options—“living

in sanctity and freedom [or] if facing death, dying for sanctity and freedom as
did the millions of the Orthodox ancestors.” A young member of the Serbian Cultural Club
enthusiastically called this show of national pride as the “brightest day” in his life.42
Accordingly, when on March 27, 1941, a group of officers led by an air force general,
Dušan Simović, deposed Prince Paul and the government of Cvetković, the coup was greeted
throughout Serbia as an expression of popular will. Political rivalries were temporarily
forgotten as members of all political parties, with the exception of the Zbor, took part in anti-
pact rallies. Gripped by emotions, most Serbs barely understood the potential implications,
particularly as rumors and hopes for Western and Soviet help temporarily overrode creeping
fears of war.43
In the meantime, desperate to avoid or at least postpone war, the plotters tried to convince
Berlin that the coup was an internal affair and in no way affected Yugoslavia's obligations in
foreign policy. Simović even turned to the leaders of the ethnic German community in Banat,
asking them to convince Berlin that Yugoslavia would stand by its obligations as stipulated by
the Tripartite Pact.44 In the growing atmosphere of foreboding, Simović and his colleagues
tried half measures, hoping not to provoke Hitler. Since Yugoslav diplomats and spies
repeatedly reported of Germany's military preparations against Yugoslavia, Simović decided
to put the army on alert but did not dare order general mobilization until April 3. On the same
day, the government declared Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana “free cities”—a clear sign of
resignation to Hitler's violent reaction.45
In such an atmosphere, positive signals from Moscow were received as a godsend solution
for Yugoslavia's predicament. Yugoslavia did not have diplomatic relations with the USSR,
and only in May 1940 had the two countries signed a trade agreement, which was followed the
next month by mutual diplomatic recognition. When on March 29, 1941, the Soviet embassy in
Belgrade indicated that the USSR was ready to sign an agreement with Yugoslavia and offer
military assistance, Simović brushed off traditional fears of communism and grasped the
Soviet proposal as the last resort to avoid confrontation with Germany. On April 5 the Soviet-
Yugoslav treaty of friendship and nonaggression was signed in Moscow and implied potential
Soviet aid to Yugoslavia. However, while Stalin was relying on the treaty to indicate to Berlin
the Soviets’ strategic interests in the Balkans, he did not want to antagonize his German ally.
Hence, the Soviet military intervention in Yugoslavia was out of the question.46

In the creation of the post–World War I order, the SCS and its successor Yugoslavia faced a
difficult task of mending and integrating regions of different economic capacities and political
experiences into a centralized administrative system. In the 1930s, internal problems were
exacerbated by international tensions, and the Yugoslav government desperately tried to
maintain neutrality in Europe, which was now divided into two hostile camps. The Italian
invasion of Albania in April 1939 and Greece in October 1940 indicated that such a policy
was no longer possible. Against a background of Germany's victory over France, Yugoslav
statesmen and generals realized that their state was woefully unprepared to fight the Axis.
Consequently, the March 1941 coup seemed an utter blunder, based on wishful thinking and
emotions rather than on a realistic appreciation of the country's limited economic and military