Mind Association

Can We Solve the Mind--Body Problem?

Author(s): Colin McGinn
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 98, No. 391 (Jul., 1989), pp. 349-366
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
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 Can WeSolvetheMind-BodyProblem?
COLIN McGINN

How it is thatanythingso remarkableas a stateof consciousnesscomes about as a

resultof initiatingnervetissue,is just as unaccountableas the appearance of the
Djin, whereAladdin rubbed his lamp in the story... (JulianHuxley)

We havebeentrying fora longtimeto solvethemind-bodyproblem.It

has stubbornlyresistedourbestefforts.The mystery persists.I thinkthe
timehascometoadmitcandidly thatwe cannotresolvethemystery. ButI
also thinkthatthisveryinsolubility or the reason for it removes the
philosophical
problem. In thispaperI explainwhy I saythese outrageous
things.
problemI wanttodiscussconcerns
The specific consciousness, thehard
nutofthemind-bodyproblem.How is it possibleforconsciousstatesto
dependupon brainstates?How can technicolour phenomenology arise
fromsoggygreymatter? What makes thebodily organ we call thebrain so
fromotherbodilyorgans,say thekidneys the body
radicallydifferent
partswithouta traceof consciousness? How could the aggregation of
millionsofindividuallyinsentientneuronsgenerate subjective awareness?
We knowthatbrainsarethedefactocausalbasisofconsciousness, butwe
have,itseems,no understanding whateverofhowthiscan be so. It strikes
us as miraculous,
eerie,evenfaintlycomic.Somehow,we feel,thewaterof
thephysicalbrainis turnedintothewineofconsciousness, butwe drawa
totalblankon the natureof thisconversion. Neuraltransmissions just
seemlikethewrongkindofmaterials withwhichto bringconsciousness
into the world,but it appears that in some way theyperformthis
mysteriousfeat.The mind-body problemis theproblemofunderstanding
howthemiracleis wrought, thusremoving thesenseofdeepmystery. We
wantto takethe magicout of the linkbetweenconsciousness and the
brain.1
Purported solutionsto theproblemhavetendedto assumeone of two
1 One ofthepeculiarities
ofthemind-body problemis thedifficultyofformulating itin a rigorous
way.We havea senseoftheproblemthatoutruns itclearly.Thus wequickly
ourcapacitytoarticulate
findourselvesresorting to lookinward,insteadofspecifying
to invitations precisely whatit is about
consciousnessthatmakesitinexplicable in termsofordinaryphysicalproperties.Andthiscanmakeit
seemthattheproblem is spurious.A creaturewithout wouldnotproperly
consciousness appreciatethe
problem(assuming sucha creature couldappreciate otherproblems).I thinkan adequatetreatment of
themind-body problem shouldexplainwhyitis so hardtostatetheproblemexplicitly. My treatment
in ourinadequateconceptions
locatesour difficulty ofthenatureof thebrainand consciousness. In
fact,ifwe knewtheirnaturesfullywe wouldalreadyhavesolvedtheproblem.This shouldbecome
clearlater.
Mind, Vol. xcviii, no. 391, July I989 ( Oxford University Press I989

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350 ColinMcGinn
forms.One form,whichwe maycall constructive, attempts to specify
some naturalpropertyof the brain (or body) which explainshow
consciousness can be elicitedfromit. Thus functionalism, forexample,
suggests a propertynamely, causal role which is held to be satisfied
by
bothbrainstatesand mentalstates;thisproperty is supposedto explain
howconsciousstatescan comefrombrainstates.2The otherform,which
hasbeenhistorically dominant, franklyadmitsthatnothing merely natural
coulddo thejob,andsuggests insteadthatwe invokesupernatural entities
or divine, interventions. Thus we haveCartesiandualismand Leibnizian
pre-established harmony. These 'solutions'at leastrecognizethatsome-
thingpretty remarkable is neededifthemind-body relation is to be made
senseof; theyare as extremeas theproblem.The approachI favouris
naturalistic butnotconstructive: I do notbelievewecaneverspecify what
it is aboutthebrainthatis responsible forconsciousness, but I am sure
thatwhatever it is it is notinherently miraculous. The problemarises,I
wantto suggest, becausewe arecutoffbyourverycognitive constitution
fromachievinga conception of thatnaturalproperty of thebrain(or of
consciousness) thataccountsforthepsychophysical link.This is a kindof
causal nexusthatwe are precludedfromeverunderstanding, giventhe
waywehavetoformourconceptsanddevelopourtheories. No wonderwe
findtheproblemso difficult!
BeforeI canhopetomakethisviewplausible, I needtosketch thegeneral
conception of cognitive competence thatunderliesmy position.Let me
introduce theideaofcognitive A typeofmindM is cognitively
closure. closed
withrespect toa property P (ortheory T) ifandonlyiftheconcept-forming
procedures atM's disposalcannotextendtoa graspofP (oran understand-
ingofT). Conceiving mindscomeindifferent kinds,equippedwithvarying
powersandlimitations, biasesandblindspots, so thatproperties (ortheories)
maybe accessibleto somemindsbutnotto others.Whatis closedto the
mindofa ratmaybe opentothemindofa monkey, andwhatis opentous
maybe closedto themonkey. Representational poweris notall ornothing.
Minds are biologicalproductslikebodies,and likebodiestheycomein
different shapesand sizes,moreor less capacious,moreor less suitedto
certain cognitive tasks.3This is particularly clearforperceptual of
faculties,
' I would also classifypanpsychism as a constructive solution,since it attemptsto explain
consciousnessin termsofproperties ofthebrainthatareas naturalas consciousness itself.
Attributing
specksofproto-consciousness to theconstituents ofmatter is notsupernatural in thewaypostulating
immaterialsubstances or divineinterventionsis; it is merely extravagant.I shallherebe assuming that
panpsychism,likeall otherextantconstructive solutions, is inadequate as an answerto themind-body
problem-as (of course)are the supernatural 'solutions'.I am speakingto thosewho still feel
perplexed(almosteveryone, I wouldthink, at leastin theirheart).
3 This kindofviewofcognitive capacityis forcefully advocatedbyNoamChomsky inReflections
on
Language,PatheonBooks,I975, and byJerry Fodorin TheModularity ofMind,Cambridge, Mass.,
MIT Press,I983. Chomskydistinguishes between'problems', whichhumanmindsare in principle
equippedto solve,and 'mysteries', whichsystematically eludeourunderstanding; a
and he envisages
studyof our cognitive systems thatwouldchartthesepowersand limitations. I am hereengagedin
sucha study,citingthemind-body problemas falling on thesideof themysteries.

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 Can WeSolve theMind-BodyProblem?351
course:perceptual closureishardlytobedenied.Different speciesarecapableof
perceiving differentpropertiesof theworld,and no speciescan perceive
everyproperty thingsmayinstantiate (withoutartificial instrumentation
anyway). But suchclosuredoes notreflect adversely on therealityof the
properties thatlie outsidethe representational capacitiesin question;a
property is no less real fornot beingreachablefroma certainkindof
perceiving andconceiving mind.The invisiblepartsoftheelectromagnetic
spectrum arejustas realas thevisibleparts,and whether a specifickindof
creature can formconceptual representationsof theseimperceptible parts
does not determinewhethertheyexist. Thus cognitiveclosurewith
respectto P doesnotimplyirrealism aboutP. ThatP is (as we mightsay)
noumenalforM does notshowthatP does notoccurin somenaturalistic
scientific
theory T itshowsonlythatT is notcognitively accessibleto M.
Presumably monkey mindsand theproperty ofbeingan electron illustrate
thispossibility.And thequestionmustariseas to whether humanminds
are closedwithrespectto certaintrueexplanatory theories.Nothing,at
least,in theconceptof realityshowsthateverything real is open to the
humanconcept-forming facultyif,thatis, we are realistsaboutreality.4
Considera mindconstructed accordingto the principlesof classical
empiricism, a Humean mind. Hume mistakenly thoughtthat human
mindswereHumean,butwe canat leastconceiveofsucha mind(perhaps
dogs and monkeys haveHumeanminds).A Humeanmindis such that
perceptual closuredetermines cognitive closure,since'ideas' mustalways
be copiesof 'impressions'; therefore the concept-forming systemcannot
transcend whatcan be perceptually presentedto thesubject.Such a mind
willbe closedwithrespectto unobservables; theproperties ofatoms,say,
willnotbe representable bya mindconstructed in thisway.This implies
thatexplanatory theoriesin whichtheseproperties are essentially men-
tionedwill not be accessibleto a Humean mind.5And hence the
observable phenomena thatareexplainedbyallusionto unobservables will
be inexplicable by a mind thus limited.But notice:the incapacityto
explaincertainphenomena does notcarrywithit a lackof recognition of
the theoretical problemsthe phenomenapose. You mightbe able to

4 See ThomasNagel'sdiscussion ofrealismin The ViewFromNowhere, Oxford,OxfordUniversity

Press,I986, ch.VI. He arguesthereforthepossibility of propertieswe can nevergrasp.Combining
Nagel'srealismwithChomsky-Fodor cognitiveclosuregivesa positionlookingverymuchlikeLocke's
in theEssayConcerningHumanUJnderstanding: theideathatourGod-given do notequipus to
faculties
fathom thedeeptruth In fact,Lockeheldprecisely
aboutreality. thisabouttherelation betweenmind
couldenableus to understand
and brain:onlydivinerevelation how'perceptions'are producedin our
mindsbymaterial objects.
5 Hume,of course,argued,in effect,thatno theoryessentially employing a notionof objective
could be graspedby our minds-and likewisefor the notionof objective
causal necessitation
We mightcomparethefrustrations
persistence. of theHumeanmindto theconceptual travails
of the
puresoundbeingsdiscussedin Ch. II ofP. F. Strawson's London,Methuen,I1959; both
Individuals,
aretypesofmindwhoseconstitution putsvariousconceptsbeyondthem.We can do a lotbetterthan
thesetruncatedminds,butwe also haveourconstitutional limitations.

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352 ColinMcGinn
appreciate a problemwithoutbeingable to formulate (evenin principle)
thesolutionto thatproblem(I supposehumanchildren are oftenin this
position, at leastfora while).A Humeanmindcannotsolvetheproblems
thatour physicssolves,yetit mightbe able to havean inklingof what
needs to be explained.We would expect,then, that a moderately
intelligent enquiring Humeanmindwillfeelpermanently perplexedand
mystified bythephysical world,sincethecorrect scienceis forever beyond
itscognitive reach.Indeed,something likethiswas precisely theviewof
Locke.He thought thatourideasof matterare quitesharplyconstrained
by our perceptions and so concludedthatthe truescienceof matteris
eternally beyondus-that we could neverremoveour perplexities about
(say) whatsolidityultimately is.6 But it does not followforLocke that
natureis itselfinherently mysterious; thefeltmystery comesfromourown
cognitive limitations, notfromanyobjectiveeeriness in theworld.It looks
todayas ifLockewaswrongaboutourcapacity to fathom thenatureofthe
physicalworld,butwe can stilllearnfromhis fundamental thought-the
insistence thatour cognitivefacultiesmay not be up to solvingevery
problemthatconfronts us. To put thepointmoregenerally: the human
mindmaynotconform to empiricistprinciples, but it mustconform to
someprinciples-andit is a substantive claimthattheseprinciples permit
thesolutionof everyproblemwe can formulate or sense.Total cognitive
opennessis not guaranteedfor human beingsand it should not be
expected. Yet whatis noumenal forus maynotbe miraculous in itself.
We
shouldtherefore be alertto thepossibility thata problemthatstrikes us as
deeplyintractable, as utterlybaffling,mayarisefroman areaofcognitive
closurein ourwaysofrepresenting theworld.7Thatis whatI nowwantto
argueis thecase withoursenseofthemysterious natureoftheconnection
betweenconsciousness and thebrain.We are biasedawayfromarriving at
the correctexplanatory theoryof the psychophysical nexus.And this
makesus proneto an illusionof objectivemystery. Appreciating this
should removethe philosophical problem:consciousness does not, in
reality, arisefromthebrainin themiraculous wayin whichtheDjin arises
fromthelamp.
I nowneedtoestablish threethings:(i) thereexistssomeproperty ofthe
brainthataccountsnaturalistically forconsciousness; (ii) we are cogni-
tivelyclosedwithrespectto thatproperty; but(iii) thereis no philosophi-
cal (as opposedtoscientific) mind-body problem. Mostoftheworkwillgo
intoestablishing (ii).
6
See theEssay,BookII, ch.IV. Lockecomparestheprojectofsayingwhatsolidity ultimately is to
tryingto clearup a blindman'svisionby talkingto him.
7 Some of themorearcaneaspectsof cosmology and quantumtheory mightbe thought to lie just
withintheboundsofhumanintelligibility.Chomsky suggests
thatthecausationofbehaviour mightbe
necessarilymysteriousto humaninvestigators:
see Reflections
onLanguage,p. I56. I myself
believethat
themind-bodyproblemexhibits a qualitatively
differentlevelof mystery
fromthiscase (unlessit is
takenas an aspectofthatproblem).

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 Can WeSolve'theMind-BodyProblem?353

Resolutely shunning the supernatural, I thinkit is undeniablethatit

mustbe in virtueofsomenatural property ofthebrainthatorganisms are
conscious.Therejusthasto be someexplanation forhow brains subserve
minds.If we are notto be eliminativists aboutconsciousness, thensome
theorymustexistwhichaccountsforthepsychophysical correlations we
observe.It is implausibleto take these correlations as ultimate and
inexplicablefacts,as simplybrute.And we do notwantto acknowledge
radical emergence of the consciouswithrespectto the cerebral:thatis
too much like acceptingmiracles de re.Brainstatescauseconsciousstates,
we know,and thiscausal nexus must proceedthrough necessary connec-
of
tions some kind thekind that would make the nexus intelligibleifthey
wereunderstood.8 Consciousness is likelifein thisrespect. We know that
life evolvedfrominorganic matter, so we expect there to be some
explanation of thisprocess.We cannotplausiblytakethe arrivalof life
as a primitive brutefact,nor can we acceptthatlife arose by some
formof miraculousemergence.Rather,theremust be some natural
accountof howlifecomesfrommatter, whether or notwe can knowit.
Eschewing vitalism and themagictouchofGod's finger, we rightly insist
thatit mustbe in virtueof somenaturalproperty of (organized)matter
thatparcelsof it getto be alive.But consciousness itselfis justa further
biologicaldevelopment, and so it too must be susceptibleofsomenatural
explanation-whether or not human beings are capable of arriving at this
explanation. Presumably there exist objectivenatural laws that somehow
accountfortheupsurgeofconsciousness. Consciousness, in short,mustbe
a naturalphenomenon, naturally arisingfromcertainorganizations of
matter. Let us thensaythatthereexistssomeproperty P, instantiated by
the brain,in virtueof whichthe brainis the basis of consciousness.
Equivalently, thereexistssome theoryT, referring to P, whichfully
explainsthedependence ofconsciousstateson brainstates.If we knewT,
thenwe wouldhavea constructive solutionto themind-bodyproblem.
The questionthenis whether we can evercometo knowT and graspthe
natureofP.
Let mefirst observethatitis surely thatwe couldneverarriveat
possible
a graspof P; thereis, as I said,no guarantee thatour cognitive powers
permitthesolutionofeveryproblemwe can recognize. Onlya misplaced
idealismaboutthe naturalworldcouldwarrant the dogmaticclaimthat
everything is knowableby the human species at this stage of its
evolutionary development (considerthesameclaimmadeon behalfofthe
intellectofcro-Magnon man).It maybe thateveryproperty forwhichwe
can forma conceptis such thatit could neversolve the mind-body
problem.We could be like five-year old childrentryingto understand
8 Cf. Nagel's discussionof emergencein 'Panpsychism', in Mortal Questions,Cambridge,
CambridgeUniversity Press,I979. I agreewithhimthattheapparent ofmindfrom
radicalemergence
only,on painofaccepting
has to be epistemic
matter miracles
inexplicable in theworld.

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354 ColinMcGinn
RelativityTheory.Still,so farthisis justa possibility claim:whatreason
do we haveforasserting, positively,thatourmindsareclosedwithrespect
to P?
Longstanding historical failureis suggestive, but scarcelyconclusive.
Maybe,it willbe said,thesolutionis justaroundthecorner,or it has to
waitupon the completion of the physicalsciences?Perhapswe simply
have yet to producethe Einstein-like geniuswho will restructure the
problemin somecleverwayand thenpresentan astonished worldwith
the solution?9However,I thinkthat our deep bafflement about the
problem,amounting to a vertiginous sense of ultimatemystery, which
resistsevenarticulate formulation, shouldat leastencourage us to explore
the idea thatthereis something terminal about our perplexity. Rather
as traditionaltheologians foundthemselves concedingcognitiveclosure
withrespectto certainof the properties of God, so we shouldlook
seriouslyat the idea thatthe mind-bodyproblembringsus bang up
againstthelimitsofourcapacityto understand theworld.That is whatI
shalldo now.
Thereseemto be twopossibleavenuesopento us in ouraspiration to
identifyP: we couldtryto gettoP byinvestigating consciousness directly,
or we couldlookto thestudyofthebrainforP. Let us considerthesein
turn,starting withconsciousness. Our acquaintancewithconsciousness
could hardlybe moredirect;phenomenological description thuscomes
easily.'Introspection'
(relatively) is thenameofthefaculty through which
we catchconsciousness in all its vividnakedness. By virtueof possessing
thiscognitivefaculty we ascribeconceptsofconsciousness to ourselves;
we
thushave'immediate access'to theproperties ofconsciousness. But does
theintrospective faculty revealproperty P? Can we telljustbyintrospect-
ingwhatthesolutionto themind-body problemis? Clearlynot.We have
directcognitive accessto one termofthemind-brain butwe do
relation,
not have such access to the natureof the link.Introspection does not
presentconsciousstatesas depending uponthebrainin someintelligible
way.We cannottherefore introspect P. Moreover, it seemsimpossible that
we shouldeveraugmentour stockof introspectively ascribedconcepts
withtheconceptP-that is, we couldnotacquirethisconceptsimplyon
thebasisofsustained and carefulintrospection. Purephenomenology will
neverprovidethe solutionto the mind-bodyproblem.Neitherdoes it
seemfeasibleto tryto extractP fromtheconceptsof consciousness we
now have by someprocedure of conceptualanalysis-anymorethanwe
could solvethelife-matter problemsimplyby reflecting on theconcept

9 Despitehis reputation forpessimism overthemind-bodyproblem,a carefulreadingof Nagel

revealsan optimisticstrainin histhought(bythestandardsofthepresent the
paper):see,in particular,
closingremarks of'Whatis it Like to be a Bat?',in MortalQuestions.
Nagelspeculates thatwe might
be able to devisean 'objectivephenomenology'thatmadeconsciousstatesmoreamenableto physical
analysis.Unlikeme,he doesnotregardtheproblemas inherently beyondus.

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 Can WeSolve theMind-BodyProblem?355
life.'0P has to lie outsidethe fieldof the introspectable, and it is not
implicitlycontainedin theconceptswe bringto bearin our first-person
ascriptions. Thus the facultyof introspection, as a concept-forming
capacity,is cognitivelyclosedwithrespectto P; whichis notsurprising in
viewofitshighly limiteddomainofoperation (mostproperties oftheworld
areclosedto introspection).
But thereis a further pointto be made aboutP and consciousness,
whichconcernsour restricted access to the conceptsof consciousness
themselves. It is a familiarpointthattherangeofconceptsof conscious-
ness attainableby a mind M is constrained by the specificformsof
consciousness possessedby M. Crudely,you cannotformconceptsof
consciousproperties unlessyouyourself instantiate thoseproperties. The
manbornblindcannotgrasptheconceptofa visualexperience ofred,and
humanbeingscannotconceiveof theecholocatory experiences of bats."
These are cases of cognitiveclosure withinthe class of conscious
properties.But nowthiskindofclosurewill,it seems,affect ourhopesof
accessto P. For supposethatwe werecognitively openwithrespectto P;
suppose,thatis, thatwe had thesolutionto theproblemof howspecific
formsof consciousnessdepend upon different kinds of physiological
structure.Then,of course,we wouldunderstand how thebrainof a bat
subserves thesubjective experiences ofbats.Call thistypeofexperience B,
and call theexplanatory property thatlinksB to the bat's brainPi. By
grasping Pi it wouldbe perfectly intelligibleto us how the bat's brain
generatesB-experiences; we would have an explanatory theoryof the
in
causalnexus question. We would be in possession of the samekindof
understanding we would have of our own experiences ifwe had thecorrect
psychophysical theory of them. But then it seems to follow that graspof
thetheory thatexplainsB-experiences wouldconfer a graspofthenature
of thoseexperiences: forhow could we understand thattheorywithout
the
understanding concept B that occurs in it? How couldwe graspthe
natureof B-experiences withoutgraspingthe character of thoseexperi-
ences?The truepsychophysical theory wouldseemto providea routeto a
graspof thesubjective formof thebat'sexperiences. But now we facea
dilemma, a dilemmawhichthreatens to becomea reductio: eitherwe can
graspthistheory, in whichcase theproperty B becomesopento us; or we
'0 This is perhapsthemostremarkably optimisticviewof all-the expectation thatreflectingon
theordinary conceptofpain(say)willrevealthemanner ofpain'sdependence on thebrain.If I am not
mistaken, thisis in effecttheviewofcommon-sense theythinkthatP consistsin causal
functionalists:
role,and thatthiscan be inferred fromtheconceptsofconsciousstates.This wouldmake
analytically
ittrulyamazingthatweshouldeverhavefelttheretobe a mind-body problem at all,sincethesolution
is alreadycontained in ourmentalconcepts.Whatoptimism!
" See Nagel,'Whatis itLike tobe a Bat?'Noticethatthefugitive ofsuchproperties
character with
respectto ourconceptshas nothing colourproperties,
likefugitive
to do withtheir'complexity'; such
experientialproperties are 'simple'.Note too thatsuch propertiesprovidecounter-examples to the
claimthat(somehow)rationality that,once possessed,can be extendedto encompassall
is a faculty
concepts, so thatifany conceptcan be possessedtheneveryconceptcan.

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356 ColinMcGinn
B is not open to us. It
simplybecauseproperty
cannotgraspthetheory,
seemsto me thattheloomingreductio hereis compelling: ourconceptsof
consciousnessjust are inherently constrainedby our own formof
consciousness, so thatanytheory theunderstanding ofwhichrequiredus
to transcendtheseconstraints would ipso facto be inaccessibleto us.
Similarly, I think,anytheory thatrequiredus to transcend thefiniteness
of our cognitivecapacitieswould ipsofacto be a theorywe could not
grasp-and this despitethe factthat it mightbe needed to explain
something we can see needsexplaining. We cannotsimplystipulate that
our concept-forming abilitiesare indefinitelyplasticand unlimitedjust
becausetheywouldhaveto be to enableus to graspthetruthaboutthe
world.We constitutionally lack the concept-forming capacityto encom-
pass all possibletypesofconsciousstate,and thisobstructs ourpathto a
generalsolutionto themind-body problem.Even ifwe couldsolveit for
ourowncase,we couldnotsolveit forbatsand Martians.P is,as it were,
toocloseto thedifferent formsofsubjectivity forit to be accessibleto all
suchforms, giventhatone'sformofsubjectivity restricts one'sconceptsof
subjectivity.12
I suspectthatmostoptimists aboutconstructively solvingthe mind-
body problemwill preferto place theirbets on the brainside of the
relation.Neuroscience is theplacetolookforproperty P, theywillsay.My
questionthenis whether thereis anyconceivable wayin whichwe might
cometo introduce P in thecourseof our empirical investigationsof the
brain.New conceptshavebeenintroduced in theeffort to understand the
workings of the brain,certainly: could not P thenoccurin conceivable
extensions of thismannerof introduction? So far,indeed,thetheoretical
conceptswe ascribeto thebrainseemas remotefromconsciousness as any
ordinary physical properties are,butperhapswe mightreachP bydiligent
application ofessentially thesameprocedures: so it is tempting to think.I
wantto suggest, to thecontrary, thatsuchprocedures areinherently closed
withrespectto P. The fundamental reasonforthis,I think, is theroleof
perceptionin shapingour understanding of the brain-thewaythatour
perception ofthebrainconstrains theconceptswe can applyto it.A point
whosesignificance it wouldbe hardto overstress hereis this:theproperty
ofconsciousness itself(or specificconsciousstates)is notan observable or

12 It might be suggested thatwe borrowNagel'sidea of'objectivephenomenology'in orderto get

aroundthisproblem.Insteadof representing experiences
undersubjectivedescriptions,we should
describethemin entirely objectiveterms,thusbringingthemwithinourconceptual ken.My problem
withthisis that,evenallowing thattherecouldbe sucha formofdescription,itwouldnotpermit us to
understand how the subjectiveaspectsof experience dependupon the brain-whichis reallythe
problemwe are trying to solve.In fact,I doubtthatthenotionof objectivephenomenology is any
more coherentthan the notionof subjectivephysiology. Both involvetryingto bridgethe
psychophysicalgap bya sortofstipulation. The lessonhereis thatthegap cannotbe bridgedjustby
applyingconceptsdrawnfromone side to itemsthatbelongon theotherside; and thisis because
neithersortofconceptcouldeverdo whatis needed.

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 Can WeSolve theMind-BodyProblem?357

perceptible property of the brain.You can stareintoa livingconscious

brain,yourown or someoneelse's, and see therea wide varietyof
unstantiated properties-its shape,colour,texture, etc.-but youwillnot
thereby see what the subject is experiencing, the consciousstateitself.
Conscious states are simply not potential objects of perception:they
dependuponthebrainbuttheycannotbe observed bydirecting thesenses
ontothebrain.In otherwords,consciousness is noumenalwithrespectto
perception ofthebrain.'3I takeit thisis obvious.So we knowthereare
properties of the brainthatare necessarily closedto perception of the
brain;thequestionnowis whether P is likewise closedto perception.
My argument willproceedas follows. I shallfirstarguethatP is indeed
perceptually closed;thenI shallcompletetheargument to fullcognitive
closureby insisting thatno formof inference fromwhatis perceivedcan
leadus to P. The argument forperceptual closurestartsfromthethought
thatnothing we can imagineperceiving in thebrainwouldeverconvince
us thatwe have locatedthe intelligible nexuswe seek.No matterwhat
recondite property we couldsee to be instantiated in thebrainwe would
alwaysbe baffled abouthowit couldgiveriseto consciousness. I hereby
inviteyou to tryto conceiveof a perceptible property of the brainthat
mightallaythefeelingof mystery thatattendsour contemplation of the
brain-mind link:I do notthinkyouwillbe abletodo it.It is liketrying to
conceiveof a perceptiblepropertyof a rock that would renderit
perspicuous thatthe rockwas conscious.In fact,I thinkit is the very
impossibility of thisthatlies at therootof thefeltmind-bodyproblem.
But whyis this?Basically,I think,it is becausethesensesare gearedto
representing a spatialworld;theyessentially presentthingsin spacewith
spatiallydefinedproperties. But it is precisely such properties thatseem
inherently incapableofresolving themind-body problem:we cannotlink
consciousness to the brainin virtueof spatialproperties of the brain.
Therethebrainis, an objectof perception, laid out in space,containing
spatiallydistributed processes;but consciousness defiesexplanationin
suchterms.Consciousness does notseemmadeup out of smallerspatial
processes;yet perception of the brainseemslimitedto revealingsuch
processes.'4 The senses are responsive to certain kinds of
properties-those thatare essentially bound up withspace- but these
13 We shoulddistinguishtwoclaimsabouttheimperceptibility of consciousness:(i) consciousness
by directing
is not perceivable the sensesonto the brain;(ii) consciousness is not perceivable by
directingthesensesanywhere, eventowardsthebehaviour that'expresses'consciousstates.I believe
boththeses,butmypresent pointrequiresonly(i). I am assuming, ofcourse,thatperception cannotbe
theory-laden;
unrestrictedly or thatif it can, the infusions of theorycannothave been originally
derivedsimplybylookingat thingsor tasting themor touching themor ...
14 Nageldiscusses ofthinking
thedifficulty ofconsciousprocesses in thespatialtermsthatapplyto
thebrainin The ViewFromNowhere, pp. 50-I, buthe doesnotdrawmydespairing The
conclusion.
unlike(say)thedependence
caseis exactly ofliquidityon theproperties ofmolecules, sinceherewe do
thinkofbothtermsoftherelation as spatialin character;so we can simplyemploytheidea ofspatial
composition.

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358 ColinMcGinn
properties areofthewrongsort(thewrongcategory) P. Kant
to constitute
was right,theformofoutersensibility is spatial;butifso, thenP willbe
noumenalwithrespectto the senses,sinceno spatialproperty willever
delivera satisfying answerto themind-bodyproblem.We simplydo not
understand the idea thatconsciousstatesmightintelligibly arise from
spatialconfigurations ofthekinddisclosedbyperception oftheworld.
I takeit thisclaimwillnotseemterribly controversial.Afterall,we do
notgenerally expectthateveryproperty referred to in ourtheories should
be a potential objectof humanperception: considerquantumtheoryand
cosmology. Unrestricted perceptual opennessis a dogmaof empiricism if
evertherewasone.Andthereis no compelling reasonto supposethatthe
property neededto explainthemind-brain relationshouldbe in principle
perceptible; it mightbe essentially 'theoretical',an objectof thought not
sensory experience. Lookingharderat natureis nottheonly(or thebest)
way of discoveringits theoretically significant properties.Perceptual
closuredoes not entailcognitiveclosure,since we have availablethe
procedureof hypothesis formation, in whichunobservables come to be
conceptualized.
I readilyagreewiththesesentiments, but I thinkthereare reasonsfor
believing thatno coherent methodof conceptintroduction willeverlead
us to P. This is becausea certainprinciple ofhomogeneity operatesin our
introduction of theoreticalconceptson the basis of observation. Let me
firstnotethatconsciousness itselfcouldnotbe introduced simplyon the
basisof whatwe observeaboutthebrainand its physicaleffects. If our
data,arrivedat by perception of thebrain,do notincludeanything that
bringsin consciousstates,thenthe theoretical properties we need to
explainthesedatawillnotincludeconsciousstateseither.Inference to the
best explanation of purelyphysicaldata will nevertakeus outsidethe
realmofthephysical, forcingus to introduce conceptsofconsciousness.'5
Everything physicalhas a purelyphysicalexplanation. So theproperty of
consciousness is cognitivelyclosed withrespectto the introduction of
conceptsby meansofinference to thebestexplanation ofperceptual data
aboutthebrain.
Now thequestionis whether P couldeverbe arrivedat bythiskindof
inference. Here we mustbe carefulto guardagainsta formof magical
emergentism withrespectto conceptformation. Suppose we tryout a
relativelycleartheory ofhowtheoretical conceptsareformed: we getthem
by a sortof analogicalextension of whatwe observe.Thus, forexample,
we arriveat the conceptof a moleculeby takingour perceptual
representations of macroscopicobjectsand conceivingof smallerscale
objectsofthesamegeneralkind.This methodseemsto workwellenough

15 Cf.Nagel:'it willneverbe legitimate

to infer,
as a theoretical
explanation ofphysical
phenomena
alone,a property thatincludesor impliesthe consciousness of its subject','Panpsychism',
p. I83.

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 Can WeSolve'theMind-BodyProblem?359
forunobservable material objects,butitwillnothelpinarriving atP, since
analogicalextensionsoftheentities we observein thebrainareprecisely as
hopelessas the originalentitieswere as solutionsto the mind-body
problem.We wouldneed a methodthatleftthe base of observational
properties behindin a muchmoreradicalway.But it seemsto me that
evena moreunconstrained conception ofinference to thebestexplanation
wouldstillnotdo whatis required:it wouldno moreserveto introduce P
thanit servesto introduce theproperty ofconsciousness itself.To explain
theobserved physicaldatawe needonlysuchtheoretical properties as bear
uponthosedata,nottheproperty thatexplainsconsciousness, whichdoes
notoccurin thedata.Sincewe do notneedconsciousness to explainthose
data,we do not need the property thatexplainsconsciousness. We will
nevergetas farawayfromtheperceptual datain ourexplanations ofthose
data as we need to get in order to connectup explanatorily with
consciousness. This is, indeed, why it seems that consciousnessis
theoretically
epiphenomenal in thetaskof accounting forphysicalevents.
No conceptneededto explainthe workings of the physicalworldwill
sufficetoexplainhowthephysical worldproducesconsciousness. So ifP is
perceptuallynoumenal, thenit willbe noumenalwithrespectto percep-
tion-basedexplanatory inferences. Accordingly, I do not thinkthatP
couldbe arrivedat by empirical studiesof thebrainalone.Nevertheless,
thebrainhasthisproperty, as it has theproperty ofconsciousness. Onlya
magicalidea ofhowwe comebyconceptscouldlead one to thinkthatwe
canreachP byfirst perceiving thebrainandthenaskingwhatis neededto
explainwhatwe perceive.'6(The mind-body problemtemptsus to magic
in morewaysthanone.)
It willhelpelucidatethepositionI am driving towardsif I contrast it
withanother viewofthesourceof the perplexitywe feelabout themind-
brainnexus.I havearguedthatwe cannotknowwhichproperty of the
brainaccountsforconsciousness, and so we find the mind-brain link
But,it maybe said,thereis another
unintelligible. account of our sense of
irremediable mystery, which does not requirepositingproperties our
mindscannotrepresent. This alternative viewclaimsthat,evenifwe now
had a graspof P, we wouldstill feelthatthereis something mysterious
aboutthelink,becauseofa specialepistemological featureofthesituation.
Namelythis:our acquaintance withthebrainand our acquaintance with
consciousness are necessarily mediatedby distinctcognitivefaculties,
namelyperception and introspection. Thus thefaculty through whichwe
factthatthemicroprocesses
a striking
16 It is surely thathavebeendiscoveredin thebrainby the
usualmethodsseemno nearerto consciousness of thebrainopento casual
thanthegrossproperties
inspection. Neitherdo moreabstract'holistic'features seemto be on therightlinesto
ofbrainfunction
tellus thenatureofconsciousness.The deeperscienceprobesintothebrainthemoreremoteit seems
to getfromconsciousness. Greaterknowledge ofthebrainthusdestroysourillusionsaboutthekinds
of properties thatmightbe discoveredby travelling alongthispath.Advancedneurophysiological
theory seemsonlyto deepenthemiracle.

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360 ColinMcGinn
apprehend one termoftherelation is necessarily distinct fromthefaculty
through whichwe apprehend theother.In consequence, it is notpossible
for us to use one of these facultiesto apprehendthe natureof the
psychophysical nexus.No singlefaculty willenableus everto apprehend
thefactthatconsciousness dependsuponthebrainin virtueofproperty P.
Neitherperception alone nor introspection alone will everenableus to
witness thedependence. Andthis,myobjector insists, is therealreasonwe
findthe link baffling: we cannotmake sense of it in termsof the
deliverances ofa singlecognitive faculty. So, evenifwe nowhad concepts
fortheproperties of thebrainthatexplainconsciousness, we wouldstill
feela residualsenseof unintelligibility; we wouldstilltakethereto be
something mysterious goingon. The necessity to shiftfromone faculty to
the otherproducesin us an illusionof inexplicability. We mightin fact
havetheexplanation rightnowbutbe undertheillusionthatwe do not.
The rightdiagnosis, then,is thatwe shouldrecognize thepeculiarity ofthe
epistemological situationand stop tryingto makesense of the psycho-
physicalnexusin thewaywe makesenseof othersortsofnexus.It only
seems tous thatwe canneverdiscover a property thatwillrenderthenexus
intelligible.
I thinkthislineof thought deservesto be takenseriously, but I doubt
thatit correctly diagnosesour predicament. It is trueenoughthatthe
problematic nexusis essentially apprehended by distinct faculties, so that
it willneverrevealits secretsto a singlefaculty; but I doubtthatour
intuitive senseofintelligibilityis so rigidlygoverned bythe'single-faculty
condition'. Whyshouldfactsonlyseemintelligible to us ifwe can conceive
of apprehending themby one (sortof) cognitive faculty? Whynotallow
that we can recognizeintelligible connectionsbetweenconcepts(or
properties)even when those concepts(or properties)are necessarily
ascribedusingdifferent faculties? Is it notsuspiciously empiricist to insist
thata causalnexuscan onlybe madesenseofby us ifwe can conceiveof
itsbeingan objectofa singlefaculty ofapprehension? Wouldwe thinkthis
ofa nexusthatcalledfortouchand sightto apprehend each termof the
relation? Suppose(perimpossibile) thatwe wereoffered P on a plate,as a
giftfromGod: wouldwe stillshakeourheadsand wonderhowthatcould
resolvethe mystery, beingstill the victimsof the illusionof mystery
generatedby the epistemological dualityin question?No, I thinkthis
suggestion is notenoughto accountforthemiraculous appearanceofthe
link:it is betterto supposethatwe arepermanently blockedfromforming
a conceptofwhataccountsforthatlink.
How strongis thethesisI am urging? Let me distinguish absolute from
relativeclaimsof cognitive closure.A problemis absolutely cognitively
closedifno possiblemindcouldresolveit;a problemis relatively closedif
mindsof somesortscan in principlesolveit whilemindsof othersorts
cannot.Most problemswe maysafelysuppose,are onlyrelatively closed:

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 Can WeSolve theMind-BodyProblem?36I
armadillominds cannotsolve problemsof elementary arithmetic but
humanmindscan. Shouldwe say thatthe mind-bodyproblemis only
relatively
closedor is theclosureabsolute? This dependson whatwe allow
as a possibleconcept-forming mind,whichis notan easyquestion.If we
allowformindsthatformtheirconceptsofthebrainand consciousness in
waysthatare quite independent of perception and introspection, then
theremaybe roomfortheideathattherearepossiblemindsforwhichthe
mind-bodyproblemis soluble,and easilyso. But if we supposethatall
conceptformation is tiedto perception and introspection, however loosely,
thenno mindwillbe capableof understanding howit relatesto its own
body-the insolubility willbe absolute.I thinkwe can just aboutmake
senseoftheformer kindofmind,byexploiting ourownfaculty ofa priori
reasoning.Our mathematical concepts(say) do not seem tied eitherto
perception or to introspection, so theredoesseemto be a modeofconcept
formation thatoperateswithoutthe constraints I identified earlier.The
suggestion mightthenbe thata mindthatformed all ofitsconceptsin this
way-includingits conceptsof the brainand consciousness-would be
freeofthebiasesthatprevent us fromcomingup withtherighttheory of
howthetwoconnect.Such a mindwouldhaveto be able to thinkofthe
brainand consciousness in waysthatutterly prescindfromtheperceptual
andtheintrospective-in somewhat thewaywe now(itseems)thinkabout
numbers. This mindwouldconceiveofthepsychophysical linkin totallya
prioriterms.Perhapsthisis how we shouldthinkof God's mind,and
God's understanding of themind-bodyrelation.At anyrate,something
prettyradicalis goingto be neededif we are to devisea mindthatcan
escapethekindsof closurethatmaketheprobleminsolubleforus-if I
am rightin mydiagnosis ofourdifficulty. If theproblemis onlyrelatively
insoluble,thenthe typeof mindthatcan solve it is goingto be very
differentfromoursand thekindsof mindwe can readilymakesenseof
(theremay,ofcourse,be cognitive closureheretoo).It certainly seemsto
me to be at leastan open questionwhetherthe problemis absolutely
I wouldnotbe surprised
-insoluble; ifit were.17
My positionis bothpessimistic and optimistic at thesametime.It is
pessimistic aboutthe prospectsforarriving at a constructive solutionto
themind-body problem, butit is optimistic aboutourhopesofremoving
thephilosophical perplexity. The centralpointhereis thatI do notthink
we needto do theformer in orderto achievethelatter.This dependson a
ratherspecialunderstanding ofwhatthephilosophical problemconsistsin.
WhatI wantto suggestis thatthenatureofthepsychophysical connection
hasa fullandnon-mysterious explanation in a certainscience,butthatthis
17 The kindoflimitationI haveidentifiedis therefore
notthekindthatcouldbe remedied simply
by a largeincreasein generalintelligence.
No matterhow largethe frontallobes of our biological
descendantsmaybecome,theywillstillbe stumpedbythemind-body problem,
so longas theyform
their(empirical)
conceptson thebasisofperception and introspection.

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362 Colin McGinn

scienceis inaccessible to us as a matterofprinciple. Call thisexplanatory

scientific
theory T: T is as naturalandprosaicanddevoidofmiracleas any
theory ofnature;it describes thelinkbetweenconsciousness and thebrain
in a waythatis no moreremarkable (or alarming)thanthewaywe now
describethelinkbetweentheliverand bile.'8 According to T, thereis
nothingeeriegoingon in the worldwhenan eventin myvisualcortex
causesme to havean experience ofyellow-however muchit seemsto us
that there is. In other words,there is no intrinsicconceptualor
metaphysical difficulty abouthowconsciousness dependson thebrain.It
is notthatthecorrect scienceis compelled to postulatemiracles de re;it is
ratherthatthecorrect scienceliesin thedarkpartoftheworldforus. We
confuseourowncognitive limitationswithobjective eeriness.We arelikea
Humeanmind tryingto understand the physicalworld,or a creature
withoutspatialconceptstryingto understand the possibilityof motion.
This removesthe philosophical problembecauseit assuresus thatthe
entitiesthemselvespose no inherent philosophical The case is
difficulty.
unlike,forexample,the problemof how theabstractworldof numbers
mightbe intelligibly relatedto the worldof concreteknowingsubjects:
herethemystery seemsintrinsic to theentities,nota mereartefact ofour
cognitive limitations or biasesin tryingto understand the relation.19 It
would not be plausibleto suggestthat thereexistsa science,whose
theoreticalconceptswe cannotgrasp,whichcompletely resolvesanysense
ofmystery thatsurrounds thequestionhowtheabstract becomesan object
ofknowledge forus. In thiscase,then,eliminativism seemsa liveoption.
The philosophicalproblemaboutconsciousness and thebrainarisesfroma
sensethatwe are compelledto acceptthatnaturecontainsmiracles-asif
themerely metalliclampofthebraincouldreallyspiritintoexistence the
Djin of consciousness. But we do not need to acceptthis:we can rest
securein the knowledge thatsome (unknowable) property of the brain
makeseverything fallintoplace. Whatcreatesthe philosophical puzzle-
mentis theassumption thattheproblemmustsomehowbe scientific but
18
Or again,no moremiraculous thanthetheoryof evolution. Creationism is an understandable
responseto thetheoretical problemposedbytheexistence ofcomplexorganisms; we now
fortunately,
havea theorythatrendersthisresponseunnecessary, and so undermines thetheismrequiredby the
creationist theappearanceof miraclemightalso temptus in a
thesis.In the case of consciousness,
direction,
'creationist' withGod requiredto perform thealchemynecessary to transform matterinto
experience. Thus themind-body problemmightsimilarly be used to provetheexistence ofGod (no
miraclewithouta miracle-maker). We cannot,I think,refutethisargument in thewaywe can the
originalcreationistargument, namelybyactuallyproducing a non-miraculous explanatory theory,but
we can refuteit by arguingthatsucha naturalistic theorymustexist.(It is a condition of adequacy
uponanyaccountof themind-body relationthatit avoidassuming theism.)
19 See Paul Benacerraf, 'Mathematical Truth',JournalofPhilosophy, I973, fora statement of this
problemaboutabstractentities.Anotherproblemthatseemsto me to differ fromthe mind-body
problemis theproblemoffreewill.I do notbelievethatthereis someunknowable property
Q which
reconcilesfreewill withdeterminism (or indeterminism); rather,the conceptof freewill contains
internalincoherencies-asthe conceptof consciousness does not. This is whyit is much more
reasonable aboutfreewillthanaboutconsciousness.
to be an eliminativist

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 Can WeSolve theMind-BodyProblem?363
thatany sciencewe can come up withwill represent thingsas utterly
miraculous.And the solutionis to recognizethatthe sense of miracle
comes fromus and not fromthe world.There is, in reality,nothing
mysteriousabout how the braingeneratesconsciousness. There is no
metaphysical
problem.20
So farthatdeflationary claimhas beenjustified bya generalnaturalism
and certainconsiderations aboutcognitive closureand theillusionsit can
give rise to. Now I wantto marshallsome reasonsforthinking that
consciousness is actuallya rathersimplenaturalfact;objectively, con-
sciousnessis nothing veryspecial.We shouldnowbe comfortable withthe
idea that our own sense of difficulty is a fallibleguide to objective
complexity: whatis hardforus to graspmaynotbe veryfancyin itself.
The grainofourthinking is nota mirror heldup to thefactsofnature.21
In particular,it maybe thattheextentofourunderstanding offactsabout
the mind is not commensurate withsome objectiveestimateof their
intrinsic
complexity: we maybe goodat understanding themindin some
ofitsaspectsbuthopelesswithrespectto others, in a waythatcutsacross
objectivedifferences in whatthe aspectsinvolve.Thus we are adeptat
understanding actionin termsofthefolkpsychology of beliefand desire,
and we seem not entirely out of our depthwhenit comesto devising
theoriesoflanguage. Butourunderstanding ofhowconsciousness develops
fromthe organization of matteris non-existent. But now,thinkof these
variousaspectsof mindfromthepointof viewof evolutionary biology.
Surelylanguageand the propositional attitudesare morecomplexand
advancedevolutionary achievements thanthemerepossession ofconscious-
ness by a physicalorganism.Thus it seems that we are betterat
understanding someofthemorecomplexaspectsofmindthanthesimpler
ones.Consciousness arisesearlyin evolutionary historyand is foundright
acrosstheanimalkingdom. In somerespectsit seemsthatthebiological
engineering requiredforconsciousness is less fancythanthatneededfor
certainkindsofcomplexmotorbehaviour. Yet we can cometo understand
thelatterwhiledrawing a totalblankwithrespectto theformer. Conscious
statesseem biologically quite primitive, comparatively speaking.So the
20
A testof whethera proposedsolutionto the mind-bodyproblemis adequateis whetherit
relievesthepressure towardseliminativism. If thedatacan onlybe explainedbypostulatinga miracle
(i.e. notexplained),
thenwe mustrepudiate thedata-thisis theprinciplebehindtheimpulseto deny
thatconsciousstatesexist.My proposalpassesthistestbecauseit allowsus to resistthepostulationof
miracles;it interpretstheeerinessas merelyepistemic, thoughdeeplyso. Constructive solutionsare
nottheonlywayto relievethepressure.
21 Chomsky suggeststhattheveryfaculties ofmindthatmakeus goodat somecognitive tasksmay
makeus poorat others;see Reflections on Language,PP. I55-6. It seemsto me possiblethatwhat
makesus goodat thescienceof thepurelyphysicalworldis whatskewsus awayfromdeveloping a
scienceof consciousness. Our facultiesbias us towardsunderstanding matterin motion,but it is
precisely thiskindofunderstanding thatis inapplicable
to themind-body problem. Perhaps,then,the
priceof beinggood at understanding matteris thatwe cannotunderstand mind.Certainlyour
notorious tendencyto thinkofeverythingin spatialtermsdoesnothelpus in understanding themind.

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364 ColinMcGinn

theoryT thatexplainstheoccurrence ofconsciousness in a physicalworld

is veryprobably lessobjectivelycomplex(by somestandard) thana range
ofothertheories thatdo notdefyourintellects. If onlywe couldknowthe
psychophysical mechanism itmightsurprise us withitssimplicity, itsutter
naturalness. In themanualthatGod consultedwhenhe madetheearth
and all the beaststhatdwellthereonthechapterabouthow to engineer
consciousness frommatteroccursfairlyearlyon, well beforethe really
difficultlaterchapterson mammalian reproduction and speech.It is not
thesize oftheproblembutitstypethatmakesthemind-body problemso
hardforus. This reflection shouldmakeus receptive to theidea thatit is
something aboutthetracksofourthought thatprevents us fromachieving
a sciencethatrelatesconsciousness to its physicalbasis: the enemylies
withinthegates.22
The positionI havereachedhas implications fora tangleofintuitions it
is naturalto haveregarding the mind-bodyrelation.On the one hand,
thereare intuitions, pressedfromDescartesto Kripke,to theeffect that
the relationbetweenconsciousstatesand bodilystatesis fundamentally
contingent. It can easilyseem to us that thereis no necessitation
involvedin the dependence of themindon the brain.But,on theother
hand,it looksabsurdto tryto dissociate thetwoentirely, to letthemind
floatcompletely freeof thebody.Disembodiment is a dubiouspossibility
at best,and somekindof necessary supervenience of thementalon the
physicalhas seemedundeniableto many.It is not my aim here to
adjudicatethislongstanding dispute;I wantsimplyto offer a diagnosisof
whatis goingon when one findsoneselfassailedwiththis flurry of
conflicting intuitions.The reasonwe feelthetugof contingency, pulling
consciousness loosefromitsphysical moorings, maybe thatwe do notand
cannotgraspthenatureof theproperty thatintelligibly linksthem.The
brain has physicalpropertieswe can grasp,and variationsin these
correlate withchangesin consciousness, butwe cannotdrawtheveilthat
concealsthemannerof theirconnection. Not grasping thenatureof the
connection, it strikesus as deeplycontingent; we cannotmake the
assertionof a necessaryconnection intelligibleto ourselves.There may
thenbe a realnecessary connection;it is justthatit willalwaysstrikeus as
curiously bruteand unperspicuous. We maythus,as upholders ofintrinsic
contingency, be thedupesof our own cognitive blindness.On the other
hand,we are scarcelyin a positionto assertthatthereis a necessary
22
I getthisphrasefromFodor,The Modularity ofMind,p. 12I. The intendedcontrastis with
kindsofcognitive closurethatstemfromexogenous Our problemwith
factors-as,say,in astronomy.
P is notthatit is toodistantor toosmallor toolargeor toocomplex;rather, ofour
theverystructure
concept-forming apparatuspointsus awayfromP.
23 Saul Kripke,Namingand Necessity, Oxford,Blackwell,I980. Of course,Descartesexplicitly
arguedfrom(whathe tooktobe) theessential naturesofthebodyandmindto thecontingency oftheir
connection.If we abandontheassumption thatwe knowthesenatures,thenagnosticism aboutthe
modality oftheconnection seemstheindicated conclusion.

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 Can WeSolvetheMind-BodyProblem?365
connection betweentheproperties ofthebrainwe can graspand statesof
consciousness, sincewe are so ignorant (and irremediably so) aboutthe
character of the connection. For all we know,the connection may be
contingent, as accessto P wouldrevealifwe couldhavesuchaccess.The
linkbetweenconsciousness and property P is not,to be sure,contin-
gent-virtually by definition-but we are notin a positionto sayexactly
how P is relatedto the 'ordinary'properties of the brain.It may be
necessary or it maybe contingent. Thus it is thatwe tendto vacillate
between contingency andnecessity; forwe lacktheconceptual resources to
decidethequestion-orto understand theanswerwe areinclinedto give.
The indicatedconclusionappearsto be thatwe can neverreallyknow
whether disembodiment is metaphysically possible,or whether necessary
supervenience is thecase,or whether spectrum inversioncouldoccur.For
theseall involveclaimsaboutthemodalconnections betweenproperties of
consciousness and theordinary properties of thebodyand brainthatwe
canconceptualize; andtherealnatureoftheseconnections is notaccessible
to us. PerhapsP makesthe relationbetweenC-fibrefiringand pain
necessary or perhapsit doesnot:we aresimplynotequippedto know.We
arelikea Humeanmindwondering whether theobserved linkbetween the
temperature ofa gasand itspressure (at a constantvolume)is necessary or
contingent. To knowthe answerto thatyou need to graspatomic(or
molecular)theory, and a Humeanmindjust is not up to attaining the
requisitetheoretical understanding. Similarly,we are constitutionally
ignorant at preciselythespotwheretheanswerexists.
I predictthatmanyreadersofthispaperwillfinditsmainthesisutterly
incredible, even ludicrous.Let me remarkthatI sympathize withsuch
readers:thethesisis noteasilydigestible. But I wouldsaythis:ifthethesis
is actuallytrue,it willstillstrikeus as hardto believe.For theidea ofan
explanatory property (or set of properties) thatis noumenalforus, yetis
essentialforthe (constructive) solutionof a problemwe face,offends a
kindof naturalidealismthattendsto dominateour thinking. We findit
taxingto conceiveoftheexistence ofa realproperty, underournosesas it
were,whichwe are builtnotto grasp-a property thatis responsible for
phenomena thatwe observein themostdirectwaypossible.This kindof
realism,whichbringscognitive closureso closeto home,is apt to seem
bothan affront to ourintellects and impossible to getourmindsaround.
We tryto thinkofthisunthinkable property andunderstandably failin the
effort;so we rushto inferthattheverysupposition ofsucha property is
nonsensical. RealismofthekindI am presupposing thusseemsdifficult to
holdin focus,and anyphilosophical theory thatdependsuponit willalso
seemto reston something systematically elusive.24My responseto such
24 This is thekindofrealismdefendedbyNagelin ch.VI of The ViewFromNowhere:to be is not
byus. I wouldsaythatthemind-body
to be conceivable problemprovides thatthere
a demonstration
properties-notmerelythattherecouldbe. I would also say that
are such concept-transcending

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366 ColinMcGinn
misgivings,however, is unconcessive:
thelimitsofourmindsare justnot
thelimitsofreality. It is deplorably
anthropocentric
to insistthatreality
be
constrainedbywhatthehumanmindcan conceive.We needto cultivate a
visionof reality(a metaphysics) thatmakesit trulyindependent of our
givencognitivepowers,a conceptionthatincludesthesepowersas a
properpart.It is justthat,in thecaseofthemind-body problem, thebitof
realitythatsystematically eludesour cognitive
graspis an aspectof our
ownnature.Indeed,it is an aspectthatmakesit possibleforus to have
mindsat all and to thinkabouthowtheyare relatedto our bodies.This
particulartranscendent tractof realityhappensto lie withinour own
heads. A deep fact about our own natureas a formof embodied
consciousnessis thusnecessarily hiddenfromus. Yet thereis nothing
inherentlyeerieor bizarreabout thisembodiment. We are muchmore
straightforward than we seem. Our weirdnesslies in the eye of the
beholder.
The answerto the questionthatformsmy titleis therefore 'No and
Yes'.25

OxfordUniversity COLIN MCGINN

realismofthiskindshouldbe acceptedprecisely becauseithelpssolvethemind-body problem;itis a
metaphysicalthesisthatpullsitsweightin copingwitha problemthatlookshopelessotherwise.
There
is thusnothing'epiphenomenal' aboutsuchradicalrealism:theexistenceofa reality
we cannotknow
can yethaveintellectualsignificance
forus.
25 Discussionswiththefollowing peoplehavehelpedme workout theideasof thispaper:Anita
Avramides, JerryKatz,ErnieLepore,MichaelLevin,ThomasNagel,GalenStrawson, PeterUnger.
My largedebttoNagel'sworkshouldbe obviousthroughout thepaper:I wouldnothavetriedtoface
themind-bodyproblemdownhad he notfirstfacedup to it.

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