PEOPLE V. TOMIO
The information was filed with
G.R. No. 74630 September 30, 1991
202 SCRA 77
FACTS:
 Tatsumi Nagao (Nagao), a Japanese national,
arrived in Manila on April 29, 1986 for a five-
day vacation tour and was billeted at the
Holiday Inn at Pasay City.
 On May 2, 1986, while Nagao was having
lunch, was approached by Maida Tomio
(Tomio) and Mitamura, both Japanese, and
offered themselves as his guides in Manila.
Mitamura accompanied Nagao for dinner.
Before Mitamura left the restaurant, he
placed a pack of cigarettes on Nagao’s shirt
pocket. Nagao was later approached by five
policemen in plain clothes who searched his
person and found the pack of cigarettes
which was supposedly marijuana. At the
police station, Tagahiro Nakajima alias
Yamada (Yamada) and Tomio acted as his
interpreters. They told Nagao that they had
paid the police U.S. $100,000.00 for his
release.
 Upon Nagao’s release, Nagao returned to his
hotel, Holiday Inn, escorted by the
appellants and a policeman. His escorts did
not allow him to leave the hotel. From
Holiday Inn, Nagao was transferred to
Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, then to
Philippine Village Hotel and to Virra
Condominium. Nagao called his father
asking for money, who initially refused to
pay three million yen, but he eventually
agreed when Sato talked to him. After Tomio
and Yamada brought Nagao to RCBC to
withdraw U.S. $1,850.00, they were met by
policemen and Tomio and Yamada were
arrested.
 Tomio and Yamada (accused-appellants)
were subsequently charged with the crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
for ransom.
RTC Manila.
 The accused-appellants argued that they did
not always guard Nagao as Nagao was able
to watch movies, eat at a Japanese
restaurant, go to a sauna bath, and in one
occasion accompanied a girl outside the
hotel to see her off. Also, while they were at
Virra Condominium where they stayed for
two or three days together in one room,
Nagao sometimes held the key to the room.
Also, the reason they went along with Nagao
to the RCBC bank on May 12 was that he did
not know how to go there so they brought
him to the bank so that he could withdraw
the remittance from Japan which was
intended as payment for his hotel
accommodation and other expenses.
 The trial court ruled that the accused-
appellants were guilty as charged.
ISSUES:
1. Does RTC Manila have jurisdiction over the
case filed against accused-appellants?
2. If RTC has jurisdiction over the case, was it
correct in holding the accused-appellants
guilty of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention?
RULING:
Held 1: YES.
Rationale:
 On 2 May 1986, the day when they
made their initial, but crucial move
on the target, the complainant
(hereinafter referred to as Mr.
Nagao), appellants, through the
overt act of accused Tomio Maeda
alias Sato Toshio and another
Japanese, brought complainant
 "some other places in Manila" after
they succeeded in getting his trust
and confidence, following a
conversation over lunch in a coffee
shop at Holiday Inn Hotel.
 The essential ingredients of the
crime charged were thus
committed in various places.
 The case can, therefore, be filed
with the appropriate court in any of
the places where the complainant
was brought to by appellants in the
pursuit of or in connection with the
crime charged. Section 15 of Rule
110 of the Rules of Court provides
that subject to existing laws, in all
criminal prosecutions, action shall
be instituted and tried in the court
of the municipality or territory
wherein the offense was
committed or any one of the
essential ingredients thereof took
place.
Held 2: YES.
Rationale:
 To show that they commiserated
with him, they made it appear that
they advanced the money to the
police. We are, however, convinced
that the accused-appellants never
advanced the money. That is why
they stuck to the complainant like
"a leech," as vividly described by
the trial court, after he was
eventually "released" by the police.
There is no doubt in Our mind that
during the period from 3 May 1986
until the accused-appellants were
arrested on 12 May 1986,
complainant was moved from one
hotel to another by the appellants,
effectively depriving him of his
liberty. As correctly observed by the
Solicitor General, while it may be
conceded that complainant had the
freedom of locomotion, he "did not
have the freedom to leave the hotel
premises at will and go wherever he
pleased."
 What then was the money they
advanced to the police? Nothing.
However, they succeeded in
making it appear to Mr. Nagao,
after they came out of the room at
the Southern Police District, that
they advanced the amount to the
police, for which reason he was
released. This was part of the
stratagem to give a semblance of
legality to the demand for ransom.
 Even granting for the sake of
argument that, in effect, there was
created a simple loan contract
between appellants and Mr. Nagao,
as asserted by appellant Tomio
Maeda, the deprivation of the
former's liberty until the amount
shall have been fully "paid" to
them, is still kidnapping or illegal
detention for ransom.
Decision: The decision of the RTC is affirmed.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
CARMEN LIM @ "MAMENG LIM"
Facts:
Aida Villanueva, 10 years old, and her sister,
Avelyn, 7 years old were sent by their father
Charito to buy rice. They went to the pier, to
meet their mother left when she did not
arrive. They went to Helen Theatre to see a
picture. In front of the theatre was the store
and residence of accused Carmen Lim.
Carmen called them "Come here Nene" and
asked them to get inside her house by
passing through the front door.
They conversed and Lim gave Aida and
Avelyn rice and kangkong for lunch.
Afterwards, Aida was told by the accused to
take a bath and Lim gave her a dress to wear.
The prosecution alleged that from July 1,
1986 to July 15, 1986, Aida Villanueva was
detained in the house of the accused doing
household chores. Avelyn was brought by
Lim's sister in Cebu on the same day they
arrived in the house of the accused.
On July 15, 1986, the father, Charito found
Aida in the house of Lim. He asked the Lim to
let Aida go home with him, but she refused.
So, he left and came back the following day
accompanied by Sgt. Antonio Ariate who had
with him an armalite. Sgt. Ariate identified
himself to the accused and told her that he
was taking Aida with him. Lim let Aida go.
According to accused Lim, she saw Aida and
Avelyn in front of her store and inquired
from them about their parents. The sisters
claimed that they were driven away by their
father and were not given any food to eat.
Lim took pity on them and gave them food
and allowed them to take a bath. Concerned
for their safety, she offered to shelter the
sisters. As Lim’s younger sister was visiting at
that time, appellant proposed to Aida to let
Avelyn accompany appellant's sister to the
latter's home. Aida agreed, on condition that
she and Avelyn could meet every week. Aida
stayed in appellant's residence for about two
weeks. To help in the house, Aida would go
to the market to buy bread, fish and salt for
appellant's household. She also helped
watch over appellant's store from time to
time.
Lim said that on the morning of 15 July 1986,
Charito Villanueva, arrived at her store and
introduced himself to Lim as the father of
the two sisters. He said that he was going to
bring the children home but Aida refused to
go with her father. When asked by appellant
why she refused, Aida replied that she was
afraid that her father would beat her up.
Charito returned to Lim's store the next day
accompanied by Sgt. Antonio Ariate, Jr.
Charito again talked to Aida to convince her
to go home with him which this time, Aida
agreed.
Issue: W/N the trial court erred in convicting
appellant
Held: Yes.
In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by
the prosecution is insufficient to sustain a
conviction.
There is no kidnapping in this case. The two
minors voluntarily entered the appellant's
residence through the front entrance. The
fact of detention which is an essential
element in the crime charged, was not
clearly established. There was no showing
that there was actual confinement or
restriction of the person of the offended
party. Lim's residence has a store fronting
the street where many customers
presumably come and go. The place is busy
with a movie house in front. There is no
indication that Aida was locked up,
physically restrained of her liberty or unable
to communicate with anyone.
There are other circumstances which create
grave doubts in Aida's version of her two
week detention. In her testimony, Aida
claimed that she attempted to escape three
times but she was not able to do so but it was
not explained clearly how and why she did
not succeed. When Aida saw her father for
the first time, she inexplicably did not shout
for help or run to him but just observed him
and the appellant talk for half an hour. The
actuations of both Aida and her father are
highly incredible and are not the natural
reactions of a ten-year old child who has
been detained against her will for two weeks
and who has tried unsuccessfully to escape
three times.
The fact that her father was already there
was the perfect opportunity for Aida to try
and get away from the appellant. Aida also
did not go with her father because the
appellant allegedly told her not to go. For
someone who had been detained against
her will, as between her father and her
detainor, Aida would have disregarded the
appellant's order and would have run to her
father. Neither is it believable that a father
who has been desperately looking for his
two minor daughters for two weeks would
just calmly accept the appellant's refusal to
let go of his daughter.
It is apparent that Aida had free access going
in and out of the appellant's residence. In
fact, Aida could have escaped at that
particular period of time. She was three feet
away from the appellant when Sgt. Ariate
saw her so she could have made a run for it
if she really wanted to go.
The unbelievable and conflicting evidence of
the prosecution strengthens the version of
the appellant that she took pity on the two
runaway children and decided to give them
food and shelter. Whether or not she treated
them like unpaid servants is not in issue.
What is apparent from the records is the
absence of proof showing kidnapping and
serious illegal detention.
Another circumstance that belies the
kidnapping charge is the unexplained delay
in the lodging of the complaint against the
appellant. An entire week passed before the
complaint was lodged on July 23, 1986. Also,
there is no motive whatsoever for Lim to
kidnap the two children. She is a woman of
sufficient means. Had she wanted to hire an
additional maid, she could certainly afford to
hire another one without going to the extent
of committing a crime as serious as
kidnapping. No motive was ever
propounded by the prosecution. Thus, we
apply the precept that though proof of
motive is not indispensable to conviction,
yet a void in the evidence in this respect
discloses a weakness in the case for the
prosecution.
Finally, the execution of the affidavit of
desistance by Charito Villanueva, stating
that his daughters were not detained after
all by the appellant taken together with the
circumstances abovementioned has the
effect of exculpating the appellant from the
charge of kidnapping. The instant case falls
under the exception where an affidavit of
desistance is given due consideration.
Significantly, the father of the two girls
testified in open court on November 24,
1987 that he was withdrawing the case and
that his children were not detained. The
prosecution had every opportunity to cross-
examine or tear apart the retraction and
prove that the facts were as earlier alleged
but it failed to do so.
Topic: Kidnapping and Illegal Detention
(Brief summary of the case: Where the
taking of the victim was incidental to the
basic purpose of killing, the crime is only
murder and this is true even if before the
killing, the victim was taken from one place
to another. From the acts of the accused, it
cannot be inferred that the latter's purpose
was actually to detain or deprive the victims
of their liberty and the fact alone that
ransom money was demanded did not per se
qualify the crime to kidnapping in the
absence of other elements.)
People vs ROMEO PADICA y LORICA, LESLIE
GANS y MELENDRES, FLORENTINO
FABRIGAS, ROMEO PRADEZ, LEONARDO
MARAJAS, LEOPOLDO MARAJAS and LEON
MARAJAS, JR. y RAMOS, ** accused. LEON
MARAJAS, JR. y RAMOS, accused-appellant. ,
221 SCRA 362
Facts:
(Note: Accused Romeo Padica y Lorica (who
was later discharged to be a state witness)
and Romeo Pradez are one and the same
person (Original Record, 546). The other
accused have remained at large, hence the
lone appellant in this case is Leon Marajas,
Jr. y Ramos.)
The records show that Leon Marajas, Jr.,
Romeo Padica, Leslie Gans, Florentino
Fabrigas, Romeo Pradez, Leonardo Marajas
and Leopoldo Marajas were originally
charged in the latter part of 1978 with
kidnapping for ransom with murder and
illegal possession of firearms.
Padica and herein both pleaded not guilty.
Prosecution's narration of facts:
"On or about 9:00 o clock in the morning of
February 8, 1978, appellant and his brother,
Leopoldo Marajas, using a car driven by
Leopoldo, visited Romeo Padica in his house
in Metro Manila. Leopoldo requested Padica
to drive for Eddie Boy Marajas, a brother of
Leopoldo and appellant, and his classmates,
giving Padica P100.00 for the purpose. Upon
receiving the amount, Padica, pursuant to
the instructions of Leopoldo, drove the car,
with Leopoldo and appellant on board, and
proceeded to Pasay City, arriving there at
about 10:00 A.M. Leopoldo left the vehicle
and, upon coming back after a while, he told
Padica that they were going to Sukat,
Parañaque.
"Thereafter, with Padica still driving the car,
they proceeded to the Superville
Subdivision, also in Sukat, where they
arrived at about 11:30 A.M. of the same
date. Eddie Boy Marajas and Francis Banaga(
THE VICTIM), both fourteen (14) years of
age, more or less, were in said subdivision.
Leopoldo alighted from the car and talked to
them. Subsequently, Leopoldo together with
Francis and Eddie Boy, boarded the car. All
of them proceeded to Calamba, Laguna, with
Padica still driving the vehicle. Seated beside
Padica was Leopoldo Marajas, while
appellant and Eddie Boy occupied the back
seat, with Francis Banaga between them.
"Upon reaching Calamba at about 12:00
noon of the same date, Leopoldo Marajas
told Padica, to drive the car into the
sugarcane plantation at the side of the road.
Once inside the plantation, Padica stopped
the car when told to do so by Leopoldo, who
then alighted from the vehicle and told
Francis Banaga to alight. However, Francis
refused to get down from the car.
Notwithstanding his resistance, he was
forced out of the car by Leopoldo Marajas,
Eddie Boy and appellant, who pulled him out
of the vehicle. Thereafter, the three brought
Francis Banaga to a place inside the
sugarcane plantation, more or less ten (10)
meters away from the car, while Padica
remained in the vehicle. Leopoldo Marajas
then delivered several stabbing blows at
Banaga after which appellant shot Banaga
with a handgun. Banaga fell on the ground.
Leopoldo, Eddie Boy and appellant returned
to the car. Leopoldo took the wheel from
Padica and drove the car to Muntinlupa,
where Padica alighted and was left behind
with Leopoldo warning Padica, 'Pare, steady
ka lang, isang bala ka lang.'
On or about 5:00 P.M. of the same day,
Tomas Banaga, father of Francis, became
alarmed when his son failed to come home.
A few minutes after 6:00 P.M. of (the) same
date, someone called up by phone, telling
Tomas not to look for his son as he was in
good condition, and demanding
P500,000.00 for his (Francis') release. Tomas
reported the incident to the Philippine
Constabulary authorities in Camp Crame.
February 9, 1978, Tomas received a second
phone call in the course of which the caller
reduced the amount demanded to
P200,000.00. On February 10, 1978, there
was another phone call with (the) caller
lowering the amount to P23,000.00 and
giving instructions that the money be
wrapped in a newspaper, placed in a paper
bag, and delivered by a girl wearing a T-shirt
to Luneta, in front of the National Library,
under a true with red flowers, at 8:30 P.M.
of February 10, 1978.
"Norma Camello, sister-in-law of Tomas
Banaga, volunteered to deliver the money as
the maid of (the) Banaga family who was
supposed to do it was scared. She went to
the National Library at Luneta and
positioned herself under a tree with red
flowers, pursuant to the instructions of the
caller. A few minutes later, a taxicab arrived.
Appellant alighted from the vehicle,
approached Camello and got the money
from her which was in a paper bag, saying:
'Hihintayin na lang ninyo ang bata mamaya
sa bahay. When appellant returned to the
waiting taxicab and was about to board it,
Sgt. Simplicio Dulay, one of those sent to
Luneta to entrap the person who would
receive the ransom money, apprehended
and arrested appellant
Pursuant to the information given by
appellant during the investigation, a
Philippine Constabulary team led by Lt.
Napoleon Cachuela, accompanied by
appellant, went to Calamba, Laguna search
for the body of Francis Banaga. Appellant led
the team to the place where the cadaver was
dumped, which was inside a sugarcane
plantation about 75 meters away from the
road. The team recovered the body of
Francis Banaga and brought it to the
Municipal Health Officer of Calamba for
autopsy.
According to the necropsy report ,Francis
Banaga sustained two (2) entry gunshot
wounds, one on the head and the other on
the chest, with two (2) exit gunshot wounds
and several lacerated wounds. The death of
Francis was caused by 'intra-thoracic brain
hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds.'
After three (3) years in hiding out of fear for
his life, Romeo Padica finally revealed to Lt.
Cruz (sic) of Regional Security Unit
Intelligence Division, Lucena City that he
(Padica) witnessed the killing of Francis
Banaga. Padica had met Lt. Cruz (sic) near
the Lucena City Market and after making the
disclosure, surrendered to the authorities.
Appellant predictably presented a different
narration of the events that led to his arrest.
He insists that he was the victim of an
elaborate frame-up by the military
authorities assigned to investigate the case.
Appellant claims that on February 8, 1978,
the day that the victim disappeared, he was
in Batangas province, where he was a
resident. In the early morning of February
10, 1978, he decided to go to Manila, with
Sto. Tomas, Batangas as his point of
departure, in order to thresh out some
financial matters in connection with his
business of buy and sell.
He arrived in Manila at around 9:00 A.M. and
proceeded to the office of Mrs. Aquilina
Marquez-Marajas, his sister-in-law, at
Mabini Street in Malate to talk to his
brother, Leonardo. Not finding Leonardo
there, he then went to the house of his
sister, Nelly Marajas, a neighbor of the
Banaga family, at Gatchalian Subdivision in
Parañaque. He was about to board a tricycle
at the main gate of the subdivision at around
9:30 A.M. when he was suddenly accosted
by two Metrocom officers in civilian clothes
who forcibly took him to a car. Appellant was
later brought at about 12:00 noon to the
Siesta Court Hotel, also in Malate, where he
was repeatedly beaten and subjected to
torture by his abductors who tried in vain to
extract information about the
disappearance of Francis Banaga.
In the evening of the same day, he was taken
out of the hotel and was taken by the men to
an unspecified safehouse where, once again,
his ordeal at their hands was resumed.
Unable to bear the maltreatment any
further, appellant then tried to fool them by
admitting that the missing Francis Banaga
could be found in Paete, Laguna. He then led
a group of his captors to the said place but
they found no trace of the missing boy.
Incensed at the deception, the men took him
back to the safehouse.
Later, appellant was again taken out of the
safehouse and, together with another
captive whom he identified only as
"Florentino," he was brought to an isolated
sugarcane plantation. There Florentino led
the military team to the cadaver of Francis
Banaga. Appellant and Florentino were later
brought back to the safehouse. The former
claims that he was kept there for about two
months, during which time he helped in the
maintenance and care of the safehouse and
its surroundings. He also met at the
safehouse .
RTC ruling:
After more than eight years of trial, the trial
court rendered its assailed decision
pronouncing the guilt of appellant for the
crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua
Issue: Is the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom
with murder?
Ruling: NO. We do not adopt as correct the
nature or categorization of the offense for
which he must do penance.
At the outset, from the evidence on record,
we are not convinced that the crime of
kidnapping for ransom was committed as
charged in both the original and amended
informations. Rather the crime committed
was murder, attended by the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and/or abuse of
superior strength, and not the complex
crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder
as found by the trial court without objection
by either the prosecution or defense. The
essential element in the crime of kidnapping
that the victim must have been restrained or
deprived of his liberty, or that he was
transported away against his will with the
primary or original intent to effect that
restraint, is absent in this case. The
malefactors evidently had only murder in
their hearts when they invited the trusting
Francis Banaga to go with them to Laguna,
and not to confine or detain him for any
length of time or for any other purpose.
We have consistently held that where the
taking of the victim was incidental to the
basic purpose to kill, the crime is only
murder, and this is true even if, before the
killing but for purposes thereof, the victim
was taken from one place to another. Thus,
where the evident purpose of taking the
victims was to kill them, and from the acts of
the accused it cannot be inferred that the
latter's purpose was actually to detain or
deprive the victims of their liberty, the
subsequent killing of the victims constitute
the crime of murder, hence the crime of
kidnapping does not exist and cannot be
considered as a component felony to
produce a complex crime of kidnapping with
murder.
That from the beginning of their criminal
venture appellant and his brothers intended
to kill the victim can readily be deduced from
the manner by which they swiftly and cold-
bloodedly snuffed out his life once they
reached the isolated sugarcane plantation in
Calamba, Laguna. Furthermore, there was
no evidence whatsoever to show or from
which it can be inferred that from the outset
the killers of the victim intended to exchange
his freedom for ransom money. On the
contrary, the demand for ransom appears to
have arisen and was consequently made as
an afterthought, as it was relayed to the
victim's family very much later that
afternoon after a sufficient interval for
consultation and deliberation among the
felons who had killed the victim around five
hours earlier.
It will be observed that under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the
circumstance that the kidnapping is
perpetrated for the purpose of ransom
raises the imposable penalty to death. It is
essential, however, that the element of
deprivation or restraint of liberty of the
victim be present. The fact alone that
ransom money is demanded would not per
se qualify the act of preventing the liberty of
movement of the victim into the crime of
kidnapping, unless the victim is actually
restrained or deprived of his liberty for some
appreciable period of time or that such
restraint was the basic intent of the accused.
Absent such determinant intent and
duration of restraint, the mere curtailment
of freedom of movement would at most
constitute coercion.
In addition, Francis Banaga, then
already fourteen years of age and a fourth
year high school student, was neither forced
nor coerced unlawfully into going along with
his killers. He voluntarily boarded the car and
went with the Marajas brothers to Laguna.
The victim had every reason to trust them as
they were his neighbors in Gatchalian
Subdivision. In fact, one of the brothers,
accused Leonardo Marajas alias "Eddie Boy,"
was his schoolmate and a playmate.
There was treachery since, under
the aforestated circumstances, the victim
was lured by his killers into going with them
to Laguna without the slightest inkling of
their nefarious design, coupled with the
sudden and unexpected assault by the
malefactors on the hapless victim in the
isolated sugarcane plantation in Calamba,
which thereby divested him of an
opportunity either to effectively resist or to
escape. Abuse of superior strength was
likewise present, for the accused
deliberately resorted to their collective
strength for the purpose of overpowering
whatever feeble defense the poor Francis
Banaga could offer.
Superior strength should not be
appreciated distinctly but should be
considered as being absorbed in and by
treachery, and the same is true with regard
to the allegation of craft. Hence, abuse of
superior strength may not be taken into
account separately in this case, either as a
qualifying or as an aggravating circumstance.
On the other hand, although the trial court
and both parties herein have again passed
sub silentio thereon, it is evident that the
aggravating circumstance of uninhabited
place was present since appellant and his co-
accused obviously and deliberately chose
the desolation and isolation of the sugarcane
plantation to perpetrate the crime far from
the gaze of potential eye-witnesses. This
circumstance is underscored by the fact that
they committed the crime at about 12:00
noon, a time of day when any passersby or
assistance could hardly be expected in the
vicinity of the locus criminis.
Appellant's defense that he was in
another place at the time of Francis Banaga's
disappearance and killing must necessarily
fail. Indeed, trite as our innumerable
reiterations have already made this
statement of rejection, we must perforce
again reprobate appellant's alibi as an
inherently weak defense decidedly easy of
concoction.
Appellant's further denial that he
was entrapped on the night of February 10,
1978 by the authorities after receiving
ransom money from Norma Camello must
likewise be rejected. Both Norma Camello
and Sgt. Simplicio Dulay, one of the police
operatives, positively and without hesitation
identified appellant as the person who was
collared at Luneta Park.
Appellant asserts that the trial
court should not have given credence to the
testimony of Romeo Padica as it is incredible
and inconsistent with the other evidence on
record.
There is no merit in all the foregoing
submissions and pretensions of appellant. It
is true that the testimony of a particeps
criminis is to be invariably viewed with much
caution, coming as it does from a polluted
source. However, in the case at bar and after
a careful evaluation, we find no plausible
reason to depart from the favorable
appreciation by the trial court of Padica's
testimony which the said court
characterized as reasonable and probable,
given in a clear, straightforward and
convincing manner thereby leaving no doubt
in the mind of said court that he was telling
the truth.
There is certainly nothing strange in
the matter of the Marajas brothers
requesting Padica to drive for them. As
testified to by the latter, he was then a close
friend of one of the brothers, Leopoldo, who
was the one who requested him to drive,
and the latter presumably had full
confidence in him as he was at the time a
professional driver of taxicabs.
The fact that appellant and his co-
accused carried out the murder of Francis
Banaga in broad daylight is hardly surprising.
As pointedly noted by the Solicitor General,
"it is not difficult to believe that appellant
and his co-accused committed the crime in
broad daylight because there were no other
persons at the scene of the incident," as the
same was inside a desolate sugarcane
plantation in the outskirts of Calamba,
Laguna and the crime was perpetrated at
noon of that day, as we have earlier
explained.
Appellant has also clearly lost sight
of the rule that the discharge of an accused
to be a state witness, lies within the sound
discretion of the court before whom it is
sought and in the exercise of that discretion,
it is not required that the court be absolutely
certain that all the requirements for the
proper discharge of a co-accused be present.
In the case under consideration, the
prosecution presented enough evidence to
support its motion for the discharge of
Padica. The trial court's reliance thereon and
its consequent finding on the basis thereof
that Padica did not appear to be the most
guilty must be respected as it was in better
position to evaluate such evidence.
As for the several hematomas and
contusions that were discovered on the
body of Francis Banaga, it is entirely possible
that the same were inflicted when the victim
put up a furious struggle for his life against
his assailants. According to Padica, the
Marajas brothers forcefully pulled out
Banaga from the car when they stopped by
the roadside. They continued to inflict
physical harm on the boy while prodding him
to proceed inside the sugarcane plantation
until they reached a clearing where, after
Leopoldo Marajas delivered stabbing blows
on the victim which may not have inflicted
knife wounds but contusions from the
assailant's clenched fists, Leon Marajas, Jr.
then fired away with the fatal shots. All the
while and just before he was shot to death,
Padica narrated that the victim desperately
exerted all efforts to ward off the assault on
his person.
Appellant also raises as an issue the
questionable manner in which Padica
surrendered, after nearly three years of
hiding.
We find his explanation satisfactory and
credible, he had desired all along to
surrender as he had grown tired of
constantly fearing for his life and of his
difficult plight as a fugitive from justice. He
was obviously always on the lookout for
persons in authority whom he could trust
during his stay of two to three months in
Lucena City where he had in the meantime
found work as a porter in the public market.
In the course of his stay there, he had heard
about the "kind-hearted" Lt. Perez, a ranking
officer of the local constabulary.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the
trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and another
one is rendered CONVICTING accused-
appellant Leon Marajas, Jr. y Ramos of the
crime of murder and IMPOSING upon him
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ABDILA
SILONGAN, ET. AL. (G.R. No. 137182, April
24, 2003)
“
Penalties Modified
”
FACTS: On March 16, 1996, businessman
Alexander Saldaña went to Sultan Kudarat
with with Americo Rejuso Jr., Ervin Tormis,
and Victor Cinco to meet a certain
Macapagal Silongan alias Commander
Lambada. The four victims were taken to the
mountain hideout in Maguindanao. The
kidnappers demanded P15 million pesos
from Alexander’s wife for his release,
it was later reduced to twelve million pesos
after negotiations. The release was made in
effect of the exchange for a relative of the
kidnappers who was caught delivering a
ransom note to Alexander's family. Only
eight of the accused were brought to trial,
namely, Abdila, Macapagal, and Teddy, all
surnamed Silongan, Akmad Awal, Rolly
Lamalan, Sacaria Alon, Jumbrah Manap, and
Ramon Pasawilan. After trial, the RTC
rendered judgment and named the seven (7)
accused Abdila, and Macapagal, all
surnamed Silongan, Akmad Awal, Rolly
Lamalan, Sacaria Alon, Jumbrah Manap, and
Ramon Pasawilan as guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and was charged with
Kidnapping for Ransom and sentenced
Death Penalty. Teddy Silongan was
acquitted.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN THEIR VERDICT OF IMPOSING THE DEATH
PENALTY TO THE ACCUSED WITH
INDEMNIFICATION DAMAGES AND MORAL
DAMAGES.
RULING:
NO. Considering that it has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt that the abduction
of Alexander Saldaña, Americo Rejuso, Jr.,
Ervin Tormis, and Victor Cinco were for the
purpose of extorting ransom, the trial court
correctly imposed the death penalty. As
already stated, the trial court ordered the
appellants to pay, jointly and severally,
Alexander Saldaña and Americo Rejuso, Jr.,
indemnification damages of P50,000 each
and moral damages of P100,000 and
P50,000, respectively. The court affirmed
the award of P100,000 to Alexander and
P50,000 to Americo as moral damages. The
amount of moral anxiety suffered by the two
victims is in no wise the same. Undoubtedly,
Alexander's family had undergone greater
distress in the uncertainty of seeing
Alexander again. Three Justices of the Court
maintain their position that R.A. No. 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to
the ruling of the majority that the law is
constitutional, and that the death penalty
can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
People v. Ty
FACTS:
Vicente Ty AND Carmen Ty were charged
with the crime of kidnapping and failure to
return a minor in an information filed by 2nd
Assistant City Prosecutor of Kalookan City
Rosauro J. Silverio, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on or about the month of April 1989, in
Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being then the
owners, proprietors, managers and
administrators of Sir John Clinic and as such
said accused had the custody of Arabella
Somblong, a minor, conspiring together and
mutually helping one another and with
deliberate intent to deprive the parents of
the child of her custody, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to
restore the custody of said Arabella
Sombong to her parents by giving said
custody of subject minor to another person
without the knowledge and consent of her
parents.
On November 18, 1987, complainant
Johanna Sombong brought her sick daughter
Arabella, then only seven (7) months old, for
treatment to the Sir John Medical and
Maternity Clinic located at No. 121 First
Avenue, Grace Park, Kalookan City which
was owned and operated by the accused-
appellants. Arabella was diagnosed to be
suffering bronchitis and diarrhea, thus
complainant was advised to confine the child
at the clinic for speedy recovery. About three
(3) days later, Arabella was well and was
ready to be discharged but complainant was
not around to take her home. A week later,
complainant came back but did not have
enough money to pay the hospital bill in the
amount of P300.00. Complainant likewise
confided to accused-appellant Dr. Carmen
Ty that no one would take care of the child
at home as she was working. She then
inquired about the rate of the nursery and
upon being told that the same was P50.00
per day, she decided to leave her child to the
care of the clinic nursery. Consequently,
Arabella was transferred from the ward to
the nursery. Thereafter, hospital bills started
to mount and accumulate. It was at this time
that accused-appellant Dr. Ty suggested to
the complainant that she hire a yaya for
P400.00 instead of the daily nursery fee of
P50.00. Complainant agreed, hence, a yaya
was hired. Arabella was then again
transferred from the nursery to the
extension of the clinic which served as
residence for the hospital staff.
From then on, nothing was heard of the
complainant. She neither visited her child
nor called to inquire about her whereabouts.
Her estranged husband came to the clinic
once but did not get the child. Efforts to get
in touch with the complainant were
unsuccessful as she left no address or
telephone number where she can be
reached. This development prompted Dr. Ty
to notify the barangay captain of the childs
abandonment.[6] Eventually, the hospital
staff took turns in taking care of Arabella.[7]
Sometime in 1989, two (2) years after
Arabella was abandoned by complainant, Dr.
Fe Mallonga, a dentist at the clinic,
suggested during a hospital staff conference
that Arabella be entrusted to a guardian who
could give the child the love and affection,
personal attention and caring she badly
needed as she was thin and sickly. The
suggestion was favorably considered, hence,
Dr. Mallonga gave the child to her aunt,
Lilibeth Neri.[8]
In 1992, complainant came back to claim the
daughter she abandoned some five (5) years
back.
When her pleas allegedly went unanswered,
she filed a petition for habeas corpus against
accused-appellants with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. Said petition was
however denied due course and was
summarily dismissed without prejudice on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the alleged
detention having been perpetrated in
Kalookan City.
Thereafter, the instant criminal case was
filed against accused-appellants.
Complainant likewise filed an administrative
case for dishonorable conduct against
accused-appellant Dr. Carmen Ty before the
Board of Medicine of the Professional
Regulation Commission. This case was
subsequently dismissed for failure to
prosecute. On October 13, 1992,
complainant filed a petition for habeas
corpus with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, this time against the alleged
guardians of her daughter, namely, Marietta
Neri Alviar and Lilibeth Neri. On January 15,
1993, the trial court rendered a decision
granting the petition and ordering the
guardians to immediately deliver the person
of Cristina Grace Neri to the complainant,
the court having found Cristina to be the
complainants child. On appeal to the Court
of Appeals, however, said decision was
reversed on the ground that the guardians
were not unlawfully withholding from the
complainant the rightful custody of Cristina
after finding that Cristina and complainants
daughter are not one and the same person.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellants are
guilty of kidnapping and failure to return a
minor.
HELD:
Accused-appellants are not guilty of the
crime charged.
This Court in Sombong v. Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals
reversing the trial courts ruling that
complainant has rightful custody over the
child, Cristina Grace Neri, the latter not
being identical with complainants daughter,
Arabella. The Court discoursed, thusly:
Petitioner does not have the right of custody
over the minor Cristina because, by the
evidence disclosed before the court a quo,
Cristina has not been shown to be
petitioners daughter, Arabella. The evidence
adduced before the trial court does not
warrant the conclusion that Arabella is the
same person as Cristina.
In the instant case, the testimonial and
circumstantial proof establishes the
individual and separate existence of
petitioners child, Arabella, from that of
private respondents foster child, Cristina.
We note, among others, that Dr. Trono, who
is petitioners own witness, testified in court
that, together with Arabella, there were
several babies left in the clinic and so she
could not be certain whether it was Arabella
or some their baby that was given to private
respondents. Petitioners own evidence
shows that, after the confinement of
Arabella in the clinic in 1987, she saw her
daughter again only in 1989 when she visited
the clinic. This corroborates the testimony of
petitioners own witness, Dra. Ty, that
Arabella was physically confined in the clinic
from November, 1987 to April, 1989. This
testimony tallies with her assertion in her
counter-affidavit to the effect that Arabella
was in the custody of the hospital until April,
1989. All this, when juxtaposed with the
unwavering declaration of private
respondents that they obtained custody of
Cristina in April, 1988 and had her baptized
at the Good Samaritan Church on April 30,
1988, leads to the conclusions that Cristina is
not Arabella.
Significantly, Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-
Jaguros, herself a mother and the ponente of
the herein assailed decision, set the case for
hearing on August 30, 1993 primarily for the
purpose of observing petitioners demeanor
towards the minor Cristina. She made the
following personal but relevant
manifestation:
The undersigned ponente as a mother
herself of four children, wanted to see how
petitioner as an alleged mother of a missing
child supposedly in the person of Cristina
Neri would react on seeing again her long
lost child. The petitioner appeared in the
scheduled hearing of this case late, and she
walked inside the courtroom looking for a
seat without even stopping at her alleged
daughters seat; without even casting a
glance on said child, and without even that
tearful embrace which characterizes the
reunion of a loving mother with her missing
dear child. Throughout the proceedings, the
undersigned ponente noticed no signs of
endearment and affection expected of a
mother who had been deprived of the
embrace of her little child for many years.
The conclusion or finding of undersigned
ponente as a mother, herself, that
petitioner-appellee is not the mother of
Cristina Neri has been given support by
aforestated observation.
Since we hold that petitioner has not been
established by evidence to be entitled to the
custody of the minor Cristina on account of
mistaken identity, it cannot be said that
private respondents are unlawfully
withholding from petitioner the rightful
custody over Cristina. At this juncture, we
need not inquire into the validity of the
mode by which private respondents
acquired custodial rights over the minor,
Cristina.
Under the facts and ruling in Sombong, as
well as the evidence adduced in this case
accused-appellants must perforce be
acquitted of the crime charged, there being
no reason to hold them liable for failing to
return one Cristina Grace Neri, a child not
conclusively shown and established to be
complainants daugther, Arabella.
The foregoing notwithstanding, even if we
were to consider Cristina Grace Neri and
Arabella Sombong as one and the same
person, still, the instant criminal case against
the accused-appellants must fall.
Before a conviction for kidnapping and
failure to return a minor under Article 270 of
the Revised Penal Code can be had, two
elements must concur, namely: (a) the
offender has been entrusted with the
custody of the minor, and (b) the offender
deliberately fails to restore said minor to his
parents or guardians. The essential element
herein is that the offender is entrusted with
the custody of the minor but what is actually
punishable is not the kidnapping of the
minor, as the title of the article seems to
indicate, but rather the deliberate failure or
refusal of the custodian of the minor to
restore the latter to his parents or guardians.
Said failure or refusal, however, must not
only be deliberate but must also be
persistent as to oblige the parents or the
guardians of the child to seek the aid of the
courts in order to obtain custody.
Essentially, the word deliberate as used in
the article must imply something more than
mere negligence; it must be premeditated,
obstinate, headstrong, foolishly daring or
intentionally and maliciously wrong.

In the case at bar, it is evident that there was
no deliberate refusal or failure on the part of
the accused-appellants to restore the
custody of the complainants child to her.
When the accused-appellant learned that
complainant wanted her daughter back after
five (5) long years of apparent wanton
neglect, they tried their best to help herein
complainant find the child as the latter was
no longer under the clinics care. Accused-
appellant Dr. Ty did not have the address of
Arabellas guardians but as soon as she
obtained it from Dr. Fe Mallonga who was
already working abroad, she personally went
to the guardians residence and informed
them that herein complainant wanted her
daughter back.
The efforts taken by the accused-appellants
to help the complainant in finding the child
clearly negate the finding that there was a
deliberate refusal or failure on their part to
restore the child to her mother. Evidence is
simply wanting in this regard.
It is worthy to note that accused-appellants
conduct from the moment the child was left
in the clinics care up to the time the child
was given up for guardianship was
motivated by nothing more than an earnest
desire to help the child and a high regard for
her welfare and well-being.
People V. Merano
Merano knew Marquez in the Beauty parlor
where she was working and had grown to
trust her. One September 6, after a trip to a
beach in Laguna, Marquez allegedly
borrowed Merano’s then three-month old
daughter Justine to buy her some clothes,
milk and food. Merano said she agreed
because Marquez would sometimes bring
things for Justine. However, Marquez failed
to return the child. Merano was searching
for her child but to no avail. On November
11, 1998 she received a call from the accused
who told her that she will return Justine the
following day and that she cannot do so now
because her own son is confined in the
hospital. The accused also asked her to pay
50,000 for the expenses in taking care of
Justine. However, the accused did not return
the child. As such Merano went to the house
of the accused only to find out from the
maid that the accused was not there and
that Justine only stayed in the house for a
couple of days.
Merano went to see then Mayor Alfredo Lim
to ask for his help, who in turn referred her
to Inspector Eleazar of San Pedro, Laguna,
who assigned two police officers to
accompany her to Marquez’s house.
However, the accused was not there.
Later on Merano gave her sworn statement
to the police and filed a complaint against
Marquez. On February 11, 1999, Marquez
allegedly called Merano up again to tell her
to pick up her daughter at Castillo’s house in
Tiaong, Quezon. The following day, Merano,
accompanied by two policemen, went to the
house of Castillo in Quezon. Merano claimed
that Castillo told her that Marquez sold
Justine to him and his wife and that they
gave Marquez Sixty Thousand Pesos
(₱60,000.00) supposedly for Merano who
was asking for money. Castillo even gave
Merano a photocopy of the handwritten
"Kasunduan" dated May 17, 1998, wherein
Merano purportedly gave Justine to the
Castillo spouses. The Castillos asked Merano
not to take Justine as they had grown to love
her but Merano refused. However, she was
still not able to take Justine home with her
because the police advised her to go through
the proper process as the Castillos might
fight for their right to retain custody of
Justine. Merano then learned from Castillo
that in an effort to legalize the adoption of
Justine, the Castillos turned over custody of
Justine to the Reception and Study Center
for Children of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development.
Arguments of the defense:
1. She claims that her guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt because
the elements of the crime of kidnapping or
serious illegal detention is not present in the
case
2. Marquez alleged that Merano
offered Justine to her for adoption. Marquez
told Merano that she was not interested but
she could refer her to her friend Modesto
Castillo (Castillo).
3. SPO2 Fernandez, one of the police
officers who accompanied Merano to
Castillo’s house in February 1999, was
presented by the defense to prove that he
was a witness to the execution of a
document wherein Merano gave up her right
to Justine to the Castillo spouses.
4. It is illogical for her to give the
whereabouts of Justine if she was guilty
Ruling:
The appeal is without merit
1. The crime of Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention falls under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, viz:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal
detention. — Any private individual who
shall kidnap or detain another, or in any
other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have
lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating
public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have
been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained, or if threats to kill him shall have
been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall
be a minor, except when the accused is any
of the parents, female or a public officer.
She was not charged for illegal detention but
for deliberate failure to return the minor to
her parent after being entrusted with the
child’s custody. The Revised Penal Code
considers it a crime when a person who has
been entrusted with the custody of a minor
later on deliberately fails to return said
minor to his parent or guardian. This may be
found in Article 270, which reads:
Art. 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a
minor. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon any person who,
being entrusted with the custody of a minor
person, shall deliberately fail to restore the
latter to his parents or guardians.25
This crime has two essential elements:
1. The offender is entrusted with the custody
of a minor person; and ( from both versions
of the parties in the case, it was established
that marquez was entrusted with the
custody of Justine. Marquez agreed to the
arrangement to temporarily take care of the
child. For the first element to be present, it
does not matter how long the custody
lasted.
2. The offender deliberately fails to restore
the said minor to his parents or guardians.
(Marquez’s deliberate failure to return
Justine, a minor at that time, when
demanded to do so by the latter’s mother,
shows that the second element is likewise
undoubtedly present in this case.)
This Court, in elucidating on the elements of
Article 270, stated that while one of the
essential elements of this crime is that the
offender was entrusted with the custody of
the minor, what is actually being punished is
not the kidnapping but the deliberate failure
of that person to restore the minor to his
parents or guardians.27 As the penalty for
such an offense is so severe, the Court
further explained what "deliberate" as used
in Article 270 means:
Indeed, the word deliberate as used in
Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code must
imply something more than mere negligence
- it must be premeditated, headstrong,
foolishly daring or intentionally and
maliciously wrong
2. Marquez’s insistence on Merano’s
alleged desire and intention to have Justine
adopted cannot exonerate her because it
has no bearing on her deliberate failure to
return Justine to Merano. If it were true that
Marquez merely facilitated Justine’s
adoption, then there was no more need for
Merano to contact Marquez and vice-versa,
since Merano, as Marquez claimed, had
direct access to Castillo. The evidence
shows, however, that Merano desperately
searched for a way to communicate with
Marquez. Finally, even if it were true that
Merano subsequently agreed to have
Castillo adopt Justine, as evidenced by the
"Kasunduan sa Pagtalikod sa Karapatan at
Pagpapa-ampon sa Isang Anak," this would
still not affect Marquez’s liability as the
crime of kidnapping and failure to return the
minor had been fully consummated upon
her deliberate failure to return Justine to
Merano.
3. Anent Marquez’s claim that SPO2
Fernandez’s testimony corroborated hers, a
perusal of the transcript of SPO2
Fernandez’s testimony will reveal that its
focus was mainly on how the agreement on
Justine’s adoption came to be. The fact that
SPO2 Fernandez may have corroborated
Marquez’s defense of adoption by testifying
that he witnessed how Merano gave up her
child for adoption to Castillo is irrelevant. As
we have discussed above, the crime of
kidnapping and failure to return a minor had
been fully consummated way before the
execution of the agreement in February
1999, the validity of which is not in issue
before us now. Moreover, even if Merano
had indeed given up Justine to Castillo on
February 12, 1999, Merano’s consent to
have Justine adopted in 1999 has no impact
on her demand to regain custody of Justine
in 1998.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated August 29, 2007 in CA-G.R.
CR. HC No. 00467 finding Aida Marquez
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO
RETURN A MINOR under Article 270 of the
Revised Penal Code is hereby AFFIRMED. No
Costs.
G.R. No. 93475 June 5, 1991
ANTONIO A. LAMERA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14
March 1985, along Urbano Street, Pasig,
Metro Manila, an owner-type jeep, then
driven by petitioner, allegedly "hit and
bumped" a tricycle then driven by Ernesto
Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle and
injuries to Ernesto Reyes and Paulino Gonzal.
Two informations were filed against
petitioner: (a) an Information for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property
with multiple physical injuries under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code; and (b) an
Information for violation of paragraph 2 of
Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code on
Abandonment of one's victim. The
information reads as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of March,
1985, in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the
above-named accused, being the driver of an
owner-type jeep with Plate No. NCC-313 UV
Pil. '85 which hit and bumped a motorized
tricycle with Plate No. NA-6575-MC '85
driven by Ernesto Reyes and as a
consequence of which Paulino Gonzal and
Ernesto Reyes sustained physical injuries
and lost consciousness, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
abandoned (sic) them and failed (sic) to help
or render assistance to them, without
justifiable reason.
On 29 June 1987 the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig rendered its decision in
Criminal Case No. 2793 finding the petitioner
guilty of the crime of Abandonment of one's
victim as defined and penalized under
paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised
Penal Code. Petitioner appealed.
Subsequently, petitioner filed this instant
petition and he raises this sole issue: could
there be a valid charge for alleged
abandonment under Article 275, par. 2 of
the Revised Penal Code which provides as
basis for prosecution. "2. Anyone who shall
fail to help another whom he has
accidentallywounded or injured" when, he
was previously charged with "reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property
with multiple physical injuries" under Article
265 (sic) of the Revised Penal Code?
He maintains the negative view and supports
it with the argument that "[f]or the same act,
that is, the vehicular collision, one could not
be indicted in two separate informations at
the same time based on "accident" and
"recklessness', for there is a world of
difference between "reckless imprudence"
and "accidentally'."
Issue: whether or not prosecution for
negligence under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code is a bar to prosecution for
abandonment under Article 275 of the same
Code.
The Supreme Court holds in the negative
because said Articles penalize different and
distinct offenses. The rule on double
jeopardy, which petitioner has, in effect,
invoked, does not, therefore, apply pursuant
to existing jurisprudence.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the
petitioner is actually invoking his right
against double jeopardy.1âwphi1 He,
however, failed to directly and categorically
state it in his petition or deliberately
obscured it behind a suggestion of possible
resultant absurdity of the two informations.
The reason seems obvious. He forgot to raise
squarely that issue in the three courts below.
In any case, to do so would have been a futile
exercise. When he was arraigned, tried, and
convicted in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig in Criminal Case No. 2793, he was not
yet arraigned in Criminal Case No. 64294
before the Regional Trial Court. As stated
above, the judgment of conviction in the
former was rendered on 29 June 1987, while
his arraignment in the latter took place only
on 27 April 1989.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c)
after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having
been entered, and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused.
He is charged for two separate offenses
under the Revised Penal Code.
It is a cardinal rule that the protection
against double jeopardy may be invoked
only for the same offense or identical
offenses. A simple act may offend against
two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law, and if one provision
requires proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not, an
acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the
information under one does not bar
prosecution under the other. Phrased
elsewhere, where two different laws (or
articles of the same code) defines two
crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is
no obstacle to a prosecution of the other,
although both offenses arise from the same
facts, if each crime involves some important
act which is not an essential element of the
other.
The two informations filed against petitioner
are clearly for separate offenses.1âwphi1
The first, Criminal Case No. 64294, for
reckless imprudence (Article 365), falls
under the sole chapter (Criminal Negligence)
of Title Fourteen (Quasi Offenses) of Book
Two of the Revised Penal Code. The second,
Criminal Case No. 2793, for Abandonment of
one's victim (par. 2, Art. 275), falls under
Chapter Two (Crimes Against Security) of
Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal Liberty
and Security) of Book Two of the same Code.
Undoubtedly then, no constitutional,
statutory or procedural obstacle barred the
filing of the two informations against
petitioner.
PEOPLE VS REYES (G.R. NO. L-21528- L-
21529)
FACTS:
The petitioner, Rosauro Reyes, was a former
civilian employee of the Navy Exchange,
Sangley Point, Cavite City. He led a group of
about 20 to 30 persons in a demonstration
staged in front of the main gate of the United
States Naval Station at Sangley Point. They
carried placards bearing statements such as,
"Agustin, mamatay ka;", "Agustin,
mamamatay ka rin" and others. The base
commander, Capt. McAllister, called up Col.
Patricia Monzon, who as Philippine Military
Liaison Officer at Sangley Point was in charge
of preserving harmonious relations between
personnel of the naval station and the
civilian population of Cavite City. Capt.
McAllister requested Col. Monzon to join
him at the main gate of the base to meet the
demonstrators. Col. Monzon went to the
place and talked to Rosauro Reyes and one
Luis Buenaventura upon learning that the
demonstration was not directed against the
naval station but against Agustin Hallare and
a certain Frank Nolan for their having
allegedly caused the dismissal of Rosauro
Reyes from the Navy Exchange, Col. Monzon
suggested to them to demonstrate in front
of Hallare's residence, but they told him that
they would like the people in the station to
know how they felt about Hallare and Nolan.
They assured him, however, that they did
not intend to use violence, as "they just
wanted to blow off steam."
At that time Agustin Hallare was in his office
inside the naval station. When he learned
about the demonstration he became
apprehensive about his safety, so he sought
Col. Monzon's protection. The colonel
thereupon escorted Hallare, his brother, and
another person in going out of the station,
using his (Monzon's) car for the purpose.
Once outside, Col. Monzon purpose slowed
down to accommodate the request of Reyes.
He told Hallare to take a good look at the
demonstrators and at the placards they
were carrying. When the demonstrators saw
Hallare they shouted, "Mabuhay si Agustin."
Then they boarded their jeeps and followed
the car. One jeep overtook passed the car
while the other to led behind. After Hallare
and his companions had alighted in front of
his residence at 967 Burgos St., Cavite City,
Col. Monzon sped away.
The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators
parked in front of Hallare's residence after
having gone by it twice Rosauro Reyes got off
his jeep and posted himself at the gate, and
with his right hand inside his pocket and his
left holding the gate-door, he shouted
repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina mo.
Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka,
papatayin kita." Thereafter, he boarded his
jeep and the motorcade left the premises.
Meanwhile, Hallare, frightened by the
demeanor of Reyes and the other
demonstrators, stayed inside the house.
On the basis of the foregoing events Rosauro
Reyes was charged with grave threats and
grave oral defamation
On the day of the hearing the prosecution
moved to amend the information in Criminal
Case No. 2594 for grave threats by deleting
therefrom the word "orally". The defense
counsel objected to the motion on the
ground that the accused had already been
arraigned on the original information and
that the amendment "would affect
materially the interest of the accused."
Nevertheless, the amendment was allowed
and the joint trial proceeded.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the amendment of
information for grave threats is substantial
2. Whether or not petitioner should
be charged with grave threats only.
HELD:
1. NO.
After a careful consideration of the original
information, we find that all the elements of
the crime of grave threats as defined in
Article 282 1 of the Revised Penal Code and
penalized by its paragraph 2 were alleged
therein namely: (1) that the offender
threatened another person with the
infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) that
such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3)
that the threat was not subject to a
condition. Hence, petitioner could have
been convicted thereunder. It is to be noted
that under the aforementioned provision
the particular manner in which the threat is
made not a qualifying ingredient of the
offense, such that the deletion of the word
"orally" did not affect the nature and
essence of the crime as charged originally.
Neither did it change the basic theory of the
prosecution that the accused threatened to
kill Rosauro Reyes so as to require the
petitioner to undergo any material change
or modification in his defense. Petitioner
was not exposed after the amendment to
the danger of conviction under paragraph 1
of Article 282, which provides for a different
penalty, since there was no allegation in the
amended information that the threat was
made subject to a condition. In our view the
deletion of the word "orally" was effected in
order to make the information conformable
to the evidence to be presented during the
trial. It was merely a formal amendment
which in no way prejudiced petitioner's
rights.
2. YES
The demonstration led by petitioner Agustin
Hallare in front of the main gate of the naval
station; the fact that placards with
threatening statements were carried by the
demonstrators; their persistence in trailing
Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence;
and the demonstration conducted in front
thereof, culminating in repeated threats
flung by petitioner in a loud voice, give rise
to only one conclusion: that the threats were
made "with the deliberate purpose of
creating in the mind of the person
threatened the belief that the threat would
be carried into effect. It cannot be denied
that the threats were made deliberately and
not merely in a temporary fit of anger,
motivated as they were by the dismissal of
petitioner one month before the incident.
The charge of oral defamation stemmed
from the utterance of the words, "Agustin,
putang ina mo". This is a common enough
expression in the dialect that is often
employed, not really to slander but rather to
express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if
ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer,
that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a
mother. In the instant case, it should be
viewed as part of the threats voiced by
appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently
to make the same more emphatic.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
hereby reversed and petitioner is acquitted,
with costs de oficio, insofar as Criminal Case
No. 2595 of the Court a quo (for oral
defamation) is concerned; and affirmed with
respect to Criminal Case No. 2594, for grave
threats, with costs against petitioner.
CALUAG vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 171511 March 4, 2009
FACTS:
Around 4:00 in the afternoon, Nestor, one of
the witnesses presented, learned that two of
his guests from an earlier drinking spree
were mauled. At that time, Caluag and
Sentillas were drinking. When Nestor
inquired from several people including his
own son Raymond what happened, Caluag
butted in and replied, Bakit kasama ka ba
roon?, and immediately boxed him without
warning. Nestor retaliated but he was
overpowered by Caluag and Sentillas. Julia
saw Caluag and Sentillas box her husband.
Although she tried to pacify them, they did
not listen to her. To avoid his assailants,
Nestor ran to his house. Julia followed him.
At around 6:00 p.m., Nestor told his wife to
report the boxing incident to the barangay
authorities.
At around 7:30 in the evening, when Julia
and her son Rotsen were on their way to
their barangay hall, she encountered Caluag,
who blocked her way at the alley near her
house. Caluag confronted Julia with a gun,
poked it at her forehead, and said Saan ka
pupunta, gusto mo ito? Despite this fearful
encounter, she was still able to proceed to
the barangay hall where she reported the
gun-poking incident to the barangay
authorities.
For the defense, Caluag stated that Nestor
was drunk and unruly and blocked his way.
He also stated that it was Nestor who boxed
on the face which caused him to fall down.
Nestor pursued him and punched him again.
Thereafter, an unidentified man from the
crowd armed with a knife went towards
Nestor but Sentillas timely interceded and
pacified the man. Sentillas never boxed
Nestor. Caluag also denied poking a gun at
Julia.
MeTC: found Caluag and Sentillas guilty of
slight physical injuries, and Caluag guilty of
grave threats.
RTC & CA: Affirmed in toto the joint decision
of the MeTC.
Contention the petitioner: Petitioner argues
that assuming that he did poke a gun at Julia,
the crime committed was other light threats
as defined under Article 285, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is guilty of grace
threats?
HELD:
Yes, the Court sustained the conviction of
the petitioner.
In grave threats, the wrong threatened
amounts to a crime which may or may not be
accompanied by a condition. In light threats,
the wrong threatened does not amount to a
crime but is always accompanied by a
condition. In other light threats, the wrong
threatened does not amount to a crime and
there is no condition.
The acts committed by the accused
constituted grave threats where there was a
threat to kill or shoot someone, which
amounts to a crime, and the threat to kill was
not subject to a condition.
The records show that at around 7:30 in the
evening, Julia Denido left her house to go to
the barangay hall to report the mauling of
her husband which she witnessed earlier at
around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon. On her
way there, petitioner confronted her and
pointed a gun to her forehead, while at the
same time saying “Saan ka pupunta, gusto
mo ito?” Considering what transpired earlier
between petitioner and Julia’s husband,
petitioner’s act of pointing a gun at Julia’s
forehead clearly enounces a threat to kill or
to inflict serious physical injury on her
person. Actions speak louder than words.
Taken in the context of the surrounding
circumstances, the uttered words do not go
against the threat to kill or to inflict serious
injury evinced by petitioner’s accompanying
act. Given the surrounding circumstances,
the offense committed falls under Article
282, par. 2 (grave threats) since: (1) killing or
shooting someone amounts to a crime, and
 (2) the threat to kill was not subject to a
condition.
The threat to commit a wrong will constitute
or not constitute a crime is the distinguishing
factor between grave threats on one hand,
and light and other light threats on the
other.
Article 285, par. 1 (other light threats) is
inapplicable although it specifically states,
“shall threaten another with a weapon or
draw such weapon in a quarrel,” since it
presupposes that the threat to commit a
wrong will not constitute a crime.
Jose Timoner vs People
FACTS:
Jose Timoner, the petitioner, was convicted by the
Municipal Court of Daet with the crime of Grave
Coercion, as penalized under Art. 286 of the Revised
Penal Code, because of the complaint by Pascual
Dayaon, Lourdes Rabustillos and others. Timoner,
then Mayor of Daet, together with two uniformed
policemen, Samuel Morena and Ernesto Quibral, and
six laborers, was acting on the recommendation of
Dra. Allegre, the Municipal Health Officer, to close
among other structures that were along the sidewalk,
the barbershop of Dayaon and store of Rabustillos.
Timoner filed a complaint in the CFI of Camarines
Norte against Rebustillos and others for judicial
abatement of their stalls, alleged that the stalls
constituted public nuisances as well as per se. The
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
was the Intermediate Appellate Court then, however,
the CA affirmed in full the judgment of the trial court.
Petitioner claimed that their actions was done in
abatement of a public nuisance and, therefore, under
lawful authority.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Timoner committed Grave Coercion
HELD:
The petitioner was acquitted of the crime
charged. He did not commit Grave Coercon
as the elements of Grave Coercion 1) that a
person is prevented by another from doing
something not prohibited by law, or
compelled to do something against his will,
be it right or wrong; 2) that the prevention or
compulsion is effected by violence, threats or
intimidation; and 3) that the person who
restrains the will and liberty of another has
no right to do so, or in other words, that the
restraint is not made under authority of law
or in the exercise of any lawful right.
required that he acted not under the
authority of the law. As the then Mayor of
the City, Timoner had the authority to act on
behalf of the recommendation and his
constituents’ right to public order and
safety, and that such stalls along the
sidewalk affected the community and
general public, as it is in a public place, and
was annoying to all who come within its
sphere. The Supreme Court did contend that
the barbershop did constitute a public
nuisance, as defined under Article 694 and
695 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Furthermore, it had been recommended for
closure by the Municipal Health Officer.
G.R. No. 90423 September 6, 1991
FRANCIS LEE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
PELAGIA PANLINO DE CHIN, respondents.
ART. 286. Grave coercions. — The penalty of
arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, without
authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent
another from doing something not prohibited by law,
or compel him to do something against his will,
whether it be right or wrong.
If the coercion be committed for the purpose of
compelling another to perform any religious act or to
prevent him from so doing, the penalty next higher in
degree shall be imposed.
Facts:
At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of June 20,
1984, the complainant Maria Pelagia Paulino de Chin,
23 years old, was fetched from her house upon the
instruction of the petitioner Branch Manager Francis
Lee of Pacific Banking Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as bank). The petitioner confronted the
complainant about a forged Midland National Bank
Cashier Check No. 3526794, which the latter allegedly
deposited in the account of Honorio Carpio. During
the said confrontation, the petitioner Francis Lee was
shouting at her with piercing looks and threatened to
file charges against her unless and until she returned
all the money equivalent of the subject cashier check.
Accordingly, the complainant was caused to sign a
prepared withdrawal slip, and later, an affidavit
prepared by the bank's lawyer, where she was made
to admit that she had swindled the bank and had
return the money equivalent of the spurious check. It
was about six o'clock in the afternoon of the same day
when the complainant was able to leave the bank
premises.
Issue:
Whether or not the acts of petitioner in simply
"shouting at the complainant with piercing looks" and
"threats to file charges against her" are sufficient to
convict him of the crime of grave coercion.
Held:
Petitioner's demand that the private respondent
return the proceeds of the check accompanied by a
threat to file criminal charges was not improper.
There is nothing unlawful on the threat to sue. In the
case of Berg v. National City Bank of New York (102
Phil. 309, 316), We ruled that:
... It is a practice followed not only by banks but even
by individuals to demand payment of their accounts
with the threat that upon failure to do so an action
would be instituted in court. Such a threat is proper
within the realm of the law as a means to enforce
collection. Such a threat cannot constitute duress
even if the claim proves to be unfounded so long as
the creditor believes that it was his right to do so.
The circumstances of this case reveal that the
complainant, despite her protestations, indeed
voluntarily, albeit reluctantly, consented to do all the
aforesaid acts.
Bearing in mind her involvement in the deposit and
encashment of the check, the complainant admitted
to being nervous upon being informed that the check
was spurious.
We find that complainant's lengthy stay at the bank
was not due to the petitioner's threat. It was rather
due to her desire to prove her innocence
Further, We find that contrary to complainant's
allegations in her affidavit, it was not the petitioner
who suggested the encashment of the RCBC Time
Deposit Certificate but her sister; and that again, it
was not the petitioner who agreed to the sister's
suggestion but Cruz, the PRO Manager, Foreign
Department of the bank
Moreover, while complainant claimed that her
freedom of movement was restrained, she, however,
was able to move about freely unguarded from the
office of the petitioner situated at the ground floor to
the office of Cruz at the mezzanine floor where her
sister found her.
The most telling proof of the absence of intimidation
was the fact that the complainant refused to sign the
promissory note in spite of the alleged threats of the
petitioner. American authorities have declared that
"(t)he force which is claimed to have compelled
criminal conduct against the will of the actor must be
immediate and continuous and threaten grave
danger to his person during all of the time the act is
being committed. That is, it must be a dangerous
force threatened 'in praesenti.' It must be a force
threatening great bodily harm that remains constant
in controlling the will of the unwilling participant
while the act is being performed and from which he
cannot then withdraw in safety.
Against this backdrop, We hold that coercion did not
exist in this case. Consequently, the petitioner should
be acquitted.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and a new one hereby entered
ACQUITTING the accused of the crime of grave
coercion.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
PROCOPIO REYES, POLICARPIO NACANA,
FLORENTINO CLEMENTE, HERMOGENES MALLARI,
MARCELINO MALLARI, CASTOR ALIPIO, and RUFINO
MATIAS, defendants-appellants.
(60 Phil 369, G.R. No. L-40577 August 23, 1934)
FACTS:
While the pabasa was going on the evening of April
10, 1933, between 11 and 12 o'clock, the defendants
arrived at the place, carrying bolos and crowbars, and
started to construct a barbed wire fence in front of
the chapel. Alfonso Castillo, who was chairman of the
committee in charge of the pabasa, tried to persuade
them to refrain from carrying out their plan, by
reminding them of the fact that it was Holy Week and
that it was highly improper to construct a fence at
that time of the evening. A verbal altercation ensued.
When the people attending the pabasa in the chapel
and those who were eating in the yard thereof
noticed what was happening, they became excited
and left the place hurriedly and in such confusion that
dishes and saucers were broken and benches toppled
over. The pabasa was discontinued and it was not
resumed until after an investigation conducted by the
chief of police on the following morning, which
investigation led to the filing of the complaint.
Many years ago the Clemente family by informal
donation gave the land on which the old chapel was
erected. When it was destroyed, the present chapel
was erected, and there is now a dispute as to whether
the new chapel is not now impinging on the land that
belongs to the Clemente family. The appellants are
partisans of he Clemente family.
The appellants were then convicted in the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac of a violation of article 133 of
the Revised Penal Code or Offending the religious
feelings.
ISSUE: Whether the defendants are guilty of Article
133 or unjust vexation.
HELD:
The defendants are not guilty of Article 133 but of
unjust vexation. It is to be noted that article 133 of
the punishes acts "notoriously offensive to the
feelings of the faithful." The construction of a fence,
even though irritating and vexatious under the
circumstances to those present, is not such an act as
can be designated as "notoriously offensive to the
faithful", as normally such an act would be a matter
of complete indifference to those not present, no
matter how religious a turn of mind they might be.

The Court ruled that the act of building a fence was

innocent and was simply to protect private property
rights. The fact that this argument is a pretense only
is clearly shown by the circumstances under which
the fence was constructed, namely, late at night and
in such a way as to vex and annoy the parties who had
gathered to celebrate the pabasa and is further
shown by the fact that many of the appellants saw fit
to introduce as their defense a false alibi.

Appellants are therefore acquitted of a violation of

article 133 of the Revised Penal Code but found guilty
of a violation of article 287 of the Revised Penal Code.