Drew Pollhammer

On the Significance of the Tragic in

Moses Mendelssohn’s Aesthetics of Perfection

Moses Mendelssohn first wrote on the ‘problem of tragedy’ for an aesthetics of

perfection in his 1755 essay “On Sentiments” (Beiser 206). The problem, as it arose there,

concerned the fact that one often finds the aesthetic experience of perceiving various kinds of

imperfections in art as somehow pleasing. This reality poses a problem for any aesthetics of

perfection inasmuch as such aesthetic theories contend that pleasure is the sensuous intuition of

the perfection of an object (Guyer 259–260). The problem, or paradox, then concerns how it is

the case that experience proves that one often does take pleasure in the intuition of tragic events

in art, where tragedy must be seen as an imperfection in the aesthetic object.

In the present essay, I will explain how Mendelssohn overcomes the “problem of tragic

pleasure” (Beiser 198) by developing his theory of ‘mixed sentiments’. I will ultimately show

how the notions of love and sympathy in Mendelssohn’s theory of mixed sentiments allows him

to circumvent the problem of tragic pleasure in a way that had momentous significance for the

development of German aesthetics following him.

As noted above, Mendelssohn first wrote on the problem of tragic pleasure in the early

essay “On Sentiments”. There, Mendelssohn describes the problem thus: “Human beings are so
   2  

peculiar in their delights that often they take pleasure in what ought to arouse their sorrow;

indeed even in the very instant that it arouses their sorrow …The grisly sight pleases”

(Philosophical Writings 36).1 Mendelssohn then poses the question, “[w]hence this peculiar

satisfaction?” (Ibid.). The question—“whence this peculiar satisfaction?”—troubled

Mendelssohn for many years over the course of the development of theory of mixed sentiments

up until the 1771 second version of the “Rhapsody or addition to the Letters on sentiments”. On

this point, Frederick Beiser states that “Mendelssohn’s thinking about tragedy was turbulent,

undergoing constant revisions and reversals” (Beiser 206).

At this earliest stage of Mendelssohn’s grappling with the problem of tragic pleasure, i.e.,

in the dialogue “On Sentiments”, the problem was posed with reference to the aesthetic intuition

of a painting of a sea ship in the midst of being torn asunder during a violent storm. In the

dialogue Mendelssohn (under the guise of Euphranor) states to his interlocutor Theocles: “You

yourself, Theocles, how often have you doted on the painting that shines in my father’s cabinet

… It is a ship that, having battled long enough with the storm and waves, is finally sinking …

And this sight pleases you Theocles?” (PW 36-37). The reasons for how it possible is that such a

sight—a tragic and therefore imperfect sight—could please Theocles is what Mendelssohn’s

aesthetics of perfections must uncover, and in such a way that the very possibility of an

aesthetics of perfection is not undermined by an irrationalism which would allow for pleasurable

intuitions of the imperfect without reason2.

                                                                                                               
1  Hereafter  cited  as  PW.    
2  Cf. Beiser: “Behind the conundrum of tragic pleasure there lurked an even greater danger:

irrationalism. Since perfection is the form or structure of reason, the pleasure that we take in the
imperfection of tragedy seems to show that we are not entirely rational beings. Indeed, it
suggests that we enjoy things just because they are disorderly, destructive, frenzied, and even
mad” (206)

 
   3  

Here it will be helpful to explain a bit more in detail why such a pleasure in something

imperfect poses a problem for an aesthetics of perfection. It is first necessary to properly

distinguish imperfections in objects from perfections in objects. Mendelssohn concisely

distinguishes the differences between imperfections in objects and perfections in objects in the

“Rhapsody”. Here, Mendelssohn states: “the affirmative features of a matter constitute the

elements of its perfection, just as the negative features on the same constitute the elements of its

imperfection” (PW 132–133).

Mendelssohn then goes on to further define aesthetic perfection, following Wolff, as a

“multiplicity which harmonizes in something common”, where this “something common” is the

natural law, or reason, which harmonizes the multiplicity into a unity (PW 133; Cf. Koller 329–

330). Hence Mendelssohn’s definition of a pleasant sentiment as “nothing other than the clear,

but indistinct intuiting of perfection” (151–emphasis in original). Earlier, in “On Sentiments”,

Mendelssohn refers to such a pleasant sentiment as the “pleasure of beauty” (PW 24). The

intuition of the beautiful is the clear but indistinct intuition of the harmonizing of the many in the

unity of the natural law that binds them as a unity. This is to say that when intuiting the beautiful,

one does not analyze each distinct aspect of the parts of thing which comprise its unity, but rather

sees the whole simply in its wholeness, i.e., as indistinct but nevertheless whole in its pleasurable

clearness to sensuous intuition.

If one were to view each distinct law-like adherence of each discrete part of a unity, one

would get caught up in a process of endless micro-analysis and would thereby not be able to

view the unity of the multiplicity wherein consists the pleasure of intuitions of the beautiful. As
   4  

an example of the intuition of sensuous perfection, Mendelssohn offers the intuition of two dwarf

trees. He writes:

If you observe two dwarf trees in your fruit garden and pay heed to the branches which
ascend in circular order, you then appreciate the sensuous beauty of the trees. Its
appearance pleases you, and your sensuous feeling is excited. A type of perfection is, to
be sure, bound up with the beauty since given the general design of beauty a reason may
be given why the branches are aligned just so. But the purpose of the order is to delight
the senses through a simple proportion, and the perfection depends upon the beauty (PW
24)

What is important to note in this example is that, while it is the case that there is a

“general design”, a “circular order” and a “reason” for why the “branches are aligned just so” for

the dwarf trees, it isn’t the reason as reason, which is intuited in sensuous experience, but rather

the clear but indistinct whole as pleasurable, which is to say as beautiful. By stating that the

perfection depends upon beauty in this example, Mendelssohn means that one has to have the

pleasurable experience of the object as a beautiful intuition (and therefore not as an intellectual

intuition of perfection) in order for “sensuous perfection” to be gleaned.3 This move marks a

momentous achievement in aesthetics inasmuch as it ushers in the autonomy of aesthetic

intuition as something wholly different than intellectual perfection.

To recap, sensuous perfection is the pleasure in intuitions of the beautiful: one is pleased

by the beauty of the clear intuition of on a object (for example, the dwarf trees), despite the fact
                                                                                                               
3  Here  it  is  necessary  to  qualify  this  remark  by  pointing  out  an  ambiguity  in  Mendelssohn’s  

account  of  whether  the  perfection  depends  upon  the  beauty  or  whether  the  opposite  is  the  
case,  as  Mendelssohn  notes  in  the  “Rhapsody”:  “As  far  as  pleasant  sentiments  are  
concerned,  they  are  an  effect  of  perfection,  a  gift  of  heaven  inseparable  from  knowledge  and  
from  the  choice  of  the  good”  (PW  151).  I  contend  that  Mendelssohn’s  comments  in  the  
“Rhapsody”  take  philosophical  precedence  over  his  earlier  remarks  in  “On  Sentiments”.  
One  way  to  deal  with  this  ambiguity  is  to  contend  that  in  aesthetic  intuition  the  pleasure  in  
the  beauty  of  an  object  is  what  the  specifically  aesthetic  perfection  “depends”  on,  but  
inasmuch  as  aesthetic  intuition  is  a  lesser  kind  of  intuition  than  intellectual  intuition,  
aesthetic  perfections  are,  in  fact,  an  effect  of  the  highest,  i.e.  intellectual  perfections.  I  
contend  that  this  is  the  case.      
   5  

that one does not at the same time intuit each distinct natural law within the multiplicity for “why

the branches are aligned just so” (PW 24). It is intellectual perfection, as opposed to sensuous

perfection, which is concerned with the intuition of each distinct natural-law-abiding connection

in the multiplicity of the tree and its connection to everything else. On this point, Mendelssohn

states: “consider these leaves, these branches, these buds here, those blossoms there; what sort of

common final purpose binds them together. In what connection do they stand to the tree and,

through it, to the whole of things?” (PW 24). Intellectual intuitions are thus concerned with

distinct objects, their connections, and their final purposes, which is to say their reasons for

being.

Having defined sensuous, or aesthetic, perfection and distinguished it from intellectual

perfection, it is now possible to unravel the problem of tragic pleasure: why it is the case that

objects which should not please us, i.e., objects with imperfections, nonetheless do please us in

some way. First, it is important to note why it is the case that something tragic in an object, for

example the image of the impending death of sailors aboard a ship in peril, comprises its being

imperfect. This will require a brief description of Mendelssohn’s notion of the will.

Mendelssohn’s theory of perfection is intertwined with his metaphysical theory of the

will. Following Plato, Mendelssohn contends that everyone desires the good. This is perhaps

nowhere more evident than in the “Rhapsody” where Mendelssohn states: “each spirit generally,

is originally oriented to the good and perfect, and that the choice of a spirit which is free could

not possibly have anything but perfection as its sufficient reason” (PW 150). It is with respect to

this theory of the will that the “problem of tragic pleasure” is so troublesome for Mendelssohn.

How can it be the case that every spirit desires the good and desires perfection, and yet a spirit

can find pleasure in that which has imperfections? Importantly, the fact that tragic objects are
   6  

imperfect is evident in the fact that upon viewing them, even as in some manner pleasurable, we

nevertheless also feel a certain pain or repulsion; and these feelings necessarily denote an

imperfection in the object.

To repeat a remark from above, Mendelssohn states that “the affirmative features of a

matter constitute the elements of its perfection, just as the negative features on the same

constitute the elements of its imperfection” (PW 132–133). The fact that one feels a degree of

displeasure in the viewing of tragic objects denotes the fact that there is something imperfect in

them; there is a lack of pleasurable harmony in our intuition of them inasmuch as their content

contains these negative features, i.e., the tragic features, which displease the viewer (PW 133).

Inasmuch as Mendelssohn’s aesthetics of perfection as well as his theory of the will cannot allow

that rational beings find pleasure in imperfect things, i.e., things which contravene the rational

being’s desire for the good, he must find a way of overcoming this problem. He does so with his

theory of mixed sentiments, to which I now turn.

Mendelssohn’s ingenious move of establishing the notion of mixed sentiments allows

him to claim that the pleasure that we feel in viewing tragic objects is not a pleasure felt for the

object itself, but rather for the subjectively affirmative powers that the tragic objects arouse in us.

On this point, Mendelssohn writes:

Each individual representation stands in a twofold relation. It is related, at once, to the

matter before it as its object (of which it is a picture or copy) and then to the soul or the
thinking subject (of which it constitutes a determination). As a determination of the soul,
many a representation can have something pleasant about it although, as a picture of the
object, it is accompanied by disapproval and a feeling of repugnance. (PW 132)

Thus, a mixed sentiment is an intuition involving the simultaneous disapproval of the

imperfect/tragic object and the approval of the enhanced perfection of the soul in knowing of

disapproving of the object’s imperfection. Mendelssohn is clear on this: “negative determinations

   7  

… arouse dissatisfaction in relation to the object and satisfaction in relation to the mind’s

projection which intuitively knows and disapproves of the object” (PW 146).

In mixed sentiments concerning the intuition of something tragic4 in objects, one feels

repelled by the tragic object itself, but finds pleasure in the powers of the soul which are able to

determine the imperfections in the object; and it is such determinations which increase the

perfection of the soul itself—an increase in perfection the soul cannot but find pleasurable.

Alexander Rueger aptly describes the pleasure that the soul finds in its powers to perfect itself in

the intuition of mixed sentiments thus: “That we feel our mental faculties set in motion by the

repulsive object, that we feel repulsed, is in itself a fact that suggests a perfection—the soul is

doing what it is supposed to do, it is engaging in its natural activity, and this realization gives us

pleasure, at a higher level as it were” (Rueger 185).

Importantly, we must understand “natural activity” in this passage, as Mendelssohn does,

i.e., as meaning the striving toward the good and “drive for perfection” of each thing (PA 150).

With respect to the intuition of tragic objects (e.g. the painting of the ship in a storm) or tragedy

on stage, it is a decidedly moral kind of perfection which the soul feels upon knowing that and

why the tragic objects which it intuits are displeasing. It is at this point that the notions of love

and sympathy (mitleid) are of great significance for Mendelssohn’s theory of mixed sentiments.5

In the case of the intuition of the painting of the ship one feels sympathy for those aboard it; and

                                                                                                               
4  It  is  important  to  note  that  mixed  sentiments  concerning  tragedy  in  objects  are  not  the  

only  kinds  of  mixed  sentiments.  However,  for  reasons  of  space,  they  are  the  only  kinds  of  
mixed  sentiments  I  will  discuss  here.    
5  Mendelssohn  also  stressed  the  significance  of  “admiration”  in  for  his  theory  of  mixed  

sentiments  concerning  the  intuition  of  tragic  objects.  Space  constraints  do  not  allow  me  to  
discuss  the  role  of  admiration  here.  For  an  excellent  account  of  the  role  of  admiration  in  
mixed  sentiments  of  the  tragic,  I  refer  the  reader  to  Frederick  Beiser’s  book  Diotima’s  
Children,  p.  209.    
   8  

the feeling of sympathy is a moral perfection of the soul—an intuition which is nevertheless

aroused by an object the content of which is itself displeasing.

Similarly, in the intuition of tragic plays it is the feelings of love and sympathy for the

tragic hero which the soul takes pleasure in, despite the repulsiveness of the tragic events

besetting the tragic hero her/himself. On this point, Mendelssohn writes: “in those ill-fated

occurrences [i.e., the tragic events in the play] nothing but sympathy is the soul of our pleasure”

(PW 73).6 Thus it is the soul’s feelings of sympathy for the tragic hero which the soul finds

pleasure in. Importantly, the notion of sympathy is intertwined with the notion of love for the

tragic hero. On this point, Mendelssohn writes, in “On Sentiments” that, with regard to sympathy

in mixed sentiments a “quite noticeable, positive feature presents itself … by means of which

this emotion [sympathy] distinguishes itself from all others. It is nothing but the love for an

object combined with the conception of a misfortune that befalls its; a physical evil for which it

is not responsible” (PA 74).

In the “Rhapsody”, Mendelssohn echoes the above passage when he writes, with specific

reference to tragic plays, that “since every love is bound up with the willingness to put ourselves

in the position of the beloved, we must share all sorts of suffering or pathos with the beloved

person [i.e., the tragic hero], what one very emphatically calls sympathy” (PA 142). The most

important point here is that, for Mendelssohn, the subjective feelings of love and sympathy one

has upon intuiting an object which is itself displeasing, are pleasurable for the soul inasmuch as

the soul intuits its own moral enhancement toward ever increasing perfection.

Such striving for moral perfection, toward the good, denotes for Mendelssohn, a higher

kind of perfection than mere sensuous perfection. On this point, Mendelssohn states: “every

                                                                                                               
6  Cf.  PW,  p.  72:  “The  pleasures  that  tragedies  afford  us  is  governed  by  the  measure  of  

sympathy  that  they  arouse  in  us”.    

   9  

good act, every virtuous action, is joined with a sentiment of the soul that is sweeter than all

sensuous gratification” (PA 150). While it is no doubt the case that viewers can take pleasure in

certain sensuous aspects of degrees of perfection in the aesthetic tragic object7, it is of greater

importance for Mendelssohn to show how reason takes precedence over sensuous perfections:

each spirits strives toward its natural, final purpose, which is to say, the good which it desires.

To conclude, I would simply like to point out the historical/philosophical significance of

Mendelssohn’s theory of mixed sentiments by highlighting the fact that it is entirely plausible

that Immanuel Kant would not have had the inspiration to develop his notions of ‘reflective

judgement’, the ‘free play of the faculties’, and a ‘purposiveness without purpose’ amongst other

notions, were it not for Mendelssohn’s monumental work on distinguishing subjective

perfections8 from both objective perfections and objective imperfections in his theory of mixed

sentiments.9

                                                                                                               
7  For  reasons  of  space,  I  have  not  discussed  these  here.    
8  Subjective  perfections  are  those  which  concern  the  perfections  of  the  soul.  Objective  

perfections  are  perfections  in  objects.  I  have  primarily  been  concerned  in  this  essay  with  
subjective  moral  perfections,  namely  those  of  sympathy  and  love.    
9  On  the  significance  of  Mendelssohn’s  theory  of  mixed  sentiments  for  Kant’s  aesthetic  

philosophy  I  refer  the  reader  to  Rueger’s  excellent  essay  “Enjoying  the  Unbeautiful:  From  
Mendelssohn’s  Theory  of  ‘Mixed  Sentiments’  to  Kant’s  Aesthetic  Judgments  of  Reflection”  
(2009).  Rueger  notes:  “the  Kantian  colonization  of  the  realm  of  beauty  proceeded  after  a  
model  that  was  supposed  to  tame  the  pleasure  in  the  tragic  …  phenomena  that  seemed  to  
lie  outside  of  reason’s  domain  altogether.  The  experience  of  beauty  appears  autonomous  
(in  the  specified  sense  of  independence  from  the  perfection  of  the  object)  in  Kant’s  theory  
because  he  used  a  model  for  beauty  that  was  designed  for  what  had  been  considered  to  be  
autonomous  all  along:  the  unbeautiful”  (187-­‐188).    
   10  

Works Cited:

Beiser, Frederick. Diotima’s Children: German Aesthetic Rationalism from Leibniz to Lessing.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Guyer, Paul. “Mendelssohn’s Theory of Mixed Sentiments”. In Moses Mendelssohn’s

Metaphysics and Aesthetics. Ed. Reinier Munk. Dordrecht: Springer Verlag, 2011.

Koller, Aaron. “Mendelssohn’s Response to Burke on the Sublime”. ”. In Moses Mendelssohn’s

Metaphysics and Aesthetics. Ed. Reinier Munk. Dordrecht: Springer Verlag, 2011.

Mendelssohn, Moses. Philosophical Writings. Trans. Daniel O. Dahlstrom. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Rueger, Alexander. “Enjoying  the  Unbeautiful:  From  Mendelssohn’s  Theory  of  ‘Mixed  
Sentiments’  to  Kant’s  Aesthetic  Judgments  of  Reflection”  The  Journal  of  Aesthetics  
and  Art  Criticism  67  (2009):  181-­‐189.