#15 FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE vs.

Case Date Ponente

COURT OF APPEALS Number

PETITIONER: RESPONDENT:
FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE
ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his capacity as Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Roxas City and the
late POTENCIANO KAPUNAN, SR., as substituted by
his heirs, namely: LEONA KAPUNAN TIANGCO,
CICERO KAPUNAN, JESUS KAPUNAN, SANTIAGO
KAPUNAN, POTENCIANO KAPUNAN, JR., PAZ
KAPUNAN PUBLICO, SUSA KAPUNAN GENUINO,
and ERLINDA KAPUNAN TESORO

NATURE OF THE CASE:petition for review

DOCTRINE:
The reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an
employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on
labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to void liability under the substantive
provisions of the Civil Code..

FACTS:

Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., an eighty-two year old retired schoolteacher, was
struck by the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner Filamer and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha, as
Kapunan, Sr. was walking along Roxas Avenue, Roxas City at 6:30 in the evening of October 20, 1977.
Kapunan, Sr. suffered multiple injuries for which he was hospitalized for a total of twenty (20) days.
At the time of the vehicular accident, only one headlight of the jeep was functioning. Funtecha, who
only had a student driver's permit, was driving after having persuaded Allan Masa, the authorized
driver, to turn over the wheels to him.
Kapunan, Sr. instituted a criminal case against Funtecha alone in the City Court of Roxas City for
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The inferior court found Funtecha guilty as
charged and on appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the then Court of First Instance of Capiz.
Pursuant to his reservation, Kapunan, Sr. commenced a civil case for damages 3 before the RTC of
Roxas City against Filamer and Funtecha.
Also included was Agustin Masa, the director and president of Filamer Christian Institute, in his
personal capacity "in that he personally authorized and allowed said Daniel Funtecha who was his
houseboy, to drive the vehicle in question despite his knowledge and awareness that the latter did not
have the necessary license or permit to drive said vehicle. His son, Allan Masa, who was with Funtecha
at the time of the accident, was not impleaded as a co-defendant.4
On December 14, 1983, the trial court rendered judgment finding not only petitioner Filamer
and Funtecha to be at fault but also Allan Masa, a non-party.
Only petitioner Filamer and third-party defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation appealed the lower
court's judgment to the Court of Appeals and as a consequence, said lower court's decision became
final as to Funtecha. On December 17, 1985, the Appellate Court rendered the assailed judgment
affirming the trial court's decision in toto.6 Hence, the present recourse by petitioner Filamer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the term "employer" as used in Article 2180 is applicable to petitioner Filamer with
reference to Funtecha. NO.

HELD:

Yes. Upon MR, the SC ruled in favor of Kapunan (heirs). The provisions of Section 14,
Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR was only meant to provide guidelines as
compliance with labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages is
concerned. This does not in any way affect the provisions of any other laws like the civil
code. The IRR cannot defeat the provisions of the Civil Code. In other words, Rule X is
merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. There is a distinction
hence Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for
damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working
student of a school and against the school itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment
between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one
for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both
doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor
to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is
misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to
void liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a
driver’s position in order that Filamer may be held responsible for his grossly negligent
act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit
of Filamer (the act of driving the jeep from the school to Masa’s house is beneficial to the
school because this enables Masa to do a timely school transportation service in the
morning). Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with
the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve Filamer of the burden of rebutting the
presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a
servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. Filamer has failed to show proof of
its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees
Funtecha and Allan.