Chapter 7

Not-Self a n d Not-Substantial Existence

420
 Chapter 7

Not-Self and Not-Substantial Existence

7-l-l| Connection with the preceding discussion

W e noticed, in the preceding chapter, that in the Nikayas we come across

certain portions which appear to deny the existence of core and substantial

nature but which was originally and basically an idea quite different from the

implication of the word ‘anatta. The concept of something being the core of

existence and the negation of the same have been represented by the word ‘sara
in the relatively older strata of the Nikayas. This is done by using special words
such as ‘puggala, 'satta, 'jiva and ‘tathagata or ‘vedagu in the later Nikayan

literature and Abhidham matexts. The two separate ideas namely, the negation
of self {atti) and the negation of substantial existence (sara) have been mixed and

confused in the process of doctrinal development from the NikayanBuddhism to

the Abhidham maBuddhism.' Perhaps it is better to say that the teaching of

'The scholars have oSered some explanations on this point. Matunami states; ‘The
anattatheory as a negation ofthe substantial concepts would be formed, as a natural
consequence, when the three teaching — impermanence {anicca), not-self{anatta)and
emptiness (suim a) - were understood to have the same meaning (‘Not-self and
Twelve-Unked Chain of Dependent Origination Viewing from the Statement in Jain
Literature’, in HistoryofBuddhist Thought, Professor YukiFelicitation Volumeon
the Occasion ofHis Soju, 1964, p.28). E. Kanakura states: ‘The theory of five
khandha-8means that the whole existence is represented by the five khandha-sand
there is nothing beyond them. Therefore, “the five khandha-sare not self’[relative
negation] might have been construed to mean that there exists no self [absolute
negation]’(JZze Thought ofSelfinIndianPhilosophy{Indo-tetugakunoJiga-sisdi,

421
anattaalmost absorbed in itselfthe idea of negation of substantial existence for
some reason or other. We can assume such doctrinal development in a simple

diagram as follows:

Not-self {an-atti) No-self {an-atta)

[atta=I,selfi conxitcflam = seffi pugg±i,
ormne] andjm etc. ^sunin]

Non substantial Non substantial

{expressedbyiheuoniasau or [negation ofp u ^
ffdkiaedby^anxecinaloges] iicLsOta eS::]

Assuming a doctrinal development as indicated the diagram above, let us

now attempt to observe the negation of the substantial being and how and why it

has been absorbed into the teaching of anatta. The first step of our

Tokyo, Daizo-syuppan. 1974, p.193); ‘The word atta which originally imphed the
meaning of “oneself’ subsequently changed to mean “subject” and “substance”’ (E.
Kanakura, ibid., p.194). P.T. Raju says that Buddha’s refusal to answer the
question whether the atman existed or not was taken by his followers as his denial of
its existence (ThePhilosophicalTraditionofIndia, p.119). I can assume two reasons
of doctrinal change in the history of Early Buddhism: ® Compilation of the Canon.
One’s opinion and interpretation was added to the original lines in the process of
Atman
compilation (Cf J. Imanisi, ‘The Concepts of in the Anatma-vada (1)’,
HokkaidoJournalofIndologicalandBuddhistStudies 5, 1990, pp. 39-66. @ Debate
with the heretics. Especially, it was possible that the teaching was changed when
the heretics criticize a Buddhist teaching which contradict with another teaching of
Buddha and the Buddhist tried to explain that they did not contradict each other (Cf
R.F. Gombich, HowBuddhismBegan, especially the chapter VI, ‘Retracing an
Ancient Debate: How Insight Worsted Concentration in the Pali Canon’,pp.96-134.
See also, E. Kanakura, ibid. p. 179).

422
consideration is to observe the usage of some words, which show substantial

nature in certain contexts.

7-l-2| The substantial existence (^ara) and its negation (1)

W e all cherish in the deep framework of our existence, consciously or

unconsciously, a strong desire to search for something substantial as a centre of

our existence, on which we can depend comfortably without any kind of fear, or

being dependent on which we feel secured and continue to strive for our Ufe-

purpose.

In the Nikayas, the Buddha exhorts his disciphnes not to hold such a kind
of concept, which expressed philosophically amounts to substantial existence.

W e can trace this teaching in the verse part of the Nikayas, though there it is
stated in an unsophisticated and not philosophical form. This fact shows that it

was a time-honored teaching in the history of early Buddhism. Let us examine

some of the statements regarding this matter appearing in the verse part of the

Nikayas. The first example is Sutta-Nipata, 5:

Yo najjhagama bhavesu saram vicinarii puppham iva udumbaresu. so bhikkhu

jahati orapararh, urago jiimam iva tacaiti puranam. (The bhikkhuwho does not
find any essence in existence, as one does not find a flower on a fig tree, leaves

the near shore and the far shore as a snake leaves its old worn-out skin.)"

“ The translations by the scholars are: ‘He who does not see any substantiality in
forms of becoming as one does not find flowers on a fig tree (H. Saddhatissa, The
SuttaNipata, p.l); ‘The monk seeing in states of becoming no essence as he would,
when surveying a fig tree, no flowers’(Thanissaro Bhikkhu, TheSuttaNipata: The
SuttaCollection, Free Distribution, BPS.).

423
 Mention should be made of the word ‘sira’. The word sara means: ®

essential, most excellent, (D the innermost, hardest part of anything, the heart or

pith of a tree, (2) substance, essence, choicest part, ® value.^ In the Sn.5, it

means essence or substance. Though it is difficult to know clearly what the

word sara intends to signify here, it seems to mean something center in our

existence [or the world] on which we can depend. The Commentary explains it

as 'niccabhavamattabhivaiii from philosophical point of view.^ What this

statement makes clear is that there is no saraas such meaning, as there is no

flower on a fig tree.’ Another example is the statement of Therigatha(458) in

^ PTSD. p.705. According to Childers’ DictionaryofthePali Language (p.464), it

means: ‘essence, substance, choicest part, pith, marrow; main point, real truth;
strength, vigor; wealth.’ The meaning of the words‘sard ‘asara
and and the context
in which the words are used in the Nikayas may be classified into the following two
types: I) It means something substantial or central being regarded as an eternal core
of the existence. It is compared to the heartwood in a hoUow herbaceous stem,
which does not really exist in it. It seems that the sara in this meaning is used for
an example to illustrate what does not really exist but one tend to desire for
searching of it to chng. Cleeirly, the negation ofsuch concept of sara bears a striking
resemblance to the teaching of simia. In this section ofthe present research, we are
concerned with the usage of sara in this meaning. I; It means the truth in a moral
sense, that is, what we should search for and know without misunderstanding.
Example of this is the statement of Dhp. 11-12: Those who regard untruth as truth
and see untruth in truth never arrive at truth but follow wrong resolves. Those who
know truth as truth and untruth as untruth arrive at truth and foUow right resolves.
{asaresaramatinosirecasaradassinotesaraiiinidhigacchantimicchasaiiikappagocara.
saraih ca sarato natva asaram ca asarato te saram adhigacchanti
sammasaibkappagocari). Chinese version of the Dhammapada, Fa-chii-chi^
{Hokkukyd) tranlated sara as a meaning of ‘what is truly beneficial. S.
Radhakrishnan explains the word ‘sard as foUows: ‘the sap of a things, essence or
reahty of a thing. It is the highest reality metaphysically and truth in a moral sense
{TheDhammapada, withIntroductoryEssays, Pali Text, English Translationand
Notes, p.62). The similar explanation is given by Max Muller in TheDhammapada
(SBE, voL lO.p.6) saying, ‘It is impossible in a translation to do more than indicate
the meaning of such words, and in order to understand them fully, we must know not
only their definition, but their history’ This simile appears in many places of the
Nikayaa, Mahasaropama-sutta
especially see, the (MN.30, The Great discourse on the
simile of heartwood) and the Cujasaropama-sutta (MN.29, The Shorter Discourse on
the simile of the heartwood); and also, MN. voL 1, pp. Ill, 233-234; MN. vol. 3, p.
141; DN. voL 1, pp. 48-51. Cf AN. vol. 3, pp. 19-20; AN. vol. 4, pp. 336-337; AN. vol.
5, pp. 314-317.
p.l9.
® The notable studies on a flower on a fig tree {pupphamudumbaresii) has made by

424
which a nun Sumedha describes her body as kayakali’ (miserable body) and
‘asara’!’ From the verses 448 to 522 {CattalisanipSta samatta, which is a
collection of the Sumedha’s words), she describes one’s nature of existence in

various ways. They are: asassata(not eternal) <450; 455>, tuccha(empty) and
anicca (impermanent) <455; 501>, rOparhphenapindopamassa (body is like a
lump of foam) <501>.

Dhp. 170-171 illustrates by using a simile the nature of existence without

substantial entity, though the word sarais not used here.

yatha bubbulakarh passe yatha passe maricikam' evam lokam avekkhantarh

maccuraja na passati. Etha, passath’ imam lokarh cittarh rajarathOpamam

yattha bala visidanti, n’atthi sango vijanatarh. (Look upon the world as a

bubble, look upon it as a mirage. Him who looks thus upon the world the

king of death does not see. Come, look at this world resembhng a painted

K.R. Norman:The Group ofDiscourses {Sutta-Nipata) vol.2. Oxford, PTS. 1995,

Perspectives onIndo-European Language,
p.133. And, Rare as fig flowers’ in
CultureandReligion (Study in honor of Edgar C. Polome), McLean, Virginia, 1991,
pp. 216-220. In the former article, he states about the simile of fig tree’s flower: ‘the
use of the simile clearly arises from the fact that, as Emeneau states, the Indians
seem not to have understood that the inflorescence of the genus Ficus is in the form
of crowded compact clusters offlowers placed inside a fleshy stalk, i.e. the flowers are
inside the fig. They consequently believed that fig tree, unHke other trees, fructified
without flowering.’ [Emeneau, M.B. ‘The stranghng figs in Sanskrit Literature’,
University of CaliforniaPublications in Classical Philology, vol.13, No. 10, 1941,
p.345].
« Cf Udv I. 35.
' The word 'maricika’ means a mirage’. Depending on PTSD. (p.524),
'maricidhammd is like a mirage, unsubstantial’. Which translation is better for the
word 'maricika in this context, a mirage or a heat haze? H. Nakamura comments on
this point that ‘heat haze’ is better because the Chinese version-s of the
Dhammapada translate it as ‘SfAll’ which means a heat haze (H, Nakamura, The
Dhammapada, Iwanami, p.104). Ifwe understand it as a mirage — a strange effect
caused by hot air in a desert, in which one think he can see objects when they are not
actually there -, itwiU be similar meaning with the simile of fig tree’s flower: both do
not really exist. However, from the relation to the pervious word bubbujaka which
seems to intend to illustrate nature of transient Life, the heat haze seems to be better

425
 royal chariot. The foolish are sunk in it; for the wise there is no attachment

for it.)

Phenapindupama-Sutta(SN.XXII.95, vol.3,
A similar teaching is found in the

pp. 140-143), which explains the five khandhas, as empty {ntta), worthless

(tuccha) and devoid of any essence (as^a). It reads as follows in a form of the
verse:

Phenapindupamam ruparh, vedana bubbulupama, maricikupama sailiia,

sankhara kadalupama, mayupamaiica viimanam, desitadiccabandhuna.

(Material form is like foam, feeling is like a bubble, perception is hke a mirage,

constructing activities are like a plantain tree, and consciousness is like a

conjurer’s trick.)®

If one sees these five khandhascarefully with proper attention, they would
appear to be empty (ritta) and worthless {tuccha). Wh e n three factors {iyn,
usma, vinnana] leave from his body, he will be discarded as food for others.®

Etadisayaih santano, mayayam balalapini vadhako eso akkhato saro ettha na

vijjati. (Of such nature is this body, this is a trick misleading the ignorant.

This body is called a murderer, these [five khandhas] are devoid of essence.)

suited to the context. I cannot say for certain which is correct.

« SN.XXII.95 (voLS, p.142).
® SN.XXII.95 (voLS, p.142-143).
SN.XXII.95 (voL3, p.143).

426
 A simile of searching heartwood is frequently used in the prose part of the

Nikayas. A ma n who wonders about in search of heartwood enters the forest

with a sharp hatchet. He sees there the herbaceous stem of a big plantain,

which is straight, and young but devoid of a true inner stem. He cuts off the

bottom part, its crown and so on, but can not get its heartwood. A m a n who can

see it with proper attention can realize that it is empty (ntta), worthless (tuccha)
and devoid of any essence(sira) as there is no essence in a plantain trunk.
The teachings presented by the word asara, rittaand tuccha, also by some

metaphorical expressions such as foam, bubble, mirage, are classified under the

same type of teaching given by the word suMa, which is emphatically taught in
MahayanaBuddhism. The empty nature of existence is called 'sunna in the

Nikayastoo."
EtymologicaUy the word simna(Skt. sunya) is a derivative originated form
‘suna {^/su= sva, svi, to expand).^^ It basically means ‘empty’, void, or in

abstract sense, unsubstantial’and ‘devoid of reahty’.^'^ Though the teaching of

suMalater has come to mean the same thing as anatta,^^we should notice here

" The teaching of sunna appears in the following statements: Dhp. 92-93, Sn. 11^9,
Therag. 395; MN. vol.3, p.l04f, 109, 293-294; SN.XX.7, vol.2, p.267; AN.vol.3, p.10/;
Ja. voLl, p. 29G.
H. Nakamura, ThoughtsofEarlyBuddhism[GensiBukkyonoSisho], vol.1, p.4yu.
As for the teaching of suMa in early Buddhism, H. Nakamura explains, t is
observed in the literature of early Buddhism that the thought ofsunna is
various forms. It seems that the teaching of sunna Nikayas
appearing in the derived
from the doctrine of impermanence (anicca).’ _ i■ j
For example, in the Padsambhidamagga anatta
(vol.2, p.63), is explamed to be
sjmonymous with suMs. ‘Contemplation of not-self and contemplation o voi ess,
these ideas are one in meaning and only the letter is ^erent (ra ca
anattanupassanaya ca sumatanupassana, ime dhamma ekattha, byanjanameva
nanaii}). And also voL2, p.48 mentions anattaand sumawith the relation to anicca
and dukkhs. ‘When we gives attention to formations as impermanent, they appear to
him as exhaustion. When he gives attention to formations as painful, they appear
as terror When he gives attention to formation as not self they appear as voi^ess
{Aniccato manasikaroto khayato sahkhara upatthanti. Dukkhato mana^ amto
bhayatosankharaupatthanti.Anattatomanasikarotosunnatosaiikharaupatthanti).
427
that 'suMa was originally closer to the teaching of axiiccarather than that of
anatta. The nature of anicca^^ signifies that everything has no eternal
substance. The early part of the Nikayas repeatedly teaches to realize the

nature of anicca, however the teaching is given so far as one can know it fix>m

one’s experience. Originally, it is not a kind of dogmatic and ontological

thinking which has been discussed enthusiastically among Buddhist

philosophers in later time. It seems that the disciples in early time showed deep

interest in reah2dng the nature of impermanence in the practical sense, that is,

one’s impermanence of stem reality of life that one has to die.'®

anattais not used for illustrating such

Here, we should notice that the word

nature of existence, but the word aniccaand asaraare used. If the word atta

was pregnant with the meaning of substantial concepts and anattameant that

there is no eternal core in existence, in more philosophical sense, if anatta

signified the meaning of non-substantiality, it is only natural that the disciples of

the Buddha should use the word anattain order to explain such nature of non-
substantial existence. I can assume that the word anatta did not have an

explicit meaning of non-substantiaUty when these parts of early Buddhist

literature were compiled.

The suttaconcludes the teaching by the following sentence (SN.XXII.95,

vol.3, p.142): ‘conditioned things are thus impermanent, unstable and are not to

take delight in,’and therefore: ‘one should disgust with aU conditioned things,

one should not attached to them and one should get firee from them.’ Here, it is

notable that the word anattais not used in the sentence.

The term ‘asassata’ and ^addhuva’ are also used to denote the nature of
impermanence in the Nikayas.
Cf. Therag.782.

428
 Of course, here it is also stated that one should not delight in and should

disgust with, and should not attach to the objects, so the aim of the teaching of

asara(no substantial) should be same as that of anatta(not self). W e can say

that the aims of teachings are same (detachment) but the means to it are

different (realization of non substantiaHty and the realization of not selQ.

Though the teaching of as^adoes not intend to show the ontological idea but
intend to lead the audience to detach from the object, it is undeniable that the

teaching of asarahas ontological feeling which later developed into certain form
of ontological philosophy.

The teaching of not-self aims at leading people to detach from object

through the practice to reahze subjectively ‘I a m not atta, on the other hrnd, the
teaching of ‘non substantiality’ aims at leading people to detach th* imselves

through the practice to realize how every thing exists (there is no eternal core)

which is more an objective observation than the practice of not-self

7-l-3| The substantial existence and its negation (2)

In this section we shall examine the statements which explain the non-

substantial nature of existence without using the word 5ira, but by using certain

notable expressions or similes. Some of these statements would certainly prove

to support Nagasena’s teaching of non-substantiahty stated in the Milmdapanha,

a text which we shall discuss in the next section.

(1) SN.I.2 (vol.1, p.11) The subject of one who speaks.

Being are only names (designations) for expression {akkheyyasannind), and

429
 they consist (only) in this expression. Those who do not understand this

truth come under the yoke of death. But he who rightly understands this

expression does not have the conceit of the speaker (subject) of the expression

{akkhataraiii na mannati). There is for him no yoke of death.

(2) Dhp.147 (= Therag. 1020; Udv. XXVIL20).

Behold this painted image, a body full of wounds, put together, diseased, and full

of many thoughts in which there is neither permanence nor stability. (Passa

cittakatam bimbarh arukayaih samussitaih, aturarii bahusanhappam yassa n’atthi

dhuvam thiti.)

(3) SN.XXII.97 (vol.3, p. 147. See, also in SN.XXII.98)

This is another example which displays a developed form of the teaching

about non-substantial nature of existence: The statement is given in a form of

prose with some elaborated technical terms [This statement has already been

considered in details in the chapter 4]

Bhikkhu, if there were material form which is even as httle as this pinch of

dust and which is permanent, stable, durable, not subject to change and

eternal like aU things permanent, the practice of the Life of Purity for the

complete extinction of dukkha would not have appeared. Bhikkhu, it is

because there is no material form which is even as little as this pinch of dust

and which is permanent, stable, durable, not subject to change and eternal

like all things permanent, that the practice of the Life of Purity for the

complete extinction of suffering has appeared. (Ettakam ce pi bhikkhu rupam

430
 abhavissa niccarii dhuvam sassatam aviparinamadhammaiii, na yidam

brahmacariyavaso pannayetha s a m m a dukkhakkhayaya. Yasma ca kho

bhikkhu ettakam pi rupaiii natthi niccarii dhuvarii sassatam

aviparinamadhammani, tasma brahmacariyavaso paiinayati

sammadukkhakkhayaya.)

The sutta concludes the teaching by the sentence: ‘conditioned things are

thus impermanent, unstable and are not taken deHght in,’ and therefore: ‘one

should be disgusted with all conditioned things, one should not be attached to

them and one should get free fi*om them.’ Here, it is notable that the word

anatta is not used in this context.

SN.XXII.96 uses the term attabhavapa^abbo (obtaining one’s own nature)

on the same basis as permanent, stable, durable, not subject to change, and

eternal. The important point to note is that the five notions - (D nicca, © dhuva.

® sassata, ® aviparinamadhamma and D attabbavapa^abha - are used in the

same category in order to illustrate the nature of existence.

(4) SN.XXXV.193 (vol.4, p.166-168)

Ananda and Udayi had a discussion on anattahood of consciousness

{vinnana). Udayi’s question is: Though this body is not-self (anatta), is it possible

in the same way to describe that this consciousness also is not-self? Of course,

the answer of Ananda is, ‘this consciousness also is not-self.’ Then the smiile of

heartwood is given; A man, looking for the heartwood, enters a forest with a

sharp axe. There he sees a mighty plantain-trunk, straight up, new grown and

SN.XXIL97 (voL3, p. 147). See, also SN.XXn.98.

431
of towering height. He cuts it down at the root, chops it off at the top, and

thoroughly peels out the skin. But he does not find there even pith, not to speak

of the heartwood (sara). Then the instruction comes;

Even so, a bhikkhu does not see self or anything belonging to the self in the

six-fold spheres of sense. Without holding thus, he does not attach to

anything in the world, without attachment, he is not longing after, without

longing after, he reaches by himself complete extinction of existence. (Evam

eva kho avuso bhikkhu chasu phassayatanesu nevattanaih na attaniyam

samanupassati, so evam asamanupassanto na kinci loke upadiyati,

anupadiyam na paritassanti, aparitassarii paccattanneva^® pannibbayati.)

What the passages make clear at once are; 3) Udayi had an idea that the

concept of consciousness {vimana) was something substantial, which was

regarded by Udayi wrongly as the concept playing an important role of a subject.

® The word anatti was apphed to vinnana in order to make Udayi realize his

misunderstanding. 3) It can be said in this context that the word anatta was

used to negate Udayi’s wrong idea that consciousness is not anatt£ H e seemed

to hold an idea of atta as meaning a subject existing substantially and existing

separately from the body The notable point is that the simile of heartwood

{sara) was apphed here by Ananda for testifying the theory of anatta. W e can

represent the ideas of Udayi and Ananda in a simple diagram as follows;

PTS edition (voL 3, p. 168, 7.8) reads ‘paccattam neva. Shinghale^ MS^ of
Copenhagen, ‘paccattanneva’, Singhalese M S of Paris, ‘paccattanceva, an . •,
l-QreaAs'paccattannevd. o
The statement is discussed by J.R Remon, The Self and Non Self m Ear y
Buddhism, 11

432
 Udayi: vinnana —not anatta [—> vinnana —atta ]

Ananda: vinnana = anatta ^ sara can not be found (simile of

heartwood)

In this statement, there is a developed form of anatta teaching. The word

atta seems to have a meaning of viMana which is regarded as something

substantial in one’s existence and thus comparable to a heart wood {sara). It did

not state positively that the teaching of anatta negates the substantial entity

(saj^). However, we find here the possibility of construing anatta to mean non

substantiality of existence.

It is important to note here that the statement of Ananda to Udayi

(SN.XXXV. 193) - the Buddha is not mentioned here - m ay belong to a relatively

later period of time of the development of ideas in the Nikayan literature.

(5) SN.XXXV. 197 (vol.4, p. 174-175) a simile of empty village

Simde of empty village {sunno gamo) is applied to explain that the six-fold

internal organs are contentless {ritta), worthless (tuccha) and void (sunna). It is

said that: The wise, instructed and inteUigent one examines the eyes and find

them empty, vain and void [Similarly with regard to the rest of the six internal

organs].

(6) SN.XXXV.85 (vol.4, p.54) the world is empty

The statement of the empty world {suMo lokd) was given; The world is

empty because the world is empty of the self and anything belonging to the self

{sunnam attena vaattaniyena va), so they call it as the empty world {tasma sunno

433
loko ti vuccati).

(7) SN.V.IO (vol.l, p.135)

The statement of the nun Vajirx Just as the assemblage of parts constitutes

the word ‘chariot’, so also when the aggregates appear together, the phrase

‘being’ (satta) is used. [Since this has been discussed already in the preceding

chapters, I shall not elaborate the point].

7-2-lj Net-self and Non-Substantial existence in the MUindapaSha

The Milindapanha^° {the Questions ofMilind^ is a famous work of the non-

canonical Pali hterature.^' Extant Chinese version is Na-hsien pi-ch’iu-ching

(Nagasenabbiksusutra),^ which seems to be translated into Chinese in the third

century AD.^ The Commentary, Milindatikais available."^

In the MUindapaSha, the Buddhist m o n k Nagasena and the Greek king

It is also called as 'Milinda.panhS often in Sri Lanka. Pali texts are available in
Sri Lanka, Burma, and Thailand. Burmese editions contain Sanskritalized form of
words. V Trenckner edited critical edition in 1880 (with indices 1928): The
Milindapanho, being Dialogues between King Milinda and the Buddhist Sage
Nagasena (London, Williams and Norgate, 1880); appended a General Index by C.J.
Rylands and an Index of Gathm and thematic Table of Contents by Mrs. C.A.F. Rhys
Davids, published for the Pali Text Society (London; Royal Asiatic Society, 1928),
reprinted 1962. Translations have been made in various languages, in English,
German, French, and Japanese. And the studies on the text and thought of
Milindapanha are abundant. (See, Oskar von Hiniiber, A Handbook ofPaliLiterature,
p.82; H. Nakamura, A Interchange of Thought Between India and the West [Indo to
Girisha no Siso Eburyu\, Shinjusha, Tokyo, 1998, pp. 109-111.
In Burma, it is regarded as a text of the Khuddaka Nikaya.
^ Taisho, voL32, pp.694a-719a. The two editions are available; (A) a version of the 2
fascicles [pp.694a-703c], and (B) a version of 3 fascicles [703c-719a]. A translator is
unknown. It is assumed that the language of the original form firom which the
Chinese version was translated was Sanskrit or Buddhist Sanskrit H. Nakamura
points out that some words transliterated into Chinese represent that its original
form should have a sound o f ( H . Nakamura, ibid, pp. 113-114).
^ M. Wintemitz, HistoryofIndian Literature -Buddhist Literature, p.163.

434
Milinda have a discussion about various topics, in which the question on the

substantial existences is one of the most important topics. King Milinda

questioned straightway to Nagasena about the existence of such concepts as

puggala, jiva, and vedagu. Nagasena explained these from Buddhist point of

view.

M a n y scholars mention the Milindapanha when they try to explain

Buddhist idea of Not-self or No-self. However, as we shall see, it is not strictly

correct to hold the negation of substantial concepts of the Milindapanha under

the category oi‘anatta’fiom the viewpoints of its original meaning.

The Milindapanha is especially noteworthy for our present study for two

reasons: Q It contains a profound discussion about the substantial concepts such

as puggala, jiva, vedagu, and we find Nagasena rejecting the existence of these

concepts. W e can gather from their dialogues what these concepts mean and

how they are denied, and their relation to the anatta teaching. ® The text gives

good information when we consider a doctrinal development of anatta teaching

(reasons for the doctrinal change from ‘not-self to ‘no-self), because it is stated

that the text has been compiled sometime after the Nikayan literature and before

the Abhidhamma literature.® It means that the thoughts appearing in the

Milindapanha hold an important position, a turning point, in the historical

change of the idea.

Milindatfka edited by P.S.Jaini, London, PTS. 1961.

^ S. Radhakrishnan states: ‘The discussion seems to have taken place some 400
years after Buddha’s death, and represents to us a form of Buddhism which came

435
7-2-2| When the MUmdapaSba was originated ? —Ttextual Criticism —

(1) The original portion

There is a fairly general agreement that the original text of the

MUindapanha was not written in Pali, and that it must have been written in

Sanskrit or Prakrit in NorthWest India.^ The extant MUindapanha is a

collection of the following parts:

D The Secular Narrative (pp. l-24)'‘

® The Distinguishing Characteristics of Ethical Quahties (pp.25-64)

® The Removal of Difficulties (pp.65-89)

D The Solving of Dilemmas (pp.90-328)

D The Problem of Inference (pp.329-347)

s; The Voluntary Extra Vows (pp.348-362)

t The Similes of Arahatship (pp.363-420)

Most of us would accept that the original part consisted of chapters I-III

into vogue much later than the age of Buddha (Indian PMlosophy, voLl, p.345).
R.N. Basu, A CriticalStudy oftheMUindapanha, p.6; Winternitz, HistoryofIndian
Literature, vol.2, p.163; H, Nakamua, ibid. p. 113; T.W. Rhys Davids, The Questions
ofKing Milinda voLl (SBE.35), p. xlv. W. Geiger points out: 'MUindapanha is very
probably based on a Buddhist S a n s k r i t composed in North-West India in about
the beginning of the Christian era’{PaliLiterature and Language, 27). Oskar Von
p .

Hiniiber stated; ‘The original MUindapanha was much shorter and written in a
language different from Pali, perhaps Gandhari, a northwestern Middle Indie (A
Hand Book ofPaliLiterature, p.83). H. Nakamura points out that the reeison for its
origin in North West India is that it mentions often the names of places such as
Himavant QAjiL pp. 6; 8; 70), Oha-nadi Sagala (Mil.6: 22) and Kasmira (Mil
P, 82; 83).
Its introduction too was much shorter in the original than the existing Pah version
(W. Geiger, PaliLiterature and Language, 27).

436
(Trenkner’s edition, pp. 1-89)“ and Chapters IV-IIV, (pp.90-420) are later

interpolations.

The most striking proof for it is that the last four chapters (pp.90-420) are

not found in the Chinese translation Na-bsien pi-ch’iu-ching {Nagasenabhiksu-

sutra)r^ The following are additional reasons to distinguish its original part

from that of the later accretions.

1 At the end of the chapter III (Mil. p.89), it is stated: ‘the answers to

Milinda’s questions are concluded {Milindapanhmam pucchavissajjana

samatta).

1; The form of the questions, answers and phraseology are different.^ M.

Wintemitz states: The later books, in hterary aspect as weU, differ strongly

from the genuine part of the work. W e find very many similes and intelligent

remarks here and there in these later books, but they do not at all have the

beauty and originahty of the first book.’^‘

a; In respect of the contents, the chapters JV-V differ substantially firom the

preceding three chapters. The original part (pp. 1-89) refers generally to the

doctrine about the existence of substantial entity, citta, nibbana. and samsara

by using the elegant similes, which are easy to understand for the beginner of

Buddhism. O n the other hand, the latter parts (pp.90-420) mainly discuss

Mrs. Rhys Davids divides it into seven chapters depending on Sri Lanka edition.
I shall mention here the number of chapters depending on her classification, and the
pages depending on the Trenkner’s edition of the text.
M. Winternitz, HistoryofIndian Uterature -Buddhist Literature, p.165.
Oskar Von Hintiber, A Hand Book ofPali Uterature, pp.84-85. R.N. Basu states:
‘Thus, it is apparent, that the vivacity and sobriety with which the first division
vibrates is quite absent in the second division, although it bears a stamp ofeloquence
on the part of the compiler’{A CriticalStudy oftheMilindapaUha, p.7).
M. Winternitz, HistoryofIndian Literature^ vol.2, p. 166.

437
 some of the difficult topics which are undoubtedly incomprehensible for the

people who are not familiar with the Buddhist doctrine. The topics discussed

here are so comphcated that they require a deep knowledge of the canonical

texts.

® Buddhaghosa, a famous commentator of the 5^** century, considers

MilindapaDha as a high authority and quotes from it. The quotations are

mainly taken from the chapters I-III of the text.“

It should be noted that the introductory part of the Milindapanha is also a

later interpolation. Since it is quite anachronical that Mihnda should have

talked to the six heretics who were contemporaries of the Buddha.^

N o w we can understand that the first three chapters which have

corresponding Chinese translation were composed first, and the remaining parts

were added to them, because the original Milindapanha became popular and

acquired an authority as explaining the Buddhist dogmatic teaching in the form

of a dialogue between King Milinda and Nagasena. It is difficult to ascertain

how and when the last four chapters were added to the original part.^ From the

M. Winternitz, ibid.
“ Oskar Von Hintiber, A Hand Book ofPaliLiterature, p.83.
Mil. pp.4-5. It is pointed out that this story seems to be added later taking a leaf
from SamaMaphala-sutta in DN. Moreover, it is also assumed that the original
parts are also composed successively because we can find at the end of the second
chapter (Mol. p.64) the phrase 'Nagasena-Milinda-raja-paUba nittbita [This phrase is
not found in the Chinese translation] (H. Nakamura, ibid. pp. 118-119. C£ Louis
Finot, Les Questions deMilinda. traduit de Pah. Les classiques de I’Orient, 8. Paris,
1923, Introduction, p. 11; p.lSOn).

^ M. Winternitz states as for a process of compositioa’‘I think it wiU suf&ce to admit

the existence of three versions: 1. The original work; 2. A further enlarged text that
forms the basis of tbe Chinese translation; 3. The Pali text augmented with
interpolations of the books IV-VII and enlargement of the introduction’ {History of
Indian Literature vol.2, -BuddhistLiterature, p.l66n.).

438
fact that Buddbaghosa quoted passages not only firom the original part but also

from the fourth and the seventh chapters,^ most of the text seems to have

existed when Buddbaghosa wrote commentaries (about 430 AD). As for the

place where interpolations were made, some scholars hold that they were made

not in India but in Sri Lanka.^^ However, we can not overlook the fact that the

names of places in the northwest India are sometimes mentioned in the last four

chapters.^ So probably the interpolations are also of Indian origin and not

Ceylonese.

(2) The date of origiaal portion

The opinions are divided among the scholars on the date of composition of

the text.^® Though it is very difficult to ascertain the date of composition of the

original part (pp. 1-89), the following information wiU provide important clues to

decide the issue.

® The date of Greek king MiUnda will help us to estimate the date of its

origin. W e have no definite information as to the date of King Mihnda, but he is

ascribed probably to the first century B C depending on the several sources both

in India and in Greek. M. Winternitz comments; ‘the author of the

?kilindapanha, whose name in any case is not known to us, had been living in an

As for the quotations by Buddbaghosa, see, Rhys Davids, The Questions of King
Milinda, SBE. 35, pp. xiv-xvi, and I.B. Horner, Milinda’s Question, SBB. 22, vol.1, p.
Xfi:
It was considerably extended in Ceylon by various additions after existing models
(W. Geiger, PaliLiterature and Language, 27).
^ H. Nakamura, ibid. pp. 114; 127-128. Of RN. Basu, A Critical Study of the
MilindapaOba, p.6.
The elementary work goes back to the second century BC. approximately {L’Inde
classique II, p.352). The work probably originated in the 2“*century AD. (Garbe,
Trenkner, and see in detail note of Winternitz, History of Indian Literature -
Buddhist Literature, p.164). H. Nakamura assumes that it was composed in a
period ranging from the first century B C to the first centiuy AD.

439
age when the memory of the Greek King had still been fresh.’ A nd he conclude:

‘It is difficult to assume that his memory could hardly be preserved for more than

a century later. Therefore, the time of composition of the work hardly be far

removed from the age of the beginning of the Christian era.’^°

2) The text frequently quotes passages from the Nikayas, and mentions the

names of the su/^tes^'and the word ‘Abhidhamma These quotations indicate

that the text oame into existeace at a time when the classification of Tipitak^

and Nikayas was already made^.

$ The date that the Chinese version was translated will be helpful.^ M.

Wintemitz points out that it seems to be translated into Chinese in the third

•century AD.^ H. Nakamura says, ‘The Chinese text mentions itself as being

translated in the Eastern Tsin Dynasty (317-420 AD), but it is not reliable. It

M. Winternitz, ibid. p.164. There is httle agreement about the time of King
Mihnda: W. Geiger states that it is the end of 2“‘* centxiry B C {Pali Ldteratwe and
Language, 27). Winternitz says that King Menander ruled here in about the period
from 125 B C and 95 BC. {HistoryofIndian Ldterature -Buddhist Literature, p.163).
Lamotte, H.C. Raychaudhuri and L.D. Barnett estimate it in the first centiu-y BC.
B. Bhattacarya and R.C. Majumdar state that it is prior to 90 BC. (In detail, see note
of Winternitz, ibid. p.163).
tepitako (p.19); Mahasamaya-suttanta (p.20) <DN. No.20, pp.253-262 or
Suttanipata, II.13>; Mahamahgala-suttanta (p.20) <Suttanipata.^^.‘^-^l>',
Samacittapariyaya-suttanta (p.20) <AN.vol.l, p.63-63>; Rahulovada-suttanta (p.20)
<MN.voLl, No.61, pp. 63-65>; Parabhava-suttanta (p.20) <Suttanipata, 1.6, pp.l8-
25>; Saiiiyutta-nikaya (p.36) <SN.X.12.12 = Suttanipata, 184> (Cf H. Nakamura,
The Questions ofKing Mihnda, Toyobunnko. vol. 1, pp.60-61). The mention of aU
the seven books of Abhidhamma signifies that the Pah text of MihndapaOha was
compiled after the Third Buddhist Council when these were supposed to be collected
(R.N. Basu, A CriticalStudy oftheMilindapaUha, pp.8-9).
The word 'Abhidhammd is mentioned in pp. 1; 12-13; 16; 17; 31; 46; 56-57; 332;
341; 381. C£ R.N. Basu, A CriticalStudy ofthe MilindapaOha, pp. 16-18.
T.W. Rhys Davids, The Question ofKing Milinda, SBE.35, p. xxxviii
^ The original parts of Milindapanha can be traced very roughly. The Chinese
version contains only chapter I-III, which should have been composed between 100
B C and 200 AD. The remaining foiu- parts (pp.90-420) existed at the time of the
Atthakatha, which quote also from Mil II-V. (Oskar Von Hiniiber, A Hand Book ofPah
Literature, p.85-6>. T.W. Rhys Davids, The Question ofKing Milinda, SBE., 35, p.
XIV and p. XXVII).
^ M. Winternitz, ibid. p.163.

440
seems to be translated earlier to the Tsin Dynasty. M a y be perhaps done in Go-

kan Dynasty (25-220 AD) if we take into account the phraseology of the

translation."“

Although opinions are divergent on the date of compilation, it follows firom

what we have observed that the most of the original part of Milindapanba was

composed probably firom the first century B C to the first century AD, and that it

give us good information to know the Buddhist teaching on the process of

doctrinal development/' Especially, some substantial concepts discussed in the

Milindapanha are noteworthy for examination concerning the not self teaching

and its relation to the non substantiality.

(3) Some questions about MilmdapaSha

® Can we trace the Greek way of thinking in the statement of Milinda?

Attempts have been made by scholars to show Greek influence to the

dialogue in the Milindapa^a, or tried to trace Greek way of thinking in the

statements of King MUinda. J.D.M. Derrett points out the influence of the N e w

Testament.^ W.W. T a m states that there is probably a similarity to those of the

dialogues of Plato.^®

^ Kogen Mizuno, ‘On sutta-s of The Questions of Milinda’ [Milindamonkyo-nii ni

tuite], in Study of Buddhist Texts - Mizuno Kogen jyosaku-shyu, voL 1 1959,
pp. 17-55. H. Nakamura, ibid. pp. 123-124.
It can be said that the thought ofNagasena must be classified under the category of
Theravada Buddhism. It does not clesirly mentions the idea of Mabayana (H.
Nakamura, ibid.p.l34).
^ J.D.M. Derrett, ‘Greece and India; the MiEndapanha, the Alexander-romance and
the Gospels’, in Zeitschrift fixt Religions und Geistesgescbicbte. Bd.19 (1967). H.
Nakamura, ibid.137.
W.W. Tarn, The Greeks in Bactiia and India, Cambridge University Press, 1951,
p.415. R.N. Basu, A Critical Study of the Milindapanha, p.2. C£ H. Nakamura,
ibid. pp. 138-140.

441
 However, M. Wintemitz states that this mode of dialogues has no foreign

designs and had been made purely on Indian tradition: there is no reason for

supposing a Greek prototjrpe.®®

® A general characteristics of Nagasena’s teaching

Before proceeding to a more detailed discussion of the statement in the

Milindapanha, it will be advisable to consider general characteristics of

Nagasena’s teaching. In the Milindapanha, discussion is held on various topics

in the form of logical argumentation, but the problems are solved by Nagasena

mostly with the help of similes.

King Milinda accepts the teaching presented by Nagasena without pursuing

the matter to its logical end.^^ In this point we must admit the great similarity

with the statement in the Nikayas when the Buddha taught his followers. The

Buddha did not persuade to accept his teaching by way of a consistent logical

analysis, as we already observed in the third chapter

7-2-3| The negation of the substantial existence (1) - puggala -

The Milindapanha deals with ma n y points of Buddhist doctrine. King

Milinda asked the questions and Nagasena skillfully explains them using various

similes. A m o n g these questions, the most notable one is the problem on the

existence of puggala. The word 'puggala (Skt. ‘pudgala) basically means

C£ M. Winternitz, ibid. voL2, p.164, 165n.; R.N. Basu, A Critical Study of the
Milindapanha, •p.2.
C£ R.N. Basu, ibid p.2.

442
‘person’and ‘individual’,®^ but in the MilindapaSha it has a sense of substantial

existence (the theoretical idea of a permanent subject, soul),“ which is negated

by Nagasena.

Before turning to a closer examination on this word in the Milindapanha, I

would like to observe the general usage of the word puggala in the Nikayan

Uterature.

(1)

In the Nikayas, the word 'puggala is used in general as meaning a ‘m a n ’or

‘person’ and simply denotes a particular person or persons. For example, the

Itivuttaka, 24 reads; ‘The accumulation of a single person’s bones for an aeon

would be a heap on a par with the mountain, so said the Great Seer {Ekass-

ekena kappena puggalassa-attbisancayo, siya pubbatasamo rasi iti vuttam

mahesina). The word ‘puggala in this verse should not be understood as a

concept with substantial nature by ontological thinking."^

The word puggala appears in ma n y places and in diverse contexts, however

when we look them closely, we notice that in the Nikayas it is used mostly in the

following three distinctive contexts. They are: ® in the context to refer the

‘An individual as oppose to a group, person, man. In later philosophical Uteratiu-e

{abhidhamma), character, soul ( = attaiif <PTSD. p.463>. Nyanatdoka explains:
‘individual, person, as well as the synonyms: personality, individual, being {satta),
self {atta), etc., in short aU terms designating a personal entity, hence also; I, you, he,
man, god etc.’ {Buddhist Dictionary—Msinu^ of Buddhist Tbrms and Doctrine,
p.l70). As a etymology, Buddhaghosa gives an imaginary explanation: 'puii means
‘a heU’. It is termed as puggala because it land igalati) there [in heU] (pun ti vuccati
nirayo, tasmiihgalantitipuggala) <Vism. p.310>.
“ S. Collins, SelflessPersons -Imageryand Thought in Therevada Buddhism, p.77.
^ S. CoUins says: ‘the words purisaIpuggala are used frequently in simple narrative
contexts where the intention is simply to denote a particular person or persons; it
would be an absvird mistranslation iJfone attempted to see in this use a reference of
the pure monadic spiritual individual of the Sadikhya system, which is denote by the
equivalent purusd (ibid. p.73).

443
transmigration; © in the context to mentions the characteristic t5T)es of m e n

(when they are compared to others);®® @ in the context to mention one’s status or

the level of progress along the Buddhist Path.

I shall take an example to Ulustrate the first case of usage. The Itivuttaka

reads: ‘If a single person were to wander and transmigrate on for an aeon

{ekapuggalassa bhikkhave kappaih sandhavato saihsarato), he would leave

behind a chain of bones, a pile of bones, a heap of bones, as large as this Mount

VepuUa.’®® Similar examples are abundant in the Nikayas.°~ It can be said that

these examples of the word puggala in the context to explain a transmigration of

particular person are not intended to speak of substantial subject who

transmigrates. However, there is a possibility as later developed interpretation

that such puggala would be regarded as some substantial entity to transmigrate

when a question would occur concerning who transmigrates fix>m this world into

the next.

The examples for the second type of usage of puggala which mentions the

characteristic types of m e n frequently appear in the Ahguttara Nikaya. AN.

IV.5 (vol.2, pp5-6) reads: These four tj^es of people are to be found existing in the

world {cattarome, bhikkhave, puggala santo sarhvijjamana lokasmiiii). Here, the

four types of person were explained in comparison with the flow (anusota):

Itiv. 24 (p.17). The word attabhiva is a similar word. S. Collins states: ‘Where
attabhava weis more oriented towards expressing, in a suitably impersonal way, the
structure of individuals and rebirth as particular forms of existence, puggala is more
oriented toward description of those individuals and reborn “person” as character
types’(S. Collins, Selfless Persons, p.160, c£ pp. 156-157). According to G.C. Pande,
it seems to have meant an individual existence, particular individual life. Notable
is his statement: ‘the meaning of atta taken separately from the compound \jEin-att^
may not have been important" {Studies in the Origins ofBuddhism, p.487).
Itiv. 24 (p.17).
C£ AN.V0L2, pp. 102ff

444
 (1) the one who goes with the flow {anusotagami puggald): the one w ho

indulges in sensual passion and does evil deeds.

(2) the one who goes against the flow {patisotagamipuggald): the one does not

indulge in sensual passion and does not do evil deeds.

(3) the person who stands fast {thitatto puggald): the one who, with total

ending of the first set of five fetters, is spontaneous rebirth {opapatik^^

there to be totally unbound, never again to return fi'om that world.

(4) People who has crossed over, go beyond, stand on firm ground, the

brahmin {tinnoparangto tbale titthati brahmand): one who, through the ending

of the mental fermentation, enter and remains in the fermentation, is firee

release of awareness and release of discernment, having known and made

them manifest for himself right in the here and now.

The classification of the people can be found in ma n y places of the

Anguttara Nikaya. These people do not intend to signify a substantial nature of

puggala, but to imply the people in a conventional sense. However, here we can

say again that there is an attitude of ontological analysis through objectifying the

people, and that we must admit the possibility of the later development of the

word puggala which would be regarded as substantial existence.

W e may assume that the usage of puggala especially for the h u m a n types is

relatively new in compilation of the Nikayas, because they appear especially in

the Anguttara Nikaya which is regarded by the scholars as later composition, and

because the claissifications of puggala in the Anguttara Nikaya seem to be early

^ The word opapatika means ‘arisen or reborn without visible cause, spontaneous
rebirth and apparitional rebirth’(PTSD. p. 168).

445
stage of development to the Abbidhamma literature such as the Puggala-

paftSati^^ the object of which is to deal with the various types of individuals. So

we m a y say that it is relatively in a rater period that the word puggala was used

in the context of analyzing h u ma n types.

(2)

The Bharahara Sutta (SN.III.25-26) is a more noteworthy example in which

the word puggala can be understood as an entity with some substantial nature.

Here, puggala was distinguished from the khandhas as if it is a substantial

existence playing an important role for the subject of action.®® It m a y be said

that the usage of the word puggala in the Bharahara Sutta is placed in the

transitional stages Hvm the conventional meaning tothe meaning of substantial

entity which is fully discussed in the Mihndapanha and other Abbidhamma

literature. Puggalavadins referred to the statement of the Bharahara Sutta in

order to support their idea of the existence of puggala.

The Bharahara Sutta is a discourse to teach to eradicate the craving and

attachment by mean of the metaphorically expressed word ‘burden’ {bbara).^^

Four things - the burden (bharo), bearer of burden (bharaharo), the bearing of the

Different types of persons are arranged in groups from one to ten. It is said that
the Puggala-pannati is one of earUest parts of Abbidhamma Pitaka. Most of its
contents have literal parallels to the Ahguttara Nikaya and the Sahgiti Sutta of
Digha Nikaya (Kanai lal Hazra, Pali Language and Literature, voLl, pp.447-451;
Oskar Von Hiniiber, A Handbook ofPaliLiterature, pp.69-70).
Usually the usage [ofthe word puggale^ does not indicate any belief in an Atman,
but the well known Bharahara suttais a striking exception. The sutta itselfappears
to clearly distinguish between the Puggala and the Khandhaa. The latter are
merely a burden of the former (G.C. Pande, ibid. p.490).
It means ‘anything to carry, a lord’,figuratively ‘a difficult thing’,‘a burden or duty,
i.e. ‘a charge’ and ‘business’ (I^. vol. 2, p. 467). See also, Sn. 914; SN.vol.1, p.33.
And the Mahaniddesa (p.334) explains 'bhard in three types: khandha-bhara, kilesa-
bhara, and abhisankhara-bhara.

446
burden {bbaradinani), and laying down the burden {bbaranikkhepansuii) — are

explained as follows:

® bharo : the five khandhas, which are the object of clinging are the burden

{pancupadanakkhandha tissa vacanlyam).

2 bharaharo : the puggala, having such and such a name, belonging to such

and such clan, is called the bearer of the burden (puggalo tissa vacaniyam,

yoyam ayasma evamnamo evamgottd).

^ bharadanam ; the craving for sense pleasure {kamatanha), craving for

continued existence {bhavatanha) and craving for no further existence

{vibhavatanhS).

0 bharanikkhepanam : the cessation, through complete non-attachment, the

liberation and detachment firom it {yo tassayeva tanhaya asesaviragaiiirodho

cagopatinissaggo mutti anaJayo).

Even though the puggala was distinguished fix>m the khandhas in the

above statement, it shows httle or no concern about question of puggala as

substantial entity.®^ The puggala and his burden were explained in a sense of

figurative way of expression which the Buddha frequently used to exhort his

follower to detach one’s clinging. Here, the veiy concern of the master is to

teach the importance of detachment. A nd we shall notice that the word burden

was sometimes used in the verse of the Nikayas in order to signify a defilement.

V.P. Varma comments; ‘I think that this is a very intriguing passage and it
definitely sanctions the notion of a substantive psychic entity. But perhaps it is
alone in so categorical an assertion with regard to the reality of the puggala. It
might be teiken as a later interpolation in view of its incongruence with the vast
majority of other passages which sanction anatmavadd {Early Buddhism and its

447
and one who upholds his burden {panna-bbara) meant the people who attained

Arahantship

However, we should notice that the puggala and burden (puggala and the

khandJias) are explained separately. This creates the possibUity to interpret

that the puggala exists as the subject as distinguished firom the khandhas. This

is perhaps the reason why the Puggalavadios tried to seek strong support for

their views from the statement of the Bh^ahara Sutta^ This is a fact we

should pay more attention to when we come to study doctrinal development. If

the burden was interpreted as something really existing in ontological sense,

then the notion of puggala also might come to be interpreted in ontological sense

as a substantial entity which exists as the subject as distinguished from the

khandhas. But, I must say at once that it is one thing to interpret a word

suitably to support one’s own theory and quite a different one to grasp its

intended sense.

S3The word paima-bharawhich hteraUy means one who upholds his ^

for illustrating the one who has attained Arahantship. Sn.626 (- Dhp.40Z) reads^
‘The m a n who understands in this world the end of his own misery, who has laia
aside burden, unfettered, him I caU a brahmaii. The commentaiy i as
laiding down the khandhas, {ohitakkhandhabharam). Cf Itiv. 44 {ohita^am).
The Personalist argues that the burden cannot be the taking hold of the burden (
Harvey, ibid. p.37). ‘Later on, this bharavahi conception as formulated m the bJN
was taken up by the Sammitiyas and the Vatisiptriy^ and they atoered to the noUon
of a soul as distinct from the namarupd (V. P. Varma, ibid. p me
Sammitlyanikasastra {san-mi-ti pu lun, Taisho. Vol.32, No.l649) rea^
‘Furthermore, some schools admit that the person is different from the nve
aggregates. Why? B e c a u s elike a person bearing a burden. The Buddha said
i t is

“The burden is the five aggregates; the bearer is the person.” Hen^>
separate from the five aggregates. That is why the person is dmeren ^ e
aggregates’ i^Taisyo, voL32. p.465b, \L 10-12). In the Sammltiyamka^astra there^
the statement fiwm which we can know that this question
the Puggalavadiis but also by other schools (p.463b, 11 9-10; P-465b
Bhikshu Thich Thien Chau, The Uterature of the Personalits of Early Buddhism,
Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1999, pp.23-24).

448
Let m e summarize the two points that have been observed concerning the

statement of the Bbirahara Sutta:

® The statement in the Bbirahara Sutta does not intend to concern about the

notion of puggala in a sense of ontological thinking, but intends to teach

detachment.

I) However, as the Puggalavadins tried to find in this statement strong

support for their views on the substantial concept of puggala, here we must

not forget that the statement leaves a possibihty to be interpreted that the

word puggala implies some ontological entity of substantial nature.

(3)

W e shall now focus on the negation of 'puggala’ appearing in the

Milindapanha. W h e n the King Milinda asked the name of Nagasena, Nagasena

rephed that he was called Nagasena, Surasena, Virasena or Sihasena. Then the

following explanation was given with regard to the notion of'puggala.

But although parents, your majesty, give such name as Nagasena, Surasena,

Virasena or Sihasena, however, sir, it is only a way of counting {sankhi), a

term {samaMa), an appellation {pannatti), a convenient designation (vohira),

a mere name (namamatta),^ this Nagasena, there is no puggala here to be

found {na h’ettha puggalo upalabbhati).^

The word sankha means: enumeration, estimating, denomination, word and name
(DN.II.227; MN.I.109; SN.III.71iO- The word samama means: designation and name
(DN.I.202; 11.20; MN.III.68; Sn.611; 648). The word pannattimeans: making known,
manifestation, description, designation, name, idea, notion and concept (MN.III.68;
SN.III.71; IV.38; 39). The word vobara means: current appellation, common use [of

449
 The king Milinda is perplexed to hear the Nagasena’s statement, and asked:

If there is no puggala involved in the matter, who gives you robes, food,

lodging and necessaries for the sick?®^ In that case, there is no merit, there is

no demerit, there is no one who does or causes to be done meritorious or

demeritorious deeds, neither good nor evil deeds can have any fi*uit or result.

If a m a n were to kiU you there would be no murder, then it follows that there

are no real masters or teachers in your order, and that your ordinations are

void.

Then the king Milinda makes a counter-question asking analytically as to

what Nagasena is: ‘Is the hair of the head Nagasena? [Here the question was

made with regard to each of the thirty-two forms of organic matter in the h u m a n

body].®® The answer every time is ‘N o ’. Then, the King asks, in the same way,

‘Is each of the five kbandbas is Nagasena?, ‘Is it aU these khandhas combined

that are Nagasena? and ‘Is there anything outside the five kbandhaa that is

Nagasena? Needless to say, Nagasena’s answer is ‘No’.

Hearing negative answer of Nagasena, King Milinda criticizes him saying.

language], common way of defining and usage (SnA. 383; 466; 483). And the word
namamatta means: a mere name.
MU. p.25. The translations of the last phrase by the scholars are: ‘For there is no
permanent individuality (no soul) involved in the matter’ (T.W. Rhys Davids, The
Questions ofKing Milinda, SBE. 35, p.40). ‘For there is no Ego here to be foimd
(H.C. Warren, Buddhism in Translations, p.129). ‘indeed no person is apprehended
here’(P. Harvey, The SelflessMind, p.35).
The king Milinda asked what was the subject ofone’s conduct by various examples:
W h o is it makes use of them? W h o is it keeps the perceptions? W h o is it apphes
himself meditation? W h o is it realizes the Path, the Frmts, and Nibbana? etc.
(Mil.pp.25-26).
This classification of the parts of human body is preferably used in Buddhist
Uterature, for instance: Asubbanupassana (Cf.Vism. 178-196); Kayagatasati (Cf.
p .

Vism. p.239-266); Kuddhaka Patha, 3.

450
‘I can discover no Nagasena. Nagasena is mere empty sound. W h o then is the

Nagasena that we see before us?"

Nagasena asks by using a simile of chariot - each of the separated parts is

not a chariot and the king explains about his understanding about the

existence of the chariot; ‘Because of the pole, and because of the axles..., the

denomination, term, appellation, convenient designation, mere name of ‘chariot’

come into use’. After King’s explanation, Nagasena explains as follows:

Very good, you rightly understand the meaning of chariot. And the same

thing is true in respect of me, your majesty {evarn eva kho maharaha mayham).

Because of the hair of the head, because of hair of the body {pi kese ca paticca

lome ca paticca)..., there come into use the denomination, term, appellation,

convenient designation, mere name of Nagasena {ca paticca Nagasena ti

sankha samama pahnatti vobaro namamattam pavattati). However, in the

absolute sense, there is no puggala here to be found {paramatthatopan’ettha

puggalo nupaJabbhati).^^

As a conclusion, the well known verse of a chariot is given [This is the

statement of nun Vajira (SN. vol. 1, p. 135) which we have already examined in the

fourth chapter].

Just as the term ‘chariot’ is used because of its various parts, so when the

khandhas are there, we use the expression ‘being’. {Yatha hi angasambhara

Md. pp.27-28.

451
 hoti saddo ratbo iti, evaih khandhesu santesu hoti satto tisammutiti)7°

It is clear from Milinda’s question that the matter of concern for King

MUinda is a problem of the subject for actions. The negation of the existence of

‘puggala’means for Milinda the negation of all the subjects for any actions. So

its negation leads him to the nihilism {natthikaditthi), which inevitably comes to

the view of the inefficacy of action {akiriyadittbi).

W e have to inquire more carefuUy into what the ‘puggala means in this

context and the characteristic of Nagasena’s negation of it. The word ‘puggala

in the Milindapanha denotes the existence of ‘individual’ which gives one his

identity. It is the individual existence regarded as the subject, but it seems not

to mean the spiritual part of a person (Kke a concept often translated as soul')

which continue to exist after they die. It seems, if anything, to me a n ‘the

individual existence regarded as substantial entity’.

The negation is given in the form of ‘in the absolute sense, there is no

puggala here to be found’{paramatthatopan’ettha puggalo nupalabbbati). The

word ‘paramattha is one of the important technical terms in the history of

Buddhist teaching, which had been discussed especially in the Mahayana

literature. To say that the puggala can not be found in the absolute sense

impUes that the puggala can be found in conventional sense. It means that the

puggala does not exist as a substantial entity but we can hold the puggala in a

form of combination of the kbandhas. W e have observed in the pervious

chapters that there are, in the parts of the Nikayas,, these tjT)es of recognitions

about one’s existence.

Mil. p.28. This verse is mentioned also in the Kbatbivattbu (p.66).

452
 It is important to compare the statement of Nagasena and that of K h e m a k a

(SN.XXII.89, vol.3, pp. 126-132. W e have examined it in the fifth chapter).

K h e m a k a’s statement is that; ‘I still have the conceit of I am taking together the

five aggregates that are the objects of clinging, however, I do not consider any of

them as this is /.’ The simile of the lotus flower and scent seems to be

equivalent to that of chariot viewed in the light of their purpose of teaching. We

notice here that there is a striking resemblance in both statements except one

important difference. The difference is: ^ e m a k a states that he has the conceit

of I am because of taking together the five khandhas ipancasu

upadanakkhandhesu asmlti adhigatam). O n the other hand, Nagasena admits

the puggala on the conventional level as forming the composition of the five

khandhas together.

Khemaka Sutta: the five aggregates -> the conceit of I a m {asmi).

Milindapanha: the five aggregates the individual existence {puggala)

In the Khemaka Sutta, the intention of the teaching is the eUmination of

attachment about 1’ (conceit of I’)- However, in the Milindapanha, since the

word puggala is used instead of ‘asmi, the stress is put more strongly on the

negation of substantial existence of puggala rather that the negation of

attachment. W e can assume that there is here a doctrinal change fix>m the

negation of attachment to the negation of substantial existence, which resulted

from the objective or ontological speculation concerning ‘individual’.

453
7-2-4| The negation of the substantial existence (2) - jiva and vedagu—

The word jiva is also a controversial concept in the history of Indian

philosophy. W e have already examined the usage of jiva^^ in the Nikayas. In

the Milindapanha, it clearly has a meaning of‘soul’.

The word vedagu {veda-gu) hterally means ‘knowing the Vedas, and in early

Buddhist Uterature, it impUes ‘one who has gained a thorough knowledge’.“ It

is also used as an epithet of a Buddha.'® For example, Sn. 322 reads as follows:

evam pi yo vedagu"* bhavitatto bahussuto hoti avedhadhammo so kho pare

nijjhapaye pajanaih sotavadhanupanisupapanne. (In the same way, one who

has knowledge, has developed himself, who is learned and dependable, clearly

knowing, he can help others to reahze it, ifthey are willing to listen and ready

to receive.)

It is said that the earliest mention ofj7va is found in Rigveda, 164.30. The notion
of jiva has been used in many different rehgious schools in India. For instance,
Carvakas take it as the living body with the attribute of conscioxisness. The Niyaya
Vaisesikas take it as a unique substance, to which all cognition, feehngs and
conations belong as attribute. And we know that in Jain belief, the word ‘y/ra’is so
important concept G^^.N. Bhattacharj^a, A Glossary ofIndian Religious Terms and
Concepts, p.74; S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy voLl, pp.334-340).
Regarding this point, H. Nakamura comments: ‘The Buddha, seeing that the
people thought highly of Vedas, adopted the word ‘vedagu in Buddhist sense as a
meaning ‘one who knows the truth’ (The Suttanipata, Iwanam Bunko, pp.315-316;
Gotama Buddha, voL2, Shyunju sha, Tokyo, p.455). W e may understand this as one
of Buddha’s peculiar teaching methods, ‘give an old term new meaning’, which we
observed in the chapter one.
R.C. Childers, Dictionary of the Pali Language, p.561. PTSD. p.674. In early
Buddhism, one who has completed his spiritual practice {Tathagata, thus-gone) was
called ‘an adept in the Veda (Vedagu) (H.Nakamura, A History of Early Vedanta
Philosophy, p.95, e.g. Sn.456, 472).
Burmese MS. reads ‘vedagu’.
Commentary explains: ‘vedagu ti vedasamkhatehi catuhi maggaHanehi gatd (Fj.
vol.2, p. 330); K R Norman translates it as ‘one who has knowledge’taking it as the
equivalent of ‘vedakd {The Group of Discourses - Sutta-Nipata - , vol.2, Revised
Translation with Introduction and Note, 1955, Oxford, PTS. p. 209). Similar
examples are numerous: Sn. 458, 529, 749, 846, 947, 1049, 1060; SN. VoLl, p.141;
AN.vol.2, p.6; etc.

454
 However, in the Milindapanba, it exceptionally means ‘soul’ as an

equivalent to the term 'jivd as soul.^® Milinda clearly gives a definition about

what 'jivsL means. Firstly, Nagasena asks how the king understands the concept

oijiva (vedagij): ‘What is this vedagu, Great king? (Ab pan’esa maharaja vedagu

namati)'^^ Then the king explains the nature ofjiva as foUows:

Yo bhante abbhantare jivo cakkhuna ruparii passati, sotena saddarh sunati,

ghanena gandham ghayati, jivhaya rasaiii sayati, kayena photthabbam phusati,

manasa dhammarh vijanati. (The jiva within, Reserved sir, which sees forms

through the eye, hears sounds through the ear, smells odors through the nose,

tastes the flavors through the tongue, feels touch through the body, and

discerns things thorough the mind.)^®

The king Milinda further explains: ‘just as we here, sitting in the palace,

can look out of any window as we wish - east, west, north, south— ,so also this

jiva within looks out of any door it wishes’ (ayam abbbabtare jivo yens yena

dvarena icchati passituw tena tena dvarena passati)'''^ It wiU be clear fix)m

Mihnda’s explanation that the jiva is held as the subjective entity which can

control aU the sense organs as it wishes, staying within one’s body. In this

meaning, the word ‘soul’would be fittest as its equivalent in English. Nagasena

denies such concept of jiva. H e makes the king Milinda realize that such

‘A Special meaning of vedagu is that of “soul” in Milindapanha, p. 54,71’ (PTSD.

p.647).
It is interesting that Nagasena uses the word vedagu io his question and the king
replaces it by the word jiva in his answer. Does this show that the two words are
used in the same meaning?
Mil.p.54. T.W. Rhys Davids states that 'abbhantarejivd is not found in this sense
in the Htakas {The Questions ofKing Milinda, SBE. 35, p.86n).

455
concept ofjiva held by the king is baseless. After pointing out the impossibility

of king’s idea by using similes,®” Nagasena ultimately negates the existence of

jiva in the following manner.

Idha maharaja cakkhuii ca paticca rupe ca uppajjati cakkhuvinnanarii,

tamsahajata phasso vedana saMa cetana ekaggata jivitindriyam manasikaro ti

evam ete dham m a paccayato jayanti, na h ’ ettba vedagu upaJabbhati. (Here,

great king, because of the eye and because of visible objects arises the sense of

sight; and those conditions - contact, sensation, perception, thought,

abstraction, sense of vitaHty, and attention - arise each simultaneously with

its predecessor Thus do these physical and mental states originate from a

cause, and so there is no such thing as vedagu)^^

Let us see the other examples for the usage of the word jiva in the

Milindapanha. In the Mil. p.86, the king asks whether these three - perception,

reason and jiva in being - are the same in essence and different only in the letter.

Nagasena rephes; ‘Recognition, Great king, is the mark of perception.

Here, Nagasena gives the four kinds of similes in order to show unreasonableness
of the existence of y»a. They can be summarized in the foUowi^ sentences:
there is jiva which can sees the object with the eye just as one who is sittmg m tne
palace may look out of any window he likes, in the Uke manner y/ra can
ear, the nie, the tongue..., but it is impossible for jiva [The same should be smd of
the other four sense-organs and the mind] (MU. pp. 54-55); ® In the palace wi
windows aU thrown open, ifwe stretch forth our heads, we can see all kin(te ot obje
perfectly. But it is impossible that jiva do the same when the door ot eyes are
thrown open (Mil. p.55); @ In case a flavor were placed on the tongue, jiva is aow to
know whether it is sour or salt or bitter or pungent or astringent or sweet, am,
after that flavor has passed into the stomach, jiva would not know whether it i ^ o ^
or salt etc. (Mil. p.56); @ If a m an who is seal his hps were to throw mto the troug
full of honey, he could not know whether that into which he had l^en ^
sweet or whether it was not. Because, the honey could not get mto his mouth 111
jiva is there, he would know it] (Mil. p.56).

456
discrimination of reason, and there is no such thing as a jiva in being

(Vijananalakkhanaih maharaja vinnanarh, pajSnftnalakkhana panna, bhutasmim

jivo na upalabbhati).

In the Mil. p.30, Anantakaya who is a vassal of the King Milinda states his

idea about what the jiva is. He says, ‘The jiva, the inner breath which comes

and goes, that I suppose to be Nagasena’{Yo so bhante abbhantare-jivo pavisati

ca nikkhamati ca so Nagasena timaiinami).

In MU. pp.258-259, the king asks if the water is alive or not. The king

says; ‘This water when boHing over the fire gives forth many a sound, hissing and

simmering. Is then, Nagasena, the water alive? Is it shouting at play, or is it

crying out at the torment inflicted on it?" Then, the Nagasena explains: ‘It is not

aHve, Great king, there is no soul or being in water {na’ tthi udake jivo va satto

va). It is by reason of the greatness of the shock of the heat of the fire that it

gives forth sounds, hissing and simmering.’

Several observations in the last few paragraphs have shown what the

concept of jiva means and how it is negated by Nagasena. The concept of jiva,

according to the King Milinda, will be described as: X' sitting within the body, I)

controlling aU cognition, 3) vital principle which sometimes is regarded as the

inner breath. I cannot say for certain whether these characteristics of jiva as

described by the King Milinda were derived firom the Greek way of thinking or

not. Because we can find these characteristics of jiva within the ideas of some

rehgious schools in India at the time when the Milindapanha was composed.

What is important is the fact that Nagasena denied the existence of such

concept ofjiva. W e have already observed that the question about the jiva being

MiLpp.56-57.

457
the body itself or not is one of the unanswered questions. In the Nikayas, this

type of question, existence or non existence of jiva, was not discussed because of

the attitude of'avyikata. However, it should be noted that the existence ofjiva

is clearly denied in this context. It must be said that thus there was a great

change in the history of Buddhist doctrine with regard to the attitude towards

substantial existence. Absolute negation of jiva in the Milindapaiiha is more

clearly illustrated in the following two examples.

The statement on the jiva in the MilindapaSha is quoted in the

Abhidharmakosa {Astamakosasthanasambaddah pudgala-viniscayali),^~ and the

Tsa-pao-ts’ang-ching, viz., The Storehouse of Sundry Valuable.^ [The sentence

stated in the above two texts can not be found in the extant Pali Milindapanba, so

it is assumed that they form quotations fro™ some other version]. The existence

of the jiva is absolutely denied in these two texts.

Fitstly, in the Abhidharmakosa, King Milinda questions to Nagasena; ‘Is

this jiva the same as the body, or isjiva one thing and the body another?”{Kim nu

sa jivas tat sariram anyo jiva’ nyat sariram).^* Then, Nagasena asks the King

about the mango fruits saying, ‘Are the finiits of the mango-tree in your palace

sour or are they sweet? W h e n the king says that there is no mango-tree in his

palace, Nagasena concludes by saying:

Abhidharmakosabhasyam of Vasubandhu, ed by P. Pradhan, 1957. Cf Th.

Stcherbatsky, The Soui Theoryofthe Buddhist, pp.40-41.
This text dated Yen-hsing2 (AD.472) contains 121 parables or stories. There is
no Indian original of the complete text, but many stories have parallels in Sanskrit
or Pali. A Sanskrit translation of Chinese title would be Ksudraka pitaka. It wets
compiled in China based on Indian materials. The text was compiled and composed
by the chief monk Tan-yon and translated by Kikkaya and Liu Hsiao-pino.
Complete English translation from Chinese ia available: ‘The Story of Sundry
Valuable^, translated by Charles WiUemen, Berkeley California, Numata Center for
Buddhist Translation and Research, 1994.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam oi Vasubandhu, p.469.

458
 Then how can I tell you anything about the jiva, which does not exist, of it

being the same as the body or being different from it? (evam eva maharaja sa

evajivo nastikuto’sya sarirad anyatam ananyatam va vyakaromi).^

The Storehouse of Sundry Valuable (Parable 111; The Discussion of King

Menandros with Nagasena, Taisho, vol.4, p.492c-493b) is another notable text in

which the jiva is denied absolutely. It reads as follows:

The king further asked, ‘I would like to ask you now about m y person.^ Is

the self *■ permanent or impermanent? Give m e a satisfactory reply.’

Nagasena rephed with the question, ‘When, for instance, 0 king, there are

fruits on the amra tree in your palace, are they sweet or sour?” The king said,

‘There is no such tree in m y palace at aU. W h y do you ask m e whether the

fruits are sweet or sour?” Nagasena said, ‘The same appUes to the seK

Since aU five aggregates are without a self, why ask m e if the self is

permanent or impermanent?’

The notable point is that, in this sentence, the word self is used when

Nagasena states that: ‘Since aU five aggregates are without a self, w h y ask m e if

the self\s permanent or impermanent.’ It is supposed that the original Pali /

Sanskrit from which the word ‘self was translated was ‘jiva according to

Abbidharmakosabhasyam oi Vasubandhu, p.469.

This is a translation of Chinese phrase which Uterally means ‘about the
matter in the being”(Taisho, voL4, p.492c).
This is a rendering of the Chinese word ‘S' to which the Pah word atta is often
rendered (Taisho, vol.4, p.492c).

459
the corresponding statement in extant Pali text. However, the translator has

understood the word jiva as an equivalent for the word self (atta / atman).

Judging from the fact that some commentaries explain the word atta as an

equivalent for the words 'jfva, puggala, satta, it may be said that there was a

confusion about these notions of the words at that time it was translated into

Chinese.

There is a further point which needs to be noted regarding the usage of

‘vedagii. W e have already observed earlier that Nagasena denied the existence

of vedagii. In that context the word vedagu meaning ‘soul’ is the same as jiva

(Mil. p.54). Another example which mentions the negation of vedagu in

the Milindapanha, p.71. It reads as follows in a form of a dialogue between

Nagasena and the King Milinda:

Bhante Nagasena, vedagu upalabbhatP.

(Nagasena, is there vedagu to be found?)

Paramatthena kho maharaja vedagu na upalabbhati.

(Great King, in the absolute sense, there is no vedagu to be found.)

It has been understood by the scholars that the word vedagu in this context

(p.71) also has the same meaning of ‘soul’ as the usage in the pervious part

(p.54).®* However, according to the statement in the Milinda-Tlka and the Na-

hsienpi-ch’iu-ching{Nagasenabhiksusutra), we can recognize that the ‘vedagii in

p.71 is better to be understood to represent its original meaning, ‘one who has

gained a thorough knowledge’.

T.W. Rhys Davids translates the sentence in question as ‘Is there such a thing,

460
 Milinda-Tika explains as follows, as an answer to the question ‘w h y this

question was made again though it was questioned before?’®®

Pubbe paiiho jiva-vedagu sandhaya pucchito. Ayarii ‘ye brahmana vedagu’ ti

adina vuttarii puggalavedagum sandhaya pucchito. (The former question was

asked regarding 'jiva-vedagu, and this question was asked regarding

‘puggala-vedagu which concerns ‘one who had reached the end of knowledge
¥
about Brahman, Veda etc. .)90

The Na-hsien pi-ch’iu-ching, a Chinese translation of the Milmdapanha,

renders vedagu as ‘one who has knowledge’.®* It translates the word vedagu of

page 54 in the Milindapanha as one who is eternal’®" or ‘person’.®'^

7-2-5| The negation of the substantial existence (3) - satta -

The word satta {Skt. sattva) also has a meaning of substantial entity,®^

Nagasena, as the soul’{The Questios ofKing Milinda, SBE. V6L35, p.111).

vedagu upalabbhati ti ayaih paiiho pubbe ca pucchito kasma puna pucchito
{Milinda-Tika, p.16).
Milinda-Tika, p. 16.
Taisho, voL 32, p.715c. C£ Bhikkhu Thich Chau, ibid. pp.83-84. A. Tamai, ‘Soul
theory in the MilindapaHbei [MUindapaUha ni okeru Reikon-setu ni tuite], Journal of
Indian and Buddhist Studies, Tok^o 21-3, 1973, pp. 146-147.
Taisho, voL 32^^.^12b.
Taisho, voL 32, p.715c.
The word ‘sattd means ‘a living being". It seems to be used in the MilindapaUha
as almost synonymous with the word 'puggald. The following sentences are
examples for the conventional use of it and for showing its similarity with the
concept of puggala. So sace akaiikhati, parasattinam parapuggalanaih cetasa
cetopahcca pajaneyyam (AN. vol. 3, p. 29. Cf AN. vol.3, p.4lG.). And see also the
statement of Vajira (SN.vol.1, p.135). Later, it is regarded as an equivalent to atta.
Nyanatiloka explains the word satta, from the Theravadds point of view, as foUows:
‘This term, just like atta, puggala, jiva, and all the other terms denoting “ego-entity”,
is to be considered as a merely conventional term {vohara-vacana), not possessing

461
which is discussed in the Milindapanha with reference to the idea of

transmigration. The King Mihnda asks Nagasena: ‘Is there any satta, Nagasena,

who transmigrates from this body to another?" {Bhante Nagasena atthikoci satto

yo imamha kaya annaiii kayarh sankamati) Nagasena replies in negative and

explains how one cannot get free from his evil deeds even if there is no such

entity.

Just as, great king, this name and form commits deeds, either pure or impure,

and by these kammas, another name and form is reborn. A n d therefore one

is not free from his evil deeds, (evam eva kho maharaja imina namarupena

kammaih karoti sobhanam va asobhanam va, tena kammena annarh

namarupam patisandahati, tasma na parimutto papakehi kammehiti^^^

The king Mdinda tries to attribute a role of the subject to this concept of

transmigratory satta,^ which is supposed to be responsible for one’s good or bad

deeds. However, Nagasena does not admit such a satta, and instead, gives the

name and form (namarupa) the role of transmigratory principle.

Another example is in the MU. p.268, where Nagasena explains three things

which one cannot find in the world. They are;

3) There are no things, whether conscioxis^iimncQnsciQiis,-which are not

any reality-value’(Nanatiloke, Buddhist Dictionary, p.196).

95 Mil. p.72.
The king Mihnda gives the definition of the transmigration {saihsarei) when he was
requested by Nagasena: ‘A being born here dies here. Having died here, it springs
up elsewhere. Having been born there, there it dies. Having died there, it springs
up elsewhere. That is what is meant by transmigration’ {Jdha maharaja jato idh’
eva marati, idha mato annarta uppajjati, tahiihjato tahim yeva marati, tahiiii mato

462
 subject to decay and death (sacetana vaacetana va ajaramara like na ‘ttbi).

® There is no permanence for the conformations’ (sanJcbaranaw niccata na’

tthi).

3) In the highest sense, there is no finding (Jaddbi) such as a ‘beign’ (satta)

{paramatthena sattupaladdhina’tthi).

It is important to note here that the existence of satta was negated by a

qualified phrase ‘in the highest sense’{paramatthena), which is the same type of

negation we find when word puggala is negated.

What is important is that these three things which do not exist in the world

seem to imply the three marks - dukkha, anicca and anatta respectively and in

this context, the negation of satta occupies the place of anatta.

7-2-61 Other concepts to which King Milinda attributes substantial nature

Nagasena denies all the substantial concepts such as 'puggala, ‘jiva,

vedagu and 'satta. Besides these concepts, King Milinda persists in searching

something substantial which can play the role of an eternal subject, especially

the concept of mind (citta) is sometimes regarded as having substantial nature.

The following statements are good example of MiLinda’s persistence.

® King Milinda holds the mind (dtta) as a substantial existence, which

remembers things of the past. Nagasena explains that one recollects by

annatra uppajjati; evaihkho maharaja saihsarohoti) <MiLp.77>.

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 memory {satif' not by the mind. Because ifone recollects by the mind, when

one forgets the things, we will have to admit that at that time one does not

have a mind and which is absurd.'^®

® King Milinda holds the idea that the mind {citta) is ruler {issara) of the

body, master (samin) of the body, and holds highest power {vasavattin) over

the body‘s

$ The king held on idea of mind being a substantial reality in the context of

the dream. He says; ‘W h e n a m a n dreams a dream that is a prognostication,

does his own mind set out itself to seek the omen {Mm tassa cittaih sayam

gantva tarn nimittam vicinati), or does the prognostication comes of its own

accord into the path of his mind {tam va nimittam cittassa apatham

upagaccbati), or does some one else come and teU him of it? {anno va agantva

tassa aroceti).' Nagasena denies such concept of mind held by King Mihnda,

and gives psychological explanation supported by the teaching of conditioned

ipaticca) origination (samuppada).

Nagasena explains how one’s memory springs up without any substantial subject.
He enumerates the seventeen ways (akara) by w H c h one’s memory arise [The text
says ‘sixteen ways’{so/asahiakarebisati uppajjati} in the beginning of the paragraph
but actually lists seventeen ways]. 1. abhijanato (by personal experience), 2.
katumikaya (by outward aid), 3. olarika-viHiianato (by the impression made by the
greatness of some occasion), 4. hita-vinnanoto (by the impression made by joy), 5.
ahita-vinhanato (by the impression made by sorrow), 6. sabhaga-nimittato (by
similarity of appearance), 7. visabbaga-nimittato (by difference of appearance), 8.
katbabbinnanato (by the knowledge of speech), 9. lakkbanato (by a sign), 10. saranato
(by the effort to recoUect), 11. muddato (by calculation), 12. gananato (by arithmetic),
13. dbaranato (by learning by heart), 14. bbavanato (by meditation), 15. pottbaka-
nibandbanato (by reference to a book), 16. upanikkbepato (by a pledge), 17.
anubbutato (by association) <Mil. pp.79-80>. Some of these words are difficult to be
understood, see in detail, I. B. Horner, Milinda’s Question: Milindapanba, SBB.
vol.22.
®»Mil. p.77.

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7-2-TI Two types ofnegations

The substantial existences mentioned in the Miliadapanha - puggala, jiva,

satta, vedagu, citta - are all dined by Nagasena, but his ways of negation can be

classified into two types depending on the nature of concepts.

The first type of the negation is presented in a form of ‘paramatthato na

upalabbhati (there is no [such concept] to be found in the highest sense of the

term). This is the negation qualified by the phrase ‘in the highest sense’,which

implies the existence in the ‘ordinary sense’. The concepts negated in this

qualified way are p

‘ uggala’, ‘satta’ an& ‘vedagu’ {p. 71). These words are chiefly

used in the Nikayas to denote their original meanings - people’,‘being’,and ‘one who

has knowledge’ respectively - in the ordinary sense, without any metaphysical

connotation. However, we can assume that these words came to be regarded as

substantial concepts at the time when King Milinda and Nagasena held their debate.

Then the negation of these words would intend to make the king realize the true

nature of existence, that is, they do no exists substantially but just exist transitorily

in the form of being composed by many. The qualified phrase ‘paramatthato entails

transitory existence of‘people’,‘being’,and ‘one who has knowledge’. Viewed in this

hne, the negation of the concepts - puggala, satta, and vedagu (p. 71) - by Nagasena

may belong to the same teaching of the negation of seeing the object as substantial,

though it is presented in the more developed form. When I consider the steps of

development about how this teaching [to negate to see the things substantially] was

presented, the following stages may be assumed.

MiL253.

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 ® One should not see people substantially.

(D One should not regard people as substantial existence.

® One should know that there is no substantial ‘people’to be found.

The second way of negation is presented by the phrase ‘na upalabbhati’

(there is no [such concept] to be found) without the qualifying phrase. This

absolute negation is applied to the concepts such as ‘jiva and ‘vedagu (p.54),

which mean ‘soul’. W e can understand that Nagasena negates absolutely these

concepts and does not allow to hold it in the ordinary sense too. W e must recall

that, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the Nikayas kept ‘avyakata

attitude towards these concepts which me a n ‘soul’. However, here in the

MUindapanha, Nagasena clearly declares that there is no jiva in this world. W e

see a notable shift in the Buddhist history of doctrinal development, from an

indeterminate attitude to an absolute negation of existence concerning the

substantial concept

7-2-8| A relation between 'anatta and ‘no substantial existence’

In this section, we shall consider the relation between the teaching of

‘anatta and the negation of substantial existences. As I have mentioned before.

S. Radhakrishnan made several important statements; ‘O n obviously incomplete

data Buddha might have withheld judgement. Nagasena doubted the caution of
Buddha and become actively negative. To him lack of evidence for an opinion was a
sufficient reason for disbelieving it. For believing on incomplete evidence is not only
a blunder but a crime. Suspended judgement was Buddha’s attitude: reckless
repudiation was Nagasena’s amendment’(Indian Philosophy, voLl, p.346); ‘W h e n we
pass from the direct teaching of Buddha to its interpretation by Nagasena and
Buddhaghosa a negative complexion is cast over the silence or the agnosticism of the
original teaching of Buddha. Buddhist thought is torn away from its ancestral stem
and planted in a purely rational soil’(ibid. p.390).

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these two theories are basically and originally do not teach the same principle.

However subsequently they came to be mixed and are regarded as one and same

teaching, viz. anatta - negation of substantial existence. H o w are these two

theories understood in the Milindapanhal Though it is difficult to know the

exact meaning of anatta in the Milindapanha because the word appears in only a

few contexts,we may assume that the nature of negation presented by

Nagasena should be marked as a transitional stage in the history of doctrinal

change regarding the teaching of ‘anatta, which develops fi-om the idea of ‘not

self to that of no self or no substantial existence’. The reasons for this

assumption are derived from two points.

The first point is: If the Nagasena understood anatta as the negation of

substantial existences, it is strange that he should not have used the term

anatta when he negated such concepts as puggala, jiva, satta etc. This implies

that the negation of substantial concepts was not directly equated with the

teaching of ‘anatta in the Milindapaiiha. It m a y be contended that the

Nagasena did not purposely use the Buddhist technical term anatta because he

The examples of the usage oi‘anatta in the Milindapaiiha are as follows; 1 PaMa
pi kho maharaja sakiccayam katva tatth’ eva nirujjhati, yam pana taya pamaya
kataiii: aniccan ti va dukkhan ti va anatta ti va, taiii na nirujjhati (When the wisdom
has achieved its own duty, then it ceases to go on. But that which has been acquired
by means of it remains, that is, the knowledge of impermanence, suffering and not
self) <Mil.p.42>. a Panna maharaja uppajjamana avijjandhakararh vidhameti,
vijjobhasamjaneti, Hanalokaih vidamsetj ariyasaccanipakatanikaroti, tatoyogavacaro
aniccan ti va dukkhan ti va anatta ti va sammapaiiiiaya passati (When wisdom arise
in the heart, Great King, it dispels the darkness of ignorance, it causes the radiance
of knowledge to arise, it makes the hght of intelligence to shine forth, and it makes
the noble truth clearer. Thus does the recluse who is devoted to effort reahze with
the true wisdom the impermanence, the suffering and not seH) <Mil. p.39>. 3' The
word ‘anattasanHa ia used as one of the twenty-six saHna-s. <Mil. p.332>. 3 evam
eva kho maharaja yogina yogavacarena: aniccarh dukkham anatta ti sankharesu
manasam saHcarayitabbam (In the same way, Great King, the recluse should make
his mind move about aU things [seeing] that formations are impermanent, suffering,
and not selO <Mil.p.387>. ^ To explain what the recluse should practice concerning
the body, the forty practices are given. Here, ‘anattato upasitabbni is presented as

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thought Mihnda a Greek king would not understand such a highly technical

Buddhist phrase. However, this justification cannot be accepted for two

reasons: J) Nagasena did use other terms which are peculiar to Buddhism, for

example, five khandhas, panca nivaranani, namarupa, etc.‘"“ 2 The term

‘anatta was actually used in another context in which the negation of substantial

concepts was not discussed.'"’

The second point is: W h e n Nagasena explained what one cannot find in the

world, the three things are given, viz. i what is not subject to decay and death, 3

what is not impermanent, and a concepts such as being (satta). W e can

understand that these three represent the three essential marks of Buddhism,

dukkha, anicca and anattarespectively. A nd the negation of substantial concept

‘satta is put in the place oi'anatta. From this we m ay surmise that according

to the Milindapanha the anatta teaching signified the negation of substantial

concepts such as ‘satta.

W e ma y go on from these two points to conclude that the nature of negation

presented by Nagasena should be marked as a transitional shift from the

historical doctrine of ‘not self to the further doctrine of ‘no substantial

existences’.

one of these practices <Mil.418>.

Many Buddhist technical terms are used in the Milindapanha. The five moral
powers (indriya-balani), the seven conditions of Arahatship {bojjhanga-magga) etc.
<Mil.p.33>. And, the texts read as foUows: Then the Elder convinced King Milinda
with discourse drown fi-om Abhidhamma...’ <Mil.p.56>. This also represents that
King Milinda had basic knowledge of Buddhist terminology.
Mil.p.39.

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