emilio III and
Isabel, we considered that:
1. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and
her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their
grandchild;
2. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of
the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership
of gains during the subsistence of their marriage;
3. Cristina’s properties, forming part of her estate, are still
commingled with those of her husband, Federico, because her share
in the conjugal partnership remains undetermined and unliquidated;
and
4. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in
the distribution of the latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree from
Federico, and not simply in representation of his deceased
illegitimate father, Emilio I.
In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals’
Decision in favor of her sole administratorship based on her status as a
legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks to administer.
Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules
of Court on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of
administration cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of the Civil Code must
be followed. Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had demonstrated adverse
interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to become a
co-administrator thereof.
Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild and
therefore, not an heir of the decedent; (2) corollary thereto, Emilio III, not
being a "next of kin" of the decedent, has no interest in the estate to justify
his appointment as administrator thereof; (3) Emilio III’s actuations since his
appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9 November 2001 emphatically
demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the order of preference in Section 6,
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and (4) there is no basis for joint
administration as there are no "opposing parties or factions to be
represented."
To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who, as between
Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator of the
decedent’s estate. We did not choose. Considering merely his demonstrable
interest in the subject estate, we ruled that Emilio III should likewise
administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother, Cristina, as a co-
administrator. In the context of this case, we have to make a choice and
therefore, reconsider our decision of 16 June 2010.
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a
decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor
is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband
or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the
person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted
to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in
the appointment of an administrator. This order of preference, which
categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors
in the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in jurisprudence.8
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the
estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the
estate.9 This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into
account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who
will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the
estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence
or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to
administer the estate correctly.10 In all, given that the rule speaks of an order
of preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a decedent’s
estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest
therein greater than any other candidate.
To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving spouse in the
administration of a decedent’s estate presupposes the surviving spouse’s
interest in the conjugal partnership or community property forming part of the
decedent’s estate.11 Likewise, a surviving spouse is a compulsory heir of a
decedent12 which evinces as much, if not more, interest in administering the
entire estate of a decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership
or absolute community property.
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the
appointment of administrator of a decedent’s estate, that the appointment of
co-administrators has been allowed, but as an exception. We again refer to
Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court which specifically states that
letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the
next of kin. In addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of
the Rules of Court which say that "x x x when an executor or administrator
dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or administrator may
administer the trust alone, x x x."
In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more than one
administrator for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein. 13 We
recognized that the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent
or the determination of a person’s suitability for the office of judicial
administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court
exercising the power of appointment.14
Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in
Philippine and American jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of
co-administrators: (1) to have the benefits of their judgment and perhaps at
all times to have different interests represented;15 (2) where justice and equity
demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management
of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any
cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle;16 (4) to have all interested
persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best
interests of the estate;17 and when a person entitled to the administration of
an estate desires to have another competent person associated with him in
the office.18
In the frequently cited Matias v. Gonzales, we dwelt on the appointment of
special co-administrators during the pendency of the appeal for the probate
of the decedent’s will. Pending the probate thereof, we recognized Matias’
special interest in the decedent’s estate as universal heir and executrix
designated in the instrument who should not be excluded in the
administration thereof. Thus, we held that justice and equity demands that
the two (2) factions among the non-compulsory heirs of the decedent,
consisting of an instituted heir (Matias) and intestate heirs (respondents
thereat), should be represented in the management of the decedent’s
estate.19
Another oft-cited case is Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, where we held that
"inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and
that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of any hand
in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will would be
unfair to her proprietary interests."20
Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling in Ventura v.
Ventura21 where we allowed the appointment of the surviving spouse and
legitimate children of the decedent as co-administrators. However, we drew a
distinction between the heirs categorized as next of kin, the nearest of kin in
the category being preferred, thus:
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is
Juana Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura
and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those
persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent’s
property (citations omitted). It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose
interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of
administrator. ‘Among members of a class the strongest ground for
preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of
kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred.’" (citations omitted)
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court,
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio
Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest
of kin of Gregorio Ventura, they are entitled to preference over the illegitimate
children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence,
under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the
person or persons to be appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the
surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or
Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the
Court, in order to represent both interests.22 (Emphasis supplied)
In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,23 we maintained that the order of
preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on the attendant
facts and circumstances. In that case, we affirmed the legitimate child’s
appointment as special administrator, and eventually as regular
administrator, of the decedent’s estate as against the surviving spouse who
the lower court found unsuitable. Reiterating Sioca v. Garcia24 as good law,
we pointed out that unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may
consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately
interested in the estate.
In Valarao v. Pascual,25 we see another story with a running theme of heirs
squabbling over the estate of a decedent. We found no reason to set aside
the probate court’s refusal to appoint as special co-administrator Diaz, even if
he had a demonstrable interest in the estate of the decedent and
represented one of the factions of heirs, because the evidence weighed by
the probate court pointed to Diaz’s being remiss in his previous duty as co-
administrator of the estatein the early part of his administration. Surveying
the previously discussed cases of Matias, Corona, and Vda. de Dayrit, we
clarified, thus:
Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales,
Corona v. Court of Appeals, and Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, cited in the
assailed Decision. Contrary to their claim, these cases do not establish an
absolute right demandable from the probate court to appoint special co-
administrators who would represent the respective interests of squabbling
heirs. Rather, the cases constitute precedents for the authority of the probate
court to designate not just one but also two or more special co-administrators
for a single estate. Now whether the probate court exercises such
prerogative when the heirs are fighting among themselves is a matter left
entirely to its sound discretion.
Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge upon
factual circumstances other than the incompatible interests of the heirs which
are glaringly absent from the instant case. In Matias this Court ordered the
appointment of a special co-administrator because of the applicant's status
as the universal heir and executrix designated in the will, which we
considered to be a "special interest" deserving protection during the
pendency of the appeal. Quite significantly, since the lower court in Matias
had already deemed it best to appoint more than one special administrator,
we found grave abuse of discretion in the act of the lower court in ignoring
the applicant's distinctive status in the selection of another special
administrator.
In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice of
Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide
latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her will," for this Court to
compel her appointment as special co-administrator. It is also manifest from
the decision in Corona that the presence of conflicting interests among the
heirs therein was not per se the key factor in the designation of a second
special administrator as this fact was taken into account only to disregard or,
in the words of Corona, to "overshadow" the objections to the appointment
on grounds of "impracticality and lack of kinship."
Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of the
decedent as special co-administrator because it was "our considered opinion
that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and
that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of any hand
in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will would be
unfair to her proprietary interests." The special status of a surviving spouse in
the special administration of an estate was also emphasized in Fule v. Court
of Appeals where we held that the widow would have more interest than any
other next of kin in the proper administration of the entire estate since she
possesses not only the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive
property of the decedent but also a share in the conjugal partnership for
which the good or bad administration of the estate may affect not just the
fruits but more critically the naked ownership thereof. And in Gabriel v. Court
of Appeals we recognized the distinctive status of a surviving spouse
applying as regular administrator of the deceased spouse's estate when we
counseled the probate court that "there must be a very strong case to justify
the exclusion of the widow from the administration."
Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias, Corona and
Vda. de Dayrit was based upon the independent proprietary interests and
moral circumstances of the appointee that were not necessarily related to the
demand for representation being repeatedly urged by
respondents.26(Emphasis supplied)
In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally declared the mandatory
character of the rule on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of
administration:
Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of
preference in the issuance of letters of administration, it categorically seeks
out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires that
sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It would be a grave
abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and
insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason
therefor.27
Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya,28 we expounded on the legal
contemplation of a "next of kin," thus:
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator
of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next
of kin of the decedent. When the law speaks of "next of kin," the reference is
to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent's
property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the
estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of
whether an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of
the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the
issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits.
Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked
into and passed upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late
Francisco Angeles.29
Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals,30 we took into consideration the size of,
and benefits to, the estate should respondent therein be appointed as co-
administrator. We emphasized that where the estate is large or, from any
cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle, the appointment of co-
administrators may be sanctioned by law.
In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio III’s
demonstrable interest in the estate and glossed over the order of preference
set forth in the Rules. We gave weight to Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in
Cristina’s estate and without a closer scrutiny of the attendant facts and
circumstances, directed co-administration thereof. We are led to a review of
such position by the foregoing survey of cases.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to
be settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-
administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse
interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set forth in
Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the estate
of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the
interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. 31 Given
Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedent’s
legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the
appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a
demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the
Court32 and depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the
case.33
Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of this
case even as we reiterate Isabel’s and her sibling’s apparent greater interest
in the estate of Cristina.
These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of
preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. They
compel that a choice be made of one over the other.
1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between
Isabel, on the one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, traced back
from the time their paternal grandparents were alive, which can be
characterized as adverse interest of some kind by, or hostility of,
Emilio III to Isabel who is immediately interested in the estate;
2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III
working harmoniously as co-administrators may result in prejudice to
the decedent’s estate, ultimately delaying settlement thereof; and
3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of
Cristina’s estate, has not looked after the estate’s welfare and has
acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.
Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III’s
demonstrable interest in the estate makes him a suitable co-administrator
thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an
unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent Isabel points out that after
Emilio III’s appointment as administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has
not looked after the welfare of the subject estate and has actually acted to
the damage and prejudice thereof as evidenced by the following:
1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a
complete inventory, omitted in the partial inventories 34 he filed
therewith properties of the estate35 including several parcels of land,
cash, bank deposits, jewelry, shares of stock, motor vehicles, and
other personal properties, contrary to Section 1,36paragraph a, Rule
81 of the Rules of Court.
2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against Federico’s
settlement of the decedent’s estate which adjudicated to himself a
number of properties properly belonging to said estate (whether
wholly or partially), and which contained a declaration that the
decedent did not leave any descendants or heirs, except for
Federico, entitled to succeed to her estate.37
In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012 requiring Emilio III to
respond to the following imputations of Isabel that:
1. Emilio III did not file an inventory of the assets until November 14, 2002;
2. The inventory Emilio III submitted did not include several properties of the
decedent;
3. That properties belonging to the decedent have found their way to different
individuals or persons; several properties to Federico Suntay himself; and
4. While some properties have found their way to Emilio III, by reason of
falsified documents;38
Emilio III refutes Isabel’s imputations that he was lackadaisical in assuming
and performing the functions of administrator of Cristina’s estate:
1. From the time of the RTC’s Order appointing Emilio III as
administrator, Isabel, in her pleadings before the RTC, had
vigorously opposed Emilio III’s assumption of that office, arguing that
"the decision of the RTC dated 9 November 2001 is not among the
judgments authorized by the Rules of Court which may be
immediately implemented or executed;"
2. The delay in Emilio III’s filing of an inventory was due to Isabel’s
vociferous objections to Emilio III’s attempts to act as administrator
while the RTC decision was under appeal to the Court of Appeals;
3. The complained partial inventory is only initiatory, inherent in the
nature thereof, and one of the first steps in the lengthy process of
settlement of a decedent’s estate, such that it cannot constitute a
complete and total listing of the decedent’s properties; and
4. The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up charges where
Isabel, as private complainant, has been unwilling to appear and
testify, leading the Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44 of
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to warn the prosecutor of a possible
motu propio dismissal of the cases.
While we can subscribe to Emilio III’s counsel’s explanation for the blamed
delay in the filing of an inventory and his exposition on the nature thereof,
partial as opposed to complete, in the course of the settlement of a
decedent’s estate, we do not find any clarification on Isabel’s accusation that
Emilio III had deliberately omitted properties in the inventory, which
properties of Cristina he knew existed and which he claims to be
knowledgeable about.
The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as
administrator rooted in his failure to "make and return x x x a true and
complete inventory" which became proven fact when he actually filed partial
inventories before the probate court and by his inaction on two occasions of
Federico’s exclusion of Cristina’s other compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and
her siblings, from the list of heirs.
As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and executes
an oath to faithfully discharge the duties of settling the decedent’s estate with
the end in view of distribution to the heirs, if any. This he failed to do. The
foregoing circumstances of Emilio III’s omission and inaction become even
more significant and speak volume of his unsuitability as administrator as it
demonstrates his interest adverse to those immediately interested in the
estate of the decedent, Cristina.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the
protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent
Isabel have a deep aversion for each other.1awp++i1 To our mind, it
becomes highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to work as co-
administrators of their grandmother’s estate. The allegations of Emilio III, the
testimony of Federico and the other witnesses for Federico and Emilio III that
Isabel and her siblings were estranged from their grandparents further drive
home the point that Emilio III bears hostility towards Isabel. More importantly,
it appears detrimental to the decedent’s estate to appoint a co-administrator
(Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of some kind or hostility to
those, such as herein respondent Isabel, immediately interested in the said
estate.
Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply a
preliminary order to facilitate the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we here
point out that Emilio III is not without remedies to protect his interests in the
estate of the decedent. In Hilado v. Court of Appeals,39 we mapped out as
among the allowable participation of "any interested persons" or "any
persons interested in the estate" in either testate or intestate proceedings:
xxxx
4. Section 640 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate
of the deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment,
embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence
of the decedent’s title or interest therein;"
5. Section 1041 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the
examination and allowance of the Administrator’s account "to persons
interested;"
6. Section 7(b)42 of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the
persons interested" before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the
disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and
7. Section 1,43 Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate" to
petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the
decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.44
In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise avail of the remedy found
in Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or
administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal. – If an
executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate
according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty
expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or
otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may
remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to resign. When an executor
or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or
administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letters
to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor or
administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person.
Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial restraint:
we uphold that the question of who are the heirs of the decedent Cristina is
not yet upon us. Article 992 of the Civil Code or the curtain bar rule is
inapplicable in resolving the issue of who is better qualified to administer the
estate of the decedent.
Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain
from making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive
shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that
the question on who will administer the properties of the long deceased
couple has yet to be settled.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue remains good law:
The declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the
evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The
estate had hardly been judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet
reached the stage of distribution of the estate which must come after the
inheritance is liquidated.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing
admonition:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. - x x x. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under
the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of
them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.45
Lastly, we dispose of a peripheral issue raised in the Supplemental
Comment46 of Emilio III questioning the Special Second Division which
issued the 18 April 2012 Resolution. Emilio III asseverates that "the
operation of the Special Second Division in Baguio is unconstitutional and
void" as the Second Division in Manila had already promulgated its Decision
on 16 June 2010 on the petition filed by him:
7. The question is: who created the Special Second Division in Baguio,
acting separately from the Second Division of the Supreme Court in Manila?
There will then be two Second Divisions of the Supreme Court: one acting
with the Supreme Court in Manila, and another Special Second Division
acting independently of the Second Division of the Supreme Court in
Manila.47
For Emilio III’s counsels’ edification, the Special Second Division in Baguio is
not a different division created by the Supreme Court.
The Second Division which promulgated its Decision on this case on 16 June
2010, penned by Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, now has a different
composition, with the advent of Justice Nachura’s retirement on 13 June
2011. Section 7, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court provides:
Sec. 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of decisions
or signed resolutions and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed;
creation of a Special Division. – Motions for reconsideration or clarification of
a decision or of a signed resolution and all other motions and incidents
subsequently filed in the case shall be acted upon by the ponente and the
other Members of the Division who participated in the rendition of the
decision or signed resolution.
If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified,
or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on the motion for
reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced through raffle by a
new ponente who shall be chosen among the new Members of the Division
who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution and who
concurred therein. If only one Member of the Court who participated and
concurred in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution remains, he or
she shall be designated as the new ponente.
If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which rendered the decision or
signed resolution has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is
disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on the motion for
reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced through raffle by a
replacement Member who shall be chosen from the other Divisions until a
new Justice is appointed as replacement for the retired Justice. Upon the
appointment of a new Justice, he or she shall replace the designated Justice
as replacement Member of the Special Division.
Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be filled by raffle from
among the other Members of the Court to constitute a Special Division of five
(5) Members.
If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that rendered the Decision
or signed Resolution are no longer Members of the Court, the case shall be
raffled to any Member of the Court and the motion shall be acted upon by
him or her with the participation of the other Members of the Division to which
he or she belongs.
If there are pleadings, motions or incidents subsequent to the denial of the
motion for reconsideration or clarification, the case shall be acted upon by
the ponente on record with the participation of the other Members of the
Division to which he or she belongs at the time said pleading, motion or
incident is to be taken up by the Court. (Emphasis supplied)
As regards the operation thereof in Baguio City, such is simply a change in
venue for the Supreme Court's summer session held last April.48
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Our Decision in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010 is MODIFIED. Letters
of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall
solely issue to respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a bond
to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special
Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
4. G.R. No. 92999 October 11, 1990
REYNALDO MENDIOLA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEAL, REDENTOR A. MENDIOLA, FLORENTINA M.
MENDIOLA, ERNEST'INA A. MENDIOLA, EDGARDO M. MENDIOLA,
MANUEL M. MENDIOLA, ENRICO M. MENDIOLA RICARDO A.
MENDIOLA and MARILOU M. MENDIOLA, respondents.
Rodrigo Law Office for petitioner.
Antonio M. Pagsibigan for private respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a contest between two brothers for appointment as executor of their
father's estate. The petitioner assails the decision dated February 12, 1990
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 19373 the orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila in Sp. Proc. No. 10027 removing him as
executor of the estate of his father, the late Carlos Mendiola, and appointing
his brother, Redentor Mendiola, in his stead .
The facts, as stated in the decision of the Court of appeals, are quoted
below:
The petitioner and private respondents are the surviving
heirs of the late Carlos Mendiola who died on December 28,
1984. Florentina Mendiola is the surviving spouse while the
petitioner and all the private respondents are the children of
the.
A petition for probate of a will was filed by the petitioner on
March 30, 1987 in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro
Manila entitled 'Probate of the Will and Testament of
Deceased Carlos Mendiola' Sp. Proc. No. 10027 which was
set for hearing on August 18, 1987.
 On October 9, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 166
presided by Judge Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision
allowing the will and issuing letters testamentary in favor of
the petitioner who was declared executor of the estate of the
deceased in the will. After the petitioner took his oath on
October 14, 1987 letters testamentary was issued in favor of
the petitioner on October 20, 1987.
On April 28, 1989, the private respondents filed a motion for
the removal of the executor and another motion on May 2,
1989 for the appointment of Redentor Mendiola of (sic)
executor.
On May 22, 1989, the respondent-Judge granted the motion
and ordered the removal of the petitioner as executor and
revoked the letters testamentary. On May 23, 1989, the trial
court ordered the appointment of Redentor Mendiola as
executor.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner which
was opposed by the private respondents and the trial court
denied the motion for reconsideration. (p. 26, Rollo.)
On Appeal, the Court of Appeals aimed the judgment of the trial court, hence,
this petition for review.
Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals erred in not annulling the
probate court's order removing him as executor for: (a) no evidence had
been adduced by the respondents in support of their motion for his removal,
and (b) that he was not given his day in court.
There is no merit in the petition. Sufficient evidence was adduced in the
proceedings in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, that petitioner failed to pay
the estate tax. Petitioner's own counsel, Atty. Gregorio Ejercito, admitted in a
Manifestation that his client indeed has no proof or receipt of payment of the
estate tax (Annexes "C" and "L", pp. 69 & 84, Rollo, respectively). Petitioner
also failed to render an accounting of the estate and settle the same
according to law. Furthermore, he involved the heirs in a transaction with
Villarica Pawnshop which, because of petitioner's failure to honor his part of
the bargain, resulted in the filing of a suit by Villarica against the heirs (Civil
Case No. 58450). The case is still pending in the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig.
The removal of the petitioner is in accordance with the provisions of Section
2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court that:
If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account
and settle the estate according to law, or to perform an order
or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by
these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise
incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may
remove him, or in its discretion, may permit him to resign ... .
The determination of a person's suitability for the office of
judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound
judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment
and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal
unless the said court is clearly in error. (Abad vs. Court of
Tax Appeals, 18 SCRA 371.)
The removal of an administrator under Section 2 of Rule 82
lies within the discretion of the court appointing him. (Id.)
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the questioned decision dated
February 12, 1990 and the order dated April 25, 1990 of the respondent
Court of Appeals, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit, with costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
5. G.R. No. 164108 May 8, 2009
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS
HOLDING CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A.
REYES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 and
ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15
May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos
Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca
Benedicto-Paulino.1 At the time of his death, there were two pending civil
cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No.
95-9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod
City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein.
The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of
Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First
Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.2
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the
RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her
favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor A.
Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to
be ₱5 Million, "net of liabilities."3 On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued
an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of her
deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor.4 In
January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists
of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased
husband.5 In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private
respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two
pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts. 6 Private
respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two
cases as ₱136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and ₱35,198,697.40
for Civil Case No. 11178.7 Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private
respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and appraisal report
pertaining to the estate.8
On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a
Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,9praying that they be furnished
with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate
proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion,
disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of her husband. Even before the Manila RTC acted on the
manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the
Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the
required inventory of the decedent’s estate.10 Petitioners also filed other
pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of
private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the
inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and
inaccurate.
On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the
manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties
within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate
proceedings.11 After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals.
The petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in
the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
decision12 dismissing the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the
intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to
intervene, according to the appellate court, is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the claims of
petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as
these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other
courts.
Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower
courts erred in denying them the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of
procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the rule on
intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special
Proceedings.13
To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the
courts a quo. First, they prayed that they be henceforth furnished "copies of
all processes and orders issued" by the intestate court as well as the
pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with the said court.14 Second, they
prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by
administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the
estate, and upon submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal of the fair market
value of the same.15 Third, petitioners moved that the intestate court set a
deadline for the submission by the administrator of her verified annual
account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination
under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties
interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate. 16
The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely
informed by the rule on intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of
Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both,
or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x" While the language of
Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in
the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal
interest required of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and
immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant."17
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules
of Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings.
The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special
proceedings under the Rules of Court,18 not the Rules on Civil Procedure.
Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable to special proceedings."
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72,
intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a
decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of
"intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent
claims.
Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to
intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they
had sought then before the RTC, and also now before us, do not square with
their recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that
petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not
necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the
RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be,
let us now turn our focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings.
In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any
interested persons" or "any persons interested in the estate" to participate in
varying capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite
these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes
the right of "any person interested" to oppose the issuance of letters
testamentary and to file a petition for administration;" (2) Section 3, Rule 79,
which mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition for letters of
administration to the known heirs, creditors, and "to any other persons
believed to have interest in the estate;" (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a
"person interested in the estate" to petition for the allowance of a will; (4)
Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of the
deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or
conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedent’s
title or interest therein;" (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of
the time and place of the examination and allowance of the Administrator’s
account "to persons interested;" (6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires
the court to give notice "to the persons interested" before it may hear and
grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of
the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in
the estate" to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the
estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided
for.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract,
whether express or implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if
contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the court
immediately after granting letters of administration and published by the
administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice. 19 However, it
appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose
from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal
Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims
to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86. 20 These
actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be
commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87.
Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as
represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case
No. 11178, whereas the other civil case21 was already pending review before
this Court at the time of Benedicto’s death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be settled
in the civil cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate
proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted,
they would have the right to enforce the judgment against the estate. Yet
until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in the
intestate proceedings?
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia, 22 and
it does provide us with guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the
facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance and
damages against respondents, and during a hearing of the case, learned that
the same trial court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to
whom Dinglasan had sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus
amended his complaint to implead Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of
her late husband. He likewise filed a verified claim-in-intervention,
manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that a co-administrator be
appointed, the bond of the administrator be increased, and that the intestate
proceedings not be closed until the civil case had been terminated. When the
trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took cognizance of the
pending civil case, the administrator moved to close the intestate
proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an
extrajudicial partition of the estate. The trial court refused to close the
intestate proceedings pending the termination of the civil case, and the Court
affirmed such action.
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it
was only pursuant to their desire to protect their interests it appearing that
the property in litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only
property of the estate left subject of administration and distribution; and the
court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the
unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will
necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the determination
and distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331
the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely
makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of the two
cases and cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess of its
jurisdiction.
Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing
of the intestate proceedings pending determination of the separate civil
action for the reason that there is no rule or authority justifying the extension
of administration proceedings until after the separate action pertaining to its
general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be entertained. Section 1,
Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real
or personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions
to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may
be commenced against the executor or administrator." What practical value
would this provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be
prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs desire to close the
intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil
case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that questions
concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed
by another person should be determined in a separate action and should be
submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules
would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings
can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x
x23(Emphasis supplied) [Citations omitted]
It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed
to an action-in-intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can
partake of the spirit behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later,
the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: "[t]he rulings of this court have always
been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect
their interests are allowed to do so to protect the same, but not for a decision
on their action."24
Petitioners’ interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but
they are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of
Special Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also "any person
interested" or "persons interested in the estate" various specified capacities
to protect their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent
claim based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be
reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor,
the estate of the decedent would have already been distributed, or
diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be enforced
against it.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a
creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every
aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for
specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those
proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the
part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs
from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the
prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and
there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be
protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought
by petitioners.
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and
orders issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the
pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as
to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of
the developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the
assets of the estate. Such a running account would allow them to pursue the
appropriate remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the
right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if property
of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.
At the same time, the fact that petitioners’ interests remain inchoate and
contingent counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate
proceedings. We are mindful of respondent’s submission that if the Court
were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes and pleadings of the
intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent or
otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter
how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that
would mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody
posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims, would unduly
complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would ultimately
offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of cases.
Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been
recognized by this Court, with respect to the petitioners herein, that
addresses the core concern of petitioners to be apprised of developments in
the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,25 the Court heard a
petition for mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the RTC
judge, praying that they be allowed access to the records of the intestate
proceedings, which the respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2 of
Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating that "the records of every court
of justice shall be public records and shall be available for the inspection of
any interested person x x x." The Court ruled that petitioners were "interested
persons" entitled to access the court records in the intestate proceedings.
We said:
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records to—monitor
prompt compliance with the Rules governing the preservation and proper
disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of
the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual
accounting—appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum
of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over the
outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested persons"
under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x26
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the
intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating
the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the
interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and
disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging
their right to access the records, rather than entitling them to the service of
every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim,
will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator and the
heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests
of the creditors in the estate are preserved.1awphi1
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do
require notice to any or all "interested parties" the petitioners as "interested
parties" will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be
given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference
to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor
or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize
the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or
otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the
hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue.
After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted
inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.
We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be
set for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and
complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof: the
inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to
assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the
intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administratrix of her
verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her
examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and
other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the
estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.
Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true
inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased
within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85
requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within
one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We
do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to
perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still
contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did
delay in the performance of these duties in the context of dissipating the
assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and available under Rule
88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims against the estate.
Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator,
the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance
with Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may seek with
the court the removal of the administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor,
even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After
all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of
sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general competence or good
faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is
correct. Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners should not be
deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as
enunciated in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that
petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto
Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such
interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased
Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
6. G.R. No. L-61700 September 14, 1987
PRINCESITA SANTERO, FEDERICO SANTERO and WILLIE
SANTERO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, ANSELMA DIAZ,
VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA, MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO,
and REYNALDO EVARISTO, in his capacity as Administrator of the
Intestate Estate of PABLO SANTERO, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a Petition for certiorari which questions the order of the respondent
court granting the Motion for Allowance filed by private respondents. Said
order reads as follows:
Acting on the Motion For Allowance dated June 30, 1982
filed by Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel, all surnamed
Santero, thru their guardian, Anselma Diaz, the Opposition
thereto dated July 8, 1982 filed by the oppositors, the Reply
to Opposition dated July 12, 1982 filed by movant Anselma
Diaz and the Rejoinder dated July 26, 1982 filed by the
oppositors, the Court was constrained to examine the Motion
For Allowance filed by the herein movant last year wherein
the ground cited was for support which included educational
expenses, clothing and medical necessities, which was
granted and said minors were given an allowance prayed for
in their motion.
In the Motion For Allowance in question guardian-movant
Anselma Diaz only followed the precedent of the Court which
granted a similar motion last year to be spent for the school
expenses of her wards. In their opposition the oppositors
contend that the wards for whom allowance is sought are no
longer schooling and have attained majority age so that they
are no longer under guardianship. They likewise allege that
the administrator does not have sufficient funds to cover the
said allowance because whatever funds are in the hands of
the administrator, they constitute funds held in trust for the
benefit of whoever will be adjudged as owners of the Kawit
property from which said administrator derives the only
income of the intestate estate of Pablo Santero, et al.
In the Reply filed by the guardian-movant, she admitted
some of her children are of age and not enrolled for the first
semester due to lack of funds but will be enrolled as soon as
they are given the requested allowances. She cited Article
290 of the Civil Code providing that:
Support is everything that is indispensable
for substance, dwelling, clothing and
medical attendance, according to the social
position of the family.
Support also includes the education of the
person entitled to be supported until he
completes his education or training for some
trade or vocation, even beyond the age of
majority.'
citing also Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Allowance to widow and family. The widow
and minor or incapacitated children of a
deceased person, during the settlement of
the estate, shall receive therefrom, under
the direction of the Court, such allowance as
provided by law.'
From the foregoing discussion alone, the Court cannot
deviate from its duty to give the allowance sought by the
wards, the fact that they need further education which should
have been provided to them if their deceased father were
alive.
On the allegation that the funds from which the allowance
would be derived are trust funds, the Court, time and again
had emphasized that the estate of the Santeros is quite big
and the amount to be released for allowances is indeed
insignificant and which can easily be replaced from its
general fund if the so-called trust fund is adjudicated to the
oppositors.
WHEREFORE, Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel, all
surnamed Santero are hereby granted an allowance of two
thousand (P2,000.00) pesos each for tuition fees, clothing
materials and subsistence out of any available funds in the
hands of the administrator who is ordered to reimburse to
them the said amount after this order shall have become
final to enable the oppositors to file their appeal by certiorari
if they so desire within the reglementary period.
SO ORDERED.
Bacoor, Cavite, July 28, 1982.
(pp. 35-36, Rollo)
It appears from the records that petitioners Princesita Santero-Morales,
Federico Santero and Winy Santero are the children begotten by the late
Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while private respondents Victor,
Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are four of the seven
children begotten by the same Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz. Both sets
of children are the natural children of the late Pablo Santero since neither of
their mothers, was married to their father Pablo. Pablo Santero in turn, who
died on November 30, 1973 was the only legitimate son of Pascual Santero
who died in 1970 and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who died in 1976.
Meanwhile before We could act on the instant petition private respondents
filed another Motion for Allowance dated March 25, 1985 with the respondent
court to include Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito all surnamed Santero as
children of the
I late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz praying that an order be
granted directing
L the administrator Reynaldo C. Evaristo, to deliver the sum
of P6,000.00D to each of the seven (7) children of Anselma Diaz as their
allowance fromE the estate of Pablo Santero. The respondent Court granted
the motion F of the private respondents but oppositors (petitioners herein)
asked the court
O to reconsider said Order.
On September N 10, 1985, an Amended Order was issued by respondent
Court directing
S Anselma Diaz to submit her clarification or explanation as to
the additionalO three (3) children of Anselma Diaz included in the motion. In
compliance therewith Anselma Diaz filed her "Clarification" stating among
others that M in her previous motions, only the last four minor children as
represented . by the mother, Anselma Diaz were included in the motion for
support and her first three (3) children who were then of age should have
been included B since all her children have the right to receive allowance as
advance payment
L of their shares in the inheritance of Pablo Santero under
Art. 188, of the
E New Civil Code.
On October Z 15, 1985, petitioners herein filed their Motion
to Admit Supplemental
A Petition opposing the inclusion of three (3) more
heirs. We denied
E that "Motion for Extension of Time to file their Supplemental
Petition" as per
x Our Resolution dated October 23, 1985.
On November e 11, 1985, another Order was issued by the respondent court
directing thecadministrator of the estate to get back the allowance of the three
additional recipients
u or children of Anselma Diaz apparently based on the
t
oppositors' (petitioners herein) "Urgent Motion to Direct the Administrator to
Withhold Disbursement of Allowance to the Movants."
The issues now being raised in this present Petition are:
1. Whether or not respondent court acted with abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the
allowance to the respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina
and Miguel-P2,000.00 each despite the fact that all of them
are not minors and all are gainfully employed with the
exception of Miguel.
2. Whether or not respondent Court acted with abuse of
discretion in granting the allowance based on the allegations
of the said respondents that the abovenamed wards are still
schooling and they are in actual need of money to defray
their school expenses for 1982-83 when the truth is that they
are no longer schooling.
3. Whether or not respondent Court acted with abuse of
discretion in granting the motion for allowance without
conducting a hearing thereon, to determine the truth of
allegations of the private respondents.
Petitioners argue that private respondents are not entitled to any allowance
since they have already attained majority age, two are gainfully employed
and one is married as provided for under Sec. 3 Rule 83, of the Rules of
Court. Petitioners also allege that there was misrepresentation on the part of
the guardian in asking for allowance for tuition fees, books and other school
materials and other miscellaneous expenses for school term 1982-83
because these wards have already attained majority age so that they are no
longer under guardianship. They further allege that the administrator of the
estate of Pablo Santero does not have sufficient funds to cover said
allowance because whatever funds are in the hands of the administrator
constitute funds held in trust for the benefit of whoever will be adjudged as
owners of the Kawit properties from where these funds now held by the
administrator are derived.
In this connection, the question of whether the private respondents are
entitled to allowance or not concerns only the intestate estate of the late
Pablo Santero and not the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Simona
Pamuti, parents of their late legitimate son Pablo Santero. The reason for this
is Art. 992 of the New Civil Code which states that "An illegitimate child has
no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child." The question of whether or not the
petitioners and private respondents are entitled to inherit by right of
representation from their grandparents more particularly from Simona Pamuti
was settled by Us in the related case of "Anselma Diaz, et al. vs. Felisa
Pamuti-Jardin" (G.R. No. 66574-R) wherein We held that in view of the
barrier present in said Art. 992, petitioners and private respondents are
excluded from the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
The present petition obviously lacks merit.
The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the New Rules of
Court but Arts. 290 and 188 of the Civil Code reading as follows:
Art. 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing and medical attendance,
according tothe social position of the family.
Support also includes the education of the person entitled to
be supported until he completes his education or training for
some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of
majority.
Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall
be given to the surviving spouse and to the children during
the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what
belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted
that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or
rents pertaining to them.
The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married
is of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of
their right to allowance under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court limit
allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the
deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her
children without distinction. Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo,
Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled to allowances as
advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero.
Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving
spouse and to the children the right to receive support during the liquidation
of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec.
3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. Be it noted however that
with respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate spouse" (not
common-law spouses who are the mothers of the children here).
It is not true that the Motion for Allowance was granted by respondent Court
without hearing. The record shows that the "Motion for Allowance" dated
June 30, 1982 contains a Notice of Hearing (p. 2, Annex "A") addressed to
the lawyers for the petitioners and setting the hearing thereof on July 8, 1982
at 9:00 in the morning. Apparently a copy of said motion was duly received
by the lawyer, Atty. Beltran as he filed an opposition thereto on the same
date of hearing of the motion. Furthermore even the instant petition admits
that the wards, (petitioners and private respondents as represented by their
respective guardians) "have been granted allowances for school expenses
for about 8 years now." The respondent court in granting the motion for
allowance merely "followed the precedent of the court which granted
a similar motion last year." (Annex "F") However in previous years (1979-
1981) the "wards" (petitioners and private respondents) only received
P1,500.00 each depending upon the availability of funds as granted by the
court in several orders. (Annex 1 to Annex 4).
WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforementioned circumstances, the instant
Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed judgment is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
7. G.R. No. L-19265 May 29, 1964
MOISES SAN DIEGO, SR., petitioner,
vs.
ADELO NOMBRE and PEDRO ESCANLAR, respondents.
A. R. Castañeda and M. S. Roxas for petitioner.
Amado B. Parreño Law Office for respondents.
PAREDES, J.:
The case at bar had its origin in Special Proceedings No. 7279 of the CFI of
Negros Occidental wherein respondent Adelo Nombre was the duly
constituted judicial administrator. On May 1, 1960, Nombre, in his capacity
was judicial administrator of the intestate estate subject of the Sp. Proc.
stated above, leased one of the properties of the estate (a fishpond identified
as Lot No. 1617 of the cadastral survey of Kabankaban, Negros Occidental),
to Pedro Escanlar, the other respondent. The terms of the lease was for
three (3) years, with a yearly rental of P3,000.00 to expire on May 1, 1963,
the transaction having been done, admittedly, without previous authority or
approval of the Court where the proceedings was pending. On January 17,
1961, Nombre was removed as administrator by Order of the court and one
Sofronio Campillanos was appointed in his stead. The appeal on the Order of
Nombre's removal is supposedly pending with the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Escanlar was cited for contempt, allegedly for his refusal to
surrender the fishpond to the newly appointed administrator. On March 20,
1961, Campillanos filed a motion asking for authority to execute a lease
contract of the same fishpond, in favor of petitioner herein, Moises San
Diego, Sr., for 5 years from 1961, at a yearly rental of P5,000.00. Escanlar
was not notified of such motion. Nombre, the deposed administrator,
presented a written opposition to the motion of Campillanos on April 11,
1964, pointing out that the fishpond had been leased by him to Escanlar for 3
years, the period of which was going to expire on May 1, 1963. In a
supplemental opposition, he also invited the attention of the Court that to
grant the motion of the new administrator would in effect nullify the contract
in favor of Escanlar, a person on whom the Court had no jurisdiction. He also
intimated that the validity of the lease contract entered into by a judicial
administrator, must be recognized unless so declared void in a separate
action. The opposition notwithstanding, the Court on April 8, 1961, in effect
declared that the contract in favor of Escanlar was null and void, for want of
judicial authority and that unless he would offer the same as or better
conditions than the prospective lessee, San Diego, there was no good
reason why the motion for authority to lease the property to San Diego
should not be granted. Nombre moved to reconsider the Order of April 8,
stating that Escanlar was willing to increase the rental of P5,000.00, but only
after the termination of his original contract. The motion for reconsideration
was denied on April 24, 1961, the trial judge stating that the contract in favor
of Escanlar was executed in bad faith and was fraudulent because of the
imminence of Nombre's removal as administrator, one of the causes of which
was his indiscriminate pleasant, of the property with inadequate rentals.
From this Order, a petition for Certiorari asking for the annulment of the
Orders of April 8 and 24, 1961 was presented by Nombre and Escanlar with
the Court of Appeals. A Writ of preliminary injunction was likewise prayed for
to restrain the new administrator Campillanos from possessing the fishpond
and from executing a new lease contract covering it; requiring him to return
the possession thereof to Escanlar, plus damages and attorney's fees in the
amount of P10,000.00 and costs. The Court of Appeals issued the injunctive
writ and required respondents therein to Answer. Campillanos insisted on the
invalidity of the contract in favor of Escanlar; the lower court alleged that it
did not exactly annul or invalidate the lease in his questioned orders but
suggested merely that Escanlar "may file a separate ordinary action in the
Court of general jurisdiction."
The Court of Appeals, in dismissing the petition for certiorari, among others
said —
The controlling issue in this case is the legality of the contract of
lease entered into by the former administrator Nombre, and Pedro
Escanlar on May 1, 1960.
Respondents contend that this contract, not having been authorized
or approved by the Court, is null and void and cannot be an obstacle
to the execution of another of lease by the new administrator,
Campillanos. This contention is without merit. ... . It has been held
that even in the absence of such special powers, a contract or lease
for more than 6 years is not entirely invalid; it is invalid only in so far
as it exceeds the six-year limit (Enrique v. Watson Company, et al., 6
Phil. 84). 1
No such limitation on the power of a judicial administrator to grant a
lease of property placed under his custody is provided for in the
present law. Under Article 1647 of the present Civil Code, it is only
when the lease is to be recorded in the Registry of Property that it
cannot be instituted without special authority. Thus, regardless of the
period of lease, there is no need of special authority unless the
contract is to be recorded in the Registry of Property. As to whether
the contract in favor of Escanlar is to be so recorded is not material
to our inquiry. 1äwphï1.ñët
On the contrary, Rule 85, Section 3, of the Rules of Court authorizes
a judicial administrator, among other things, to administer the estate
of the deceased not disposed of by will. Commenting on this Section
in the light of several Supreme Court decisions (Jocson de Hilado v.
Nava, 69 Phil. 1; Gamboa v. Gamboa, 68 Phil. 304; Ferraris v.
Rodas, 65 Phil. 732; Rodriguez v. Borromeo, 43 Phil. 479), Moran
says: "Under this provision, the executor or administrator has the
power of administering the estate of the deceased for purposes of
 liquidation and distribution. He may, therefore, exercise all acts of
administration without special authority of the Court. For instance, he
may lease the property without securing previously any permission
from the court. And where the lease has formally been entered into,
the court cannot, in the same proceeding, annul the same, to the
prejudice of the lessee, over whose person it had no jurisdiction. The
proper remedy would be a separate action by the administrator or
the heirs to annul the lease. ... .
On September 13, 1961, petitioner herein Moises San Diego, Sr., who was
not a party in the case, intervened and moved for a reconsideration of the
above judgment. The original parties (the new administrator and respondent
judge) also filed Motions for reconsideration, but we do not find them in the
record. On November 18, 1961, the Court of Appeals denied the motions for
reconsideration. With the denial of the said motions, only San Diego,
appealed therefrom, raising legal questions, which center on "Whether a
judicial administrator can validly lease property of the estate without prior
judicial authority and approval", and "whether the provisions of the New Civil
Code on Agency should apply to judicial administrators."
The Rules of Court provide that —
An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession of
the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it
is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of
administration, and shall administer the estate of the deceased not
disposed of by his will. (Sec. 3, Rule 85, old Rules).
Lease has been considered an act of administration (Jocson v. Nava;
Gamboa v. Gamboa; Rodriguez v. Borromeo; Ferraris v. Rodas, supra).
The Civil Code, on lease, provides:
If a lease is to be recorded in the Registry of Property, the following
persons cannot constitute the same without proper authority, the
husband with respect to the wife's paraphernal real estate, the father
or guardian as to the property of the minor or ward, and the manager
without special power. (Art. 1647).
The same Code, on Agency, states:
Special powers of attorneys are necessary in the following cases:
(8) To lease any real property to another person for more than one
year. (Art. 1878)
Petitioner contends, that No. 8, Art. 1878 is the limitation to the right of a
judicial administrator to lease real property without prior court authority and
approval, if it exceeds one year. The lease contract in favor of Escanlar being
for 3 years and without such court approval and authority is, therefore, null
and void. Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that there is no
limitation of such right; and that Article 1878 does not apply in the instant
case.
We believe that the Court of Appeals was correct in sustaining the validity of
the contract of lease in favor of Escanlar, notwithstanding the lack of prior
authority and approval. The law and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter
militates in favor of this view. While it may be admitted that the duties of a
judicial administrator and an agent (petitioner alleges that both act in
representative capacity), are in some respects, identical, the provisions on
agency (Art. 1878, C.C.), should not apply to a judicial administrator. A
judicial administrator is appointed by the Court. He is not only the
representative of said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of the estate
(Chua Tan v. Del Rosario, 57 Phil. 411). A judicial administrator before
entering into his duties, is required to file a bond. These circumstances are
not true in case of agency. The agent is only answerable to his principal. The
protection which the law gives the principal, in limiting the powers and rights
of an agent, stems from the fact that control by the principal can only be thru
agreements, whereas the acts of a judicial administrator are subject to
specific provisions of law and orders of the appointing court. The observation
of former Chief Justice Moran, as quoted in the decision of the Court of
Appeals, is indeed sound, and We are not prone to alter the same, at the
moment.
We, likewise, seriously doubt petitioner's legal standing to pursue this
appeal. And, if We consider the fact that after the expiration of the original
period of the lease contract executed by respondent Nombre in favor of
Escanlar, a new contract in favor of said Escanlar, was executed on May 1,
1963, by the new administrator Campillanos. who, incidentally, did not take
any active participation in the present appeal, the right of petitioner to the
fishpond becomes a moot and academic issue, which We need not pass
upon.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby
affirmed, in all respects, with costs against petitioner Moises San Diego, Sr.
8. G.R. No. 118671 January 29, 1996
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division), MARIA
PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE
RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision
dated November 10, 1994 and the resolution dated January 5, 1995 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045.
The facts show that on June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz1 executed a
holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted
daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three
granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and
Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his
heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz
executor of his estate.2
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash
component of his estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private
respondents in accordance with the decedent's will. For unbeknown reasons,
Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his
father's holographic will.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator's death, it was private
respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario
Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond
Ruiz,3 Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will
was executed under undue influence.
On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate — the house and
lot at No. 2 Oliva Street, Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the testator bequeathed
to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline4 — was leased out
by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.
On January 19, 1993, the probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the
Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00
representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property. In compliance,
on January 25, 1993, Edmond turned over the amount of P348,583.56,
representing the balance of the rent after deducting P191,416.14 for repair
and maintenance expenses on the estate.5
In March 1993, Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real
estate taxes on the real properties of the estate. The probate court approved
the release of P7,722.00.6
On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will.
Consequently, the probate court, on May 18, 1993, admitted the will to
probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond
conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. The letters
testamentary were issued on June 23, 1993.
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz
as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds." It prayed for
the release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court.
Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a "Motion for
Release of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of
Allowance of Probate Will." Montes prayed for the release of the said rent
payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for
the distribution of the testator's properties, specifically the Valle Verde
property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the provisions of
the holographic will.
On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioner's motion for release
of funds but granted respondent Montes' motion in view of petitioner's lack of
opposition. It thus ordered the release of the rent payments to the decedent's
three granddaughters. It further ordered the delivery of the titles to and
possession of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters and
respondent Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his
opposition to respondent Montes's motion for release of rent payments which
opposition the court failed to consider. Petitioner likewise reiterated his
previous motion for release of funds.
On November 23, 1993, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he was
withdrawing his motion for release of funds in view of the fact that the lease
contract over the Valle Verde property had been renewed for another year.7
Despite petitioner's manifestation, the probate court, on December 22, 1993,
ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may
be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for
support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and
deductible from their share in the inheritance. The court, however, held in
abeyance the release of the titles to respondent Montes and the three
granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date of first publication
of the notice to creditors.8 The court stated thus:
xxx xxx xxx
After consideration of the arguments set forth thereon by the parties
the court resolves to allow Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz to take
possession of the rental payments deposited with the Clerk of Court,
Pasig Regional Trial Court, but only such amount as may
be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and
allowances for support of Maria Cathryn Veronique, Candice
Albertine and Maria Angeli, which are subject to collation and
deductible from the share in the inheritance of said heirs and insofar
as they exceed the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
As to the release of the titles bequeathed to petitioner Maria Pilar
Ruiz-Montes and the above-named heirs, the same is hereby
reconsidered and held in abeyance until the lapse of six (6) months
from the date of first publication of Notice to Creditors.
WHEREFORE, Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz is hereby ordered to
submit an accounting of the expenses necessary for administration
including provisions for the support Of Maria Cathryn Veronique
Ruiz, Candice Albertine Ruiz and Maria Angeli Ruiz before the
amount required can be withdrawn and cause the publication of
the notice to creditors with reasonable dispatch.9
Petitioner assailed this order before the Court of Appeals. Finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge, the appellate court
dismissed the petition and sustained the probate court's order in a decision
dated November 10, 199410 and a resolution dated January 5, 1995.11
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that:
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING AND CONFIRMING
THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
PASIG, BRANCH 156, DATED DECEMBER 22, 1993, WHICH
 WHEN GIVEN DUE COURSE AND IS EFFECTED WOULD: (1)
DISALLOW THE EXECUTOR/ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
OF THE LATE HILARIO M. RUIZ TO TAKE POSSESSION OF ALL
THE REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE; (2)
GRANT SUPPORT, DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE
SETTLEMENT OF AN ESTATE, TO CERTAIN PERSONS NOT
ENTITLED THERETO; AND (3) PREMATURELY PARTITION AND
DISTRIBUTE THE ESTATE PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF
THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL EVEN BEFORE ITS INTRINSIC
VALIDITY HAS BEEN DETERMINED, AND DESPITE THE
EXISTENCE OF UNPAID DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE
ESTATE.12
The issue for resolution is whether the probate court, after admitting the will
to probate but before payment of the estate's debts and obligations, has the
authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the
support of the testator's grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the titles to
certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the
executor of the will.
On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides:
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and minor or
incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of
the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court,
such allowance as are provided by law.
Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the widow and the minor or
incapacitated children of the deceased the right to receive allowances for
support during the settlement of estate proceedings. He contends that the
testator's three granddaughters do not qualify for an allowance because they
are not incapacitated and are no longer minors but of legal age, married and
gainfully employed. In addition, the provision expressly states "children" of
the deceased which excludes the latter's grandchildren.
It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not
be limited to the "minor or incapacitated" children of the deceased. Article
18813 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in force at the
time of the testator's death, provides that during the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse and children,
regardless of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to
provisional support from the funds of the estate.14 The law is rooted on the
fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right to education,
subsist even beyond the age of majority.15
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from
the funds of the decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to
"widow and children" and does not extend it to the deceased's grandchildren,
regardless of their minority or incapacity.16 It was error, therefore, for the
appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance to
the grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his estate.
Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of
the bequeathed properties to private respondents six months after the date of
first publication of notice to creditors. An order releasing titles to properties of
the estate amounts to an advance distribution of the estate which is allowed
only under the following conditions:
Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. —
Nothwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in proceedings to
settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and
upon such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such
part of the estate as may not be affected by the controversy or
appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance
with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these Rules.17
And Rule 90 provides that:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — When the
debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration the
allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax if any, chargeable to the
estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the
application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested
in the estate, and after hearing upon notice shall assign the residue
of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and
the proportions or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons
may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor
or administrator, or any other person having the same in his
possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are
the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive
shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations
above-mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such
time as the court directs.18
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties
can only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2)
before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them
gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of
said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is
made to meet those obligations.19
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the
Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private
respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first publication of
the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of "notice" to creditors,
not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts
when he died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much
less ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid
before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the
distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax
obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the
inheritance.20 Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of the
estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.
It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of
the titles six months after admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will is
conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity21 and settles only the
question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.22 Questions as to the
intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any
devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.23
The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by
petitioner before the probate court in his Reply to Montes' Opposition to his
motion for release of funds24 and his motion for reconsideration of the August
26, 1993 order of the said court.25 Therein, petitioner assailed the distributive
shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his father's will included
the estate of his mother and allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate
heir of his mother. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who
are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their distributive shares in his estate,
the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary
cases.26
Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived
him of his right to take possession of all the real and personal properties of
the estate. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and
management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not
absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the
payment of the debts and expenses of administration,"27 Section 3 of Rule 84
of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides:
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts,
and to administer estate not willed. — An executor or administrator
shall have the right to the possession and management of the real as
well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses for
administration.28
When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the
clerk of court, he had been previously granted by the probate court certain
amounts for repair and maintenance expenses on the properties of the
estate, and payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But petitioner moved
again for the release of additional funds for the same reasons he previously
cited. It was correct for the probate court to require him to submit an
accounting of the necessary expenses for administration before releasing
any further money in his favor.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited with
it only a portion of the one-year rental income from the Valle Verde property.
Petitioner did not deposit its succeeding rents after renewal of the
lease.29Neither did he render an accounting of such funds.
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of
his father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled
and partitioned.30 As executor, he is a mere trustee of his father's estate. The
funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties
and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. 31 He cannot unilaterally
assign to himself and possess all his parents' properties and the fruits thereof
without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal
properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration,
the expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax,
all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity,
propriety and justness.32
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 33045 affirming the order dated December 22, 1993 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig in SP Proc. No. 10259 are affirmed
with the modification that those portions of the order granting an allowance to
the testator's grandchildren and ordering the release of the titles to the
private respondents upon notice to creditors are annulled and set aside.
Respondent judge is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the proceedings
below.
SO ORDERED.
9. G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014
THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner, v. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON
V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V.
MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, AND FRANKLIN L.
MERCADO, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of
properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be
submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional
unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is
one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the
settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the
status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the
conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
Antecedents
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived
by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children,
namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland,
Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two children parties to present evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the
by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner court to resolve the motion for approval of the inventory.7cralawred
Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned leave of court to examine Teresita on the inventory.
corporate shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu
Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court
properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his on the issue of what properties should be included in or excluded from the
real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer Certificate of inventory, the RTC set dates for the hearing on that issue.8cralawlawlibrary
Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty. Ruling of the RTC

On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City
a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio’s
estate (Special Proceedings No. 3094–CEB).1 The RTC granted the petition
considering that there was no opposition. The letters of administration in
favor of Teresita were issued on September 7, 1992.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio
on December 14, 1992 for the consideration and approval by the RTC. She
indicated in the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had “left no
real properties but only personal properties” worth P6,675,435.25 in all,
consisting of cash of P32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00;
pieces of jewelry valued at P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir
Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth
P22,708.25.2
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from
the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the
inventory, and to be examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma’s
motion through the order of January 8, 1993.
On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8,
1993,3 supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks
covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of stock;4the deed of assignment
executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991 involving real properties with the
market value of P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares
of stock with total par value of P4,440,700.00;5 and the certificate of stock
issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth
P30,000.00.6
On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be
examined under oath on the inventory, and that she (Thelma) be allowed 30
days within which to file a formal opposition to or comment on the inventory
and the supporting documents Teresita had submitted.
On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need for the
After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued on
March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by
Teresita had excluded properties that should be included, and accordingly
ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and considerations, the
Court hereby denies the administratrix’s motion for approval of inventory. The
Court hereby orders the said administratrix to re–do the inventory of
properties which are supposed to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio
S. Mercado by including therein the properties mentioned in the last five
immediately preceding paragraphs hereof and then submit the revised
inventory within sixty (60) days from notice of this order.
The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an account of her
administration of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had come
to her possession. She must render such accounting within sixty (60) days
from notice hereof.
SO ORDERED.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought
the reconsideration of the order of March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of
the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had
already been sold to Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land covered by
the deed of assignment had already come into the possession of and
registered in the name of Mervir Realty.10Thelma opposed the motion.
On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration, 11 stating
that there was no cogent reason for the reconsideration, and that the
movants’ agreement as heirs to submit to the RTC the issue of what
properties should be included or excluded from the inventory already
estopped them from questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue.
Decision of the CA
Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to approve the inventory, and in ordering her as administrator to
include real properties that had been transferred to Mervir Realty, Teresita,
joined by her four children and her stepson Franklin, assailed the adverse
orders of the RTC promulgated on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by
petition for certiorari, stating:
I the Civil Code, to the effect that the sale made through a public instrument
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE REAL PROPERTY WHICH WAS
SOLD BY THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO DURING HIS LIFETIME TO A
PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION) BE
INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.
II
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT REAL PROPERTIES WHICH ARE IN
THE POSSESSION OF AND ALREADY REGISTERED IN THE NAME (OF)
PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION) BE
INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.
III
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOW ESTOPPED
FROM QUESTIONING ITS JURISDICTION IN PASSING UPON THE ISSUE
OF WHAT PROPERTIES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO MERCADO.12
On May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari, disposing
as follows:13
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition
is GRANTED partially. The assailed Orders dated March 14, 2001 and May
18, 2001 are hereby reversed and set aside insofar as the inclusion of
parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an area
of 53,301 square meters subject matter of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
November 9, 1989 and the various parcels of land subject matter of the
Deeds of Assignment dated February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in the
revised inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is concerned
and affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition
for certiorari because the order of the RTC directing a new inventory of
properties was interlocutory; that pursuant to Article 1477 of the Civil Code,
to the effect that the ownership of the thing sold “shall be transferred to the
vendee” upon its “actual and constructive delivery,” and to Article 1498 of
was equivalent to the delivery of the object of the sale, the sale by Emigdio
and Teresita had transferred the ownership of Lot No. 3353 to Mervir Realty
because the deed of absolute sale executed on November 9, 1989 had been
notarized; that Emigdio had thereby ceased to have any more interest in Lot
3353; that Emigdio had assigned the parcels of land to Mervir Realty as early
as February 17, 1989 “for the purpose of saving, as in avoiding taxes with the
difference that in the Deed of Assignment dated January 10, 1991, additional
seven (7) parcels of land were included”; that as to the January 10, 1991
deed of assignment, Mervir Realty had been “even at the losing end
considering that such parcels of land, subject matter(s) of the Deed of
Assignment dated February 12, 1989, were again given monetary
consideration through shares of stock”; that even if the assignment had been
based on the deed of assignment dated January 10, 1991, the parcels of
land could not be included in the inventory “considering that there is nothing
wrong or objectionable about the estate planning scheme”; that the RTC, as
an intestate court, also had no power to take cognizance of and determine
the issue of title to property registered in the name of third persons or
corporation; that a property covered by the Torrens system should be
afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title; that the RTC, by
disregarding the presumption, had transgressed the clear provisions of law
and infringed settled jurisprudence on the matter; and that the RTC also
gravely abused its discretion in holding that Teresita, et al. were estopped
from questioning its jurisdiction because of their agreement to submit to the
RTC the issue of which properties should be included in the inventory.
The CA further opined as follows:
In the instant case, public respondent court erred when it ruled that
petitioners are estopped from questioning its jurisdiction considering that they
have already agreed to submit themselves to its jurisdiction of determining
what properties are to be included in or excluded from the inventory to be
submitted by the administratrix, because actually, a reading of petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration dated March 26, 2001 filed before public
respondent court clearly shows that petitioners are not questioning its
jurisdiction but the manner in which it was exercised for which they are not
estopped, since that is their right, considering that there is grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of limited jurisdiction when it issued
the assailed Order dated March 14, 2001 denying the administratrix’s motion
for approval of the inventory of properties which were already titled and in
possession of a third person that is, Mervir Realty Corporation, a private
corporation, which under the law possessed a personality distinct and
separate from its stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred
the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in
favor of Mervir Realty Corporation should stand undisturbed.
Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court had no authority
to determine the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate
fiction and even if public respondent court was not merely acting in a limited
capacity as a probate court, private respondent nonetheless failed to adjudge
competent evidence that would have justified the court to impale the veil of
corporate fiction because to disregard the separate jurisdictional personality
of a corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly
established since it cannot be presumed.14
On November 15, 2002, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration of
Teresita, et al.15
Issue
Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion
of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had
been either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir
Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
I
Was certiorari the proper recourse
to assail the questioned orders of the RTC?
The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Thelma contends that the resort
to the special civil action for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC by
Teresita and her co–respondents was not proper.
Thelma’s contention cannot be sustained.
The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended
on whether the assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in
nature. In Pahila–Garrido v. Tortogo,16 the Court distinguished
between final and interlocutory orders as follows:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known.
The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to
enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not
completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided
upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on
the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain
whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the
order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect
to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory;
otherwise, it is final.
The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the
writ of preliminary injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and
should not be the subject of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an appeal
from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single
action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of
the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals
will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable
length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary
expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are
incidental questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders
rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the
subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the
ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment
itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory
order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the
approval of the inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her
motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of
the properties in the inventory was not yet a final determination of their
ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the concomitant
determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory were provisional and subject to revision at anytime during the
course of the administration proceedings.
In Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court, in affirming the
decision of the CA to the effect that the order of the intestate court excluding
certain real properties from the inventory was interlocutory and could be
changed or modified at anytime during the course of the administration
proceedings, held that the order of exclusion was not a final but an
interlocutory order “in the sense that it did not settle once and for all the title
to the San Lorenzo Village lots.” The Court observed there that:
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court
may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not
conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action
regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3 Moran’s
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448–9 and (c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a
473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L–42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to
266).18 (Bold emphasis supplied) a claim against it;

To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals,19 where the Court (d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
declared that a “probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding,
can only pass upon questions of title provisionally,” and reminded, (e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a
citing Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, that the “patent reason is the probate deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final
court’s limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except
ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
property, can only be settled in a separate action.” Indeed, in the cited case administrator; and
of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals,20 the Court pointed out:
All that the said court could do as regards the said properties is determine (f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.
to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have
to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not come
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. (Bold under any of the instances in which multiple appeals are permitted.
emphasis supplied)
II
On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion
et al. to take against the assailed orders. The final judgment rule embodied in in directing the inclusion of the properties
the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court,21 which also in the estate of the decedent?
governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments,
final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law “that completely disposes of In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC committed grave
the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be abuse of discretion for including properties in the inventory notwithstanding
appealable” may be the subject of an appeal in due course. The same rule their having been transferred to Mervir Realty by Emigdio during his lifetime,
states that an interlocutory order or resolution (interlocutory because it deals and for disregarding the registration of the properties in the name of Mervir
with preliminary matters, or that the trial on the merits is yet to be held and Realty, a third party, by applying the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate
the judgment rendered) is expressly made non–appealable. fiction.

Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical Was the CA correct in its conclusion?
recognition of the possibility that material issues may be finally determined at
various stages of the special proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in
of Court enumerates the specific instances in which multiple appeals may be reaching its conclusion, ignored the law and the facts that had fully warranted
resorted to in special proceedings, viz: the assailed orders of the RTC.
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. – An
interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of
judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic administration may be granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving
Relations Court, where such order or judgment: spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person dies
intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving spouse,
(a) Allows or disallows a will; the RTC becomes duty–bound to direct the preparation and submission of
the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit the inventory within
distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled;
three months from the issuance of letters of administration pursuant to Rule
83 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. –
Within three (3) months after his appointment every executor or administrator
shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and
personal estate of the deceased which has come into his possession or
knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the court may order one or
more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all
the real and personal properties of the decedent in the inventory. 22 However,
the word all is qualified by the phrase which has come into his possession or
knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be known to the
administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the
administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true
inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent can
be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of
another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of
the estate of the decedent is “to aid the court in revising the accounts and
determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making
a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to
facilitate the administration of the estate.”23 Hence, the RTC that presides
over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the
question of what properties should be included in the inventory. According
to Peralta v. Peralta,24 the CA cannot impose its judgment in order to
supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included
or excluded from the inventory in the absence of “positive abuse of
discretion,” for in the administration of the estates of deceased persons, “the
judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not
interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it be
shown that there has been a positive abuse of discretion.” 25As long as the
RTC commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be
respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court
is special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by
title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right
of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said
properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the
inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. Such
determination is provisional and may be still revised. As the Court said
in Agtarap v. Agtarap:26
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate
court or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the
probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but
does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise
during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court
merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a
probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or
intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a
part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to
that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be
included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is,
then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to
an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency
and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a
testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final determination
of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all
heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or
the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate
court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate
court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction
extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of
the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether
the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the
deceased spouse.27 (Italics in the original; bold emphasis supplied)
It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its
directive for the inclusion of the properties in question in its assailed order of
March 14, 2001, viz:
In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted that Emigdio
Mercado was one of the heirs of Severina Mercado who, upon her death, left
several properties as listed in the inventory of properties submitted in Court
in Special Proceedings No. 306–R which are supposed to be divided among
her heirs. The administratrix admitted, while being examined in Court by the
counsel for the petitioner, that she did not include in the inventory submitted
by her in this case the shares of Emigdio Mercado in the said estate of
Severina Mercado. Certainly, said properties constituting Emigdio Mercado’s
share in the estate of Severina Mercado should be included in the inventory
of properties required to be submitted to the Court in this particular case.
In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado also
admitted in Court that she did not include in the inventory shares of stock of
Mervir Realty Corporation which are in her name and which were paid by her
from money derived from the taxicab business which she and her husband
had since 1955 as a conjugal undertaking. As these shares of stock partake
of being conjugal in character, one–half thereof or of the value thereof should
be included in the inventory of the estate of her husband.
In the third place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado
admitted, too, in Court that she had a bank account in her name at Union
Bank which she opened when her husband was still alive. Again, the money
in said bank account partakes of being conjugal in character, and so, one–
half thereof should be included in the inventory of the properties constituting
as estate of her husband.
In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing in this case
that Lot No. 3353 of Pls–657–D located in Badian, Cebu containing an area
of 53,301 square meters as described in and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 3252 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cebu is still
registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado until now. When it was the
subject of Civil Case No. CEB–12690 which was decided on October 19,
1995, it was the estate of the late Emigdio Mercado which claimed to be the
owner thereof. Mervir Realty Corporation never intervened in the said case in
order to be the owner thereof. This fact was admitted by Richard Mercado
himself when he testified in Court. x x x So the said property located in
Badian, Cebu should be included in the inventory in this case.
Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several parcels of land by
the late Emigdio S. Mercado to Mervir Realty Corporation on January 10,
1991 by virtue of the Deed of Assignment signed by him on the said day
(Exhibit N for the petitioner and Exhibit 5 for the administratrix) was a transfer
in contemplation of death. It was made two days before he died on January
12, 1991. A transfer made in contemplation of death is one prompted by the
thought that the transferor has not long to live and made in place of a
testamentary disposition (1959 Prentice Hall, p. 3909). Section 78 of the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 provides that the gross estate of the
decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death
of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has
at any time made a transfer in contemplation of death. So, the inventory to be
approved in this case should still include the said properties of Emigdio
Mercado which were transferred by him in contemplation of death. Besides,
the said properties actually appeared to be still registered in the name of
Emigdio S. Mercado at least ten (10) months after his death, as shown by the
certification issued by the Cebu City Assessor’s Office on October 31, 1991
(Exhibit O).28
Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and
the jurisprudence relevant to the procedure for preparing the inventory by the
administrator. The aforequoted explanations indicated that the directive to
include the properties in question in the inventory rested on good and valid
reasons, and thus was far from whimsical, or arbitrary, or capricious.
Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from Severina
Mercado should be included in the inventory because Teresita, et al. did not
dispute the fact about the shares being inherited by Emigdio.
Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code in August 3, 1988, their property regime was
the conjugal partnership of gains.29 For purposes of the settlement of
Emigdio’s estate, it was unavoidable for Teresita to include his shares in the
conjugal partnership of gains. The party asserting that specific property
acquired during that property regime did not pertain to the conjugal
partnership of gains carried the burden of proof, and that party must prove
the exclusive ownership by one of them by clear, categorical, and convincing
evidence.30 In the absence of or pending the presentation of such proof, the
conjugal partnership of Emigdio and Teresita must be provisionally liquidated
to establish who the real owners of the affected properties were,31 and which
of the properties should form part of the estate of Emigdio. The portions that
pertained to the estate of Emigdio must be included in the inventory.
Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in the
name of Mervir Realty, the RTC made findings that put that title in dispute.
Civil Case No. CEB–12692, a dispute that had involved the ownership of Lot
3353, was resolved in favor of the estate of Emigdio, and Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was still in Emigdio’s name. Indeed, the
RTC noted in the order of March 14, 2001, or ten years after his death, that
Lot 3353 had remained registered in the name of Emigdio.
Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all in Civil Case No. CEB–
12692. Such lack of interest in Civil Case No. CEB–12692 was susceptible of
various interpretations, including one to the effect that the heirs of Emigdio
could have already threshed out their differences with the assistance of the
trial court. This interpretation was probable considering that Mervir Realty,
whose business was managed by respondent Richard, was headed by
Teresita herself as its President. In other words, Mervir Realty appeared to
be a family corporation.
Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor of
Mervir Realty was a notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the
exclusion from the inventory of the properties involved. A notarized deed of
sale only enjoyed the presumption of regularity in favor of its execution, but
its notarization did not per se guarantee the legal efficacy of the transaction
under the deed, and what the contents purported to be. The presumption of
regularity could be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary.32 As the Court has observed in Suntay v. Court of Appeals:33
x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor
the presumption of regularity, it is not the intention nor the function of the
notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never, in the first
place, intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The
intention of the parties still and always is the primary consideration in
determining the true nature of a contract.(Bold emphasis supplied)
It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares of stock of
Mervir Realty with the real properties owned by Emigdio would still have to
be inquired into. That Emigdio executed the deed of assignment two days
prior to his death was a circumstance that should put any interested party on
his guard regarding the exchange, considering that there was a finding about
Emigdio having been sick of cancer of the pancreas at the time. 34 In this
regard, whether the CA correctly characterized the exchange as a form of an
estate planning scheme remained to be validated by the facts to be
established in court.
The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the
name of Mervir Realty could not be a valid basis for immediately excluding
them from the inventory in view of the circumstances admittedly surrounding
the execution of the deed of assignment. This is because:
The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a
system of registration of titles to lands. However, justice and equity demand
that the titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the
mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his
complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. The real
purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever
to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in
the certificate at the time of registration or that may arise subsequent thereto.
Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the
ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily
presumed to have regularly performed their duties.35
Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the deed of
assignment of January 10, 1991, such lots should still be included in the
inventory to enable the parties, by themselves, and with the assistance of the
RTC itself, to test and resolve the issue on the validity of the assignment.
The limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court might have
constricted the determination of the rights to the properties arising from that
deed,36 but it does not prevent the RTC as intestate court from ordering the
inclusion in the inventory of the properties subject of that deed. This is
because the RTC as intestate court, albeit vested only with special and
limited jurisdiction, was still “deemed to have all the necessary powers to
exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective.” 37
Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and
submitted for the important purpose of resolving the difficult issues of
collation and advancement to the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil
Coderequired every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein
Teresita herself, to “bring into the mass of the estate any property or right
which he (or she) may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime
of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it
may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition.” Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also
provided that any advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir
“may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the
person raising the questions and on the heir.” Rule 90 thereby expanded the
special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the
matters relating to the inventory of the estate of the decedent by authorizing
it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous title
to any compulsory heir by the decedent.38
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in
the inventory of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion
of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted
with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best
to include all properties in the possession of the administrator or were known
to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties
that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as the
RTC commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be
respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse
of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi–judicial power was
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a
positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising
judicial or quasi–judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as
to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 39
In light of the foregoing, the CA’s conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the RTC was unwarranted and erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review
on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on
May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14, 2001 and May
18, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial
Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special Proceedings No. 3094–
CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas,
petitioner, and to resolve the case; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the
costs of suit.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
10. G.R. No. L-24584 October 30, 1975
ILUMINADA DE GALA-SISON, As Administratrix of the Intestate Estate
of the late Generoso de Gala, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANOLO L. MADDELA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon and SOCORRO MANALO, respondents.
Norberto J. Quimsibing for petitioner.
Agcaoili and Dimaano for private respondent.
ANTONIO, J.:
Petition for certiorari to annul the orders, dated August 21, 1964 and May 10,
1965, in Special Proceeding No. 2887 of respondent Judge Manolo L.
Maddela of the Court of First Instance of Quezon insofar as said orders
require petitioner-administratrix to deposit the amount of P39,240.15 in her
possession with a reputable banking institution.
Prior to the afore-mentioned orders in question, the Court of First Instance of
Quezon, then presided over by Judge Vicente Santiago, issued an order on
August 29, 1952, in Special Proceeding No. 2887, directing the administratrix
(a) to include in her inventory of properties left by the deceased certain
pieces of jewelry described in Exhibit "Y" of oppositor Socorro Manalo, and
(b) to deposit cash in her possession amounting to P40,998.56 with a
reputable banking institution. On appeal, the Court of Appeals in its decision
of February 2, 1961 in case CA-G.R. No. 10711-R,1 affirmed the lower
court's order of August 29, 1952. However, on a petition for certiorari,2 this
Court, finding that the amount of P1,698.41 was spent by the petitioner
Iluminada de Gala-Sison, as administratrix, which expense was approved by
the court on August 2, 1950, so that the amount ordered to be deposited
should be reduced by P1,698.41 to P39,240.15, rendered on July 31, 1963 a
decision modifying the appealed order of August 29, 1952 to read as follows:
Considering that the balance of P40,938.56 existing at the
time of the issuance of the order appealed from, dated
August 29, 1952, may no longer exist by virtue of the fact
that the administratrix must have already paid to the heirs
their respective allowances and shares in the inheritance,
the disputed order should be modified to include only such
balance of the original amount of P40,938.56 as may be in
the possession of the administratrix, after deducting the
expenses approved by the court and the allowances and
inheritances authorized by the court to be given to the widow
and the heirs.
On October 7, 1963, respondent Socorro Manalo moved for the execution of
the decision of July 31, 1963, and the respondent Judge issued on October
16, 1963 an order requiring, within ten (10) days from the receipt of the order,
the administratrix Iluminada de Gala-Sison (1) "to file an amended inventory
including therein the pieces of jewelry listed in Socorro Manalo's Exhibit 'Y' ";
and (2) "to deposit with any reputable banking institution the remainder of the
amount of P40,938.56, which may be in her possession, after deducting the
expenses approved by the court and the allowances and inheritances
authorized by the court, as specified in its order issued in this case dated
July 7, 1950, to be given to the widow and the heirs of the deceased
Generoso de Gala."
Under date of November 29, 1963, the petitioner filed an Amended Inventory
in compliance with the said order. However, the petitioner-administratrix did
not comply with the portion of said order which required her to deposit the
remainder of the amount of P40,938.56 which may be in her possession.
Instead, she filed on November 29, 1963 a Manifestation stating that "there is
really no necessity for any deposit to be made with a banking institution
which the probate court then believed was necessary way back on August
29, 1952 when the accountable fund was still a sizable one," since from the
remainder of said amount of P40,938.56 ordered to be deposited, several
deductions should be made consisting in the following:
(a) additional expenses in the sum of P1,698.41 which was
approved by the probate court per order of 3 August 1950;
(b) advances and allowances to petitioner as heir (she being
the only surviving child of the late Generoso de Gala in the
sum of P22,000.00 (the other heirs through respondent-
oppositor and the surviving widow have already been given
similar advances and allowances in the sums of P21,815.88
and P19,151.39);
(c) expenses of litigation and attorney's fees already incurred
and paid since 1952; and .
(d) compensation of petitioner as administratrix of the
intestate estate.
On August 21, 1964, the respondent Judge issued an order, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
To resolve the foregoing contention of the administratrix, this
court examined carefully the records and finds that there is
no merit in her contention. First: The decision of the
Supreme Court authorized the deduction of expenses,
allowances and inheritance already approved by the court;
whereas the amounts now sought to be deducted have
never been so authorized by this court; and Second: It now
appears that the present contention of the administratrix was
already raised by her in the Supreme Court, and in spite of
 such claim, the decision of said court did not authorize such
deduction.
An examination of the records also reveals that from the
amount of P40,935.56, only the sum of P1,698.41 must be
deducted specially considering that from the manifestation
aforesaid the administratrix failed to assert any other
deductions as justified by the decision of the Supreme Court.
Hence, the amount that must be deposited by the
administratrix is the amount of P39,240.15.
WHEREFORE, this court orders the administratrix to fully
comply with its order dated August 16, 1963 by depositing
with any reputable banking institution the amount of
P39,240.15 within ten (10) days from the receipt of this
order.
On September 17, 1964, petitioner filed simultaneously (1) a motion for
reconsideration of the order of August 21, 1964; (2) a motion for payment to
herself the amount of P22,000.00 as her advance or allowance against her
distributive share and for the approval thereof; (d) a petition for allowance
and payment, from the properties and assets of the estate, of the sum of
P20,000.00 as her fees and compensation as administratrix; and (4) a
verified accounting of the petitioner-administratrix for approval by the court.
On May 10, 1965, the respondent Judge issued an order the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration dated
September 17, 1964 is hereby denied, and the administratrix
is hereby ordered anew to fully comply with the order of this
court dated August 21, 1964 by depositing with any
reputable banking institution the amount of P39,340.15
within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of this order.
The motion for payment of advances, dated September 17,
1964 and the petition for allowance and payment of
compensation, also dated September 17, 1964 are both
denied; and the accounting dated September 10, 1964 is
hereby disapproved.
On May 26, 1965, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration of the order dated May 10, 1965, alleging, among others,
that the lower court erred in holding that the disbursements itemized in her
verified accounting are unsupported by receipts and that her payments of
attorney's fees were for her benefit as heir; and praying that said order of
May 10, 1965, be set aside and reconsidered to the end that the
administratrix among others may be granted a day in court for the
presentation of her evidence or receipts supporting her verified accounting
and disbursements itemized therein and that thereafter her said accounting
be approved; that she be allowed payment of P22,000.00 as her advance or
allowance against the distributive share as similar advances and allowances
had been granted by the oppositor Socorro Manalo and the surviving spouse
Felisa Alabastro; and that she be granted allowance and payment of her
administratrix' compensation and fees for her administration of the intestate
estate.
Before action could be taken by the lower court on petitioner's motion for new
trial and/or reconsideration, petitioner interposed the present petition
for certiorari before this Court, alleging that respondent Judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the challenged orders. The gist of petitioner's contention is that she
cannot be compelled to deposit in a bank what she no longer has,
considering that she is entitled to the deductions which she made from the
original amount, for (a) as sole surviving child of decedent, she is entitled to
advances and allowances from the inheritance, and (b) as administratrix, she
is to be reimbursed for her expenditures and to deduct her fees as such
administratrix.
The instant petition must be dismissed. In the case at bar, there is pending
before the court a quo a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration filed by
the petitioner-administratrix. In said motion, she prays for a chance to submit
"receipts proving the disbursements itemized in her verified accounting, and
therefore begs leave for a new trial to offer such evidence". She also alleges
therein that she will submit evidence which will show that her disbursements
"are properly and legally chargeable to the estate". She therefore prayed for
the reconsideration of the denial of her motion for payment of P22,000.00 "as
her advance or allowance against her distributive share" and the payment of
her fees as administratrix. It is very obvious that the court a quo should be
given an opportunity to act on these matters because the correctness of the
order requiring petitioner to deposit the amount of P39,240.15 with a banking
institution is dependent upon the ascertainment by the court of the
correctness of the account of the administratrix. Contrary to petitioner's
contention, the matters relating to the advances to her as heir, her
compensation as administratrix and her other disbursements cannot be
considered separately from the order to deposit the amount of P39,240.15,
for as the respondent court observed: "It is ... very obvious that should said
petitions be granted, she shall be relieved thereby of her obligation to deposit
the amount of P39,314.15 as ordered by this Court." Our decision of July 31,
1963 which modified the appealed order of the Quezon Court of First
Instance in effect reaffirmed the authority of the probate court to pass upon
the correctness of the disbursements made by the administratrix, as clearly
shown by the dispositive portion thereof, which directed the deposit of the
balance of the original amount of P40,938.56 in the possession of the
administratrix after deducting the expenses, allowances and inheritances
approved or authorized by the court.
Pursuant to Section 7 of Rule 85 of the Rules, 3 a judicial administrator is
entitled, by way of compensation as such, to either (a) P4.00 per day "for the
time actually and necessarily employed" by him as such administrator, or (b)
a "commission upon the value of so much of the estate as comes into his
possession and was finally disposed of by him" according to the schedule
therein provided. The administrator may be allowed a greater or additional
sum "where the estate is large, and the settlement has been attended with
great difficulty, and has required a high degree of capacity on the part of the
executor or administrator". It must be noted that petitioner is seeking as her
compensation as administratrix an amount greater than that ordinarily
allowed under the rules on the ground that the estate is large, its settlement
"having been attended with great difficulty (since 1947 or almost 17 years
ago) and required a high degree of capacity". In order to entitle the executor
or administrator to additional compensation, the estate must be large, the
settlement extraordinarily difficult, and a high degree of capacity
demonstrated by him. The amount of his fee in special cases under the
Rules is a matter largely in the discretion of the probate court, which will not
be disturbed on appeal, except for an abuse of discretion. 4 Whether or not
the probate court abused its discretion would depend on the attendant facts.
We do not have before Us any competent evidence on the basis of which We
can ascertain the veracity of petitioner's claims. Upon the other hand, such
evidence could be presented before the court a quo. Similarly, any review of
the order of the probate court denying petitioner's motions on the ground that
the different disbursements contained in her accounts "are not only
unsupported by receipts but likewise not properly and legally chargeable
against the estate of the deceased ..." would involve a consideration of the
supporting evidence which We do not have before Us. Indeed, petitioner
alleges in her petition that it is for the purpose of submitting the "supporting
proofs" to her account that she filed the motion for new trial with the court a
quo. It likewise appears from the records that the court below was given
almost no time to pass upon the motion, the same being dated May 26, 1965
and this petition for certiorari being dated June 1, 1965. On the basis of the
foregoing facts, the present petition for certiorari is indeed premature. We
consider it pertinent to state that:
"... The office of the writ of certiorari has been reduced to the
correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot legally
be used for any other purpose. It is truly an extraordinary
remedy and, in this jurisdiction, its use is restricted to truly
extraordinary cases-cases in which the action of the inferior
court is wholly void; where any further steps in the case
would result in a waste of time and money and would
produce no result whatever; where the parties, or their
privies, would be utterly deceived; where a final judgment or
decree would be naught but a snare and a delusion,
deciding nothing, protecting nobody, a judicial pretension, a
recorded falsehood, a standing menace. It is only to avoid
such results as these that a writ of certiorari is issuable, and
even here an appeal will lie if the aggrieved party prefers to
prosecute it."5
And We have emphasized that before a petition for certiorari can be brought
against an order of the trial court, all remedies available in that court must
first be exhausted. Thus, a petition for certiorari may not be granted where
there is an appeal or other adequate remedy, like a motion for
reconsideration, which is pending in the court below. 6The lower court must
be granted by the aggrieved party sufficient opportunity to correct the error it
may have committed.7 It is true that there are several exceptions to this rule,
such as where the order complained of is void for being violative of due
process;8 or there are special circumstances which warrant immediate and
more direct action;9 or where execution had been ordered and the need for
relief is extremely urgent; 10 or the lower court has taken an unreasonably
long time to resolve the motions before it and further delay would prejudice
the party concerned; 11 or where the motion will raise the same point which
has already been squarely stated before the court; 12 or the proceeding in
which the order occurred is a patent nullity as the court acted without
jurisdiction. 13 However, the case at bar does not fall within any of the above
exceptions.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against
the petitioner.
11. G.R. No. L-50277 February 14, 1980
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DOMINADOR TUMANG, MAGDALENA
A. TUMANG, administratrix-appellee,
vs.
GUIA T. LAGUIO AND HER MINOR CHILDREN, movants-appellants.
ANTONIO, J.:
This case was forwarded to this Court by the Court of Appeals on the ground
that it involves purely legal issues. The factual background, as found by the
Court of Appeals, is as follows:
In Special Proceeding No. 1953 involving the estate of the late Dominador
Tumang and pending before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, the
widow of the deceased, namely Magdalena A. Tumang, administratrix and
executrix of the will, filed a petition to declare the testate proceedings
definitely terminated and closed with respect to herself and two of her
children — Melba Tumang Ticzon and Nestor A. Tumang. The petition was
premised on the fact that the aforesaid heirs had already acknowledged
receipt of the properties adjudicated to them, and in order for such properties
to be transferred in their names, there was need for an order of the court
declaring the proceedings closed with respect to the aforesaid heirs. The
petition was opposed by appenee's daughter, Guia T. Laguio and her
children on the ground that appellee, as administratrix and executrix, had not
yet delivered all properties adjudicated to them. Moreover, the oppositors
contended that there could be no partial termination of the proceedings.
Thereafter, the administratrix withdrew the aforementioned petition.
During the hearing of the motion to withdraw petition, Magdalena Tumang, as
required by the court, filed a pleading captioned "Compliance", alleging that
as shown by the attached receipts issued by the BIR, the estate and
inheritance taxes had been fully paid; that as certified by the Deputy Clerk of
Court, no claim has been presented that has not already delivered all the
properties and dividends of the shares of stock adjudicated to her and her
minor children since the approval of the original and amendatory projects of
partition; and that with such admission, the court no longer has jurisdiction to
entertain the motion under consideration.
Resolving the foregoing, the court a quo issued the first questioned Order on
February 5, 1971, stating in part, the following:
Considering the opposition well founded, the court hereby
considers the motion to require administratrix to render an
accounting untenable, as the final accounting of the
administratrix was already approved and therefore denies
the motion of oppositor and counter-petitioner dated Jan. 25,
1971. 2
A motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Order was filed by Guia T.
Laguio and her minor children. On August 16, 1971, the court a quo issued
the second questioned Order denying the motion for reconsideration in the
following manner:
After a careful consideration of the grounds relied upon by
the movant counter-petitioner, this Court resolves to deny
the motion for reconsideration for the reason that in view of
said counter-petitioner's receipt of the cash dividends in
question without first requiring the administratrix the
accounting now being sought to be rendered for purposes of
determining the correctness of the cash dividends
constitutes already a waiver on her part to question such
correctness of the aforesaid cash dividends. The counter-
petitioner is being assisted by counsel in the person of her
own husband, and who being well-versed in such legal
process, could have rejected receipt of the said cash
dividends on the shares of stock if the correctness of the
same was at that time being doubted. To say the least,
therefore, the grounds for the motion for reconsideration are,
in the honest opinion of this Court, unmeritorious, and all the
motion, in effect, is hereby denied. 3
The sole issue is whether or not the court should have required the executrix
to render an accounting of the cash and stock dividends received after the
approval of her final accounts. A corollary issue is whether or not petitioners
have waived their right to demand such accounting.
Section 8 of Rule 85 provides that the "executor or administrator shall render
an account of his administration within one (1) year from the time of receiving
letters testamentary or of administration ..., and he shall render such further
accounts as the court may requite until the estate is wholly settled."
In the instant case, further accounts by the executrix appear to be in order, in
view of the fact that the dividends sought to be accounted for are not
included in the final accounts rendered by the executrix. It appears that the
interests of all the parties will be better served and the conflict between
petitioners and respondent will be resolved if such additional accounting is
made. Further, "it has been held that an executor or administrator who
receives assets of the estate after he has filed an account should file a
supplementary account thereof, and may be compelled to do so, but that it is
only with respect to matters occuring after the settlement of final account that
representatives will be compelled to file supplementary account." 4 It is only
in a case where the petition to compel an executor to account after he has
accounted and has been discharged fails to allege that any further sums
came into the hands of the executor, and the executor specifically denies the
receipt of any further sums that the accounting should be denied. 5
There is no question that in the instant case, the fact that the executrix
received funds of the estate after the approval of her final accounts and
before the issuance of an order finally closing the proceedings is admitted.
She must, therefore, account for the same, in consonance with her duty to
account for all the assets of the decedent's estate which have come into her
possession by virtue of her office. 6 An executor should account for all his
receipts and disbursements since his last accounting. 7
We disagree with the lower court's finding that petitioners, by receiving the
dividends without requiring an accounting, had waived their right to do so.
The duty of an executor or administrator to render an account is not a mere
incident of an administration proceeding which can be waived or disregarded.
It is a duty that has to be performed and duly acted upon by the court before
the administration is finally ordered closed and terminated, 8 to the end that
no part of the decedent's estate be left unaccounted for. The fact that the
final accounts had been approved does not divest the court of jurisdiction to
require supplemental accounting for, aside from the initial accounting, the
Rules provide that "he shall render such further accounts as the court may
require until the estate is wholly settled." 9
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Orders of the lower court
dated February 5, 1971 and August 16, 1971 are set aside, and respondent
executrix is hereby ordered to render a supplemental accounting of all cash
and stock dividends as well as other properties of the estate which came into
her possession after the approval of her final accounts.
SO ORDERED.
12. G.R. No. 120880 June 5, 1997
FERDINAND R. MARCOS II, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE and HERMINIA D. DE GUZMAN, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, Government action is once again
assailed as precipitate and unfair, suffering the basic and oftly implored
requisites of due process of law. Specifically, the petition assails the
Decision 1of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 31363, where the said court held:
In view of all the foregoing, we rule that the deficiency
income tax assessments and estate tax assessment, are
already final and (u)nappealable-and-the subsequent levy of
real properties is a tax remedy resorted to by the
government, sanctioned by Section 213 and 218 of the
National Internal Revenue Code. This summary tax remedy
is distinct and separate from the other tax remedies (such as
Judicial Civil actions and Criminal actions), and is not
affected or precluded by the pendency of any other tax
remedies instituted by the government.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered DISMISSING the petition for certiorari with prayer
for Restraining Order and Injunction.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
More than seven years since the demise of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, the
former President of the Republic of the Philippines, the matter of the
settlement of his estate, and its dues to the government in estate taxes, are
still unresolved, the latter issue being now before this Court for resolution.
Specifically, petitioner Ferdinand R. Marcos II, the eldest son of the
decedent, questions the actuations of the respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue in assessing, and collecting through the summary remedy
of Levy on Real Properties, estate and income tax delinquencies upon the
estate and properties of his father, despite the pendency of the proceedings
on probate of the will of the late president, which is docketed as Sp. Proc.
No. 10279 in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 156.
Petitioner had filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with an application for writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order on June 28, 1993, seeking to —
I. Annul and set aside the Notices of Levy on real property
dated February 22, 1993 and May 20, 1993, issued by
respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue;
II. Annul and set aside the Notices of Sale dated May 26,
1993;
III. Enjoin the Head Revenue Executive Assistant Director II
(Collection Service), from proceeding with the Auction of the
real properties covered by Notices of Sale.
After the parties had pleaded their case, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision 2 on November 29, 1994, ruling that the deficiency assessments for
estate and income tax made upon the petitioner and the estate of the
deceased President Marcos have already become final and unappealable,
and may thus be enforced by the summary remedy of levying upon the
properties of the late President, as was done by the respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby
rendered DISMISSING the petition for Certiorari with prayer
for Restraining Order and Injunction.
No pronouncements as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Unperturbed, petitioner is now before us assailing the validity of the appellate
court's decision, assigning the following as errors:
A. RESPONDENT COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE SUMMARY TAX REMEDIES
RESORTED TO BY THE GOVERNMENT ARE NOT
AFFECTED AND PRECLUDED BY THE PENDENCY OF
THE SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF
THE LATE PRESIDENT'S ALLEGED WILL. TO THE
CONTRARY, THIS PROBATE PROCEEDING PRECISELY
PLACED ALL PROPERTIES WHICH FORM PART OF THE
LATE PRESIDENT'S ESTATE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS OF
THE PROBATE COURT TO THE EXCLUSION OF ALL
OTHER COURTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.
B. RESPONDENT COURT ARBITRARILY ERRED IN
SWEEPINGLY DECIDING THAT SINCE THE TAX
ASSESSMENTS OF PETITIONER AND HIS PARENTS
HAD ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE,
THERE WAS NO NEED TO GO INTO THE MERITS OF
THE GROUNDS CITED IN THE PETITION. INDEPENDENT
OF WHETHER THE TAX ASSESSMENTS HAD ALREADY
BECOME FINAL, HOWEVER, PETITIONER HAS THE
RIGHT TO QUESTION THE UNLAWFUL MANNER AND
METHOD IN WHICH TAX COLLECTION IS SOUGHT TO
BE ENFORCED BY RESPONDENTS COMMISSIONER
AND DE GUZMAN. THUS, RESPONDENT COURT
SHOULD HAVE FAVORABLY CONSIDERED THE MERITS
OF THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS IN THE PETITION:
(1) The Notices of Levy on Real Property
were issued beyond the period provided in
the Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 38-
68.
(2) [a] The numerous pending court cases
questioning the late President's ownership
or interests in several properties (both
personal and real) make the total value of
his estate, and the consequent estate tax
due, incapable of exact pecuniary
determination at this time. Thus,
respondents' assessment of the estate tax
 and their issuance of the Notices of Levy
and Sale are premature, confiscatory and
oppressive.
[b] Petitioner, as one of the late President's
compulsory heirs, was never notified, much
less served with copies of the Notices of
Levy, contrary to the mandate of Section
213 of the NIRC. As such, petitioner was
never given an opportunity to contest the
Notices in violation of his right to due
process of law.
C. ON ACCOUNT OF THE CLEAR MERIT OF THE
PETITION, RESPONDENT COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED
IN RULING THAT IT HAD NO POWER TO GRANT
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO PETITIONER. SECTION 219 OF
THE NIRC NOTWITHSTANDING, COURTS POSSESS THE
POWER TO ISSUE A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN RESPONDENTS
COMMISSIONER'S AND DE GUZMAN'S ARBITRARY
METHOD OF COLLECTING THE ALLEGED DEFICIENCY
ESTATE AND INCOME TAXES BY MEANS OF LEVY.
The facts as found by the appellate court are undisputed, and are hereby
adopted:
On September 29, 1989, former President Ferdinand Marcos
died in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA.
On June 27, 1990, a Special Tax Audit Team was created to
conduct investigations and examinations of the tax liabilities
and obligations of the late president, as well as that of his
family, associates and "cronies". Said audit team concluded
its investigation with a Memorandum dated July 26, 1991.
The investigation disclosed that the Marcoses failed to file a
written notice of the death of the decedent, an estate tax
returns [sic], as well as several income tax returns covering
the years 1982 to 1986, — all in violation of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Subsequently, criminal charges were filed against Mrs.
Imelda R. Marcos before the Regional Trial of Quezon City
for violations of Sections 82, 83 and 84 (has penalized under
Sections 253 and 254 in relation to Section 252 — a & b) of
the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue thereby caused the
preparation and filing of the Estate Tax Return for the estate
of the late president, the Income Tax Returns of the Spouses
Marcos for the years 1985 to 1986, and the Income Tax
Returns of petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II for the
years 1982 to 1985.
On July 26, 1991, the BIR issued the following: (1)
Deficiency estate tax assessment no. FAC-2-89-91-002464
(against the estate of the late president Ferdinand Marcos in
the amount of P23,293,607,638.00 Pesos); (2) Deficiency
income tax assessment no. FAC-1-85-91-002452 and
Deficiency income tax assessment no. FAC-1-86-91-002451
(against the Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos in the
amounts of P149,551.70 and P184,009,737.40 representing
deficiency income tax for the years 1985 and 1986); (3)
Deficiency income tax assessment nos. FAC-1-82-91-
002460 to FAC-1-85-91-002463 (against petitioner
Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II in the amounts of P258.70
pesos; P9,386.40 Pesos; P4,388.30 Pesos; and P6,376.60
Pesos representing his deficiency income taxes for the years
1982 to 1985).
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue avers that copies of
the deficiency estate and income tax assessments were all
personally and constructively served on August 26, 1991
and September 12, 1991 upon Mrs. Imelda Marcos (through
her caretaker Mr. Martinez) at her last known address at No.
204 Ortega St., San Juan, M.M. (Annexes "D" and "E" of the
Petition). Likewise, copies of the deficiency tax assessments
issued against petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II
were also personally and constructively served upon him
(through his caretaker) on September 12, 1991, at his last
known address at Don Mariano Marcos St. corner P.
Guevarra St., San Juan, M.M. (Annexes "J" and "J-1" of the
Petition). Thereafter, Formal Assessment notices were
served on October 20, 1992, upon Mrs. Marcos c/o
petitioner, at his office, House of Representatives, Batasan
Pambansa, Quezon City. Moreover, a notice to Taxpayer
inviting Mrs. Marcos (or her duly authorized representative or
counsel), to a conference, was furnished the counsel of Mrs.
Marcos, Dean Antonio Coronel — but to no avail.
The deficiency tax assessments were not protested
administratively, by Mrs. Marcos and the other heirs of the
late president, within 30 days from service of said
assessments.
On February 22, 1993, the BIR Commissioner issued
twenty-two notices of levy on real property against certain
parcels of land owned by the Marcoses — to satisfy the
alleged estate tax and deficiency income taxes of Spouses
Marcos.
On May 20, 1993, four more Notices of Levy on real property
were issued for the purpose of satisfying the deficiency
income taxes.
 On May 26, 1993, additional four (4) notices of Levy on real
property were again issued. The foregoing tax remedies
were resorted to pursuant to Sections 205 and 213 of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
In response to a letter dated March 12, 1993 sent by Atty.
Loreto Ata (counsel of herein petitioner) calling the attention
of the BIR and requesting that they be duly notified of any
action taken by the BIR affecting the interest of their client
Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II, as well as the interest of
the late president — copies of the aforesaid notices were,
served on April 7, 1993 and on June 10, 1993, upon Mrs.
Imelda Marcos, the petitioner, and their counsel of record,
"De Borja, Medialdea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra and Serapio Law
Office".
Notices of sale at public auction were posted on May 26,
1993, at the lobby of the City Hall of Tacloban City. The
public auction for the sale of the eleven (11) parcels of land
took place on July 5, 1993. There being no bidder, the lots
were declared forfeited in favor of the government.
On June 25, 1993, petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos
II filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
It has been repeatedly observed, and not without merit, that the enforcement
of tax laws and the collection of taxes, is of paramount importance for the
sustenance of government. Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and
should be collected without unnecessary hindrance. However, such
collection should be made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will
negate the very reason for government itself. It is therefore necessary to
reconcile the apparently conflicting interests of the authorities and the
taxpayers so that the real purpose of taxation, which is the promotion of the
common good, may be achieved. 3
Whether or not the proper avenues of assessment and collection of the said
tax obligations were taken by the respondent Bureau is now the subject of
the Court's inquiry.
Petitioner posits that notices of levy, notices of sale, and subsequent sale of
properties of the late President Marcos effected by the BIR are null and void
for disregarding the established procedure for the enforcement of taxes due
upon the estate of the deceased. The case of Domingo vs. Garlitos 4 is
specifically cited to bolster the argument that "the ordinary procedure by
which to settle claims of indebtedness against the estate of a deceased,
person, as in an inheritance (estate) tax, is for the claimant to present a claim
before the probate court so that said court may order the administrator to pay
the amount therefor." This remedy is allegedly, exclusive, and cannot be
effected through any other means.
Petitioner goes further, submitting that the probate court is not precluded
from denying a request by the government for the immediate payment of
taxes, and should order the payment of the same only within the period fixed
by the probate court for the payment of all the debts of the decedent. In this
regard, petitioner cites the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. The
Administratrix of the Estate of Echarri (67 Phil 502), where it was held that:
The case of Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas
and Collector of Internal Revenue (52 Phil 803), relied upon
by the petitioner-appellant is good authority on the
proposition that the court having control over the
administration proceedings has jurisdiction to entertain the
claim presented by the government for taxes due and to
order the administrator to pay the tax should it find that the
assessment was proper, and that the tax was legal, due and
collectible. And the rule laid down in that case must be
understood in relation to the case of Collector of Customs
vs. Haygood, supra., as to the procedure to be followed in a
given case by the government to effectuate the collection of
the tax. Categorically stated, where during the pendency of
judicial administration over the estate of a deceased person
a claim for taxes is presented by the government, the court
has the authority to order payment by the administrator; but,
in the same way that it has authority to order payment or
satisfaction, it also has the negative authority to deny the
same. While there are cases where courts are required to
perform certain duties mandatory and ministerial in
character, the function of the court in a case of the present
character is not one of them; and here, the court cannot be
an organism endowed with latitude of judgment in one
direction, and converted into a mere mechanical contrivance
in another direction.
On the other hand, it is argued by the BIR, that the state's authority to collect
internal revenue taxes is paramount. Thus, the pendency of probate
proceedings over the estate of the deceased does not preclude the
assessment and collection, through summary remedies, of estate taxes over
the same. According to the respondent, claims for payment of estate and
income taxes due and assessed after the death of the decedent need not be
presented in the form of a claim against the estate. These can and should be
paid immediately. The probate court is not the government agency to decide
whether an estate is liable for payment of estate of income taxes. Well-
settled is the rule that the probate court is a court with special and limited
jurisdiction.
Concededly, the authority of the Regional Trial Court, sitting, albeit with
limited jurisdiction, as a probate court over estate of deceased individual, is
not a trifling thing. The court's jurisdiction, once invoked, and made effective,
cannot be treated with indifference nor should it be ignored with impunity by
the very parties invoking its authority.
In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the jurisdiction of the
probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his
prospective heirs before final adjudication; 5 to determine who are the heirs
of the decedent; 6 the recognition of a natural child; 7 the status of a woman
claiming to be the legal wife of the decedent; 8 the legality of disinheritance of
an heir by the testator; 9 and to pass upon the validity of a waiver of
hereditary rights. 10
The pivotal question the court is tasked to resolve refers to the authority of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue to collect by the summary remedy of levying
upon, and sale of real properties of the decedent, estate tax deficiencies,
without the cognition and authority of the court sitting in probate over the
supposed will of the deceased.
The nature of the process of estate tax collection has been described as
follows:
Strictly speaking, the assessment of an inheritance tax does
not directly involve the administration of a decedent's estate,
although it may be viewed as an incident to the complete
settlement of an estate, and, under some statutes, it is made
the duty of the probate court to make the amount of the
inheritance tax a part of the final decree of distribution of the
estate. It is not against the property of decedent, nor is it a
claim against the estate as such, but it is against the interest
or property right which the heir, legatee, devisee, etc., has in
the property formerly held by decedent. Further, under some
statutes, it has been held that it is not a suit or controversy
between the parties, nor is it an adversary proceeding
between the state and the person who owes the tax on the
inheritance. However, under other statutes it has been held
that the hearing and determination of the cash value of the
assets and the determination of the tax are adversary
proceedings. The proceeding has been held to be
necessarily a proceeding in rem. 11
In the Philippine experience, the enforcement and collection of estate tax, is
executive in character, as the legislature has seen it fit to ascribe this task to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Section 3 of the National Internal Revenue
Code attests to this:
Sec. 3. Powers and duties of the Bureau. — The powers and
duties of the Bureau of Internal Revenue shall comprehend
the assessment and collection of all national internal
revenue taxes, fees, and charges, and the enforcement of all
forfeitures, penalties, and fines connected therewith,
including the execution of judgments in all cases decided in
its favor by the Court of Tax Appeals and the ordinary courts.
Said Bureau shall also give effect to and administer the
supervisory and police power conferred to it by this Code or
other laws.
Thus, it was in Vera vs. Fernandez 12 that the court recognized the liberal
treatment of claims for taxes charged against the estate of the decedent.
Such taxes, we said, were exempted from the application of the statute of
non-claims, and this is justified by the necessity of government funding,
immortalized in the maxim that taxes are the lifeblood of the
government. Vectigalia nervi sunt rei publicae — taxes are the sinews of the
state.
Taxes assessed against the estate of a deceased person,
after administration is opened, need not be submitted to the
committee on claims in the ordinary course of administration.
In the exercise of its control over the administrator, the court
may direct the payment of such taxes upon motion showing
that the taxes have been assessed against the estate.
Such liberal treatment of internal revenue taxes in the probate proceedings
extends so far, even to allowing the enforcement of tax obligations against
the heirs of the decedent, even after distribution of the estate's properties.
Claims for taxes, whether assessed before or after the death
of the deceased, can be collected from the heirs even after
the distribution of the properties of the decedent. They are
exempted from the application of the statute of non-claims.
The heirs shall be liable therefor, in proportion to their share
in the inheritance. 13
Thus, the Government has two ways of collecting the taxes
in question. One, by going after all the heirs and collecting
from each one of them the amount of the tax proportionate to
the inheritance received. Another remedy, pursuant to the
lien created by Section 315 of the Tax Code upon all
property and rights to property belong to the taxpayer for
unpaid income tax, is by subjecting said property of the
estate which is in the hands of an heir or transferee to the
payment of the tax due the estate. (Commissioner of Internal
Revenue vs. Pineda, 21 SCRA 105, September 15, 1967.)
From the foregoing, it is discernible that the approval of the court, sitting in
probate, or as a settlement tribunal over the deceased is not a mandatory
requirement in the collection of estate taxes. It cannot therefore be argued
that the Tax Bureau erred in proceeding with the levying and sale of the
properties allegedly owned by the late President, on the ground that it was
required to seek first the probate court's sanction. There is nothing in the Tax
Code, and in the pertinent remedial laws that implies the necessity of the
probate or estate settlement court's approval of the state's claim for estate
taxes, before the same can be enforced and collected.
On the contrary, under Section 87 of the NIRC, it is the probate or settlement
court which is bidden not to authorize the executor or judicial administrator of
the decedent's estate to deliver any distributive share to any party interested
in the estate, unless it is shown a Certification by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue that the estate taxes have been paid. This provision
disproves the petitioner's contention that it is the probate court which
approves the assessment and collection of the estate tax.
If there is any issue as to the validity of the BIR's decision to assess the
estate taxes, this should have been pursued through the proper
administrative and judicial avenues provided for by law.
Section 229 of the NIRC tells us how:
Sec. 229. Protesting of assessment. — When the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized
representative finds that proper taxes should be assessed,
he shall first notify the taxpayer of his findings. Within a
period to be prescribed by implementing regulations, the
taxpayer shall be required to respond to said notice. If the
taxpayer fails to respond, the Commissioner shall issue an
assessment based on his findings.
Such assessment may be protested administratively by filing
a request for reconsideration or reinvestigation in such form
and manner as may be prescribed by implementing
regulations within (30) days from receipt of the assessment;
otherwise, the assessment shall become final and
unappealable.
If the protest is denied in whole or in part, the individual,
association or corporation adversely affected by the decision
on the protest may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within
thirty (30) days from receipt of said decision; otherwise, the
decision shall become final, executory and demandable. (As
inserted by P.D. 1773)
Apart from failing to file the required estate tax return within the time required
for the filing of the same, petitioner, and the other heirs never questioned the
assessments served upon them, allowing the same to lapse into finality, and
prompting the BIR to collect the said taxes by levying upon the properties left
by President Marcos.
Petitioner submits, however, that "while the assessment of taxes may have
been validly undertaken by the Government, collection thereof may have
been done in violation of the law. Thus, the manner and method in which the
latter is enforced may be questioned separately, and irrespective of the
finality of the former, because the Government does not have the unbridled
discretion to enforce collection without regard to the clear provision of law." 14
Petitioner specifically points out that applying Memorandum Circular No. 38-
68, implementing Sections 318 and 324 of the old tax code (Republic Act
5203), the BIR's Notices of Levy on the Marcos properties, were issued
beyond the allowed period, and are therefore null and void:
. . . the Notices of Levy on Real Property (Annexes O to NN
of Annex C of this Petition) in satisfaction of said
assessments were still issued by respondents well beyond
the period mandated in Revenue Memorandum Circular No.
38-68. These Notices of Levy were issued only on 22
February 1993 and 20 May 1993 when at least seventeen
(17) months had already lapsed from the last service of tax
assessment on 12 September 1991. As no notices of
distraint of personal property were first issued by
respondents, the latter should have complied with Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. 38-68 and issued these Notices
of Levy not earlier than three (3) months nor later than six (6)
months from 12 September 1991. In accordance with the
Circular, respondents only had until 12 March 1992 (the last
day of the sixth month) within which to issue these Notices of
Levy. The Notices of Levy, having been issued beyond the
period allowed by law, are thus void and of no effect. 15
We hold otherwise. The Notices of Levy upon real property were issued
within the prescriptive period and in accordance with the provisions of the
present Tax Code. The deficiency tax assessment, having already become
final, executory, and demandable, the same can now be collected through
the summary remedy of distraint or levy pursuant to Section 205 of the NIRC.
The applicable provision in regard to the prescriptive period for the
assessment and collection of tax deficiency in this instance is Article 223 of
the NIRC, which pertinently provides:
Sec. 223. Exceptions as to a period of limitation of
assessment and collection of taxes. — (a) In the case of a
false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or of a
failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a
proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be
begun without assessment, at any time within ten (10) years
after the discovery of the falsity, fraud, or
omission: Provided, That, in a fraud assessment which has
become final and executory, the fact of fraud shall be
judicially taken cognizance of in the civil or criminal action for
the collection thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Any internal revenue tax which has been assessed within
the period of limitation above prescribed, may be collected
by distraint or levy or by a proceeding in court within three
years following the assessment of the tax.
xxx xxx xxx
The omission to file an estate tax return, and the subsequent failure to
contest or appeal the assessment made by the BIR is fatal to the petitioner's
cause, as under the above-cited provision, in case of failure to file a return,
the tax may be assessed at any time within ten years after the omission, and
any tax so assessed may be collected by levy upon real property within three
years following the assessment of the tax. Since the estate tax assessment
had become final and unappealable by the petitioner's default as regards
protesting the validity of the said assessment, there is now no reason why
the BIR cannot continue with the collection of the said tax. Any objection
against the assessment should have been pursued following the avenue
paved in Section 229 of the NIRC on protests on assessments of internal
revenue taxes.
Petitioner further argues that "the numerous pending court cases questioning
the late president's ownership or interests in several properties (both real and
personal) make the total value of his estate, and the consequent estate tax
due, incapable of exact pecuniary determination at this time. Thus,
respondents' assessment of the estate tax and their issuance of the Notices
of Levy and sale are premature and oppressive." He points out the pendency
of Sandiganbayan Civil Case Nos. 0001-0034 and 0141, which were filed by
the government to question the ownership and interests of the late President
in real and personal properties located within and outside the Philippines.
Petitioner, however, omits to allege whether the properties levied upon by the
BIR in the collection of estate taxes upon the decedent's estate were among
those involved in the said cases pending in the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, the
court is at a loss as to how these cases are relevant to the matter at issue.
The mere fact that the decedent has pending cases involving ill-gotten wealth
does not affect the enforcement of tax assessments over the properties
indubitably included in his estate.
Petitioner also expresses his reservation as to the propriety of the BIR's total
assessment of P23,292,607,638.00, stating that this amount deviates from
the findings of the Department of Justice's Panel of Prosecutors as per its
resolution of 20 September 1991. Allegedly, this is clear evidence of the
uncertainty on the part of the Government as to the total value of the estate
of the late President.
This is, to our mind, the petitioner's last ditch effort to assail the assessment
of estate tax which had already become final and unappealable.
It is not the Department of Justice which is the government agency tasked to
determine the amount of taxes due upon the subject estate, but the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, 16 whose determinations and assessments are
presumed correct and made in good faith. 17 The taxpayer has the duty of
proving otherwise. In the absence of proof of any irregularities in the
performance of official duties, an assessment will not be disturbed. Even an
assessment based on estimates is prima facie valid and lawful where it does
not appear to have been arrived at arbitrarily or capriciously. The burden of
proof is upon the complaining party to show clearly that the assessment is
erroneous. Failure to present proof of error in the assessment will justify the
judicial affirmance of said assessment. 18 In this instance, petitioner has not
pointed out one single provision in the Memorandum of the Special Audit
Team which gave rise to the questioned assessment, which bears a trace of
falsity. Indeed, the petitioner's attack on the assessment bears mainly on the
alleged improbable and unconscionable amount of the taxes charged. But
mere rhetoric cannot supply the basis for the charge of impropriety of the
assessments made.
Moreover, these objections to the assessments should have been raised,
considering the ample remedies afforded the taxpayer by the Tax Code, with
the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Court of Tax Appeals, as described
earlier, and cannot be raised now via Petition for Certiorari, under the pretext
of grave abuse of discretion. The course of action taken by the petitioner
reflects his disregard or even repugnance of the established institutions for
governance in the scheme of a well-ordered society. The subject tax
assessments having become final, executory and enforceable, the same can
no longer be contested by means of a disguised protest. In the
main, Certiorari may not be used as a substitute for a lost appeal or
remedy. 19 This judicial policy becomes more pronounced in view of the
absence of sufficient attack against the actuations of government.
On the matter of sufficiency of service of Notices of Assessment to the
petitioner, we find the respondent appellate court's pronouncements sound
and resilient to petitioner's attacks.
Anent grounds 3(b) and (B) — both alleging/claiming lack of
notice — We find, after considering the facts and
circumstances, as well as evidences, that there was
sufficient, constructive and/or actual notice of assessments,
levy and sale, sent to herein petitioner Ferdinand
"Bongbong" Marcos as well as to his mother Mrs. Imelda
Marcos.
Even if we are to rule out the notices of assessments
personally given to the caretaker of Mrs. Marcos at the
latter's last known address, on August 26, 1991 and
September 12, 1991, as well as the notices of assessment
personally given to the caretaker of petitioner also at his last
known address on September 12, 1991 — the subsequent
notices given thereafter could no longer be ignored as they
were sent at a time when petitioner was already here in the
Philippines, and at a place where said notices would surely
be called to petitioner's attention, and received by
responsible persons of sufficient age and discretion.
Thus, on October 20, 1992, formal assessment notices were
served upon Mrs. Marcos c/o the petitioner, at his office,
House of Representatives, Batasan Pambansa, Q.C.
(Annexes "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-3"; pp. 207-210,
Comment/Memorandum of OSG). Moreover, a notice to
taxpayer dated October 8, 1992 inviting Mrs. Marcos to a
conference relative to her tax liabilities, was furnished the
counsel of Mrs. Marcos — Dean Antonio Coronel (Annex
"B", p. 211, ibid). Thereafter, copies of Notices were also
served upon Mrs. Imelda Marcos, the petitioner and their
counsel "De Borja, Medialdea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra and
Serapio Law Office", on April 7, 1993 and June 10, 1993.
Despite all of these Notices, petitioner never lifted a finger to
 protest the assessments, (upon which the Levy and sale of
properties were based), nor appealed the same to the Court
of Tax Appeals.
There being sufficient service of Notices to herein petitioner
(and his mother) and it appearing that petitioner continuously
ignored said Notices despite several opportunities given him
to file a protest and to thereafter appeal to the Court of Tax
Appeals, — the tax assessments subject of this case, upon
which the levy and sale of properties were based, could no
longer be contested (directly or indirectly) via this instant
petition for certiorari. 20
Petitioner argues that all the questioned Notices of Levy, however, must be
nullified for having been issued without validly serving copies thereof to the
petitioner. As a mandatory heir of the decedent, petitioner avers that he has
an interest in the subject estate, and notices of levy upon its properties
should have been served upon him.
We do not agree. In the case of notices of levy issued to satisfy the
delinquent estate tax, the delinquent taxpayer is the Estate of the decedent,
and not necessarily, and exclusively, the petitioner as heir of the deceased.
In the same vein, in the matter of income tax delinquency of the late
president and his spouse, petitioner is not the taxpayer liable. Thus, it follows
that service of notices of levy in satisfaction of these tax delinquencies upon
the petitioner is not required by law, as under Section 213 of the NIRC, which
pertinently states:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Levy shall be effected by writing upon said certificate a
description of the property upon which levy is made. At the
same time, written notice of the levy shall be mailed to or
served upon the Register of Deeds of the province or city
where the property is located and upon the delinquent
taxpayer, or if he be absent from the Philippines, to his agent
or the manager of the business in respect to which the
liability arose, or if there be none, to the occupant of the
property in question.
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing notwithstanding, the record shows that notices of warrants of
distraint and levy of sale were furnished the counsel of petitioner on April 7,
1993, and June 10, 1993, and the petitioner himself on April 12, 1993 at his
office at the Batasang Pambansa. 21 We cannot therefore, countenance
petitioner's insistence that he was denied due process. Where there was an
opportunity to raise objections to government action, and such opportunity
was disregarded, for no justifiable reason, the party claiming oppression then
becomes the oppressor of the orderly functions of government. He who
comes to court must come with clean hands. Otherwise, he not only taints his
name, but ridicules the very structure of established authority.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVED to DENY the present petition.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby
AFFIRMED in all respects.
SO ORDERED.
13. G.R. No. 134100 September 29, 2000
PURITA ALIPIO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G. JARING, represented by his
Attorney-In-Fact RAMON G. JARING,respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The question for decision in this case is whether a creditor can sue the
surviving spouse for the collection of a debt which is owed by the conjugal
partnership of gains, or whether such claim must be filed in proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of the decedent. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals ruled in the affirmative. We reverse.
The facts are as follows:
Respondent Romeo Jaring1 was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in
Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of five years
ending on September 12, 1990. On June 19, 1987, he subleased the
fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to the spouses Placido and
Purita Alipio and the spouses Bienvenido and Remedios Manuel. The
stipulated amount of rent was ₱485,600.00, payable in two installments of
₱300,000.00 and ₱185,600.00, with the second installment falling due on
June 30, 1989. Each of the four sublessees signed the contract.
The first installment was duly paid, but of the second installment, the
sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance of
₱50,600.00. Despite due demand, the sublessees failed to comply with their
obligation, so that, on October 13, 1989, private respondent sued the Alipio
and Manuel spouses for the collection of the said amount before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Dinalupihan, Bataan. In the alternative, he
prayed for the rescission of the sublease contract should the defendants fail
to pay the balance.
Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her
husband, Placido Alipio, had passed away on December 1, 1988. 2 She
based her action on Rule 3, §21 of the 1964 Rules of Court which then
provided that "when the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest
thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially
provided in these rules." This provision has been amended so that now Rule
3, §20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
When the action is for the recovery of money arising from contract, express
or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court
in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be
dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final
judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be
enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting
claims against the estate of a deceased person.
The trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that since petitioner
was herself a party to the sublease contract, she could be independently
impleaded in the suit together with the Manuel spouses and that the death of
her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from the case.3 The Manuel
spouses failed to file their answer. For this reason, they were declared in
default.
On February 26, 1991, the lower court rendered judgment after trial, ordering
petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay private respondent the unpaid
balance of ₱50,600.00 plus attorney's fees in the amount of ₱10,000.00 and
the costs of the suit.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court
erred in denying her motion to dismiss. In its decision 4 rendered on July 10,
1997, the appellate court dismissed her appeal. It held:
The rule that an action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon must
be dismissed when the defendant dies before final judgment in the regional
trial court, does not apply where there are other defendants against whom
the action should be maintained. This is the teaching of Climaco v. Siy Uy,
wherein the Supreme Court held:
Upon the facts alleged in the complaint, it is clear that Climaco had a cause
of action against the persons named as defendants therein. It was, however,
a cause of action for the recovery of damages, that is, a sum of money, and
the corresponding action is, unfortunately, one that does not survive upon the
death of the defendant, in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court.
xxx xxx xxx
However, the deceased Siy Uy was not the only defendant, Manuel Co was
also named defendant in the complaint. Obviously, therefore, the order
appealed from is erroneous insofar as it dismissed the case against Co.
(Underlining added)
Moreover, it is noted that all the defendants, including the deceased, were
signatories to the contract of sub-lease. The remaining defendants cannot
avoid the action by claiming that the death of one of the parties to the
contract has totally extinguished their obligation as held in Imperial
Insurance, Inc. v. David:
We find no merit in this appeal. Under the law and well settled jurisprudence,
when the obligation is a solidary one, the creditor may bring his action in toto
against any of the debtors obligated in solidum. Thus, if husband and wife
bound themselves jointly and severally, in case of his death, her liability is
independent of and separate from her husband's; she may be sued for the
whole debt and it would be error to hold that the claim against her as well as
the claim against her husband should be made in the decedent's estate.
(Agcaoili vs. Vda. de Agcaoili, 90 Phil. 97).5
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on June 4,
1998.6 Hence this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN APPLYING CLIMACO v. SIY UY, 19 SCRA 858, IN
SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT
SEEKING THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE AGAINST REMAINING
DEFENDANTS BUT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THE CLAIM FOR
PAYMENT AGAINST HER AND HER HUSBAND WHICH SHOULD
BE PROSECUTED AS A MONEY CLAIM.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN APPLYING IMPERIAL INSURANCE INC. v. DAVID, 133
SCRA 317, WHICH IS NOT APPLICABLE BECAUSE THE
SPOUSES IN THIS CASE DID NOT BIND THEMSELVES JOINTLY
AND SEVERALLY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT JARING.7
The petition is meritorious. We hold that a creditor cannot sue the surviving
spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of
money chargeable against the conjugal partnership and that the proper
remedy is for him to file a claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent.
First. Petitioner's husband died on December 1, 1988, more than ten months
before private respondent filed the collection suit in the trial court on October
13, 1989. This case thus falls outside of the ambit of Rule 3, §21 which deals
with dismissals of collection suits because of the death of the defendant
during the pendency of the case and the subsequent procedure to be
undertaken by the plaintiff, i.e., the filing of claim in the proceeding for the
settlement of the decedent's estate. As already noted, Rule 3, §20 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now provides that the case will be allowed to
continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the
plaintiff therein will then be enforced in the manner especially provided in the
Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. The
issue to be resolved is whether private respondent can, in the first place, file
this case against petitioner.
Petitioner and her late husband, together with the Manuel spouses, signed
the sublease contract binding themselves to pay the amount of stipulated
rent. Under the law, the Alipios' obligation (and also that of the Manuels) is
one which is chargeable against their conjugal partnership. Under Art. 161(1)
of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for ¾
All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership. 8
When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was automatically
dissolved9 and debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the settlement of
estate proceedings in accordance with Rule 73, §2 which states:
Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. ¾ When the marriage is
dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall
be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in
the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses
have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or
intestate proceedings of either.
As held in Calma v. Tañedo,10 after the death of either of the spouses, no
complaint for the collection of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal
partnership can be brought against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim
must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the
conjugal property. The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse,
the powers of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to
the administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the
settlement of estate proceedings.11Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even
a de facto administrator such that conveyances made by him of any property
belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal
partnership property is void.12
The ruling in Calma v. Tañedo was reaffirmed in the recent case of Ventura
v. Militante.13 In that case, the surviving wife was sued in an amended
complaint for a sum of money based on an obligation allegedly contracted by
her and her late husband. The defendant, who had earlier moved to dismiss
the case, opposed the admission of the amended complaint on the ground
that the death of her husband terminated their conjugal partnership and that
the plaintiff's claim, which was chargeable against the partnership, should be
made in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate. The trial court
nevertheless admitted the complaint and ruled, as the Court of Appeals did in
this case, that since the defendant was also a party to the obligation, the
death of her husband did not preclude the plaintiff from filing an ordinary
collection suit against her. On appeal, the Court reversed, holding that ¾
as correctly argued by petitioner, the conjugal partnership terminates upon
the death of either spouse. . . . Where a complaint is brought against the
surviving spouse for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against
said conjugal [partnership], any judgment obtained thereby is void. The
proper action should be in the form of a claim to be filed in the testate or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.
In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the
spouses, there is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This does not
mean, however, that the conjugal partnership continues. And private
respondent cannot be said to have no remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the
Revised Rules of Court, he may apply in court for letters of administration in
his capacity as a principal creditor of the deceased . . . if after thirty (30) days
from his death, petitioner failed to apply for administration or request that
administration be granted to some other person.14
The cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals in support of its ruling,
namely, Climaco v. Siy Uy15 and Imperial Insurance, Inc. v. David,16 are
based on different sets of facts. In Climaco, the defendants, Carlos Siy Uy
and Manuel Co, were sued for damages for malicious prosecution. Thus,
apart from the fact the claim was not against any conjugal partnership, it was
one which does not survive the death of defendant Uy, which merely resulted
in the dismissal of the case as to him but not as to the remaining defendant
Manuel Co.
With regard to the case of Imperial, the spouses therein jointly and severally
executed an indemnity agreement which became the basis of a collection
suit filed against the wife after her husband had died. For this reason, the
Court ruled that since the spouses' liability was solidary, the surviving spouse
could be independently sued in an ordinary action for the enforcement of the
entire obligation.
It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal
partnership of gains, an obligation entered into by the husband and wife is
chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership which
is primarily bound for its repayment.17 Thus, when the spouses are sued for
the enforcement of an obligation entered into by them, they are being
impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal partnership
and not as independent debtors such that the concept of joint or solidary
liability, as between them, does not apply. But even assuming the contrary to
be true, the nature of the obligation involved in this case, as will be discussed
later, is not solidary but rather merely joint, making Imperial still inapplicable
to this case.
From the foregoing, it is clear that private respondent cannot maintain the
present suit against petitioner.1âwphi1 Rather, his remedy is to file a claim
against the Alipios in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
petitioner's husband or, if none has been commenced, he can file a petition
either for the issuance of letters of administration18 or for the allowance of
will,19 depending on whether petitioner's husband died intestate or testate.
Private respondent cannot short-circuit this procedure by lumping his claim
against the Alipios with those against the Manuels considering that, aside
from petitioner's lack of authority to represent their conjugal estate, the
inventory of the Alipios' conjugal property is necessary before any claim
chargeable against it can be paid. Needless to say, such power exclusively
pertains to the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of the decedent's
estate and not to any other court.
Second. The trial court ordered petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay
private respondent the unpaid balance of the agreed rent in the amount of
₱50,600.00 without specifying whether the amount is to be paid by them
jointly or solidarily. In connection with this, Art. 1207 of the Civil Code
provides:
The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one
and the same obligation does not imply that each one of the former has a
right to demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to render, entire
compliance with the prestations. There is a solidary liability only when the
obligation expressly so estates, or when the law or the nature of the
obligation requires solidarity.
Indeed, if from the law or the nature or the wording of the obligation the
contrary does not appear, an obligation is presumed to be only joint, i.e., the
debt is divided into as many equal shares as there are debtors, each debt
being considered distinct from one another.20
Private respondent does not cite any provision of law which provides that
when there are two or more lessees, or in this case, sublessees, the latter's
obligation to pay the rent is solidary. To be sure, should the lessees or
sublessees refuse to vacate the leased property after the expiration of the
lease period and despite due demands by the lessor, they can be held jointly
and severally liable to pay for the use of the property. The basis of their
solidary liability is not the contract of lease or sublease but the fact that they
have become joint tortfeasors.21 In the case at bar, there is no allegation that
the sublessees refused to vacate the fishpond after the expiration of the term
of the sublease. Indeed, the unpaid balance sought to be collected by private
respondent in his collection suit became due on June 30, 1989, long before
the sublease expired on September 12, 1990.
Neither does petitioner contend that it is the nature of lease that when there
are more than two lessees or sublessees their liability is solidary. On the
other hand, the pertinent portion of the contract involved in this case reads: 22
2. That the total lease rental for the sub-leased fishpond for the entire period
of three (3) years and two (2) months is FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT-FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (₱485,600.00) PESOS, including all the
improvements, prawns, milkfishes, crabs and related species thereon as well
all fishing equipment, paraphernalia and accessories. The said amount shall
be paid to the Sub-Lessor by the Sub-Lessees in the following manner, to
wit:
A. Three hundred thousand (₱300,000.00) Pesos upon signing this contract;
and
B. One Hundred Eight-Five Thousand Six-Hundred (₱185,6000.00) Pesos to
be paid on June 30, 1989.
Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely joint. Since the obligation of
the Manuel and Alipio spouses is chargeable against their respective
conjugal partnerships, the unpaid balance of ₱50,600.00 should be divided
into two so that each couple is liable to pay the amount of ₱25,300.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Bienvenido Manuel and Remedios
Manuel are ordered to pay the amount of ₱25,300.00, the attorney's fees in
the amount of ₱10,000.00 and the costs of the suit. The complaint against
petitioner is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a claim by private
respondent in the proceedings for the settlement of estate of Placido Alipio
for the collection of the share of the Alipio spouses in the unpaid balance of
the rent in the amount of ₱25,300.00.
SO ORDERED.
14. G.R. No. L-51278 May 9, 1988
HEIRS OF RAMON PIZARRO, SR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO Z. CONSOLACION, CFI of Davao and LUIS TAN alias
CHEN YEH-AN, respondents.
Rogelio A. Barba for petitioners.
Oscar Breva for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Order of
June 1, 1979, of the then Court of First Instance of Davao * dismissing
petitioners' claim against the estate of the late Dominga Garcia, and
questioning the legality of the Order of the same court dated July 17, 1979
which denied due course to the petitioners' notice of appeal to the Court of
Appeals and directed them to file instead a petition for review before this
Tribunal.
Petitioners are the oppositors in Special Proceeding No. 2116 in the then
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Davao City Branch II, for settlement of the
estate of the deceased Dominga Garcia, filed by private respondent herein,
Luis Tan alias Chen Yeh-An.
The records disclose that on August 12,1977, Luis Tan filed a verified petition
with the CFI of Davao for the issuance of letters of administration in favor of a
certain Alfonso Atilano. The petition alleged, among others that private
respondent is the only surviving son of the deceased Dominga Garcia who
died intestate sometime in 1930 in Canton, China; that the deceased left a
parcel of land 1 located at C.M. Recto Avenue, Davao City; and that the said
lot is in the possession of the heirs of Ramon Pizarro, 2 petitioners herein.
On October 4, 1977, petitioners filed an opposition to the said petition
claiming that they are the heirs of Ramon Pizarro who died intestate on June
16, 1974; and that the deceased was the vendee of one-half (1/2) of the
aforementioned lot by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement of estate and deed
of absolute sale executed by Vicente Tan in Hongkong on May 27, 1966.
Petitioners prayed that letters of administration of Dominga Garcia's estate
be issued in favor of anyone of them.
The respondent court set the petition for hearing. Said order and the petition
were duly published in the Mindanao Times. ** The City of Davao 3 was
likewise served with a copy of said petition. On December 6, 1977, after
private respondent had begun presentation of evidence in support of his
petition, the parties herein entered into a compromise whereby petitioners
agreed, among others, to withdraw their opposition to the appointment of
private respondent's recommendee and for the intestate proceedings to
proceed in due course. Said agreement was approved in the order of
respondent court dated December 6,1977. 4
Accordingly, on March 27, 1978, after the judicial administrator had qualified
and his inventory of the assets of the late Dominga Garcia was approved,
respondent court issued an order requiring the filing of creditors' claim
against the said estate within the period of six (6) months from the date of the
first publication. 5 Copy of said order was received by petitioners through
counsel on March 28, 1979. 6
Meanwhile, on January 23,1979, private respondent and the City of Davao
filed a joint motion asking respondent court to take notice of their agreement
which in substance provides for an agreement to file a joint motion in the CFI
of Davao to proceed with the determination of the heirs of the deceased
Domingao Garcia which shall be determinative of their respective claims
against the estate. On February 19, 1979, petitioners filed their opposition to
the said joint motion on the sole ground that it is without procedural basis.
Private respondent filed his reply thereto on February 21, 1979. On February
22, 1979, respondent court issued an order taking note of the agreement
between private respondent and the City of Davao.
On February 28, 1979, private respondent filed a motion to drop and exclude
the petitioners on the ground that they do not even claim to be the heirs of
the deceased Dominga Garcia and that the extrajudicial deed of partition and
deed of absolute sale allegedly executed in Hongkong in favor of the
petitioners' deceased father is spurious and simulated. On March 5, 1979,
petitioners filed their opposition to said motion. They likewise filed a claim
against the estate of the deceased Garcia in the amount of P350,000.00
representing services allegedly rendered by their deceased father in favor of
Vicente Tan. On March 8, 1979, private respondent filed a reply to
petitioners' opposition and a motion to strike out or dismiss the claim on the
ground that it is spurious and barred for having been filed beyond the six (6)
month period set in the notice for the filing of creditors' claim. On March 29,
1979, petitioners filed another claim against the estate for P200,000.00
allegedly advanced by their deceased father for the payment of realty and
income taxes of the said lot sometime in 1936, to which claim private
respondent filed an opposition on the ground that it is barred for having been
filed beyond the six (6) month period and that it was merely intended to delay
the proceedings.
In the Order of June 1, 1979, respondent court dismissed both claims of the
petitioners on the ground that they are barred for having been filed out of
time. 7 On June 26, 1979, petitioners filed a notice of appeal stating that they
are appealing the order of June 1, 1979 to the Court of Appeals in so far as it
declared their claims barred. 8 On July 5, 1979, private respondent filed an
opposition to the projected appeal on the ground that the appeal involves a
pure question of law and thus, the same should be directed to the Supreme
Court. 9 On July 17, 1979, respondent court issued an order dismissing
petitioners' appeal and directed petitioners to file instead a petition for review
on certiorari before this Court.10
Hence, the present petition. ***
It is the position of the petitioners that the order of June 1, 1979 of the
respondent court, which directed that the filing of claims against the estate of
the late Dominga Garcia be filed within six (6) months after the first
publication of the notice thereof, is null and void in that it is violative of
Section 2, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. They contend that said
provision mandates that the filing of such claims should be for a period of six
(6) months starting from the sixth month after the date of the first publication
of the notice down to the twelfth month. 11 They argue that to require filing of
claims within the sixth month from publication of notice will shorten the period
in violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 2, Rule 86, which
provides:
Sec. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. — In the
notice provided in the preceding section, the court shall state
the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall
not be more than twelve (12) nor less than six (6) months
after the date of the first publication of the notice. However,
at anytime before an order of distribution is entered, on
application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within
the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown
and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be
filed within a time not exceeding one (1) months.
We agree. The range of the period specified in the rule is intended to give the
probate court the discretion to fix the period for the filing of claims. The
probate court is permitted by the rule to set the period provided it is not less
than six (6) months nor more than twelve (12) months from the date of the
first publication of the notice thereof. Such period once fixed by the court is
mandatory.
The purpose of the law, in fixing a period within which claims against an
estate must be presented, is to insure a speedy settlement of the affairs of
the deceased person and the early delivery of the property to the person
entitled to the same. 12
In Sikat vs. Vda. Mafincode Villanueva, 13 this Court ruled that the speedy
settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and
those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts
and expenses of administration have been paid is the ruling spirit of our
probate law.
However, in this case the trial court set the period for the filing of the claims
within six (6) months from the date of the first publication of the notice. It was
obviously short of the minimum limit of six (6) months provided for by the law.
Petitioner correctly observed that the trial court thereby shortened the period
set by the law.
Since the notice issued and the period set by the trial court was not in
accordance with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court, what should then apply is the period as provided for by the rules which
is not less than six months nor more than twelve (12) months from the date
of first publication of notice. The first publication of the notice in the Mindanao
Times was on March 30, 1978. Thus the two claims of petitioners against the
estate which were filed on March 5, 1979 and March 29, 1979 respectively
were filed on time.
The other issue raised in the petition is the authority of the trial court to
determine whether the appeal involves a question of law or both questions of
law and facts. The petitioners cite Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court,
which provides as follows:
 Sec. 3. Where appealed case erroneously brought. —
Where the appealed case has been erroneously brought to
the Court of Appeals, it shall not dismiss the appeal, but
shall certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and
clear statement of the grounds therefor.
Petitioners contend that it is the Court of Appeals which has the authority to
determine whether the issue in the appeal is purely a question of law in
which case it shall certify the same to the proper court, which in this case is
this Tribunal.
In the present case, when the lower court found that the order sought to be
appealed was its order of June 1, 1979, wherein it held that the claims filed
by petitioners against the estates were barred having been filed beyond the
period fixed by the trial court in the notice, which appeal involves an
interpretation of Section 2, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, instead of giving
due course to the notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals filed by petitioners,
the petitioners were instructed to file a petition for review with this Court as
the issue is a pure question of law.
We find the action taken by the trial court to be well-taken. Certainly, it is
within the competence and jurisdiction of the trial court to determine whether
the appeal interposed was based on pure questions of law or involves both
questions of law and facts in considering the appeal.14 The provision of
Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court applies only when the appeal is
already brought to the Court of Appeals at which time it may, instead of
dismissing the appeal, upon determination that it involves a pure question of
law, order that the case be certified to this Court.
It must be noted that in the notice of appeal it is not even required that the
appellant indicate the court to which its appeal is being interposed. The
requirement is merely directory and failure to comply with it or error in the
court indicated is not fatal to the appeal. 15
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the orders of the respondent
court of June 1, 1979 and July 17, 1979 are reversed and set aside in so far
as the claims filed by petitioners were found to be barred, the same having
been timely filed, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
15. G.R. No. L-18935 February 26, 1965
IN RE: INTESTATE ESTATE OF BEATRIZ C. DE RAMA, deceased.
ANGELO O. DE RAMA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CHERIE PALILEO, claimant-appellee.
Amelia G. de Castro and Domingo D. Sison for petitioner-appellant.
Jose P. Bengzon Law Offices for claimant-appellee.
BARRERA, J.:
The facts of this case are not disputed: In connection with the proceeding for
the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Beatriz Cosio de
Rama, and pursuant to the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal before
which the proceeding is pending, a notice to all persons with money claims
against the deceased to file their said claims within six months, was duly
published, the first notice appearing in the August 13, 1958 issue of the
Manila Chronicle. On January 27, 1959, the administrator filed an inventory
of the estate, showing assets amounting to P139.596.77 and liabilities in the
sum of P33,012.95. The period provided in the published notice having
expired without anybody filing any claim against the deceased, the
administrator, upon order of the court, submitted a final account of the estate
and a project of partition, which were approved on May 12, 1960. Under date
of June 7, 1961, however, Cherie Palileo petitioned the court for permission
to file a claim in the proceeding, alleging that on the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 2256-R, promulgated on May 6, 1961, she obtained
a money judgment against the deceased Beatriz C de Rama; that although
the lower court decided in her favor the question of ownership and
possession of a real property involved in the case, it was only the Court of
Appeals that granted money judgment, when the case was decided on
appeal. The administrator opposed this petition on the ground that the claim
was filed beyond the period provided in the notice to creditors.
By order of August 8, 1961, the lower court sustained the claimant and
allowed her to file her claim within one month from receipt of said order, it
appearing that no final decree of distribution has as yet been entered in the
case. This appeal from the aforesaid order, brought by the administrator,
raises the issue of when money claims against a deceased person may be
filed in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of such deceased
person.
Section 2 of Rule 87 of the old Rules of Court (now Rule 86) provides:
Sec. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. — In the notice
provided in section 1, the court shall state the time for the filing of
claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve nor
less than six months after the date of the first publication of the
notice. However, at any time before an order of distribution is
entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim
within the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown
and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed
within a time not exceeding one month.1äwphï1.ñët
It is clear from the foregoing that the period prescribed in the notice to
creditors is not exclusive; that money claims against the estate may be
allowed any time before an order of distribution is entered, at the discretion of
the court, for cause and upon such terms as are equitable. 1 This extension
of the period shall not exceed one month, from the issuance of the order
authorizing such extension.2
It is not controverted in the instant case that no order of distribution of the
estate has as yet been made. Appellant, however, charges that the lower
court committed an abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed order without
sufficient ground or cause therefor. The petition of claimant-appellee, for
permission to file a claim in the proceeding, was based on the fact that the
award of damages in her favor, against the deceased Beatriz C. de Rama,
was contained in the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 22556-
R which was promulgated on May 6, 1961 or after the 6-month period
provided in the notice to creditors had already elapsed. It is her contention
that she could not have filed a money claim against the estate before the
promulgation of said decision because although the lower court in that case
upheld her right to the ownership and possession of the building subject
thereof, no damages were adjudged in her favor. Considering this argument,
the lower court found it sufficient to justify the relaxation of the rule and
extension of the period within which to file her claim. In the circumstances,
the action taken by the lower court cannot be considered an abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to justify its reversal by
this court.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the order appealed from, the
same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
16. G. R. No. L-57205 December 14, 1981
THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF DOMINADOR DANAN, represented by its
Administratrix, ADORACION F. VDA. DE DANAN, and the HEIRS of the
late DOMINADOR DANAN, et al., petitioners,
vs.
HON. FELIPE V. BUENCAMINO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch II, Guagua, Pampanga,
BENITO MANALANSAN, et al., respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The proceedings in the lower court which are narrated below were culled
mostly from the expediente of the case because the annexes to the petition
are not well organized.
Dominador Danan died on November 7, 1970, in Lubao, Pampanga. He did
not leave a will. Service Engineers, Inc. which claimed to be a creditor of the
deceased filed a petition dated November 12, 1971, in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga praying that letters of administrative of the intestate
estate of Dominador Danan be issued in favor of Engineer Carlos B.
Navarro. The petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No. G-22. It was,
however, Adoracion F. Vda. de Danan, widow of the deceased, who was
appointed administratrix of the estate.
On November 13, 1973, the court issued an order directing all persons
having money claims against the estate to file them within six (6) months
after the date of the first publication of the order which was December 10,
1973. On June 12, 1974, Benito Manalansan and Ines Vitug Manalansan
filed a contingent claim in the amount of P98,411.17 plus interest in
anticipation of a deficiency after the spouses shall have foreclosed a real
estate mortgage which the deceased and his wife had executed in their
favor. On July 11, 1974, the administratrix filed an answer to the contingent
claim wherein she admitted the existence of the debt which was secured by a
mortgage; however, she prayed that the contingent claim be denied because
it had no basis for the mortgage had not yet been foreclosed and ergo there
was no deficiency.
Notice was given by the Clerk of Court on July 26, 1974, that the hearing on
the contingent claim would be held on September 2, 1974, and in fact there
was such a hearing on that day wherein only the claimants in the person of
Ines Vitug Manalansan appeared. Atty. Juanito I. Vitug, counsel for the
administratrix, did not appear because according to the interpreter he was
sick or attending to his fishpond which had overflowed according to a son of
the administratrix. At the request of Atty. Lorenzo P. Navarro who
represented the Manalansans, the court allowed the claim to be heard
without prejudice to the right of the administratrix to present rebuttal
evidence. In that hearing, Mrs. Manalansan testified that she and her
husband had a final judgment against the Danans for P62,574.80 with 12%
interest compounded annually, 10% of the amount due and unpaid for
attorney's fees and moral damages in the amount of P5,000; that on June 6,
1974, the debt had grown to P264,121.17; and that if the market value of the
properties mortgaged and the P5,000 award for moral damages be deducted
from P264,121.17, the net amount due would be P98,411.17. The following
exhibits were marked during the hearing: The Record on Appeal in CA G.R.
No. 49109-R, Exhibit A — Contingent Claim; the decision in said case,
Exhibit B — Contingent Claim; Notice of Judgment attached thereto, Exhibit
B-1- Contingent Claim; Motion for Reconsideration, Exhibit C — Contingent
Claim; and Denial of Motion for Reconsideration, Exhibit D — Contingent
Claim. Atty. Navarro, however, asked that the presentation of the exhibits be
made during the next hearing wherein the administratrix shall be given the
opportunity to present rebuttal evidence. Accordingly, the court set the next
hearing to October 3, 1974, but was re-set to November 18, 1974, at the
request of the administratrix who said that her lawyer had an urgent personal
engagement in Baguio City on the first setting. On November 18, 1974, the
following order was given in open court: "Counsel for the administratrix is
given ten (10) days upon receipt hereof within which to interpose objection, if
any, to the exhibits offered by Atty. Navarro." From the tenor of the order
which gave Atty. Vitug ten days "upon receipt hereof" to interpose objection,
he did not appear on November 18, 1974. The record does not show that an
objection was ever interposed.
On February 28, 1979, the court held in abeyance the claim of the
Manalansans pending the resolution by this Court of a motion for
reconsideration in Manalansan vs. Castaneda, G.R. No. L-43607 which was
decided on June 27, 1978, 83 SCRA 777, on an ancillary question.
On November 12, 1979, the court set the hearing of the contingent claim of
the Manalansans on January 28, 1980, but the record does not show that a
hearing was actually held on that date.
On October 28, 1980, the Manalansans filed a Motion to Resolve Claim
Against the Estate, dated October 24, 1980. Attached to the motion is a
Statement of Account stating that the amount of the deficiency judgment
which the administratrix should be ordered to pay as of November 2, 1980, is
the sum of P 294,298.26. The motion contained a notice that it would be
submitted for the consideration and approval of the court on November 5,
1980, but the record does not show that it was so considered on that day. In
an order dated November 18, 1980, the court gave the administratrix ten (10)
days from receipt to file her comment on the aforesaid motion. The same
order stipulated that, "After the submission of the same [comment], the
instant motion is deemed submitted for resolution." The record does not
show that the administratrix submitted a comment as required. On January 3,
1981, the court issued the following order:
Acting upon the Motion to Resolve claim against the estate
filed by the claimnants Benito Manalansan and Ines V.
Manalansan dated October 24, 1980, based on the grounds
therein stated which the Court finds to be well-taken, the
said claim of P 294,298.26 as of November 2, 1980 is
hereby approved and ordered to be paid, pursuant to
Section 5 and 1 1, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court and for
failure of the administratrix to comply with the order of this
Court dated November 18, 1980.
It was only on January 8, 1981, that the administratrix filed an Opposition to
Contingent Claim against Estate. There the administratrix questioned the
jurisdiction of the court to entertain the claim "for being exorbitant and
shocking to the senses and that the same was filed out of time or beyond the
reglementary period provided by law."
In the meantime, Ines Vitug Manalansan died in a vehicular accident on
December 22, 1980, so she was substituted by her co-claimant Benito
Manalansan and their children, namely: Elsa, Gil, Anita, Jesus, Luz and
Martin.
On January 27, 1981, the administratrix filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order of January 3, 1981 (which ordered payment of the claim of P
294,298.26) on the ground that the claim was "exorbitant, shocking to the
senses and that the same was filed out of time or beyond the reglementary
period provided by law."
After an exhange of comments and reply to the Motion for Reconsideration,
the Court issued an order, dated May 30, 1981, as follows: "For lack of
merits, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied."
The administratrix now wants Us to review the actuations of the lower court
by raising the following issues:
I. Can a trial Judge legally and validly consider, take
cognizance of and render judgment on a claim filed against
the Estate in an Intestacy Proceeding when said claim was
filed outside the period prescribed by Section 2, Rule 86 of
the Revised Rules of Court?
II. Can a trial Judge adjudicate and render judgment on a
contingent claim against the Estate in an Intestacy
Proceeding on the basis merely of the direct testimony of a
claimant, such direct testimony not subjected to the rigid test
of cross examination by the adverse party, the documentary
evidence or exhibits presented by the claim in the course of
such direct testimony not having been formally offered nor
formally admitted by the Court and such claimant not having
formally rested his/her case; and that the adverse party
against whom the claim is being asserted not having had the
opportunity to adduce controverting or rebutting evidence?
III. Can a claim against the Estate in an Intestacy
Proceeding that is not supported by the evidence on record
be awarded?
On the first issue, there is no question that the contingent claim was filed two
(2) days beyond the six-month period stipulated in the order which directed
all persons having money claims against the estate to file them. However, it
is to be noted that the claim was filed on June 12, 1974, whereas the
timeliness of its filing was raised only on January 8, 1981, in the Opposition
to the Contingent Claim against Estate. In the interregnum the administratrix
had acquiesced to the entertainment of the claim by filing an answer thereto
on July 11, 1974, and again by asking for postponement of the October 3,
1974, hearing wherein she was to present her rebuttal evidence. She is not
only estopped by her conduct but laches also bar her claim. (See Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy, L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29; Rodriguez vs. Court of
Appeals, L-29264, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 419.) Moreover, Rule 86, Sec.
2 of the Rules of Court gives the probate court discretion to allow claims
presented beyond the period previously fixed provided that they are filed
within one month from the expiration of such period but in no case beyond
the date of entry of the order of distribution. The contingent claim of the
Manalansans was filed within both periods.
The second and third issues are impressed with merit.
True it is that the probate court gave opportunities to the administratrix to
contest the contingent claim. Thus she filed an answer thereto on July 11,
1974; a hearing was held on September 2, 1974, but she did not appear; the
hearing on October 3, 1974 was re-set to November 18, 1974 at her request
but she failed to appear on the latter date; she did not interpose objection to
the exhibits offered by the Manalansans as stipulated in the order of
November 18, 1974; and lastly the administratrix was given ten days within
which to file her comment to the Motion to Resolve Claim Against the Estate.
These notwithstanding, We believe that the opportunities given to the
administratrix were not ample enough and do not meet the minimum
requirements for due process. On June 12, 1974, when the claim was filed it
amounted to only P98,411.17. However, on January 3, 1981, when the
probate court approved the claim it had ballooned to the enormous amount of
P294.298.26. Noteworthy by is the fact that the order approving the claim
does not explain how it reached that amount. The probate court should not
have been satisfied with merely asking for objections or comments from the
administratrix but it should have conducted a full dress hearing on the claim
by using its coercive powers if necessary.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the court a quo dated January 3, 1981 and May
30, 1981, are hereby set aside and it is directed to conduct a thorough and
full dress hearing on the claim of the private respondents. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
17. G.R. No. 147561 June 22, 2006
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC-ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
Asurety company’s liability under the performance bond it issues is solidary.
The death of the principal obligor does not, as a rule, extinguish the
obligation and the solidary nature of that liability.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to reverse the March 13, 2001 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-GR CV No. 41630. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Order dated January 28, 1993 issued by the lower court
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of the instant case be
REMANDED to the lower court for the reception of evidence of all parties."3
The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the CA in this wise:
"On May 24, 1989, [respondent] Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation
(Republic-Asahi) entered into a contract with x x x Jose D. Santos, Jr., the
proprietor of JDS Construction (JDS), for the construction of roadways and a
drainage system in Republic-Asahi’s compound in Barrio Pinagbuhatan,
Pasig City, where [respondent] was to pay x x x JDS five million three
hundred thousand pesos (P5,300,000.00) inclusive of value added tax for
said construction, which was supposed to be completed within a period of
two hundred forty (240) days beginning May 8, 1989. In order ‘to guarantee
the faithful and satisfactory performance of its undertakings’ x x x JDS, shall
post a performance bond of seven hundred ninety five thousand pesos
(P795,000.00). x x x JDS executed, jointly and severally with [petitioner]
Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. (SICI) Performance Bond No. SICI-
25849/g(13)9769.
"On May 23, 1989, [respondent] paid to x x x JDS seven hundred ninety five
thousand pesos (P795,000.00) by way of downpayment.
"Two progress billings dated August 14, 1989 and September 15, 1989, for
the total amount of two hundred seventy four thousand six hundred twenty
one pesos and one centavo (P274,621.01) were submitted by x x x JDS to
[respondent], which the latter paid. According to [respondent], these two
progress billings accounted for only 7.301% of the work supposed to be
undertaken by x x x JDS under the terms of the contract.
"Several times prior to November of 1989, [respondent’s] engineers called
the attention of x x x JDS to the alleged alarmingly slow pace of the
construction, which resulted in the fear that the construction will not be
finished within the stipulated 240-day period. However, said reminders went
unheeded by x x x JDS.
"On November 24, 1989, dissatisfied with the progress of the work
undertaken by x x x JDS, [respondent] Republic-Asahi extrajudicially
rescinded the contract pursuant to Article XIII of said contract, and wrote a
letter to x x x JDS informing the latter of such rescission. Such rescission,
according to Article XV of the contract shall not be construed as a waiver of
[respondent’s] right to recover damages from x x x JDS and the latter’s
sureties.
"[Respondent] alleged that, as a result of x x x JDS’s failure to comply with
the provisions of the contract, which resulted in the said contract’s rescission,
it had to hire another contractor to finish the project, for which it incurred an
additional expense of three million two hundred fifty six thousand, eight
hundred seventy four pesos (P3,256,874.00).
"On January 6, 1990, [respondent] sent a letter to [petitioner] SICI filing its
claim under the bond for not less than P795,000.00. On March 22, 1991,
[respondent] again sent another letter reiterating its demand for payment
under the aforementioned bond. Both letters allegedly went unheeded.
"[Respondent] then filed [a] complaint against x x x JDS and SICI. It sought
from x x x JDS payment of P3,256,874.00 representing the additional
expenses incurred by [respondent] for the completion of the project using
another contractor, and from x x x JDS and SICI, jointly and severally,
payment of P750,000.00 as damages in accordance with the performance
bond; exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and attorney’s fees
in the amount of at least P100,000.00.
"According to the Sheriff’s Return dated June 14, 1991, submitted to the
lower court by Deputy Sheriff Rene R. Salvador, summons were duly served
on defendant-appellee SICI. However, x x x Jose D. Santos, Jr. died the
previous year (1990), and x x x JDS Construction was no longer at its
address at 2nd Floor, Room 208-A, San Buena Bldg. Cor. Pioneer St., Pasig,
Metro Manila, and its whereabouts were unknown.
"On July 10, 1991, [petitioner] SICI filed its answer, alleging that the
[respondent’s] money claims against [petitioner and JDS] have been
extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr. Even if this were not the
case, [petitioner] SICI had been released from its liability under the
performance bond because there was no liquidation, with the active
participation and/or involvement, pursuant to procedural due process, of
herein surety and contractor Jose D. Santos, Jr., hence, there was no
ascertainment of the corresponding liabilities of Santos and SICI under the
performance bond. At this point in time, said liquidation was impossible
because of the death of Santos, who as such can no longer participate in any
liquidation. The unilateral liquidation on the party (sic) of [respondent] of the
work accomplishments did not bind SICI for being violative of procedural due
process. The claim of [respondent] for the forfeiture of the performance bond
in the amount of P795,000.00 had no factual and legal basis, as payment of
said bond was conditioned on the payment of damages which [respondent]
may sustain in the event x x x JDS failed to complete the contracted works.
[Respondent] can no longer prove its claim for damages in view of the death
of Santos. SICI was not informed by [respondent] of the death of Santos.
SICI was not informed by [respondent] of the unilateral rescission of its
contract with JDS, thus SICI was deprived of its right to protect its interests
as surety under the performance bond, and therefore it was released from all
liability. SICI was likewise denied due process when it was not notified of
plaintiff-appellant’s process of determining and fixing the amount to be spent
in the completion of the unfinished project. The procedure contained in
Article XV of the contract is against public policy in that it denies SICI the
right to procedural due process. Finally, SICI alleged that [respondent]
deviated from the terms and conditions of the contract without the written
consent of SICI, thus the latter was released from all liability. SICI also
prayed for the award of P59,750.00 as attorney’s fees, and P5,000.00 as
litigation expenses.
"On August 16, 1991, the lower court issued an order dismissing the
complaint of [respondent] against x x x JDS and SICI, on the ground that the
claim against JDS did not survive the death of its sole proprietor, Jose D.
Santos, Jr. The dispositive portion of the [O]rder reads as follows:
‘ACCORDINGLY, the complaint against the defendants Jose D. Santos, Jr.,
doing business under trade and style, ‘JDS Construction’ and Stronghold
Insurance Company, Inc. is ordered DISMISSED.
‘SO ORDERED.’
"On September 4, 1991, [respondent] filed a Motion for Reconsideration
seeking reconsideration of the lower court’s August 16, 1991 order
dismissing its complaint. [Petitioner] SICI field its ‘Comment and/or
Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration.’ On October 15, 1991, the
lower court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby given due course. The Order dated 16 August 1991 for the dismissal
of the case against Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc., is reconsidered and
hereby reinstated (sic). However, the case against defendant Jose D.
Santos, Jr. (deceased) remains undisturbed.
‘Motion for Preliminary hearing and Manifestation with Motion filed by
[Stronghold] Insurance Company Inc., are set for hearing on November 7,
1991 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
‘SO ORDERED.’
"On June 4, 1992, [petitioner] SICI filed its ‘Memorandum for
Bondsman/Defendant SICI (Re: Effect of Death of defendant Jose D. Santos,
Jr.)’ reiterating its prayer for the dismissal of [respondent’s] complaint.
"On January 28, 1993, the lower court issued the assailed Order
reconsidering its Order dated October 15, 1991, and ordered the case,
insofar as SICI is concerned, dismissed. [Respondent] filed its motion for
reconsideration which was opposed by [petitioner] SICI. On April 16, 1993,
the lower court denied [respondent’s] motion for reconsideration. x x x."4
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that SICI’s obligation under the surety agreement was not
extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr. Consequently, Republic-
Asahi could still go after SICI for the bond.
The appellate court also found that the lower court had erred in pronouncing
that the performance of the Contract in question had become impossible by
respondent’s act of rescission. The Contract was rescinded because of the
dissatisfaction of respondent with the slow pace of work and pursuant to
Article XIII of its Contract with JDS.
The CA ruled that "[p]erformance of the [C]ontract was impossible, not
because of [respondent’s] fault, but because of the fault of JDS Construction
and Jose D. Santos, Jr. for failure on their part to make satisfactory progress
on the project, which amounted to non-performance of the same. x x x
[P]ursuant to the [S]urety [C]ontract, SICI is liable for the non-performance of
said [C]ontract on the part of JDS Construction."5
Hence, this Petition.6
Issue
Petitioner states the issue for the Court’s consideration in the following
manner:
"Death is a defense of Santos’ heirs which Stronghold could also adopt as its
defense against obligee’s claim."7
More precisely, the issue is whether petitioner’s liability under the
performance bond was automatically extinguished by the death of Santos,
the principal.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Sole Issue:
Effect of Death on the Surety’s Liability
Petitioner contends that the death of Santos, the bond principal, extinguished
his liability under the surety bond. Consequently, it says, it is automatically
released from any liability under the bond.
As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not
extinguish the obligation.8 Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except
when the transmission is prevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties,
or the nature of the obligation.9 Only obligations that are personal10 or are
identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death. 11
Section 5 of Rule 8612 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution
of money claims arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased
debtor. Evidently, those claims are not actually extinguished. 13 What is
extinguished is only the obligee’s action or suit filed before the court, which is
not then acting as a probate court.14
In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had
under his contracts with respondent were not intransmissible by their nature,
by stipulation, or by provision of law. Hence, his death did not result in the
extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to
his estate.15 Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe
out the obligations under the performance bond. Consequently, petitioner as
surety cannot use his death to escape its monetary obligation under its
performance bond.
The liability of petitioner is contractual in nature, because it executed a
performance bond worded as follows:
"KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
"That we, JDS CONSTRUCTION of 208-A San Buena Building, contractor,
of Shaw Blvd., Pasig, MM Philippines, as principal and the STRONGHOLD
INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. a corporation duly organized and existing
under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines with head office at Makati,
as Surety, are held and firmly bound unto the REPUBLIC ASAHI GLASS
CORPORATION and to any individual, firm, partnership, corporation or
association supplying the principal with labor or materials in the penal sum of
SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY FIVE THOUSAND (P795,000.00), Philippine
Currency, for the payment of which sum, well and truly to be made, we bind
ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns,
jointly and severally, firmly by these presents.
"The CONDITIONS OF THIS OBLIGATION are as follows;
"WHEREAS the above bounden principal on the ___ day of __________,
19__ entered into a contract with the REPUBLIC ASAHI GLASS
CORPORATION represented by _________________, to fully and faithfully.
Comply with the site preparation works road and drainage system of
Philippine Float Plant at Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, Metro Manila.
"WHEREAS, the liability of the Surety Company under this bond shall in no
case exceed the sum of PESOS SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY FIVE
THOUSAND (P795,000.00) Philippine Currency, inclusive of interest,
attorney’s fee, and other damages, and shall not be liable for any advances
of the obligee to the principal.
"WHEREAS, said contract requires the said principal to give a good and
sufficient bond in the above-stated sum to secure the full and faithfull
performance on its part of said contract, and the satisfaction of obligations for
materials used and labor employed upon the work;
"NOW THEREFORE, if the principal shall perform well and truly and fulfill all
the undertakings, covenants, terms, conditions, and agreements of said
contract during the original term of said contract and any extension thereof
that may be granted by the obligee, with notice to the surety and during the
life of any guaranty required under the contract, and shall also perform well
and truly and fulfill all the undertakings, covenants, terms, conditions, and
agreements of any and all duly authorized modifications of said contract that
may hereinafter be made, without notice to the surety except when such
modifications increase the contract price; and such principal contractor or his
or its sub-contractors shall promptly make payment to any individual, firm,
partnership, corporation or association supplying the principal of its sub-
contractors with labor and materials in the prosecution of the work provided
for in the said contract, then, this obligation shall be null and void; otherwise
it shall remain in full force and effect. Any extension of the period of time
which may be granted by the obligee to the contractor shall be considered as
given, and any modifications of said contract shall be considered as
authorized, with the express consent of the Surety.
"The right of any individual, firm, partnership, corporation or association
supplying the contractor with labor or materials for the prosecution of the
work hereinbefore stated, to institute action on the penal bond, pursuant to
the provision of Act No. 3688, is hereby acknowledge and confirmed."16
As a surety, petitioner is solidarily liable with Santos in accordance with the
Civil Code, which provides as follows:
"Art. 2047. By guaranty a person, called the guarantor, binds himself to the
creditor to fulfill the obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should
fail to do so.
"If a person binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor, the provisions of
Section 4,17 Chapter 3, Title I of this Book shall be observed. In such case
the contract is called a suretyship."
xxxxxxxxx
"Art. 1216. The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors
or some or all of them simultaneously. The demand made against one of
them shall not be an obstacle to those which may subsequently be directed
against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully collected."
Elucidating on these provisions, the Court in Garcia v. Court of
Appeals18 stated thus:
"x x x. The surety’s obligation is not an original and direct one for the
performance of his own act, but merely accessory or collateral to the
obligation contracted by the principal. Nevertheless, although the contract of
a surety is in essence secondary only to a valid principal obligation, his
liability to the creditor or promisee of the principal is said to be direct, primary
and absolute; in other words, he is directly and equally bound with the
principal. x x x."19
Under the law and jurisprudence, respondent may sue, separately or
together, the principal debtor and the petitioner herein, in view of the solidary
nature of their liability. The death of the principal debtor will not work to
convert, decrease or nullify the substantive right of the solidary creditor.
Evidently, despite the death of the principal debtor, respondent may still sue
petitioner alone, in accordance with the solidary nature of the latter’s liability
under the performance bond.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
18. G.R. No. L-33006 December 8, 1982
NICANOR NACAR, petitioner,
vs.
CLAUDIO A. NISTAL as Municipal Judge of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur,
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Agusan del Sur, ILDEFONSO JAPITANA and
ANTONIO DOLORICON, respondents.
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner.
Ildefonso Japitana and Antonio Boloricon for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Nicanor Nacar filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with
preliminary injunction to annul an order of the respondent judge of the
municipal court of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur directing the attachment of
seven (7) carabaos, to effect the return of four (4) carabaos seized under the
questioned order, and to stop the respondent judge from further proceeding
in Civil Case No. 65.
Respondent Ildefonso Japitana filed the complaint in Civil Case No. 65 and
entitled it "Claim Against the Estate of the Late Isabelo Nacar With
Preliminary Attachment:" On the basis of this complaint, including an
allegation "that defendant are (sic) about to remove and dispose the above-
named property (seven carabaos) with intent to defraud plaintiff herein", and
considering that Mr. Japitana had given security according to the Rules of
Court, Judge Nistal issued the order commanding the provincial sheriff to
attach the seven (7) heads of cattle in the possession of petitioner Nicanor
Nacar. Actually only four (4) carabaos were attached because three (3)
carabaos had earlier been slaughtered during the rites preceding the burial of
the late Isabelo Nacar.
Nicanor Nacar filed a motion to dismiss, to dissolve writ of preliminary
attachment, and to order the return of the carabaos. Private respondent
Japitana filed an opposition to this motion while intervenor Antonio Doloricon
filed a complaint in intervention asserting that he was the owner of the
attached carabaos and that the certificates of ownership of large cattle were
in his name.
The respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss prompting Mr. Nacar to
come to the Supreme Court.
In a resolution dated January 12, 1971, this Court, upon the posting of a
bond in the amount of P1,000.00, directed the issuance of a preliminary
mandatory injunction. The respondents were enjoined from further enforcing
the writ of attachment and to return the seized carabaos. The judge was
restrained from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 65.
We find the petition meritorious.
The pertinent portions of the complaint filed by Mr. Japitana with the
municipal court read as follows:
ILDEFONSO JAPITANA Civil Case No. 65 Plaintiff,
FOR:
— Versus —
CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE NICANOR NACAR THE
LATE ISABELO NACAR WITH Defendant. PRELIMINARY
ATTACHMENT x ---------------------------------x
COMPLAINT
COMES NOW the undersigned plaintiff and before this
Honorable Court, respectfully avers:
xxx xxx xxx
That at various dates since the year 1968, the defendant
have (sic) incurred indebtedness to the plaintiff in the total
sum of TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY ONE
(P2,791.00) PESOS, which said amount had long been
overdue for payment, and which the defendant up to this
date have (sic) not been able to pay, despite repeated
demands from the plaintiff;
That the defendant Isabelo Nacar died last April, 1970
leaving among other things personal property consisting
seven (7) heads of carabaos now in the possession of the
defendant Nicanor Nacar;
That plaintiff herein file a claim against the estate of the late
Isabelo Nacar to recover the aforementioned sum of
P2,791.99;
That defendant are (sic) about to remove and dispose the
above mentioned property with intent to defraud plaintiff
herein;
That plaintiff is willing to put up a bond for the issuance of a
preliminary attachment in an amount to be fixed by the
Court, not exceeding the sum of P 2,791.00 which is the
plaintiff's claim herein;
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that pending the
hearing of this case, a writ of preliminary attachment be
issued against the properties of the defendant to serve as
security for the payment or satisfaction of any judgment that
may be recovered herein; and that after due hearing on the
principal against the defendant for the sum of P 2,791,00
with legal interest from September 15, 1970 plus costs of
this suit. (Annex "A", p. 7 rollo).
In his motion to dismiss, the petitioner raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction
and absence of a cause of action. Mr. Nacar averred that the indebtedness
mentioned in the complaint was alleged to have been incurred by the late
Isabelo Nacar and not by Nicanor Nacar. There was, therefore, no cause of
action against him. The petitioner also stated that a municipal court has no
jurisdiction to entertain an action involving a claim filed against the estate of a
deceased person.
The same grounds have been raised in this petition. Mr. Nacar contends:
xxx xxx xxx
 9. That the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction.The
municipal courts or inferior courts have NO jurisdiction to
settle the estate of deceased persons. The proper remedy is
for the creditor to file the proper proceedings in the court of
first instance and file the corresponding claim. But assuming
without admitting that the respondent judge had jurisdiction,
it is very patent that he committed a very grave abuse of
discretion and totally disregarded the provisions of the Rules
of Court and decisions of this honorable Court when he
issued an ex-parte writ of preliminary attachment, when
there is no showing that the plaintiff therein has a sufficient
cause of action, that there is no other security for the claim
sought to be enforced by the plaintiff; or that the amount
claimed in the action is as much as the sum for which the
order is prayed for above all legal counterclaims; There was
no bond to answer for whatever damages that herein
petitioner may suffer; (Rollo, pp. 3- 4).
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent judge tried to avoid the consequences of the issues raised in
the motion to dismiss by stating that although the title of the complaint styled
it a claim against the estate of the late Isabelo Nacar, the allegations showed
that the nature of the action was really for the recovery of an indebtedness in
the amount of P2,791.99.
The rule cited by the judge is correctly stated but it is hardly relevant to the
contents of the complaint filed by Mr. Japitana.
It is patent from the portions of the complaint earlier cited that the allegations
are not only vague and ambiguous but downright misleading. The second
paragraph of the body of the complaint states that the defendant (herein
petitioner Nicanor Nacar) at various dates since the year 1968 incurred debts
to the plaintiff in the sum of P2,791.00. And yet, in the subsequent
paragraphs, one clearly gathers that the debts were actually incurred by the
late Isabelo Nacar, who died several months before the filing of the
complaint. The complaint which the respondent judge reads as one for the
collection of a sum of money and all the paragraphs of which are incidentally
unnumbered, expressly states as a material averment:
xxx xxx xxx
That plaintiff herein file (sic) a claim against the estate of the late Isabelo
Nacar to recover the aforementioned sum of P2,791.00;
xxx xxx xxx
Under the circumstances of this case, respondent Japitana has no cause of
action against petitioner Nacar. Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust
Company (58 SCRA 559) gives the elements of a valid cause of action:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in
violation of the legal right of the other. Its essential elements
are, namely: (1) the existence of a legal right in the plaintiff,
(2) a correlative legal duty in the defendant, and (3) an act or
omission of the defendant in violation of plaintiff's right with
consequential injury or damage to the plaintiff for which he
may maintain an action for the recovery of damages or other
appropriate relief. ( Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. vs.
Barrios, et al., 79 Phil. 666, 667; Ramitere et al. vs.
Montinola Vda. de Yulo, et al., L-19751, February 28, 1966,
16 SCRA 251, 255). On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 6
of the Rules of Court provides that the complaint must state
the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.
Hence, where the complaint states ultimate facts that
constitute the three essential elements of a cause of action,
the complaint states a cause of action; (Community
Investment and Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 Phil. 215, 218)
otherwise, the complaint must succumb to a motion to
dismiss on that ground.
Indeed, although respondent Japitana may have a legal right to recover an
indebtedness due him, petitioner Nicanor Nacar has no correlative legal duty
to pay the debt for the simple reason that there is nothing in the complaint to
show that he incurred the debt or had anything to do with the creation of the
liability. As far as the debt is concerned, there is no allegation or showing that
the petitioner had acted in violation of Mr. Japitana's rights with
consequential injury or damage to the latter as would create a cause of
action against the former.
It is also patent from the complaint that respondent Japitana filed the case
against petitioner Nacar to recover seven (7) heads of carabaos allegedly
belonging to Isabelo Nacar which Japitana wanted to recover from the
possession of the petitioner to answer for the outstanding debt of the late
Isabelo Nacar. This matter, however, is only ancillary to the main action. The
ancillary matter does not cure a fatal defect in the complaint for the main
action is for the recovery of an outstanding debt of the late lsabelo Nacar due
respondent Japitana, a cause of action about which petitioner Nacar has
nothing to do.
In fact the fatal defect in the complaint was noticed by the respondent court
when it advised respondent Japitana to amend his complaint to conform with
his evidence and from the court's admission that it was inclined to dismiss
the case were it not for the complaint in intervention of respondent Doloricon.
Respondent Doloricon filed his complaint for intervention on the ground that
the four carabaos, subject of the writ of attachment, were actually his
carabaos. Thus, the respondent court in its Order denying the petitioner's
motion to dismiss, to dissolve writ of preliminary attachment and in order the
return of the carabaos said:
... Antonio Doloricon manifested before this Court that he is
filing a third-party complaint alleging that he is the true and
lawful owner of the carabaos in questions.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court for the
interest of both parties will not for the meantime dismiss this
 case. Antonio Doloricon is hereby given 10 days from receipt
hereof within which to file his third-party complaint. The
plaintiff who in his opposition to defendant's motion to
dismiss pray (sic) for the custody of the carabaos. This Court
further requires plaintiff to put up the additional bond of P
I,000.00 after which the latter may be entitled of (sic) the
custody of the carabaos subject of litigation pending final
termination of this case. (Rollo, pp. 18-19)
The respondent court's reason for not dismissing the case is contrary to
applicable precedents on the matter. We ruled in Mathay v. Consolidated
Bank and Trust Company, supra:
Section I, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, providing in part
that:
Within the time for pleading a motion to
dismiss may be made on any of the
following grounds; ...
(g) That the complaint states no cause of
action. ...
explicitly requires that the sufficiency of the complaint must be tested
exclusively on the basis of the complaint itself and no other should be
considered when the ground for motion to dismiss is that the complaint states
no cause of action. Pursuant thereto this Court has ruled that:
As a rule the sufficiency of the complaint,
when challenged in a motion to dismiss,
must be determined exclusively on the basis
of the facts alleged therein' (Uy Chao vs. De
La Rama Steamship Co., Inc., L-14495,
September 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 69, 72. See
also De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino et al., 95
Phil. 365, 371; Dalandan, et at. vs. Julio, et
al., L- 19101, February 29, 1964, 10 SCRA
400; Ramitere et al. vs. Montinola Vda. de
Yulo, et al., L-19751, February 28, 1966, 16
SCRA 250, 254; Acuna vs. Batac Producers
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., et
al., L-20338, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 526,
531)
Hence, it was error for the respondent court not to dismiss the case simply
because respondent Doloricon filed the complaint for intervention alleging
that he owned the carabaos.
Moreover, even assuming that respondent Japitana had a legal right to the
carabaos which were in the possession of petitioner Nacar, the proper
procedure would not be to file an action for the recovery of the outstanding
debts of the late Isabelo Nacar against his stepfather, the petitioner Nacar as
defendant. As we said in Maspil v. Romero (61 SCRA 197):
Appropriate actions for the enforcement or defense of rights
must be taken in accordance with procedural rules and
cannot be left to the whims or caprices of litigants. It cannot
even be left to the untrammeled discretion of the courts of
justice without sacrificing uniformity and equality in the
application and effectivity thereof.
Considering the foregoing, the respondent court's denial of the motion to
dismiss the complaint and its issuance of a writ of attachment based on the
allegations of the complaint are improper. With this conclusion, we find no
need to discuss the other issue on whether or not the procedural rules on the
issuance of a writ of attachment were followed by the respondent court in
issuing the subject writ of attachment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The preliminary mandatory
injunction issued on January 13, 1971 is made permanent and the cash bond
filed by the petitioner in connection therewith is ordered returned to him.
SO ORDERED.
19. G.R. No. L-30453 December 4, 1989
ANGELINA PUENTEVELLA ECHAUS, in her own behalf and as
Administratrix of the Estate of Luis Puentevella, assisted by her
husband, RENE ECHAUS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON BLANCO, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
and PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK, as Administrator
of the Testate Estate of the late Charles Newton Hodges, AVELINA A.
MAGNO, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of the late Linnie Jane
Hodges, respondents.
Sarmiento, Guatelara & Associates and Nepomuceno, Hofileña & Guingona
for petitioner.
Rizal R. Quimpo & Cornelio P. Ravena for respondents A.A. Magno & Judge
R. Blanco
T. U. Benedicto & Associates for respondent PCIB.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for mandamus seeking to compel respondent presiding
judge of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo (now Regional Trial Court) in
Special Proceedings No. 1672 to issue an order directing respondent
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PICB) as administrator of the
estate of the late Charles Newton Hodges (C.N. Hodges) to pay herein
petitioner the amount of eight hundred fifty-one thousand four hundred
seventy- two pesos and eighty-three centavos (P851,472.83) with legal
interest, adjudged in Civil Case No. 6628.
The antecedent facts of the instant case are as follows:
Herein petitioner Angelina Puentevella Echaus, in her own behalf and as
Administratrix of the intestate estate of her deceased father Luis Puentevella,
assisted by her husband, Rene Echaus filed a complaint on May 30, 1962 IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the defendant, in its
against Charles Newton Hodges (C.N. Hodges) praying for an accounting of capacity as Administrator of the Estate of Charles Newton
the business covering the Ba-Ta Subdivision, the recovery of her share in the Hodges is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
profits and remaining assets of their business and the payment of expenses EIGHT(Y) HUNDRED FIFTY-ONE THOUSAND FOUR
and moral and exemplary damages (p. 10, Rollo). The complaint was HUNDRED SEVENTY-TWO PESOS and EIGHTY THREE
docketed as Civil Case No. 6628 of the Court of First Instance of Negros CENTAVOS (P851,472.83) with legal interest thereon from
Occidental. date of judgment until paid. All other claims arising from the
On July 20, 1962, C. N. Hodges, through counsel, filed his Answer (p. counterclaim, and third-party complaint, not otherwise
10, Rollo). adjudicated, are hereby dismissed, with costs against the
Trial on the merits commenced on December 7, 1962, with the testimony of defendant,
Angelina Echaus (p. 12, Rollo). Sometime thereafter, counsel for C. N. IT IS SO ORDERED.
Hodges manifested that defendant C. N. Hodges died on December 25, Bacolod City, Philippines, December 5, 1966.
1962. No motion to dismiss was filed by C. N. Hodges' counsel. On February (
14, 1964, the trial court ordered the substitution of the Philippine Commercial S
and Industrial Bank (PCIB), as administrator of the estate of deceased C. N. G
Hodges, as party defendant. No objection to the order was interposed by D
PCIB. )
A petition for the settlement of the estate of C. N. Hodges was instituted
before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, the date of which does not appear E
in the records, and docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1672. A notice to D
creditors was published in "Yuhum" a newspaper of general circulation in its U
issues of March 13, 20 and 27, 1963 (p. 190, Rollo). A
On November 12, 1966, the parties in Civil Case No. 6628 submitted a R
stipulation of facts and submitted the case for decision on the basis of said D
stipulation of facts (p. 12, Rollo). The parties also agreed in the stipulation of O
facts that:
1. The parties, being duly represented in the panel of D
Commissioners constituted by this Honorable Court, shall be .
bound by the Commissioners' findings on the questions of
facts presented to them for determination, if such findings E
are accepted by this Honorable Court in its Decision. N
2. With a view to the, speedy settlement and termination not R
only of the Estate of C. N. Hodges (Special Proceedings I
1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo pending since Q
1962) but also of the estate of Luis Puentevella (Special U
Proceedings 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Negros E
Occidental pending since 1951), in accordance with the Z
letter and spirit of the Rules of Court, and relying upon the
wisdom and impartiality of the Presiding Judge of this J
Honorable Court who is now on the point of closing a brilliant u
and exemplary career on the Bench, the parties shall accept d
its Decision herein as final. g
xxx xxx xxx e
(p. 20, Rollo) (p. 41, Rollo)
On December 5, 1966, judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of On January 21, 1967, the same trial court issued an order granting plaintiff's
plaintiff Angelina F. Echaus, the dispositive portion of which states: motion for the issuance of a writ of execution (p. 43, Rollo) against PCIB.
However, the writ was not enforced as plaintiff opted to file a motion dated
February 20, 1967 (pp. 44-46, Rollo) in Special Proceedings No. 1672
(estate proceedings of deceased C. N. Hodges) for the payment of the
judgment. Herein respondent Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix of the
estate of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges (wife of C. N. Hodges) opposed
the motion (p. 3, Rollo). Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 6628, Avelina Magno,
filed a petition for relief from judgment on March 27, 1967 and a motion to
intervene dated April 24, 1967 (p. 57, Rollo). On June 6, 1967, the heirs of C.
N. Hodges filed a motion to intervene in the same Civil Case No. 6628. On
July 20, 1967, respondent Judge Ramon Blanco, presiding judge of the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo City, Branch V, taking cognizance of Special
Proceedings No. 1672, issued on Order (pp. 52-56, Rollo) holding in
abeyance the resolution of the motion of Angelina Echaus for payment of the
judgment rendered in her favor in Civil Case No. 6628, until after the
resolution of the "Petition for Relief from Judgment" filed by Administratrix
Magno before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case
No. 6628.
On November 23, 1967, the petition for relief from judgment was denied on
the ground that Magno, as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
was not a party to the case (p. 58, Rollo). The twin motions to intervene filed
by the heirs of C. N. Hodges and Avelina Magno, as administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges were likewise denied on the ground that
pleadings in intervention are allowed only before or during the trial and not
when a final and executory judgment had already been rendered (p.
61, Rollo).
In a motion (pp. 66-68, Rollo) dated November 25, 1968, Angelina P. Echaus
prayed for the resolution of her previous motion to direct payment of the
judgment credit which was held in abeyance, stating that the petition for relief
from judgment filed in Civil Case No. 6628 was dismissed by the trial court
which dismissal has become final and executory in view of the failure of
Avelina Magno to file a record on appeal on time.
On February 26, 1969, respondent Judge Ramon Blanco issued an Order
(pp. 72-74, Rollo) reiterating his position that the motion to direct payment of
the judgment credit cannot yet be resolved and holding in abeyance the
resolution thereof in view of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
Supreme Court in G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, (PCIB v. Blanco),
enjoining respondent judge from hearing Special Proceedings Nos. 1307 and
1672, entitled "Testate Estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges" and "Testate
Estate of Charles N. Hodges," respectively. It is noted that in the same
Order, respondent judge mentioned that the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the Supreme Court was clarified in another resolution dated
October 4, 1967 to the effect that he (respondent judge) is not restrained
from approving final deeds of sale executed by the Administrator PCIB
covering properties of the respective estates and that he can act on such
other routinary administrative matters necessary for the gathering and
preservation of the estate (pp. 73-74, Rollo).
The pertinent portion of said Order states:
In G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, PCIB vs. Blanco, the
Supreme Court on August 12, 1967 issued a writ of
preliminary injunction restraining the presiding judge of this
Branch V from hearing Sp. Proc. 1307 and 1672 of the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo entitled 'Testate Estate of the late
Linnie Jane Hodges and Testate Estate of C. N. Hodges'
which writ of preliminary injunction was clarified by the
Supreme Court in its resolution of October 4, 1967 to the
effect that the presiding judge of this Branch V is not
restrained from approving final deeds of sale executed by
the administrator PCIB covering properties of the said estate
and that the presiding judge of this Branch can act on such
other routinary administration matters necessary for the
gathering and preservation of the estate.
In view therefore of the said writ of preliminary injunction, it is
the considered opinion of the undersigned presiding judge
that he cannot act, meanwhile, on the motion or motions and
the oppositions thereto taking into account that the said
motions involve substantive and mandatory procedural,
requirements considering that the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental of Civil Case 6628 is
being questioned by the oppositors as a money claim and as
such should have been prosecuted in the probate court.
WHEREFORE, unless allowed by the Supreme Court to
resolve the instant motions and oppositions thereto thus
further clarifying the writ of preliminary injunction which was
issued on August 12, 1967, the resolution on the said
motions and oppositions thereto is thereby held in abeyance.
SO ORDERED.
In a manifestation (pp. 69-71, Rollo, Annex "H" of Petition) dated February
28, 1969, petitioner manifested that private respondent Avelina Magno's
petition for certiorari and mandamus (G.R. L- 30013) filed before this Court
questioning the validity of the decision in Civil Case No. 6628 was dismissed
for lack of merit on January 15, 1969 (p. 109, Rollo). Still, petitioner failed to
obtain an affirmative response to their motion.
Petitioner then filed the instant petition for mandamus dated April 21, 1969
seeking: a) to set aside respondent judge's order of February 26, 1969; and
b) to order PCIB to pay the judgment credit in Civil Case No. 6628.
It is the contention of petitioner that the judgment in Civil Case No. 6628 is
now final and executory and the execution thereof becomes a matter of right
under Rule 39, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. The duty to order the
execution of a final and executory judgment is ministerial and the failure of
respondent judge to issue such order is a proper case for mandamus.
On the other hand, private respondents contend that the judgment rendered
in Civil Case No. 6628 is null and void for having been rendered without
jurisdiction. Money claims against a defendant who dies without a judgment
having been rendered in the Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed and
prosecuted as a claim in the estate proceedings as laid down under Section
21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. This procedure was not followed in Civil
Case No. 6628. Also, even, if it is assumed that the judgment in the said civil
case is valid, the claim presented in the estate proceedings is already barred
by the statute of non-claims.
It must be noted that Civil Case No. 6628 which is a money claim, was
Instituted during the lifetime of C. N. Hodges. During its pendency and before
a decision could be rendered by the Regional Trial Court hearing the case,
C. N. Hodges died. Upon his death, he was substituted by PCIB as
administrator of his estate. Being a money claim, said civil case should have
been dismissed and instituted as a money claim in the intestate estate of C.
N. Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1627) in accordance with Section 21 of Rule 3 of
the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 21. Where claim does not survive.-When the action is
for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided in these rules.
However, this is not to suggest that because the claim of petitioner was
pursued to its conclusion in Civil Case No. 6682 instead of being dismissed
and filed as a money claim in Special Proceedings No. 1672, the judgment
rendered therein is null and void. The case of Ignacio v. Pampanga Bus Co.,
Inc., L-18936, May 23, 1967, 20 SCRA 126, is in point. In the said case,
Pampanga Bus Co., Inc., (Pambusco) filed a suit to collect P105,000.00
against defendants Valentin Fernando and Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de
Fernando. The latter died during the pendency of the case. On Pambusco's
motion, the court ordered Jose Nicolas, then Administrator, to substitute for
deceased Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando as one of the defendants.
No objection to the order was registered. A judgment was rendered therein
which became final. Pambusco then moved in 'the intestate proceedings of
the deceased for the payment of the judgment credit. The administratrices
opposed. Pambusco's motion was granted. This order admitting Pambusco's
claim was brought to us. We ruled therein that:
1. xxx xxx xxx
The philosophy behind the rule which provides for the
dismissal of the civil case is that, upon the death of a
defendant, all money claims should be filed in the testate or
intestate proceedings 'to avoid useless duplicity of
procedure.' Obviously, the legal precept just quoted is
procedural in nature. It outlines the method by which an
action for recovery of money, debt or interest may continue,
upon the terms therein prescribed. whether the original suit
for the recovery of money as here-proceeds to its
conclusion, or is dismissed and the claim covered thereby
filed with the probate court, one thing is certain: no
substantial rights of the parties are prejudiced.
2. ... . Now that the judgment has become final, the estate
cannot be heard to say that said judgment-reached after a
full dress trial on the merits-will now go for naught. The
estate has thus waived its right to have Pambusco's claim
re-litigated in the estate proceedings. For, though
presentment of probate claims is imperative, it is generally
understood that it may be waived by the estate's
representative. And, waiver is to be determined from the
administrator's 'acts and conduct.' Certainly, the
administrator's failure to plead the statute of non-claims, his
active participation, and resistance to plaintiff's claim, in the
civil suit, amount to such waiver.
3. Courts are loathe to overturn a final judgment. Judicial
proceedings are entitled to respect. Non quieta movere.
Plaintiff's claim has passed the test in three courts of justice:
the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeals and this
Court. The judgment in plaintiff's favor should be enforced.
Appellant's technical objection-after judgment had become
final in the civil case that plaintiff's claim should have been
litigated in the probate court does not impair the validity of
said judgment. For, such objection does not go into the
court's Jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Moreover, when PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges was
ordered to be substituted as defendant, it registered no objection to the
order. Thus, even if We admit for the sake of argument that the trial court,
after the death of C. N. Hodges has no jurisdiction to render a judgment
therein, the argument must fail. PCIB, participated actively in the said case. It
did not appeal the decision rendered therein, neither did it raise the issue of
jurisdiction ion at any stage. It has been consistently held by this court that
while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party's active
participation in the proceedings before the court without jurisdiction will estop
such party from assailing such lack of jurisdiction (Tajonera v. Lamaroza,
(1981), 110 SCRA 438; Nieta v. Manila Banking Corp., (1983), 124 SCRA
455, cited in Sps. Antonio Martinez and Benedicta Balatbat v. The Hon.
Judge de la Merced, et al., G.R. No. 82039. June 20, 1989).
Of more importance is the fact that the validity of the decision in Civil Case
No. 6628 had been passed upon by us with finality in G.R. No. L-30013
(PCIB v. Blanco). In that case, the estate of C. N. Hodges and Linnie Jane
Hodges questioned the decision of the trial court dismissing the petition for
relief from judgment. We dismissed the petition for lack of merit on January
15, 1969 (p. 109, Rollo).
Private respondent Avelina Magno, in her memorandum in lieu of oral
argument. alleged that the Judgment sought to be enforced is barred under
the Rules of Court (p. 180, Rollo,). The proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of C. N. Hodges was opened in 1962 and the notice to creditors was
published in "Yuhum" a newspaper of general circulation in its issues of
March 12, 10, and 27, 1963. Under Section 2, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court,
the time provided for filing claims against the estate shall be stated by the
court in the notice, which shall not be more than twelve (12) months nor less
than six (6) months after the date of its first publication. Since petitioner filed
her motion to direct payment only on February 20, 1967, which is more than
four years from the publication of the notice then, it is already barred.
The above argument of private respondent is not correct. The Rules of Court
allows a creditor to file his claim after the period set by the court in the notice
to creditors, provided the conditions stated in the rules are present. The rule
provides:
Sec. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed.-... . However,
at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on
application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within
the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown
and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be
filed within a time not exceeding one (1) month. (Rule 86)
It is clear from the foregoing (Section 2 of Rule 87 [now Rule 86]) that the
period prescribed in the notice to creditors is not exclusive; that money
claims against the estate may be allowed any time before an order of
distribution is entered, at the discretion of the court for cause and upon such
terms as are equitable (Quisumbing v. Guison, 76 Phil. 730; Edmands v.
Phil. Trust Co., G.R. No. L-2670, September 29, 1950, 48 O.G. 139; Paulin v.
Aquino, G.R. No. L-11267, March 20.1958: Afan v. de Guzman, G.R. No. L-
14715, April 28, 1960). At the time petitioner's motion to direct payment of
the judgement credit was filed, no order of distribution was issued yet. Also, it
is worthy to cite herein a situation, similar to the case at bar. which was
considered by this court as a good excuse for the late filing of a claim against
the decedent:
Here the claim filed in the probate court on February 25,1959, while the
defendants in the civil case were still perfecting their appeal therein. The
record does not show that the administrator objected thereto upon the
ground that it was filed out of time. The pendency of that case, we are
persuaded, to say is a good excuse for tardiness in the filing of the claim. (In
pari materia: De Rama v. Palileo, L-18935, Feb. 26, 1965). An the order of
the final distribution is still to be given. (Ignacio v. Pambusco, supra.)
It is also petitioner's contention that properties under custodia legis may be
reached for the satisfaction of a judgment, citing the case of Reganon v.
Imperial, G.R. No. 24434, January 17, 1968; Fores v. Santos, G.R. No. L-
24538, May 4, 1968 and De Borja, et al. v. De Borja, et al., L-14951, August
31, 1961. A cursory reading of the text of the above-cited cases will reveal
that what is involved therein is the attachment for purposes of execution of
theinterest of an heir (to answer for claims against such heir) in the estate of
the decedent which is allowed by the Rules; and not the attachment of the
estate itself nor any property therein for the satisfaction of a claim against the
decedent:
Sec. 7. Attachment of real and personal property; recording
thereof. -Properties shall be attached by the officer executing
the order in the following manner:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) The interest of the party against whom attachment is
issued in property belonging to the estate of the decedent,
whether as heir, legatee or devisee, by serving the executor
or administrator or other personal representative of the
decedent with a copy of the order and notice that said
interest is attached, ... . (Rule 57, Rules of Court)
While the judgment in Civil Case No. 6628 has become final and executory,
execution is not the proper remedy to enforce payment thereof. The ordinary
procedure by which to settle claims of indebtedness against the estate of a
deceased person, ..., is for the claimant to present a claim before the probate
court so that said court may order the administrator to pay the amount
thereof (Domingo v. Garlitos, L-18994, June 29, 1963). This was the
procedure correctly chosen by petitioner. In Aldamiz v. Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Mindoro, L-2360, December 29, 1949, We held:
... a writ of execution is not the proper procedure allowed by
the Rules of Court for the payment of debts and expenses of
administration. The proper procedure is for the court to order
the sale of personal estate or the sale or mortgage of real
property of the deceased and all debts or expenses of
administration should be paid out of the proceeds of the sale
or mortgage. The order for the sale or mortgage should be
issued upon motion of the administrator and with the written
notice to all the heirs, legatees and devisees residing in the
Philippines, according to Rule 89, Section 3, and Rule 90,
Section 2. And when sale or mortgage of real estate is to be
made, the regulations contained in Rule 90, Section 7,
should be complied with.
xxx xxx xxx
And in the case of Domingo v. Garlitos, p. 446, supra:
The legal basis for such a procedure is the fact that in the
testate or intestate proceedings to settle the estate of a
deceased person, the properties belonging to the estate are
under the jurisdiction of the Court and such jurisdiction
continues until said properties have been distributed among
the heirs entitled thereto. During the pendency of the
proceedings all the estate is in custodia legis and the proper
procedure is not to allow the sheriff, in case of a court
judgment, to seize the properties but to ask the court for an
order to require the administrator to pay the amount due
from the estate and required to be paid.
Nevertheless, while We hold that the judgment credit should be admitted as
a claim against the estate of C. N. Hodges, the question of whether an order
to direct payment thereof is compellable by mandamus is doubtful. At the
time the second motion for payment was filed by petitioner, respondent
judge's hands were "tied" by an existing writ of preliminary injunction issued
by Us in G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 (PCIB v. Blanco) restraining him
from hearing Special Proceedings Nos. 1307 (Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges) and No. 1672 (Testate Estate of C. N. Hodges where the motion to
direct payment was filed). While this writ was clarified by a subsequent
resolution issued on October 4,1967 to the effect that respondent judge is not
restrained from approving final deeds of sale executed by the administrator
PCIB covering properties of the estate and from acting on such other
routinary administration matters for the gathering and preservation of the
estate, it is clear that an order to direct payment is not embraced under the
clarificatory resolution. Even if petitioners' judgment credit allowed as a claim
against the estate. immediate payment thereof by the administrator of the
estate, is not a matter of right. A judgment against the executor or
administrator shall be that he pay, in due course of administrator, the amount
ascertained to be due, and it shall not create a lien upon the property of the
estate, or give the judgment creditor any priority in payment (Sec. 13, Rule
86, Revised Rules). The time for paying debts (and legacies) is to be fixed by
the probate court having jurisdiction over the estate of the deceased (Sec.
15, Rule 18). In the absence of any showing that respondent judge who is
taking cognizance of the estate proceedings had already allowed the
administrator to dispose of the estate and to pay the debts and legacies of
the deceased, a writ of mandamus will not issue to compel him to order
payment of petitioner's claim.
It is essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus that the (plaintiffs)
should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required (Province of
Pangasinan v. Reparations Commission, 80 SCRA 376).
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for the writ of mandamus is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
20. G.R. No. 175910 July 30, 2009
ATTY. ROGELIO E. SARSABA, Petitioner,
vs.
FE VDA. DE TE, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, FAUSTINO
CASTAÑEDA, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 with prayer for preliminary
injunction assailing the Order2 dated March 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 19, Digos City, Davao del Sur, in Civil Case No. 3488.
The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
On February 14, 1995, a Decision was rendered in NLRC Case No. RAB-11-
07-00608-93 entitled, Patricio Sereno v. Teodoro Gasing/Truck Operator,
finding Sereno to have been illegally dismissed and ordering Gasing to pay
him his monetary claims in the amount of ₱43,606.47. After the Writ of
Execution was returned unsatisfied, Labor Arbiter Newton R. Sancho issued
an Alias Writ of Execution3 on June 10, 1996, directing Fulgencio R. Lavarez,
Sheriff II of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), to satisfy the
judgment award. On July 23, 1996, Lavarez, accompanied by Sereno and his
counsel, petitioner Atty. Rogelio E. Sarsaba, levied a Fuso Truck bearing
License Plate No. LBR-514, which at that time was in the possession of
Gasing. On July 30, 1996, the truck was sold at public auction, with Sereno
appearing as the highest bidder.4
Meanwhile, respondent Fe Vda. de Te, represented by her attorney-in-fact,
Faustino Castañeda, filed with the RTC, Branch 18, Digos, Davao del Sur, a
Complaint5 for recovery of motor vehicle, damages with prayer for the
delivery of the truck pendente lite against petitioner, Sereno, Lavarez and the
NLRC of Davao City, docketed as Civil Case No. 3488.
Respondent alleged that: (1) she is the wife of the late Pedro Te, the
registered owner of the truck, as evidenced by the Official Receipt6 and
Certificate of Registration;7 (2) Gasing merely rented the truck from her; (3)
Lavarez erroneously assumed that Gasing owned the truck because he was,
at the time of the "taking,"8 in possession of the same; and (4) since neither
she nor her husband were parties to the labor case between Sereno and
Gasing, she should not be made to answer for the judgment award, much
less be deprived of the truck as a consequence of the levy in execution.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss9 on the following grounds: (1) respondent
has no legal personality to sue, having no real interests over the property
subject of the instant complaint; (2) the allegations in the complaint do not
sufficiently state that the respondent has cause of action; (3) the allegations
in the complaint do not contain sufficient cause of action as against him; and
(4) the complaint is not accompanied by an Affidavit of Merit and Bond that
would entitle the respondent to the delivery of the tuck pendente lite.
The NLRC also filed a Motion to Dismiss10 on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and lack of cause of action.
Meanwhile, Lavarez filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and
Third-Party Complaint.11 By way of special and affirmative defenses, he
asserted that the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter and
that the complaint does not state a cause of action.
On January 21, 2000, the RTC issued an Order 12 denying petitioner's Motion
to Dismiss for lack of merit.
In his Answer,13 petitioner denied the material allegations in the complaint.
Specifically, he cited as affirmative defenses that: respondent had no legal
personality to sue, as she had no interest over the motor vehicle; that there
was no showing that the heirs have filed an intestate estate proceedings of
the estate of Pedro Te, or that respondent was duly authorized by her co-
heirs to file the case; and that the truck was already sold to Gasing on March
11, 1986 by one Jesus Matias, who bought the same from the Spouses Te.
Corollarily, Gasing was already the lawful owner of the truck when it was
levied on execution and, later on, sold at public auction.
Incidentally, Lavarez filed a Motion for Inhibition, 14 which was opposed15 by
respondent.
On October 13, 2000, RTC Branch 18 issued an Order 16 of inhibition and
directed the transfer of the records to Branch 19. RTC Branch 19, however,
returned the records back to Branch 18 in view of the appointment of a new
judge in place of Judge-designate Rodolfo A. Escovilla. Yet, Branch 19
issued another Order17 dated November 22, 2000 retaining the case in said
branch.
Eventually, the RTC issued an Order18 dated May 19, 2003 denying the
separate motions to dismiss filed by the NLRC and Lavarez, and setting the
Pre-Trial Conference on July 25, 2003.
On October 17, 2005, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss the
Case on the following grounds:19 (1) lack of jurisdiction over one of the
principal defendants; and (2) to discharge respondent's attorney-in-fact for
lack of legal personality to sue.
It appeared that the respondent, Fe Vda. de Te, died on April 12, 2005.20
Respondent, through her lawyer, Atty. William G. Carpentero, filed an
Opposition,21 contending that the failure to serve summons upon Sereno is
not a ground for dismissing the complaint, because the other defendants
have already submitted their respective responsive pleadings. He also
contended that the defendants, including herein petitioner, had previously
filed separate motions to dismiss the complaint, which the RTC denied for
lack of merit. Moreover, respondent's death did not render functus officio her
right to sue since her attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castañeda, had long testified
on the complaint on March 13, 1998 for and on her behalf and, accordingly,
submitted documentary exhibits in support of the complaint.
On March 22, 2006, the RTC issued the assailed Order 22 denying petitioner's
aforesaid motion.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for
Inhibition,23 in which he claimed that the judge who issued the Order was
biased and partial. He went on to state that the judge's husband was the
defendant in a petition for judicial recognition of which he was the counsel,
docketed as Civil Case No. C-XXI-100, before the RTC, Branch 21,
Bansalan, Davao del Sur. Thus, propriety dictates that the judge should
inhibit herself from the case.
Acting on the motion for inhibition, Judge Carmelita Sarno-Davin granted the
same24 and ordered that the case be re-raffled to Branch 18. Eventually, the
said RTC issued an Order25 on October 16, 2006 denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioner directly sought recourse from the Court via the present
petition involving pure questions of law, which he claimed were resolved by
the RTC contrary to law, rules and existing jurisprudence.26
There is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to what
the law is on certain state of facts, and which does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-
litigants. On the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the doubt or
controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put,
when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the
conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a question of law.27
Verily, the issues raised by herein petitioner are "questions of law," as their
resolution rest solely on what the law provides given the set of circumstances
availing. The first issue involves the jurisdiction of the court over the person
of one of the defendants, who was not served with summons on account of
his death. The second issue, on the other hand, pertains to the legal effect of
death of the plaintiff during the pendency of the case.
At first brush, it may appear that since pure questions of law were raised,
petitioner's resort to this Court was justified and the resolution of the
aforementioned issues will necessarily follow. However, a perusal of the
petition requires that certain procedural issues must initially be resolved
before We delve into the merits of the case.
Notably, the petition was filed directly from the RTC which issued the Order
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. The question before Us then is:
whether or not petitioner correctly availed of the mode of appeal under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
Significantly, the rule on appeals is outlined below, to wit:28
(1) In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, appeal may be made to the Court of Appeals by mere
notice of appeal where the appellant raises questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law;
(2) In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction where the appellant raises only questions of law, the
appeal must be taken to the Supreme Court on a petition for review
on certiorariunder Rule 45.
(3) All appeals from judgments rendered by the RTC in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction, regardless of whether the appellant raises
questions of fact, questions of law, or mixed questions of fact and
law, shall be brought to the Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review under Rule 42.
Accordingly, an appeal may be taken from the RTC which exercised its
original jurisdiction, before the Court of Appeals or directly before this Court,
provided that the subject of the same is a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared by the Rules to be appealable.29The first mode of appeal, to be filed
before the Court of Appeals, pertains to a writ of error under Section 2(a),
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, if questions of fact or questions of fact and law
are raised or involved. On the other hand, the second mode is by way of an
appeal by certiorari before the Supreme Court under Section 2(c), Rule 41, in
relation to Rule 45, where only questions of law are raised or involved.30
An order or judgment of the RTC is deemed final when it finally disposes of a
pending action, so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial court. In
other words, the order or judgment ends the litigation in the lower court. 31 On
the other hand, an order which does not dispose of the case completely and
indicates that other things remain to be done by the court as regards the
merits, is interlocutory. Interlocutory refers to something between the
commencement and the end of the suit which decides some point or matter,
but is not a final decision on the whole controversy.32
The subject of the present petition is an Order of the RTC, which denied
petitioner's Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, for lack of merit.
We have said time and again that an order denying a motion to dismiss is
interlocutory.33 Under Section 1(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an
interlocutory order is not appealable. As a remedy for the denial, a party has
to file an answer and interpose as a defense the objections raised in the
motion, and then to proceed to trial; or, a party may immediately avail of the
remedy available to the aggrieved party by filing an appropriate special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Let it be
stressed though that a petition for certiorari is appropriate only when an order
has been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Based on the foregoing, the Order of the RTC denying petitioner's Omnibus
Motion to Dismiss is not appealable even on pure questions of law. It is worth
mentioning that the proper procedure in this case, as enunciated by this
Court, is to cite such interlocutory order as an error in the appeal of the case
-- in the event that the RTC rules in favor of respondent -- and not to appeal
such interlocutory order. On the other hand, if the petition is to be treated as
a petition for review under Rule 45, it would likewise fail because the proper
subject would only be judgments or final orders that completely dispose of
the case.34
Not being a proper subject of an appeal, the Order of the RTC is considered
interlocutory. Petitioner should have proceeded with the trial of the case and,
should the RTC eventually render an unfavorable verdict, petitioner should
assail the said Order as part of an appeal that may be taken from the final
judgment to be rendered in this case. Such rule is founded on considerations
of orderly procedure, to forestall useless appeals and avoid
undue inconvenience to the appealing party by having to assail orders as
they are promulgated by the court, when all such orders may be contested in
a single appeal.
In one case,35 the Court adverted to the hazards of interlocutory appeals:
It is axiomatic that an interlocutory order cannot be challenged by an appeal.
Thus, it has been held that "the proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary
appeal from an adverse judgment on the merits, incorporating in said appeal
the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. Allowing appeals from
interlocutory orders would result in the `sorry spectacle’ of a case being
subject of a counterproductive ping-pong to and from the appellate court as
often as a trial court is perceived to have made an error in any of its
interlocutory rulings. x x x.
Another recognized reason of the law in permitting appeal only from a final
order or judgment, and not from an interlocutory or incidental one, is to avoid
multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which must necessarily suspend the
hearing and decision on the merits of the case during the pendency of the
appeal. If such appeal were allowed, trial on the merits of the case would
necessarily be delayed for a considerable length of time and compel the
adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may
interpose as many appeals as incidental questions may be raised by him,
and interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. 36
And, even if We treat the petition to have been filed under Rule 65, the same
is still dismissible for violating the principle on hierarchy of courts. Generally,
a direct resort to us in a petition for certiorari is highly improper, for it violates
the established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of
courts.37 This principle, as a rule, requires that recourse must first be made to
the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.
However, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. A strict
application of the rule is not necessary when cases brought before the
appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions.38
In the present case, petitioner submits pure questions of law involving the
effect of non-service of summons following the death of the person to whom
it should be served, and the effect of the death of the complainant during the
pendency of the case. We deem it best to rule on these issues, not only for
the benefit of the bench and bar, but in order to prevent further delay in the
trial of the case. Resultantly, our relaxation of the policy of strict observance
of the judicial hierarchy of courts is warranted.
Anent the first issue, petitioner argues that, since Sereno died before
summons was served on him, the RTC should have dismissed the complaint
against all the defendants and that the same should be filed against his
estate.
The Sheriff's Return of Service39 dated May 19, 1997 states that Sereno
could not be served with copy of the summons, together with a copy of the
complaint, because he was already dead.
In view of Sereno's death, petitioner asks that the complaint should be
dismissed, not only against Sereno, but as to all the defendants, considering
that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Sereno.1avvph!1
Jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of summons by the sheriff, his
deputy or other proper court officer, either personally by handing a copy
thereof to the defendant or by substituted service.40 On the other
hand, summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action
brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court
may acquire jurisdiction over his person.41
Records show that petitioner had filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of
lack of legal personality of respondent; the allegations in the complaint did
not sufficiently state that respondent has a cause of action or a cause of
action against the defendants; and, the complaint was not accompanied by
an affidavit of merit and bond. The RTC denied the motion and held therein
that, on the basis of the allegations of fact in the complaint, it can render a
valid judgment. Petitioner, subsequently, filed his answer by denying all the
material allegations of the complaint. And by way of special and affirmative
defenses, he reiterated that respondent had no legal personality to sue as
she had no real interest over the property and that while the truck was still
registered in Pedro Te's name, the same was already sold to Gasing.
Significantly, a motion to dismiss may be filed within the time for but before
the filing of an answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a
claim.42 Among the grounds mentioned is the court's lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defending party.
As a rule, all defenses and objections not pleaded, either in a motion to
dismiss or in an answer, are deemed waived.43 The exceptions to this rule
are: (1) when the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) when
there is another action pending between the parties for the same cause, or
(3) when the action is barred by prior judgment or by statute of limitations, in
which cases, the court may dismiss the claim.
In the case before Us, petitioner raises the issue of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of Sereno, not in his Motion to Dismiss or in his Answer but only
in his Omnibus Motion to Dismiss. Having failed to invoke this ground at the
proper time, that is, in a motion to dismiss, petitioner cannot raise it now for
the first time on appeal.
In fine, We cannot countenance petitioner's argument that the complaint
against the other defendants should have been dismissed, considering that
the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of Sereno. The court's
failure to acquire jurisdiction over one's person is a defense which is
personal to the person claiming it. Obviously, it is now impossible for Sereno
to invoke the same in view of his death. Neither can petitioner invoke such
ground, on behalf of Sereno, so as to reap the benefit of having the case
dismissed against all of the defendants. Failure to serve summons on
Sereno's person will not be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint against
the other defendants, considering that they have been served with copies of
the summons and complaints and have long submitted their respective
responsive pleadings. In fact, the other defendants in the complaint were
given the chance to raise all possible defenses and objections personal to
them in their respective motions to dismiss and their subsequent answers.
We agree with the RTC in its Order when it resolved the issue in this wise:
As correctly pointed by defendants, the Honorable Court has not acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Patricio Sereno since there was indeed no
valid service of summons insofar as Patricio Sereno is concerned. Patricio
Sereno died before the summons, together with a copy of the complaint and
its annexes, could be served upon him.
However, the failure to effect service of summons unto Patricio Sereno, one
of the defendants herein does not render the action DISMISSIBLE,
considering that the three (3) other defendants, namely, Atty. Rogelio E.
Sarsaba, Fulgencio Lavares and the NLRC, were validly served with
summons and the case with respect to the answering defendants may still
proceed independently. Be it recalled that the three (3) answering defendants
have previously filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint which was denied by
the Court.
Hence, only the case against Patricio Sereno will be DISMISSED and the
same may be filed as a claim against the estate of Patricio Sereno, but the
case with respect to the three (3) other accused will proceed.
Anent the second issue, petitioner moves that respondent's attorney-in-fact,
Faustino Castañeda, be discharged as he has no more legal personality to
sue on behalf of Fe Vda. de Te, who passed away on April 12, 2005, during
the pendency of the case before the RTC.
When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the
Rules of Court require a substitution of the deceased. 44 Section 1, Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court enumerates the actions that survived and may be filed
against the decedent's representatives as follows: (1) actions to recover real
or personal property or an interest thereon, (2) actions to enforce liens
thereon, and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to a person or a
property. In such cases, a counsel is obliged to inform the court of the death
of his client and give the name and address of the latter's legal
representative.45
The rule on substitution of parties is governed by Section 16, 46 Rule 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Strictly speaking, the rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of
jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. The rule on substitution was
crafted to protect every party's right to due process. It was designed to
ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in
the suit through his heirs or the duly appointed legal representative of his
estate. Moreover, non-compliance with the Rules results in the denial of the
right to due process for the heirs who, though not duly notified of the
proceedings, would be substantially affected by the decision rendered
therein. Thus, it is only when there is a denial of due process, as when the
deceased is not represented by any legal representative or heir, that the
court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting judgment therein.47
In the case before Us, it appears that respondent's counsel did not make any
manifestation before the RTC as to her death. In fact, he had actively
participated in the proceedings. Neither had he shown any proof that he had
been retained by respondent's legal representative or any one who
succeeded her.
However, such failure of counsel would not lead Us to invalidate the
proceedings that have long taken place before the RTC. The Court has
repeatedly declared that failure of the counsel to comply with his duty to
inform the court of the death of his client, such that no substitution is
effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment rendered
thereon if the action survives the death of such party. The trial court's
jurisdiction over the case subsists despite the death of the party. 48
The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due process of
every party to the litigation who may be affected by the intervening death.
The deceased litigants are themselves protected as they continue to be
properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal
representative of their estate.49
Anent the claim of petitioner that the special power of attorney50 dated March
4, 1997 executed by respondent in favor of Faustino has become functus
officio and that the agency constituted between them has been extinguished
upon the death of respondent, corollarily, he had no more personality to
appear and prosecute the case on her behalf.
Agency is extinguished by the death of the principal. 51 The only exception
where the agency shall remain in full force and effect even after the death of
the principal is when if it has been constituted in the common interest of the
latter and of the agent, or in the interest of a third person who has accepted
the stipulation in his favor.52
A perusal of the special power of attorney leads us to conclude that it was
constituted for the benefit solely of the principal or for respondent Fe Vda. de
Te. Nowhere can we infer from the stipulations therein that it was created for
the common interest of respondent and her attorney-in-fact. Neither was
there any mention that it was to benefit a third person who has accepted the
stipulation in his favor.
On this ground, We agree with petitioner. However, We do not believe that
such ground would cause the dismissal of the complaint. For as We have
said, Civil Case No. 3488, which is an action for the recovery of a personal
property, a motor vehicle, is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. As such, it is not extinguished by the death of
a party.
In Gonzalez v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,53 We have
laid down the criteria for determining whether an action survives the death of
a plaintiff or petitioner, to wit:
x x x The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the
nature of the action and the damage sued for. If the causes of action which
survive the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property
and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while
in the causes of action which do not survive the injury complained of is to the
person the property and rights of property affected being incidental. x x x
Thus, the RTC aptly resolved the second issue with the following
ratiocination:
While it may be true as alleged by defendants that with the death of Plaintiff,
Fe Vda. de Te, the Special Power of Attorney she executed empowering the
Attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castañeda to sue in her behalf has been rendered
functus officio, however, this Court believes that the Attorney-in-fact had not
lost his personality to prosecute this case.
It bears stressing that when this case was initiated/filed by the Attorney-in-
fact, the plaintiff was still very much alive.
Records reveal that the Attorney-in-fact has testified long before in behalf of
the said plaintiff and more particularly during the state when the plaintiff was
vehemently opposing the dismissal of the complainant. Subsequently
thereto, he even offered documentary evidence in support of the complaint,
and this court admitted the same. When this case was initiated, jurisdiction
was vested upon this Court to try and hear the same to the end. Well-settled
is the rule to the point of being elementary that once jurisdiction is acquired
by this Court, it attaches until the case is decided.
Thus, the proper remedy here is the Substitution of Heirs and not the
dismissal of this case which would work injustice to the plaintiff.
SEC. 16, RULE 3 provides for the substitution of the plaintiff who dies
pending hearing of the case by his/her legal heirs. As to whether or not the
heirs will still continue to engage the services of the Attorney-in-fact is
another matter, which lies within the sole discretion of the heirs.
In fine, We hold that the petition should be denied as the RTC Order is
interlocutory; hence, not a proper subject of an appeal before the Court. In
the same breath, We also hold that, if the petition is to be treated as a
petition for certiorari as a relaxation of the judicial hierarchy of courts, the
same is also dismissible for being substantially insufficient to warrant the
Court the nullification of the Order of the RTC.
Let this be an occasion for Us to reiterate that the rules are there to aid
litigants in prosecuting or defending their cases before the courts. However,
these very rules should not be abused so as to advance one's personal
purposes, to the detriment of orderly administration of justice. We can
surmise from the present case herein petitioner's manipulation in order to
circumvent the rule on modes of appeal and the hierarchy of courts so that
the issues presented herein could be settled without going through the
established procedures. In Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto,54 We stressed that this
should be the constant policy that must be observed strictly by the courts and
lawyers, thus:
x x x. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is
to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental
charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with
the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to
issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where
absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor.
Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or
proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other
tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not
controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary
writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial
Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s
procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to be the policy
in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.55
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Order
dated March 22, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Digos, Davao
del Sur in Civil Case No. 3488, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
21. G.R. No. L-19270 March 31, 1962
MANUEL GERVACIO BLAS,
THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED MARIA GERVACIO BLAS, ET
AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. CECILIA MUÑOZ-PALMA, as Judge of the Rizal Court of First
Instance;
ROSALINA SANTOS, as Executrix of the testate estate of the late
Maxima Santos;
MARTA GERVACIO BLAS CHIVI, LUDOVICO PINPIN and TOMASA
AVENDAÑO, respondents.
Teofilo Sison and Nicanor Sison for petitioners.
Jose T. de los Santos and Rodolfo M. Caluag for respondent Rosalina
Santos.
Pascual and Felizardo for respondent Marta Gervacio Blas Chivi.
Dominador L. Reyes for respondents Ludovico Pinpin and Tomasa
Avendaño.
LABRADOR, J.:
Petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition against the order of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Judge Cecilia Muñoz Palma, presiding, dated
October 25, 1961, which (1) granted the motion of respondent executrix
Rosalina Santos to set Civil Case No. 4395 of said court, appealed to this
Court as G.R. No. L-14070, for hearing to determine certain factual issues
before proceeding with the execution of the judgment rendered therein by
this Court, (2) admitted the complaint in intervention of intervenors Ludovico
Pinpin and Tomasa Avendaño, and (3) denied the motion filed by plaintiffs,
petitioners herein, to enforce the judgment of this Court in the above-
mentioned case without the necessity of further hearing.
The events that led to the present petition may be summarized as follows:
On July 26, 1961, plaintiffs, petitioners herein, filed before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, a motion for the execution of the decision of this Court in
G.R. No. L-14070, dated March 29, 1961 (Civil Case No. 4395, Court of First
Instance of Rizal), which motion was granted by the respondent judge in an
order dated August 16, 1961. Pursuant to said order, a writ of execution was
issued by the clerk of the lower court on August 24, 1961, and notice thereof
served upon respondent Rosalina Santos on August 29, 1961, giving the
latter 10 days within which to comply the same. Instead of complying with the
order, respondent executrix, on September 15,1961, filed a motion to set the
case for hearing, alleging that it would be difficult to comply with the court's
order unless the following questions were first resolved: (1) what properties
to be conveyed by the executrix; (2) to whom conveyance is to be made; and
(3) in what proportions conveyance should be effected. This motion was
opposed by herein petitioners as well as by Marta Chivi on the ground that
the decision of this Court was clear enough on the questions raised and
could be complied with without the necessity of adducing evidence. A reply to
this opposition was filed by respondent executrix and a rejoinder thereto
presented by petitioners.
On October 3, 1961, plaintiff again filed a motion to enforce the final
judgment in the above-numbered case in accordance with Sec. 10, Rule 39,
to which motion defendant executrix filed an opposition reiterating the
necessity of a hearing before the judgment of this Court could be executed.
In the meantime, or on August 29, 1961, Ludovico Pinpin and Tomasa
Avendaño presented a complaint in intervention, alleging that they are
legatees named in the last will and testament of the deceased Don Simeon
Blas as well as in that of the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas, and
that they are, therefore, entitled to participate in the one-half share of Maxima
Santos in her conjugal partnership with Simeon Blas. Petitioners opposed the
admission of the intervention complaint on the ground that Pinpin and
Avendaño have absolutely no interest in the case, not being the heirs and
legatees contemplated in the document Exhibit "A", signed by the late
Maxima Santos, nor in the will and project of partition covering the estate of
Simeon Blas nor in the decision rendered by the Supreme Court sought to be
executed; and that the admission of the intervention complaint would violate
the rule of res judicata and the doctrine of "law of the case". A reply to the
opposition was filed by the claimants-intervenors and a rejoinder thereto
presented by plaintiffs. After considering the allegations of the parties in their
respective pleadings, respondent judge issued an order dated October 25,
1961, wherein the motion for intervention was admitted, the motion for
hearing granted, and the motion to enforce the judgment of this Court was
denied. A motion for reconsideration of this order presented by petitioners on
October 31, 1961 was denied by respondent judge on December 7, 1961.
Hence, the present action was brought before this Court.
The pertinent parts of the order against which the present petition has been
instituted is, for the sake of clarity, hereby quoted:
In pages 27 to 46 of said Project of Partition, an enumeration was
made of the properties constituting the entire share of Maxima
Santos on the basis of the above-quoted distribution. It is, therefore,
incorrect to state that all these properties listed in pages 27 to 46 of
the Project of Partition constitute the one-half share of Maxima
Santos in the conjugal properties for as already indicated, said
enumeration includes: (a) the one-third portion devised to her by her
husband, Simeon Blas in his will; (b) the one-third portion
constituting the share of Lazaro Gervacio Blas; and (c) her one-half
share in the conjugal properties. In view of this, there is need of
segregating in that list of properties found in pages 27 to 46 of the
Project of Partition, those which constitute the one-half share of
Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas in the conjugal properties from those
 portions which she inherited from her husband as well as those
which she bought from Lazaro Gervacio Blas.
As regards the allowance of the intervention of several parties in this
proceeding, this Court is simply guided by that portion of the
Decision of the Supreme Court which states that considering that all
heirs and legatees designated in the will of Simeon Blas have not
appeared in this Civil Case, the said heirs and legatees may file
adversary pleadings to determine the participation of each and every
one of them in the properties to be conveyed.
For a proper understanding of the case at bar, we hereby quote the
dispositive part of the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-14070:.
... the defendant-appellee, administratrix ... is ordered to convey and
deliver one-half of the properties adjudicated to Maxima Santos as
her share in the conjugal properties in said Civil Case No. 6707, ... to
the heirs and the legatees of her husband Simeon Blas.
The objection to the execution of the above-quoted dispositive part of the
decision lies, as contended by counsel for respondent executrix Rosalina
Santos and as found by the trial court, in the supposed impossibility of
pointing out from among the properties adjudicated to Maxima Santos in the
project of partition of the estate of her deceased husband, the properties that
should be conveyed and delivered.
It must be borne in mind that it was not the intention of our decision in the,
previous case (G.R. No. L-14070) which was ordered executed, that of the
very numerous properties adjudicated to Maxima Santos in the project of
partition, those that should be conveyed and delivered to the petitioners
herein, petitioners also in the previous case, be specifically pointed out
separately from the rest of the properties that should remain as Maxima
Santos' share. It was not expected, in view of the fact that the project of
partition of the estate of Simeon Blas does not indicate the properties
adjudicated to Maxima Santos as her share in the conjugal partnership
separately from those received by her from her husband as devisee of the
free portion of his estate, or those acquired by purchase, that the properties
constituting the one-half to be conveyed out of Maxima Santos' share in the
conjugal partnership, be expressly singled out from the others. What was
expected to be done by the court executing the judgment, in order to carry
out the decision of this Court, was to determine what undivided portion or
aliquot part of all the properties adjudicated to her in various capacities
should be conveyed by virtue of the judgment, and then to have said
undivided portion or aliquot part conveyed in an appropriate deed and
delivered to the petitioners, without need of actually partitioning the bulk of
the properties and pointing out which of them belongs to petitioners and
which belongs to the widow Maxima Santos.1äwphï1.ñët
The practice in the distribution of the estates of deceased persons is to
assign the whole of the properties left for distribution to the heirs in a certain
definite proportion, an aliquot part pertaining to each of the heirs. This
method or plan of distribution and partition of estates is provided for in
section 1 of Rule 91, which reads thus: .
Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. Testimony
taken on controversy preserved. — When the debts, funeral charges,
and expenses of administration, the allowances to the widow, and
inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with
law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after
hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or
parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and
recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or
any other person having the same in his possession. ...
It might be pertinent to recall, in order to show the propriety of this method of
partition by determination of the aliquot portion pertaining to each heir, that
the original action, G.R. No. L-14070, was instituted to obtain a judicial
declaration that one-half of the properties of Maxima Santos assigned to her
as her share in the conjugal properties of herself and her husband, be
conveyed to the petitioners, because of a document signed by Maxima
Santos (Annex "H" of complaint) in which she promised to convey to the
heirs of her deceased husband one-half of the properties that she would
receive as her share in the conjugal properties of herself and her husband.
The action was expressly based on said document, Annex "H" of complaint,
in which the promise to convey said one-half portion was made. There was
no demand that said one-half be expressly and actually segregated in the
action, or that the conjugal properties be actually divided or partitioned. The
defendants in that case contended that the document Annex "H" was not
executed by Maxima Santos and that if it was so executed, the same was
null and void as constituting a promise to convey future inheritance. There
was no intent to designate or point out the properties to be conveyed. The
properties appear in the inventory filed in the proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of Simeon Blas but no demand was made for their
determination in the case. In view of the nature of the claim, which was to
compel conveyance in accordance with the written contract or promise, and
the nature of the defense, which is the supposed invalidity of the promise, the
decision could not be other than a mere declaration of the validity of the
instrument, coupled with an order for the conveyance and delivery to the
petitioners of the said one-half share as promised in the document Annex
"H". All of the above circumstances would have been ascertained had the
court below taken pains to read even the decision and the project of partition
alone.
It is true that objection was also raised by the defendants in the previous
case to the action on the ground that the deceased Maxima Santos had
received in one single mass of properties, not only her share in the conjugal
estate but also a devise of one-third of the free portion of the estate of her
husband Simeon Blas, as well as the share of one of the latter's heirs. But
such objection could not prevent compliance with the promise made the
deceased Maxima Santos (to convey to the heirs of her husband one-half of
what she received of the conjugal properties of her husband and herself).
And the objection then raised was opportunely denied.
The project of partition mentioned in the dispositive part of our decision
sought to be enforced, which is the project of partition in Civil Case No. 6707
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, contains the following resume of the
properties received by Maxima Santos in various capacities in the settlement
of the estate of her husband Simeon Blas:
1/2 of all properties left by the deceased, as her
share in the conjugal partnership property . . . . . . . . . P339,440.00
1/3 free disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113,146.66
1/3 of strict legitime devised to Lazaro Blas
and sold by the latter to the widow . . . . . . . . . . . 37,715.56
TOTAL .......... P490,302.22
The properties received by Maxima Santos as her share in the conjugal
partnership properties is expressly stated to be P339,440.00. In accordance
with the promise made in Annex "H", to convey and deliver to the heirs of the
deceased husband one-half thereof, the value of the properties that she was
obliged to convey and deliver is one-half of said properties, or P169,720.
Following what we have stated above, that the practice in the settlement of
assets of deceased persons is to assign to each heir or participant a certain
aliquot portion, undivided if division is difficult to carry out, the share to be
assigned by Maxima Santos is P169,720 divided by P490,302.22 or
approximately 34.61-1/3%. In order to carry out the decision of this Court,
therefore, the administratrix should have been compelled or ordered to
convey and deliver the 34.61-1/3% of the total amount of the properties that
she received in the project of partition.
The procedure to be followed is that outlined in section 8 of Rule 90 which
reads as follows: .
Sec. 8. When court may authorize conveyance of realty which
deceased contracted to convey. Notice. Effect of deed. — Where the
deceased was in his lifetime under contract, binding in law, to deed
real property, or an interest therein, the court having jurisdiction of
the estate may, on application for that purpose, authorize the
executor or administrator to convey such property according to such
contract, or with such modifications as are agreed upon by the
parties and approved by the court; and if the contract is to convey
real property to the executor or administrator, the clerk of the court
shall execute the deed. The deed executed by such executor,
administrator or clerk of court shall be as effectual to convey the
property as if executed by the deceased in his lifetime; but no such
conveyance shall be authorized until notice of the application for that
purpose has been given personally or by mail to all persons
interested, and such further notice has been given, by publication or
otherwise, as the court deems proper; nor if the assets in the hands
of the executor or administrator will thereby be reduced so as to
prevent a creditor from receiving his full debt or diminish his
dividend.
The above-quoted section is applicable because the deceased Maxima
Santos had agreed and promised to convey in her will one-half of her share
in the conjugal assets to such of the heirs of her husband as she may
designate. If the administratrix Rosalina Santos is reluctant to execute the
deed as ordered by the Court, the deed of conveyance and delivery of the
properties may be executed by the clerk of court, in which case, as declared
by the rule, the deed shall be as effectual to convey the property as if
executed by the deceased in her lifetime.
We note that the petitioners prepared a deed of conveyance to be signed by
the clerk of court, but the error in the said deed of conveyance lies in that it
includes all of the properties mentioned in the project of partition, adjudicated
to Maxima Santos which, as above indicated, should not be the case,
because what was actually adjudicated to her in the project of partition
included not only her share in the conjugal property, but also what she
received from her husband out of the free portion, and what she had
purchased from an heir of her husband.
It is to be noted further that in order to have the document executed and
approved by the court, the specific steps prior to the execution of the deed of
conveyance as pointed out in the last part of the above-quoted section must
be strictly followed.
With the above explanations, there should be no difficulty for the court below
to proceed with the execution of the decision in accordance with its terms.
Our attention has been called to the fact of the properties included in the
inventory of the estate left by the deceased Simeon Blas, certain properties
listed in Annex "2" of the petition in the case at bar, are not included in the
project of partition. We have checked the said properties and have found that
the same are actually included in the inventory of the estate left by Simeon
Blas but do not appear among those adjudicated to any of the heirs in the
project of partition. Without making a final pronouncement as to the effect of
such conveyances, it is possible that such conveyances violated the express
promise made by Maxima Santos in Annex "H" that she convey one-half of
her share in the conjugal properties to the heirs of her deceased husband.
On the other hand, the persons who may have purchased the same may
have acquired them in good faith, without knowledge of the existence of the
promise made by the deceased Maxima Santos in Annex "H". The only just
ruling regarding these properties would be to reserve to the petitioners herein
the right of action to claim from the administratrix of Maxima Santos, or from
the persons to whom they have been transferred, or from both, their one-half
share therein as promised by Maxima Santos in Annex "H".
The above considerations dispose of the main issue submitted to this Court
in the case at bar. One minor matter remains to be considered, and that is,
the petition for intervention filed by Ludovico Pinpin and Tomasa Avendaño
alleging that they have interest in the action as legatees of the deceased
Simeon Blas. This petition was opposed by the petitioners herein, but was
finally admitted by the court a quo.
These intervenors appear to have received legacies in the will of the
deceased Simeon Blas. The portion of said will containing the legacies to
these intervenors are as follows:.
IV
"Ang isang ikatlong bahagi, etc.
x x x x x x x x x
4. Ipinagkakaloob ko kay TOMASA AVENDAÑO, etc.
x x x x x x x x x
6. Ipinagkakaloob ko kay LUDOVICO PINPIN, etc."
(Pp. 254-255, Record on Appeal, G.R. No. L-14070, Maria
Gervacio Blas, et al. vs. Rosalina Santos.).
The question at issue, therefore, is whether these intervenors are embraced
within the term "herederos at legatarios o pinamamanahan ng aking
nabanggit na asawa, SIMEON BLAS, sa kaniyang testamento," to which
persons Maxima Santos had obligated herself to convey one-half of her
share in the conjugal properties.
A study of the testament of Simeon Blas (Record on Appeal, pp. 249-257,
G.R. No. L-14070) and the promise or contract executed by Maxima Santos,
Annex "H", shows that the two terms (herederos and legatarios) are used in
the devises or legacies to the various heirs and legatees. With respect to the
legitimate heirs of Simeon Blas, to whom he devised the strict legitime and
the mejora, he used the expression "ibinibigay ko at ipinamamana sa aking
apong Maria Gervacio Blas, Marta Gervacio Blas at Lazaro Gervacio Blas"
(Chapter II, paragraph 2 of the testament of Simeon Blas). With respect to
the mejora he uses the same term "ipinamamana" and he says thus:"Para sa
aking mga apong Luding at Leoncio Blas ay ipinagkakaloob ko
at ipinamamana ang halagang SAMPUNG LIBONG PISO (P10,000) sa
bawat isa sa kanila." In the last or fourth chapter where the one-third subject
to the free disposal are disposed of, he uses only the term "ipinagkakaloob".
This term is used for Andres Pascual, Leoncio Santos, Catalina
Blas, Tomasa Avendaño, Justo Garcia, Ludovico Pinpin, and Fermin
Santiago, all of whom are not relatives of the deceased. Taking into account
the fact that both the will of the deceased Simeon Blas and the document
Annex "H" executed by Maxima Santos were prepared by the same persons
and at about the same time, both bearing date of December 26, 1936, and
are attested by the same witnesses, and the further fact that it was the
deceased Simeon Blas that had asked for the execution of the document
Annex "II", it stands to reason that the word "ipinamamana" refers to devices
made legal heirs (heirs at law) of the deceased Simeon Blas, whereas the
term "ipinagkakaloob" refers to persons who are not related to him, on his
heirs at law. Accordingly, in the document Annex "H" which reads as follows:.
MAUNAWA NG SINO MANG MAKABABASA:
Na akong si MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS, nasa hustong
gulang, kasal kay SIMEON BLAS, taga bayan ng Malabon,
Rizal, Philippines, sa pamamagitan ngkasulatang ito ay
malaya kong ipinahahayag:
Na aking nabasa at naunawa ang testamento at huling
kalooban na nilagdaan ng aking asawa, SIMEON BLAS, at
ipinahahayag ko sa ilalim ng aking karangalan at sa harap
ng aking asawa na igagalang at pagpipitaganan ang lahat at
bawat isang bahagi ng nabanggit na testamento at
ipinangangako ko pa sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito na
ang lahat ng maiiwang pag-aari at kayamanan naming mag-
asawa, na nauukol at bahaging para sa akin sa paggawa ko
naman ng aking testamento ay ipinagkakaloob ko ang
kalahati (1/2) sa mga herederos at legatarios o
pinamamanahan ng aking nabanggit na asawa, SIMEON
BLAS, sa kaniyang testamento na ako'y makapipili o
makahihirang sa kahi't kangino sa kanila ng aking
pagbibigyan at pamamanahan sang-ayon sa pag-galang,
paglilingkod, at pakikisama na gagawin sa akin.
SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT NG ITO, ay nilagdaan ko ang
kasulatang ito ngayong ika 26 ng Diciembre ng taong 1936,
dito sa San Francisco del Monte, SanJuan, Rizal,
Philippines.
MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS
the words "herederos at legatarios o pinamamanahan ng aking nabanggit na
asawa," mean the heirs at law or relatives of the deceased Simeon Blas and
not other persons who are not heirs but had received legacies in money or
otherwise. Consequent to this conclusion, intervenors Ludovico Pinpin and
Tomasa Avendaño cannot claim any right by virtue of said document Annex
"H" and their petition for intervention should be, as it hereby is, disallowed.
IN VIEW THEREOF, the order sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside and
the court below is ordered to proceed with the execution of the judgment in
G.R. No. L-14070 in accordance herewith. With costs against the respondent
Rosalina Santos.
22. G.R. No. L-26695 January 31, 1972
JUANITA LOPEZ GUILAS, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA AND
ALEJANDRO LOPEZ respondents .
Filemon Cajator for petitioner.
Eligio G. Lagman for respondent Alejandro Lopez.
MAKASIAR, J.:p
It appears from the records that Jacinta Limson de Lopez, of Guagua,
Pampanga was married to Alejandro Lopez y Siongco. They had no children.
On April 28, 1936, Jacinta executed a will instituting her husband Alejandro
as her sole heir and executor (pp. 20-21, rec.).
In a Resolution dated October 26, 1953 in Sp. Proc. No. 894 entitled "En el
Asunto de la Adopcion de la Menor Juanita Lopez y Limson" (pp. 92-94, 103,
rec.), herein petitioner Juanita Lopez, then single and now married to
Federico Guilas, was declared legally adopted daughter and legal heir of the
spouses Jacinta and Alejandro. After adopting legally herein petitioner
Juanita Lopez, the testatrix Doña Jacinta did not execute another will or
codicil so as to include Juanita Lopez as one of her heirs.
In an order dated March 5, 1959 in Testate Proceedings No. 1426, the
aforementioned will was admitted to probate and the surviving husband,
Alejandro Lopez y Siongco, was appointed executor without bond by the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Annexes "A" and "B", pp. 18-23, rec.).
Accordingly, Alejandro took his oath of office as executor (Annex "C", p. 24,
rec.).
Nevertheless, in a project of partition dated March 19, 1960 executed by both
Alejandro Lopez and Juanita Lopez Guilas, the right of Juanita Lopez to
inherit from Jacinta was recognized and Lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 (Jacinta's
paraphernal property), described and embraced in Original Certificate of Title
No. 13092, both situated in Bacolor Pampanga — Lot 3368 with an area of
68,141 square meters and Lot 3441 with an area of 163,231 square meters,
then assessed respectively at P3,070.00 and P5,800.00 (Annex "D", pp. 27-
36, rec.) — were adjudicated to Juanita Lopez-Guilas as her share free from
all liens, encumbrances and charges, with the executor Alejandro Lopez,
binding himself to free the said two parcels from such liens, encumbrances
and charges. The rest of the estate of the deceased consisting of 28 other
parcels of lands with a total assessed valuation of P69,020.00 and a
combined area of 743,924.67 square meters, as well as personal properties
including a 1953 Buick car valued at P2,500.00 were allotted to Don
Alejandro who assumed all the mortgage liens on the estate (Annex "D", pp.
25-37, rec.).
In an order dated April 23, 1960, the lower court approved the said project of
partition and directed that the records of the case be sent to the archives,
upon payment of the estate and inheritance taxes (Annex "E", p. 38, rec.).
Upon ex-parte petition of the adjudicatees Alejandro Lopez and Juanita
Lopez-Guilas dated August 25, 1961 (Annex "F", pp. 39-40, rec.), the lower
court in an order dated August 28, 1961, approved the correction of clerical
errors appearing in the project of partition (Annex "G", p. 41, rec.).
On April 10, 1964, herein petitioner Juanita Lopez-Guilas filed a separate
ordinary action to set aside and annul the project of partition, which case was
docketed as Civil Case 2539 entitled "Juanita Lopez-Guilas vs. Alejandro
Lopez" in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, on the ground of lesion,
perpetration and fraud, and pray further that Alejandro Lopez be ordered to
submit a statement of accounts of all the crops and to deliver immediately to
Juanita lots nos. 3368 and 3441 of the Bacolor Cadastre, which were
allocated to her under the project of partition (p. 132, rec.).
Meanwhile, in Testate Proceedings No. 1426, Juanita filed a petition dated
July 20, 1964 praying that Alejandro Lopez be directed to deliver to her the
actual possession of said lots nos. 3368 and 3441 as well as the 1,216
caverns of palay that he collected from the ten (10) tenants or lessees of the
said two lots (Annex "H", pp. 42-44, rec.).
In his opposition dated August 5, 1964 to the said petition, Alejandro Lopez
claims that, by virtue of the order dated April 23, 1960 which approved the
project of partition submitted by both Alejandro and Juanita and directed that
the records of the case be archived upon payment of the estate and
inheritance taxes, and the order of December 15, 1960 which "ordered
closed and terminated the present case", the testate proceedings had
already been closed and terminated; and that he ceased as a consequence
to be the executor of the estate of the deceased; and that Juanita Lopez is
guilty of laches and negligence in filing the petition of the delivery of her
share 4 years after such closure of the estate, when she could have filed a
petition for relief of judgment within sixty (60) days from December 15, 1960
under Rule 38 of the old Rules of Court (Annex "I") citing A. Austria vs. Heirs
of Antonio Ventenilla, L-100808, Sept. 18, 1956 (pp. 45-48, rec.).
In her reply dated November 17, 1965 to said opposition, Juanita contends
that the actual delivery and distribution of the hereditary shares to the heirs,
and not the order of the court declaring as closed and terminated the
proceedings, determines the termination of the probate proceedings (citing
Intestate estate of the deceased Mercedes Cano, Timbol vs. Cano, 59 O.G.
No. 30, pp. 46-73, April 29, 1961, where it was ruled that "the probate court
loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of
all the taxes, and after the remaining estate is delivered to the heirs entitled
to receive the same"); that the executor Alejandro is estopped from opposing
her petition because he was the one who prepared, filed and secured court
approval of, the aforesaid project of partition, which she seeks to be
implemented; that she is not guilty of laches, because when she filed on July
20, 1964, her petition for he delivery of her share allocated to her under the
project of partition, less than 3 years had elapsed from August 28, 1961
when the amended project of partition was approved, which is within the 5-
year period for the execution of judgment by motion (Annex "J", pp. 49-52,
rec.).
In its order dated October 2, 1964, the lower court after a "pre-trial" stated
that because the civil action for the annulment of the project of partition was
filed on April 13, 1964, before the filing on July 2, 1964 of the petition for
delivery of the shares of Juanita Lopez, "the parties have agreed to suspend
action or resolution upon the said petition for the delivery of shares until; after
the civil action aforementioned has been finally settled and decided", and
forthwith set the civil action for annulment for trial on November 25, and
December 2, 1964 (Annex "K", pp. 53-54, rec.).
On June 11, 1965, Juanita filed an amended complaint in Civil Case 2539
(pp. 78-110, rec.), where she acknowledges the partial legality and validity of
the project of partition insofar as the allocation in her favor of the Lots Nos.
3368 and 3441, the delivery of which she is seeking (pp. 106-107, rec.).
In her motion dated November 17, 1965, Juanita sought the setting aside of
the order dated October 2, 1964 on the ground that while the said order
considered her action for annulment of the project of partition as a prejudicial
question, her filing an amended complaint on June 11, 1965 in civil case No.
2539 wherein she admitted the partial legality and validity of the project of
partition with respect to the adjudication to her of the two lots as her share,
rendered said civil case No. 2539 no longer a prejudicial question to her
petition of July 20, 1964 for the delivery of her share (Annex "L", pp. 55-59,
rec.).
Alejandro filed his opposition dated December 1, 1965 to the aforesaid
motion of Juanita to set aside the order dated October 2, 1964 (Annex "M",
pp. 60-61, rec.), to which Juanita filed her rejoinder dated December 6, 1965
wherein she stated among others that pursuant to the project of partition,
executor Alejandro secured the cancellation of OCT. No. 13093 covering the
two parcels of land adjudicated to her under the project of partition and the
issuance in his exclusive name on August 4, 1961 TCT No. 26638-R
covering the said Lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 of the Bacolor Cadastre (Annex
"N", pp. 62-71, rec.).
In an order dated April 27, 1966, the lower court denied Juanita's motion to
set aside the order of October 2, 1964 on the ground that the parties
themselves agreed to suspend resolution of her petition for the delivery of
her shares until after the civil action for annulment of the project of partition
has been finally settled and decided (Annex "O", p. 72, rec.).
Juanita filed a motion dated May 9, 1966 for the reconsideration of the order
dated April 27, 1966 (Annex "P" pp. 73-77, rec.), to which Alejandro filed an
opposition dated June 8, 1966 (Annex "Q", pp. 112-113, rec.).
Subsequently, Alejandro filed a motion dated July 25, 1966 praying that the
palay deposited with Fericsons and Ideal Rice Mill by the ten (10) tenants of
the two parcels in question be delivered to him (Annex "R", pp. 114-116,
rec.),to which Juanita filed an opposition dated July 26, 1966 (Annex "S", pp.
117-121, rec.). In an order dated September 8, 1966, the lower court denied
the motion for reconsideration of the order dated April 27, 1966, and directed
Fericsons Inc. and the Ideal Rice Mills to deliver to Alejandro or his
representative the 229 cavans and 46 kilos and 325 and 1/2 cavans and 23
kilos of palay respectively deposited with the said rice mills upon the filing by
Alejandro of a bond in the amount of P12,000.00 duly approved by the court
(Annex "T", pp. 122-127, rec.). Hence, this petition
for certiorari and mandamus.
The position of petitioner Juanita Lopez-Guilas should be sustained and the
writs prayed for granted.
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only
after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the
heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of
partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol
vs. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong vs. Tecson,
89 Phil., pp. 28-30). As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has
not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed
and terminated Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is
not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action
to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapsed
(Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however, for the heir
who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper
motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening
of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed,
and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another
court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate on
intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil., 730, 741-742;
Timbol vs. Cano, supra.; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil.
1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil.,
455, 460-461).
Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as worded, which
secures for the heirs or legatees the right to "demand and recover their
respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person
having the same in his possession", re-states the aforecited doctrines.
The case of Austria vs. Heirs of Ventenilla (99 Phil. 1068) does not control
the present controversy; because the motion filed therein for the removal of
the administratrix and the appointment of a new administrator in her place
was rejected by the court on the ground of laches as it was filed after the
lapse of about 38 years from October 5, 1910 when the court issued an order
settling and deciding the issues raised by the motion (L-10018, September
19, 1956, 99 Phil., 1069-1070). In the case at bar, the motion filed by
petitioner for the delivery of her share was filed on July 20, 1964, which is
just more than 3 years from August 28, 1961 when the amended project of
partition was approve and within 5 years from April 23, 1960 when the
original project of partition was approved. Clearly, her right to claim the two
lots allocated to her under the project of partition had not yet expired. And in
the light of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 and
the jurisprudence above cited, the order dated December 15, 1960 of the
probate court closing and terminating the probate case did not legally
terminate the testate proceedings, for her share under the project of partition
has not been delivered to her.
While it is true that the order dated October 2, 1964 by agreement of the
parties suspended resolution of her petition for the delivery of her shares until
after the decision in the civil action for the annulment of the project of
partition (Civil Case 2539) she filed on April 10, 1964; the said order lost its
validity and efficacy when the herein petitioner filed on June 11, 1965 an
amended complaint in said Civil Case 2539 wherein she recognized the
partial legality and validity of the said project of partition insofar as the
allocation in her favor of lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 in the delivery of which she
has been insisting all along (pp. 106-107, rec.).
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Granting the writs prayed for;
2. Setting aside the orders of the respondent court dated October 2, 1964
and April 27, 1966, as null and void; and, without prejudice to the
continuance of Civil Case No. 2539, which, by reason of this decision,
involves no longer Lots 3368 and 3441 of the Bacolor Cadastre, .
3. Directing.
(a) the Register of Deeds of Pampanga to cancel TCT No.
26638-R covering the aforesaid lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 of
the Bacolor Cadastre and to issue anew Transfer Certificate
of Title covering the said two lots in the name of herein
petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas; and
(b) the respondent Alejandro Lopez
(1) to deliver to herein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas the
possession of lots Nos. 3368 and 3441;
(2) to deliver and/or pay to herein, petitioner all the rents,
crops or income collected by him from said lots Nos. 3368
and 3441 from April 23, 1960 until the possession of the two
aforementioned lots is actually delivered to her, or their value
based on the current market price; and
(3) to pay the costs.
So ordered.
23. G.R. No. 165744 August 11, 2008
OSCAR C. REYES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, Branch 142, ZENITH
INSURANCE CORPORATION, and RODRIGO C. REYES, respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)1 promulgated
on May 26, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74970. The CA Decision affirmed the
Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 142, Makati City dated
November 29, 20022 in Civil Case No. 00-1553 (entitled "Accounting of All
Corporate Funds and Assets, and Damages") which denied petitioner Oscar
C. Reyes’ (Oscar) Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment
Suit.
BACKGROUND FACTS
Oscar and private respondent Rodrigo C. Reyes (Rodrigo) are two of the four
children of the spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. Pedro, Anastacia,
Oscar, and Rodrigo each owned shares of stock of Zenith Insurance
Corporation (Zenith), a domestic corporation established by their family.
Pedro died in 1964, while Anastacia died in 1993. Although Pedro’s estate
was judicially partitioned among his heirs sometime in the 1970s, no similar
settlement and partition appear to have been made with Anastacia’s estate,
which included her shareholdings in Zenith. As of June 30, 1990, Anastacia
owned 136,598 shares of Zenith; Oscar and Rodrigo owned 8,715,637 and
4,250 shares, respectively.3
On May 9, 2000, Zenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint 4 with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) against Oscar, docketed as SEC Case
No. 05-00-6615. The complaint stated that it is "a derivative suit initiated and
filed by the complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes to obtain an accounting of the
funds and assets of ZENITH INSURANCE CORPORATION which are now
or formerly in the control, custody, and/or possession of respondent [herein
petitioner Oscar] and to determine the shares of stock of deceased
spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes that were arbitrarily and fraudulently
appropriated [by Oscar] for himself [and] which were not collated and taken
into account in the partition, distribution, and/or settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouses, for which he should be ordered to account for all the
income from the time he took these shares of stock, and should now deliver
to his brothers and sisters their just and respective shares."5 [Emphasis
supplied.]
In his Answer with Counterclaim,6 Oscar denied the charge that he illegally
acquired the shares of Anastacia Reyes. He asserted, as a defense, that he
purchased the subject shares with his own funds from the unissued stocks of
Zenith, and that the suit is not a bona fide derivative suit because the
requisites therefor have not been complied with. He thus questioned the
SEC’s jurisdiction to entertain the complaint because it pertains to the
settlement of the estate of Anastacia Reyes.
When Republic Act (R.A.) No. 87997 took effect, the SEC’s exclusive and
original jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A was transferred to the RTC designated as a special
commercial court.8 The records of Rodrigo’s SEC case were thus turned over
to the RTC, Branch 142, Makati, and docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1553.
On October 22, 2002, Oscar filed a Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance
or Harassment Suit.9He claimed that the complaint is a mere nuisance or
harassment suit and should, according to the Interim Rules of Procedure for
Intra-Corporate Controversies, be dismissed; and that it is not a bona
fide derivative suit as it partakes of the nature of a petition for the settlement
of estate of the deceased Anastacia that is outside the jurisdiction of a
special commercial court. The RTC, in its Order dated November 29, 2002
(RTC Order), denied the motion in part and declared:
A close reading of the Complaint disclosed the presence of two (2)
causes of action, namely: a) a derivative suit for accounting of the
funds and assets of the corporation which are in the control, custody,
and/or possession of the respondent [herein petitioner Oscar] with
prayer to appoint a management committee; and b) an action for
determination of the shares of stock of deceased spouses Pedro and
 Anastacia Reyes allegedly taken by respondent, its accounting and
the corresponding delivery of these shares to the parties’ brothers
and sisters. The latter is not a derivative suit and should properly be
threshed out in a petition for settlement of estate.
Accordingly, the motion is denied. However, only the derivative suit
consisting of the first cause of action will be taken cognizance of by
this Court.10
Oscar thereupon went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus11 and prayed that the RTC Order be annulled and set aside
and that the trial court be prohibited from continuing with the proceedings.
The appellate court affirmed the RTC Order and denied the petition in its
Decision dated May 26, 2004. It likewise denied Oscar’s motion for
reconsideration in a Resolution dated October 21, 2004.
Petitioner now comes before us on appeal through a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Petitioner Oscar presents the following points as conclusions the CA should
have made:
1. that the complaint is a mere nuisance or harassment suit that should be
dismissed under the Interim Rules of Procedure of Intra-Corporate
Controversies; and
2. that the complaint is not a bona fide derivative suit but is in fact in the
nature of a petition for settlement of estate; hence, it is outside the
jurisdiction of the RTC acting as a special commercial court.
Accordingly, he prays for the setting aside and annulment of the CA decision
and resolution, and the dismissal of Rodrigo’s complaint before the RTC.
THE COURT’S RULING
We find the petition meritorious.
The core question for our determination is whether the trial court, sitting as a
special commercial court, has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Rodrigo’s complaint. To resolve it, we rely on the judicial principle that
"jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein."12
JURISDICTION OF SPECIAL COMMERCIAL COURTS
P.D. No. 902-A enumerates the cases over which the SEC (now the RTC
acting as a special commercial court) exercises exclusive jurisdiction:
SECTION 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions
of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations,
partnership, and other forms of associations registered with it as
expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:
a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts of the board
of directors, business associates, its officers or partners,
amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be
detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the
stockholders, partners, members of associations or
organizations registered with the Commission.
b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership
relations, between and among stockholders, members, or
associates; between any or all of them and the corporation,
partnership or association of which they are stockholders,
members, or associates, respectively; and between such
corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar
as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as
such entity; and
c) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors,
trustees, officers, or managers of such corporations,
partnerships, or associations.
The allegations set forth in Rodrigo’s complaint principally invoke Section 5,
paragraphs (a) and (b) above as basis for the exercise of the RTC’s special
court jurisdiction. Our focus in examining the allegations of the complaint
shall therefore be on these two provisions.
Fraudulent Devices and Schemes
The rule is that a complaint must contain a plain, concise, and direct
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action and
must specify the relief sought.13 Section 5, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides that in all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with
particularity.14 These rules find specific application to Section 5(a) of P.D.
No. 902-A which speaks of corporate devices or schemes that amount to
fraud or misrepresentation detrimental to the public and/or to the
stockholders.
In an attempt to hold Oscar responsible for corporate fraud, Rodrigo alleged
in the complaint the following:
3. This is a complaint…to determine the shares of stock of the
deceased spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes that were
arbitrarily and fraudulently appropriated for himself [herein
petitioner Oscar] which were not collated and taken into account in
the partition, distribution, and/or settlement of the estate of the
deceased Spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes, for which he should
be ordered to account for all the income from the time he took these
shares of stock, and should now deliver to his brothers and sisters
their just and respective shares with the corresponding equivalent
amount of P7,099,934.82 plus interest thereon from 1978
representing his obligations to the Associated Citizens’ Bank that
was paid for his account by his late mother, Anastacia C. Reyes.
This amount was not collated or taken into account in the partition or
distribution of the estate of their late mother, Anastacia C. Reyes.
3.1. Respondent Oscar C. Reyes, through other schemes of
fraud including misrepresentation, unilaterally, and for his own
benefit, capriciously transferred and took possession and
control of the management of Zenith Insurance
Corporation which is considered as a family corporation, and other
properties and businesses belonging to Spouses Pedro and
Anastacia Reyes.
xxxx
4.1. During the increase of capitalization of Zenith Insurance
Corporation, sometime in 1968, the property covered by TCT No.
225324 was illegally and fraudulently used by respondent as a
collateral.
xxxx
5. The complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes discovered that by some
manipulative scheme, the shareholdings of their deceased
mother, Doña Anastacia C. Reyes, shares of stocks and [sic]
valued in the corporate books at P7,699,934.28, more or less,
excluding interest and/or dividends, had been transferred solely in
the name of respondent. By such fraudulent manipulations and
misrepresentation, the shareholdings of said respondent Oscar C.
Reyes abruptly increased to P8,715,637.00 [sic] and becomes [sic]
the majority stockholder of Zenith Insurance Corporation, which
portion of said shares must be distributed equally amongst the
brothers and sisters of the respondent Oscar C. Reyes including the
complainant herein.
xxxx
9.1 The shareholdings of deceased Spouses Pedro Reyes
and Anastacia C. Reyes valued at P7,099,934.28 were illegally
and fraudulently transferred solely to the respondent’s [herein
petitioner Oscar] name and installed himself as a majority
stockholder of ZenithInsurance Corporation [and] thereby deprived
his brothers and sisters of their respective equal shares thereof
including complainant hereto.
xxxx
10.1 By refusal of the respondent to account of his [sic]
shareholdings in the company, he illegally and fraudulently
transferred solely in his name wherein [sic] the shares of stock
of the deceased Anastacia C. Reyes [which] must be properly
collated and/or distributed equally amongst the children,
including the complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes herein, to their
damage and prejudice.
xxxx
11.1 By continuous refusal of the respondent to account of his [sic]
shareholding with Zenith Insurance Corporation[,] particularly the
number of shares of stocks illegally and fraudulently transferred to
him from their deceased parents Sps. Pedro and Anastacia Reyes[,]
which are all subject for collation and/or partition in equal shares
among their children. [Emphasis supplied.]
Allegations of deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and
threats are largely conclusions of law that, without supporting statements of
the facts to which the allegations of fraud refer, do not sufficiently state an
effective cause of action.15 The late Justice Jose Feria, a noted authority in
Remedial Law, declared that fraud and mistake are required to be averred
with particularity in order to enable the opposing party to controvert the
particular facts allegedly constituting such fraud or mistake.16
Tested against these standards, we find that the charges of fraud against
Oscar were not properly supported by the required factual allegations. While
the complaint contained allegations of fraud purportedly committed by him,
these allegations are not particular enough to bring the controversy within the
special commercial court’s jurisdiction; they are not statements of ultimate
facts, but are mere conclusions of law: how and why the alleged
appropriation of shares can be characterized as "illegal and fraudulent" were
not explained nor elaborated on.
Not every allegation of fraud done in a corporate setting or perpetrated by
corporate officers will bring the case within the special commercial court’s
jurisdiction. To fall within this jurisdiction, there must be sufficient nexus
showing that the corporation’s nature, structure, or powers were used to
facilitate the fraudulent device or scheme. Contrary to this concept, the
complaint presented a reverse situation. No corporate power or office was
alleged to have facilitated the transfer of the shares; rather, Oscar, as an
individual and without reference to his corporate personality, was alleged to
have transferred the shares of Anastacia to his name, allowing him to
become the majority and controlling stockholder of Zenith, and eventually,
the corporation’s President. This is the essence of the complaint read as a
whole and is particularly demonstrated under the following allegations:
5. The complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes discovered that by some
manipulative scheme, the shareholdings of their deceased mother,
Doña Anastacia C. Reyes, shares of stocks and [sic] valued in the
corporate books at P7,699,934.28, more or less, excluding interest
and/or dividends, had been transferred solely in the name of
respondent. By such fraudulent manipulations and
misrepresentation, the shareholdings of said respondent Oscar
C. Reyes abruptly increased to P8,715,637.00 [sic] and becomes
[sic] the majority stockholder of Zenith Insurance Corporation,
which portion of said shares must be distributed equally amongst the
brothers and sisters of the respondent Oscar C. Reyes including the
complainant herein.
xxxx
9.1 The shareholdings of deceased Spouses Pedro Reyes
and Anastacia C. Reyes valued at P7,099,934.28 were illegally
and fraudulently transferred solely to the respondent’s [herein
petitioner Oscar] name and installed himself as a majority
stockholder of ZenithInsurance Corporation [and] thereby deprived
 his brothers and sisters of their respective equal shares thereof
including complainant hereto. [Emphasis supplied.]
In ordinary cases, the failure to specifically allege the fraudulent acts does
not constitute a ground for dismissal since such defect can be cured by a bill
of particulars. In cases governed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-
Corporate Controversies, however, a bill of particulars is a prohibited
pleading.17 It is essential, therefore, for the complaint to show on its face
what are claimed to be the fraudulent corporate acts if the complainant
wishes to invoke the court’s special commercial jurisdiction.
We note that twice in the course of this case, Rodrigo had been given the
opportunity to study the propriety of amending or withdrawing the complaint,
but he consistently refused. The court’s function in resolving issues of
jurisdiction is limited to the review of the allegations of the complaint and, on
the basis of these allegations, to the determination of whether they are of
such nature and subject that they fall within the terms of the law defining the
court’s jurisdiction. Regretfully, we cannot read into the complaint any
specifically alleged corporate fraud that will call for the exercise of the court’s
special commercial jurisdiction. Thus, we cannot affirm the RTC’s
assumption of jurisdiction over Rodrigo’s complaint on the basis of Section
5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A.18
Intra-Corporate Controversy
A review of relevant jurisprudence shows a development in the Court’s
approach in classifying what constitutes an intra-corporate controversy.
Initially, the main consideration in determining whether a dispute constitutes
an intra-corporate controversy was limited to a consideration of the intra-
corporate relationship existing between or among the parties.19 The types of
relationships embraced under Section 5(b), as declared in the case of Union
Glass & Container Corp. v. SEC,20 were as follows:
a) between the corporation, partnership, or association and the
public;
b) between the corporation, partnership, or association and its
stockholders, partners, members, or officers;
c) between the corporation, partnership, or association and the State
as far as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; and
d) among the stockholders, partners, or associates themselves.
[Emphasis supplied.]
The existence of any of the above intra-corporate relations was sufficient to
confer jurisdiction to the SEC, regardless of the subject matter of the dispute.
This came to be known as the relationship test.
However, in the 1984 case of DMRC Enterprises v. Esta del Sol Mountain
Reserve, Inc.,21 the Court introduced the nature of the controversy test.
We declared in this case that it is not the mere existence of an intra-
corporate relationship that gives rise to an intra-corporate controversy; to rely
on the relationship test alone will divest the regular courts of their jurisdiction
for the sole reason that the dispute involves a corporation, its directors,
officers, or stockholders. We saw that there is no legal sense in disregarding
or minimizing the value of the nature of the transactions which gives rise to
the dispute.
Under the nature of the controversy test, the incidents of that relationship
must also be considered for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
controversy itself is intra-corporate.22 The controversy must not only be
rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must as well
pertain to the enforcement of the parties’ correlative rights and obligations
under the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory
rules of the corporation. If the relationship and its incidents are merely
incidental to the controversy or if there will still be conflict even if the
relationship does not exist, then no intra-corporate controversy exists.
The Court then combined the two tests and declared that jurisdiction should
be determined by considering not only the status or relationship of the
parties, but also the nature of the question under controversy.23 This two-tier
test was adopted in the recent case of Speed Distribution, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals:24
To determine whether a case involves an intra-corporate
controversy, and is to be heard and decided by the branches of the
RTC specifically designated by the Court to try and decide such
cases, two elements must concur: (a) the status or relationship of the
parties; and (2) the nature of the question that is the subject of their
controversy.
The first element requires that the controversy must arise out of
intra-corporate or partnership relations between any or all of the
parties and the corporation, partnership, or association of which they
are stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of them
and the corporation, partnership, or association of which they are
stockholders, members, or associates, respectively; and between
such corporation, partnership, or association and the State insofar as
it concerns their individual franchises. The second element requires
that the dispute among the parties be intrinsically connected with the
regulation of the corporation. If the nature of the controversy involves
matters that are purely civil in character, necessarily, the case does
not involve an intra-corporate controversy.
Given these standards, we now tackle the question posed for our
determination under the specific circumstances of this case:
Application of the Relationship Test
Is there an intra-corporate relationship between the parties that would
characterize the case as an intra-corporate dispute?
We point out at the outset that while Rodrigo holds shares of stock in Zenith,
he holds them in two capacities: in his own right with respect to the 4,250
shares registered in his name, and as one of the heirs of Anastacia Reyes
with respect to the 136,598 shares registered in her name. What is material
in resolving the issues of this case under the allegations of the complaint is
Rodrigo’s interest as an heir since the subject matter of the present
controversy centers on the shares of stocks belonging to Anastacia, not on
Rodrigo’s personally-owned shares nor on his personality as shareholder
owning these shares. In this light, all reference to shares of stocks in this
case shall pertain to the shareholdings of the deceased Anastacia and the
parties’ interest therein as her heirs.
Article 777 of the Civil Code declares that the successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Accordingly, upon
Anastacia’s death, her children acquired legal title to her estate (which title
includes her shareholdings in Zenith), and they are, prior to the estate’s
partition, deemed co-owners thereof.25 This status as co-owners, however,
does not immediately and necessarily make them stockholders of the
corporation. Unless and until there is compliance with Section 63 of the
Corporation Code on the manner of transferring shares, the heirs do not
become registered stockholders of the corporation. Section 63 provides:
Section 63. Certificate of stock and transfer of shares. – The capital
stock of stock corporations shall be divided into shares for which
certificates signed by the president or vice-president, countersigned
by the secretary or assistant secretary, and sealed with the seal of
the corporation shall be issued in accordance with the by-laws.
Shares of stock so issued are personal property and may be
transferred by delivery of the certificate or certificates indorsed by the
owner or his attorney-in-fact or other person legally authorized to
make the transfer. No transfer, however, shall be valid, except as
between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books
of the corporation so as to show the names of the parties to the
transaction, the date of the transfer, the number of the
certificate or certificates, and the number of shares
transferred. [Emphasis supplied.]
No shares of stock against which the corporation holds any unpaid
claim shall be transferable in the books of the corporation.
Simply stated, the transfer of title by means of succession, though effective
and valid between the parties involved (i.e., between the decedent’s estate
and her heirs), does not bind the corporation and third parties. The transfer
must be registered in the books of the corporation to make the transferee-
heir a stockholder entitled to recognition as such both by the corporation and
by third parties.26
We note, in relation with the above statement, that in Abejo v. Dela
Cruz27 and TCL Sales Corporation v. Court of Appeals 28 we did not require
the registration of the transfer before considering the transferee a
stockholder of the corporation (in effect upholding the existence of an intra-
corporate relation between the parties and bringing the case within the
jurisdiction of the SEC as an intra-corporate controversy). A marked
difference, however, exists between these cases and the present one.
In Abejo and TCL Sales, the transferees held definite and uncontested
titles to a specific number of shares of the corporation; after the
transferee had established prima facie ownership over the shares of stocks
in question, registration became a mere formality in confirming their status as
stockholders. In the present case, each of Anastacia’s heirs holds only an
undivided interest in the shares. This interest, at this point, is still inchoate
and subject to the outcome of a settlement proceeding; the right of the heirs
to specific, distributive shares of inheritance will not be determined until all
the debts of the estate of the decedent are paid. In short, the heirs are only
entitled to what remains after payment of the decedent’s debts; 29 whether
there will be residue remains to be seen. Justice Jurado aptly puts it as
follows:
No succession shall be declared unless and until a liquidation of the
assets and debts left by the decedent shall have been made and all
his creditors are fully paid. Until a final liquidation is made and all the
debts are paid, the right of the heirs to inherit remains inchoate. This
is so because under our rules of procedure, liquidation is
necessary in order to determine whether or not the decedent
has left any liquid assets which may be transmitted to his
heirs.30 [Emphasis supplied.]
Rodrigo must, therefore, hurdle two obstacles before he can be considered a
stockholder of Zenith with respect to the shareholdings originally belonging to
Anastacia. First, he must prove that there are shareholdings that will be left
to him and his co-heirs, and this can be determined only in a settlement of
the decedent’s estate. No such proceeding has been commenced to
date. Second, he must register the transfer of the shares allotted to him to
make it binding against the corporation. He cannot demand that this be done
unless and until he has established his specific allotment (and prima
facieownership) of the shares. Without the settlement of Anastacia’s estate,
there can be no definite partition and distribution of the estate to the heirs.
Without the partition and distribution, there can be no registration of the
transfer. And without the registration, we cannot consider the transferee-heir
a stockholder who may invoke the existence of an intra-corporate
relationship as premise for an intra-corporate controversy within the
jurisdiction of a special commercial court.
In sum, we find that – insofar as the subject shares of stock (i.e., Anastacia’s
shares) are concerned – Rodrigo cannot be considered a stockholder of
Zenith. Consequently, we cannot declare that an intra-corporate relationship
exists that would serve as basis to bring this case within the special
commercial court’s jurisdiction under Section 5(b) of PD 902-A, as amended.
Rodrigo’s complaint, therefore, fails the relationship test.
Application of the Nature of Controversy Test
The body rather than the title of the complaint determines the nature of an
action.31 Our examination of the complaint yields the conclusion that, more
than anything else, the complaint is about the protection and enforcement of
successional rights. The controversy it presents is purely civil rather than
corporate, although it is denominated as a "complaint for accounting of all
corporate funds and assets."
Contrary to the findings of both the trial and appellate courts, we read only
one cause of action alleged in the complaint. The "derivative suit for
accounting of the funds and assets of the corporation which are in the
control, custody, and/or possession of the respondent [herein petitioner
Oscar]" does not constitute a separate cause of action but is, as correctly
claimed by Oscar, only an incident to the "action for determination of the
shares of stock of deceased spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes allegedly
taken by respondent, its accounting and the corresponding delivery of these
shares to the parties’ brothers and sisters." There can be no mistake of the
relationship between the "accounting" mentioned in the complaint and the
objective of partition and distribution when Rodrigo claimed in paragraph
10.1 of the complaint that:
10.1 By refusal of the respondent to account of [sic] his
shareholdings in the company, he illegally and fraudulently
transferred solely in his name wherein [sic] the shares of stock of the
deceased Anastacia C. Reyes [which] must be properly collated
and/or distributed equally amongst the children including the
complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes herein to their damage and prejudice.
We particularly note that the complaint contained no sufficient allegation that
justified the need for an accounting other than to determine the extent of
Anastacia’s shareholdings for purposes of distribution.
Another significant indicator that points us to the real nature of the complaint
are Rodrigo’s repeated claims of illegal and fraudulent transfers of
Anastacia’s shares by Oscar to the prejudice of the other heirs of the
decedent; he cited these allegedly fraudulent acts as basis for his demand
for the collation and distribution of Anastacia’s shares to the heirs. These
claims tell us unequivocally that the present controversy arose from the
parties’ relationship as heirs of Anastacia and not as shareholders of Zenith.
Rodrigo, in filing the complaint, is enforcing his rights as a co-heir and not as
a stockholder of Zenith. The injury he seeks to remedy is one suffered by an
heir (for the impairment of his successional rights) and not by the corporation
nor by Rodrigo as a shareholder on record.
More than the matters of injury and redress, what Rodrigo clearly aims to
accomplish through his allegations of illegal acquisition by Oscar is the
distribution of Anastacia’s shareholdings without a prior settlement of her
estate – an objective that, by law and established jurisprudence, cannot be
done. The RTC of Makati, acting as a special commercial court, has no
jurisdiction to settle, partition, and distribute the estate of a deceased. A
relevant provision – Section 2 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court – that
contemplates properties of the decedent held by one of the heirs declares:
Questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made
by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by
the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the
final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising
the questions and on the heir. [Emphasis supplied.]
Worth noting are this Court’s statements in the case of Natcher v. Court of
Appeals:32
Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate
of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate
court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
xxxx
It is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot resolve
to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding because it is
subject to specific prescribed rules. [Emphasis supplied.]
That an accounting of the funds and assets of Zenith to determine the extent
and value of Anastacia’s shareholdings will be undertaken by a probate court
and not by a special commercial court is completely consistent with the
probate court’s limited jurisdiction. It has the power to enforce an accounting
as a necessary means to its authority to determine the properties included in
the inventory of the estate to be administered, divided up, and distributed.
Beyond this, the determination of title or ownership over the subject shares
(whether belonging to Anastacia or Oscar) may be conclusively settled by the
probate court as a question of collation or advancement. We had occasion to
recognize the court’s authority to act on questions of title or ownership in a
collation or advancement situation in Coca v. Pangilinan33 where we ruled:
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be
resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a
jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a procedural question
involving a mode of practice "which may be waived."
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be
passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. That question
should be ventilated in a separate action. That general rule has
qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate
or testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from,
the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final
determination in a separate action.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question
of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs,
or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the
rights of third parties are not impaired, the probate court is
competent to decide the question of ownership. [Citations
omitted. Emphasis supplied.]
In sum, we hold that the nature of the present controversy is not one which
may be classified as an intra-corporate dispute and is beyond the jurisdiction
of the special commercial court to resolve. In short, Rodrigo’s complaint also
fails the nature of the controversy test.
DERIVATIVE SUIT
Rodrigo’s bare claim that the complaint is a derivative suit will not suffice to
confer jurisdiction on the RTC (as a special commercial court) if he cannot
comply with the requisites for the existence of a derivative suit. These
requisites are:
a. the party bringing suit should be a shareholder during the time of
the act or transaction complained of, the number of shares not being
material;
b. the party has tried to exhaust intra-corporate remedies, i.e., has
made a demand on the board of directors for the appropriate relief,
but the latter has failed or refused to heed his plea; and
c. the cause of action actually devolves on the corporation; the
wrongdoing or harm having been or being caused to the corporation
and not to the particular stockholder bringing the suit.34
Based on these standards, we hold that the allegations of the present
complaint do not amount to a derivative suit.
First, as already discussed above, Rodrigo is not a shareholder with respect
to the shareholdings originally belonging to Anastacia; he only stands as a
transferee-heir whose rights to the share are inchoate and unrecorded. With
respect to his own individually-held shareholdings, Rodrigo has not alleged
any individual cause or basis as a shareholder on record to proceed against
Oscar.
Second, in order that a stockholder may show a right to sue on behalf of the
corporation, he must allege with some particularity in his complaint that he
has exhausted his remedies within the corporation by making a sufficient
demand upon the directors or other officers for appropriate relief with the
expressed intent to sue if relief is denied.35 Paragraph 8 of the complaint
hardly satisfies this requirement since what the rule contemplates is the
exhaustion of remedies within the corporate setting:
8. As members of the same family, complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes
has resorted [to] and exhausted all legal means of resolving the
dispute with the end view of amicably settling the case, but the
dispute between them ensued.
Lastly, we find no injury, actual or threatened, alleged to have been done to
the corporation due to Oscar’s acts. If indeed he illegally and fraudulently
transferred Anastacia’s shares in his own name, then the damage is not to
the corporation but to his co-heirs; the wrongful transfer did not affect the
capital stock or the assets of Zenith. As already mentioned, neither has
Rodrigo alleged any particular cause or wrongdoing against the corporation
that he can champion in his capacity as a shareholder on record. 36
In summary, whether as an individual or as a derivative suit, the RTC –
sitting as special commercial court – has no jurisdiction to hear Rodrigo’s
complaint since what is involved is the determination and distribution of
successional rights to the shareholdings of Anastacia Reyes. Rodrigo’s
proper remedy, under the circumstances, is to institute a special proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Anastacia Reyes, a move
that is not foreclosed by the dismissal of his present complaint.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and REVERSE the decision
of the Court of Appeals dated May 26, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74970. The
complaint before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 142, Makati, docketed as
Civil Case No. 00-1553, is ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
24. G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Rex Suiza Castillon for petitioner.
Salas & Villareal for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of the
Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 09010 (Concordia Villanueva v.
Celedonia Solivio) affirming the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No.
13207 for partition, reconveyance of ownership and possession and
damages, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff
and against defendant:
a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr.
be divided into two (2) shares: one-half for the plaintiff and
one-half for defendant. From both shares shall be equally
deducted the expenses for the burial, mausoleum and
related expenditures. Against the share of defendants shall
be charged the expenses for scholarship, awards, donations
and the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Memorial
Foundation;'
b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the
entire estate property, including but not limited to, specific
items already mentioned in this decision and to render an
accounting of the property of the estate, within thirty (30)
days from receipt of this judgment; one-half (1/2) of this
produce shall belong to plaintiff;
c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses
of litigation; P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees plus costs.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr.,
author of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who
died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters,
nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt,
petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia
Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva,
sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his
marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before
Esteban, Jr. was born.
Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his
second wife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High
School, brought up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of
land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her
mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but no
conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban,
Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only
child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she,
her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties
were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt
Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation
to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college
education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February 26,1977
without having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to
do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's
desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from
whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in
their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. This
fact was admitted by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the
Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special
Proceeding No. 2540, where she stated:
4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the
immediately preceding paragraph [that herein movant is also
the relative of the deceased within the third degree, she
being the younger sister of the late Esteban Javellana, father
of the decedent herein], because prior to the filing of the
petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant
Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the
decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known
each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they
have been visiting each other's house which are not far away
for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the
proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good
faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on March 8, 1977 Spl.
Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the
estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended petition
(Exh. 5) praying that letters of administration be issued to her; that she be
declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after payment of all claims and
rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her (p.
115, Rollo).
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended
petition, she was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr.
She explained that this was done for three reasons: (1) because the
properties of the estate had come from her sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that
she is the decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her
as sole heir, the disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the
foundation would be facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared
her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate
to pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set
up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which
she caused to be registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission on
July 17,1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98, Rollo).
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva
filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as
"sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. On
October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court for tardiness (pp. 80-
81, Record). Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7,
1980 (or one year and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana-
Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for partition, recovery of possession,
ownership and damages.
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case
No. 13207, in favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.
On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment
pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and
accounting of the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those orders,
Celedonia averred that the properties of the deceased had already been
transferred to, and were in the possession of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for reconsideration.
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA
GR CV No. 09010). On January 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals, Eleventh
Division, rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court in
toto.Hence, this petition for review wherein she raised the following legal
issues:
1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to
entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery of
Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc.
No. 2540) were still pending in Branch 23 of the same court;
2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from
intervening in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 through extrinsic fraud;
3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva
troncal in favor of Celedonia, his relative within the third
 degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited
them; and
4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate
after she had agreed to place the same in the Salustia
Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation, and notwithstanding
the fact that conformably with said agreement, the
Foundation has been formed and properties of the estate
have already been transferred to it.
I. The question of jurisdiction—
After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's
contention that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to
entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her
share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings
(Spl, Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in
Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission
and approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the
residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings (p. 31,
Record).
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate
to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate
proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far relieves the
administrator from his duties (Santiesteban v. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367,
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March
29, 1974, 56 SCRA 266).
The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia
as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of
the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last paragraph of the order directed
the administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the estate." The pertinent
portions of the order are quoted below:
2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of
Miss Celedonia Solivio as Sole Heir, dated March 7, 1978], it
appears from the record that despite the notices posted and
the publication of these proceedings as required by law, no
other heirs came out to interpose any opposition to the
instant proceeding. It further appears that herein
Administratrix is the only claimant-heir to the estate of the
late Esteban Javellana who died on February 26, 1977.
During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on
March 17, 1978, it was established that the late Esteban
Javellana died single, without any known issue, and without
any surviving parents. His nearest relative is the herein
Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his late mother who
reared him and with whom he had always been living with
[sic] during his lifetime.
xxxxxxxxx
2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is
hereby declared as the sole and legal heir of the late
Esteban S. Javellana, who died intestate on February 26,
1977 at La Paz, Iloilo City.
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the
settlement of this estate so that it can be terminated. (pp, 14-
16, Record)
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court
of First Instance (now RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set aside the
order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself
(Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her share of the properties of
the deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy
when the court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of
Appeals for review on certiorari. However, instead of availing of that remedy,
she filed more than one year later, a separate action for the same purpose in
Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate action was improperly filed
for it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and
legal distribution of the estate.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting
dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with probate
proceedings pending in a co-equal court. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695, January 31, 1972, 43
SCRA 111, 117, where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project
of partition executed between her and her father in the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of her mother:
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same. The finality of the approval of the project of The
probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make
distribution, has power to determine the proportion or parts
to which each distributed is entitled. ... The power to
determine the legality or illegality of the testamentary
provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making a
just and legal distribution of the inheritance. ... To hold that a
separate and independent action is necessary to that effect,
would be contrary to the general tendency of the
jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is further,
expensive, dilatory, and impractical. (Marcelino v. Antonio,
70 Phil. 388)
A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of
the decedent is exclusively within the range of the
administratrix proceedings and can not properly be made an
independent action. (Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364)
A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper.
(Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436)
 partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate
proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445,
April 29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As
long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not
been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be
deemed closed and terminated Siguiong v. Tecson, supra);
because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and
does not prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain
his share, provided the prescriptive period therefore has not
elapsed (Mari v. Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137). The better practice,
however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to
demand his share through a proper motion in the same
probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of
the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already
been closed, and not through an independent action, which
would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus
reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate court
already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of. (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730,
741-742; Timbol v. Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107,
April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines,
L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460-461; Emphasis
supplied)
In Litam et al., v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the
special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased
Rafael Litam the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed
that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a
Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal
properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in
the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the
deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal properties of his
wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this
Court, we ruled that "such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only
heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the
exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which
it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the
presentation of the project of partition. (p. 378).
However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been
closed and terminated for over three years, the action for annulment of the
project of partition was allowed to continue. Considering that in the instant
case, the estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless, Concordia
had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, We
have opted likewise to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the
interest of justice.
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207
setting aside the probate proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11) on
the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-
heir of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition of the
estate, and requiring the administratrix, Celedonia, to submit an inventory
and accounting of the estate, were improper and officious, to say the least,
for these matters he within the exclusive competence of the probate court.
II. The question of extrinsic fraud—
Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings
by extrinsic fraud employed by Celedonia? It is noteworthy that extrinsic
fraud was not alleged in Concordia's original complaint in Civil Case No.
13207. It was only in her amended complaint of March 6, 1980, that extrinsic
fraud was alleged for the first time.
Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is
any act or conduct of the prevailing party which prevented a
fair submission of the controversy (Francisco v. David, 38
O.G. 714). A fraud 'which prevents a party from having a trial
or presenting all of his case to the court, or one which
operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself,
but to the manner by which such judgment was procured so
much so that there was no fair submission of the
controversy. For instance, if through fraudulent machination
by one [his adversary], a litigant was induced to withdraw his
defense or was prevented from presenting an available
defense or cause of action in the case wherein the judgment
was obtained, such that the aggrieved party was deprived of
his day in court through no fault of his own, the equitable
relief against such judgment may be availed of. (Yatco v.
Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971). (cited in Philippine Law
Dictionary, 1972 Ed. by Moreno; Varela v. Villanueva, et al.,
96 Phil. 248)
A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or
collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, which
connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing
litigant 'outside the trial of a case against the defeated party,
or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated
party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of
the case. ... The overriding consideration is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party
from having his day in court or from presenting his case. The
fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the
jurisdiction of the court. (Libudan v. Gil, L-21163, May 17,
1972, 45 SCRA 17, 27-29; Sterling Investment Corp. v. Ruiz,
L-30694, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 318, 323)
The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the following
reasons:
1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding
intended to be filed by Celedonia. She admitted in her
 complaint that she and Celedonia had agreed that the latter
would "initiate the necessary proceeding" and pay the taxes
and obligations of the estate. Thus paragraph 6 of her
complaint alleged:
6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the
estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. at the lowest
possible cost and the least effort, the plaintiff and the
defendant agreed that the defendant shall initiate the
necessary proceeding, cause the payment of taxes and
other obligations, and to do everything else required by law,
and thereafter, secure the partition of the estate between her
and the plaintiff, [although Celedonia denied that they
agreed to partition the estate, for their agreement was to
place the estate in a foundation.] (p. 2, Record; emphasis
supplied)
Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings.
She stayed away by choice. Besides, she knew that the estate came
exclusively from Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio, and she had agreed with
Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the deceased had planned to do.
2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice
of the time and place of hearing of the petition is required to
be published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79,
Rules of Court). Notice of the hearing of Celedonia's original
petition was published in the "Visayan Tribune" on April 25,
May 2 and 9, 1977 (Exh 4, p. 197, Record). Similarly, notice
of the hearing of her amended petition of May 26, 1977 for
the settlement of the estate was, by order of the court,
published in "Bagong Kasanag" (New Light) issues of May
27, June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp. 182-305, Record). The
publication of the notice of the proceedings was constructive
notice to the whole world. Concordia was not deprived of her
right to intervene in the proceedings for she had actual, as
well as constructive notice of the same. As pointed out by
the probate court in its order of October 27, 1978:
... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed
about five months after Celedonia Solivio was declared as
the sole heir. ... .
Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been
duly published as required by law, despite which the present
movant only came to court now, then she is guilty of laches
for sleeping on her alleged right. (p. 22, Record)
The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the requisites of
a petition for relief from judgment nor a motion for new trial.
The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:
Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction
of probate court and proceeding was in rem no subsequent
errors or irregularities are available on collateral attack.
(Bedwell v. Dean 132 So. 20)
Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban
within the third degree on his mother's side was not false. Moreover, it was
made in good faith and in the honest belief that because the properties of
Esteban had come from his mother, not his father, she, as Esteban's nearest
surviving relative on his mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It would
have been self-defeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if
she stated in her petition that Concordia was her co-heir. Her omission to so
state did not constitute extrinsic fraud.
Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters
which would defeat one's own claim or defense is not such
extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation of the
judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d
622; First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman,
15 SW 2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149)
It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's
estate may be filed by any "interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79, Rules of
Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition did not preclude Concordia from
filing her own.
III. On the question of reserva troncal—
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased
was subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative
within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal provision of
the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant
any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister,
is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired
by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within
the third degree and who belong to the line from which said
property came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the
reservor (reservista)—the ascendant who inherits by
operation of law property from his descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the
reservees (reservatarios)—relatives within the third degree
counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to
the line from which the property came.
3. The propositus—the descendant who received by
gratuitous title and died without issue, making his other
ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by
Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not
reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the
descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the
properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a
reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within
the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to
properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from
another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not apply to property
inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation
covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters,
nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are
Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased
in accordance with the following articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor
children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives
shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them by reason of relationship by the
whole blood.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being
relatives of the decedent within the third degree in the
collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject
estate 'without distinction of line or preference among them
by reason of relationship by the whole blood,' and is entitled
one-half (1/2) share and share alike of the estate. (p. 57,
Rollo)
IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share—
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the
deceased to the foundation in honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana (from whom the estate came), an agreement which she ratified and
confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated April 3,
1978" which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner
Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have
agreed to make the estate of the decedent a
foundation, besides they have closely known each other due
to their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting
each other's house which are not far away for (sic) each
other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied)
she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not
waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of
Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" which
Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his mother and to
finance the education of indigent but deserving students as well.
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a
judicial admission, it is conclusive and no evidence need be presented to
prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Granada v.
Philippine National Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v.
Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido,
G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 478; and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161 SCRA 347).
The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who,
significantly, did not even testify in the case, although she could have done
so by deposition if she were supposedly indisposed to attend the trial. Only
her husband, Narciso, and son-in-law, Juanito Domin, actively participated in
the trial. Her husband confirmed the agreement between his wife and
Celedonia, but he endeavored to dilute it by alleging that his wife did not
intend to give all, but only one-half, of her share to the foundation (p. 323,
Record).
The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation"
was established and duly registered in the Securities and Exchange
Commission under Reg. No. 0100027 for the following principal purposes:
1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of
scholarships for such deserving students as the Board of
Trustees of the Foundation may decide of at least one
scholar each to study at West Visayas State College, and
the University of the Philippines in the Visayas both located
in Iloilo City.
2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St.
Clements Redemptorist Community for a deserving student
who has the religious vocation to become a priest.
3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will
promote the advancement and enrichment of the various
fields of educational endeavors, especially in literary arts.
Scholarships provided for by this foundation may be named
after its benevolent benefactors as a token of gratitude for
their contributions.
4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the
community to determine community needs and be able to
alleviate partially or totally said needs.
5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the
proper care of the Solivio-Javellana mausoleum at Christ the
King Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo City, and the Javellana
Memorial at the West Visayas State College, as a token of
appreciation for the contribution of the estate of the late
Esteban S. Javellana which has made this foundation
possible. Also, in perpetuation of his Roman Catholic beliefs
and those of his mother, Gregorian masses or their
 equivalents will be offered every February and October, and
Requiem masses every February 25th and October llth, their
death anniversaries, as part of this provision.
6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions,
endowments and financial aids or loans from whatever
source, to invest and reinvest the funds, collect the income
thereof and pay or apply only the income or such part
thereof as shall be determined by the Trustees for such
endeavors as may be necessary to carry out the objectives
of the Foundation.
7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease,
mortgage, pledge, exchange, sell, transfer, or otherwise,
invest, trade, or deal, in any manner permitted by law, in real
and personal property of every kind and description or any
interest herein.
8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable
or proper for the accomplishments of any of the purposes
herein enumerated or which shall at any time appear
conducive to the protection or benefit of the corporation,
including the exercise of the powers, authorities and
attributes concerned upon the corporation organized under
the laws of the Philippines in general, and upon domestic
corporation of like nature in particular. (pp. 9-10, Rollo)
As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:
The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three
(3) of its eight Esteban Javellana scholars graduated in
1986, one (1) from UPV graduated Cum Laude and two (2)
from WVSU graduated with honors; one was a Cum Laude
and the other was a recipient of Lagos Lopez award for
teaching for being the most outstanding student teacher.
The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso
Barangay High School, the site of which was donated by the
Foundation. The School has been selected as the Pilot
Barangay High School for Region VI.
The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez,
who would be ordained this year. He studied at St. Francis
Xavier Major Regional Seminary at Davao City. The
Foundation likewise is a member of the Redemptorist
Association that gives yearly donations to help poor students
who want to become Redemptorist priests or brothers. It
gives yearly awards for Creative writing known as the
Esteban Javellana Award.
Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S.
Javellana Multi-purpose Center at the West Visayas State
University for teachers' and students' use, and has likewise
contributed to religious civic and cultural fund-raising drives,
amongst other's. (p. 10, Rollo)
Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the
Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia
has honored hers.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia J.
Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to
one-half of his estate. However, comformably with the agreement between
her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased
should be conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation,"
of which both the petitioner and the private respondent shall be trustees, and
each shall be entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees to constitute
the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer the same for
the purposes set forth in its charter. The petitioner, as administratrix of the
estate, shall submit to the probate court an inventory and accounting of the
estate of the deceased preparatory to terminating the proceedings therein.
SO ORDERED.
25. G.R. No. 94005. April 6, 1993.
LUISA LYON NUÑAL, herein represented by ALBERT NUÑAL, and ANITA
NUÑAL HORMIGOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and EMMA LYON DE LEON in her behalf and
as guardian ad litem of the minors HELEN SABARRE and KENNY
SABARRE, EDUARDO GUZMAN, MERCEDEZ LYON TAUPAN,
WILFREDO GUZMAN, MALLY LYON ENCARNACION and DORA LYON
DELAS PEÑAS, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; ONCE IT
BECOMES FINAL, MAY NO LONGER BE MODIFIED IN ANY RESPECT;
EXCEPTIONS. — In the case of Manning International Corporation v. NLRC,
(195 SCRA 155, 161 [1991]) We held that ". . ., nothing is more settled in the
law than that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be
an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the
modification is attempted to be made by the Court rendering it or by the
highest Court of land. The only recognized exceptions are the correction of
clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause
no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is void."
Furthermore, "(a)ny amendment or alteration which substantially affects a
final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including
the entire proceedings held for that purpose."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REMEDY OF AGGRIEVED PARTY. — In the case at bar,
the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 872 has become final and
executory. Thus, upon its finality, the trial judge lost his jurisdiction over the
case. Consequently, any modification that he would make, as in this case,
the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin would be in excess of his authority. The
remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit against the parties
in Civil Case No. 872 and all other heirs for her share in the subject property,
in order that all the parties in interest can prove their respective claims.
DECISION
CAMPOS, JR., J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision ** dated February 22,
1990 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 14889 entitled "Emma Lyon
de Leon, et al., plaintiffs-appellees versus Luisa Lyon Nuñal, now deceased
herein represented by Albert Nuñal, et al., defendants appellants," dismissing
petitioners' appeal and affirming the trial court's order *** dated January 9,
1987 for the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin as one of the heirs who shall
benefit from the partition.
The facts as culled from the records of the case are as follows.
This case originated from a suit docketed as Civil Case No. 872 filed by
Emma Lyon de Leon in her behalf and as guardian ad litem of the minors
Helen Sabarre and Kenny Sabarre, Eduardo Guzman, Mercedes Lyon
Taupan, Wilfredo Guzman, Mally Lyon Encarnacion and Dona Lyon de las
Peñas, (herein private respondents) against Luisa Lyon Nuñal, now
deceased and herein represented by her heirs, Albert Nuñal and Anita Nuñal
Hormigos (herein petitioners), for partition and accounting of a parcel of land
located in Isabela, Basilan City. Subject parcel of land was formerly owned
by Frank C. Lyon and May Ekstrom Lyon, deceased parents of Helen, Dona,
Luisa, Mary, Frank and William James. Private respondents claimed that said
parcel of land, formerly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3141 in
the name of Frank C. Lyon, has been in possession of petitioner Luisa Lyon
Nuñal since 1946 and that she made no accounting of the income derived
therefrom, despite demands made by private respondents for the partition
and delivery of their shares.
On December 17, 1974, after trial and hearing, the then Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial court) rendered its judgment in favor of private
respondents and ordered the partition of the property but dismissing private
respondents' complaint for accounting. The dispositive portion of the
judgment reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the partition of the
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3141 among the plaintiffs
and defendant. The parties shall make partition among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance, subject to the Court's confirmation, should the
parties be unable to agree on the partition, the court shall appoint
commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to such
party in interest such part and proportion of the property as the Court shall
direct. Defendant is further ordered to pay plaintiffs attorney's fees in the sum
of P2,000.00." 1
On July 30, 1982, the order of partition was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 57265-R. The case was remanded to the court of
origin for the ordered partition. 2
On May 17, 1984, an order for the issuance of the writ of execution was
issued by the court a quo. 3
On July 17, 1984, Mary Lyon Martin, daughter of the late Frank C. Lyon and
Mary Ekstrom Lyon, assisted by her counsel filed a motion to quash the
order of execution with preliminary injunction. In her motion, she contends
that not being a party to the above-entitled case her rights, interests,
ownership and participation over the land should not be affected by a
judgment in the said case; that the order of execution is unenforceable
insofar as her share, right, ownership and participation is concerned, said
share not having been brought within the Jurisdiction of the court a quo. She
further invokes Section 12, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. 4
On June 26, 1985, the trial court issued an order revoking the appointment of
the three commissioners and in lieu thereof, ordered the issuance of a writ of
execution. 5
On February 4, 1986, the said court issued an order appointing a Board of
Commissioners to effect the partition of the contested property. 6
On May 28, 1986, the trial court dismissed the motion to quash order of
execution with preliminary injunction filed by Mary Lyon Martin and directed
the partition of the property among the original party plaintiffs and
defendants. 7
On September 24, 1986, the Commissioners manifested to the trial court that
in view of the fact that the name of Mary Lyon Martin also appears in the
Transfer Certificate of Title, she could therefore be construed as one of the
heirs. A ruling from the trial court was then sought. 8
On September 29, 1986, the lower court issued an order directing the
counsel of Emma Lyon de Leon to furnish the court within five days from
receipt thereof all the names the of heirs entitled to share in the partition of
the subject property. 9
On October 1, 1986, the petitioners filed a manifestation praying that the
court issue an order directing the partition of the property in consonance the
decision dated December 17, 1974 of the trial court the order of said court
dated May 28, 1986. 10
Without ruling on the manifestation, the lower court issued an order directing
the Board of Commissioners to immediately partition the said property. 11
On January 3, 1987, the private respondents filed motion for clarification as
to whether the partition of property is to be confined merely among the party
plaintiffs and defendants, to the exclusion of Mary Lyon Martin. 12
On January 9, 1987, the lower court issued the assailed order directing the
inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin as co-owner with a share in the partition of the
property, to wit:
"After a perusal of the decision of the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. No. 57265-
R, where this case was appealed by the unsatisfied parties, there is a finding
that Mary now Mary Lyon Martin is one of the legitimate children of Frank C.
Lyon and Mary Ekstrom. (Page 3 of the decision).
In view of this finding, it would be unfair and unjust if she would be left out in
the partition of this property now undertaking (sic) by the said court appointed
commissioners.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court appointed commissioners is
hereby directed to include Mary Lyon Martin as co-owner in the said property
subject of partition with the corresponding shares adjudicated to her.
SO ORDERED." 13
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration 14 of the aforesaid order was denied
by the trial court. 15
On February 22, 1990 the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing
petitioners' appeal, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no legal impediment to
the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin by the court-appointed Board of
Commissioners as one of the heirs who shall benefit from the partition, the
instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED." 16
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on June 6, 1990. 17
Petitioners filed this petition for review alleging that the Court of Appeals has
decided questions of substance contrary to law and the applicable decisions
of this Court, for the following reasons:
"1.) BY SUSTAINING THE ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
DIRECTING THE COURT APPOINTED BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS TO
INCLUDE MARY L. MARTIN TO SHARE IN THE PARTITION OF THE
PROPERTY IN LITIGATION DESPITE THE FACT, OVER WHICH THERE
IS NO DISPUTE, THAT SHE HAS NOT LITIGATED EITHER AS A PARTY
PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 872, IT HAS REFUSED
TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION TO AMEND OR MODIFY THE JUDGMENT IN CIVIL CASE
NO. 872 AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DATED 28 MAY
1986 WHICH HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
2.) WHEN THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS CATEGORICALLY STATED
THAT MARY L. MARTIN "NEVER LITIGATED AS ONE OF THE
PLAINTIFFS IN SAID CASE," AND HER ONLY PARTICIPATION THEREIN
WAS SIMPLY CONFINED "AS A WITNESS FOR DEFENDANT-SISTER
LUISA LY ON NUÑAL," AND TO ALLOW HER TO SHARE IN THE
PARTITION THIS LATE WITHOUT REQUIRING A PROCEEDING WHERE
THE PARTIES COULD PROVE THEIR RESPECTIVE CLAIMS, IS
TANTAMOUNT TO DENYING THE NUÑALS OF THEIR RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS. 18
The crux of this case is whether of not the trial court may order the inclusion
of Mary L. Martin as co-heir entitled to participate in the partition of the
property considering that she was neither a party plaintiff nor a party
defendant in Civil Case No. 872 for partition and accounting of the aforesaid
property and that the decision rendered in said case has long become final
and executory.
Petitioners contend that the trial court's decision dated December 14, 1974 in
Civil Case No. 872 ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3141 among plaintiffs and defendants has
long become final and executory. Hence the trial court has no jurisdiction to
issue the questioned Order dated January 9, 1987 ordering the Board of
Commissioners to include Mary Lyon Martin to share in the partition of said
property despite the fact that she was not a party to the said case. Said
Order, therefore, resulted in an amendment or modification of its decision
rendered in Civil Case No. 872.
We find merit in the instant petition.
In the ease of Manning International Corporation v. NLRC, 19 We held that ".
. ., nothing is more settled in the law than that when a final judgment
becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The
judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification
is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by
the Court rendering it or by the highest Court of land. The only recognized
exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called
nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course,
where the judgment is void."
Furthermore, "(a)ny amendment. or alteration which substantially affects a
final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including
the entire proceedings held for that purpose." 20
In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 872 has
become final and executory. Thus, upon its finality, the trial judge lost his
jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, any modification that he would
make, as in this case, the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin would be in excess
of his authority.
The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit against the
parties in Civil Case No. 872 and all other heirs for her share in the subject
property, in order that all the parties in interest can prove their respective
claims.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated January 9, 1987
of the trial Court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The decision of the trial court dated December 17, 1974 in
Civil Case No. 872 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
25. G.R. No. 44347 September 27, 1938
FELIX PAULINO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALEJANDRO SEVA, defendant-appellant.
Callera, Sierra and Salazar for appellant.
Gregorio A. Sabater for appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This case was certified by the Court of Appeals to this Supreme Court for
proper action in accordance with the provisions of section 145-H of
Commonwealth Act No. 3, as it was discovered that it was originally
commenced in the justice of the peace court of Oas, Albay, and judgment
having been rendered therein, an appeal was taken to the Court of First
Instance of said province. The judge of the Court of First Instance delegated
the case to the justice of the peace of the capital and the latter, by virtue of
said delegation, tried the same and decided it. From his judgment, an appeal
was taken to the Court of Appeals.
It was sought to collect from the defendant-appellant the sum of P210, plus
42 cavans of palay, or in lieu thereof, the sum of P84. By reason of the
amount of the demand, the action was properly instituted in the justice of the
peace court of Oas, Albay, so that the case was brought to the Court of First
Instance of Albay on appeal. Such being the case, the judge of the Court of
First Instance could not delegate the trial thereof to the justice of the peace of
the capital, because, according to the provisions of Act No. 4090, he is
empowered to make such delegation only in cases originally cognizable by
him (Dumlao vs. Asuncion, G. R. No. 37027 [58 Phil., 904]). Wherefore,
inasmuch as the delegation made by the judge of the Court of First Instance
in favor of the justice of the peace of the capital of the Province of Albay is
null and void, and as all the proceedings conducted by said justice of the
peace, including the judgment rendered by him, are null and void, this case is
ordered remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay so that it may
conduct the trial and render its decision by virtue of its appellate jurisdiction,
without costs. So ordered.
26. G.R. No. L-14157 October 26, 1960
In the matter of escheat proceedings of the estate of the deceased
Anne Fallon Murphy and Tomas Fallon married to Julia Fallon.
MUNICIPALITIES OF MAGALLON, ISABELA and LA CASTELLANA,
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
IGNATIUS HENRY BEZORE, ET AL., oppositors-heirs appellants.
Martiniano O. dela Cruz for appellant.
Assistant General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco for
appellees.
LABRADOR, J.:
These are escheat proceedings instituted by the Municipalities of Magallon,
La Castellana and Isabela, Province of Negros Occidental, in the Court of
First Instance of that province, praying that the estates of the deceased Anne
Fallon Murphy and Thomas Fallon the latter married to Julia Fallon,
consisting of agricultural lands and residential lots, as well as accrued rentals
deposited with the Warner, Barnes and Co., Ltd., be escheated in favor of
the above-named municipalities, respectively, wherever the real estates are
situated. Finding that the petition was in order, the judge of the court ordered
the publication of the petition and set the same for hearing before itself on
October 9, 1957.
The evidence shows that the properties sought to be escheated originally to
Charles J. Fallon, an American citizen, married to Rosario Santaromana.
Fallon died in Manila on March 25, 1935, so his wife acquired by inheritance
one-half of the said properties as owner, and the other half as usufructuary.
The value of the properties of Charles J. Fallon in 1936 is estimated at
P46l,105.41 (Exhibit "H"). His wife Rosario Santaromana died in 1943, and
thereupon the properties which she held in usufruct were transmitted to the
brother and sister of her deceased husband, namely, Thomas Fallon and
Anne Fallon Murphy. The value of the estate belonging to both Thomas
Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy were residents of the United States and as
nothing was known about them from their relatives in the United States, the
petitioning municipalities believed that they had died without heirs. Hence the
petition for escheat.
At the hearing of the petition, evidence was submitted that Anne Fallon
Murphy died on March 12, 1936 in San Francisco, California (ROA p. 21),
while Thomas Fallon, died on May 26, 1936, also in San Francisco,
California (ROA p. 25). Julia Fallon, on the other hand, died in San
Francisco, California on December 2, 1944 (ROA p. 26).
Opposition to the petition for escheat was filed by Ignatius Bezore. Elwood
Knickerbocker and Mary Irene Fallon McCormick Henry Bezore claims that
he is the a nephew of the decedents because his mother was their sister.
Elwood Knickerbocker also claims to be the sole legatee of his wife Loreta
Knickerbocker, who in turn, was the residuary legatee of Anne Fallon
Murphy. Mary Irene Murphy McCormick likewise claims that she is the niece
of the decedents as her father was a brother of said decedents. Conformably
to their petitions, all the oppositors pray that the petition for escheat be
dismissed and that the properties of the decedents be disturbed among
them.
The court, after hearing, found that Anne Fallon Murphy died in San
Francisco on March 12, 1936 and Thomas Fallon, also in the same city on
May 26, 1936; that Thomas Fallon was survived by his wife Julia Fallon, who
in turn, died in San Francisco on December 22, 1944; that Ane Fallon
Murphy executed a will on February 7, 1935, which was admitted to probate
on May 7, 1937. Considering these facts the court denied the petition for
escheat of the properties of the deceased Anne Fallon Murphy and Thomas
Fallon, for the reason that Thomas Fallon died with an heir his wife Julia
Fallon, and Anne Fallon Murphy, for her part, died leaving a will, in which she
disposed of all her properties.
As to prayers contained in the opposition asking that the oppositors be
declared heirs of the deceased Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy, the
court declared that the evidence submitted was not competent or sufficient to
sustain the claim of the oppositors and, therefore denied said prayers.
The petitioning municipalities presented no appeal, but the oppositors did
appeal, claiming that the lower court erred in not rendering judgment in their
favor and in not declaring them heirs of the decedents Anne Fallon Murphy
and Thomas Fallon.
This appeal can not be entertained. While it is possible for the estates of the
deceased Anne Fallon Murphy and Thomas Fallon, who at the time of their
death were residents of San Francisco, California, to be settled here, or more
especially in Negros Occidental where they had properties, these
proceedings were instituted as escheat proceedings and not for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons. The court acquired jurisdiction
to hear the petition for escheat by virtue of the publication of the petition for
escheat. The jurisdiction acquired can not be converted into one for the
distribution of the properties of the said decedents. For such proceedings (for
the distribution of the estate of the decedents) to be instituted, the proper
parties must be presented and the proceedings should comply with the
requirements of the Rule. Hence, the court of First Instance did not have the
power to order, or to proceed with, the distribution of the estates of the
decedents in these escheat proceedings, and adjudicate the properties to the
oppositors.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it hereby is,
affirmed, without costs.
27. G.R. No. L-45460 February 25, 1938
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, ET
AL., applicants-appellants,
vs.
COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, INC., ET AL., oppositors-appellees.
Juan S. Rustia for appellants.
Araneta, Zaragoza and Araneta for appellee Colegio de San Jose, Inc.
Francisco Alfonso for appellee Young.
IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Laguna of
October 29, 1936, which denied the applicants motion questioning the
appearance and intervention in the case of the oppositors Colegio de San
Jose and Carlos Young, and from the resolution of the 30th of the same
month which denied the petition for escheat filed by the said petitioners, with
the costs against the latter.
This case was commenced in the said by a petition filed by the petitioners in
behalf of the municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, wherein they
claim the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasa by the right of escheat. The
Colegio de San Jose, Inc., appeared specially and assailed the petition upon
the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance and decide
the case and that the petition does not allege sufficient facts to entitle the
applicants to the remedy prayed for; and asked that the petition be finally
dismissed. Carlos Young intervened and filed a motion asking for the
dismissal or the petition upon the ground that the Code of Civil Procedure,
under which the same was filed, is not applicable because it was not yet in
force when the original owner of the hacienda died, which was in April, 1596,
and that the petition was irregularly docketed as the applicants had paid at
the docket fees which the clerk of court should collect. Subsequently the
attorneys for both parties filed another motions of minor importance, almost
all of which contains the arguments advanced in support of their contentions.
On October 29, 1936, the court overruled the objection to the appearance
and intervention in the case by the Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young,
entering the order which is one of those appealed from. And on the 30th of
the same moth the court entered the resolution, also appealed from,
dismissing the petition for escheat, with the costs to the petitioners.
The petitioners attribute to the court the following errors: "(1) In overruling the
objection of the appellant of September 2, 1936, and in not excluding the
appellees Carlos Young and Colegio de San Jose, Inc., from these
proceedings. (2) In sustaining definitely the appellees' petitions to dismiss,
without previous hearing and in derogation of the right to amend in any case.
(3) In improperly and unseasonably taking judicial notice of certain facts in
other judicial records to reinforce the appealed resolutions, and in
erroneously distorting those facts judicially taken notice of. (4) In holding that
the municipality of San Jose has neither right standing to file a petition for
escheat; that the petition does not state facts sufficient a cause of action and
that the same does not lie, and that the Court of First Instance of Laguna is
without jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide said petition. (5) In
finally dismissing the petition upon the dilatory exceptions thereto, and the
ordering the payment of costs when no hearing has yet taken place."
1. The sworn petition which gave rise to the proceeding is based upon the
provisions of section 750 and 751 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the English
text of which reads:1ªvvphïl.nët
SEC. 750. Procedure when person dies intestate without heirs. —
When a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property in
the Philippines Islands, leaving no heir or person by law entitled to
the same, the president and municipal council of the municipality
where the deceased last resided, if he was an inhabitant of these
Islands, or of the municipality in which he had estate, if he resided
out of the Islands, may, on behalf of the municipality, the file a
petition with the Court of First Instance of the province for an
inquisition in the premises; the court shall there upon appoint a time
and place of hearing, and deciding on such petition, and cause a
notice thereof to be published in some newspaper of general
circulation in the province of which the deceased was last an
inhabitant, if within the Philippines Island, and if not, some
newspaper of general circulation in the province in which he had
estate. The notice shall recite the substance of the facts and request
set forth in the petition, the time and place at which persons claiming
the estate may appear and be heard before the court, and shall be
published at least six weeks successively, the last of which
publication shall be at least six weeks before the time appointed by
the court to make inquisition.
 SEC. 751. Decree of the court in such case. — If, at the time
appointed for the that purpose, the court that the person died
intestate, seized of real or personal property in the Islands, leaving
no heirs or person entitled to the same and no sufficient cause is
shown to the contrary, the court shall order and decree that the
estate of the deceased in these Islands, after the payment of just
debts and charges, shall escheat; and shall assign the personal
estate to the municipality where he was last an inhabitant in the
Islands, and the real estate to the municipality in which the same is
situated. If he never was a inhabitant of the Islands, the whole estate
may be assigned to the several municipalities where the same is
located. Such estate shall be for the use of schools in the
municipalities, respectively, and shall be managed and disposed or
by the municipal council like other property appropriated to the use of
schools.
Accordingly to the first of the said sections, the essential facts which should
be alleged in the petition, which are jurisdiction because they confer
jurisdiction upon the Court of First Instance, are: That a person has died
intestate or without leaving any will; that he has left real or personal property;
that he was the owner thereof; that he has not left any heir or person who is
by law entitled to the property; and that the one who applies for the escheat
is the municipality where deceased had his last residence, or in case should
have no residence in the country, the municipality where the property is
situated.
The following section provides that after the publications and trial, if the court
finds that the deceased is in fact the owner of real and personal property
situated in the country and has not left any heirs or other person entitled
thereto, it may order, after the payments of debts and other legal expenses,
the escheat, and in such case it shall adjudicate the personal property to the
municipality where the deceased had his last place of residence and the real
property to the municipality or municipalities where they are situated.
Escheat, under sections 750 and 751, is a proceeding whereby the real and
personal property of a deceased person become the property of the State
upon his death without leaving any will or legal heirs (21 C.J., sec. 1, p. 848;
American L. & T. Co. vs. Grand River Co., 159 Fed., 775; In re Miner, 143
Cal., 194; Johnston vs. Spicer 107 N.Y., 185; Wright vs. Methodist Episcopal
Church, Hoffm. [N.Y.], 201; In re Linton's, 198 Pa., 438; State vs. Goldberg,
113 Tenn., 298). It is not an ordinary action contemplated by section 1 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, but a special proceeding in accordance with the
said section and Chapter XXXIX, Part II, of the same Code. The proceeding,
as provided by section 750, should be commenced by petition and not by
complaint.
In a special proceeding for escheat under section 750 and 751 the petitioner
is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have a
direct right or interest in the property sought to be escheated is likewise and
interest and necessary party and may appear and oppose the petition for
escheat. In the present case the Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and Carlos
Young appeared alleging to have a material interest in the Hacienda de San
Pedro Tunasa; and the former because it claims to be the exclusive owner of
the hacienda, and the latter because he claim to be the lessee thereof under
a contract legality entered with the former. In view of these allegations it is
erroneous to hold that the said parties are without right either to appear in
case or to substantiate their respective alleged right. This unfavorably
resolves the petitioners' first assignment of error.
2. The final dismissal of the petition for escheat decreed by the court is
assigned by the petitioners as the second error committed by it upon the
contention that the demurrer, to which amount the motions for dismissal, is
not a pleading authorized by law in this kind of proceeding and because, in
any event, the court should have given them an opportunity to amend the
petition.
Chapter XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, relative to the escheat of
properties, does not in fact authorize the filing of a demurrer to the petition
presented for that purpose, and section 91 and 99 permitting the interposition
of demurrers to the complaint and answer, respectively, are not applicable to
special proceedings. But is no reason of a procedure nature which prevents
the filing of a motion to dismiss based upon any of the grounds provided by
law for a demurrer to a complaint. In such case, the motion to dismiss pays
the role of a demurrer and the court should resolve the legal question raised
therein. When, for instance, a petition for escheat does not state facts which
entitle the petitioner to the remedy prayed from and even admitting them
hypothetically it is clear that there are nor grounds for the court to proceed to
the inquisition provided by law, we see no reason to disallow an interest party
from filing a motion to dismiss the petition which is untenable from all
standpoints. And when the motion to dismiss is entertained upon this ground,
the petition may be dismissed unconditionally and the petitioner is not
entitled, as in the case of a demurrer, to be afforded an opportunity to amend
his petition.
3. The petitioners assign as third error the judicial notice which the court took
of the complaint filed in civil case No. 6790, docketed and pending in the
same court, wherein the petitioner recognized the personality Colegio de San
Jose, Inc., and Carlos Young and the latters' interest in said action of
interpleader and in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan which is the same
subject matter of the instant proceedings.
In general, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the
adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of
the other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the
same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been
heard or are actually pending before the same judge. (U.S. vs. Claveria, 29
Phil., 527.) The rule is squarely applicable to the present case, wherefore, we
hold that the assignment of error is tenable.
4. In the appealed resolution the court held that the municipality of San
Pedro, represented by the petitioners, has no personality to institute the
petition for escheat that the latter does not state sufficient facts, and that the
court is without jurisdiction either to take cognizance of the proceeding or to
grant the remedy sought. These legal conclusions are the subject matter of
the fourth assignment of error.
According to the allegations of the petition, the petitioners base their right to
the escheat upon the fact that the temporal properties of the Father of the
Society of Jesus, among them, the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, were
confiscated by order of the King of Spain and passed from then on the Crown
of Spain. The following allegations of the petition are important and specific
and clearly the theory maintained by the petitioners: "11. As a result of the
perpetual expulsion of the Jesuits in their dominions, the King also decreed
the confiscation of all their properties, estate, rents, foundation, etc., in favor
of the Crown of Spain, and the order of the King was thus complied with here
in the Philippines. The Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasa from then on passed
to the Crown of Spain under the administration and management on its
respective here, the Governor-General of the Philippines Islands. 12. As a
result of the war between Spain and the United States, the latter acquired by
way of transfer, all the properties of the Crown of Spain in the Philippines,
under articles III and VIII of the Treaty of Peace entered into in Paris on
December 10, 1989, and among which properties was included the Hacienda
de San Pedro Tunasan. 13. That the said hacienda thereafter passed to the
Government of the Philippines Islands by virtue of the Act of the United
States Congress of July 1, 1992 (Philippine Bill), by mere administration for
the benefit of the inhabitant of the Philippines; and there after, under the
Tydings-McDuffie law approved by the same Congress on March 24, 1934,
section 5, the United States, in turn, have ceded to the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, upon its inauguration, all the properties, estate, etc., ceded by
Spain to the United States as above stated, among them being the Hacienda
de San Pedro Tunasan. Said Commonwealth was inaugurated on November
15, 1935."
If the hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan,, which is the only property sought to
be escheated and adjudicated to the municipality of San Pedro, has already
passed to the ownership of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, it is
evident that the petitioners cannot claim that the same be escheated to the
said municipality, because it is no longer the case of real property owned by
a deceased person who has not left any heirs or person who may legality
claim it, these being the conditions required by section 750 and without which
a petition for escheat should not lie from the moment the hacienda was
confiscated by the Kingdom of Spain, the same ceased to be the property of
the children of Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, the Colegio de San Jose or
the Jesuit Father, and became the property of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines by virtue of the transfer under the Treaty of Paris, alleged in the
petition. If the municipality of San Pedro believes that it has some other right
to the hacienda, distinct from the escheat relied upon in its petition which
gave rise to this proceeding, it should bring the proper action, but it cannot
avail itself successfully of the remedy provided by section 750 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. We, therefore, hold that the court did not commit the error
assigned in ruling that the petition does not allege sufficient facts justifying
the escheat of the hacienda in favor of the municipality of San Pedro and in
finally dismissing the same. Having reached this conclusion we do not
believe it necessary to go into further considerations regarding the
personality of the municipality of San Pedro and the court's lack of
jurisdiction.
5. The last assignment of error does not require any further consideration.
The questions raised therein have already been passed upon in the
preceding considerations, with the exception of the order to pay costs. With
respect thereto, there is no reason why they should not be taxed against the
petitioners, they being defeated party (section 487, Code of Civil Procedure).
That no trial was had is not a bar to the imposition of costs under the
provisions of section 492.
For the foregoing reasons, the appealed order and resolution are affirmed,
with the costs of this instance against the petitioners and appellants. So
ordered.
28. G.R. No. 141273 May 17, 2005
JOSE RIVERO, JESSIE RIVERO and AMALIA RIVERO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MARY JANE DY CHIAO*-DE GUZMAN, and
BENITO DY CHIAO, JR., represented by his uncle HENRY S. DY
CHIAO, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 44261 annulling the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 19, in Civil Case No.
RTC'96-3612.
The Antecedents
On August 27, 1996, Benedick Arevalo filed a Complaint2 against Mary Jane
Dy Chiao-De Guzman, Benito Dy Chiao, Jr., and Benson Dy Chiao, in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, for compulsory recognition as the
illegitimate child of their father, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., and for the
administration and partition of his estate as he had died intestate on July 27,
1995. Since Benedick was a minor, his natural mother and guardian ad
litem, Shirley Arevalo, filed the complaint on his behalf. Concepcion, Benito
Sr.'s wife, was not impleaded as she had died on July 7, 1995. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. RTC ′96-3612 and raffled to Branch 19 of the
court.3
Benedick, whose counsel was Atty. Amador L. Simando, made the following
allegations in his complaint:
During his lifetime, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. was engaged in business, under the
business name Benito Commercial in Naga City. He courted Shirley Arevalo
(Benedick's mother) in 1991, assuring her of his sincere love, likewise
promising that her college education would be financed and that she would
be provided with a better life. Blinded by his promises and assurances of his
love for her, Shirley agreed to an amorous relationship with Benito, Sr. True
to his word, Benito, Sr. then provided her with a residential house and lot
located in Canaman, Camarines Sur, where they cohabited and resided; he
also financed her college education in midwifery. On October 5, 1995,
"Benedick Arevalo Dy Chiao, Jr.," the plaintiff, was born, the product of the
amorous relationship, whom Benito, Sr. acknowledged as his son. He also
continued to give Shirley and their son financial and moral support.
It was also alleged that the Dy Chiao siblings recognized Benedick as the
illegitimate son of their father. Moreover, when he died intestate, Benito, Sr.
left behind residential lands and commercial buildings
worth P100,000,000.00, more or less; as such, there was a need for the
appointment of an administrator of the estate to preserve his (Benedick's)
rights over the same before its partition. It was prayed that upon the filing of
the complaint, Benedick's mother be appointed as his guardian ad litem, that
an administrator of the estate of the deceased be appointed, and that after
due proceedings, judgment be rendered in favor of Benedick, as follows:
a. declaring the Plaintiff as the illegitimate son of the late Benito Dy
Chiao.
b. ordering herein Defendants to recognize and acknowledge the
Plaintiff as the illegitimate son of the late Benito Dy Chiao.
c. ordering the Partition of the Estate of Benito Dy Chiao and
distributing the same in favor of the Defendants and herein Plaintiff in
a manner provided for by law.
d. granting the Plaintiff such other reliefs as may be just and
equitable under the law.4
In an answer to the complaint, Mary Jane, through counsel, for herself, and
purportedly in behalf of her brothers, denied the allegations that Shirley and
her father had an amorous relationship and that Benedick was the illegitimate
son of their father for want of knowledge or information; the allegation that
they had recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of their father was,
likewise, specifically denied. Finally, she alleged that the plaintiff's action was
for a claim against the estate of their father, which should be filed in an action
for the settlement of the estate of their deceased parents.5
On October 28, 1996, Benedick filed a Motion,6 praying that the court order a
mental examination of the Dy Chiao brothers, who were patients at the Don
Susano J. Rodriguez Mental Hospital, and for the appointment of their sister
as their guardian ad litem in the case. It was, likewise, prayed that the
director of the hospital be summoned to appear before the court to inform it
of the mental condition of the Dy Chiao brothers.
On December 6, 1996, Benedick filed a Motion7 set for hearing on December
9, 1996, reiterating his plea for the appointment of Mary Jane as guardian ad
litem of her brothers. That same day, however, the plaintiff, through counsel,
filed a "Compromise Agreement" dated November 24, 1996, with the
following signatories to the agreement: Shirley Arevalo, for the plaintiff and
assisted by counsel, Atty. Amador L. Simando; and Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De
Guzman, assisted by counsel, Atty. Adan Marcelo B. Botor, purportedly for
and in behalf of her brothers.
Appended to the agreement was a photocopy of a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA)8 dated September 20, 1995, notarized and certified by Atty. Edmundo
L. Simando, purportedly signed by the Dy Chiao brothers, who were then still
confined in the hospital. Mary Jane was therein appointed to be their
attorney-in-fact, with the following powers:
1. To represent us in negotiations and be our representative with
power to sign Agreements or Contracts of Lease involving property
and/or assets belonging to the estate of our late father Benito Dy
Chiao, Sr. while said estate is not yet settled between (sic) all heirs;
as well as to collect rentals and other money due to the estate by
reason of said agreements or contracts;
2. To file or cause to be filed the necessary proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of our late father, and to ask for letters of
administration in her favor as a next of kin or as someone selected
by us, next of kin, to be the administrator.
On December 13, 1996, the trial court approved the agreement and rendered
judgment on the basis thereof, quoted as follows:
Before this Court is a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT entered into by
and between the parties in this case which is herein below quoted,
thus:
"COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
Plaintiff and defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman duly
assisted by their respective counsels hereby submit the
following Compromise Agreement:
1. That the defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman
hereby recognizes the plaintiff as the illegitimate son of her
deceased father Benito Dy Chiao, Sr.;
2. That in full satisfaction and settlement of plaintiff's claim
from the estate of the late Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., defendant
Maryjane Dy Chiao De Guzman for herself and in behalf of
her brothers, who are likewise defendants in this case,
hereby agree and bind herself to pay the plaintiff the amount
of P6,000,000.00 which shall be taken from the estate of the
late Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., which amount shall be payable
under the following terms and conditions:
a. The amount of P1,500,000.00 shall be payable
upon signing of this Compromise Agreement;
b. The balance of P4,500,000.00 shall be payable
within the period of one year from the date of signing
of this Compromise Agreement and for which the
defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman shall
issue twelve (12) checks corresponding to the said
balance in the amount of P375,000.00 per check;
 3. That the parties hereby waive other claims and On April 18, 1997, Benedick terminated the services of Atty. Simando since
counterclaims against each other; he was Mary Jane's counsel in Special Proceedings No. 96-684.
4. That any violation of this Compromise Agreement shall On April 28, 1997, the sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Real
render the same to be immediately executory. Property13 over five parcels of land titled under Benito Dy Chiao, Sr.,
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable including the improvements thereon.
Court that the foregoing Compromise Agreement be The Dy Chiao brothers, represented by their uncle, Henry S. Dy Chiao, then
approved and a decision be rendered in accordance filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Urgent Prayer for
therewith. the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order dated May 27, 1997,
Naga City, Philippines, November 24, 1996. assailing the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612, as well as
(SGD.) the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto. The petition alleged that the Dy
BENEDICK AREVALO Chiao brothers had no legal capacity to be sued because they were of
Plaintiff MARYJANE DY unsound GUZMAN
CHIAO-DE mind, which impelled their uncle Henry to file a petition for
Defendant guardianship over their person and property, now pending in the RTC of
Naga City, Branch 61, docketed as Special Proceedings No. RTC'97-695.
represented by: They did not authorize their sister Mary Jane to execute any compromise
(SGD.) agreement for and in their behalf; yet, in confabulation with Benedick's
SHIRLEY AREVALO counsel, she was able to secure a judgment based on a void compromise
Natural Guardian & Guardian agreement. It was further alleged that the Dy Chiao brothers were unaware
Ad Litem of the complaint against them and that they did not engage the services of
Assisted by: the law firm of Botor, Hidalgo & Fernando Associates to represent them as
(SGD.) (SGD.) counsel in said cases. As such, the said counsel had no authority to file the
AMADOR L. SIMANDO ADAN MARCELO answer to the BOTOR
complaint for and in their behalf. It was further pointed out that
Counsel for the Plaintiff Counsel for the Defendants" less than a month before the said compromise agreement was executed by
WHEREFORE, finding the foregoing Compromise Agreement to be their sister, she filed purportedly in their behalf, on November 22, 1996, a
the law between the parties, not being tainted with infirmities, petition for the settlement of the estate of their parents in the RTC of Naga
irregularities, fraud and illegalities, and the same not being contrary City, with the assistance of Atty. Simando (Benedick's counsel), as well as
to law, public order, public policy, morals and good customs, for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, docketed as Special
JUDGMENT is hereby rendered APPROVING the same. Proceedings No. RTC'96-684.14 There was thus collusion between Mary
Parties are hereby enjoined to faithfully abide by the terms and Jane and Atty. Simando.
conditions of the foregoing Compromise Agreement. The Dy Chiao brothers, likewise, opposed the appointment of their sister as
No pronouncement as to costs. the administrator of their parents' estate.15 The verification and certification of
SO ORDERED.9 non-forum shopping in the petition was signed by their uncle Henry as their
It appears that a copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to the Dy representative.
Chiao brothers to the "Benito Commercial Building, Naga City." On May 29, 1997, the CA issued a status quo order. However, before the
On December 17, 1996, Mary Jane, through Atty. Simando, (the counsel for said order was served on Benedick, several lots covered by Transfer
Benedick in Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612), filed a petition with the RTC for Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 16931 in the name of Benito, Sr. had already
the settlement of the estate of her father and for her appointment as been sold at public auction: Lot No. 3, to Jose Rivero for P6,400,000.00; Lot
administrator thereto. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. No. 4 to Jessie Rivero for P7,600,000.00 and Lot No. 5, for P7,000,000.00, to
RTC′96-684 and raffled to Branch 20 of the court; it was later transferred to Amalia Rivero. Another property covered by TCT No. 5299 had also been
Branch 19. sold to Consuelo Dy for P310,000.00.16 The buyers at public auction had
On April 3, 1997, Benedick filed a Motion for Execution, 10 of the Decision already remitted the amounts of P15,319,364.00 and P162,836.00 to the
dated November 24, 1996, on the allegation that the defendants had failed to executing sheriffs,17 who later remitted P5,711,164.00 to Benedick through
comply with their obligations under the compromise agreement. The trial his mother, Shirley, in satisfaction of the decision,18 and the remainder given
11
court granted the motion in an Order dated April 7, 1997. Conformably, it to the Clerk of Court of the RTC.
12
issued a Writ of Execution for the enforcement of the said decision.
On June 3, 1997, Sheriffs Arthur S. Cledera and Arnel Jose A. Rubio
executed a Provisional Certificate of Sale19over the property to the buyers at
public auction.
The Dy Chiao brothers, through their uncle Henry, then filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction with urgent prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order, informing the CA of the recent
developments in the case below. In a Resolution20 dated July 14, 1997, the
appellate court granted their plea for a writ of preliminary injunction upon the
filing of a P500,000.00 bond, directing as follows:
(a) the private respondents and/or the sheriffs of the respondent
court to deposit before the Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 19, Naga City, the proceeds of the public auction
sale held on June 3, 1997 and to submit to this Court within five (5)
days from notice, proof of compliance therewith;
(b) Sheriffs Arnel Jose Rubio and Arthur Cledera, through the
respondent court, to refrain from issuing any certificate of sale over
the properties sold at the public auction sale conducted on the
aforementioned date;
(c) the respondent court to issue a notice of lis pendens on all the
properties affected by [the] public auction sale conducted on June 3,
1997 and cause its registration with the Register of Deeds concerned
within five (5) days from notice.
The sheriff was, likewise, directed to refrain and/or cease and desist from
issuing/effecting any further certificate of sale over the affected
properties.21 On August 15, 1997, the RTC issued an Order22 directing the
Register of Deeds of Naga City to comply with the CA resolution.
Meantime, Benson died intestate on June 25, 1997.23 His brother, Benito, Jr.
then filed a Notice of Death and Substitution, and thereafter, a Motion to
Admit an Amended Petition to drop Benson as petitioner, and the inclusion of
his sister Mary Jane, as party respondent, as well as those who participated
in the public auction, namely, Jose Rivero, Jessie Rivero, Amalia Rivero and
Consuelo Dy. The CA granted the motion in a Resolution24 dated January 14,
1998.
Thereafter, Atty. Botor, Mary Jane's new counsel, filed an Entry of
Appearance with Motion to Dismiss,25 alleging, inter alia, that an extrajudicial
settlement between the heirs of the spouses Dy Chiao had already been
executed. Benito, Jr., represented by his uncle Henry, opposed the
motion,26 alleging that a dismissal grounded on the extrajudicial settlement
alone was improper, since what was being assailed was a decision of a court
based on a compromise agreement involving one who is not a party thereto,
with third-party bidders acting in bad faith. In a Resolution 27 dated February
27, 1998, the CA directed Mary Jane to submit her reply to the opposition to
the motion to dismiss filed by Henry on behalf of Benito, Jr.
In her compliance and comment/manifestation,28 Mary Jane declared that
there appeared to be a sound basis for the nullification of the assailed
decision since the illegitimate filiation of Benedick could not be the subject of
a compromise agreement. She further alleged that the parties thereunder did
not recognize the validity of the compromise agreement, as in fact she and
the petitioners were exploring the possibility of modifying their extrajudicial
settlement.29
Benedick, represented by his mother Shirley, presented before the appellate
court an SPA dated October 31, 1996 executed by Benito, Jr., prepared by
Atty. Simando, authorizing Atty. Botor to enter into a compromise agreement
in the RTC.30
On March 31, 1999, the CA rendered judgment in favor of Benito, Jr.,
granting the petition and nullifying the assailed decision and writ of execution
issued by the RTC, including the sale at public auction of the property of the
deceased. The appellate court ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
Benedick's action for recognition as the illegitimate son of Benito, Sr. and for
the partition of his estate. It further held that the filiation of a person could not
be the subject of a compromise agreement; hence, the RTC acted without
jurisdiction in rendering judgment based thereon. It concluded that the said
compromise agreement was procured through extrinsic fraud.
The CA ordered the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Naga City to deliver to the
trial court within ten days from finality of said judgment, the amount
of P15,482,200.00, together with all interests earned therefrom, and to
thereafter distribute the aggregate amount to the buyers of the said
properties, in proportion to the amounts they had paid. It also ordered
Benedick, through his mother Shirley, to turn over to the trial court, within ten
days from finality of judgment, the amount of P5,711,164.00 received from
Sheriffs Rubio and Cledera, together with all other amounts that she might
have been paid pursuant to the compromise agreement. This was, however,
without prejudice to the buyers' right of recourse against Mary Jane, who was
declared subsidiarily liable therefor. The RTC was, likewise, directed to
return to the buyers the aggregate amount in the same proportion as above
stated; thereafter, the properties would be delivered to the intestate estate of
Benito, Sr. for proper disposition by the intestate court.31
Jose Rivero, Jessie Rivero and Amalia Rivero filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the decision, on the following grounds:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT IS INVALID DUE TO
EXTRINSIC FRAUD;
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITHOUT
JURISDICTION IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED JUDGMENT IN
THIS CASE;
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE PUBLIC AUCTION SALE CONDUCTED ON JUNE 2,
1997 WAS VOID; AND
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS JOSE, JESSIE AND AMALIA,
ALL SURNAMED RIVERO COULD NOT HAVE LEGALLY BECOME
 THE OWNERS OF THE PROPERTIES SOLD AT THE PUBLIC
AUCTION SALE.32
Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration thereof, they filed the
present petition for review on certiorari.
The Present Petition
The petitioners raise the following issues: (1) whether or not Henry Dy Chiao
had the authority to file the amended petition for Benito Dy Chiao, Jr.; (2)
whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of Benedick Arevalo
for recognition as the illegitimate son of the deceased Benito Dy Chiao, Sr.,
as well as the action for partition and distribution of the latter's estate; and (3)
whether the decision of the RTC based on the compromise agreement is null
and void for extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.33
On the first issue, the petitioners aver that the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping contained in the petition with the CA was executed by
Henry; hence, it was he and not Benson or Benito, Jr. who filed the petition.
Moreover, Henry had no proof of his authority to file the petition for and in
behalf of the brothers. The petitioners assert that there was no need for
Henry to file the petition with the CA, since the Dy Chiao brothers had the
legal capacity to do so, as admitted by their counsel, and Henry himself.
Moreover, there was no law mandating Henry to represent his nephews in all
actions which may redound to their benefit.
The petitioners point out that although Henry sought to remedy the situation
by filing an amended petition praying that he be appointed as guardian ad
litem for the Dy Chiao brothers, the CA did not take cognizance of the
allegations in the petition. The CA was correct in so doing, since the matter
of whether one is incompetent should be threshed out in the guardianship
proceedings, Special Proceedings No. RTC'97-695, and not in the CA via a
petition to annul the judgment of the RTC, where Benito, Jr. is also a party
respondent.
On the other issues, the petitioners maintain that the CA erred in annulling
the decision of the RTC based on the compromise agreement on the ground
of extrinsic fraud; the alleged fraud was committed by Mary Jane as an
incident to the trial. What the CA should have done was to dismiss the
petition, without prejudice to the rights of the Dy Chiao brothers to file an
action against their sister. The latter was herself a party to the compromise
agreement and also a principal party to the case; hence, was bound by it. As
a matter of fact, the petitioners aver, Mary Jane was appointed by her
brothers as their attorney-in-fact to negotiate for and execute the
compromise agreement in their behalf.
The petitioners further assert that the RTC had jurisdiction over the petition
filed by Benedick in the RTC, and that the latter's recourse was based on
paragraph 1, Article 172 of the Family Code, although his putative father,
Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., was already dead when the complaint was filed.
The petitioners thus insist that the public auction sale conducted by the
sheriff on the subject properties was valid.
In her comment on the petition, Mary Jane avers that the decision of the CA
holding that the compromise agreement was vitiated by extrinsic fraud is
correct. She claims that she was made to sign the agreement, but was not
informed of its intricacies. She insists that she does not have any liability to
Benedick in Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612, despite her being a signatory to the
said agreement.
For his part, respondent Benito, Jr., through his uncle Henry, avers that the
latter's authority to file the amended petition before the CA in their behalf was
never questioned by the petitioners. He asserts that the CA admitted the
amended petition containing the prayer that his uncle Henry be appointed as
his guardian ad litem. Besides, the CA found that he and his brothers were
not of sound and disposing minds; hence, the need for a guardian ad litem in
the person of his uncle. He further alleges that the compromise agreement
was the product of connivance between his sister and Benedick, and their
respective counsels. He further points out that Atty. Simando, Benedick's
counsel in the RTC, was likewise the counsel for Mary Jane when she filed
her petition for letters of administration in the RTC of Naga City on December
17, 1996. He further insists that the ruling of the CA on the issues of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction of the RTC is in accord with law, and that the
decision based on the compromise agreement was null and void for lack of
jurisdiction.34
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
On the first issue, we reject the petitioners' contention that Henry was the
petitioner who filed the amended petition before the CA. As gleaned from
said petition, the petitioners were "Benito Dy Chiao, Jr. and Benson Dy
Chiao, represented by their uncle Henry S. Dy Chiao." Moreover, Henry had
the authority to file the amended petition and sign the requisite certification
on non-forum shopping when the CA admitted the amended petition and
appointed him as guardian ad litem of his nephews. This was in the January
14, 1998 Resolution of the CA, where the following findings were made:
x x x We find the opposition to be devoid of merit, firstly because
there is an obvious necessity to amend the petition; and secondly,
because the representation of an incompetent need not be by a duly
appointed judicial guardian. A guardian ad litem may be appointed
by the court. In the instant case, the members of this Court who
conducted the several hearings herein, are convinced from an
observation of the petitioners that they are not of a sound or
disposing mind. x x x35
In resolving whether to appoint a guardian ad litem for the respondent, the
appellate court needed only to determine whether the individual for whom a
guardian was proposed was so incapable of handling personal and financial
affairs as to warrant the need for the appointment of a temporary guardian. It
only needed to make a finding that, based on clear and convincing evidence,
the respondent is incompetent and that it is more likely than not that his
welfare requires the immediate appointment of a temporary guardian. 36 A
finding that the person for whom a guardian ad litem is proposed is incapable
of managing his own personal and financial affairs by reason of his mental
illness is enough.37
Guardians ad litem are considered officers of the court in a limited sense,
and the office of such guardian is to represent the interest of the incompetent
or the minor.38 Whether or not to appoint a guardian ad litem for the
petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of the court where the
petition was filed, taking into account the best interest of the incompetent or
the minor.39 The court has discretion in appointing a guardian ad litem that
will best promote the interest of justice.40 The appointment of a guardian ad
litem is designed to assist the court in its determination of the incompetent's
best interest.41
The records will show that no less than Benedick Arevalo sought the
appointment of Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman as guardian ad litem for
respondent Benito Dy Chiao, Jr. and his brother, Benson Dy Chiao, before
the RTC in Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612.
It must be stressed that the appellate court was not proscribed from
appointing Henry as guardian ad litem for the respondents, merely because
of the pendency of his petition for appointment as guardian over their person
and property before Branch 61 of the RTC. Time was of the essence; the
RTC had issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of its decision based
on the compromise agreement; the plaintiff therein, Benedick Arevalo, was
bent on enforcing the same, and had in fact caused the sale of five parcels of
land belonging to the estate of Benito, Sr. worth millions of pesos. Indeed,
the sheriff was able to sell at public auction prime real property of the estate
of the deceased for P20,000,000.00 before the status quo order of the CA
reached him.
It goes without saying that the finding of the CA on the mental capacity of the
respondents is without prejudice to the outcome of the petition in Special
Proceedings No. RTC'97-695.
The petitioners' claims that there was no factual basis for the appellate
court's finding that the respondents were incompetent cannot prevail. It must
be stressed that the CA conducted a hearing before arriving at the
conclusion that respondent Benito, Jr. was incompetent. More importantly,
such claim involves a factual issue which cannot be raised before this Court
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
On the issue of jurisdiction, case law has it that the jurisdiction of the tribunal
over the nature and subject matter of an action is to be determined by the
allegations of the complaint, the law in effect when the complaint was filed
and the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. The caption of the
complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action. If a court is
authorized by statute to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case only and
undertakes to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case to which the statute
has no application, the judgment rendered is void. The lack of statutory
authority to make a particular judgment is akin to lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.42
The CA nullified the decision of the RTC on the ground, inter alia, that the
filiation of Benedick could not be the subject of a compromise, and that Mary
Jane had no authority to execute the compromise agreement for and in
behalf of her brothers.
The petitioners, for their part, maintain that Mary Jane's recognition of
Benedick as the illegitimate son of her father was not a compromise, but an
affirmation of the allegations in the complaint that the Dy Chiao siblings had,
in effect, recognized him as the illegitimate son of their deceased father. The
petitioners posit that the admissions in the compromise agreement are
likewise binding on the Dy Chiao siblings.
The contention of the petitioners is bereft of merit. The Court finds and so
holds that the decision of the RTC based on the compromise agreement
executed by Mary Jane is null and void.
Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the
civil status of persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the
lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is
for the court to determine its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will
or agreement of the parties.43
A compromise is a contract whereby parties, making reciprocal concerns,
avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced.44 Like any other
contract, it must comply with the requisite provisions in Article 1318 of the
New Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object
certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the
obligation which is established. Like any other contract, the terms and
conditions of a compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public policy and public order.45 Any compromise agreement
which is contrary to law or public policy is null and void, and vests no rights
and holds no obligation to any party. It produces no legal effect at
all.46 Considering all these, there can be no other conclusion than that the
decision of the RTC on the basis of a compromise agreement where
Benedick was recognized as the illegitimate child of Benito, Sr. is null and
void.
Article 1878 of the New Civil Code provides that an SPA is required for a
compromise. Furthermore, the power of attorney should expressly mention
the action for which it is drawn; as such, a compromise agreement executed
by one in behalf of another, who is not duly authorized to do so by the
principal, is void and has no legal effect, and the judgment based on such
compromise agreement is null and void.47 The judgment may thus be
impugned and its execution may be enjoined in any proceeding by the party
against whom it is sought to be enforced.48 A compromise must be strictly
construed and can include only those expressly or impliedly included
therein.49
As previously stated, the Court is convinced that the compromise agreement
signed by Mary Jane and Benedick was a compromise relating to the latter's
filiation. Mary Jane recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of her
deceased father, the consideration for which was the amount
of P6,000,000.00 to be taken from the estate, the waiver of other claims from
the estate of the deceased, and the waiver by the Dy Chiao siblings of their
counterclaims against Benedick. This is readily apparent, considering that
the compromise agreement was executed despite the siblings' unequivocal
allegations in their answer to the complaint filed only two months earlier, that
Benedick was merely an impostor:
11. That paragraph 11 is DENIED for the truth of the matter is that
they have not recognized any person or impostor who pretends
having a filial relation with their deceased father by reason of herein
Defendant's father's incapacity to bear children or to engage in any
carnal act considering the age and physical state of their father at
that time alluded to by the Plaintiff … .50
To stress, the compromise agreement executed by Benedick and Mary Jane
is null and void; as such, the decision of the RTC based thereon is also
without force and effect.
It is, likewise, plain as day that only Mary Jane recognized Benedick as the
illegitimate son of her deceased father –
1. That the defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman hereby
recognizes the plaintiff as the illegitimate son of her deceased father
Benito Dy Chiao, Sr.51
Such recognition, however, is ineffectual, because under the law, the
recognition must be made personally by the putative parent and not by any
brother, sister or relative.52
It is conceded that Mary Jane, in her behalf, and purportedly in behalf of her
brothers, agreed and bound herself to pay Benedick the amount
of P6,000,000.00 to be taken from the estate of their deceased father.
However, a cursory reading of the SPA on record will show that the Dy Chiao
brothers did not authorize their sister to recognize Benedick as the
illegitimate son of their father. They could not have agreed to
pay P6,000,000.00 to be taken from the estate, because they had denied
that Benedick was the illegitimate son of their father in their answer to the
complaint.
On the assumption that the Dy Chiao brothers had signed the SPA on
September 20, 1995, a cursory reading of the compromise agreement will
show that they did not specifically empower their sister to enter into a
compromise agreement with Benedick in Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612. It
bears stressing that the SPA was executed as early as September 20, 1995,
while the complaint was filed with the RTC almost a year thereafter, or on
August 27, 1996.
The trial court acted with precipitate and inordinate speed in approving the
compromise agreement. The records show that at about the time when it was
executed by Mary Jane, her brothers were patients at the Don Susano J.
Rodriguez Mental Hospital, and Benedick had accused her of being a
spendthrift by reason of her alleged addiction to drugs. 53
On his belief that the Dy Chiao brothers were incompetent, Benedick even
filed a motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for them, and for the
examination of Mary Jane for drug addiction, as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court
that after hearing, an order be issued, as follows:
1. Appointing a Special Administrator and/or Receiver over the
Estate of Benito Dy Chiao [Sr.];
2. Appointing Guardian Ad Litem over the person of Defendants
Benito, Jr. and Benson Dy-Chiao;
3. Ordering defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao to submit a medical
examination by a medical expert on drugs to be commissioned by
the Honorable Court to determine whether or not said defendant is a
drug dependent.54
Indeed, Benedick filed a Motion on November 14, 1996, for the Dy Chiao
siblings to appear before the RTC at 8:30 a.m. of November 18, 1996. He,
likewise, prayed that the Director of the Don Susano J. Rodriguez Mental
Hospital be directed to bring the clinical records of the brothers, which the
trial court granted per its Order dated November 12, 1996.55
Upon Mary Jane's failure to appear for the hearing, Benedick even sought to
have her cited in contempt of court. Despite his charge that Mary Jane was a
drug addict and a spendthrift, he, nevertheless, prayed in his Motion dated
December 5, 1996, that she be appointed the special administratrix of the
estate of Benito, Sr. and the guardian ad litem of her brothers, thus:
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing considerations, it is most
respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that Maryjane Dy Chiao-
De Guzman be appointed as Special Administrator over the Estate of
the late Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., and as Guardian Ad Litem of
defendants Benito, Jr., and Benson Dy Chiao.56
Barely two weeks earlier, or on November 24, 1996, Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De
Guzman (whom Benedick branded as a spendthrift and a drug addict),
executed the compromise agreement, not only in her behalf, but also in
behalf of her brothers, who were confined in the hospital and whom Benedick
considered as mentally incompetent, and needed a guardian ad litem. The
trial court ignored all the foregoing proceedings and approved the
compromise agreement without bothering to resolve the issue of whether the
Dy Chiao brothers were indeed incompetent, and whether there was a need
to appoint a guardian ad litem for them.
What is so worrisome is that the counsel of the Dy Chiao siblings, Atty. Botor,
did not even bother to file any pleading in his clients' behalf, relative to the
motions filed by Benedick. Despite the allegations that the Dy Chiao brothers
were in the mental hospital and needed a guardian ad litem, and that Mary
Jane was a spendthrift and a drug addict, Atty. Botor still proceeded to sign
the compromise agreement as their counsel. More ominously, the said
counsel knew that it was he who had been empowered by the Dy Chiao
brothers to compromise Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612 (based on the SPA
dated October 31, 1996); yet, he still allowed Mary Jane to execute the same
based on an SPA dated September 20, 1995 notarized by no less than
Benedick's counsel, Atty. Amador Simando.
The Court is convinced that the compromise agreement was the handiwork
of Atty. Simando, because it was he who notarized the SPA dated
September 20, 1995 purportedly executed by the Dy Chiao brothers. He later
became the counsel of Benedick against the Dy Chiao siblings in Civil Case
No. RTC'96-3612. He signed the compromise agreement as Benedick's
counsel, despite his incessant claim that the brothers were incompetent and
needed a guardian ad litem. Barely 11 days after the execution of the
compromise agreement, Atty. Simando filed a Petition for the Settlement of
the Estate of Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., this time as counsel of Mary Jane. It
bears stressing that Mary Jane was the defendant in Civil Case No. RTC'96-
3612, and that as counsel of Benedick, the plaintiff in the said civil case, Atty.
Simando had accused her of being a drug addict and a spendthrift. By then
of course, his client (Benedick) had already received P6,000,000.00 from the
estate of his alleged putative father.
Since the decision of the RTC is null and void, the writ of execution issued
pursuant thereto and the subsequent sale at public auction of the properties
belonging to the estate of Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. are null and void.
Considering our foregoing disquisitions, the Court no longer finds the need to
still resolve the other issues that were raised.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
29. [G.R. No. L-5893. February 28, 1956.]
CARMEN PARDO DE TAVERA y LOPEZ MANZANO, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. EL HOGAR FILIPINO, INC., MAGDALENA ESTATE, INC. and
ERNEST BERG, Defendants; EL HOGAR FILIPINO, INC. and
MAGDALENA ESTATE, INC., Defendants-Appellants.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
A parcel of land containing an area of 2,784 square meters as described in
transfer certificate of title No. 36234 issued on 6 September 1930 by the
office of the Register of Deeds in and for the City of Manila was registered in
the name of Andres Luna de Pardo de Tavera, single; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryCarlos Pardo de Tavera, married to Belen
Ramirez; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryGonzales; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryMaria Audotte Pardo de Tavera y Ramirez, 3 years of
age, single; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryRoberto Pardo de Tavera y Ramirez,
9 years of age, single; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand Carmen Pardo de
Tavera y Lopez Manzano, 11 years of age, single (Exhibit B). On 6 August
1930 the co-owners agreed to organize a corporation under the name of
Tavera-Luna, Inc. for the purpose of building a modern structure on the
parcel of land and to that end they also agreed to accept shares of stock of
the corporation to be organized in exchange for their respective shares in the
parcel of land and building erected thereon to be transferred to the
corporation (Exhibit D-2). On 12 August 1930 the duly appointed guardian of
the minor Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez Manzano, mother of the minor,
filed a petition in the probate court (Special Proceeding No. 34154) praying
for the approval of the agreement referred to (Exhibit D-2) and seeking
authority to accept shares of stock of the corporation in exchange for the
share of the minor in the property (Exhibit D-1). On 28 August 1930 the
probate court approved the agreement in so far as the minor Carmen Pardo
de Tavera y Lopez Manzano was concerned and authorized the guardian to
accept the shares of stock of the corporation in exchange for the share of the
minor in the property (Exhibit E-1). The Tavera-Luna, Inc., was actually
incorporated on 14 December 1930 and the guardian of the minor Carmen
Pardo de Tavera y Lopez Manzano transferred her share in the property on
16 January 1931. After the transfer of the shares of the co-owners in the
property, transfer certificate of title No. 36234 (Exhibit B) was cancelled and
in lieu thereof transfer certificate of title No. 37347 in the name of Tavera-
Luna, Inc. was issued on 23 January 1931 (Exhibit H). On 17 January 1931
upon application of the corporation, El Hogar Filipino, Inc., a loan and
building association, granted it a loan of P1,000,000 for the purpose of
erecting a concrete building in lieu of the wooden building standing thereon.
This loan was secured by a first mortgage registered on the certificate. On 11
February 1932 an additional loan of P300,000 was obtained by the
corporation from El Hogar Filipino, Inc. secured by a mortgage on the same
property. The period of the first mortgage of P1,000,000 was extended.
Transfer certificate of title No. 37347 in the name of Tavera-Luna, Inc.
(Exhibit H) was cancelled and in lieu thereof transfer certificate of title No.
40177 was issued on 28 April 1932 in the name of Tavera-Luna, Inc., but the
parcel of land was subdivided into several lots with their respective
description (Exhibit K). Again, transfer certificate of title No. 40177 (Exhibit K)
was partially cancelled as to one of the several lots and transfer certificate of
title No. 41127 was issued in the name of Tavera-Luna, Inc. on 25 August
1932 (Exhibit K-1). Thereafter, partial cancellations were made of transfer
certificate of title No. 40177 (Exhibit K) as to some of the small lots and
transfer certificates of title Nos. 41128, 43104, 43105, 43107, 43108, 43109
and 7276 were issued in the name of Tavera-Luna, Inc. The last certificates
of title cover small parts of the original parcel of land. The larger part of the
parcel of land is described in transfer certificates of title Nos. 40177 (Exhibit
K) and 41127 (Exhibit K-1). Not long after the construction of the building
known as “Crystal Arcade” was finished, El Hogar Filipino, Inc., the
mortgagee, took over the possession and management of the property to
apply the rents, after deducting management expenses, to the payment of
the mortgagee debt and on 28 September 1933 the mortgagee foreclosed
the mortgage extrajudicially and purchased the whole property at public
auction sale for P1,363,555.37 (Exhibits L and L- 1). The mortgagor having
failed to redeem the property, the mortgagee consolidated its title and the
certificate of title Nos. 40177 (Exhibit K) and 41127 (Exhibit K-1) in the name
of Tavera-Luna, Inc. were cancelled and in lieu thereof transfer certificates of
title Nos. 59596 (Exhibit M), and 59570 (Exhibit M-1 were issued in the name
of the mortgagee, El Hogar Filipino, Inc. on 12 August 1940. On 26 August
1943, nearly nine months after the filing of the original complaint in this case,
El Hogar Filipino, Inc. sold the whole property to Magdalena Estate, Inc. for
P1,400,000 in Japanese war notes (Exhibit P). The certificates in the name
of El Hogar Filipino, Inc. Nos. 59569 and 59570 (Exhibits M and M-1) were
cancelled and lieu thereof transfer certificates of title Nos. 67102 and 67103
were issued in the name of Magdalena Estate, Inc. on 26 August 1943
(Exhibits Q and Q-1). On 22 September 1943 Magdalena Estate, Inc. sold
one-third undivided share in the property to Ernest Berg for P466,666.66 in
Japanese war notes (Exhibit R).
On 17 November 1942, Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez Manzano brought
an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to annul the transfer of her
right, share and interest in the property made by her guardian to Tavera-
Luna, Inc. However, before judgment could be rendered by the Court, the
battle for liberation of Manila supervened and the record of the case was
destroyed. After reconstitution of the record of the case, amendment to the
pleadings to include the Magdalena Estate, Inc. and Ernest Berg to party-
Defendants and trial on the merits, the Court of First Instance of Manila
rendered judgment annulling the order of the probate court that had granted
authority to the guardian of the Plaintiff to transfer her ward’s right, share
interest in the parcel of land to Tavera-Luna, Inc. and the transfer thereof
pursuant thereto; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythe transfers of the ward’s share
in the property to El Hogar Filipino, Inc., Magdalena Estate, Inc. and Ernest
Berg; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythe certificates of title issued to the
transferees in so far as the ward’s share in the property is concerned; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand ordering cancellation of transfer certificates issued
to the transferees and issuance of new ones in the name of the transferees
and the Plaintiff with the statement in the certificates to be issued
that Plaintiff’s share in the property is two-ninths, free from any lien or
encumbrance, and accounting of the income collected by the transferees
during the periods of their respective possession of the property and
payment or delivery thereof to the Plaintiff in so far as her share in the
property is concerned. The Defendants have appealed.
The point that the Plaintiff’s action is barred by the statute of limitations is no
longer urged, because the Plaintiff became of age and released from
guardianship on 19 November 1940 (Exhibit N-1 and 0- 1) and the action
was brought on 17 November 1942, or within the period provided for in
section 579, Act No. 190, which says:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
No action for the recovery of any estate sold by a guardian can be
maintained by the ward, or by any person claiming under him, unless it is
commenced within three years next after the termination of the guardianship,
or, when a legal disability to sue exists by reason of minority or otherwise, at
the time when the cause of action accrues, within three years next after the
removal of such disability.
The Plaintiff contends and the trial court sustained her claim that the order of
the probate court of 28 August 1930 (Exhibit E-1) is a nullity because the
provisions of section 569, Act No. 190, the law then in force, were not
complied with and for that reason the probate court was without jurisdiction to
order the transfer of her share in the property to the corporation to be
organized and formed. She alleges and argues that as the petition which
brought about the entry of the order of the probate court of 28 August 1930
was not verified; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryit did not set forth the condition of
the estate of the ward and the facts and circumstances upon which the
petition was founded tending to show the necessity or expediency of the sale
(transfer); chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythe Court did not direct “the next of kin
to the ward, and all persons interested in the estate, to appear before the
judge or court, at the time and place therein specified, not less than four nor
more than eight weeks from the time of making such order, to show cause
why an order should not be granted for the sale or such estate,” the order is
a nullity for lack of jurisdiction of the court issuing it.
That the probate court in guardianship proceedings No. 34154 entitled
“Tutela de la menor Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez Manzano,” had
jurisdiction over the petition filed by the guardian admits of no doubt. Only
upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction may an order entered by a court be
assailed collaterally. If the court had jurisdiction, irregularities in the
proceedings which would or could invalidate the court’s order may be
assailed directly by means of an appeal but not collaterally. 1 Lack of
verification of a petition filed in a probate court for the sale of real property
belonging to the estate of a minor is not a jurisdictional defect. 2 It should
have been attacked directly and not collaterally. 3 In her petition the guardian
alleged that the transfer of her ward’s share in the property to the corporation
then to be organized would be to or for her benefit and she expected that the
construction of a new building would enhance the value of her ward’s share
in the property and increase her income (Exhibits D-1 and D-2). No other
consideration or motive could have prompted the guardian, mother of the
minor, to file the petition. It is not necessary for a grant of authority to the
guardian to sell the estate of the ward to state that the income “is insufficient
to maintain the ward and his family or to maintain or educate the ward when
a minor.” It is enough, as the other alternative of the law provides, that “it
appears to the satisfaction of the court that it is for the benefit of the ward
that his real estate or some part thereof should be sold, and the proceeds
thereof put out at interest, or invested in some productive security.” 4 The
petition of the guardian falls under the last quoted part of section 569, Act
No. 190. That part of the section, requiring the probate court to enter an
order directing the next of kin to the ward and all persons interested in the
estate to appear before the court at a time and place therein specified, was
substantially complied with, because the next kin to the ward was her own
guardian and mother and all persons interested in the estate of the ward
were her uncles and aunt who agreed to make the transfer of their respective
shares in the property to the corporation, Tavera-Luna, Inc. Moreover, “next
of kin” are those whose relationship is such that they are entitled to share in
the estate as distributees. 5 There were no creditors to the ward’s estate.
Notice to “the next of kin to the ward, and all persons interested in the estate,
to appear before the judge or court, at the time and place therein specified,”
was not necessary, because the next of kin to the ward and all persons
interested in the estate were her mother and guardian, uncles and aunt.
Under these circumstances we are of the opinion that part of the provision of
section 569, Act No. 190, has been complied with. Hearing on the petition, as
required in said section does not necessarily mean that witnesses testify or
documents be produced or exhibited. If the court be satisfied that the
allegations of the petition are true and the interested persons or close
relatives of the ward did not object because they themselves were interested
in the scheme to organize a corporation to which all their shares in the
property were to be transferred, the provisions of the law on hearing were
also complied with. The conclusion arrived at renders it unnecessary for us to
pass upon the question whether El Hogar Filipino, Inc. was a purchaser for
value and in good faith. Suffice it to say that even if the loan was granted
when the certificate of title was still in the name of the Plaintiff and her co-
owners, the fact that the loan was applied for by an entity that was in the
process of organization and by the same persons who were the registered
owners of the property, the mortgagee was entitled to rely upon the order of
the probate court granting authority to the guardian to make the transfer of
the share of her ward in the property and was not bound to inquire further to
find out whether there were irregularities committed or defects or vices that
would render the order null and void. 1 So also the question whether the
action brought by Carlos Pardo de Tavera y Cembrano in his own behalf and
in behalf of the minor, the herein Plaintiff-Appellee, is res judicata need not
be passed upon. Certainly, it would be awkward for this Court to review a
final decree or judgment which upheld the validity of the mortgage in favor of
the Appellant, El Hogar Filipino, Inc., in the case of Carlos Pardo de Tavera
and Carmen Pardo de Tavera Manzano vs. El Hogar Filipino, Inc., 68 Phil.,
712, and to declare null and void the order of the probate court as far as the
share in the property of the minor is concerned, a declaration which would
partly reopen, review, reverse or set aside that final decree or judgment
rendered by this Court.
This action would not have been brought if the scheme and plan of the
organizers or incorporators of the Tavera-Luna, Inc. should have met with
success.
The judgment appealed from is reversed, the complaint dismissed, with costs
against the Appellee.
30. G.R. No. 110427 February 24, 1997
The Incompetent, CARMEN CAÑIZA, represented by her legal guardian,
AMPARO EVANGELISTA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA
and his wife, LEONORA ESTRADA, respondents.
NARVASA, C.J.:
On November 20, 1989, being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen
Cañiza, a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the College
of Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was declared
incompetent by judgment1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
107,2 in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A.
Evangelista.3 She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and
physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and
senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her
person and estate.
Cañiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon City.
On September 17, 1990, her guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced a
suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MetroTC) of Quezon City (Branch 35) to
eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises.4 The
complaint was later amended to identify the incompetent Cañiza as plaintiff,
suing through her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista.
The amended Complaint5 pertinently alleged that plaintiff Cañiza was the
absolute owner of the property in question, covered by TCT No. 27147; that
out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children,
grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free;
that Cañiza already had urgent need of the house on account of her
advanced age and failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet her
expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment;" that through her
guardian, Cañiza had asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate
the house but they had refused to do so; and that "by the defendants' act of
unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they .
. (were) enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent, because,
while they . . (were) saving money by not paying any rent for the house, the
incompetent . . (was) losing much money as her house could not be rented
by others." Also alleged was that the complaint was "filed within one (1) year
from the date of of first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990."
In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that they had
been living in Cañiza's house since the 1960's; that in consideration of their
faithful service they had been considered by Cañiza as her own family, and
the latter had in fact executed a holographic will on September 4, 1988 by
which she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in question.
Judgment was rendered by the MetroTC on April 13, 1992 in Cañiza's
favor,6 the Estradas being ordered to vacate the premises and pay Cañiza
P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.
But on appeal,8 the decision was reversed by the Quezon City Regional Trial
Court, Branch 96.9 By judgment rendered on October 21, 1992, 10 the RTC
held that the "action by which the issue of defendants' possession should be
resolved is accion publiciana, the obtaining factual and legal situation . .
demanding adjudication by such plenary action for recovery of possession
cognizable in the first instance by the Regional Trial Court."
Cañiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision of October
21, 1992, but failed in that attempt. In a decision 11 promulgated on June 2,
1993, the Appellate Court 12 affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto. It ruled that
(a) the proper remedy for Cañiza was indeed an accion publiciana in the
RTC, not an accion interdictal in the MetroTC, since the "defendants have
not been in the subject premises as mere tenants or occupants by tolerance,
they have been there as a sort of adopted family of Carmen Cañiza," as
evidenced by what purports to be the holographic will of the plaintiff; and (b)
while "said will, unless and until it has passed probate by the proper court,
could not be the basis of defendants' claim to the property, . . it is indicative
of intent and desire on the part of Carmen Cañiza that defendants are to
remain and are to continue in their occupancy and possession, so much so
that Cañiza's supervening incompetency can not be said to have vested in
her guardian the right or authority to drive the defendants out." 13
Through her guardian, Cañiza came to this Court praying for reversal of the
Appellate Court's judgment. She contends in the main that the latter erred in
(a) holding that she should have pursued an accion publiciana, and not
an accion interdictal; and in (b) giving much weight to "a xerox copy of an
alleged holographic will, which is irrelevant to this case." 14
In the responsive pleading filed by them on this Court's requirement, 15 the
Estradas insist that the case against them was really not one of unlawful
detainer; they argue that since possession of the house had not been
obtained by them by any "contract, express or implied," as contemplated by
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, their occupancy of the premises
could not be deemed one "terminable upon mere demand (and hence never
became unlawful) within the context of the law." Neither could the suit
against them be deemed one of forcible entry, they add, because they had
been occupying the property with the prior consent of the "real owner,"
Carmen Cañiza, which "occupancy can even ripen into full ownership once
the holographic will of petitioner Carmen Cañiza is admitted to probate."
They conclude, on those postulates, that it is beyond the power of Cañiza's
legal guardian to oust them from the disputed premises.
Carmen Cañiza died on March 19, 1994, 16 and her heirs — the
aforementioned guardian, Amparo Evangelista, and Ramon C. Nevado, her
niece and nephew, respectively — were by this Court's leave, substituted for
her. 17
Three issues have to be resolved: (a) whether or not an ejectment action is
the appropriate judicial remedy for recovery of possession of the property in
dispute; (b) assuming desahucio to be proper, whether or not Evangelista, as
Cañiza's legal guardian had authority to bring said action; and (c) assuming
an affirmative answer to both questions, whether or not Evangelista may
continue to represent Cañiza after the latter's death.
I
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which
court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought. 18 An inquiry into the averments of the
amended complaint in the Court of origin is thus in order. 19
The amended Complaint alleges: 20
6. That the plaintiff Carmen Cañiza, is the sole and absolute
owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Scout Tobias, Quezon
City, which property is now the subject of this complaint;
xxx xxx xxx
9. That the defendants, their children, grandchildren and
sons-in-law, were allowed to live temporarily in the house
of plaintiff Carmen Cañiza, for free, out of her kindness;
10. That the plaintiff, through her legal guardian, has duly
notified the defendants, for them to vacate the said house,
but the two (2) letters of demand were ignored and the
defendants refused to vacate the same. . .
11. That the plaintiff, represented by her legal guardian,
Amparo Evangelista, made another demand on the
defendants for them to vacate the premises, before
Barangay Captain Angelina A. Diaz of Barangay Laging
Handa, Quezon City, but after two (2) conferences, the result
was negative and no settlement was reached. A photocopy
of the Certification to File Action dated July 4, 1990, issued
by said Barangay Captain is attached, marked Annex "D"
and made an integral part hereof;
12. That the plaintiff has given the defendants more than
thirty (30) days to vacate the house, but they still refused to
vacate the premises, and they are up to this time residing in
the said place;
13. That this complaint is filed within one (1) year from the
date of first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990 (Annex
"B") sent by the plaintiff to the defendants, by her legal
guardian — Amparo Evangelista;
14. By the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving the plaintiff
of the possession of the house in question, they are
enriching themselves at the expense of the
incompetent plaintiff because, while they are saving money
by not paying any rent for the house, the plaintiff is losing
much money as her house could not be rented by others;
15. That the plaintiff's health is failing and she needs the
house urgently, so that funds could be raised to meet her
expenses for her support, maintenance and medical
treatment;
 16. That because of defendants' refusal to vacate the house
at No. 61 Scout Tobias, Quezon City, the plaintiff, through
her legal guardian, was compelled to go to court for justice,
and she has to spend P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Its prayer 21 is quoted below:
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and the rule of
law, plaintiff, Carmen Cañiza, represented by her legal
guardian, Amparo Evangelista, respectfully prays to this
Honorable Court, to render judgment in favor of plaintiff and
against the defendants as follows:
1. To order the defendants, their children, grandchildren,
sons-in-law and other persons claiming under them, to
vacate the house and premises at No. 6 1 Scout Tobias,
Quezon City, so that its possession can be restored to the
plaintiff Carmen Cañiza; and
2. To pay attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00;
3. To pay the costs of the suit.
In essence, the amended complaint states:
1) that the Estradas were occupying Cañiza's house by
tolerance — having been "allowed to live temporarily . .
(therein) for free, out of . . (Cañiza's) kindness;"
2) that Cañiza needed the house "urgently" because her
"health . . (was) failing and she . . (needed) funds . . to meet
her expenses for her support, maintenance and medical
treatment;"
3) that through her general guardian, Cañiza requested the
Estradas several times, orally and in writing, to give back
possession of the house;
4) that the Estradas refused and continue to refuse to give
back the house to Cañiza, to her continuing prejudice; and
5) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the last
demand to vacate.
Undoubtedly, a cause of action for desahucio has been adequately set out. It
is settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege that the
defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed
sufficient, 22 and a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that
the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without
necessarily employing the terminology of the law. 23
The Estradas' first proffered defense derives from a literal construction of
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which inter alia authorizes the
institution of an unlawful detainer suit when "the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to
hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." They contend
that since they did not acquire possession of the property in question "by
virtue of any contract, express or implied" — they having been, to repeat,
"allowed to live temporarily . . (therein) for free, out of . . (Cañiza's) kindness"
— in no sense could there be an "expiration or termination of . . (their) right
to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." Nor would
an action for forcible entry lie against them, since there is no claim that they
had "deprived (Cañiza) of the possession of . . (her property) by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.
The argument is arrant sophistry. Cañiza's act of allowing the Estradas to
occupy her house, rent-free, did not create a permanent and indefeasible
right of possession in the latter's favor. Common sense, and the most
rudimentary sense of fairness clearly require that that act of liberality be
implicitly, but no less certainly, accompanied by the necessary burden on the
Estradas of returning the house to Cañiza upon her demand. More than once
has this Court adjudged that a person who occupies the land of another at
the latter's tolerance or permission without any contract between them is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand,
failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
him. 24 The situation is not much different from that of a tenant whose lease
expires but who continues in occupancy by tolerance of the owner, in which
case there is deemed to be an unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession as of the date of the demand to vacate. 25 In other words, one
whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the
land or property the moment he is required to leave. 26 Thus, in Asset
Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 27 where a company, having lawfully
obtained possession of a plant upon its undertaking to buy the same, refused
to return it after failing to fulfill its promise of payment despite demands, this
Court held that "(a)fter demand and its repudiation, . . (its) continuing
possession . . became illegal and the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by
the
. . (plant's owner) was its proper remedy.
It may not be amiss to point out in this connection that where there had been
more than one demand to vacate, the one-year period for filing the complaint
for unlawful detainer must be reckoned from the date of the last
demand, 28the reason being that the lessor has the option to waive his right
of action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in
the premises. 29 Now, the complaint filed by Cañiza's guardian alleges that
the same was "filed within one (1) year from the date of the first letter of
demand dated February 3, 1990." Although this averment is not in accord
with law because there is in fact a second letter of demand to vacate, dated
February 27, 1990, the mistake is inconsequential, since the complaint was
actually filed on September 17, 1990, well within one year from
the second (last) written demand to vacate.
The Estradas' possession of the house stemmed from the owner's express
permission. That permission was subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as
was her right; and it is immaterial that the withdrawal was made through her
judicial guardian, the latter being indisputably clothed with authority to do so.
Nor is it of any consequence that Carmen Cañiza had executed a will
bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas; that circumstance did not
give them the right to stay in the premises after demand to vacate on the
theory that they might in future become owners thereof, that right of
ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer of ownership being possible
unless and until the will is duly probated.
Thus, at the time of the institution of the action of desahucio, the Estradas
had no legal right to the property, whether as possessors by tolerance or
sufferance, or as owners. They could not claim the right of possession by
sufferance; that had been legally ended. They could not assert any right of
possession flowing from their ownership of the house; their status as owners
is dependent on the probate of the holographic will by which the property had
allegedly been bequeathed to them — an event which still has to take place;
in other words, prior to the probate of the will, any assertion of possession by
them would be premature and inefficacious.
In any case, the only issue that could legitimately be raised under the
circumstances was that involving the Estradas' possession by tolerance, i.e.,
possession de facto, not de jure. It is therefore incorrect to postulate that the
proper remedy for Cañiza is not ejectment but accion publiciana, a plenary
action in the RTC or an action that is one for recovery of the right to
possession de jure.
II
The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Cañiza clearly
denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally
incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them
therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward's will.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it
may be changed or revoked; 30 and until admitted to probate, it has no effect
whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite
explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved
and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838, id.). 31 An
owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property
by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession
in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there
was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent:
she needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical
infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general
guardian of both the person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Cañiza. Her
Letters of Guardianship 32 dated December 19, 1989 clearly installed her as
the "guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN
CANIZA with full authority to take possession of the property of said
incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be situated and to
perform all other acts necessary for the management of her properties . .
" 33 By that appointment, it became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's
person, to attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to assure her well-
being, with right to custody of her person in preference to relatives and
friends. 34 It also became her right and duty to get possession of, and
exercise control over, Cañiza's property, both real and personal, it being
recognized principle that the ward has no right to possession or control of his
property during her incompetency. 35 That right to manage the ward's estate
carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it from anyone
who retains it, 36 and bring and defend such actions as may be needful for
this purpose. 37
Actually, in bringing the action of desahucio, Evangelista was merely
discharging the duty to attend to "the comfortable and suitable maintenance
of the ward" explicitly imposed on her by Section 4, Rule 96 of the Rules of
Court, viz.:
Sec. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied
to maintenance of ward. — A guardian must manage the
estate of his ward frugally and without waste, and apply the
income and profits thereof, so far as maybe necessary, to
the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward and
his family, if there be any; and if such income and profits be
insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell or
encumber the real estate, upon being authorized by order to
do so, and apply to such of the proceeds as may be
necessary to such maintenance.
Finally, it may be pointed out in relation to the Estradas's defenses in the
ejectment action, that as the law now stands, even when, in forcible entry
and unlawful detainer cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership
in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted
competence to resolve "the issue of ownership . . only to determine the issue
of possession." 38
III
As already stated, Carmen Cañiza passed away during the pendency of this
appeal. The Estradas thereupon moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that
Cañiza's death automatically terminated the guardianship, Amaparo
Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial guardian, and ceased to have
legal personality to represent her in the present appeal. The motion is without
merit.
While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and
ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the
ward, 39 the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista,
as niece of Carmen Cañiza, is one of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs,
the other being Cañiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by
Resolution of this Court 40 of June 20, 1994, they were in fact substituted as
parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased, in accordance with
Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, viz.: 41
Sec. 18. Death of a party. — After a party dies and the claim
is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon
proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to
 appear and be substituted for the deceased within a period
of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If
the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the
court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within
a time to be specified by the court, and the representative
shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of
the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be
recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be
allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring
the appointment of an executor or administrator and the
court may appoint guardian ad litemfor the minor heirs.
To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Cañiza's demise
did not extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her through her
guardian. 42 That action, not being a purely personal one, survived her death;
her heirs have taken her place and now represent her interests in the appeal
at bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on June 2, 1993 — affirming the Regional Trial Court's
judgment and dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari — is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated April 13, 1992 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 3410 is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
32. G.R. No. 132223 June 19, 2001
BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, petitioner,
vs.
HELEN G. BELMES, respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 45650, "In the Matter of Guardianship of Minors Valerie Vancil
and Vincent Vancil – Bonifacia P. Vancil, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. Helen G.
Belmes, Oppositor-Appellant," promulgated on July 29, 1997, and its
Resolution dated December 18, 1997 denying the motion for reconsideration
of the said Decision.
The facts of the case as summarized by the Court of Appeals in its Decision
are:
"Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a
Navy serviceman of the United States of America who died in the
said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had
two (2) children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife,
Helen G. Belmes.
"Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a guardianship proceedings over
the persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent docketed
as Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB. At the time, Valerie was only
6 years old while Vincent was a 2-year old child. It is claimed in the
petition that the minors are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and
have an estate consisting of proceeds from their father’s death
pension benefits with a probable value of P100,000.00.
"Finding sufficiency in form and in substance, the case was set for
hearing after a 3-consecutive-weekly publications with the Sunstar
Daily.
"On July 15, 1987, petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal
and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil
and Vincent Vancil Jr.
"On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen
Belmes, submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship
proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition
for guardianship under Special Proceedings No. 2819 before the
Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City.
"Thereafter, on June 27, 1988, Helen Belmes followed her opposition
with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a
New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody
of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors at
Maralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are
permanently residing; that the petition was filed under an improper
venue; and that at the time the petition was filed Bonifacia Vancil
was a resident of 140 Hurliman Court, Canon City, Colorado, U.S.A.
being a naturalized American citizen.
"On October 12, 1988, after due proceedings, the trial court rejected
and denied Belmes’ motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia
as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and instead ordered petitioner
Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office and perform her duties as such
guardian upon the posting of a bond of P50,000.00. The subsequent
attempt for a reconsideration was likewise dismissed in an Order
dated November 24, 1988."1
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision reversing the
RTC order of October 12, 1988 and dismissing Special Proceedings No.
1618-CEB.
The Court of Appeals held:
"Stress should likewise be made that our Civil Code considers
parents, the father, or in the absence, the mother, as natural
guardian of her minor children. The law on parental authority under
the Civil Code or P.D. 603 and now the New Family Code, (Article
225 of the Family Code) ascribe to the same legal pronouncements.
Section 7 of Rule 93 of the Revised Rules of Court confirms the
designation of the parents as ipso facto guardian of their minor
children without need of a court appointment and only for good
reason may another person be named. Ironically, for the petitioner,
there is nothing on record of any reason at all why Helen Belmes, the
 biological mother, should be deprived of her legal rights as natural
guardian of her minor children. To give away such privilege from
Helen would be an abdication and grave violation of the very basic
fundamental tenets in civil law and the constitution on family
solidarity."2
On March 10, 1998, Bonifacia Vancil filed with this Court the present petition,
raising the following "legal points":
"1. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that the preferential
right of a parent to be appointed guardian over the persons and
estate of the minors is absolute, contrary to existing jurisprudence.
"2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that Oppositor Helen
G. Belmes, the biological mother, should be appointed the guardian
of the minors despite the undisputed proof that under her custody,
her daughter minor Valerie Vancil was raped seven times by
Oppositor’s live-in partner.
"3. The respondent (sic) Court of Appeals gravely erred when it
disqualified petitioner Bonifacia P. Vancil to be appointed as judicial
guardian over the persons and estate of subject minors despite the
fact that she has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications as judicial guardian, merely on the basis of her U.S.
citizenship which is clearly not a statutory requirement to become
guardian."
At the outset, let it be stressed that in her "Manifestation/Motion," dated
September 15, 1998, respondent Helen Belmes stated that her daughter
Valerie turned eighteen on September 2, 1998 as shown by her Birth
Certificate.3Respondent thus prayed that this case be dismissed with respect
to Valerie, she being no longer a proper subject of guardianship proceedings.
The said "Manifestation/Motion" was noted by this Court in its Resolution
dated November 11, 1998.
Considering that Valerie is already of major age, this petition has become
moot with respect to her. Thus, only the first and third "legal points" raised by
petitioner should be resolved.
The basic issue for our resolution is who between the mother and
grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent, being the
natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to
be his guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code
which provides:
"Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a
judicial order to the contrary. xxx."
Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the
corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. In Sagala-Eslao vs.
Court of Appeals,4 this Court held:
"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts
that ‘the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one
of the natural rights incident to parenthood,’ a right supported by law
and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not
created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the
nature of the parental relationship."
Petitioner contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent.
Petitioner’s claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by
way of substitute parental authoritypursuant to Article 214 of the Family
Code, thus:
"Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents,
substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. xxx."
In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals,5 this Court ruled:
"The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over
the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of
either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental
authority. Only in case of the parents’ death, absence or unsuitability
may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent."
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental
authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent.
Considering that respondent is very much alive and has exercised
continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in
asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian, respondent’s unsuitability.
Petitioner, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that
respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely
insists that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that
her (respondent’s) live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie,
being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship
proceeding.
Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still
petitioner cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she
is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be
able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In
fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a
guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate
those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian.
Moreover, we observe that respondent’s allegation that petitioner has not set
foot in the Philippines since 1987 has not been controverted by her. Besides,
petitioner’s old age and her conviction of libel by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 6, Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CBU-168846 filed by one Danilo R.
Deen, will give her a second thought of staying here. Indeed, her coming
back to this country just to fulfill the duties of a guardian to Vincent for only
two years is not certain.
Significantly, this Court has held that courts should not appoint persons as
guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it
difficult to protect the wards. In Guerrero vs. Teran,7 this Court held:
"Doña Maria Muñoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed
upon the theory that her appointment was void because she did not
reside in the Philippine Islands. There is nothing in the law which
requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or
guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no
statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with
the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons,
wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with
this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are not
personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is
no statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to the
appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not
personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here."
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with
modification in the sense that Valerie, who has attained the age of majority,
will no longer be under the guardianship of respondent Helen Belmes.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
33. G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003
ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S.
LAHOM"), respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete without
children. The realization could have likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado
Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into their care Isabelita's nephew Jose
Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the tender age of two,
Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who treated
the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on
legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a
petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was
issued that made all the more intense than before the feeling of affection of
the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of
Naga City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom."
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of
1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In her
petition, she averred —
"7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses,
respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to
the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter
died, and even before his death he had made known his desire to
revoke respondent's adoption, but was prevented by petitioner's
supplication, however with his further request upon petitioner to give
to charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent
in the future.
xxx xxx xxx
"10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter
disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with the
Professional Regulation Commission showed his name as Jose
Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present, and in all
his dealings and activities in connection with his practice of his
profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
xxx xxx xxx
"13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city
with only her household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the
care and show of concern from a son, but respondent remained
indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year.
"14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of
petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view of a leg ailment,
and those were the times when petitioner would need most the care
and support from a love one, but respondent all the more remained
callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is not
expected of a son.
"15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's
nephews and nieces whenever they would find time to visit her,
respondent alleging that they were only motivated by their desire for
some material benefits from petitioner.
"16. That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a
strained and uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner,
the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after all
respondent's only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his
alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and her late
husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463
for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and
affection towards respondent, rendering the decree of adoption,
considering respondent to be the child of petitioner, for all legal
purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no more basis
for its existence, hence this petition for revocation,"1
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into
effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a
decree of adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:
"SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. — Upon petition of
the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if
over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as
guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the
 following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical
and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone
counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault
or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental
obligations.
"Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject
to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may
disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil
Code." (emphasis supplied)
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a)
that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner
had no cause of action in view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No.
8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription in
R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground
for rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then Article 348 2 of
the Civil Code and Article 1923 of the Family Code.
In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly:
"On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit,
Section 5(c) of R.A. No. 8369 confers jurisdiction to this Court,
having been designated Family Court in A.M. No. 99-11-07 SC.
"On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the complaint, is whether or not, admitting the facts
alleged, the Court could render a valid judgment in accordance with
the prayer of said complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 95
Phil. 365).
"Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the right
of an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier granted under the Family
Code. Conformably, on the face of the petition, indeed there is lack
of cause of action.
"Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long acquired
under the provisions of the Family Code should be respected.
Assuming for the sake of argument, that petitioner is entitled to
rescind the adoption of respondent granted on May 5, 1972, said
right should have been exercised within the period allowed by the
Rules. From the averments in the petition, it appears clear that the
legal grounds for the petition have been discovered and known to
petitioner for more than five (5) years, prior to the filing of the instant
petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the action if any, had already
prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules of Court)
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the petition is
ordered dismissed."4
Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Court, petitioner raises the following questions; viz:
1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be
revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No.
8552?
2. In the affirmative, has the adopter's action prescribed?
A brief background on the law and its origins could provide some insights on
the subject. In ancient times, the Romans undertook adoption to assure male
heirs in the family.5 The continuity of the adopter's family was the primary
purpose of adoption and all matters relating to it basically focused on the
rights of the adopter. There was hardly any mention about the rights of the
adopted.6 Countries, like Greece, France, Spain and England, in an effort to
preserve inheritance within the family, neither allowed nor recognized
adoption.7 It was only much later when adoption was given an impetus in law
and still later when the welfare of the child became a paramount
concern.8Spain itself which previously disfavored adoption ultimately relented
and accepted the Roman law concept of adoption which, subsequently, was
to find its way to the archipelago. The Americans came and introduced their
own ideas on adoption which, unlike most countries in Europe, made the
interests of the child an overriding consideration.9 In the early part of the
century just passed, the rights of children invited universal attention; the
Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child of 1924 and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,10followed by the United Nations
Declarations of the Rights of the Child,11 were written instruments that would
also protect and safeguard the rights of adopted children. The Civil Code of
the Philippines12 of 1950 on adoption, later modified by the Child and Youth
Welfare Code13 and then by the Family Code of the Philippines, 14 gave
immediate statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In 1989,
the United Nations initiated the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The
Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that
adoption was impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its
underlying intent was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552
secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it
affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new family
but also in the society as well. The new law withdrew the right of an adopter
to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to
sever the legal ties created by adoption.
Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely
affect her right to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its
jurisdiction to hear the case, both being vested under the Civil Code and the
Family Code, the laws then in force.
The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty
of due process15 that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason
and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action; 16 it includes not
only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also
exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become
vested.17 Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a
present interest,18 absolute, unconditional, and perfect19 or fixed and
irrefutable.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,20 a petition to adopt Jason Condat was filed
by Zenaida C. Bobiles on 02 February 1988 when the Child and Youth
Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) allowed an adoption to be
sought by either spouse or both of them. After the trial court had rendered its
decision and while the case was still pending on appeal, the Family Code of
the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209), mandating joint adoption by the
husband and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic argued that the case
should be dismissed for having been filed by Mrs. Bobiles alone and without
being joined by the husband. The Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the
court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The petition to adopt Jason, having been
filed with the court at the time when P.D. No. 603 was still in effect, the right
of Mrs. Bobiles to file the petition, without being joined by her husband,
according to the Court had become vested. In Republic vs. Miller,21spouses
Claude and Jumrus Miller, both aliens, sought to adopt Michael Madayag. On
29 July 1988, the couple filed a petition to formalize Michael's adoption
having theretofore been taken into their care. At the time the action was
commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt. After the decree of
adoption and while on appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Family Code
was enacted into law on 08 August 1988 disqualifying aliens from adopting
Filipino children. The Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of the adoption
decree. In discarding the argument posed by the Republic, the Supreme
Court ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the law
governing at the time the petition was filed.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed
an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new
law,22 had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the
Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently
with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for
rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after
R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside
the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 10023 of the Rules
of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption
decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a
vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a
person has no vested right in statutory privileges.24 While adoption has often
been referred to in the context of a "right," the privilege to adopt is itself not
naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by
statute.25 It is a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on
what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the
child.26 Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an
adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the
State.27 Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away
at anytime before it has been exercised.28
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a
consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the
adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless,
the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the
hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still
noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal
ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain
benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the
grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his
legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a
share in the disposable portion of his estate.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
34. G.R. No. L-57438 January 3, 1984
FELICIANO FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PELAGIO FRANCISCO, respondents.
Nicomedes M. Jajardo for petitioner.
Crescini & Associates Law Office for private respondent.
GUERRERO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the annulment of the decision and
resolution of the defunct Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court,
dated April 27, 1981. and June 26, 1981. respectively, dismissing the petition
for certiorari filed by petitioner Feliciano Francisco docketed as CA-G.R. No.
12172 entitled "Feliciano Francisco versus Judge Jesus R. De Vega and
Pelagio Francisco". In the said petition for certiorari, petitioner Feliciano
Francisco challenged the validity of the Order of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch II, now Regional Trial Court, granting
execution pending appeal of its decision by relieving petitioner Feliciano
Francisco as guardian of incompetent Estefania San Pedro and appointing
respondent herein, Pelagio Francisco, in his instead.
The antecedent facts as recited in the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals showed that:
Petitioner is the duly appointed guardian of the incompetent
Estefania San Pedro in Special Proceedings No. 532 of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan presided over by
respondent Judge. On August 30, 1974 respondent Pelagio
Francisco, claiming to be a first cousin of Estefania San
Pedro, together with two others, said to be nieces of the
incompetent, petitioned the court for the removal of petitioner
and for the appointment in his stead of respondent Pelagio
Francisco. Among other grounds, the petition was based on
the failure of the guardian to submit an inventory of the
estate of his ward and to render an accounting.
It would seem that petitioner subsequently rendered an
accounting but failed to submit an inventory, for which
reason the court on March 20, 1975 gave petitioner ten (10)
days within which to do so, otherwise he would be removed
from guardianship Petitioner thereafter submitted an
inventory to which respondent Pelagio Francisco filed an
objection on the ground that petitioner actually received
P14,000.00 for the sale of a residential land and not
P12,000.00 only as stated in the deed of sale and reported
by him in his inventory. The respondent Judge found the
claim to be true, and, in his order of April 17, 1980 relieved
the petitioner as guardian.
On motion of petitioner, however, the respondent Judge
reconsidered his finding, relying on the deed of sale as the
best evidence of the price paid for the sale of the land. in his
order dated September 12, 1980, respondent judge
acknowledged that his finding was "rather harsh and
somewhat unfair to the said guardian." Nevertheless,
respondent Judge ordered the retirement of petitioner on the
ground of old age. The order states in part as follows:
"... considering the rather advanced age of
the present guardian, this Court is inclined
and so decrees, that he should nevertheless
be, as he is hereby, retired to take effect
upon the appointment by this court and the
assumption of office of his replacement, who
shall be taken from the recommendees of
the parties herein. For this purpose, the
present guardian is hereby given twenty (20)
days from receipt of a copy of this order
within which to submit his proposal for a
replacement for himself and to comment on
petitioner's recommendee and the latter a
like period within which to comment on the
present guardian's proposed substitute, after
which the matter will be deemed submitted
for resolution and final action by the court.
SO ORDERED."
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that
he was only 72 years of age and still fit to continue with the
management of the estate of his ward as he had done with
zeal for the past twelve years. In an order dated November
13, 1980 the court denied his motion. Accordingly, on
December 17, 1980, petiti/ner filed a notice of appeal 'from
the order issued by the court on November 13, 1980' and
paid the appeal bond. On February 2, 1981 he filed the
record on appeal. 1
Meanwhile, on January 27, 1981, the court, on motion of
private respondent, required petitioner to submit within three
days his nomination for guardian of Estefania San Pedro as
required in its order of September 12, 1980. In issuing the
order, the court stated that 'an indefinite discontinuance in
office would defeat the intent and purpose of the said order
of September 12, 1980 relieving the present guardian.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence,
this petition. (referring to CA-G.R. No. SP-1217)"
On December 5, 1980, before the appeal was perfected, Pelagio Francisco
filed an "Omnibus Motion" with the court a quo with the prayer (1) to restrain
guardian from exercising office; (2) order guardian to surrender to court all
properties of the ward; and (3) appoint new guardian . 2
Petitioner, on December 9, 1980 filed his opposition to the omnibus motion
claiming that the same was premature. 3The trial court, however, disregarded
the opposition and required petitioner on January 27, 1981 to submit within
three (3) days his nomination for guardian of Estefania San Pedro as
required in its order of September 12, 1980, the court holding that "an
indefinite continuance in office would defeat the intent and purpose of the
said order of September 12, 1980, relieving the present guardian." 4
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said order, 5 but the trial court
overruled the same on March 4, 1981. Subsequently, on March 11,
1981, 6 the court a quo appointed respondent Pelagio Francisco as the new
guardian of the person and property of the incompetent Estefania San
Pedro. 7
On March 13, 1981, petitioner filed with the defunct Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari challenging the validity of the order of the trial court
granting the execution pending appeal of its decision and appointing
respondent Pelagio Francisco as the new guardian despite the fact that
respondent is five (5) years older than petitioner, docketed as CA-G.R. No.
12172.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on April 23, 1981, the pertinent
portion of its decision reading as follows:
The Rules of Court authorizes executions pending appeal
"upon good reasons to be stated in a special order." (Rule
39, Sec. 2). In the case at bar, the retirement of petitioner
was ordered on the ground of old age. When this ground is
considered in relation to the delay of the petitioner in the
making of an accounting and the submission of an inventory,
the order amounts to a finding that petitioner, considering his
"rather advanced age," was no longer capable of managing
the estate of his ward. Rule 97, Sec. 2). Given this finding, it
is clear that petitioner's continuance in office would not be in
the best interest of the ward.
 It is of course true that the order of removal is not yet final.
Considering the time -it normally takes for appeals to be
finally determined as well as the purpose of the order under
appeal, which would be frustrated if it is not immediately
executed, we cannot say that respondent acted with grave
and irreparable damage and that the order of September 12,
1980 is not yet final, petitioner has not demonstrated that in
ordering execution pending appeal, the respondent Judge
committed a grave abuse of discretion.
Indeed, the granting of execution pending appeal ties within
the sound discretion of a court. Appellate courts win not
interfere to discretion, unless it modify control or inquire into
the exercise of this be shown that there has been an abuse
of that discretion. (2 Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, 260 [1979].
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED,
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 8
Petitioner subsequently filed another motion for reconsideration advancing
the following arguments: that to grant execution pending appeal would render
petitioner's appeal moot and academic that "advanced age" was not one of
the, grounds raised by private respondent in the court below; that the court a
quo abuse its discretion in appointing respondent as guardian despite the
fact that private respondent is five (5) years older than petitioner. 9
The respondent appellate court, in its resolution dated June 26, 1981, denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the court finding it unnecessary to
repeat the discussion of the arguments which it had already considered and
only entertained the argument regarding the competency of the respondent
as the new guardian. On this point, respondent Court ruled:
The order of March 11, 1981 appointing respondent
Francisco as guardian was never assailed in the petition in
this case. As already stated, this case concerns the validity
only of the orders of January 27, 1981 and March 4, 1981
which required petitioner to recommend his own
replacement, otherwise the court would appoint a new
guardian. It does not appear that petitioner objected to the
appointment of respondent Francisco on the ground now
invoked, namely, that Francisco is in fact older than
petitioner. Nor does it appear that petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of March 11, 1981, calling
attention to the fact that respondent Francisco is older than
petitioner, In short, the point now raised does not appear to
have been urged in the lower court so that the latter could
have rectified the error, if it was error at all, For this reason, it
is not proper ground for certiorari before this Court, much
less for a motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 10
In the petition at bar, petitioner contends that (a) The Honorable Court of
Appeals has committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the removal
of petitioner as guardian of the ward Estefania San Pedro on the ground of
old age is a good ground for the execution of the decision pending appeal;
and (b) The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave misapprehension
and misinterpretation of facts when it declared that petitioner did not question
the appointment of private respondent as guardian in his stead on the ground
that the latter is older than the former by five (5) years.
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one
person, called a "guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law
regards as incapable of managing his own affairs.11 A guardianship is
designed to further the ward's well-being, not that of the guardian, It is
intended to preserve the ward's property, as wen as to render any assistance
that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody
involves immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those
responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well. 12
Having in mind that guardianship proceeding is instituted for the benefit and
welfare of the ward, the selection of a guardian must, therefore, suit this very
purpose. Thus, in determining the selection of a guardian, the court may
consider the financial situation, the physical condition, the sound judgment,
prudence and trustworthiness, the morals, character and conduct, and the
present and past history of a prospective appointee, as wen as the
probability of his, being able to exercise the powers and duties of guardian
for the full period during which guardianship will be necessary. 13
A guardian is or becomes incompetent to serve the trust if he is so
disqualified by mental incapacity, conviction of crime, moral delinquency or
physical disability as to be prevented from properly discharging the duties of
his office. 14 A guardian, once appointed may be removed in case he
becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or unsuitable
therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty (30)
days after it is due to render an account or make a return.15
We agree with the trial court and the appellate court that there is need for
petitioner Feliciano Francisco to be retired from the guardianship over the
person and property of incompetent Estefania San Pedro. The conclusion
reached by the trial court about the "rather advanced age" of petitioner at 72
years old (petitioner is now 76 years old) finding him unfit to continue the
trust cannot be disturbed. As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, this
finds direct support in the delay of the accounting and inventory made by
petitioner. To sustain petitioner as guardian would, therefore, be detrimental
to the ward. While age alone is not a control criterion in determining a
person's fitness or qualification to be appointed or be retained as guardian, it
may be a factor for consideration. 16
Considering the difficult and complicated responsibilities and duties of a
guardian, We sustain the immediate retirement of petitioner Feliciano
Francisco as guardian, affirming thereby the rulings of both the trial court and
the appellate court.
With respect to the issue of execution pending appeal in appointing
respondent Pelagio Francisco as guardian to succeed petitioner while the
latter's appeal was still pending, We hold and rule that respondent appellate
court correctly sustained the propriety of said execution pending appeal.
Upon urgent and compelling reasons, execution pending appeal is a matter
of sound discretion on the part of the trial court, 17 and the appellate court
will not interfere, control or inquire into the exercise of this discretion, unless
there has been an abuse thereof, 18 which We find none herein.
Inasmuch as the primary objective for the institution of guardianship is for the
protection of the ward, there is more than sufficient reason for the immediate
execution of the lower court's judgment for the replacement of the first
guardian. We agree with the reason given by the appellate court in sustaining
execution pending appeal that "an indefinite continuance in office would
defeat the intent and purpose of the order of September 12, 1980, relieving
the present guardian (Feliciano Francisco)."
As to the issue concerning the appointment of respondent Pelagio Francisco
as the new guardian, We likewise agree with the respondent appellate court
in denying in its resolution of June 26, 1981 for lack of merit the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner questioning the appointment of private
respondent Pelagio Francisco. We also find no abuse of discretion
committed by the appellate court.
The rule is well-established that appellate courts may not entertain issues
brought before it for the first time on appeal. (Jose Matienzo vs. Martin
Servidad, 107 SCRA 276; Garcian vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 597;
Director of Lands vs. Dano 96 SCRA 160).
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed decision and
resolution of the respondent court dated April 27, 1981 and June 26, 1981,
respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
35. G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner)
seeking to set aside the Decision1 dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional
Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case
Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed without prejudice the consolidated
petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession.
On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor
children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain
Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own,
petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they were
the children’s parents. The children2 were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle)
and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old
when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March
1977.3 Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s
clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.4
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own.
They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in
all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November
1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario
(Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the
amnesty5 given under Republic Act No. 85526(RA 8552) to those individuals
who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed
separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial
court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At
the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old
and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced
by their Affidavits of Consent.7 Michael also gave his consent to his adoption
as shown in his Affidavit of Consent.8 Petitioner’s husband Olario likewise
executed an Affidavit of Consent9 for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and
the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown.10 The DSWD issued
a similar Certification for Michael.11
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
petitions. The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner
should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court
ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing
Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion
was denied in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the motion, the trial
court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under
Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioner’s argument that mere consent
of her husband would suffice was untenable because, under the law, there
are additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his
qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party in this
case, must comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint
adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court
ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental
authority because an emancipated child acquires certain rights from his
parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or
not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it
is the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and
welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim
"dura lex sed lex" is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint
parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the petitions
were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was
already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since
they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.
We deny the petition.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without
being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm
the trial court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed
lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity
and legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of
any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically
capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than
the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her
children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of
sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and
adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of
the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for
Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic
relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been
living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to
the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such
residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been
certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate
government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in
his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to
enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided,
further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the
alien’s qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the
following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative
within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of
his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to
adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth
(4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino
spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the
guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter
of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has
signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the
spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also
insures harmony between the spouses.12
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried
at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the
petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her
husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for
adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in
Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of
petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the
illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not
legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit
of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must
comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth
in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has
diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have
been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the
filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until
the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own
country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the
latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved
during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification
to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or
adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity
of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of
petitioner.
Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary
since the children have been emancipated having reached the age of
majority. This is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being.13 The father and the mother shall jointly
exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children.14 Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the
parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person
to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.15
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when
he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age16 — emancipation
terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who
shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.17 However,
parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V
of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
ARTICLE V and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is
the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and
the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the
adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate
son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is
entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate
sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end,
the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the
means of the family.
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and
the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from
legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s)
had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the
biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the
spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the
adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations
arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to:
(i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and
(ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of
each other.18 Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority,
the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the
rights19 of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father
and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be
entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the
adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the
benefits to which biological parents are entitled20 such as support21 and
successional rights.22
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,
hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration.
They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of
society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to
experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person
of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble
and compassionate objectives of the law.23 But, as we have ruled in Republic
v. Vergara:24
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the
promotion of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should be
construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said
purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and
less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care
position to affirm the trial court’s decision favoring adoption in the case at
bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the
proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the
law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’
petition for adoption. (Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1.zw+
Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our
own legislation to suit petitioner.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show
that joint adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a
case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior
Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between
petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of
dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the
dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still
subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is
mandatory.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15
September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22
in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
36. G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M.
CASTRO, A.K.A. "MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO" AND "JAYROSE M.
CASTRO," Petitioners, v. JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND
ANA MARIA REGINA GREGORIO, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be a
showing of notice and consent. This cannot be defeated by mere procedural
devices. In all instances where it appears that a spouse attempts to adopt a
child out of wedlock, the other spouse and other legitimate children must be
personally notified through personal service of summons. It is not enough
that they be deemed notified through constructive service.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the decision2 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101021, which denied the petition for
annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before the appellate
court sought to annul the judgment of the trial court that granted respondents'
decree of adoption.3chanrobleslaw
The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed Lemuel
Gregorio (Jéd) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) by Atty. Jose G.
Castro (Jose). Jose is the estranged husband of Rosario Mata Castro
(Rosario) and the father of Joanne Benedicta Charissima M. Castro
(Joanne), also known by her baptismal name, "Maria Socorro M. Castro" and
her nickname, "Jayrose."
Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5, 1962 in Laoag
City. Their marriage had allegedly been troubled. They had a child, Rose
Marie, who was born in 1963, but succumbed to congenital heart disease
and only lived for nine days. Rosario allegedly left Jose after a couple of
months because of the incompatibilities between them.4chanrobleslaw
Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave birth to
Joanne a year later. She and Jose allegedly lived as husband and wife for
about a year even if she lived in Manila and Jose stayed in Laoag City. Jose
would visit her in Manila during weekends. Afterwards, they separated
permanently because Rosario alleged that Jose had homosexual
tendencies.5 She insisted, however, that they "remained friends for fifteen
(15) years despite their separation(.)"6chanrobleslaw
On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition7 for adoption before the Regional
Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. In the petition, he alleged that Jed and
Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio
(Lilibeth),8 whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper.9 At the
time of the filing of the petition, Jose was 70 years old. 10chanrobleslaw
According to the Home Study Report11 conducted by the Social Welfare
Officer of the trial court, Jose belongs to a prominent and respected family,
being one of the three children of former Governor Mauricio Castro.
He was also a well-known lawyer in Manila and Ilocos Norte.12 The report
mentioned that he was once married to Rosario, but the marriage did not
produce any children.13 It also stated that he met and fell in love with Lilibeth
in 1985, and Lilibeth was able to bear him two children, Jed on August 1987,
and Regina on March 1989.14 Under "Motivation for Adoption," the social
welfare officer noted:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Since, he has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario Mata, he was not
able to fulfill his dreams to parent a child. However, with the presence of his
2 illegitimate children will fulfill his dreams [sic] and it is his intention to
legalize their relationship and surname. . . .15
At the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with Jed and Regina
temporarily in Batac, Ilocos Norte.16 The children have allegedly been in his
custody since Lilibeth's death in July 1995.17chanrobleslaw
On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the adoption, 18 having ruled
that "[n]o opposition had been received by this Court from any person
including the government which was represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General."19 A certificate of finality20 was issued on February 9, 2006.
Meanwhile, on July 3, 2006, Rosario, through her lawyer, Atty. Rene V.
Saguisag, filed a complaint for disbarment against Jose with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines.21 In her complaint, she alleged that Jose had been
remiss in providing support for their daughter, Joanne, for the past 36
years.22 She alleged that she single-handedly raised and provided financial
support to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and
alleged lover, Larry R. Rentegrado (Larry), and even went to the extent of
adopting Larry's two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne's
knowledge and consent.23She also alleged that Jose made blatant lies to the
trial court by alleging that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with
Larry's wife, Lilibeth, to cover up for his homosexual relationship with
Larry.24chanrobleslaw
In his answer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose denies being
remiss in his fatherly duties to Joanne during her minority. He alleged that he
always offered help, but it was often declined.25 He also alleged that he
adopted Jed and Regina because they are his illegitimate children. He
denied having committed any of the falsification alluded to by Rosario. He
also stated that he had suffered a stroke in 1998 that left him paralyzed. He
alleged that his income had been diminished because several properties had
to be sold to pay for medical treatments.26 He then implored the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines to weigh on the case with "justice and
equity."27chanrobleslaw
On October 8, 2006, Jose died in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte.28chanrobleslaw
On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of
Appeals, seeking to annul the October 16, 2000 decision of the trial court
approving Jed and Regina's adoption.29chanrobleslaw
perpetrated during the trial and could not be classified as extrinsic fraud,
which is required in an action for annulment of judgment.38chanrobleslaw
When Rosario and Joanne's motion for reconsideration was denied on July
10, 2009,39 they filed this petition.
The issue before this court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying
the petition for annulment for failure of petitioners to (1) show that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction and (2) show the existence of extrinsic fraud.
In their petition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in its
application of the law on extrinsic fraud as ground to annul a
judgment.40 They argue that because of the fabricated consent obtained by
Jose and the alleged false information shown in the birth certificates
presented as evidence before the trial court,41 they were not given the
opportunity to oppose the petition since the entire proceedings were
concealed from them.42chanrobleslaw

In their petition, Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of the adoption Petitioners also argue that the appellate court misunderstood and misapplied
sometime in 2005.30 They allege that Rosario's affidavit of consent, marked the law on jurisdiction despite the denial of due process, notice, and non-
by the trial court as "Exh. K,"31 was fraudulent.32 They also allege that Jed inclusion of indispensable parties.43 They argue that the adoption of
and Regina's birth certificates showed different sets of information, such as illegitimate children requires the consent, not only of the spouse, but also the
the age of their mother, Lilibeth, at the time she gave birth. They argue that legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter, and such consent was
one set of birth certificates states the father to be Jose and in another set of never secured from Joanne.44chanrobleslaw
National Statistic Office certificates shows the father to be Larry, Jose's
driver and alleged lover.33 It was further alleged that Jed and Regina are not Respondents, however, argue in their comment that petitioners could not
actually Jose's illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and have been deprived of their day in court since their interest was "amply
Larry who were married at the time of their birth.34chanrobleslaw protected by the participation and representation of the Solicitor General
through the deputized public prosecutor."45chanrobleslaw
On May 26, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied the petition.
Respondents also argue that there was constructive notice through
While admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court to Rosario and publication for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
Joanne of the adoption, the appellate court ruled that there is "no explicit circulation, which constitutes not only notice to them but also notice to the
provision in the rules that the spouse and legitimate child of the adopter . . . world of the adoption proceedings.46 They argue that since the alleged fraud
should be personally notified of the hearing." 35chanrobleslaw was perpetrated during the trial, it cannot be said to be extrinsic fraud but
intrinsic fraud, which is not a ground for annulment of judgment. 47 They also
The appellate court "abhor[red] the mind baffling scheme employed by [Jose] argue that petitioners were not indispensable parties because adoption is an
in obtaining an adoption decree in favor of [his illegitimate children] to the action in rem and, as such, the only indispensable party is the
prejudice of the interests of his legitimate heirs"36 but stated that its hands state.48chanrobleslaw
were bound by the trial court decision that had already attained "finality and
immutability."37chanrobleslaw The petition is granted.

The appellate court also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information Annulment of judgment under Rule 47
contained in the different sets of birth certificates required the determination of the Rules of Civil Procedure
of the identities of the persons stated therein and was, therefore, beyond the
scope of the action for annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud was also Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file an
action with the Court of Appeals to annul judgments or final orders and parties.53 Extrinsic fraud, on the other hand, is "[that which] prevents a party
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts. This remedy will only be from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or [that
available if "the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or which] operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the manner in which it is procured."54chanrobleslaw
petitioner."49chanrobleslaw
The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial court
In Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals:50chanrobleslaw did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.
nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and
only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought, to be annulled was Jurisdiction over adoption proceedings
rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the vis-a-vis the law on adoption
remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and
readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or Petitioners argue that they should have been given notice by the trial court of
resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds the adoption, as adoption laws require their consent as a requisite in the
for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by proceedings.
prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner
should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief Petitioners are correct.
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in
safeguards cannot prosper. force at the time of the commencement of the action." 55 As Jose filed the
petition for adoption on August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 8552 56 which
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final applies over the proceedings. The law on adoption requires that the adoption
order or final resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards the by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his
time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final judgments, a wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.
solid corner stone in the dispensation of justice by the courts. The doctrine of
immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first
delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly obtain the consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out
the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial of wedlock:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the ARTICLE III
courts exist. As to the first, a judgment that has acquired finality becomes ELIGIBILITY
immutable and unalterable and is no longer to be modified in any respect
even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. — The following may
of law, and whether the modification is made by the court that rendered the adopt:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
decision or by the highest court of the land. As to the latter, controversies
cannot drag on indefinitely because fundamental considerations of public Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following
policy and sound practice demand that the rights and obligations of every cases:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of
time.51 (Emphasis supplied) (i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or

Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only two grounds (ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter:
by which annulment of judgment may be availed of: extrinsic fraud, which Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified, his/her consent
must be brought four years from discovery, and lack of jurisdiction, which thereto; or
must be brought before it is barred by estoppel or laches. 52chanrobleslaw
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. . . (Emphasis
Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction over the nature supplied)
of the action or subject matter, or lack of jurisdiction over the
 To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court
The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband and wife must file that he and Rosario were childless, thereby preventing Joanne from being
a joint petition for adoption. The rationale for this is stated in In Re: Petition notified of the proceedings. As her written consent was never obtained, the
for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim:57chanrobleslaw adoption was not valid.
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required by Republic
with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case.
insures harmony between the spouses.58 Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over
substantive statutory rights.
The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation
where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne
In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse of the proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
There was extrinsic fraud
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and
Rosario remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose The appellate court, in denying the petition, ruled that while fraud may have
to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent been committed in this case, it was only intrinsic fraud, rather than extrinsic
to the adoption. Jose, however, did not validly obtain Rosario's consent. His fraud. This is erroneous.
submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in her name cannot be
considered compliance of the requisites of the law. Had Rosario been given In People v. Court of Appeals and Socorro Florece:59chanrobleslaw
notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she would have had a reasonable Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation
opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her consent was not committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party is
obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt. prevented from fully exhibiting his side of the case by fraud or
deception practiced on him by his opponent, such as by keeping him
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter's children if they are away from court, by giving him a false promise of a compromise, or where
10 years old or older. In Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act No. the defendant never had the knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance
8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or without
SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. — After being authority connives at his defeat.60 (Emphasis supplied)
properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her
approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought within four
is hereby required:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary years from discovery.61Petitioners alleged that they were made aware of the
adoption only in 2005. The filing of this petition on October 18, 2007 is within
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, the period allowed by the rules.
of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any; (Emphasis supplied)
The badges of fraud are present in this case.
The consent of the adopter's other children is necessary as it ensures
harmony among the prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other First, the petition for adoption was filed in a place that had no relation to any
children on notice that they will have to share their parent's love and care, as of the parties. Jose was a resident of Laoag City, llocos Norte.62 Larry and
well as their future legitimes, with another person. Lilibeth were residents of Barangay 6, Laoag City.63 Jed and Regina were
born in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.64 Rosario and Joanne were residents of
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate child and that Parañaque City, Manila.65 The petition for adoption, however, was filed in the
she was over 10 years old at the time of the adoption proceedings. Her Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte.66 The trial court gave due course
written consent, therefore, was necessary for the adoption to be valid. to the petition on Jose's bare allegation in his petition that he was a resident
of Batac,67 even though it is admitted in the Home Study Report that he was
a practicing lawyer in Laoag City.68chanrobleslaw
Second, using the process of delayed registration, 69 Jose was able to secure
birth certificates for Jed and Regina showing him to be the father and Larry
as merely the informant.70 Worse still is that two different sets of fraudulent
certificates were procured: one showing that Jose and Lilibeth were married
on December 4, 1986 in Manila,71 and another wherein the portion for the
mother's name was not filled in at all.72 The birth certificates of Jed and
Regina from the National Statistics Office, however, show that their father
was Larry R. Rentegrado.73 These certificates are in clear contradiction to the
birth certificates submitted by Jose to the trial court in support of his petition
for adoption.
Third, Jose blatantly lied to the trial court when he declared that his
motivation for adoption was because he and his wife, Rosario, were
childless,74 to the prejudice of their daughter, Joanne. The consent of
Rosario to the adoption was also disputed by Rosario and alleged to be
fraudulent.75chanrobleslaw
All these tactics were employed by Jose, not only to induce the trial court in
approving his petition, but also to prevent Rosario and Joanne from
participating in the proceedings or opposing the petition.
The appellate court erroneously classified the fraud employed by Jose as
intrinsic on the basis that they were "forged instruments or perjured
testimonies"76 presented during the trial. It failed to understand, however,
that fraud is considered intrinsic when the other party was either present at
the trial or was a participant in the proceedings when such instrument or
testimony was presented in court, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[I]ntrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that prevented a fair and
just determination of the case, but the difference is that the acts or things,
like falsification and false testimony, could have been litigated and
determined at the trial or adjudication of the case. In other words, intrinsic
fraud does not deprive the petitioner of his day in court because he can
guard against that kind of fraud through so many means, including a
thorough trial preparation, a skillful, cross-examination, resorting to the
modes of discovery, and proper scientific or forensic applications. Indeed,
forgery of documents and evidence for use at the trial and perjury in court
testimony have been regarded as not preventing the participation of any
party in the proceedings, and are not, therefore, constitutive of extrinsic
fraud.77 (Emphasis supplied)
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of
any other interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic,
regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged
documents or perjured testimony during the trial.
Jose's actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable
opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed
to participate, the trial court would have hesitated to grant Jose's petition
since he failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under the law. There can
be no other conclusion than that because of Jose's acts, the trial court
granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.
The law itself provides for penal sanctions for those who violate its
provisions. Under Article VII, Section 21 of Republic Act No.
8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties. —
(a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day
to twelve (12) years and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be imposed on any
person who shall commit any of the following acts:
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue influence,
fraud, improper material inducement, or other similar acts;
(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by the law
for adoption; or
(iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or
exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a
child under the name(s) of a person(s) who is not his/her biological
parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation of birth, and shall be punished by
prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not exceeding Fifty
thousand pesos (P50.000.00). (Emphasis supplied)
Unfortunately, Jose's death carried with it the extinguishment of any of his
criminal liabilities.78 Republic Act No. 8552 also fails to provide any provision
on the status of adoption decrees if the adoption is found to have been
obtained fraudulently. Petitioners also cannot invoke Article VI, Section 19 of
Republic Act No. 855279 since rescission of adoption can only be availed of
by the adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left with no other remedy in law
other than the annulment of the judgment.
The fraud employed in this case has been to Joanne's prejudice. There is
reason to believe that Joanne has grown up having never experienced the
love and care of a father, her parents having separated a year after her birth.
She has never even benefited from any monetary support from her father.
Despite all these adversities, Joanne was able to obtain a medical degree
from the University of the Philippines College of Medicine80 and is now
working as a doctor in Canada.81 These accomplishments, however, are poor
substitutes if the injustice done upon her is allowed to continue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated October 16,
2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17 in SP.
Proc. No. 3445-17 is rendered NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
37. G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA
GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue
raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a
petition1 to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June
26, 1994;2that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has
been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s
middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and
that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname.
On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting
the adoption, thus:
"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner,
and in the absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the
petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification
provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to
maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this
petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the petitioner’s
care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute more
than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential
Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED.
Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all
obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother,
and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner’s legitimate child and
legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil
Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record
purposes.
SO ORDERED."4
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration5 praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the
surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an
adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle
name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child
may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle
name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting
an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one
adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle name
the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the
name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the
adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated;
(5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name "Garcia" (her mother’s
surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of
"Garcia" as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia
families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with
petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the
surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her
natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to
be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and
needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship
with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname
of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it
allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is
ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by
the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed
that "the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother."7
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law –
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by
which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best
known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person
is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation
which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or
in speaking of or dealing with him.8 It is both of personal as well as public
interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and
(2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is
given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other
individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to
which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may
be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the
child is entitled is fixed by law.9
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules
which regulate the use of surname10 of an individual whatever may be his
status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted
child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:
"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use
the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage
shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his
wife, such as ‘Mrs.’
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party,
she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent
spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may
choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue
using her name and surname employed before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he
were still living, in accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person
shall be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid
confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants
and descendants, the word ‘Junior’ can be used only by a son. Grandsons
and other direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
x x x"
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name –
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a
middle name. Even Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate
Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what middle
name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article
375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames
between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or
the mother’s surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee
may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child
shall bear the surname of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family Code,
enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter,
thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate
child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
x x x"
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized
the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his
middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father, thus
"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by
the wife of the surname and that of the child because the father’s surname
indicates the family to which he belongs, for which reason he would
insist on the use of the father’s surname by the child but that, if he
wants to, the child may also use the surname of the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of
the mother, how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up
to him but that his point is that it should be mandatory that the child uses
the surname of the father and permissive in the case of the surname of
the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point is covered by the
present Article 364, which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the
person himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the
following example: Alfonso Ponce Enrile’s correct surname is Ponce since
the mother’s surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice
Jose Gutierrez David’s family name is Gutierrez and his mother’s surname is
David but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified
to the effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname
of the father but he may use the surname of the mother by way of an
initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this for
inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article
(10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the
details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by
Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last
because there are so many traditions like the American tradition where they
like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also
followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter
on the Use of Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that
the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother. Prof.
Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee
approved the suggestion."12 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear
the surname of the adopters."13 Again, it is silent whether he can use a
middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and
obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon
issuance of the decree of adoption.14
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child –
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not
to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate
child.15 It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two
persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity
and filiation.16 The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act
to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which
endows the child with a legitimate status.17 This was, indeed, confirmed in
1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the
Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the
principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral
responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the
adopted child.18 Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the "Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these rights and privileges for the
adopted.20
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article
18921 of the Family Code and Section 1722 Article V of RA 8552.23
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate
child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is
consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of
the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her
mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal
lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section
1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee
remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can
well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the
future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in
the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag,
Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached
to both her mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed,
they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her
mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued
loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her
illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption –
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should
be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.25 The
interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration,26 hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. 27
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail."
This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it
may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or
obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice
which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law."28
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her
natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname,
we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly
MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her
mother’s surname "GARCIA" as her middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in
the decree of adoption.
SO ORDERED.
38. G.R. No. 182497 June 29, 2010
NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA,
BRANCH 37, DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO RAZON, JR., DIRECTOR
GEARY BARIAS, PSSUPT. CO YEE M. CO, JR. and POLICE CHIEF
INSPECTOR AGAPITO QUIMSON, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 651 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Order dated 25 April 2008 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 37, in Special Proceeding No. 08-119132 which
denied the petition for Habeas Corpus filed by herein Petitioner Nurhida
Juhuri Ampatuan in behalf of her husband Police Officer 1 Basser B.
Ampatuan2 (PO1 Ampatuan).
Petitioner alleged in her petition that her husband PO1 Ampatuan was
assigned at Sultan Kudarat Municipal Police Station. On 14 April 2008, he
was asked by his Chief of Police to report to the Provincial Director of Shariff
Kabunsuan, Superintendent Esmael Pua Ali (Supt. Ali). The latter brought
PO1 Ampatuan to Superintendent Piang Adam, Provincial Director of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Maguindanao. PO1 Ampatuan was directed
to stay at the Police Provincial Office of Maguindanao without being informed
of the cause of his restraint. The next day, 15 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan
was brought to the General Santos City Airport and was made to board a
Philippine Airlines plane bound for Manila. Upon landing at the Manila
Domestic Airport, PO1 Ampatuan was turned over to policemen of Manila
and brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim by Police Director Geary Barias
and General Roberto Rosales. A press briefing was then conducted where it
was announced that PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for the killing of two
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Officials. He was then detained at the
Police Jail in United Nations Avenue, Manila. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was
brought to inquest Prosecutor Renato Gonzaga of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila due to the alleged murder of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig,
head of the Law Department of the COMELEC. On 20 April 2008, PO1
Ampatuan was turned-over to the Regional Headquarters Support Group in
Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City.3
Petitioner continues that on 21 April 2008, Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson
Salva ordered the release for further investigation of PO1 Ampatuan.4 The
Order was approved by the City Prosecutor of Manila. But Police Senior
Superintendent Co Yee Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson
refused to release PO1 Ampatuan.
This prompted Petitioner to file the petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
RTC of Manila, Branch 37.5
Private respondents had another version of the antecedent facts. They
narrated that at around 7:08 o’clock in the evening of 10 November 2007, a
sixty-four-year-old man, later identified as Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of
the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar
and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. Investigation conducted by the Manila
Police District (MPD) Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male
perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was
commanded to the MPD District Director for proper disposition. Likewise,
inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutor’s Office.
On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Clarence V. Guinto,
rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding
probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder)
and recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary
hearing.
On even date, a charge sheet for Grave Misconduct was executed against
PO1 Ampatuan, the accusatory portion of which reads:
CHARGE SHEET
THE UNDERSIGNED NOMINAL COMPLAINANT hereby charges above-
named respondent of the administrative offense of Grave Misconduct
(murder) pursuant to Section 52 of R.A. 85516 in relation to NAPOLCOM
Memorandum Circular 93-024, committed as follows:
That on or about 7:08 in the evening of November 10, 2007, in M.H. Del Pilar
and Pedro Gil St., Ermita, Manila, above-named respondent while being an
active member of the PNP and within the jurisdiction of this office, armed with
a cal .45 pistol, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, shot Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Jr., COMELEC official on the
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal gunshot
wounds which directly cause (sic) his death.
Acts contrary to the existing PNP Laws rules and Regulations.7
Also, through a Memorandum dated 18 April 2008, Police Director General
Avelino I. Razon, Jr. directed the Regional Director of the National Capital
Regional Police Office (NCRPO) to place PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive
custody, thus:
1. Reference: Memo from that Office dated April 15, 2008 re Arrest
of PO1 Busser Ampatuan, suspect in the killing of Atty. Alioden
Dalaig and Atty. Wynee Asdala, both COMELEC Legal Officers.
2. This pertains to the power of the Chief, PNP embodied in Section
52 of RA 8551, to place police personnel under restrictive custody
during the pendency of a grave administrative case filed against him
or even after the filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature,
against such police personnel.
 3. In this connection, you are hereby directed to place PO1 Busser
Ampatuan, suspect in the killing of Atty. Alioden Dalaig and Atty.
Wynee Asdala, both COMELEC Legal Officers, under your restrictive
custody.
4. For strict compliance.8
On 19 April 2008, through a Memorandum Request dated 18 April 2008,
respondent Police Director Geary L. Barias requested for the creation of the
Summary Hearing Board to hear the case of PO1 Ampatuan.9
On 20 April 2008, Special Order No. 921 was issued by Police Director
Edgardo E. Acuña, placing PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody of the
Regional Director, NCRPO, effective 19 April 2008. Said Special Order No.
921, reads:
Restrictive Custody
PO1 Basser B. Ampatuan 128677, is placed under restrictive custody of the
Regional Director, NCRPO effective April 19, 2008. (Reference:
Memorandum from CPNP dated 18 April 2008).
BY COMMAND OF POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL RAZON:10
Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended
that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that
the latter be released from custody unless he is being held for other
charges/legal grounds.11
Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City’s
Prosecution Office, petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC of
Manila on 22 April 2008. The petition was docketed as Special Proceeding
No. 08-119132 and was raffled to Branch 37.
On 24 April 2008, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance,
respondent Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig ordered the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus commanding therein respondents to produce the body of PO1
Ampatuan and directing said respondents to show cause why they are
withholding or restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan. 12
On 25 April 2008, the RTC resolved the Petition in its Order which reads:
Essentially, counsels for petitioner insists that PO1 Basser Ampatuan is
being illegally detained by the respondents despite the order of release of
Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva dated April 21, 2008. They further
claim that as of April 23, 2008, no administrative case was filed against PO1
Ampatuan.
Respondents, while admitting that to date no criminal case was filed against
PO1 Ampatuan, assert that the latter is under restrictive custody since he is
facing an administrative case for grave misconduct. They submitted to this
Court the Pre-charge Evaluation Report and Charge Sheet. Further, in
support of their position, respondents cited the case of SPO2 Manalo, et al.
v. Hon. Calderon, G.R. No. 178920 claiming that habeas corpus will not lie
for a PNP personnel under restrictive custody. They claim that this is
authorized under Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551 authorizing the Chief of
PNP to place the PNP personnel under restrictive custody during the
pendency of administrative case for grave misconduct.
Petitioner countered that the administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan
was ante-dated to make it appear that there was such a case filed before
April 23, 2008.
The function of habeas corpus is to determine the legality of one’s detention,
meaning, if there is sufficient cause for deprivation or confinement and if
there is none to discharge him at once. For habeas corpus to issue, the
restraint of liberty must be in the nature of illegal and involuntary deprivation
of freedom which must be actual and effective, not nominal or moral.
Granting arguendo that the administrative case was ante-dated, the Court
cannot simply ignore the filing of an administrative case filed against PO1
Ampatuan. It cannot be denied that the PNP has its own administrative
disciplinary mechanism and as clearly pointed out by the respondents, the
Chief PNP is authorized to place PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody
pursuant to Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551.
The filing of the administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process
done by the PNP and this Court has no authority to order the release of the
subject police officer.
Lastly, anent the contention of the petitioner that the letter resignation of PO1
Ampatuan has rendered the administrative case moot and academic, the
same could not be accepted by this Court.1avvph!1 It must be stressed that
the resignation has not been acted (sic) by the appropriate police officials of
the PNP, and that the administrative case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is
still in the active status of the PNP.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for habeas corpus is
hereby DISMISSED.13
Distressed, petitioner is now before this Court via a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question the validity of the RTC Order
dated 25 April 2008. The issues are:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE
ARREST AND DETENTION OF PO1 BASSER B. AMPATUAN WAS
MADE WITHOUT ANY WARRANT AND THEREFORE, ILLEGAL;
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT CONCEDED THE AUTHORITY OF
RESPONDENT AVELINO RAZON, JR. UNDER SEC. 52, PAR. 4,
R.A. 8551 TO PLACE AMPATUAN UNDER RESTRICTIVE
CUSTODY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS;
III. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT SHIRKED FROM ITS JUDICIAL DUTY TO
ORDER THE RELEASE OF PO1 AMPATUAN FROM THE
CUSTODY OF RESPONDENTS MAMANG PULIS.14
Essentially, a writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement
or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.15
Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Court sets forth the procedure to be followed
in the issuance of the writ. The Rule provides:
RULE 102
HABEAS CORPUS
SECTION 1. To what habeas corpus extends. – Except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto.
SEC 2. Who may grant the writ. – The writ of habeas corpus may be granted
by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time,
or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized
by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines,
and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or
before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision
on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge
thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself,
enforceable only within his judicial district.
xxxx
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. – If it appears that
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order
of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention
is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into
is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the
application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its
inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the
instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time
of the filing of the application.16
Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been
illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however,
should not be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a
judicial process or a valid judgment.17
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the
individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement
or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is
restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is
unavailing.18 Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas
corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.19
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether
or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an
application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and
not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas
corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense
of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of
habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the
writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient.20
In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first
inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is
not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed
only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be
unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged.
Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused.21
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or
as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial
discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to
whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to
the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully
restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the
respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in
whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. 22
Petitioner contends that when PO1 Ampatuan was placed under the custody
of respondents on 20 April 2008, there was yet no administrative case filed
against him. When the release order of Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson
Salva was served upon respondents on 21 April 2008, there was still no
administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan. She also argues that the
arrest on 14 April 2008 of PO1 Ampatuan in Shariff Kabunsuan was illegal
because there was no warrant of arrest issued by any judicial authority
against him.
On the other hand, respondents, in their Comment23 filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General, argue that the trial court correctly denied the subject
petition. Respondents maintain that while the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila had recommended that PO1 Ampatuan be released from custody,
said recommendation was made only insofar as the criminal action for
murder that was filed with the prosecution office is concerned and is without
prejudice to other legal grounds for which he may be held under custody. In
the instant case, PO1 Ampatuan is also facing administrative charges for
Grave Misconduct. They cited the case of Manalo v. Calderon,24 where this
Court held that a petition for habeas corpus will be given due course only if it
shows that petitioner is being detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully,
but a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of
police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal
detention or restraint of liberty.25
The Solicitor General is correct.
In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody.
Republic Act No. 6975 (also known as the Department of Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also
known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of
1998), clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the
administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Section 41(b) of the said
law enumerates the disciplinary actions, including restrictive custody that
may be imposed by duly designated supervisors and equivalent officers of
the PNP as a matter of internal discipline. The pertinent provision of Republic
Act No. 8551 reads:
Sec. 52 – x x x.
xxxx
4. The Chief of the PNP shall have the power to impose the disciplinary
punishment of dismissal from the service; suspension or forfeiture of salary;
or any combination thereof for a period not exceeding one hundred eighty
(180) days. Provided, further, That the Chief of the PNP shall have the
authority to place police personnel under restrictive custody during the
pendency of a grave administrative case filed against him or even after the
filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such police personnel.
[Emphasis ours].
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such
constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has held
that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of
police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal
detention or restraint of liberty.26
Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit
of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for
the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure
to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always
accounted for.27
Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuan’s restrictive custody is the administrative
case filed against him, his remedy is within such administrative process.
We likewise note that PO1 Ampatuan has been under restrictive custody
since 19 April 2008. To date, the administrative case against him should
have already been resolved and the issue of his restrictive custody should
have been rendered moot and academic, in accordance with Section 55 of
Republic Act No. 8551, which provides:
SEC. 55. Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. – Upon the filing of
a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member
of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6)
years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the
accused from office for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days from
arraignment: Provided, however, That if it can be shown by evidence that the
accused is harassing the complainant and/or witnesses, the court may order
the preventive suspension of the accused PNP member even if the charge is
punishable by a penalty lower than six (6) years and one (1) day: Provided,
further, That the preventive suspension shall not be more than ninety (90)
days except if the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault,
negligence or petitions of the respondent: Provided, finally, That such
preventive suspension may be sooner lifted by the court in the exigency of
the service upon recommendation of the Chief, PNP. Such case shall be
subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90)
days from arraignment of the accused. (Emphasis supplied.)
Having conceded that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court, we have to dismiss the petition.
In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is
entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1
Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face that the latter is unlawfully
deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
39. G.R. No. 168728 August 2, 2007
SAMUEL BARREDO y GOLANI, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. VICENTE VINARAO, Director, Bureau of Corrections, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner
Samuel Barredo y Golani prays for his release from the maximum security
compound of the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City on the ground that he
has already served the sentence imposed on him in Criminal Case Nos. Q-
92-38559 and Q-92-38560.
Criminal Case No. Q-92-385591 was for carnapping2 while Criminal Case No.
Q-92-38560 was for illegal possession of firearms. 3 Both cases were filed in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 103.4
The cases were tried jointly. After trial, the court rendered a joint decision
finding petitioner guilty of both charges. Relevant parts of the dispositive
portion read:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in Q-92-38559 finding Samuel
Barredo,5 xxx GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt xxx of the crime of
Carnapping aggravated and qualified by the frustrated killing of Ciriaco
Rosales and [he is] hereby sentenced to undergo an imprisonment term of
THIRTY (30) YEARS;
xxx xxx xxx
In Q-92-38560, Samuel Barredo is hereby found GUILTY as principal beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of P.D. 1866 and he is hereby
sentenced to an imprisonment term of EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of Reclusion Temporal.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED.6
No appeal was made, hence, the decision became final and executory.
Petitioner was committed to the custody of the Quezon City Jail (as detention
prisoner) on March 15, 1993.7 After conviction, he was transferred to and
confined at the maximum security compound of the New Bilibid Prison in
Muntinlupa City on July 23, 19948 where he is now still detained.
According to petitioner, as of August 2, 2004, he already served a total of 18
years. He claims that, on October 9, 2001, the Board of Pardons and Parole
passed a resolution recommending the commutation of his sentence to a
period of from 15 to 20 years. He further points out that, based on the Bureau
of Corrections’ revised computation table for determining the time to be
credited prisoners for good conduct while serving sentence, he should only
serve 14 years, 9 months and 18 days. Thus, this petition.
Is petitioner entitled to the writ of habeas corpus? No.
Writ of Habeas Corpus Will Not Issue If Detention Is By Virtue Of Valid
Judgment
The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement,
detention or deprivation of liberty. 9 It was devised as a speedy and effective
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.10 More specifically, it is a
remedy to obtain immediate relief for those who may have been illegally
confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus deliver them from
unlawful custody.11 It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the
circumstances under which a person is detained.12
The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial
process or by virtue of a valid judgment.13 However, the writ may be allowed
as a post-conviction remedy when the proceedings leading to the conviction
were attended by any of the following exceptional circumstances:
(1) there was a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the
restraint of a person;
(2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence or
(3) the imposed penalty was excessive, thus voiding the sentence as
to such excess.14
The rule is that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody
of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record the writ of habeas corpus will not be
allowed.15Thus, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. – If it appears that
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the
writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything
in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with
or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner was detained pursuant to a final judgment of the Quezon City RTC
convicting him for the crimes of carnapping and illegal possession of
firearms. He is therefore not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus.
Sentence is Void Insofar As It Failed to Impose an Indeterminate
Sentence
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, however, the trial court
erred in imposing a straight penalty of imprisonment for 30 years in the
carnapping case. The sentence imposed by the trial court deprived petitioner
of the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. 16 Hence, it was void
insofar as it failed to impose an indeterminate sentence.
Since the crime was committed by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons, the imposable penalty under the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972
was imprisonment for not less than 17 years and 4 months and not more
than 30 years.17 Furthermore, pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the court should have imposed an indeterminate sentence with a maximum
term not exceeding the maximum fixed by the special penal law and a
minimum term not less than the minimum term prescribed by the same
law.18 Therefore, the proper imposable penalty is imprisonment not for 30
years but for an indeterminate sentence of 17 years and 4 months as
minimum to 30 years as maximum.19
Reduction of Penalty Under Amendatory Law Should be Applied
Retroactively
Petitioner is likewise entitled to a reduction of the penalty imposed upon him
in the illegal possession of firearms case in view of the passage of RA 8294.
The law reduced the penalty for simple illegal possession of firearms
to prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than
₱15,000. Being favorable to petitioner, RA 8294 should be applied
retroactively to benefit him.20 Further applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the proper imposable penalty is imprisonment for 4 years, 2 months and
1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum.21
Petitioner Has Not Yet Served The Penalties Imposed on Him
Petitioner has to serve the penalties imposed on him successively in the
order of their severity.22 Hence, he has to first serve the more severe
penalty, i.e., that imposed in the carnapping case: imprisonment for 17 years
and 4 months as minimum to 30 years as maximum. Only after he has
served this will he commence serving the less severe penalty imposed in the
illegal possession of firearms case: imprisonment for 4 years, 2 months and
1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum.23
Per the certification issued by the Bureau of Corrections, 24 as of April 3,
2007, petitioner has served a total of 18 years, 4 months and 26 days,
inclusive of his good conduct time allowance and preventive imprisonment.
Thus, while he has already served the minimum penalty in the carnapping
case, he has not yet served the minimum penalty in the illegal possession of
firearms case. Consequently, petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus. Neither is he eligible for parole because only prisoners
who have served the minimum penalty imposed on them may be released on
parole on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the Board of
Pardons and Parole.25
Petitioner’s claim that the Board of Pardons and Parole passed a resolution
recommending the commutation of his sentence does not justify the issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus. Commutation of sentence is a prerogative of the
Chief Executive.26 Hence, even if petitioner’s claim were true, the
recommendation of the Bureau of Pardons and Parole was just that, a mere
recommendation. Until and unless approved by the President, there is no
commutation to speak of.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
40. G.R. No. 160922 February 27, 2006
JEANY-VI G. KIANI, Petitioner,
vs.
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and DEPORTATION (BID); EDGARDO
CABRERA, ELISEO EXCONDE and JOSE VALE, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari for the nullification of the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 74484, dismissing the
appeal of Jeany-Vi G. Kiani, which assailed the Order of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 8, in Special Proceedings (Sp. Proc.) No. 02-
103935, dismissing her Petition for Habeas Corpus.
On June 19, 2002, Javed Kiani, a British national but a Pakistani by
birth2 reported to the Rodriguez, Rizal Police Station that his friends, Iqbal
Singh and Balbir Singh, had been forcibly taken by four (4) armed men from
their residence at Balita, Rodriguez, Rizal.3 A couple of days later, then
Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) issued Mission Order No. ADD-02-203 based on Executive
Order No. 287 of former President Joseph Estrada. In said Order,
appropriate officers of the Bureau were directed to conduct
verification/validation of the admission status and activities of Javed Kiani,
and, if found to have violated the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, to immediately place him under arrest.4 Per records of the BID,
Javed Kiani was married to a Filipina, Jeany-Vi Kiani, on July 27, 1988. He
was admitted as an immigrant and was issued a permanent resident visa on
March 17, 1993.5
A week later, on June 27, 2002, Javed Kiani was arrested at Felicidad
Village, Montalban, Rizal. The arresting officers, Eduardo Cabrera, Eliseo
Exconde and Jose Vale, Jr., operatives of the Bureau of Intelligence of the
BID, relied on information from Iqbal and Balbir Singh, who pointed to Javed
Kiani as the one who had furnished them with fake Alien Certificate
Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate Registration (ICR). Apparently,
the forms used were not official BID forms.6
On July 1, 2002, the BID Prosecutor filed a Charge Sheet7 against "Javed
Kiani alias Ahmad Singh" before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) for
violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, particularly
Section 37(a)(7) and Section 45 thereof. The case was docketed as D.C. No.
ADD-02-080. The Charge Sheet reads:
Records show that the above-named subject was arrested on June 27, 2002
by Bureau’s Intelligence operatives at Felicidad Village, Montalban, Rizal,
pursuant to Mission Order No. ADD-02-203, dated June 20, 2002.
Records also show that subject national was positively identified by Indian
nationals Balbir Singh and Iqbal Singh when they were arrested by the same
operatives on June 18, 2002 as the person who gave them spurious
immigration documents and as their protector evidenced by copies of the
ACRs and ICRs of Balbir and Iqbal Singh, which were certified by Mr.
Reynaldo Joson as "fake." Additionally, Mr. Joson certified that the forms
used in the forgery/falsification are not official forms of this Bureau.
Contrary to law.8
On the same day, July 1, 2002, the Board of Commissioners (BOC)
conducted a summary proceeding and issued a Summary Deportation Order
revoking the visa issued to Javed Kiani. The Order reads in part:
Considering the seriousness of the charge/s and the evidence in support
thereof, respondent, whose Temporary Residence Visa is hereby ordered
cancelled and revoked, is hereby ordered summarily deported to his country
of origin, subject to PNP, Court and NBI clearances and payment of an
administrative fine in the amount of ₱50,000.00.9
The next day, July 2, 2002, Javed Kiani’s wife, Jeany-Vi, filed a Petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus10 for and in behalf of her husband before the RTC of
Manila, naming the BID and its intelligence officers as Respondents. She
prayed that the court issue a writ of habeas corpus directing respondents to
produce the person of Javed Kiani before it "in the soonest time possible and
to show the cause or legal justification for the latter’s detention and
imprisonment, if any; and for such other or further reliefs as may be deemed
just and equitable under the premises." She further alleged that her husband
had intervened in the arrest of Iqbal and Balbir Singh, and that the arresting
officers resented such intervention. She insisted that the arrest and detention
of her husband were bereft of factual and legal basis, since at the time, no
deportation order had yet been issued against him. Citing the ruling of this
Court in Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa,11 she alleged that the
Mission Order issued by the Immigration Commissioner was void. The case
was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 02-103935.12 Javed Kiani had been detained
at the BID Detention Center, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila
since July 3, 2002.13
On July 18, 2002, the RTC issued an Order14 granting bail for Javed Kiani on
a bond of ₱50,000.00, and ordered respondent BID Intelligence Officers to
file their return on the writ. The respondents complied, and alleged in their
return that Javed Kiani had already been charged before the BOC and
ordered deported; hence, the petition had become moot and academic. They
refused to release Kiani although the bond had already been
posted.15 Instead, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed an Omnibus Motion16 for the reconsideration of the
Order on the following grounds: (1) under Section 37(9)(e) of Commonwealth
Act 613, as amended, it is the Commissioner of Immigration, and not the
court, who has authority to grant bail in a deportation proceeding; (2) the
court has no authority to grant the petition considering that Javed Kiani was
lawfully charged with violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, before the BSI; and (3) the BOC has subsequently issued a
Summary Deportation Order.
On October 28, 2002, the RTC issued an Order17 granting the motion and
setting aside its July 18, 2002 Order. In dismissing the petition, it ruled that
Jeany-Vi was barred from questioning the legality of the arrest and detention
of her husband, following the filing of the Charge Sheet with the BSI; as
such, there was no justification for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. It
declared that, as gleaned from the return of the writ filed by the respondents,
Javed Kiani was lawfully charged with violation of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940, as amended; hence, the Summary Deportation Order issued by
the BOC was valid.
The RTC also ruled that the proper remedy of Javed Kiani from the Summary
Deportation Order of the BOC was to file a petition for review with the CA
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court (and not a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus before it), as it had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and reverse
the Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC.
Jeany-Vi appealed the RTC’s Order of July 18, 2002 to the CA, in which she
raised the following issues:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE ARREST OF JAVED KIANI ON 27 JUNE 2002
AND HIS SUBSEQUENT DETENTION BY THE RESPONDENTS-
APPELLEES WERE VALID AND/OR LEGAL.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE SUPPOSED ISSUANCE OF A SUMMARY
DEPORTATION ORDER AGAINST JAVED KIANI HAS THE EFFECT OF
LEGALIZING AND/OR VALIDATING HIS CONTINUED DETENTION,
THEREBY RENDERING THE HABEAS CORPUS PETITION
DISMISSIBLE.18
On May 8, 2003 the CA rendered judgment dismissing the appeal.19 The CA
declared that a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus can no longer be
allowed since the party sought to be released had been charged before the
BSI. Assuming that Javed Kiani’s detention or his arrest was illegal, any
incipient infirmity thereon was cured by the filing of the Charge Sheet against
him. The appellate court cited the ruling of this Court in Velasco v. Court of
Appeals.20It likewise affirmed the ruling of the RTC that it had no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of and reverse the Summary Deportation Order of the
BOC, that the remedy of petitioner from the Summary Deportation Order of
the BOC was to file a petition for review with the CA under Rule 43 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and that her failure to do so rendered said
Order final and executory.
Jeany-Vi received a copy of the CA Decision on May 22, 2003, and filed a
Motion for Reconsideration thereof on June 6, 2003. She alleged that since
the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC had not yet been promulgated
by the BSI, the period to appeal was yet to commence, and as such, said
order could not become final and executory. Even assuming that such order
had become final and executory, her husband was entitled to a writ of
habeas corpus since he was deprived of his right to due process.
On November 21, 2003, the appellate court resolved to deny the
motion.21 Jeany-Vi received a copy of the Resolution on December 1, 2003.
On January 15, 2004, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, alleging that:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO NULLIFY
AND TO DECLARE AS ILLEGAL THE ACTUAL ARREST AND
SUBSEQUENT DETENTION OF JAVED KIANI.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE
AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO THE PUTATIVE SUMMARY
DEPORTATION ORDER AGAINST JAVED KIANI.
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE SUMMARY DEPORTATION ORDER AGAINST JAVED KIANI
HAS ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
D. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
HABEAS CORPUS IS NOT THE CORRECT OR PROPER REMEDY
AVAILABLE TO THE HEREIN PETITIONER.22
Petitioner avers that the Mission Order issued by the Immigration
Commissioner for the investigation and arrest of her husband, Javed Kiani, is
null and void. She points out that when said Order was issued, the BOC had
not yet made a determination as to the existence of a lawful ground for his
deportation. She further avers that the Immigration Commissioner has no
power to issue a Mission Order or Warrant of Arrest solely for the purpose of
investigation, and before a final order for deportation is issued by the BOC.
She insists that an order of arrest is proper only if the BOC has already
issued an Order of deportation. She cites the rulings of this Court in Qua
Chee Gan v. Deportation Board,23 Ang Ngo Chiong v. Galang,24 and Board of
Commissioners v. Dela Rosa.25
Petitioner further maintains that the filing of the Charge Sheet against Javed
Kiani by the BOC did not render the issue of the illegality of arrest and
detention moot and academic. She asserts that there is no factual and legal
basis for the deportation of her husband because he had been issued a
permanent visa and his passport is yet to expire. She avers that a warrant for
the arrest of her husband may be issued only after a Summary Deportation
Order shall have become final and executory. Considering that there was no
showing in the records that said Order had already been promulgated by the
BSI, it could not have become final and executory. She avers that the ruling
of this Court in Velasco v. Court of Appeals26 is not applicable in this case.
In its Comment on the petition filed on December 10, 2004, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) avers that it agrees with the ruling of the CA and
prays that it be affirmed. Citing the ruling of this Court in Dwikarna v.
Domingo,27 the OSG posits that the remedy of petitioner from the Summary
Deportation Order of the BOC was to appeal to the CA via a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court. It maintains that it was
inappropriate for petitioner to assail the arrest and detention of her husband
after the filing of the Charge Sheet with the BSI.
The OSG also alleges that Javed Kiani had filed an Omnibus Motion Ad
Cautelam28 dated March 19, 2004 in the BID, presumably with the BOC,
wherein he prayed that the Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC
against him be set aside, and that he be released in the meantime. The OSG
also asserts that in said motion, Javed Kiani alleged that his arrest and
detention was illegal because there had been as yet no determination by the
BOC of any ground for his deportation; in effect, he pursued the same reliefs
he seeks from this Court in his motion with the BOC, that is, to declare as
illegal his continued detention and order his release. The OSG avers that this
is a classic example of forum shopping which is prohibited under the Rules.
In reply, petitioner asserts that during the pendency of this case, Immigration
Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr. granted her husband’s Omnibus
Motion Ad Cautelam in an Order29 dated June 22, 2004, and ordered his
provisional release on a cash bond of ₱50,000.00. The Commissioner also
declared that the Summary Deportation Order against her husband had been
improvidently issued, and ruled that there was no factual and legal basis for
his summary deportation. Moreover, Javed Kiani was deprived of his right to
due process when the Order was issued on the same day the Charge Sheet
was filed with the BSI.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: (1) whether petitioner
engaged in forum shopping; and (2) whether the CA erred in (a) holding that
the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC was not the proper
remedy of petitioner; (b) upholding the validity of the Summary Deportation
Order issued by the BOC; and (c) declaring that such Order had become
final and executory.
On the first issue, we agree with the contention of the OSG that the petitioner
indulged in forum shopping. Forum shopping is the institution of two or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that
one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Section 6, Rule 43
of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a petition for review on certiorari
must contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the
last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42 of said Rules, to wit:
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification under
oath that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the
same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or
proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter
learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or
any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid
courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days
therefrom.lawphil.net
Under Section 5, Rule 45 of said Rules, the failure of the petitioner to comply
with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition.
In Balite v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court held that there is forum shopping
when a party seeks to obtain remedies in an action in one court, which had
already been solicited, and in other courts and other proceedings in other
tribunals. While a party may avail of the remedies prescribed by the Rules of
Court, such party is not free to resort to them simultaneously or at his/her
pleasure or caprice. A party should not be allowed to present simultaneous
remedies in two different forums, for it degrades and wreaks havoc to the
rule on orderly procedure. A party must follow the sequence and hierarchical
order in availing such remedies and not resort to shortcuts in procedure or
playing fast and loose with the said rules. Forum shopping, an act of
malpractice, is considered as trifling with the courts and abusing their
processes. It is improper conduct and degrades the administration of justice.
In this case, petitioner seeks not only the reversal of the Order of the RTC
dismissing her Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in behalf of her
husband (where it was also declared that he had been legally deported), as
well as the decision of the CA affirming the RTC’s Order; she also prays that
the Court render judgment nullifying the Summary Deportation Order of the
BOC and order her husband’s release from detention. However, Javed Kiani
himself, during the pendency of this case, filed an Omnibus Motion Ad
Cautelam with the BID, seeking the same reliefs, which his wife prayed for in
this case. By filing said motion, Javed Kiani sought to preempt the decision of
this Court. Petitioner and her husband even failed to inform the Court of the
filing of such motion, and did so only after the OSG had already informed the
Court of such petition, and after petitioner had been ordered to reply to the
Comment of the OSG.
Petitioner and her husband were represented by the same law firm, the Cruz
Cruz and Neria Law Offices. The instant petition and said motion were
signed by the same lawyer, Atty. Marlon Alexandre C. Cruz. That the instant
petition was filed by Jeany-Vi Kiani while the Omnibus Motion was filed by
Javed Kiani himself is of no moment; after all, the petition was filed for and in
behalf of the latter, who is the real party-in-interest.31 In effect, the Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by him, as the beneficiary, through his wife
as his representative. Worse, the Immigration Commissioner took
cognizance of and granted the same, despite the pendency of the instant
petition, thereby preempting the ruling of this Court.
The Immigration Commissioner and Atty. Marlon Alexandre C. Cruz ought to
be reprimanded for their acts.
On the merits of the petition, we find and so rule that the CA acted in accord
with jurisprudence when it affirmed the assailed Order of the RTC dismissing
the Petition for Habeas Corpus. As the Court held in Caballes v. Court of
Appeals,32
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as
substitute for the trial court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal,
certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider
questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits.
The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of
whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and
void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law
provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of
exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted
in advance of trial. The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual
remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional
circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus
cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law
and irregularities not involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring during
the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of
human life and liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed. It has also
been held that where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and
irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for
relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal. 33
In this case, when petitioner filed her Petition for Habeas Corpus with the
RTC in behalf of her husband, a Charge Sheet had already been filed
against him for violation of Section 37(a)(7) and Section 45 of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. The filing of the Charge Sheet before
the BSI cured whatever irregularities or infirmities were attendant to his
arrest. The remedy of petitioner was to file a motion for the dismissal of the
Charge Sheet and the Mission Order of the Immigration Commissioner, not a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the RTC. The RTC had no
authority to nullify the Mission Order issued by the Immigration
Commissioner, much less set aside the arrest of Javed Kiani. As held by this
Court in Commissioner Rodriguez v. Judge Bonifacio: 34
Be that as it may, there was a valid judicial process justifying Ma Jing’s
detention even before respondent judge rendered his decision as shown by
the Return of the Writ which averred, among others, that a Charge Sheet
was filed against Ma Jing. Even granting that the arrest of Ma Jing was
initially illegal, the filing of the Charge Sheet cured whatever incipient infirmity
there was in her arrest. Respondent judge therefore had no authority to
release the party who was thus committed. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules
of Court provides:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that
the person to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge; or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record, and that court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment or
order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question
his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His
remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly
issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party
sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term "court"
includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of
Immigration.35
The CA acted in accord with jurisprudence when it affirmed the ruling of the
RTC declaring that it had no jurisdiction over petitioner’s plea to set aside the
Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC against her husband Javed
Kiani. Under Section 8, Chapter 3, Title I, Book III of Executive Order No.
292, the power to deport aliens is vested on the President of the Philippines,
subject to the requirements of due process. The Immigration Commissioner
is vested with authority to deport aliens under Section 37 of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. Thus, a party aggrieved by a
Deportation Order issued by the BOC is proscribed from assailing said Order
in the RTC even via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Conformably with
ruling of the Court in Domingo v. Scheer,36 such party may file a motion for
the reconsideration thereof before the BOC. The Court ruled therein that
"there is no law or rule which provides that a Summary Deportation Order
issued by the BOC in the exercise of its authority becomes final after one
year from its issuance, or that the aggrieved party is barred from filing a
motion for a reconsideration of any order or decision of the BOC." The Court,
likewise, declared that in deportation proceedings, the Rules of Court may be
applied in a suppletory manner and that the aggrieved party may file a
motion for reconsideration of a decision or final order under Rule 37 of said
Rules.37
In case such motion for reconsideration is denied by the BOC, the aggrieved
party may appeal to the Secretary of Justice38 and, if the latter denies the
appeal, to the Office of the President of the Philippines. The party may also
choose to file a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, on the ground that the Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the
appeal, the remedy of appeal not being adequate and speedy remedy. 39 In
case the Secretary of Justice dismisses the appeal, the aggrieved party may
resort to filing a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as
amended.40
In this case, the petitioner did not file any motion with the BOC for
reconsideration of the Summary Deportation Order or appeal therefrom;
neither did she appeal to the Secretary of Justice or to the Office of the
President or file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
We note that under Section 3, Rule XIII41 of the Rules of Procedure to
Govern Deportation Proceedings, the decision of the BOC shall be returned
to the BSI for promulgation, and shall become final and executory after thirty
(30) days from promulgation unless within such period, the President of the
Philippines shall order the contrary.
This rule, however, is not applicable in this case. What the petitioner assailed
before the RTC was a Summary Deportation Order of the BOC, not a BOC
decision based on the recommendation of the BSI after due hearing as
mandated by Rule IX of the said Rules of Procedure.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
41. G.R. No. 169482 January 29, 2008
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HABEAS CORPUS OF EUFEMIA
E. RODRIGUEZ, filed by EDGARDO E. VELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
LUISA R. VILLANUEVA and TERESITA R. PABELLO, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review1 of the resolutions2 dated February 2, 2005 and
September 2, 2005 of the Court of Appeals 3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 88180
denying the petition for habeas corpus of Eufemia E. Rodriguez, filed by
petitioner Edgardo Veluz, as well as his motion for reconsideration,
respectively.
Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a
poor state of mental health and deteriorating cognitive abilities. 4 She was
living with petitioner, her nephew, since 2000. He acted as her guardian.
In the morning of January 11, 2005, respondents Luisa R. Villanueva and
Teresita R. Pabello took Eufemia from petitioner Veluz’ house. He made
repeated demands for the return of Eufemia but these proved futile. Claiming
that respondents were restraining Eufemia of her liberty, he filed a petition
for habeas corpus5 in the Court of Appeals on January 13, 2005.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to present any convincing
proof that respondents (the legally adopted children of Eufemia) were
unlawfully restraining their mother of her liberty. He also failed to establish
his legal right to the custody of Eufemia as he was not her legal guardian.
Thus, in a resolution dated February 2, 2005, 6 the Court of Appeals denied
his petition.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was also denied. 7 Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner claims that, in determining whether or not a writ of habeas
corpus should issue, a court should limit itself to determining whether or not a
person is unlawfully being deprived of liberty. There is no need to consider
legal custody or custodial rights. The writ of habeas corpus is available not
only if the rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the person
entitled thereto but also if the person who disappears or is illegally being
detained is of legal age and is not under guardianship. Thus, a writ of habeas
corpus can cover persons who are not under the legal custody of another.
According to petitioner, as long as it is alleged that a person is being illegally
deprived of liberty, the writ of habeas corpus may issue so that his physical
body may be brought before the court that will determine whether or not
there is in fact an unlawful deprivation of liberty.
In their comment, respondents state that they are the legally adopted
daughters of Eufemia and her deceased spouse, Maximo Rodriguez. Prior to
their adoption, respondent Luisa was Eufemia’s half-sister8 while respondent
Teresita was Eufemia’s niece and petitioner’s sister.9
Respondents point out that it was petitioner and his family who were staying
with Eufemia, not the other way around as petitioner claimed. Eufemia paid
for the rent of the house, the utilities and other household needs.
Sometime in the 1980s, petitioner was appointed as the "encargado" or
administrator of the properties of Eufemia as well as those left by the
deceased Maximo. As such, he took charge of collecting payments from
tenants and transacted business with third persons for and in behalf of
Eufemia and the respondents who were the only compulsory heirs of the late
Maximo.
In the latter part of 2002, Eufemia and the respondents demanded an
inventory and return of the properties entrusted to petitioner. These demands
were unheeded. Hence, Eufemia and the respondents were compelled to file
a complaint for estafa against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. Consequently, and by reason of their mother’s deteriorating
health, respondents decided to take custody of Eufemia on January 11,
2005. The latter willingly went with them. In view of all this, petitioner failed to
prove either his right to the custody of Eufemia or the illegality of
respondents’ action.
We rule for the respondents.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the
rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the one entitled
thereto.10 It is issued when one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully
being prevented from exercising legal custody over another person. 11 Thus, it
contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a person’s liberty either
through illegal confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of the
custody of any person from someone entitled to such custody.
In this case, the issue is not whether the custody of Eufemia is being
rightfully withheld from petitioner but whether Eufemia is being restrained of
her liberty. Significantly, although petitioner admits that he did not have legal
custody of Eufemia, he nonetheless insists that respondents themselves
have no right to her custody. Thus, for him, the issue of legal custody is
irrelevant. What is important is Eufemia’s personal freedom.
Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the
restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action.12
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A
prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in
fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral,
illegal restraint of liberty. "The writ of habeas corpus was devised
and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ
of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient."13 (emphasis supplied)
In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first
inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. 14 If he is
not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed
only where such restraint exists.15 If the alleged cause is thereafter found to
be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner
discharged.16 Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused.
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or
as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition.17 Judicial
discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to
whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to
the writ.18 It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully
restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted.19 If the
respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in
whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed.20
In this case, the Court of Appeals made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was
being restrained of her liberty. It found that she was not:
There is no proof that Eufemia is being detained and restrained
of her liberty by respondents. Nothing on record reveals that
she was forcibly taken by respondents. On the contrary,
respondents, being Eufemia’s adopted children, are taking care of
her.21 (emphasis supplied)
The Court finds no cogent or compelling reason to disturb this finding.22
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
43. G.R. No. 154598 August 16, 2004
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child
SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON, petitioner,
vs.
ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5,
2002 resolution1 of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in CA G.R. SP
No. 70501 dismissing the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds of lack
of jurisdiction and lack of substance. The dispositive portion 2 read:
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas corpus
on the grounds that: a) this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the petition; and b) the petition is not sufficient in
substance.
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August
28, 1998 in the Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue,
Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl whom they named
Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.
However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain
housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a "guest relations officer" in
a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. In fact, whenever
petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also often out with her
friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp.
Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she
continued her carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the
family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband. She
told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara,
Lamitan, Basilan Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in
Makati City but this was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation
that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the
whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find
them there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a
certification3 that respondent was no longer residing there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondent’s cellular
phone bills showing calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija,
Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition for
habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of
habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that
it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The
Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction
over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa
129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):
Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court
(now Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas
corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This
conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995),
an act expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction finds
its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was
enacted. It provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. – The Family Courts
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide
the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children,
habeas corpus in relation to the latter.
The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA
7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of habeas
corpus in custody of minor cases is concerned? The simple answer
is, yes, it did, because there is no other meaning of the word
"exclusive" than to constitute the Family Court as the sole court
which can issue said writ. If a court other than the Family Court also
possesses the same competence, then the jurisdiction of the former
is not exclusive but concurrent – and such an interpretation is
contrary to the simple and clear wording of RA 8369.
Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a
petition for habeas corpus involving custody of minors, a respondent
can easily evade the service of a writ of habeas corpus on him or her
by just moving out of the region over which the Regional Trial Court
issuing the writ has territorial jurisdiction. That may be so but then
jurisdiction is conferred by law. In the absence of a law conferring
such jurisdiction in this Court, it cannot exercise it even if it is
demanded by expediency or necessity.
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority
of this Court – or any court for that matter – to determine. The
enactment of a law on jurisdiction is within the exclusive domain of
the legislature. When there is a perceived defect in the law, the
remedy is not to be sought form the courts but only from the
legislature.
The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of
minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive
original jurisdiction over such petitions.
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the Rule
on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of
Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003) has rendered the
issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a petition for habeas corpus
may be filed in the Supreme Court,4Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines.5
The petition is granted.
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is
nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus involving the custody of minors.
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and
BP 129 since, by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which can issue
writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word "exclusive" apparently
cannot be construed any other way.
We disagree with the CA’s reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous
situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining
custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of
minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress
from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective
territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to
another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus
case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have
been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act
of 1997. As observed by the Solicitor General:
Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the State
is to "protect the rights and promote the welfare of children." The
creation of the Family Court is geared towards addressing three
major issues regarding children’s welfare cases, as expressed by the
legislators during the deliberations for the law. The legislative intent
behind giving Family Courts exclusive and original jurisdiction over
such cases was to avoid further clogging of regular court dockets,
ensure greater sensitivity and specialization in view of the nature of
the case and the parties, as well as to guarantee that the privacy of
the children party to the case remains protected.
The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We
rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the
custody of minors. Again, to quote the Solicitor General:
 To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the
petition for habeas corpus involving a minor child whose
whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one of the
situations that the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the
child is paramount. Second, the ex parte nature of habeas corpus
proceedings will not result in disruption of the child’s privacy and
emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the appellate court of
jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be avoided by the
legislature: the child’s welfare and well being will be prejudiced.
This is not the first time that this Court construed the word "exclusive"
as not foreclosing resort to another jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the
Solicitor General, in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation,6 the heirs of
miners killed in a work-related accident were allowed to file suit in the regular
courts even if, under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the Workmen’s
Compensation Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.
We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:
While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case at
bar. it supports petitioner’s submission that the word "exclusive" in
the Family Courts Act of 1997 may not connote automatic
foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other courts over habeas corpus
cases involving minors. In the same manner that the remedies in the
Floresca case were selective, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
and Family Court in the case at bar is concurrent. The Family Court
can issue writs of habeas corpus enforceable only within its territorial
jurisdiction. On the other hand, in cases where the territorial
jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot be determined with
certainty, the Court of Appeals can issue the same writ enforceable
throughout the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the
Revised Rules of Court, thus:
The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme
Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time,
or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the
instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made
returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before
a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing
and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a
Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at
any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only
within his judicial district. (Emphasis supplied)
In ruling that the Commissioner’s "exclusive" jurisdiction did not foreclose
resort to the regular courts for damages, this Court, in the
same Floresca case, said that it was merely applying and giving effect to the
constitutional guarantees of social justice in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
and implemented by the Civil Code. It also applied the well-established rule
that what is controlling is the spirit and intent, not the letter, of the law:
"Idolatrous reverence" for the law sacrifices the human being. The
spirit of the law insures man’s survival and ennobles him. In the
words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth
life."
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees
of the Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of the New
Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-making, but is
rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the
implementing legislation aforementioned.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in
more than one sense. Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in mind
is not accurately reflected in the language of a statute, and its literal
interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or
contradiction.7 In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word
"exclusive" will result in grave injustice and negate the policy "to protect the
rights and promote the welfare of children"8 under the Constitution and the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must
prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in
construing the provisions of RA 8369.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are
not favored:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding
thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be
drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et
concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must
be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form
a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the
legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on
the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all
doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts
should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on
the subject."9
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus
relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions
of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369
does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing
writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the
provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ―
that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of
minors is at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the
adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of
Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule
provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for
a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with
the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial
region to which the Family Court belongs.
xxx xxx xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall
be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made
returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region
where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for
hearing and decision on the merits. (Emphasis Ours)
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases
where the custody of minors is involved.
One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over
the country is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of
Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the petition. As explained by the
Solicitor General:10
That the serving officer will have to "search for the child all over the
country" does not represent an insurmountable or unreasonable
obstacle, since such a task is no more different from or difficult than
the duty of the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the
latter is likewise enforceable anywhere within the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas
corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is
hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth
Division.
SO ORDERED.
44. G.R. No. 159374 July 12, 2007
FELIPE N. MADRIÑAN, Petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCA R. MADRIÑAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When a family breaks up, the children are always the victims. The ensuing
battle for custody of the minor children is not only a thorny issue but also a
highly sensitive and heart-rending affair. Such is the case here. Even the
usually technical subject of jurisdiction became emotionally charged.
Petitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R. Madriñan were
married on July 7, 1993 in Parañaque City. They resided in San Agustin
Village, Brgy. Moonwalk, Parañaque City.
Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter: Ronnick, born on
January 30, 1994; Phillip, born on November 19, 1996; Francis Angelo, born
on May 12, 1998 and Krizia Ann, born on December 12, 2000.
After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left their conjugal
abode and took their three sons with him to Ligao City, Albay and
subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Respondent sought the help of her
parents and parents-in-law to patch things up between her and petitioner to
no avail. She then brought the matter to the Lupong Tagapamayapa in their
barangay but this too proved futile.
Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and
Francis Angelo in the Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioner’s act of
leaving the conjugal dwelling and going to Albay and then to Laguna
disrupted the education of their children and deprived them of their mother’s
care. She prayed that petitioner be ordered to appear and produce their sons
before the court and to explain why they should not be returned to her
custody.
Petitioner and respondent appeared at the hearing on September 17, 2002.
They initially agreed that petitioner would return the custody of their three
sons to respondent. Petitioner, however, had a change of heart 1 and decided
to file a memorandum.
On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed his memorandum 2 alleging that
respondent was unfit to take custody of their three sons because she was
habitually drunk, frequently went home late at night or in the wee hours of the
morning, spent much of her time at a beer house and neglected her duties as
a mother. He claimed that, after their squabble on May 18, 2002, it was
respondent who left, taking their daughter with her. It was only then that he
went to Sta. Rosa, Laguna where he worked as a tricycle driver. He
submitted a certification from the principal of the Dila Elementary School in
Sta. Rosa, Laguna that Ronnick and Phillip were enrolled there. He also
questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under
Section 5(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of
1997") family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide
the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent.3
For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home on May
18, 2002 but was driven out by petitioner. She alleged that it was petitioner
who was an alcoholic, gambler and drug addict. Petitioner’s alcoholism and
drug addiction impaired his mental faculties, causing him to commit acts of
violence against her and their children. The situation was aggravated by the
fact that their home was adjacent to that of her in-laws who frequently
meddled in their personal problems.4
On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals5 rendered a decision6 asserting
its authority to take cognizance of the petition and ruling that, under Article
213 of the Family Code, respondent was entitled to the custody of Phillip and
Francis Angelo who were at that time aged six and four, respectively, subject
to the visitation rights of petitioner. With respect to Ronnick who was then
eight years old, the court ruled that his custody should be determined by the
proper family court in a special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule
99 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it
was denied. Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition
for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the
family courts under RA 8369. He invokes Section 5(b) of RA 8369:
Section 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to
the latter;
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner is wrong.
In Thornton v. Thornton,7 this Court resolved the issue of the Court of
Appeals’ jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving
custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions:
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is
nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus involving the custody of minors.
xxx xxx xxx
We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases
involving the custody of minors.
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas
corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the
provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 [An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals] and BP 129 [The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980] are
absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases
involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be
read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 – that family courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at
issue.8 (emphases supplied)
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas corpus was
further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on
Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of
Minors:
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the
adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and
Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of
the rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition for a writ of
habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family
Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the
Family Court belongs.
xxx xxx xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made
returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where
the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and
decision on the merits.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts
in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is
involved.9 (emphases supplied)1avvphi1
We note that after petitioner moved out of their Parañaque residence on May
18, 2002, he twice transferred his sons to provinces covered by different
judicial regions. This situation is what the Thornton interpretation of RA
8369’s provision on jurisdiction precisely addressed:
[The reasoning that by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases, the lawmakers intended them to be the sole courts which can
issue writs of habeas corpus] will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving
individuals like [respondent] without legal recourse in obtaining custody of
their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they
are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family
courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial
jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to
another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas
corpuscase will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse
could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed
[RA 8369].10
Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that family
courts are vested with original exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not
in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus which may be issued
exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain to
the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in conjunction with a petition for
custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other words, the
issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to the custody case pending before
the family court. The writ must be issued by the same court to avoid splitting
of jurisdiction, conflicting decisions, interference by a co-equal court and
judicial instability.
The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to
carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer. 11 Once a court
acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it does so to the
exclusion of all other courts, including related incidents and ancillary matters.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
45. G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He
created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she
heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North
Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once,
then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out
came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a
female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman
"Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does
the law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and
counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully petition
for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the
result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a
petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case
No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the
spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962.
His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his
certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male
but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified
himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he
consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to
transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he
underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was
thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate
attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be
married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed
from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s
Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three
consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were
established. No opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-
Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of petitioner. Its
relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment
or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the
purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief
asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be
more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his
sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and
acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female.
Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own
doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will
be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On
the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited
happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the
realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to
deny the present petition despite due notice and publication thereof.
Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any
[o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition
and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries
appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for
petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and
petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the
OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that
there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason
of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals 7 rendered a decision8 in favor of
the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is
no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on
the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals
granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and
ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth
certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for
change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment
or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the
purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present
sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a
female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a
right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. 13 In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In
particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and
Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for
clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname
which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and
authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore,
jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged
with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the
law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103
(Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for
change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. 15 It likewise lays down
the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and
the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative
in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may
be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The
petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any
of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known
by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he
thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of
name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather
than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared
purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the
public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper
or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In
addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice
that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of
petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the
petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned,
assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It
was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does
not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was
concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex
On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a
legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. 21 In this connection,
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by
RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The
correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect,
RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes
and corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following
terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake
committed in the performance of clerical work in writing,
copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register
that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or
misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected
or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records: Provided, however, That no correction must
involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the
petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex
is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for
which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of
the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss,
or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and
(16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil
Code include even those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable
interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error
from" while to change means "to replace something with something else of
the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." 26 The birth
certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is
necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of
certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children
and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and
deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of
marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss
or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation
and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce
legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality
of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast,
sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article
407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or
impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the
sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age,
nationality and his family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive
term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal
personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and
its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption,
emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a
part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article
413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil
status shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of
the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default
thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be
sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such
declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall
be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the
birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by
either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the
following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of
infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the
father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents;
(e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may
be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the
facts as they existed at the time of birth.29Thus, the sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no
law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s
sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, 30 is
immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common
and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The
words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws
concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative
intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of
peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a
female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33Female is "the sex
that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to
produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and
"female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have
undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a
statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have
been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary." 36 Since
the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early
1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as
used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a
post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category
"female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body
and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason.
Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of
the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be
Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would
cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal
and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the
petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his
male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is
a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One
of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who
must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner
will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and
family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as
the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies
under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case
of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, 41 among others. These
laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court
shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not
to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do
so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects
of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly
important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first
name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they
may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented
and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on
a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his
name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation
laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a
person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex.
However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on
anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only
apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government,
Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of
happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument
about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences
and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of
social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal.
However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to
be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
46.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 166676
Petitioner, Present:
- versus - Quisumbing, J., Chairperson,
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, Carpio Morales,
Respondent. Tinga,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 12, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising
purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated
January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of
Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in
Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the
following changes of entries in Cagandahan’s birth certificate: (1) the
name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2)
gender from "female" to "male."
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate 2 before the RTC,
Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and
was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while
growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was
diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a
condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female
characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have
clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an
ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age
thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she
has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development.
She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in
mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed
that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed
from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to
Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for
three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by
the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance
and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his
behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of
Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical
certificate stating that respondent’s condition is known as CAH. He
explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body
secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally
and she has two sex organs – female and male. He testified that this
condition is very rare, that respondent’s uterus is not fully developed
because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly
period. He further testified that respondent’s condition is permanent
and recommended the change of gender because respondent has made
up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender
change would be advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondent’s petition in a Decision dated January 12,
2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he
is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately
presented to the Court very clear and convincing proofs for the
granting of his petition. It was medically proven that petitioner’s body
produces male hormones, and first his body as well as his action and
feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal
person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna
is hereby ordered to make the following corrections in the birth
[c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed
fees:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF
CAGANDAHAN; and
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioner’s school records, voter’s registry,
baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby amended
to conform with the foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking
a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF
COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW
CHANGE OF "SEX" OR "GENDER" IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE
RESPONDENT’S MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL
HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A "MALE."4
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the
correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her
sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical
condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-
compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while
the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court, respondent’s petition before the court a quo did not
implead the local civil registrar.5 The OSG further contends
respondent’s petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that
respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition
was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as
mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. 6 The OSG
argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the
birth certificate and respondent’s claimed medical condition known as
CAH does not make her a male.7
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil
Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in the
Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil
Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on
December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course
of the proceedings,8 respondent is actually a male person and hence
his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true
sex/gender,9 change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108,10 and
respondent substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court.11
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
Section 1. Venue. – A person desiring to change his name shall present
the petition to the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he
resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court].
Sec. 2. Contents of petition. – A petition for change of name shall be
signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some
other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province
where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of
such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
Sec. 3. Order for hearing. – If the petition filed is sufficient in form and
substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition,
shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a
copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week
for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The
date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an
election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the
notice.
Sec. 4. Hearing. – Any interested person may appear at the hearing and
oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or
city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.
Sec. 5. Judgment. – Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date
fixed in the order that such order has been published as directed and
that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and
reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner,
adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of
the petition.
Sec. 6. Service of judgment. – Judgments or orders rendered in
connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the
municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated, who
shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
Section 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and
valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization;
(k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (o) changes of name.
Sec. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding.
Sec. 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the
court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the
same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province.
Sec. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction
is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or
from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition
thereto.
Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is
brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also
grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the
parties pending such proceedings.
Sec. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition
or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In
either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the
civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-
compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because
respondent’s petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3,
Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required
to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the
civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final
determination of the case can be had.[12] Unless all possible
indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same
shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the
rules.13 The corresponding petition should also implead as respondents
the civil registrar and all other persons who may have or may claim to
have any interest that would be affected thereby.14 Respondent,
however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which
states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their
objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of the matters brought before it. We agree that there is
substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a
copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is
a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection,
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was
amended by Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such
matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and
without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction
of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register.18
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a
substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.19
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407
and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status
of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from
the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation;
(15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the
Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.20
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or
"inappropriate" appearance of male characteristics. A person, like
respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male
hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH
usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base,
an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2)
normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the
ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some
features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial
hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000
children are born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy.
During the twentieth century, medicine adopted the term
"intersexuality" to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as
either male or female.[22] The term is now of widespread use.
According to Wikipedia, intersexuality "is the state of a living thing of a
gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or
secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively
male nor female. An organism with intersex may have biological
characteristics of both male and female sexes."
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures.
In most societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform
to either a male or female gender role.[23] Since the rise of modern
medical science in Western societies, some intersex people with
ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically
modified to resemble either male or female genitals.[24]More
commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a
"disorder" which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether
by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the
individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or
female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which
should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been suggested that
there is some middle ground between the sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’ for
those individuals who are neither truly ‘male’ nor truly
‘female’."[25] The current state of Philippine statutes apparently
compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but
this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will
fundamentally negates such rigid classification. harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent’s
there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. position and his personal judgment of being a male.
But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of
development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed
change in the out. In other words, we respect respondent’s congenital condition and
subject’s birth certificate entry is in order. his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with
consistently and categorically female nor consistently and categorically his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the
male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. unique circumstances in this case.
However, respondent’s body system naturally produces high levels of As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has
male hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial
genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male. discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or consequences that will follow.[28] The trial court’s grant of
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of
would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence
of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here that respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his preferred
thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of name. Such a change
high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from
biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual female to male.
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender WHEREFORE, the Republic’s petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan,
such persons, like respondent, is fixed. Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not SO ORDERED.
taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with.
And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male.
Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like
taking lifelong medication,[26] to force his body into the categorical
mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has
instead taken its due course in respondent’s development to reveal
more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on
respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality
and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo
medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court
will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to
undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither
will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take
medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly
currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the
one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the
human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him
should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take
along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the
absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent"[27] and in the