ONESIMA D. BELEN, petitioner-appellant, v. BPI and MILAGROS BELEN DE OLAGUERA, oppositors-appellees.

Reyes, J.B.L., J. October 31, 1960 G.R. No. L-14474

Doctrine Art. 959 applies only in cases where the beneficiaries are relatives of the testator, not of the legatee. The law assumes the
testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy to benefit the relatives closest to him.
Summary Onesima sought to get a larger share of the legacies left by the testator to Filomena Diaz, her mother. She claims that by virtue
of the testator’s will, the latter intended that the legacies left to Filomena are to be shared equally only by Filomena’s children,
Onesima and Milagros, to the exclusion of Milagros’ 7 children. Basically, she wanted a 1/2 share, not just a 1/8 share, which is
what she would get if she were to share with the children of Milagros. SC ruled that Art. 959, which provides that a distribution
made in general terms in favor of the testator’s relatives benefit only those closest in degree to the testator, does not apply.
The disposition made by the testator was a distribution which was in favor of the relatives of the legatee, not the testator. It also
held that Onesima failed to prove that the testator intended the interpretation she was pushing.
Facts  Decedent Benigno Diaz executed a will and, later, a codicil. The latter contained the following provisions:
9.0 — In case of death of some or all legatees appointed by me, the beneficiaries will pass the legacies in favor
only of legitimate descendants and ancestors, but not the surviving spouses.
10.0 —Ten to fifteen years after my death all property, movable or immovable, rights and advantageous, can
proceed to the sale of all giving preference to legatees and of its total amount will be deducted P1,000 for the 4
children of my late brother Fabian, all expenses and reserving a sufficient and well calculated amount to cover
expenses for another ten years for the orders and masses. The remainder would be distributed to the following
people who still live, or to their legitimate descendants: A Isabel M. de Santiago —50%; Los hijos de Domingo
Legarda —30%; Filomena Diaz —10%; Nestor M. Santiago —10%
 After he died in November 2, 1944, the will and codicil were admitted to probate. Administration proceedings ended
in 1950, with the estate put under the administration of BPI as trustee for the benefit of the legatees.
 Filomena Diaz died on February 8, 1954, leaving two legitimate children:
o Milagros (married with 7 children); and
o Onesima (single).
 Onesima filed a petition, alleging that the amount which pertained to Filomena under the will and codicil should
divided equally only between Milagros and her, to the exclusion of Milagros’ children.
o Onesima petitioned the court to order BPI to deliver to her "one-half of whatever share [was due
to] Filomena Diaz as legatee in the will and codicil of the deceased testator…"
 CFI: Denied the petition. Hence, this petition.
Issues/Ratio
I. W/N the share of Filomena in clause 10 of the codicil forms part of her estate so that it pertains to her
legitimate descendants (YES)
By the last part of par. 10, the testator ordained a simple substitution with a plurality of substitutes for each legatee.
This is authorized by Art. 860: Two or more persons may be substituted for one and one person for two or more heirs.

II. W/N the share of Filomena should be distributed (1) between her children only; OR (2) also among her other
legitimate descendants (ALSO AMONG FILOMENA’S OTHER LEGITIMATE DESCENDANTS)
The issue is with regard also to the last sentence of clause 10: does "sus descendientes legitimos" (their legitimate
descendants) refer (1) conjointly to all living descendant (both children and grandchildren) of the legatee, as a class;
or they refer to the (2) descendants nearest in degree?

Onesima: Only the relatives nearest in degree to Filomena Diaz. The legacy should be divided equally between her
and her sister Milagros, to the exclusion of the latter's sons and daughters, invoking Art. 959: A distribution made in
general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree.

SC: Art. 959 applies only in cases where the beneficiaries are relatives of the testator, not of the legatee. The law
assumes the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy to benefit the relatives closest to him, because, as
according to Manresa, among a testator's relative the closest are dearest.

This, however, does not come into play where the beneficiaries are relatives of another person (the legatee) and not
of the testator. There is no reason to presume that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, for he
precisely made a testament and provided substitutes for each legatee; nor can it be said that his affections would
prefer the nearest relatives of the legatee to those more distant, since he envisages all of them in a group, and only
as mere substitutes for a preferred beneficiary.

Should Article 959 be applied by analogy? There are various reasons against this:
1. The most important one is that, as recognized by the principal commentators on the Code of 1889, the nearest
relatives exclude all the farther relatives and right of representation does not operate.
2. Second, the history of provision shows that the right of representation was deliberately suppressed.

By applying to the descendants of Filomena Diaz the "nearest relatives" rule of Art. 959, the inheritance would be
limited to her children, excluding the grandchildren. This could hardly be the intention of the testator who referred to
the substitutes of those persons listed in clause 10 as the descendants of the substitutes.

In order to support the claim of Olaguera, the latter must have proven that the testator intended to impose an order of
succession that:
(a) Rejected the right of accretion among co-heirs and co-legatees, as established by Arts. 1016 and 1019, and he
intended to replace it with representation; (to get a larger share as compared to Milagros’ children)
(b) Refused the rule of Art. 846 which would have ordained that co-heirs inherit in equal parts, unless otherwise
provided; (also to get a larger share) and
(c) Rejected the rule of Art. 1022 which provides that vacancies in the free part should be filed according to the
rules of accretion or substitution, and in default of these two, by the rules of intestacy.
 The testator could have rendered inoperative all the articles mentioned, if he had so desired but without any other
supporting circumstances, SC held that the testator did not intend to circumvent all the legal provisions with the one
phrase "sus descendientes legitimes." Appellant failed to prove such intention on the part of the testator.

In the absence of other indications of contrary intent, the proper rule to apply here is that the testator, by
designating a class or group of legatees, intended all members thereof to succeed per capita, in consonance
with Art. 846. The legacy to Filomena Diaz should be equally divided among her surviving children and grandchidren.

Holding Order appealed from AFFIRMED.