LOURDES R. BUSIÑOS vs. ATTY.

FRANCISCO RICAFORT
A.C. No. 4349 December 22, 1997

FACTS: Respondent Atty. Francisco Ricafort stands charged with having misappropriated the sum of
P30K intended for his clients as well as having deceived his clients into giving him the sum of P2K
purportedly to be deposited as a bond in the case he was handling.
 Complainant Businos is one the defendants in Civil Case involving the properties of the late Pedro
Rodrigo, father of complainant. Respondent was the counsel for the defendants.
 Complainant, representing her co-heirs, executed a special power of attorney, appointing and
constituting respondent and/or Pedro Rodrigo, Jr. to be her true and lawful attorney

The RTC ordered all deposits of rentals made in connection with this case to the defendants through Lourdes
Rodrigo Businos who were receiving the rentals from Oas prior to the institution of this case."
 The said sum was entrusted to respondent with an obligation on his part to deposit the same in the
account of complainant's husband at PNB.
 Instead of depositing the money, respondent converted the money to his own personal use, and despite
several demands, he failed to return the same to complainant. She was thus constrained to file a criminal
case for estafa and an administrative case for disbarment against him.

Complainant, upon questioning by the undersigned, testified that:

 She authorized respondent to withdraw the money representing the rental fee paid of Oas with the
instruction to deposit the same in her savings account at the PNB.
 After she was informed by the court that respondent had already withdrawn the money, she expected in
vain to receive the money a week later as respondent failed to effect the deposit.
 She demanded from him to give her the money, but he informed her that he had already spent the same.
He promised, though, to pay her the said amount. Despite several demands, respondent failed to make
good his promise to give her the money he withdrew.
 She was then constrained to file a criminal case for estafa and an administrative case against respondent
to recover the money in question.
 On third hearing of the estafa case, respondent paid complainant inside the courtroom. Because of this,
she no longer pursued the estafa case, but she has no intention of withdrawing the instant complaint.

RULING: While the findings are in order, the penalty recommended is not commensurate to the infractions.
Plainly, respondent breached Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules
16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read:
 Sec. 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. — When an attorney unjustly retains in
his hands money of his client after it has been demanded he may be punished for contempt as an officer
of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall
not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
 CANON 16 — A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
o Rule 16.01. — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
o Rule 16.02. — A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own
and those of others kept by him.
 o Rule 16.03. — A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his unlawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his
client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured
for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Respondent's transgressions manifested dishonesty and amounted to grave misconduct and grossly
unethical behavior which caused dishonor, not merely to respondent, but to the noble profession to
which he belongs, for it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably
diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.

This Court has been nothing short of exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character from
members of the Bar, this Court declared:
 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and
confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation
of his duty to his client, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high
standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can
do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity
which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity
of the profession.

Here, respondent chose to forget that by swearing the lawyer's oath, he became a guardian of truth and the
rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice — a vital
function of democracy a failure of which is disastrous to society.

Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall
not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority. This is specially so, as here, where respondent
even deliberately defied the lawful orders of the Court for him to file his comment on the complaint, thereby
transgressing Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires a lawyer to observe and
maintain the respect due the courts.

WHEREFORE, for dishonesty, grave misconduct, grossly unethical behavior in palpable disregard of
Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, aggravated by a violation of Canon 11 thereof, and
consistent with the urgent need to maintain the esteemed traditions and high standards of the legal profession
and to preserve undiminished public faith in the members of the Philippine Bar, the Court Resolves to
DISBAR respondent ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT from the practice of law. His name is hereby
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
 ANGEL L. BAUTISTA vs. ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES
A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990

FACTS: In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged
with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath.
 Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, the Fortunados for a contingent fee 50% of the
value of the property in litigation.
 Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados, which properties are the subject of
the litigation, while the case was still pending;
 Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him for the
development into a residential subdivision of the land involved claiming that he acquired (50%)
interest thereof as attorney's fees from the Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said property
was already sold at a public auction;
 Submitting to the Court of First Instance falsified documents purporting to be true copies of
"Addendum to the Land Development Agreement " and submitting the same document to the Fiscal's
Office, in connection with the complaint for estafa filed by respondent against complainant designated;
 Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who was his client;
 Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without legal basis
 misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office by making false assertion in his pleadings;

Respondent filed an answer denying the accusations against him.

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. The Solicitor General submitted his report with the recommendation that Atty. Ramon A.
Gonzales be suspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General found that respondent committed the
following acts of misconduct:
 transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the pendency of the case where
the properties were involved;
 concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their land development agreement had
already been sold at a public auction prior to the execution of said agreement; and
 misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document where two signatories who had
not signed the original (or even the xerox copy) were made to appear as having fixed their signatures
[Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404].

Respondent then filed a motion to refer the case to the IBP for investigation and disposition pursuant to
Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondent manifested that he intends to submit more evidence
before the IBP.
 The preliminary investigation conducted by the SolGen was limited to the determination of whether or
not there is sufficient ground to proceed with the case and that under Rule 139 the Solicitor General still
has to file an administrative complaint against him. Respondent claims that the case should be referred
to the IBP since Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that:
This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present Rule 139 entitled DISBARMENT
OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS. All cases pending investigation by the Office of the Solicitor
General shall be transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation
and disposition as provided in this Rule except those cases where the investigation has been substantially
completed.
RULING: The above contention of respondent is untenable.
Firstly, reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court.
 Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court may conduct disciplinary proceedings
without the intervention of the IBP by referring cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or
to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court.
 In such a case, the report and recommendation of the investigating official shall be reviewed
directly by the Supreme Court.
Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the effectivity of Rule 139-B [June
1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General had been substantially completed.
 Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that only pending cases, the investigation of which has not been
substantially completed by the Office of the Solicitor General, shall be transferred to the IBP. In
this case the investigation by the Solicitor General was terminated even before the effectivity of Rule
139-B.
Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor General already made a
thorough and comprehensive investigation of the case.
 To refer the case to the IBP, as prayed for by the respondent, will result not only in duplication of the
proceedings conducted by the Solicitor General.
Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant the referral of the case to
the IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General respondent was given
ample opportunity to present evidence, his failure to adduce additional evidence is entirely his own fault.
 There was therefore no denial of procedural due process. The record shows that respondent appeared as
witness for himself and presented 11 documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed to
cross-examine the complainant who appeared as a witness against him.

A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation because of his
fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well as with the client.
 Canon 17 states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him."
 Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that
may come into his possession."
 Notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision in the new Code, the Court, considering the above
quoted provisions of the new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well as the prevailing
jurisprudence, holds that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property in litigation constitutes a
breach of professional ethics for which a disciplinary action may be brought against him.

The Court finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part that:
We agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees.
 is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not
properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of
Professional Responsibility].
 Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject
to reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide
for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney
agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client's rights is champertous.
 Such agreements are against public policy especially where, the attorney has agreed to carry on the
action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute.
 ROSARIO JUNIO vs. ATTY. SALVADOR M. GRUPO
Adm. Case No. 5020 December 18, 2001

FACTS: Sometime in 1995, [she] engaged the services of [respondent], then a private practitioner, for the
redemption of a parcel of land registered in the name of her parents, spouses Nietes,
 [complainant] entrusted to [respondent] the amount of P25K in cash to be used in the redemption of the
aforesaid property. Respondent received the said amount as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt.
 Notwithstanding the foregoing and for no valid reason, respondent did not redeem the property;
as a result of which the right of redemption was lost and the property was eventually forfeited.
 Because of respondent's failure to redeem the property, complainant had demanded [the] return of the
money which she entrusted to the former for the above-stated purpose.
 Despite repeated demands made by the complainant and without justifiable cause, respondent has
continuously refused to refund the money entrusted to him.

In his Answer, petitioner admitted receiving the amount in question for the purpose for which it was given.
However, he alleged that —
 The subject land for which the money of complainant was initially intended to be applied could really
not be redeemed anymore. .;
 Complainant knew the mortgage agreement between her parents and the mortgage-owner had already
expired, and what respondent was trying to do was a sort of [a] desperate, last-ditch attempt to persuade
the said mortgagee to relent and give back the land to the mortgagors with the tender of redemption; but
at this point, the mortgagee simply would not budge anymore.
 When transaction failed, respondent requested that he be allowed to avail of the money because he
had an urgent need for some money himself to help defray his children's educational expenses. It was
really a personal request, a private matter between respondent and complainant, thus, respondent
executed a promissory note for the amount, a copy of which is probably still in the possession of the
complainant.
Respondent did not ask for any fee. His services were purely gratuitous; his acts [were] on his own and by
his own. It was more than pro bono; it was not even for charity; it was simply an act of a friend for a
friend. It was just lamentably unfortunate that his efforts failed.

RULING: The Court resolves to partially grant the petition.

A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interests are fully protected by the nature
of the case or by independent advice (Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility). This rule is intended
to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over the client.
 This rule is especially significant in the instant case where the respondent enjoys an immense ascendancy
over the complainant who, "as well as two of his sisters, had served respondent's family as household
helpers for many years."
 Having gained dominance over the complainant by virtue of such long relation of master and servant,
the respondent took advantage of his influence by not returning the money entrusted to him. Instead, he
imposed his will on the complainant and borrowed her funds without giving adequate security therefor
and mindless of the interest of the complainant
It would indeed appear from the records of the case that respondent was allowed to borrow the money
previously entrusted to him by complainant for the purpose of securing the redemption of the property
belonging to complainant's parents.
 Respondent, however, did not give adequate security for the loan and subsequently failed to settle his
obligation. Although complainant denied having loaned the money to respondent, the fact is that
complainant accepted the promissory note given her.
 In effect, complainant consented to and ratified respondent's use of the money. It is noteworthy that
complainant did not attach this promissory note to her complaint nor explain the circumstances
surrounding its execution.

Respondent's liability is thus not for misappropriation or embezzlement but for violation of Rule 16.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which forbids lawyers from borrowing money from their
clients unless the latter's interests are protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
 In this case, respondent's liability is compounded by the fact that not only did he not give any security
for the payment of the amount loaned to him but that he has also refused to pay the said amount.
 His claim that he could not pay the loan "because circumstances . . . did not allow it" and that, because
of the passage of time, "he somehow forgot about his obligation" only underscores his blatant disregard
of his obligation which reflects on his honesty and candor.
 A lawyer is bound to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his
client.

To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney
professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid,
promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the
case about which the consultation was had.
 If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in
his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney
voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be
regarded as established.
 HONORIO MANALANG and FLORENCIO CIRILLO vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO F. ANGELES
A.C. No. 1558 March 10, 2003

FACTS: Manalang and Cirillo alleged were the complainants in a case for overtime and separation pay
filed against their employer, the Philippine Racing Club Restaurant, before the NLRC.
 Respondent was their counsel. Judgment was rendered in their favor, in the amount of P6,5K. After the
decision became final, a writ of execution issued. However, without authority from his clients,
respondent compromised the award and was able to collect P5,5K only.
 Complainants made several demands upon respondent to turn over the amount collected minus the
agreed upon attorney's fees of 30%, but Atty. Angeles refused and offered to give them only the sum
of P2,650.
 Complainants then instituted the instant case, with the assistance of the then CLAO3 of the D of J.

In his answer, respondent stated that he offered to give complainants their money,
 but they insisted that he "deduct from this attorney's fees the amount of P2,000, representing the amount
discounted by the counsel of the PRCR, together with legal fees and other administrative expenses."
 Respondent claimed that to accept complainants' proposition meant that he "would not be
compensated for prosecuting and handling, the case."

The OSG conducted several hearings.

 The complainants' testimonies were received.
 Respondent appeared only at (3) hearings,
 the SolGen ordered respondent's testimony stricken from the record and the case deemed submitted for
resolution for his failure to appear despite due notice.

The case was transferred to the (IBP). Hearings were scheduled, but neither party appeared.
 The IBP then subpoenaed respondent but the notices were returned unserved with the indication that
respondent had changed address.
 The IBP issued an order stating that respondent had been given ample opportunities to present his
evidence and considered the case submitted for resolution on the basis of the existing evidence.
 IBP recommended that he be suspended for 2 years, and it was adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.

RULING: Where a member of the bar is charged with malpractice, the proceedings are not meant only to
rule on his culpability but also to determine if the lawyer concerned is possessed of that good moral
character, which is a condition precedent to the privilege of practicing law and continuing in the practice.

In the instant case, there is no dispute that complainants were awarded P6,5K by the NLRC for unpaid
overtime and separation pay. Of this amount, 30% or P1,950 was agreed to be paid as his attorney's fees.
 Complainants were to receive from respondent the net sum of P4,550 or P2,275 each.
 Alleging difficulties in collecting the full amount awarded, respondent compromised the award on
execution and collected only P5,500 from the losing party.
 This compromise was without authority from his clients. The authority to compromise cannot be
lightly presumed and must be supported by evidence. In the instant case, respondent failed to show
such authority.
Money claims due to workers cannot, as a rule, be the object of settlement or compromise effected by
counsel without the consent of the workers concerned.
 By compromising the judgment without the consent of his clients, respondent not only went against the
stream of judicial dicta, he also exhibited an uncaring lack of devotion to the interest of his clients as
well as want of zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights.
 In so doing, he violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Worse, as found by the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, respondent only offered to remit to complainants
the amount of P2,650 or P1,325 each, an amount substantially less than the P2,275 that each complainant
was entitled to receive under the judgment.
 Respondent failed to establish any defense. Moreover, he consistently failed to appear at the hearings.
Hence, his excuse for failing to give the money due his clients merit scant consideration.

This is a clear breach of Rule 16.03,21 Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
 His excuse, that he should be allowed to deduct sheriff's fees and other administrative expenses before
delivering the money due his clients, is unsatisfactory.
 Respondent clearly failed to comply with the Rules of Court in the enforcement of an attorney's liens.
The records of this case are barren of any statement of respondent's claims for lien or payment of his
alleged disbursements.
 Nor did respondent present any showing that he caused written notices of his lien on the money judgment
to be served upon his clients and to the losing party.

He was clinging to something which was not his, and to which he had no right. He appears oblivious of
the admonition that a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from any act or omission which might
lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal
profession.

We note that in 1976 at the hearings before the OSG, complainant Manalang he was already 58 years old,
while complainant Cirillo stated that he was 64 years of age. A quarter of century has since passed.
 It is true that a disciplinary action involves no private interest and affords no redress for private
grievance, since it is undertaken solely for the public welfare, and the attorney-at-law is called to
task mainly to answer to this Court for his conduct as an officer of the court.
 Nevertheless, we must stress that disciplinary action against a member of the bar involves the public
interest, and it should be resolved with dispatch.
 Moreover, we note that respondent's clients in the instant case were poor working men. They were
made to wait long for their money, by their very own counsel, contrary to the Attorney's Oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby SUSPENDS Atty. Francisco F. Angeles from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months, effective immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution. He is also ordered to
pay the sum of two thousand two hundred seventy five pesos (P2,275.00) each to complainants Honorio
Manalang and Florencio Cirillo, with interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of filing this
complaint until fully paid.
 DIANA RAMOS vs. ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG
A.C. No. 6788 August 23, 2007

FACTS: Complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Imbang in filing civil and
criminal actions against the spouses Jovellanos. She gave respondent ₱8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter
issued a receipt for ₱5,000 only.
 The complainant tried to attend the hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses. But, respondent never
allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside.
 He would then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and
rescheduled. This happened six times and for each "appearance" in court, respondent charged her ₱350.
 The complainant became suspicious. She personally inquired about the status of her cases in the trial
court. She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that
he was in fact employed in the PAO.

According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government service from the very start.
In fact, he first met the complainant when he was still a district attorney in the CLAO (predecessor of PAO).
 The complainant requested him to help her file an action against the Jovellanoses. Because he was with
the PAO and that the complainant was not an indigent, he declined.
 He advised the complainant to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative who was a private practitioner. The
latter did not accept the complainant's case as she was unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed.
 Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal, the complainant allegedly remained adamant. She insisted on
suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she "might spend" the cash on hand, the complainant asked
respondent to keep the ₱5,000 while she raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee.
 The complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt because one of her daughters asked
her to account for the ₱5,000 she had previously given the respondent for safekeeping. Because the
complainant was a friend, he agreed and issued a receipt.
 Respondent resigned from the PAO. A few months later, the complainant again asked respondent to
assist her in suing the Jovellanoses. Respondent agreed, however, he was unable to finalize it as he lost
contact with the complainant.

The Court's Ruling: Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. More
specifically, lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations
as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants who
owe utmost fidelity to public service.

Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For this reason, the
private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees provides:
 (b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
 (1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided
that such practice will not conflict with their official function.

Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote themselves
full-time to the work of their respective offices.
Respondent received ₱5K from the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still
connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship.
 Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the
presence of an attorney-client relationship between him and the complainant.
 Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a government
lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of profession.

Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created for the
purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants. The Revised Administrative Code provides:
 The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance to
indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.
 As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this was
inconsistent with the office's mission. Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

 Canon 1. — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
the law and legal processes.

Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of
profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's counsel.

Not only did he fail to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have
done), respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really filed an action against the Jovellanoses.
 He even made it appear that the cases were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his "appearance
fees" for hearings that never took place.

There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the complainant but
accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the complainant nor was it given to
him for a specific purpose. Nevertheless, respondent should return the ₱5,000 as he, a government lawyer,
was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED
from the practice of law and his name is ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered to
return to complainant the amount of ₱5,000 with interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10
days from receipt of this resolution.
 EMILIA R. HERNANDEZ vs. ATTY. VENANCIO B. PADILLA
A.C. No. 9387 June 20, 2012

FACTS: This is a disbarment case filed by Emilia Hernandez (complainant) against her lawyer, Atty.
Venancio B. Padilla (respondent) for his alleged negligence in the handling of her case. The records disclose
that complainant and her husband were the respondents in an ejectment case against them with the RTC.
 In a Decision, the RTC ordered that the Deed of Sale executed in favor of complainant be cancelled;
and that the latter pay the complainant Duigan attorney’s fees and moral damages.
 Complainant filed their Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Thereafter, the CA ordered them to file
Appellants’ Brief. They chose respondent to represent them in the case. On their behalf, he filed a
Memorandum on Appeal instead of an Appellants’ Brief. Thus, Duigan filed a Motion to Dismiss
the Appeal. The CA granted the Motion in a Resolution.
 No MR was filed by the couple. Complainant claims that because respondent ignored the Resolution,
he acted with "deceit, unfaithfulness amounting to malpractice of law."
 Complainant and her husband failed to file an appeal, because respondent never informed them of the
adverse decision.
 Complainant claims that she asked respondent "several times" about the status of the appeal, but "despite
inquiries he deliberately withheld response," to the damage and prejudice of the spouses.
 The Resolution became final and executory. Complainant was informed of the Resolution sometime
when the Sheriff of the RTC came to her house and informed her of the Resolution.

Respondent explained that he was not the lawyer of complainant.

 He averred that prior to the mandatory conference set by the IBP, he had never met complainant, because
it was her husband who had personally transacted with him.
 According to respondent, the husband "despondently pleaded to me to prepare a Memorandum on
Appeal because according to him the period given by the CA was to lapse within two or three days."
Thus, respondent claims that he filed a Memorandum on Appeal because he honestly believed that "it is
this pleading which was required."
 Respondent advised complainant’s husband to settle the case. The latter allegedly "gestured approval of
the advice."
 After the husband of complainant picked up the Memorandum for filing, respondent never saw or heard
from him again and thus assumed that the husband heeded his advice and settled the case.
 When respondent received an Order from the CA requiring him to file a comment on the Motion to
Dismiss filed by Duigan, he "instructed his office staff to contact Mr. Hernandez thru available means
of communication, but to no avail."
 Thus, when complainant’s husband went to the office of respondent to tell the latter of the CA’s
Resolution dismissing the case, respondent was just as surprised. The lawyer exclaimed, "KALA KO
BA NAKIPAG AREGLO NA KAYO."

RULING: We adopt the factual findings of the board of governors of the IBP. This Court, however,
disagrees with its Decision to reduce the penalty to one-month suspension. We thus affirm the six-month
suspension the Board originally imposed.
Respondent insists that he had never met complainant prior to the mandatory conference set for the
disbarment Complaint she filed against him.
 However, a perusal of the Memorandum of Appeal filed in the appellate court revealed that he had
signed as counsel for the defendant-appellants therein, including complainant and her husband.
It is further claimed by respondent that the relation created between him and complainant’s husband cannot
be treated as a "client-lawyer" relationship.
 Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty
of fidelity to the client’s cause.
 Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyer’s duty to serve the client with competence and
diligence. Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty.

Respondent also claims that he filed a Memorandum of Appeal, because he "honestly believed" that this
was the pleading required, based on what complainant’s husband said.
 Regardless of the particular pleading his client may have believed to be necessary, it was respondent’s
duty to know the proper pleading to be filed in appeals from RTC decisions.

CANON 5 — A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education
programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law
students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence.

In his MR, respondent begged for the consideration of the IBP, claiming that the reason for his failure to
file the proper pleading was that he "did not have enough time to acquaint himself thoroughly with the
factual milieu of the case.
 Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation.
 While it is true that respondent was not complainant’s lawyer from the trial to the appellate court stage,
this fact did not excuse him from his duty to diligently study a case he had agreed to handle.
 If he felt he did not have enough time to study the pertinent matters involved, as he was approached by
complainant’s husband only two days before the expiration of the period for filing the Appellant’s Brief,
respondent should have filed a motion for extension of time to file the proper pleading instead of
whatever pleading he could come up with, just to "beat the deadline set by the Court of Appeals."

18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to the client’s request for information.
 If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least respondent could have done
was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel.
 He could have thus explained why he was no longer the counsel of complainant and her husband in the
case and informed the court that he could no longer contact them. His failure to take this measure proves
his negligence.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
 Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their negligence in fulfilling their
duty would render them liable for disciplinary action.29

Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer violates his duties to his client, he
engages in unethical and unprofessional conduct for which he should be held accountable.
A.C. No. 4990 September 26, 2001

ELENA ZARATE-BUSTAMANTE and LEONORA SAVET CATABIAN, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. FLORENTINO G. LIBATIQUE, respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is a complaint for disbarment filed by Elena Zarate-Bustamante and Leonora Savet-Catabian
against Atty. Florentino G. Libatique, received by the Office of the Bar Confidant on December 14, 1998.
Complainants allege that respondent, as their counsel, neglected to inform them of the status of a case for
partition they had earlier filed, which resulted to the loss of their share in the property subject of partition.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Elena Zarate-Bustamante, Felicitas Zarate-Savet, and Florencio Zarate were children of Casimiro and
Trinidad Zarate.1 The spouses Zarate owned a parcel of land in Bauang, La Union, with an area exceeding
3,000 square meters.2 Casimiro donated the land to Florencio in 1944.3

In 1974, with respondent as counsel, Bustamante and Savet filed an action seeking partition of the land
before Branch 4 of the then Court of First Instance of Bauang, La Union, docketed as Civil Case No. 155-
BG. Defendant therein was Florencio Zarate. On October 2, 1975 the CFI ordered the parties to voluntarily
partition the property, inasmuch as all three siblings have a right to the land.

Zarate appealed from the decision of the CFI. In a decision promulgated on January 29, 1982, the Court of
Appeals reversed the order of the CFI and dismissed the complaint, after it found that the property in
question was donated to Zarate by his father in 1944 and that, since then, he had been in actual, adverse
possession of the property for almost 30 years when the complaint for partition was filed in 1974. Thus, he
had acquired title to the property by prescription.1âwphi1.nêt

In 1998, Bustamante secured a copy of the CFI order of partition and inquired from respondent if it could
still be enforced. She was also able to secure a copy of an extrajudicial partition of the property made by the
heirs of Zarate, who died in 1993, and asked respondent his opinion about such partition.

Respondent replied that the CFI order of partition could still be enforced, and that the extrajudicial partition
made by the heirs of Zarate was null and void, being contrary to the CFI order. Respondent agreed to file a
new case to enforce the order, for an acceptance fee of P10,000.00 and appearance fee of P500.00.4
Complainants paid the acceptance fee on September 30, 1998.5 On the same day, respondent, as counsel
for Bustamante and Savet's daughter Leonora Savet-Catabian, filed a new case for recovery of ownership,
partition, and declaration of nullity of extrajudicial partition.6

However, the case was dismissed upon motion of the heirs of Zarate, who cited the 1982 ruling of the CA
upholding Zarate's ownership of the property, which had become final and executory.7

Complainants claimed to have been unaware of the appeal made by Zarate to the CA, and confronted
respondent about the matter. However, respondent allegedly claimed ignorance of such appeal.8
Hence, this complaint, in which complainants aver that they lost their share in a property worth millions of
pesos due to the gross negligence and irresponsible conduct of respondent. Complainants argue that
respondent could not have been unaware of the appeal made by Zarate, since a check of court records
allegedly made by them revealed that respondent was duly served court processes in connection with the
appeal.

In his Comment, respondent admits that he was counsel for the plaintiffs in the action for partition filed
before the CFI of Bauang, La Union. He also admits that he agreed to handle a new case, this time for
recovery of ownership and declaration of nullity of an extrajudicial partition, for complainants. Respondent
stated that in agreeing to accept the new case, he only relied on the order of the CFI dated October 2, 1975,
which he believed could still be enforced. He also believed that the extrajudicial partition made by Zarate's
heirs was null and void, owing to the CFI's order of partition.

Respondent likewise admits having received P10,000.00 from complainants as acceptance fee.9 However,
he claims to have "no recollection" as to the status of the case filed before the CFI, ''as it has been a long
time ago and I have no more record of the case on file in my office.10

We referred the matter to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation on June 23, 1999. We
received the IBP's report on October 16, 2000.

The IBP found that, indeed, respondent was remiss in fulfilling his duty to his clients. He forgot about the
case filed before the CFI, and thus, failed to consider its implication on the new case that he filed in 1998.
The IBP recommended that respondent be admonished for filing a new case "when the outcome would have
been dependent on an existing appealed case."11 The IBP also recommended that respondent return the
P10,000.00 he received from complainants as acceptance fee, with legal interest.

We agree with the findings and the recommendation of the IBP.

Respondent claims to have been rattled and shocked12 upon learning, after he filed the new case in 1998,
that the CA reversed in 1982 the order of the CFI directing partition of the property, implying that he was
unaware of the appeal made by Zarate. He admits that when he filed the new case, he "had no recollection"
regarding the status of the case before the CFI. The latest development he was aware of concerned the CFI
order issued in 1975.

However, respondent also admits having filed an appellees' brief when the CFI's order of partition was
appealed to the CA. Yet, he claims to have lost track of the case owing to numerous other commitments
requiring his attention.13 He faults complainants for failing to inquire from him about the status of the case,
despite having had the opportunity to do so when they went home to Bauang on several occasions. He
blames them for not taking further steps to enforce the CFI order and protect their right to the property.
Respondent also argues that complainants should have known of the appeal, since he certainly did not
personally cause the printing of the appellees' brief and provide the money to pursue the appeal in Manila.
Only the complainants could have done so. Respondent avers that, like him, complainants might have
forgotten all about the case.14

Respondent has expressed willingness to reimburse the P 10,000.00 he received from complainants as
acceptance fee.15 He denied complainants' allegations that he was only interested in money, since,
according to him, he could have charged much more than P10,000.00 if indeed the property in question was
worth millions as claimed by complainants.16
We are not entirely persuaded by respondent's attempt to shift the blame to his clients regarding their case
on appeal.

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence. More specifically, Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 provide:

Rule 18.03. - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04. - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information.

Clearly, respondent breached his duty to his client when he conveniently forgot about the appeal filed by
Zarate. His negligence shows a glaring lack of the competence and diligence required of every lawyer, and
his admission of negligence17 does not mitigate his liability. He cannot now shift the blame to complainants
for failing to inquire about the status of the case, since, as stated above, it was his duty as lawyer to inform
his clients of the status of cases entrusted to him. His failure to do so is an infraction that this Court will not
countenance.

Respondent cannot simply say that he lost track of the first partition case because he had numerous other
commitments to attend to. Like all professionals, he is expected to devise ways to follow the course of his
cases and to keep his files updated. None of these would have happened had respondent been more mindful
of his responsibilities as an attorney.

Neither is the passage of time an excuse. It is a fundamental rule of ethics that "an attorney who undertakes
to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion."18 It is respondent's bounden duty to
see his cases through until properly completed and not abandon or neglect them in midstream.

WHEREFORE, Atty .Florentino G. Libatique is declared GUILTY of negligence in the performance of his
duties to his clients, and ADMONISHED to henceforth adhere faithfully to the canons set forth in the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He is ORDERED to return to complainants Elena Zarate-Bustamante and
Leonora Savet-Catabian the amount of P10,000.00 he received from them as attorney's fee, with legal
interest until fully returned.

Let a copy of this decision be spread in his file at the Office of the Bar Confidant and of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines.1âwphi1.nêt

A.C. No. 7298 June 25, 2007

[Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1565]

FERNANDO MARTIN O. PENA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:
In this administrative complaint, a lawyer is charged with violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility for writing a demand letter the contents of which threatened complainant
with the filing of criminal cases for tax evasion and falsification of documents.

Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio (respondent) appeared as legal counsel for Grace C. Hufana in an illegal dismissal
case before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Sometime in August 2005, complainant
Fernando Martin O. Pena, as President of MOF Company, Inc. (Subic), received a notice from the
Conciliation and Mediation Center of the NLRC for a mediation/conciliation conference. In the conference,
respondent, in behalf of his client, submitted a claim for separation pay arising from her alleged illegal
dismissal. Complainant rejected the claim as being baseless. Complainant thereafter sent notices to Hufana
for the latter to explain her absences and to return to work. In reply to this return to work notice, respondent
wrote a letter to complainant reiterating his client's claim for separation pay. The letter also contained the
following threat to the company:

BUT if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we will be constrained to file and claim bigger amounts
including moral damages to the tune of millions under established precedence of cases and laws. In addition
to other multiple charges like:

1. Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of income not reported to the government.

2. Criminal Charges for Tax Evasion

3. Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents

4. Cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws.

These are reserved for future actions in case of failure to pay the above amounts as settlements in the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).1

Believing that the contents of the letter deviated from accepted ethical standards, complainant filed an
administrative complaint2 with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP). Respondent filed an Answer with Impleader (Motion to Dismiss and Counterclaims)3 claiming that
Atty. Emmanuel A. Jocson, complainant's legal counsel, also played an important part in imputing the
malicious, defamatory, and fabricated charges against him. Respondent also pointed out that the complaint
had no certification against forum shopping and was motivated only to confuse the issues then pending
before the Labor Arbiter. By way of counterclaim, respondent asked for damages and for the disbarment of
Atty. Jocson. Respondent also asked the IBP to endorse the prosecution of Atty. Jocson for Usurpation of
Public Functions4 and for violation of the Notarial Law.5

A mandatory conference was held on 6 December 2005 but respondent failed to appear.6 Both parties were
thereafter required to submit their position papers.

The Report and Recommendation7 of Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan found that
complainant, failed to file his position paper and to comply with Administrative Circular No. 04-94 requiring
a certificate against forum shopping and, accordingly, recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
respondent. On 26 May 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.8 On 10 July 2006, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline transmitted to the Supreme Court the notice of said Resolution and the records of the case.9
Thereafter, on 18 August 2006, respondent filed with the IBP a Motion for Reconsideration (for
Modification of Decision)10 reiterating his claim of damages against complainant in the amount of four
hundred million pesos (P400,000,000.00), or its equivalent in dollars, for filing the "false, malicious,
defamers [sic], fraudulent, illegal fabricators [sic], malevolent[,] oppressive, evasive filing [of] a groundless
and false suit."11

Complainant thereafter filed this Petition for Review (of the Resolution of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline)12 alleging that he personally submitted and filed with the IBP his position paper, after serving
a copy thereof on respondent by registered mail. He further alleges that he was deprived of his right to due
process when the IBP dismissed his complaint without considering his position paper and without ruling on
the merits thereof.

Complainant accordingly prays for the reversal and setting aside of the 26 May 2006 Resolution13 of the
IBP Board of Governors and the remand of the case to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for proper
adjudication and disposition on the merits.

Based on the records, there is truth to complainant's assertion that he filed his position paper on 21 December
2005, after serving a copy of the same to respondent. The IBP stamp on the front page of said document
shows that it was received by the IBP on 21 December 2005. The registry receipt attached to the same
document also shows that it was sent by registered mail to respondent on the same date. 14

Complainant, however, omitted to offer any explanation in his petition before this Court for his failure to
attach a certification against forum shopping in his complaint against respondent.

The requirement of a certification against forum shopping was originally required by Circular No. 28-91,
dated 8 February 1994, issued by this Court for every petition filed with the Court or the Court of Appeals.
Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made effective on 1 April 1994, expanded the certification requirement
to include cases filed in courts and quasi-judicial agencies below this Court and the Court of Appeals.
Ultimately, the Court adopted paragraphs (1) and (2) of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 to become
Section 5, Rule 7 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.15 Said rule states that a violation thereof would constitute contempt of court
and be cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions without prejudice to the taking of appropriate
action against the counsel of the party concerned.16

The Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors took against complainant his failure to
attach the certification against forum shopping to his complaint and consequently dismissed his complaint.
This Court, however, disagrees and, accordingly, grants the petition. However, a remand of the case to the
IBP would unduly prolong its adjudication.

The Court's determination is anchored on the sui generis nature of disbarment proceedings, the reasons for
the certification against forum shopping requirement, complainant's subsequent compliance with the
requirement, and the merit of complainant's complaint against respondent.

The Court, in the case of In re Almacen,17 dwelt on the sui generis character of disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers, thus:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do
not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one
of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still
a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end
in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice
by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture,
there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.18 [Emphasis supplied]

In view of the nature of disbarment proceedings, the certification against forum shopping to be attached to
the complaint, if one is required at all in such proceedings, must refer to another administrative case for
disciplinary proceedings against the same respondent, because such other proceedings or "action" is one
that necessarily involves "the same issues" as the one posed in the disbarment complaint to which the
certification is supposedly to be attached.

Further, the rationale for the requirement of a certification against forum shopping is to apprise the Court of
the pendency of another action or claim involving the same issues in another court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency, and thereby precisely avoid the forum shopping situation. Filing multiple petitions or complaints
constitutes abuse of court processes,19 which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc
upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.20
Furthermore, the rule proscribing forum shopping seeks to promote candor and transparency among lawyers
and their clients in the pursuit of their cases before the courts to promote the orderly administration of
justice, prevent undue inconvenience upon the other party, and save the precious time of the courts. It also
aims to prevent the embarrassing situation of two or more courts or agencies rendering conflicting
resolutions or decisions upon the same issue.21

It is in this light that we take a further look at the necessity of attaching a certification against forum shopping
to a disbarment complaint. It would seem that the scenario sought to be avoided, i.e., the filing of multiple
suits and the possibility of conflicting decisions, rarely happens in disbarment complaints considering that
said proceedings are either "taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person."22 Thus, if the complainant in a disbarment
case fails to attach a certification against forum shopping, the pendency of another disciplinary action
against the same respondent may still be ascertained with ease. We have previously held that the rule
requiring a certification of forum shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading, "should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal
of all rules of procedure—which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible."23

At any rate, complainant's subsequent compliance with the requirement cured the supposed defect in the
original complaint. The records show that complainant submitted the required certification against forum
shopping on 6 December 2006 when he filed his Comment/Opposition to respondent's Motion to Dismiss
the present petition.

Finally, the intrinsic merit of complainant's case against respondent justifies the grant of the present petition.
Respondent does not deny authorship of the threatening letter to complainant, even spiritedly contesting the
charge that the letter is unethical.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal
within the bounds of the law," reminding legal practitioners that a lawyer's duty is not to his client but to
the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought
to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.24 In particular, Rule 19.01 commands that
a "lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not
present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper
advantage in any case or proceeding." Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any
unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a
leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer's client.25

In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe. Through his letter, he
threatened complainant that should the latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he would
file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax evasion,
falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws. The
threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but they also amount to blackmail.

Blackmail is "the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or exposure or opposition in
the public prints,…obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining from making an accusation
against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice." In common parlance and in
general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with extortion, the exaction of money either for the
performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the exercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it is
extorted by threats, or by operating on the fears or the credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers to
expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim.26

In Sps. Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr.,27 we held that "[a]n accusation for blackmail and extortion is a very
serious one which, if properly substantiated, would entail not only respondent's disbarment from the practice
of law, but also a possible criminal prosecution."28 While the respondent in Boyboy was exonerated for
lack of evidence, the same may not be said of respondent in the present case for he admits to writing the
offensive letter.

In fact, respondent does not find anything wrong with what he wrote, dismissing the same as merely an act
of pointing out massive violations of the law by the other party, and, with boldness, asserting that "a lawyer
is under obligation to tell the truth, to report to the government commission of offenses punishable by the
State."29 He further asserts that the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition and that
our laws allow and encourage the settlement of disputes.

Respondent's assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite obvious that respondent's threat to file the
cases against complainant was designed to secure some leverage to compel the latter to give in to his client's
demands. It was not respondent's intention to point out complainant's violations of the law as he so gallantly
claims. Far from it, the letter even contains an implied promise to "keep silent" about the said violations if
payment of the claim is made on the date indicated.

Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction. It is usually
done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent relationship that he has with his client, the principal. Thus,
in the performance of his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his client's claim and to take all
the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand requiring payment within a specified
period. However, the letter in this case contains more than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains a
threat to file retaliatory charges against complainant which have nothing to do with his client's claim for
separation pay. The letter was obviously designed to secure leverage to compel complainant to yield to their
claims. Indeed, letters of this nature are definitely proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged communication rule under which a
private communication executed in the performance of a legal duty is not actionable. The privileged nature
of the letter was removed when respondent used it to blackmail complainant and extort from the latter
compliance with the demands of his client.

However, while the writing of the letter went beyond ethical standards, we hold that disbarment is too severe
a penalty to be imposed on respondent, considering that he wrote the same out of his overzealousness to
protect his client's interests. Accordingly, the more appropriate penalty is reprimand.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The 26 May 2006 Resolution of the IBP Board
of Governors is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio is hereby found
liable for violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is accordingly
meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
act will be dealt with more severely.

A.C. No. 5655 January 23, 2006

VALERIANA U. DALISAY, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

At bar is a motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated April 22, 2005 finding Atty. Melanio "Batas"
Mauricio, Jr., respondent, guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

A brief revisit of facts is imperative, thus:

On October 13, 2001, Valeriana U. Dalisay, complainant, engaged respondent’s services as counsel in Civil
Case No. 00-044, entitled "Lucio De Guzman, etc., complainants, v. Dalisay U. Valeriana, respondent,"
pending before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Binangonan, Rizal. Notwithstanding his receipt of
documents and attorney’s fees in the total amount of P56,000.00 from complainant, respondent never
rendered legal services for her. As a result, she terminated the attorney-client relationship and demanded
the return of her money and documents, but respondent refused.

On January 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, found that "for the amount of P56,000.00 paid by the complainant x
x x, no action had been taken nor any pleadings prepared by the respondent except his alleged conferences
and opinions rendered when complainant frequented his law office." She recommended that respondent be
required to refund the amount of P56,000.00 to the complainant, and surprisingly, that the complaint be
dismissed.
On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-121, adopting and
approving in toto Commissioner Navarro’s Report and Recommendation.

On April 22, 2005, we rendered the assailed Decision.

Incidentally, upon learning of our Decision, respondent went to the MTC, Branch I, Binangonan, Rizal to
verify the status of Civil Case No. 00-044. There, he learned of the trial court’s Decision dated December
6, 2001 holding that "the tax declarations and title" submitted by complainant "are not official records of
the Municipal Assessor and the Registry of Deed." Thereupon, respondent filed a Sworn Affidavit
Complaint1 against complainant charging her with violations of Article 1712 and 172,3 and/or Article 1824
of the Revised Penal Code. He alleged that complainant offered tampered evidence.

In this motion for reconsideration, respondent raises the following arguments:

First, complainant did not engage his services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044. She hired him for the
purpose of filing two new petitions, a petition for declaration of nullity of title and a petition for review of
a decree.

Second, Civil Case No. 00-044 was "considered submitted for decision" as early as August 6, 2001, or more
than two months prior to October 13, 2001, the date he was engaged as counsel, hence, "he could not have
done anything anymore" about it.

Third, complainant refused to provide him with documents related to the case, preventing him from doing
his job.

And fourth, complainant offered tampered evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file
falsification cases against her.

In her opposition to the motion, complainant contends that: (1) respondent violated the principle of
confidentiality between a lawyer and his client when he filed falsification charges against her; (2) respondent
should have returned her money; (3) respondent should have verified the authenticity of her documents
earlier if he really believed that they are falsified; and (4) his refusal to return her money despite this Court’s
directive constitutes contempt.

We deny respondent’s motion for reconsideration.

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish
to become his client. He has the right to decline employment. But once he accepts money from a client, an
attorney-client relationship is established, giving rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause.5 From then
on, he is expected to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with
competence and diligence, and champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted devotion.6

Respondent assumed such obligations when he received the amount of P56,000.00 from complainant and
agreed to handle Civil Case No. 00-044. Unfortunately, he had been remiss in the performance of his duties.
As we have ruled earlier, "there is nothing in the records to show that he (respondent) entered his appearance
as counsel of record for complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044." Neither is there any evidence nor pleading
submitted to show that he initiated new petitions.
With ingenuity, respondent now claims that "complainant did not engage his services for Civil Case No. 00-
044" but, instead, she engaged him for the filing of two new petitions. This is obviously a last-ditch attempt
to evade culpability. Respondent knows very well that if he can successfully disassociate himself as
complainant’s counsel in Civil Case No.00-044, he cannot be held guilty of any dereliction of duties.

But respondent’s current assertion came too late in the day. He is already bound by his previous statements.
In his Verified Comment on the Affidavit-Complaint,7 he categorically stated that complainant engaged his
services in Civil Case No. 00-044, originally handled by Atty. Oliver Lozano, thus:

4.a. Complainant was referred to the Respondent by Atty. Oliver Lozano.

4.b. The referral intrigued Respondent no end, simply because Atty. Oliver Lozano is a bright lawyer and
is very much capable of handling Civil Case No. 00-044.

4.c. Respondent-out of respect from Atty. Oliver Lozano – did not inquire the reason for the referral. But he
was made to understand that he was being referred because Atty. Oliver Lozano believed that Respondent
would be in a better position to prosecute and/or defend the Complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044.

xxxxxx

5.c. Complainant went to the law office of Respondent on October 13, 2001 and demanded that he provides
her with free legal service.

xxxxxx

5.e. Respondent, however, told Complainant that the case (Civil Case No. 00-044) would not entitle her to
a free legal service and advised her to just re-engage the services of Atty. Oliver Lozano.

5.f. Undaunted, Complainant asked Respondent to assess her case and how she and her lawyer should go
prosecuting and/or defending her position therein.

5.g. Honestly believing that Complainant was no longer represented by counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044 at
that time, Respondent gave his professional opinion on the factual and legal matters surrounding the said
case.

5.h. Apparently impressed with the opinion of the Respondent, Complainant became even more adamant in
asking the former to represent her in Civil Case No. 00-044.

5.i. Respondent then told Complainant that she would be charged as a regular client is she insists in retaining
his services.

5.j. It was at this juncture that Complainant asked Respondent about his fees.

5.k. After re-assessing Civil Case No. 00-044, Respondent told Complainant that he will have to charge her
with an acceptance fee of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), aside form being charged for
papers/pleadings that may have to be prepared and filed in court in connection with the aforesaid case.
xxxxxx

5.n. A few days after, Respondent got a call from Atty. Oliver Lozano. The said Atty. Oliver Lozano
interceded for and in behalf of Complainant and asked that the acceptance fee that Respondent was charging
the Complainant be reduced.

xxxxxx

5.r. Complainant then returned to the office of the Respondent on October 20, 2001. The latter then informed
the former of his conversation with Atty. Oliver Lozano and his (respondent’s) decision to reduce the
acceptance fee.

5.s. Complainant was very grateful at the time, even shedding a tear or two simply because Respondent had
agreed to handle her case at a greatly reduced acceptance fee.

Statements of similar tenor can also be found in respondent’s Memorandum8 filed with the IBP.

Undoubtedly, respondent’s present version is a flagrant departure from his previous pleadings. This cannot
be countenanced. A party should decide early what version he is going to advance. A change of theory in
the latter stage of the proceedings is objectionable, not due to the strict application of procedural rules, but
because it is contrary to the rules of fair play, justice and due process.9 The present administrative case was
resolved by the IBP on the basis of respondent’s previous admission that complainant engaged his legal
services in Civil Case No. 00-044. He cannot now unbind himself from such admission and its
consequences. In fact, if anything at all has been achieved by respondent’s inconsistent assertions, it is his
dishonesty to this Court.

At any rate, assuming arguendo that complainant indeed engaged respondent’s services in filing the two (2)
new petitions, instead of Civil Case No. 00-044, still, his liability is unmistakable. There is nothing in the
records to show that he filed any petition. The ethics of the profession demands that, in such a case, he
should immediately return the filing fees to complainant. In Pariñas v. Paguinto,10 we held that "a lawyer
shall account for all money or property collected from the client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific
purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the
client on demand." Per records, complainant made repeated demands, but respondent is yet to return the
money.

Neither do we find merit in respondent’s second argument. The fact that Civil Case No. 00-044 was already
"submitted for decision" does not justify his inaction. After agreeing to handle Civil Case No. 00-044, his
duty is, first and foremost, to enter his appearance. Sadly, he failed to do this simple task. He should have
returned complainant’s money. Surely, he cannot expect to be paid for doing nothing.

In his third argument, respondent attempts to evade responsibility by shifting the blame to complainant. He
claims that she refused to provide him with documents vital to the case. He further claims that he would be
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility by handling a case without adequate preparation. This is
preposterous. When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses
the requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case.11 As a lawyer, respondent knew where
to obtain copies of the certificates of title. As a matter of fact, he admitted that his Law Office, on its own,
managed to verify the authenticity of complainant’s title. It bears reiterating that respondent did not take
any action on the case despite having been paid for his services. This is tantamount to abandonment of his
duties as a lawyer and taking undue advantage of his client.

Finally, in an ironic twist of fate, respondent became the accuser of complainant. In his fourth argument,
respondent accuses her of offering falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him
to file falsification cases against her. He thus justifies his inability to render legal services to complainant.

Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-044, will it
be sufficient to exonerate respondent? We believe not. First, Canon 19 outlines the procedure in dealing
with clients who perpetrated fraud in the course of a legal proceeding. Consistent with its mandate that a
lawyer shall represent his client with zeal and only within the bounds of the law, Rule 19.02 of the same
Canon specifically provides:

Rule 19.02 – A lawyer who has received information that his clients has, in the course of the representation,
perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and
failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.

As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule. Instead of inaction, he should have confronted
complainant and ask her to rectify her fraudulent representation. If complainant refuses, then he should
terminate his relationship with her.

Understandably, respondent failed to follow the above-cited Rule. This is because there is no truth to his
claim that he did not render legal service to complainant because she falsified the documentary evidence in
Civil Case No.00-044. This brings us to the second reason why we cannot sustain his fourth argument. The
pleadings show that he learned of the alleged falsification long after complainant had terminated their
attorney-client relationship. It was a result of his active search for a justification of his negligence in Civil
Case No. 00-044. As a matter of fact, he admitted that he verified the authenticity of complainant’s title
only after the "news of his suspension spread in the legal community." To our mind, there is absurdity in
invoking subsequent knowledge of a fact as justification for an act or omission that is fait accompli.

Obviously, in filing falsification charges against complainant, respondent was motivated by vindictiveness.

In fine, let it be stressed that the authority of an attorney begins with his or her retainer.12 It gives rise to a
relationship between an attorney and a client that is highly fiduciary in nature and of a very delicate,
exacting, and confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith.13 If much is
demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative
duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his
duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice,
does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.14 Indeed,
law is an exacting goddess demanding of her votaries not only intellectual but also moral discipline.

WHEREFORE, we DENY respondent’s motion for reconsideration. Our Decision dated April 22, 2005 is
immediately executory. Respondent is directed to report immediately to the Office of the Bar Confidant his
compliance with our Decision.

A.C. No. 5760 September 30, 2005

THE HEIRS OF TIBURCIO F. BALLESTEROS, SR., namely ELSIE B. AROMIN, DOLORES D.
BALLESTEROS, TIBURCIO B. BALLESTEROS, JR., and FE BALLESTEROS-YABUT, and THE
RURAL BANK OF PAGADIAN, INC., JULIAN B. BALLESTEROS in his capacity as Administrator of
the Estate and President/Manager of the Bank, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. MANILEÑO N. APIAG, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Julian B. Ballesteros ("complainant") as Administrator of the
Ballesteros Estate and President and Manager of the Rural Bank of Pagadian, Inc. ("Bank") against Atty.
Manileño N. Apiag ("respondent"), the retained counsel of the Ballesteros Estate and the Bank.

Complainant alleged that respondent violated the terms of the Legal Services Retainership Agreement1
("Retainer Agreement") and Canons 15, 17, 18, 19 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.2

The Facts

Complainant charges respondent for reneging on his obligations as retained counsel in the following
instances:

1. Civil Case Nos. 1645-1648

Respondent handled four actions for Unlawful Detainer and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction docketed as Civil Case Nos. 1645-1648 ("ejectment cases"). Respondent
filed the ejectment cases on 26 November 1998, which were raffled to Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Pagadian City, presided by Judge Edilberto G. Absin ("Judge Absin"). In all these cases, Judge
Absin issued an Order3 dated 2 August 1999, requiring the parties to submit their position papers.
Respondent failed to submit the position papers. On 8 December 1999, Judge Absin issued four identical
Orders dismissing the ejectment cases.4

Complainant claims that respondent never informed him of the dismissal of the ejectment cases.
Complainant learned of the dismissal only during the first week of March 2002 when his new counsel filed
a Motion for Substitution of Legal Counsel.5

Complainant also claims that respondent was aware beforehand that complainant would suffer tremendous
financial losses in the event of dismissal of the ejectment cases.6

2. Civil Case No. 3844

Respondent also handled Civil Case No. 3844 for Quieting of Title with Preliminary Injunction and
Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Mortgage. The trial court set the case for pre-trial conference on 5
February 2002. Respondent failed to appear. He did not file a pre-trial brief as well. The trial court then
ordered the third-party plaintiff to present evidence ex-parte.7

Complainant claimed he was present during the pre-trial conference. He later learned that respondent was
at his residence and did not attend the pre-trial conference.8

3. Civil Case No. 3395

Respondent also prosecuted the latter stages of an Action for Reconveyance of Real Property docketed as
Civil Case No. 3395. This case is now on appeal with the Court of Appeals’13th Division. However, when
the case was still in the Regional Trial Court, respondent failed to file a Motion for Reconsideration,
particularly on the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens annotated on the Torrens title of the property
under litigation.9

Complainant asserts that the failure to move for reconsideration would enable the defendants to sell the
property, thus making it difficult for complainant to regain possession of the property if the appellate court
rules in his favor.10

4. Civil Case No. 4019

Respondent handled Civil Case No. 4019 for Rescission of Contract and Damages against Spouses Hawani.
On 20 January 2000, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the Spouses Hawani to pay the Ballesteros
Estate back rentals including penalties of ₱852,263.84 plus ₱30,000 attorney’s fees.11

Respondent billed complainant ₱255,679.15 representing 30% contingent fee and ₱30,000 attorney’s fees.
Complainant asserts that the bill does not conform to the terms of the Retainer Agreement, which reads:

"Obligations of the Client"

xxx

5. To pay the Attorney by way of contingent fee the following:

xxx

c. Thirty percent (30%) of the total amount or equivalent sum recovered from Moral and Exemplary
Damages to the exclusion of Actual Damages, paid and received by the client thru the execution of any/all
judgment rendered in favor of the client; and by way of an additional incentive, awards for Attorney’s fees
and payment relative thereto shall pertain to and exclusively belong to the Attorney;12

Complainant claims that the award of ₱852,263.84 corresponds to unpaid rentals, penalties and charges
from 16 January 1997 to 15 January 2000. This amount represents actual damages and not moral or
exemplary damages.13

Complainant further claims that for this case alone, he paid respondent a total of ₱219,000 consisting of
fees for consultation, acceptance, court appearances, preparation of pleadings and motions.14
On 5 March 2002, complainant received from respondent a final demand letter. Complainant refused to pay
respondent. Thus, on 2 April 2002, respondent filed Civil Case No. 4370-2k2 for Collection of Sum of
Money and Damages with Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order.15

Complainant now seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Canons 15, 17, 18, 19 and Rules 18.03
and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.16

In his Comment, respondent refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that:

1. Civil Case Nos. 1645-1648

Complainant was one of the defendants in several criminal complaints17 that involved the same lot in the
four ejectment cases. Respondent contends that complainant’s motive in filing the Actions for Unlawful
Detainer was to harass the private offended party and her witnesses so they would drop the criminal cases
against complainant.18 Nevertheless, respondent filed the ejectment cases with all fidelity to his client.

Respondent maintains that he submitted the drafts of the Position Paper and Affidavit to complainant for
his signature. However, complainant did not return the drafts despite several reminders. Respondent cannot
now present the drafts because respondent submitted all copies of the Affidavit and Position Paper to
complainant. Respondent’s computer used in encoding the final drafts no longer contains the drafts in its
files.19

Respondent insists that he furnished complainant a copy of the dismissal order in the four ejectment cases.20
Respondent points out that complainant’s claim of lack of knowledge of the dismissal order for more than
two years is incredible. Respondent posits that complainant’s inaction for two years constitutes dereliction
and makes him unworthy as an administrator of the Ballesteros Estate.21

2. Civil Case No. 3844

In the civil case for Quieting of Title, respondent did not file a pre-trial brief because of the possibility of a
compromise agreement. Respondent claims that complainant, upon receiving the proposed compromise
agreement from respondent, promised to submit the compromise agreement to the Bank’s Board of
Directors for its consensus. Respondent was hopeful that the compromise agreement would succeed so he
decided not to file the pre-trial brief. His non-appearance at the pre-trial conference on 5 February 2002 was
based on his assumption that the trial court would grant the Motion for Postponement filed by counsel for
plaintiffs.22 Respondent attributed to complainant’s failure to act on the compromise agreement the
subsequent issuance by Judge Absin of the order allowing the third-party plaintiff to present evidence ex-
parte.23

Further, respondent denies the allegation that complainant was present in court during the pre-trial
conference on 5 February 2002.24 As shown in the trial court’s Order,25 defendant Bank failed to appear,
proving that complainant never attended the pre-trial conference. Respondent points to this as a clear
indicium of complainant’s extraordinary temerity to lie to the Court.26

3. Civil Case No. 3395

On Civil Case No. 3395, respondent claims that complainant never referred this case to him. Respondent’s
participation in this case was only by special appearance due to the inability of Atty. Manuel Diokno, the
counsel of record from Manila, to attend the scheduled trial. In fact, a separate Special Agreement governed
respondent’s services in this case.27

Respondent insists that he is not at fault for the non-filing of a Motion for Reconsideration because he
merely followed the instruction of Atty. Diokno to file the Notice of Appeal.28

However, to protect complainant’s interest, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Office
of the Registry of Deeds to remedy the impending effect of the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens.29

4. Civil Case No. 4019

Respondent claims that complainant presented to him the draft of the Retainer Agreement. The original
provision on the payment of contingent fee to which respondent agreed reads: "xxx [i]n the event of an
award for damages, the fee shall be thirty (30) percent of the award xxx."30 That complainant prepared the
final draft of the Retainer Agreement is shown by the details of complainant’s Residence Certificate which
were typewritten while the details of respondent’s Residence Certificate remained in blank.31

Respondent asserts that complainant maliciously altered the agreed word "inclusion" by changing it to
"exclusion"32 to make it appear that actual damages are excluded in computing the 30% contingent fee.
Respondent laments that he would not receive any contingent fee because his clients, the Ballesteros Estate
and the Bank, are artificial persons which could not recover moral and exemplary damages.33 Respondent
asserts that the word "exclusion" is inconsistent to a holistic interpretation of the Retainer Agreement.34

Respondent contends that he exerted great effort in preparing the case against the Spouses Hawani, thus he
rightfully deserves his attorney’s fees.35

Finally, respondent claims that complainant’s stubborn refusal to pay left respondent no other course but to
file the case for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages against complainant.36

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro ("IBP Commissioner
Navarro") allowed the parties to submit position paper or memorandum in lieu of a formal hearing.37 After
the parties filed their memoranda, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-234 ("IBP
Resolution") dated 16 April 2004 adopting with modification38 IBP Commissioner Navarro’s Report and
Recommendation ("Report") finding respondent negligent in legal matters entrusted to him by his client.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended the imposition on respondent of a penalty of six months
suspension from the practice of law. The Report reads:

After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, the undersigned noted that the interpretation
concerning their Retainer Agreement is a matter to be resolved by the Court where Civil Case No. 4370-
2K2 for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages was filed on April 20, 2002 and that is before RTC
Branch, 18 when complainant allegedly refused to pay respondent his attorneys fees pursuant to their
agreement which is still pending litigation between them.

With respect to the four (4) ejectment cases dismissed by the court for failure of respondent to file Position
Papers for each case as per Court Order; respondent’s allegation that it was attributable to the complainant
who did not return the draft to him which was refuted by the complainant for he was not supposed to sign
the same is of no moment for as counsel of record, it was incumbent upon respondent to take the necessary
action and not for the complainant who is not conversant with the court proceedings otherwise respondent’s
legal services would not have been engaged; and for such remission respondent had been negligent
considering that he should not have taken for granted the non-filing of Position Papers for each of the four
(4) ejectment cases which had been the very reason for the dismissal of said cases.

Respondent’s contention that his appearance in Civil Case No. 3395 being special; instead of a motion for
reconsideration he filed a Notice of Appeal upon complainant’s instruction as allegedly relayed to the latter
by their counsel of record Atty. Diokno was in violation of Rule 19.01 (sic), Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when respondent allowed his client to dictate upon him the procedure in
handling said case without first making the necessary coordination with Atty. Diokno the alleged counsel
of record of the complainant. But the fact remains that respondent pursued the case until a decision was
promulgated; therefore as such he was in control in having prosecuted Case No. 3395; a legal responsibility.

From the facts obtaining, it is evident that respondent had been negligent in legal matters and actions
entrusted to him by his client complainant herein as required by the courts in compliance with Court
procedure for which remission he should be liable.39

The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-
B40 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 18, Rule 18.03, Rule 18.04 and Rule 19.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code").

The Code mandates that every "lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence."41 The Code
further states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable."42 The Code provides that "a lawyer shall keep the client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information."43
Furthermore, "a lawyer shall not allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case."44

Respondent failed to file position papers and did not

inform complainant of the dismissal of the ejectment cases

Respondent’s assertion that he submitted the position papers to complainant for signature is not
substantiated by any evidence. Respondent’s bare allegations do not persuade the Court.

In Macarilay v. Seriña,45 the Court held the handling counsel accountable for failing to file the complaints
and imputing the fault to his client. The Court did not believe the counsel’s claim that the complaints were
ready but the client refused to sign them. Thus, the Court refused to countenance the counsel’s ill-disguised
attempt to cover up his negligence by wrongfully shifting the blame to his client.

In the present case, the evidence at hand belies respondent’s claim that complainant had knowledge of the
dismissal of the ejectment cases. In the Omnibus Motion to Withdraw as Counsel with Prayer to Enter into
the Records a Charging Lien ("Omnibus Motion")46 respondent filed on 5 March 2002, respondent included
the four ejectment cases as shown in the records.47 However, the trial court dismissed the ejectment cases
as early as 8 December 1999, making their inclusion in the Omnibus Motion clearly unwarranted.

In Garcia v. Atty. Manuel,48 the Court found the lawyer in bad faith for failing to inform the client of the
status of the case. The Court has repeatedly stressed that the lawyer-client relationship is highly fiduciary.49
There is always a need for the client to receive from the lawyer periodic and full updates on developments
affecting the case. The lawyer should apprise the client on the mode and manner that the lawyer is utilizing
to defend the client’s interests.50

A case in point is Canoy v. Ortiz51 where the Court ruled that the lawyer’s failure to file the position paper
is per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code. There the Court ruled that the lawyer could not shift the
blame to his client for failing to follow up his case because it was the lawyer’s duty to inform his client of
the status of cases. The Court further ruled that the dereliction of duty to file the position paper, compounded
by the failure for nearly two years to inform the client of the dismissal of the case, evidently shows the
lawyer’s negligence.

Respondent failed to file a pre-trial brief

and failed to attend the pre-trial conference

in the Quieting of Title case

Respondent claims that he did not file a pre-trial brief because of the possibility of a compromise agreement.
The proposed compromise agreement was prepared sometime in February 2001.52 In the pre-trial
conferences held, respondent always manifested that complainant opted not to file any pre-trial brief in the
hope of a compromise agreement.53

Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 6 Pre-trial brief. — The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, in such manner
as shall ensure their receipt thereof at least three (3) days before the date of the pre-trial, their respective
pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among others:

(a) A statement of their willingness to enter into amicable settlement or alternative modes of dispute
resolution, indicating the desired terms thereof;

xxx.

A pre-trial brief and a compromise agreement are not mutually exclusive. In fact, a pre-trial brief should
contain a statement of the willingness to enter into such a compromise agreement.

Respondent’s failure to file the pre-trial brief constitutes inexcusable negligence. As the Court held in
Spouses Galen v. Atty. Paguirigan:54

An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. A
failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. The respondent has
indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay
litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice.
Moreover, respondent’s non-appearance in the pre-trial conference held on 5 February 2002 was due to his
assumption that the trial court would grant the Motion for Postponement filed by counsel for plaintiffs. The
Court has repeatedly ruled that motions for postponements are granted only upon meritorious grounds and
no party has the right to assume that such motion would be granted.55 Respondent’s reason for his non-
appearance at the pre-trial conference is faulty and unacceptable.

Respondent failed to file a motion for reconsideration

in the reconveyance of real property case

Respondent claimed that his participation in the reconveyance of real property case was only by special
appearance and he merely followed instructions given by Atty. Diokno, the counsel of record. Atty. Diokno
directed the immediate filing of a Notice of Appeal. Complainant conveyed this instruction to respondent,
who did not call Atty. Diokno to discuss its implications.

Respondent did not act as a mere messenger of Atty. Diokno in filing the Notice of Appeal. Respondent
actually handled and pursued the case until the promulgation of the decision. Therefore, respondent cannot
claim that his participation in the case was merely by special appearance to file the Notice of Appeal.56

Respondent should know that every case a lawyer accepts deserves the lawyer’s full attention, diligence,
skill and competence regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.57 It is a
lawyer’s sworn duty to present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of his
client’s cause.58 Any member of the bar worth his title cannot afford to practice the profession in a
lackadaisical manner.59

Respondent’s claim for his lawful fees

The Court leaves the resolution of respondent’s claim for attorney’s fees to Branch 18 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pagadian City where respondent filed Civil Case No. 4370-2k2 for Collection of Sum of Money
and Damages. The resolution of respondent’s claim requires a trial on the merits.

On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on
the surrounding facts.60 The penalties for a lawyer’s failure to file a brief or other pleading range from
reprimand,61 warning with fine,62 suspension63 and, in grave cases, disbarment.64 In the present case, we
agree with the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors since respondent was clearly negligent
in handling a number of cases.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Manileño N. Apiag GUILTY of violation of Canon 18, Rule
18.03, Rule 18.04 and Rule 19.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND
respondent Atty. Manileño N. Apiag from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon finality
of this Decision.

G.R. No. 121772 January 13, 2003

ELNORA R. CORTES and EDMUNDO CORTES, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, F. S. MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondents.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 17, 1995,1 the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Order dated July 16, 1992 is hereby AFFIRMED with
modification. Appellants spouses Cortes in addition to the P100,000.00 is further ORDERED to pay six
percent (6%) per annum legal interest of such amount from July 25, 1992 until fully paid.

"Cost against appellants spouses Cortes.

"SO ORDERED."2

The controversy stemmed from a civil case for specific performance with damages filed by F.S.
Management and Development Corporation (FSMDC) against spouses Edmundo and Elnora Cortes
involving the sale of the parcel of land owned by the said spouses.3

Spouses Cortes retained the professional services of Atty. Felix Moya for the purpose of representing them
in said case. However, they did not agree on the amount of compensation for the services to be rendered by
Atty. Moya.

Before a full-blown trial could be had, defendants spouses Cortes and plaintiff FSMDC decided to enter
into a compromise agreement. On June 4, 1991, defendants spouses received from plaintiff FSMDC, three
checks totaling P2,754,340.00 which represents the remaining balance of the purchase price of the subject
land.

On June 7, 1991, Atty. Moya filed an "Urgent Motion to Fix Attorney's Fees, Etc." praying that he be paid
a sum equivalent to thirty-five percent (35%) of the amount received by the defendants spouses4 which the
latter opposed contending that the amount Atty. Moya seeks to recover is utterly excessive and is not
commensurate to the nature, extent and quality of the services he had rendered.5

On July 2, 1991, the Cortes spouses and Atty. Moya settled their differences by agreeing in open court that
the former will pay the latter the amount of P100,000.00 as his attorney's fees. Pursuant to such agreement,
the trial court issued an order of even date which reads as; follows:

"Parties in open Court agreed to movant's attorney's fees of P100,000.00 to be paid out of any check paid
by the plaintiff to defendants.

"Not later than July, 15, 1991, parties are hereby ordered to inform the Court whether or not this is complied
with, so the Court can act accordingly. (Emphasis supplied)

"SO ORDERED."6

Subsequently, the Cortes spouses terminated the services of Atty. Moya and retained the services of another
lawyer.
On January 8, 1992, or about six months after the afore-quoted Order, Atty. Moya filed an Ex-Parte
Manifestation praying that his Motion to Fix Attorney's Fees be resolved on the basis of the agreement of
the parties, "in chambers".7

The Cortes spouses filed their Comment claiming:

"l. That they agreed to the settlement of P100,000.00 attorney's fees expecting that the checks paid by
plaintiff by way of settlement will be good and may be encashed by them but it turned out that they were
all dishonored, and no compromise agreement was pushed through;

"2. That defendants are willing to pay Atty. Moya as additional compensation for his services only in
the amount of P50,000.00 subject to the condition that same shall be paid after the case is terminated in their
favor and/or the property involved is sold;

"3. That defendants shall compensate Atty. Moya said amount in addition to what they have paid
before."8

On June 26, 1992, Atty. Moya filed a "Motion for Early Resolution of Pending Incidents and to Order
Defendants to Pay Their Previous Counsel".9

On July 16, 1992, the trial court issued an Order directing the Cortes spouses to pay Atty. Moya the sum of
P100,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees.10 The Cortes spouses filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court
of Appeals.11 On July 31, 1992, Atty. Moya filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Appeal"
which was denied by the trial court in its Order dated August 4, 1992.12 Consequently, he filed a notice of
appeal questioning the Orders of the trial court dated July 16, 1992 and August 4, 1992.13

On March 17, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered the herein assailed decision resolving the respective
appeals of spouses; Cortes and Atty. Moya in favor of the latter.14 Spouses Cortes moved for the
reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court which the Court denied in its Resolution issued on
August 30, 1995.15

Hence, herein petition filed by the Cortes spouses, raising the following issues:

"l. Whether the award of P100,000.00 in favor of private respondent as and by way of attorney's [fees]
for the handling of petitioners' case before the services of the former was legally terminated is tenable under
the facts of this case.

"2 Whether the respondent Honorable Court of Appeals misapplied the principle of Estoppel in this
case."16

As both issues are interrelated, we shall resolve them jointly.

Petitioners spouses claim that they have already paid private respondent Moya the total amount of
P36,000.00 in acceptance and appearance fees.17 However, a perusal of the records shows that no competent
evidence, oral or documentary, was presented to prove said claim. It is settled that he who alleges a fact has
the burden of proving it; that mere allegation is not evidence.18 Besides, records show that the alleged
payment by petitioners of said amount was never raised before the lower court. It was only raised on appeal
with respondent appellate court. Settled is the rule that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on
appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice.19

Nevertheless, petitioners' main contention is that the award of P100,000.00 to private respondent Moya as
and by way of attorney's fees "is unconscionable and unreasonable."

On its face, the Order dated July 2, 1991 appears to be explicit and leaves no room for any other
interpretation. The first paragraph of said Order states that parties in open Court agreed that the attorney's
fees in the amount of P100,000.00 shall be paid out of any check paid by the plaintiff to defendants.20 The
said agreement is therefore in the nature of a compromise agreement.

However, petitioners contend that they agreed to pay private respondent P100,000.00 out of the three (3)
checks paid by FSPADC on June 4, 1991 and not out of any other check issued by FSMDC. This contention
finds support in the prayer of private respondent, Atty. Moya himself, in his Urgent Motion to Fix Attorney's
Fees, Etc." explicitly asking that he "be paid immediately upon the encashment of the P1,000,000.00 check
dated June 10, 1991 by the defendants". He even expressed concern that he "may not be paid the
corresponding attorney's fees out of the check that is due for payment on said date".21 Clearly therefrom,
the amount of P100,000.00 due to Atty. Moya was expected to be taken not from any check paid by FSMDC
to petitioners but specifically from the check dated June 10, 1991 given to petitioners spouses.

As already stated, the Order in question appears to be a compromise agreement between spouses Cortes and
Atty. Moya. It is true that under the doctrine of estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon.22 A party may not go back on his own acts and representations to the prejudice of the other party
who relied upon them.23 But, in technical estoppel, the party to be estopped must knowingly have acted so
as to mislead his adversary, and the adversary must have placed reliance on the action and acted as he would
otherwise not have done.24

In the present case, petitioners had evidently agreed to pay private respondent P100,000.00 out of the checks
paid by FSMDC on June 4, 1991. However, the trial court ordered the payment to be sourced out of any
check paid by FSMDC to petitioners. Yet, it does not appear from the original records that both the
petitioners and the private respondent were actually sent copies of the Order of July 2, 1991. Thus,
petitioners spouses were deprived of the opportunity to question the content of the Order on ground of
mistake or excusable negligence, pursuant to the remedy provided for under Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules
of Court. Since petitioners did not receive a copy of the said Order they could not therefore be considered
as having knowingly agreed to it as to mislead the court or the private respondent into believing that they
unconditionally acceded to pay private respondent the amount of P100,000.00 out of any check given by
FSMDC. Consequently, they are not estopped from questioning the correctness of such Order. Elementary
fairness dictates that petitioners, who were unaware of the questioned Order, should not be estopped from
questioning the same.

Having disposed of the issue on estoppel, we now turn to the question of whether or not the amount of
P100,000.00 awarded to the private respondent is in consonance with the prevailing principles and
guidelines governing compensation due to attorneys for the professional services they have rendered.

The reasonableness of the amount of attorney's fees awarded to private respondent should be properly
gauged on the basis of the long-standing rule of quantum meruit, meaning, "as much as he deserves". Where
a lawyer is employed without agreement as to the amount to be paid for his services, the courts shall fix the
amount on quantum meruit basis. In such a case, he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his
services.25 In this respect, Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

"Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys, agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have
and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the
importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional
standing of the attorney. . . ."

In addition, the following circumstances, codified in Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, serves as a guideline in fixing a reasonable compensation for services rendered by a lawyer
on the basis of quantum meruit:

"a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

"b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;

"c) The importance of the subject matter;

"d) The skill demanded;

"e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;

"f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he
belongs;

"g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the services;

"h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;

"i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or establisbed; and

"j) The professional standing of the lawyer."

In the present case, aside from invoking his professional standing, private respondent claims that he was the
one responsible in forging the initial compromise agreement wherein FSMDC agreed to pay P2,754,380.00.
The fact remains, however, that such agreement was not consummated because the checks given by FSMDC
were all dishonored. It was not the private respondent who was responsible in bringing into fruition the
subsequent compromise agreement between petitioners and FSMDC.

Nonetheless, it is undisputed that private respondent has rendered services as counsel for the petitioners. He
prepared petitioners' Answer and Pre-Trial Brief, appeared at the Pre-Trial Conference, attended a hearing
held on July 13, 1990, cross-examined the witness of FSMDC, and was present in the conference at the
Manila Hotel between the parties and their respective counsels. All these services were rendered in the years
1990 and 1991 where the value of a peso is higher. Thus, we find the sum of P100,000.00 awarded to private
respondent as his attorney's fees to be disproportionate to the services rendered by him to petitioners.

The amount of P50,000.00 as compensation for the services rendered by Atty. Moya is just and reasonable.
Besides, the imposition of legal interest on the amount payable to private respondent is unwarranted. Article
220926 of the Civil Code invoked by Atty. Moya and cited by the appellate court, finds no application in
the present case. It is a provision of law governing ordinary obligations and contracts. Contracts for
attorney's services in this jurisdiction stand upon an entirely different footing from contracts for the payment
of compensation for any other services.27

We have held that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants.28

"Law advocacy . . . is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done
or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom
from government interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to State
regulation."29

Thus, a lawyer's compensation for professional services rendered are subject to the supervision of the court,
not just to guarantee that the fees he charges and receives remain reasonable and commensurate with the
services rendered, but also to maintain the dignity and integrity of the legal profession to which he
belongs.30

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS to the effect that the
attorney's fees awarded to private respondent Felix Moya is REDUCED to P50,000.00 and the legal interest
of 6% per annum imposed by the Court of Appeals on the amount due to respondent Moya is DELETED.

G.R. No. 152072 July 12, 2007

ROMEO G. ROXAS and SANTIAGO N. PASTOR, Petitioners,

vs.
ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI, PACITA JAVIER, ELIZABETH
R. GONZALES, JOSEFINA R. DAZA, ELIAS REYES, NATIVIDAD REYES, TERESITA REYES,
JOSE REYES and ANTONIO REYES, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 152104

ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI, PACITA JAVIER, ELIZABETH

R. GONZALES, JOSEFINA R. DAZA, ELIAS REYES, NATIVIDAD REYES, TERESITA REYES,
JOSE REYES and ANTONIO REYES, Petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, JOSE B. H. PEDROSA, ROMEO G. ROXAS and
SANTIAGO N. PASTOR, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Self-approbation, pride and self-esteem should not erode and dim the luster and dignity of this Court.
Against overweening bluster and superciliousness, nay, lordly claim, this Court must stand steadfast,
unmoved and uncompromising in upholding what is right and proper. In such posture, the mandate of
affording every man the equal protection of the law cannot dwindle. Strict adherence to ethical conduct and
righteousness without veering away from responsibility will foster an impregnable respect, deference and
even reverence to this Court’s decisions and pronouncements.

In a Resolution1 dated 26 September 2006, the Court En Banc ordered Atty. Romeo G. Roxas to explain in
writing why he should not be held in contempt of court and subjected to disciplinary action when he, in a
letter2 dated 13 September 2006 addressed to Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario with copies thereof
furnished the Chief Justice and all the other Associate Justices, intimated that Justice Nazario decided G.R.
No. 152072 and No. 152104 on considerations other than the pure merits of the case, and called the Supreme
Court a "dispenser of injustice."

The letter of Atty. Roxas reads in part:

As an officer of the court, I am shocked beyond my senses to realize that such a wrongful and unjust decision
has been rendered with you no less as the ponente. This terrible decision will go down in the annals of
jurisprudence as an egregious example of how the Supreme Court, supposedly the last vanguard and bulwark
of justice is itself made, wittingly or unwittingly, as a party to the wrongdoing by giving official and judicial
sanction and conformity to the unjust claims of the Zuzuarreguis. We cannot fathom how such a decision
could have been arrived at except through considerations other than the pure merits of the case. Every law
student reading through the case can see clearly how a brother lawyer in the profession had been so short-
changed by, ironically, the most sacred and highest institution in the administration and dispensation of
justice.

xxxx

This is an unjust and unfair decision, to say the least. x x x We cry out in disbelief that such an impossible
decision could spring forth from the Supreme Court, the ultimate administrator and last bulwark of justice.
As it stands, instead of being an administrator of justice, the Supreme Court is ironically a dispenser of
injustice.

Under the circumstances, we hope you will forgive us in expressing our sentiment in this manner as we are
utterly frustrated and dismayed by the elementary injustice being foisted upon us by the Supreme Court, no
less. Given the facts of the case, we will never understand what moved the Honorable Justice to decide as
she did and what forces and influences caused her to reason out her decision in such an unfair and unjust
manner as to compromise the reputation, integrity and dignity itself of the Supreme Court, as a venerable
institution of justice.

As lawyers, we are officers of the Court so that, while we are being underservedly pained by the seething
injustice of the decision, we will submit to the authority of Highest Court of the Land, even as our reverence
for it has been irreversibly eroded, thanks to your Honor’s Judgment.

xxxx

As for Your Honor, sleep well if you still can. In the end, those we address as Honorable Justice in this
earthly life will [be] judged by the Supreme Dispenser of Justice – where only the merits of Your Honor’s
life will be relevant and material and where technicalities can shield no one from his or her wrongdoings.
Good day to you, Madame Justice!

The decision referred to in the letter is the Court’s decision3 in these consolidated cases where Attys. Roxas
and Santiago N. Pastor were ordered to return, among others, to Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr., et al. the
amount of ₱17,073,224.84.

Roxas and Pastor filed their Motion for Reconsideration4 on 8 March 2006 which they followed with an
Executive Summary5 the day after. In a resolution dated 22 March 2006, the Court noted the Executive
Summary and deferred action on the Motion for Reconsideration.6

On 27 March 2006, the Court denied with finality the Motion for Reconsideration as the basic issues have
already been passed upon and there being no substantial argument to warrant the modification of the Court’s
decision.7

On 30 March 2006, Roxas and Pastor filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration, together with the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.8

The following day, they filed a Motion for Leave to File Motion to Set the Case for Oral Argument, together
with the Motion to Set the Case for Oral Argument (on the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplement
thereto).9 In a Manifestation dated 3 April 2006, Roxas and Pastor asked that a typographical error
appearing in the affidavits of service attached to the motions be corrected and that the Motion to Set Case
for Oral Argument be granted.10

On 7 April 2006, Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr., et al., filed a Motion for Leave to File Comment
on/Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration.11

On 7 June 2006, Roxas and Pastor filed an Urgent and Compelling Motion for Reconsideration (with Motion
to Refer the Case to the En Banc).12

On 7 June 2006, the Office of then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban received from Roxas a letter (with
enclosures)13 dated 6 June 2006 which contained, inter alia, the following:

This is an unjust and unfair decision, to say the least. x x x We cry out in disbelief that such an impossible
decision could spring forth from the Supreme Court, the ultimate administrator and last bulwark of justice.
As it stands, instead of being an administrative of justice, the Supreme Court will ironically be a dispenser
of injustice.

Under the circumstances, we cannot avoid to suspect the bias and partiality of the ponente of the case who
we surmise must have been moved by considerations, other than noble.

In this regard, Mr. Chief Justice, we implore Your Honor, as steward of the Highest Court of the land, to
take appropriate steps to forthwith correct this anomalous decision by first, referring the case to the Supreme
Court En Banc, and then, after allowing us the opportunity to be heard orally En Banc and after judiciously
considering our "Urgent and Compelling Motion for Reconsideration", thereafter reversing the decision of
this Honorable Court’s First Division.
Finally, in order to cleanse the Supreme Court of the blot caused by this case, we most ardently implore
upon Your Honor to immediately direct the conduct of an investigation of how such an impossible decision
was rendered at all and to sanction the perpetrators thereon.

As the Chief Justice, we have faith in you, Sir, to rectify a grievous wrong inflicted upon a member of the
Bar and to restore the good image and reputation of the Court by causing the High Court to reverse such an
inconceivable decision that is unfair, unjust and illegal, being an [impairment] of the obligation of contracts
and against the principle of estoppel.

Said letter was indorsed to the Clerk of Court of the First Division for its inclusion in the agenda.14

On 12 July 2006, the Court resolved to (a) Note Without Action (1) the motion of petitioners Roxas and
Pastor for leave to file supplemental motion for reconsideration of the decision dated January 31, 2006; (2)
the aforesaid supplemental motion for reconsideration; and (3) respondents Zuzuarreguis’ motion for leave
of court to file comment/opposition to motion for reconsideration, said motion for reconsideration having
been denied with finality in the resolution of 27 March 2006; (b) Deny for lack of merit said petitioners’ (1)
motion for leave to file motion to set case for oral argument; and (2) motion to set the case for oral argument
[on the motion for reconsideration and the supplement thereto]; (c) Note petitioners’ manifestation regarding
the correction of typographical error in the affidavit of service of their motion for leave to file motion to set
case for oral argument and said motion to set case for oral arguments; (d) Deny the urgent and compelling
second motion for reconsideration of petitioners Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor of the decision
dated 31 January 2006 [with motion to refer the case to the Court En Banc], considering that a second
motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Sec. 2, Rule 52, in relation to Sec. 4, Rule 56 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended; (e) Deny said petitioners’ motion to refer the cases to the
Court En Banc, the latter not being an appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of the Divisions may
be appealed, pursuant to SC Circular 2-89 dated 7 February 1989, as amended by the resolution of 18
November 1993; and (f) Note the First Indorsement dated 9 June 2006 of the Hon. Chief Justice Artemio
V. Panganiban referring for inclusion in the agenda the thereto attached letter [with enclosures] of Atty.
Romeo G. Roxas, relative to these cases.15

On 13 September 2006, on motion by the Zuzuarreguis for the issuance of entry of judgment, the Court
ordered that entry of judgment in these cases be made in due course.16

On 14 September 2006, Roxas and Pastor filed an Urgent Motion for Clarification of Judgment.17 On even
date, the letter subject of this contempt proceeding dated 13 September 2006 was received by Justice Nazario
with copies thereof furnished the Chief Justice and all the other Associate Justices.18

On 18 September 2006, Roxas and Pastor filed a Motion to Withdraw said motion and instead prayed that
their Urgent and Compelling Motion for Clarification of Judgment dated 15 September 2006 be admitted.19

On 20 September 2006, the Court, treating petitioners Roxas and Pastor’s Urgent Motion for Clarification
of Judgment as a second motion for reconsideration, denied the same for lack of merit. We also noted
without action the motion to withdraw said motion for clarification with intention to re-file the same with
the necessary corrections, and referred to the Court En Banc the letter dated 13 September 2006.20

In a resolution dated 26 September 2006, this Court ordered Atty. Roxas to explain in writing why he should
not be held in contempt of court and subjected to disciplinary action on account of the letter he sent to Justice
Nazario with copies thereof furnished the Chief Justice and all the other Associate Justices.
On 22 November 2006, the Court noted without action petitioner Roxas and Pastor’s Urgent and Compelling
Motion for Clarification of Judgment in light of the denial of their Urgent Motion for Clarification of
Judgment on 20 September 2006 which the Court treated as a second motion for reconsideration.21

On 16 November 2006, by way of compliance with the 26 September 2006 resolution, Atty. Roxas
submitted his written explanation. His letter stated:

With all due respect to this Honorable Court, and beyond my personal grievances, I submit that the ruling
in the subject consolidated cases may not have met the standards or adhered to the basic characteristics of
fair and just decision, such as objectivity, neutrality and conformity to the laws and the constitution. x x x

xxxx

Aside from the fact that the aforesaid ruling appears to be seriously flawed, it also casts grave aspersions on
my personal and professional integrity and honor as a lawyer, officer of the court and advocate of justice.

xxxx

These implications, Your Honors, which I find hard to accept, have caused me severe anxiety, distress and
depredation and have impelled me to exercise my right to express a legitimate grievance or articulate a bona
fide and fair criticism of this Honorable Court’s ruling.

While certain statements, averments and/or declarations in my 13 September 2006 letter may have been
strongly-worded and construed by this Honorable Court as tending to ascribe aspersions on the person of
the Honorable Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, may I assure Your Honors that no such ascription
was ever intended by the undersigned.

Quite notably, despite my aggrieved sentiments and exasperated state, I chose to ventilate my criticisms of
the assailed ruling in a very discreet and private manner. Accordingly, instead of resorting to public criticism
through media exposure, I chose to write a personal letter confined to the hallowed halls of the highest
tribunal of the land and within the bounds of decency and propriety. This was done in good faith with no
intention whatsoever to offend any member, much less tarnish the image of this Honorable Court.

Nonetheless, it is with humble heart and a repentant soul that I express my sincerest apologies not only to
the individual members of this Honorable Court but also to the Supreme Court as a revered institution and
ultimate dispenser of justice.

As earlier explained, I was merely exercising my right to express a legitimate grievance or articulate a bona
fide and fair criticism of this Honorable Court’s ruling. If the nature of my criticism/comment or the manner
in which it was carried out was perceived to have transgressed the permissible parameters of free speech
and expression, I am willing to submit myself to the sound and judicious discretion of this Honorable Court.
xxx

After reviewing the records of these cases, We firmly stand by our decision which Atty. Roxas described to
be unjust, unfair and impossible, and arrived at through considerations other than the pure merits of the case.
Atty. Roxas’s insistence that said decision did not meet the standards or adhered to the basic characteristics
of fair and just decision, such as objectivity, neutrality and conformity to the laws and the Constitution, is
simply without basis. The fact that the decision was not in his favor does not mean that the same was contrary
to our laws and was not rendered in a fair and impartial manner.

In one case,22 we had this to say when a lawyer challenged the integrity not only of the Court of Appeals
but also of this Court by claiming that the courts knowingly rendered an unjust judgment:

We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming that his personal
knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are superior to that of both the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to erode the people's faith in the integrity of the courts of justice
and in the administration of justice. He repeatedly invoked his supposed quest for law and justice as
justification for his contemptuous statements without realizing that, in seeking both abstract elusive terms,
he is merely pursuing his own personal concept of law and justice. He seems not to comprehend that what
to him may be lawful or just may not be so in the minds of others. He could not accept that what to him may
appear to be right or correct may be wrong or erroneous from the viewpoint of another. x x x.

It is to be noted that prior to his letter dated 13 September 2006, Atty. Roxas wrote then Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban asking for an immediate investigation of "how such an impossible decision was
rendered at all and to sanction the perpetrators thereon." It is to be stressed that then Chief Justice
Panganiban was a member of the Division who concurred in the ponencia written by Justice Nazario. The
former and the other three members23 of the Division did not find anything illegal, unjust or unfair about
the decision; otherwise, they would have registered their dissents. There was none. The decision was arrived
at after a thorough deliberation of the members of the Court.

Atty. Roxas faulted the Supreme Court when "(o)ur two Motions for Reconsiderations were
unceremoniously denied via Minute Resolutions without addressing at all the merits of our very solid
arguments. We cannot help but observe the High Court’s resort to technicalities (that a second motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading) if only for it to avoid meeting the merits and arguments directly."

It is settled that the Court is not duty-bound to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion
to formulate Decisions and/or minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its
evaluation of a case.24 In the case before us, after going over the motion for reconsideration filed by Roxas
and Pastor, we did not find any substantial argument that would merit the modification of our decision and
that would require an extended resolution since the basic issues had already been passed upon.

In his letter subject of this contempt proceeding, Atty. Roxas accused Justice Nazario of deciding the case
through "considerations other than the pure merits of the case." He averred that "we will never understand
what moved the Honorable Justice to decide as she did and what forces and influences caused her to reason
out her decision in such an unfair and unjust manner as to compromise the reputation, integrity and dignity
itself of the Supreme Court, as a venerable institution of justice." He then ended by mocking her when he
said "sleep well if you still can" and that her "earthly life will [be] judged by the Supreme Dispenser of
Justice where only the merits of Your Honor’s life will be relevant and material and where technicalities
can shield no one from his or her wrongdoings."

As to the Court, supposedly the last vanguard and bulwark of justice, he likewise accuses it of making itself,
wittingly or unwittingly, a party to the wrongdoing by giving official and judicial sanction and conformity
to the unjust claims of the adverse party. He added: "This is an unjust and unfair decision, to say the least.
x x x We cry out in disbelief that such an impossible decision could spring forth from the Supreme Court,
the ultimate administrator and last bulwark of justice. As it stands, instead of being an administrator of
justice, the Supreme Court is ironically a dispenser of injustice."

In his letter of explanation, Atty. Roxas extended apologies to Justice Nazario, to the other members of the
High Court and to the High Court itself as a revered institution and ultimate dispenser of justice. He said he
was merely exercising his right to express a legitimate grievance or articulate a bona fide and fair criticism
of the Honorable Court’s ruling. He explained that his criticism of the assailed ruling was done in good faith
with no intention whatsoever to offend any member, much less tarnish the image of the Court. Instead of
resorting to public criticism through media exposure, he chose to ventilate his criticism in a very discreet
and private manner by writing a personal letter confined to the hallowed halls of the Court and within bounds
of decency and propriety.

We find the explanations of Atty. Roxas unsatisfactory. The accusation against Justice Nazario is clearly
without basis. The attack on the person of Justice Nazario has caused her pain and embarrassment. His letter
is full of contemptuous remarks tending to degrade the dignity of the Court and erode public confidence that
should be accorded it.

To prevent liability from attaching on account of his letter, he invokes his rights to free speech and privacy
of communication. The invocation of these rights will not, however, free him from liability. As already
stated, his letter contained defamatory statements that impaired public confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary. The making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free
speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be
disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the independence and
efficiency of courts or public respect therefor and confidence therein.25 Free expression must not be used
as a vehicle to satisfy one’s irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court
and its magistrates.26

This Court does not curtail the right of a lawyer, or any person for that matter, to be critical of courts and
judges as long as they are made in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels. This Court in
In re: Almacen27 said:

Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This
right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that is it articulated
by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because
then the court’s actuation are thrown open to public consumption. x x x

xxxx

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. For
like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society,
nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizen whom it is expected to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize
in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. x x x

xxxx
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to
consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he professionally answerable
for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as
a citizen.

xxxx

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls
of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and
slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation
of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

In the case at bar, we find the statements made by Atty. Roxas to have been made mala fides and exceeded
the boundaries of decency and propriety. By his unfair and unfounded accusation against Justice Nazario,
and his mocking of the Court for allegedly being part of a wrongdoing and being a dispenser of injustice,
he abused his liberty of speech.

In In re: Wenceslao Laureta,28 cited in United BF Homeowners v. Sandoval-Gutierrez,29 we ruled:

To allow litigants to go beyond the Court’s resolution and claim that the members acted "with deliberate
bad faith" and rendered an "unjust resolution" in disregard or violation of the duty of their high office to act
upon their own independent consideration and judgment of the matter at hand would be to destroy the
authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resolutions and to disregard utterly the
presumption of regular performance of official duty. To allow such collateral attack would destroy the
separation of powers and undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable
disputes.

xxxx

In resume, we find that respondent Ilustre has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and
criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice in her letters addressed to the individual
Justices quoted in the show-cause Resolution of this court en banc, particularly the under lined portions
thereof; in the language of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan quoted and underscored in the same
Resolution; in her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or the official
actions of the justices concerned and her ascription of improper motives to them; and in her unjustified
outburst that she can no longer expect justice from this Court. The fact that said letters are not technically
considered pleadings, nor the fact that they were submitted after the main petition had been finally resolved
does not detract from the gravity of the contempt committed. The constitutional right of freedom of speech
or right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court.

Atty. Roxas likewise cannot hide under the mantle of the right to privacy. It must be disclosed that prior to
his letter addressed to Justice Nazario, Atty. Roxas first wrote then Chief Justice Panganiban asking for an
investigation as to how the assailed decision was rendered and to sanction the perpetrators. The accusations
contained therein are similar to those in his letter to Justice Nazario. The fact that his letters were merely
addressed to the Justices of this Court and were not disseminated to the media is of no moment. Letters
addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial functions, become part
of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire court.30 As can be gathered from the records,
the letter to then Chief Justice Panganiban was merely noted and no show-cause order was issued in the
hope that Atty. Roxas would stop his assault on the Court. However, since Atty. Roxas persisted in attacking
the Court via his second letter, it behooved the Court to order him to explain why he should not be held in
contempt of court and subjected to disciplinary action.

Under the circumstances, we find Atty. Romeo G. Roxas guilty of indirect contempt of court under Section
3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Said section reads:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been
filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed
by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be
punished for indirect contempt:

xxxx

d. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration
of justice; x x x.

xxxx

Section 7, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides the penalty for indirect
contempt as follows:

Sec. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. – If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt
committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a
fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months or both. x x x.

The disrespect caused to the Court by Atty. Roxas merits a fine of ₱30,000.00 with a warning that a
repetition of a similar act will warrant a more severe penalty.

With his contemptuous and defamatory statements, Atty. Roxas likewise violated Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly Canons 11.03 and 11.04.1avvphi1 These provisions read:

CANON 11 -- A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE
COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY
OTHERS

xxxx

Rule 11.03. – A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive and menacing language or behavior before
the Courts.

Rule 11.04. – A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.

It is the duty of a lawyer as an officer of the court to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts and to
promote confidence in the fair administration of justice and in the Supreme Court as the last bulwark of
justice and democracy.31 Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution. Without
such guarantee, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.32 When confronted with actions
and statements, from lawyers and non-lawyers alike, that tend to promote distrust and undermine public
confidence in the judiciary, this Court will not hesitate to wield its inherent power to cite any person in
contempt. In so doing, it preserves its honor and dignity and safeguards the morals and ethics of the legal
profession.33

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Romeo G. Roxas is found GUILTY of indirect contempt of
court. He is hereby FINED the amount of ₱30,000.00 to be paid within ten (10) days from receipt of this
Resolution and WARNED that a repetition of a similar act will warrant a more severe penalty.

G.R. No. 155224 August 23, 2006

VINSON B. PINEDA, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. CLODUALDO C. DE JESUS, ATTY. CARLOS AMBROSIO and ATTY. EMMANUEL
MARIANO, Respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

The subject of this petition for review is the April 30, 2002 decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 68080 which modified the order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 151, in
JDRC Case No. 2568 entitled Ma. Aurora D. Pineda v. Vinson B. Pineda.

The facts follow.

On April 6, 1993, Aurora Pineda filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against petitioner
Vinson Pineda in the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151, docketed as JDRC Case No. 2568. Petitioner was
represented by respondents Attys. Clodualdo de Jesus, Carlos Ambrosio and Emmanuel Mariano.

During the pendency of the case, Aurora proposed a settlement to petitioner regarding her visitation rights
over their minor child and the separation of their properties. The proposal was accepted by petitioner and
both parties subsequently filed a motion for approval of their agreement. This was approved by the trial
court. On November 25, 1998, the marriage between petitioner and Aurora Pineda was declared null and
void.

Throughout the proceedings, respondent counsels were well-compensated.3 They, including their relatives
and friends, even availed of free products and treatments from petitioner’s dermatology clinic. This
notwithstanding, they billed petitioner additional legal fees amounting to P16.5 million4 which the latter,
however, refused to pay. Instead, petitioner issued them several checks totaling P1.12 million5 as "full
payment for settlement."6

Still not satisfied, respondents filed in the same trial court7 a motion

for payment of lawyers’ fees for P50 million.8

On April 14, 2000, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay P5 million to Atty. de Jesus, P2 million to Atty.
Ambrosio and P2 million to Atty. Mariano.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced the amount as follows: P1 million to Atty. de Jesus, P500,000 to
Atty. Ambrosio and P500,000 to Atty. Mariano. The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this
recourse.

The issues raised in this petition are:

(1) whether the Pasig RTC, Branch 151 had jurisdiction over the claim for additional legal fees and

(2) whether respondents were entitled to additional legal fees.

First, a lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident of the main
action in which his services were rendered or in an independent suit against his client. The former is
preferable to avoid multiplicity of suits.9

The Pasig RTC, Branch 151, where the case for the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed, had
jurisdiction over the motion for the payment of legal fees. Respondents sought to collect P50 million which
was equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties awarded to petitioner in that case. Clearly, what
respondents were demanding was additional payment for legal services rendered in the same case.

Second, the professional engagement between petitioner and respondents was governed by the principle of
quantum meruit which means "as much as the lawyer deserves."10 The recovery of attorney’s fees on this
basis is permitted, as in this case, where there is no express agreement for the payment of attorney’s fees.
Basically, it is a legal mechanism which prevents an unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits
of the legal services of counsel without paying for it. In the same vein, it avoids unjust enrichment on the
part of the lawyer himself.

Further, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid controversies with
clients concerning their compensation and to resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice
or fraud. Suits to collect fees should be avoided and should be filed only when circumstances force lawyers
to resort to it.11

In the case at bar, respondents’ motion for payment of their lawyers’ fees was not meant to collect what was
justly due them; the fact was, they had already been adequately paid.

Demanding P50 million on top of the generous sums and perks already given to them was an act of
unconscionable greed which is shocking to this Court.

As lawyers, respondents should be reminded that they are members of an honorable profession, the primary
vision of which is justice. It is respondents’ despicable behavior which gives lawyering a bad name in the
minds of some people. The vernacular has a word for it: nagsasamantala. The practice of law is a decent
profession and not a money-making trade. Compensation should be but a mere incident.12

Respondents’ claim for additional legal fees was not justified. They could not charge petitioner a fee based
on percentage, absent an express agreement to that effect. The payments to them in cash, checks, free
products and services from petitioner’s business — all of which were not denied by respondents — more
than sufficed for the work they did. The "full payment for settlement"13 should have discharged petitioner’s
obligation to them.

The power of this Court to reduce or even delete the award of attorneys’ fees cannot be denied. Lawyers are
officers of the Court and they participate in the fundamental function of administering justice.14 When they
took their oath, they submitted themselves to the authority of the Court and subjected their professional fees
to judicial control. 15

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated April 30, 2002 in CA–G.R. CV No. 68080 is hereby MODIFIED. The award of additional attorney’s
fees in favor of respondents is hereby DELETED.

A.C. No. 1890 August 7, 2002

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RAFAEL G. SUNTAY, respondent.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This Complaint for disbarment was filed by Federico C. Suntay against his nephew, Atty. Rafael G. Suntay,
alleging that respondent was his legal counsel, adviser and confidant who was privy to all his legal, financial
and political affairs from 1956 to 1964. However, since they parted ways because of politics and
respondent's overweening political ambitions in 1964, respondent had been filing complaints and cases
against complainant, making use of confidential information gained while their attorney-client relationship
existed, and otherwise harassing him at every turn.

Complainant enumerated the following cases filed by respondent to harass him: (a) Civil Case No. 4306-
M1 for injunction and damages in 1975, "Carlos Panganiban v. Dr. Federico Suntay," where respondent
appeared as counsel for the plaintiff involving fishponds which respondent had previously helped to
administer; (b) Civil Case No. 4726-M,2 "Narciso Lopez v. Federico Suntay," in 1970 where respondent
appeared as counsel for the plaintiff to determine the real contract between the parties likewise involving
the two (2) fishponds which respondent had previously helped to administer; (c) Civil Case No. 112764,3
"Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay," for damages where respondent appeared as counsel for the plaintiff;
and, (d) I.S. No. 77-1523, "Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay," for false testimony and grave oral
defamation before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan involving complainant's same testimony
subject of the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 112764.

In addition, complainant alleged that respondent relentlessly pursued a case against him for violation of PD
No. 2964 for the alleged disappearance of two (2) creeks traversing complainant's fishpond in Bulacan
covered by TCT No. T-15674. Complainant alleged that respondent's possession and examination of the
TCT and the blueprint plan of the property while he was still counsel for complainant provided him with
the information that there used to be two (2) creeks traversing the fishpond, and that since respondent helped
in the administration of the fishpond, he also came to know that the two (2) creeks had disappeared.
Required to answer the charges respondent filed a "Motion to Order Complainant to Specify His Charges"
alleging that complainant failed to specify the alleged "confidential information or intelligence" gained by
him while the attorney-client relationship existed but which he allegedly used against complainant when the
relationship terminated. Complainant filed his Comments thereon as required in our Resolution of 26 July
1978. Thereafter this case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report,
and recommendation in our Resolution dated 23 October 1978.

After almost four (4) years the OSG submitted its Report and Recommendation dated 14 October 1982
enumerating the following findings against respondent, to wit:

The evidence presented by complainant which was largely unrebutted by respondent establish two counts
of malpractice against respondent, one count of violating the confidentiality of client-lawyer relationship
and one count of engaging in unethical conduct.

1. Respondent committed malpractice when he represented Magno Dinglasan in the case for false testimony
and grave oral defamation filed by Magno Dinglasan against complainant before the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Bulacan (I.S. No. 77-1523).

The case stemmed from the testimony given by complainant on December 21, 1976, before the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 3930-M. When asked why Magno Dinglasan had testified against
him in that case, complainant stated that he once declined the demand of Magno Dinglasan, a former official
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for ₱150,000.00 as consideration for the destruction of complainant’s
record in the Bureau.

On account of that testimony, Magno Dinglasan charged complainant on July 29, 1977 with the crime of
false testimony and grave oral defamation (Exhibits G and G-1). During the preliminary investigation of the
case by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, respondent acted as counsel for Magno Dinglasan.
When the case was dismissed by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan and it was elevated to the
Ministry of Justice on appeal, respondent continued to be the lawyer of Magno Dinglasan.

Complainant testified in this disbarment proceeding that he consulted respondent, who was then his counsel,
about the demand made in 1957 or 1958 by Magno Dinglasan for ₱150,000.00 as consideration for the
destruction of complainant’s record in the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Respondent’s advice was for
complainant to disregard the demand as it was improper. Later, when Magno Dinglasan reduced the amount
to ₱50,000.00, complainant again consulted respondent. Respondent likewise advised complainant not to
heed the demand (pp. 61-62, tsn, May 21, 1981).

Respondent’s representation of Magno Dinglasan in I.S. No. 77-1523 constitutes malpractice (Section 27,
Rule 138, Rules of Court) for respondent was previously the lawyer of complainant and respondent was
consulted by complainant regarding the very matter which was the subject of the case. By serving as the
lawyer of Magno Dinglasan, in I.S. No. 77-1523, respondent thus represented an interest which conflicted
with the interest of his former client.

2. Respondent again committed malpractice when he served as lawyer of Magno Dinglasan in Civil Case
No. 112764 before the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Civil Case No. 112764 was an action for damages filed by Magno Dinglasan against complainant based,
among others, on the same testimony that complainant gave on December 21, 1976 before the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 3930-M.

For the same reasons set forth above, respondent’s representation of Magno Dinglasan in Civil Case No.
112764 constitutes malpractice as thereby he represented conflicting interests.

3. In filing a charge against complainant for alleged illegal destruction of dikes, respondent violated the
confidentiality of information obtained out of a client-lawyer relationship.

In his capacity as lawyer of complainant from 1956 to 1964, respondent had the following functions:

"Witness

"A: He was my lawyer from 1956 from the time he passed the bar up to sometime in 1964 and my legal
adviser on political matters and legal matters.

"ATTY. AQUINO:

"Q: As your lawyer from 1956 to 1964, will you kindly inform the Honorable Hearing Officer what was the
nature of the work of Atty. Suntay?

"A: He handled my cases on the titling of our properties. He served as my legal counsel in the Hagonoy
Rural Bank of which my family is the majority stockholders. He used to help me manage my fishpond. He
is our legal adviser on legal matters. He is our confidant. We have no secrets between us. He has complete
access in our papers (tsn, May 21, 1981)

Complainant owned several fishponds in Bulacan, among them, the fishpond covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-15674. This fishpond was previously traversed by two creeks, Sapang Malalim
and Sapang Caluang. The existence of the creeks is shown by the certificate of title and the blue print plan
of the fishpond. In the certificate of title, the fishpond is bounded on the north and northeast by Sapang
Caluang and on the west by Sapang Malalim (please see Exhibit 6).

In a letter dated March 17, 1973, respondent reported the disappearance of the two creeks to the authorities.
The Chief State Prosecutor referred the letter to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan. The Office
of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan required the Public Works to conduct a re-survey. (Exhibit 6).

In 1974, the Ministry of Public Works conducted a relocation survey of the fishpond.1âwphi1 The relocation
survey disclosed that there were no more creeks traversing the fishpond. Sapang Malalim and Sapang
Caluang had disappeared.

Respondent was requested to file a formal complaint with supporting affidavits, for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 296. Respondent did so and the complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 74-193. (Exhibit 6)

From the foregoing facts, it is clear that respondent made use of the information he gained while he was the
lawyer of complainant as basis for his complaint for the building of illegal dikes. His possession and
examination of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15674 and the blueprint plan provided him the
information that there used to be two creeks traversing the fishpond covered by the title. Since he helped in
the administration of the fishpond, he also came to know that the two creeks had disappeared. Thus, he
gained the data which became the basis of his complaint when he was a lawyer and part administrator of
complainant. Under the circumstances, there is a violation of professional confidence.

4. The evidence also establishes the commission of unethical conduct by respondent for serving as lawyer
of Panganiban and Lopez x x x and for himself filing criminal charges against complainant which were later
dismissed. The cases wherein respondent served as lawyer for the adversary of complainant or filed by
respondent himself against complainant are the following:

1. Carlos Panganiban v. Federico Suntay, Civil Case No. 4306-M, CFI, Branch VII, Malolos, Bulacan;

2. Narciso Lopez v. Federico Suntay, Civil Case No. 4726-M, CFI, Branch II, Malolos, Bulacan;

3. Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay, I.S. No. 77-1523, Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan;

4. Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay, Civil Case No. 112764, CFI, Branch XX, Manila; and

5. Rafael G. Suntay and Magno Dinglasan v. Federico C. Suntay, I.S. No. 74-193, Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Bulacan, for violation of P.D. 296.

While there may be validity to respondent’s contention that it is not improper for a lawyer to file a case
against a former client, especially when the professional relationship had ended several years before, yet
under the over-all circumstances of the case at bar it can not be said that respondent acted ethically.
Complainant was not a mere client of respondent. He is an uncle and a political benefactor. The parties for
whom respondent filed cases against complainant were former friends or associates of complainant whom
respondent met when he was serving as the lawyer and general adviser of complainant. The cases filed by
respondent were about properties which respondent had something to do with as counsel and administrator
of complainant.

xxxx

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, undersigned respectfully submit that the evidence establishes
commission by respondent of malpractice for violating the confidentiality of client-lawyer relationship and
engaging in unethical conduct x x x x5

Resolution of this case was delayed despite receipt of the foregoing Report and Recommendation in view
of the Omnibus Motion to Remand Case to the Office of the Solicitor General; Motion to Disqualify
Solicitor Rogelio Dancel to Act on this Case and Motion to Suspend Period to File Answer dated 18 January
1983 filed by respondent principally accusing handling Solicitor Dancel of having given unwarranted
advantage and preference to the complainant in the investigation of the case.

After several pleadings on the issue were filed by both respondent and Solicitor Rogelio Dancel, the Court
in its Resolution dated 22 August 1983 denied respondent's motion to disqualify Solicitor Dancel and
required the OSG to proceed with the investigation of this case.1âwphi1 However, no further proceedings
were conducted by the OSG until the records of the case together with other cases were turned over to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 19 May 1988.
After almost three (3) years from the time the records of this case were turned over to it, the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline submitted to this Court on 11 May 2001 Resolution No. XIV-2001-169 adopting and
approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner finding respondent guilty as
charged. The IBP recommended that respondent Atty. Suntay be suspended from the practice of law for two
(2) years for immoral conduct. In so recommending the Investigating Commissioner adopted in toto the
findings of the OSG in its Report and Recommendation dated 14 October 1982. In our Resolution of 5
September 2001 we noted the foregoing IBP Resolution. However, in view of the penalty involved, this
case was referred to the Court En Banc for final action pursuant to our Resolution dated 18 January 2000,
Sec. 2, par. (b), in A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC.6

After a review of the records of this case, the Court finds the IBP Recommendation to be well taken. As
found by both the OSG and the IBP Investigating Commissioner, respondent Atty. Rafael G. Suntay acted
as counsel for clients in cases involving subject matters regarding which he had either been previously
consulted by complainant or which he had previously helped complainant to administer as the latter's
counsel and confidant from 1956 to 1964. Thus in Civil Cases Nos. 4306-M and 4726-M respondent acted
as counsel for estranged business associates of complainant, namely, Carlos Panganiban and Narciso Lopez,
the subject matter of which were the two (2) fishponds which respondent had previously helped to
administer.

On the other hand, I.S. No. 77-1523 for false testimony and grave oral defamation before the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, and Civil Case No. 112764 for damages before the then Court of First Instance
of Manila, were filed in behalf of Magno Dinglasan, a former Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) official,
regarding whose alleged demand for ₱150,000.00 from complainant in exchange for the destruction of the
latter's record in the BIR, respondent had previously advised complainant to disregard. Civil Case No.
117624 and I.S. No. 77-1523 were precisely filed against complainant because the latter had previously
testified on the alleged demand made by Dinglasan. Although respondent denied that there was ever such a
demand made by Dinglasan, the point is that his word on the matter, i.e., whether there was in fact such a
demand, would carry much weight against complainant considering that he was the latter's counsel in 1957
or 1958 when the alleged demand was made. In addition, respondent initiated the prosecution of complainant
in I.S. No. 74-193 for violation of P.D. No. 2967 for the disappearance of the two (2) creeks, namely, Sapang
Malalim and Sapang Caluang, previously traversing complainant's fishpond in Bulacan covered by TCT
No. T-15674 by using information obtained while he was in possession of the certificate of title and the
blueprint plan of the property.

As the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 21.01. - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:

a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;

b) When required by law;

c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial action.

Rule 21.01. - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of
employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with
full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his clients even after termination of the attorney-
client relation.8 As his defense to the charges, respondent averred that complainant failed to specify the
alleged confidential information used against him. Such a defense is unavailing to help respondent's cause
for as succinctly explained in Hilado v. David - 9

Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated affair,
consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the complexity of what is
said in the course of the dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature suggested would
lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the
complainant’s cause. And the theory would be productive of other unsalutary results. To make the passing
of confidential communication a condition precedent, i.e., to make the employment conditioned on the scope
and character of the knowledge acquired by an attorney in determining his right to change sides, would not
enhance the freedom of litigants, which is to be sedulously fostered, to consult with lawyers upon what they
believe are their rights in litigation. The condition would of necessity call for an investigation of what
information the attorney has received and in what way it is or it is not in conflict with his new position.
Litigants would in consequence be wary in going to an attorney, lest by an unfortunate turn of the
proceeding, if an investigation be held, the court should accept the attorney’s inaccurate version of the facts
that came to him x x x x

Hence, the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the
yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest
practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of
unprofessional practice x x x x It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste x x x x [T]he
question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to
proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar’s wife, not
only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-
dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, IBP Resolution No. XIV-2001-169 dated 29 April 2001 is adopted
and approved. For violating the confidentiality of lawyer-client relationship and for unethical conduct,
respondent Atty. Rafael G. Suntay is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years effective upon
the finality hereof.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and all courts throughout the country.