Comparative Strategy

ISSN: 0149-5933 (Print) 1521-0448 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ucst20

Principles of Special Operations: Learning from

Sun Tzu and Frontinus

Adam Leong Kok Wey

To cite this article: Adam Leong Kok Wey (2014) Principles of Special Operations:
Learning from Sun Tzu and Frontinus, Comparative Strategy, 33:2, 131-144, DOI:
10.1080/01495933.2014.897119

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2014.897119

Published online: 28 Apr 2014.

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 Principles of Special Operations: Learning
from Sun Tzu and Frontinus

ADAM LEONG KOK WEY

Department of Strategic Studies
National Defence University of Malaysia
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

The principles espoused in Sun Tzu’s Art of War and Sextus Iulius Frontinus’s Stratage-
maton that have linkages with the practice of special operations warfare are examined
in this article. The academic study of special operations within the field of strategy has
been hindered by the lack of resources in strategic theories that explain how special
operations work and succeed. This article presents the discovery of principles of special
operations which has been vividly described in both of these classical texts but often
overlooked, and these principles can be matched with the contemporary practice of
special operations.

Introduction
The recent successful special operation in killing Osama bin Laden conducted by the
U.S. Navy SEALs has managed to increase the awareness on the strategic utility of these
secretive and elite Special Operations Forces (SOF).1 It is, however, quite unfortunate that
scholarly discourse on special operations, and how they relate to strategy, is still lacking
in substance. While most scholarly writings on special operations tend to focus on the
glamorous operations undertaken by various special operations units, academic studies on
its effectiveness at the strategic level have not been encouraging.2 There are only a few
works available today that attempt to map special operations with strategy.3 One of the
major issues compounding the problem of lesser analytical strategic analysis of special
operations was the non-mention of special operations by well-known classical strategic
theorists.
There is an argument on the lack of strategic theory that can be directly linked with
special operations (or the nonexistence of a strategy “guru” on special operations).4 This
author differs from this argument, and suggests that principles that can be applied to
explain how special operations can be used effectively, and contextual examples of how
special operations have been employed, have been written down, for example, by Sun
Tzu and Sextus Iuluis Frontinus, two millennia ago.5 The concepts and theories related to
special operations distilled from these two classical warfare texts could provide the key to
understanding and explaining how special operations succeeded and contributed to ancient
warfare practice.
The similarities between Frontinus and Sun Tzu’s principles related to special opera-
tions are remarkable. Most importantly, both of them suggested the existence of a universal
understanding in the use of such men and methods as the ways and means to meet the
ends; in other words, special operations was a form of warfare commonly practiced and
recognized as a legitimate way of fighting in the world two millennia ago. It must be
emphasized that both Sun Tzu and Frontinus did not dictate that special operations could

131
Comparative Strategy, 33:131–144, 2014
Copyright © 2014 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
0149-5933 print / 1521-0448 online
DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2014.897119
132 A. L. K. Wey

work, or win battles, alone. Special operations were described more often as being used in
a complementary role with the main body of the army.
This article describes the definitions of special operations, and assesses some of the
principles of warfare propounded by Sun Tzu and Frontinus that were useful in understand-
ing and explaining how special operations perform and contribute strategically in modern
warfare. It suggests that the common perception that strategic studies of special operations
is marred due to the absence of strategic gurus does not hold and that many lessons on
special operations can be learned from these classical strategic texts.

What are Special Operations?

Special operations have existed in conceptual form since ancient military history was first
recorded.6 The practice of special operations–like concepts has vast historical antecedents,
for example in ancient Greek military history7 and during the Middle Ages,8 the Seven Years
War, Napoleonic Wars,9 the American Revolution (War of Independence, 1775–1782),10
and the American Civil War (1861–1866).11 Due to the sheer length of the history of special
operations practice, there is a plethora of definitions that describe special operations. These
definitions can be divided into two categories, one based on a rigid assumption that special
operations are what a special operations unit does, and the second on a broader definition
of what a special operation is and a suggestion of who should conduct it. Ohad Leslau,
an independent international affairs researcher writing on Israeli special operations shares
a similar view. He stated that there are two approaches to studying special operations.
The first looks into “organization, equipment, selection and training of SOF, to distinguish
them from regular units,” 12 whereas the second focuses on “the uniqueness of the SOF’s
operations and objectives.” 13
One of the key definitions based on a special operations organization can be traced to
one of the largest employers of special operations units— the U.S. military. The official
definition of special operations is identified by the Doctrine for Joint Special Operations
(JP 3-05):

Special operations are operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically

sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or
economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad
conventional force requirement.14

Other authors who define special operations in a similar vein are James Kiras,15 Robert
Spulak, Jr.,16 and William McRaven.17 An example of a broader definition based on special
operations’ unique capabilities as opposed to an organization is Luttwak, Canby, and
Thomas’s study on special operations, A Systematic Review of “Commando” (Special)
Operations 1939–1980,18 in which special operations was defined as “ . . . self-contained
acts of war mounted by self-sufficient forces operating within hostile territory.”19 Colin
Gray points out that the most useful definition of special operations is based on Maurice
Tugwell and David Charters’s, which is also a broader definition based on the uniqueness
of special operations:

small scale, clandestine, covert or overt operations of an unorthodox and fre-

quently high-risk nature, undertaken to achieve significant political or military
objectives in support of foreign policy.20
 Principles of Special Operations 133

Finlan, writing on special forces, gives an interesting recommendation for a term that may
clarify the confused state of special operations’ definitions:

A better term, however, that would avoid much of the confusion would be
“Different Forces” because difference, in terms of relationship with strategy
and its underlying nature, is the watermark of Special Forces and best guides
their employment in war.21

Finlan points out that most of the misunderstanding and miscomprehension of special
operations is due to the connotation of the term “special,” which had given a false assumption
that what special operations do is special and performed by “special men.” The association
with the term special had further alienated the special operations community from the
wider conventional military forces. Finlan’s proposed term, Different Forces, may be able
to repair the current state of confusion.
The late M. R. D. Foot, a prominent Special Operations Executive (SOE) historian
and ex-SAS intelligence officer during World War II, managed to provide a useful working
definition of special operations:

They are unorthodox coups, that is, unexpected strokes of violence, usually
mounted and executed outside the military establishment of the day, which
exercise a startling effect on the enemy; preferably at the highest level.22

Foot’s definition concisely sums up special operations’ most important ingredients for op-
erational success and survival, which are surprise and unexpected acts of warfare. For the
purpose of this research, this author used Foot’s definition of special operations, which has
more utility in explaining the distinct nature of special operations without being obstruc-
tively narrow in its focus. 23

Sun Tzu’s Art of War

Sun Tzu’s Art of War has existed almost 2,500 years and has been widely used and quoted
in modern studies of strategy, both military and business. His work was influenced by the
Taoist nature of Chinese philosophy prevalent during his time, in which nature and humans
coexist in harmony, and the search for this harmony is paramount for success in the world,
be it in life in general or in war.
Sun Tzu’s Art of War had a set of principles that can be applied in the study of how
to use special operations to obtain positive strategic performance. Among some of the
key principles in Sun Tzu’s strategic text that can be used in mapping with key special-
operations capabilities is the use of extraordinary (indirect/unorthodox) forces, surprise,
flexibility and the ability to operate behind enemy lines, intelligence, and deception.

Extraordinary (Indirect/Unorthodox) Forces

Sun Tzu also stated one of the earliest conceptual principles of using special operations
in warfare. The passage below points to the most important concept related to special
operations by Sun Tzu:

That the army is certain to sustain the enemy’s attack without suffering defeat
is due to operations of the extraordinary [d, ch’i] and the normal forces
134 A. L. K. Wey

[d, cheng] . . . Generally in battle, use the normal force to engage; use the
extraordinary to win.24

What Sun Tzu meant by extraordinary forces is similar to special operations, where surprise
attacks were sprung on the enemies where they least expected.25 Sun Tzu stressed the
importance of understanding on the part of the commander, as well as his capability in
actually making use of both “ordinary” forces (conventional forces) and “extraordinary”
forces in a campaign for the best results. The concept of using ch’i as a form of special
operations, however, has to be cautioned against the contextual background to Sun Tzu’s
argument. There are two main arguments on what Sun Tzu meant by using ch’i and cheng
forces effectively. This dual concept can be understood as a way, or strategy, of using
military forces and nonmilitary forces to achieve one’s objective. The manipulation of
direct and indirect strategies by the commander was the core argument of this side of the
camp. The forces available to the commander, whether military or diplomatic, could be
used in a combination of direct and indirect approaches, catching the enemy off guard
with either one of the approaches, and then decisively exploiting the advantage to gain
the upper hand. The other side of the camp, influenced by Ts’ao Ts’ao, argued that ch’i
and cheng consisted of units pre-assigned for individual respective functions, either as a
ch’i unit similar to today’s special operations units, or as cheng forces comprising the
bulk of the army such as the infantry.26 Further citations on Sun Tzu’s advice in using
extraordinary forces, which is almost similar to today’s special operations context, can be
found in commentaries translated by Roger T. Ames. These passages from A Conversation
between the King of Wu and Sun Wu highlight the common usage of special operations
concepts in ancient Chinese warfare:

Dispatch light infantry to cut off the enemy’s supply lines; and . . . go by way
of places where it would never occur to him you would go, and attack him
when he is off guard.27

Sun Tzu’s concept of ch’i can be illustrated by an example of the Chinese military using
special operations in their way of warfare 2,000 years ago in the Battle of Guan Du, which
took place in 200 A.D. The kingdoms of Cao Cao and Yuan Shao were at war. Yuan
Shao’s army was well stocked with provisions of rations whereby Cao Cao’s army was less
equipped to fight a protracted war.28 Therefore, Cao Cao decided to defeat Yuan Shao in a
quick fight and found that the best option was to destroy the key to Yuan Shao’s strength,
the provisions— which he planned to do in a surprise and covert attack. The operation was
successful, as the few guards watching over the provisions were overwhelmed with ease
and the food provisions quickly destroyed by fire. This operation caused the morale of Yuan
Shao’s army to plummet and raised widespread panic that resulted in a confused retreat of
the army. Cao Cao subsequently attacked the retreating Yuan Shao army, destroying it and
leading to Yuan Shao’s collapse from power, and the consolidation of Cao Cao’s power in
Yuan Shao’s kingdom.29 This is a fine example of the tactical use of special operations,
correctly identifying and striking at the decisive point, leading to the gain of immense
strategic utility for the overall campaign.
A more recent contemporary example elucidates this point by Sun Tzu. When the
United States decided to attack Afghanistan to eliminate Al-Qaeda forces located there and
kill or capture its leader Osama Bin Laden after the 9/11 attacks, a lot of analysts and experts
had warned that it would be a difficult task as history had proven that all foreign military
 Principles of Special Operations 135

forces trying to enter Afghanistan were defeated. The difficult task ahead was rightly given
to Special Operations Forces as the spearhead in the war against terror in Afghanistan. The
first units sent in were believed to be U.S. Army Special Forces Operational Detachment
Alpha (ODA); ODA 555 and ODA 595.30 It was also known as Task Force Dagger. Once
on ground, U.S. Army Special Forces (USASF) units wasted no time in working with
the Northern Alliance, the group opposed to Taliban ruling. The USASF, specially trained
for unconventional warfare, raised and led indigenous forces in fighting a common foe.
The USASF provided the technological linkage and strategy, while the Northern Alliance
provided the manpower needed to defeat the Taliban and their Al-Qaeda bed-mates. This
was a classic example of what Sun Tzu meant by using an extraordinary force (USASF)
working in conjunction with a direct force (the Northern Alliance), which could yield
excellent strategic results.
The harmonious integration of effort between USASF and U.S. airpower proved to be
the key in unlocking the Taliban defenses which had maintained a static and entrenched
frontline against the Northern Alliance. USASF directed laser-guided and Global Posi-
tioning System (GPS)-guided bombs with pinpoint accuracy at Taliban positions. The
devastating and accurate air power soon destroyed the Taliban lines and made it easy for
Northern Alliance forces to fight and defeat them. Town after town in Afghanistan fell to
Northern Alliance hands (with USASF personnel accompanying). Some of the key towns
that fell quickly under the withering air bombing directed by USASF were Mazar-i-Sharif,
Kandahar, and the capital of Afghanistan, Kabul. Again, the USASF acted as the extraor-
dinary force directing airstrikes from a direct force, the U.S. airpower. Kabul fell into the
hands of the Northern Alliance and USASF on November 14, 2002, less than a month after
the first USASF units entered Afghanistan, and two months after the 9/11 attacks. The U.S.
military success was even more stunning as only 316 U.S. SOF personnel were involved in
the early phase of Operation Enduring Freedom.31

Surprise
The principle of surprise is another key element of special operations success,32 because
since special operations units usually work best in small units, and lack in sustained
firepower, they need to rely on surprise to safeguard themselves and achieve their mission.
Sun Tzu had mentioned in his first chapter in the section “The Tao of Paradox” that a
key element in victory is attacking the enemy where he least expects: “Attack where he is
unprepared; sally out when he does not expect you.”33
Special operations capabilities in commando assaults rely chiefly on surprise in over-
whelming the enemy. Classic examples are the great successful raids such as the Iranian
Embassy rescue operation by the SAS in 1980, and the attack and destroying of 13 Argen-
tinean attack aircraft on Pebble Island during the Falklands War in 1982, would illustrate
that the key element in these operations’ success was surprise.
More importantly, Sun Tzu’s principle of surprise can also be applied in non-kinetic
forms of warfare practiced by special forces, such as winning the “hearts and minds”
of a population, especially important in a counterinsurgency campaign. Is it possible for
Sun Tzu’s principles of surprise to be applied for special operations’ other functions such
as unconventional warfare in winning the hearts and minds of a targeted population?
How would the surprise element come into play in this role? In order to clarify this, the
following example of an SAS hearts-and-minds campaign during the Malaysian-Indonesian
Confrontation (1963–1966) shall be used to explain.
136 A. L. K. Wey

Elements of the British SAS were clandestinely inserted into the deep Borneo tropical
forest where they had met and set up contact with the aborigines of Borneo. The SAS had
provided the aborigines medical help and building assistance, which enabled them to build a
fruitful relationship and win the trust of the aborigines.34 These aborigines in turn provided
intelligence on Indonesian troop movements, serving as the covert “eyes and ears” of the
British-Commonwealth forces in the thick and often impregnable Borneo rainforest. The
Borneo rainforest was vast and extremely porous in its borders with Indonesia. Therefore, to
patrol the entire Indonesia–Borneo (Malaysia) border would be near to impossible in those
days and would had tied down vast numbers of British-Commonwealth and Malaysian
troops.
As a result of intelligence gathered and provided by the aborigines, the Indonesians
were constantly harried by the British-Commonwealth forces. The British SAS patrols were
able to move freely and stayed at native villages without much risk. This enabled special
operations to take place under the very noses of the Indonesian forces—surprising the
Indonesians with ambushes, and gathering key knowledge of their strength and movement.35
These hearts-and-minds campaigns were to prove critical in assisting the war on attrition
on the Indonesian forces, surprising them at every turn, which toward the end of the war
were exhausted with limited success on their side (and a change of government), finally led
to the Indonesian termination of the confrontation in 1966.

Flexibility and Ability to Operate Behind Enemy Lines

Flexibility to adapt to different environments and capable of engaging the enemy at quick
turn of events is paramount to the skills of special operations units. Sun Tzu had given a
description of such required flexibility:

When campaigning, be swift as the wind; in leisurely march, majestic as the

forest; in raiding and plundering, like fire; in standing, firm as the mountains.
As unfathomable as the clouds, move like a thunderbolt.36

Special operations units are flexible and can be used in a multitude of operations. Special
operations units are cross-trained to be inserted into operations by every means conceivable.
Special operations personnel are also trained in guerrilla warfare and counter-guerrilla
warfare. They are trained to live for long periods of time behind enemy lines and escape
and evade capture. Special operations operatives must be flexible enough to survive and
achieve operational success. Perhaps one of their most valuable skills in terms of flexibility
and ability to operate behind enemy lines is the capability to conduct hearts-and-minds
operations in hostile areas. This would require its members to be able to speak native
languages, to understand native cultures, and to have the ability to consume and drink like a
native, not an easy task for a regular soldier (this is the reason why selection and training to
be a special operations unit member is extremely tough, as it demands not just physical and
mental strength but high intelligence and cognitive abilities with humble personalities).37

Intelligence
Although special operations forces are traditionally not part of the intelligence community,
special operations have been known to lend a very important role in gathering intelligence
for strategic and tactical purposes. Sun Tzu has given intelligence an important function,
as he devoted a chapter of The Art of War to intelligence.38 Sun Tzu also claimed the
 Principles of Special Operations 137

importance of intelligence in another chapter that states, “Know the enemy and know
yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”39
Gathering intelligence in support of a larger operation is one of the most important
capabilities of special operations. Special operations forces are well-trained to conduct
reconnaissance and intelligence missions, sometimes lasting months in enemy-held terri-
tories. During the Falklands War, the British SAS and Royal Marines Special Boat Service
(SBS) were engaged in clandestine intelligence-gathering operations, observing and learn-
ing about the Argentine forces long before the main British force arrived. They employed
deception and managed to conceal themselves in their “hides” without the Argentineans
detecting them. Although the Argentineans were aware that special operations units had
been inserted, the SAS and SBS teams managed to conceal themselves in the harsh Falk-
lands marshland without leaving any clue of their whereabouts. They simply melted into
the Falklands environment.40 Their camouflage skills were so good that in one case an
Argentinean helicopter hovered and unloaded troops right above a SBS hideout, yet the
forces were not exposed, thus providing a capability to insert and hide in enemy territory.41
This unique capability has an important tactical utility for special operations, as from this
capability, they can launch surprise attacks or gather highly valuable intelligence, which
may tilt the strategic factor of a campaign.
Intelligence is equally an important principle for special operations to be successful.
The accurate and timely dissemination of information related to the special operation is a
key principle in lessening the risk of the operation and ensuring better chances of success.

Deception
Another set of principles which Sun Tzu advocated relates to deception:

All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity;

when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that you are far away; when
far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder
and strike him.42

Special operations, being small sized in nature, require excellent deception in forms of
camouflage and distractive operations to assist them in conducting its operations efficiently.
For example, in the “Greatest Raid of All,” Operation Chariot, which was conducted by
the British Commandos to disable the only dry dock in France that was being used by the
Germans, St Nazaire, in 1942. The operation used a destroyer, HMS Campbeltown, that
was disguised to look like a German naval ship but loaded with explosives. The destroyer
was used to ram the dry-dock gates, and a timed fuse ignited the explosives and destroyed
the dry-dock gates. The operation was successful as the deception cover managed to elude
the Germans.43
Another famous special operations unit, albeit less known, was responsible primarily
for deception operations. In fact this unit was the original forerunner of the famous SAS,
the Advanced HQ, A Force, SAS Brigade (A Force). A Force was set up in 1941 and
run by Lt. Colonel Dudley Clarke to conduct deception operations in the Middle East
theater during World War II.44 Among the major successes of A Force were the deception
operations, Treatment and Bertram, which managed to deceive the Germans on the “place,
time, and the object” of the British offensive in North Africa, and convinced the Germans
to concentrate their forces in the southern sector during the Battle of El Alamein.45
138 A. L. K. Wey

During the First Gulf War (1991), a special operation was also conducted in a deception
role to divert Iraqi forces to the eastern coasts of Kuwait, where a team of U.S. Navy SEALS
had conducted an operation simulating a beach assault.46 The Iraqis believed the Coalition
Forces attack would come from the beaches led by U.S. Marines, and so deployed their
forces on the beaches of Kuwait. This enabled General Schwarzkopf to employ his famous
“left hook” through Iraqi and Kuwaiti borders from the desert approaches in the west with
his ground armored divisions with minimal resistance, and successfully outmaneuvered
and destroyed the Iraqi forces.

Sextus Iulius Frontinus

Sextus Iulius Frontinus was a Roman military officer and civilian administrator who
lived from 35–104 A.D. He wrote two famous surviving works, one on military strat-
egy (Stratagematon), and the other on the administration and maintenance of water supply
in a city based on his civil officer experience (The Aqueducts of Rome). His work on
stratagems and the use of military trickery was based on the military history of Rome and
Greece, and has had long-lasting influence on military and strategic thought.47 Frontinus
wrote a text on strategy which has since been lost; the text’s appendix, however, survived
and was known as the Stratagematon. In Stratagematon, Frontinus had differentiated be-
tween strategy and stratagem. According to Frontinus, strategy is what a commander does,
“ . . . characterized by foresight, advantage, enterprise, or resolution . . . ”48
Stratagems, on the other hand, are “those things which fall under some special type
of these will be ‘stratagems.’”49 Frontinus may well had been aware that in warfare, there
exists a special type of operations that conducts surprise and deceiving operations based on
specially selected men. This practice is similar to modern day special operations’ practice,
too. Frontinus had highlighted this important point in a passage in his Stratagematon:

After Quintus Sertorius had learned by experience that he was by no means a

match for the whole Roman army, and had wished to prove this to the barbarians
also, who were rashly demanding battle, he brought into their presence two
horses, one very strong, the other very feeble. Then he brought up two youths
of corresponding physique, one robust, the other slight. The stronger youth was
commanded to pull out the entire tail of the feeble horse, while the slender
youth was ordered to pull out the hairs of the strong horse, one by one. Then,
when the slight youth had succeeded in his task, while the strong one was still
struggling vainly with the tail of the feeble horse, Setorius observed: “By this
illustration I have exhibited to you, my men, the nature of the Roman cohorts.
They are invincible to him who attacks them in a body; but he who assails them
by groups, will tear and rend them.50

Frontinus had already understood that the value of using small units to strike at the enemy
in separate small operations is more productive than using a large body of troops in
a frontal attack. An example appears in Frontinus’s work that describes an operation
which could have come straight from a modern-day U.S. Navy SEAL or British Royal
Marines SBS manual. An operation conducted by the Athenians under Iphicrates during
the Peloponnesian Wars against the Spartans near Abydus is illustrated in this quotation
from Frontinus’s Stratagematon:
 Principles of Special Operations 139

For some time he delayed, and then on an unusually cold day, when no one
suspected such a move, he selected his most rugged men, rubbed them down
with oil and warmed up with wine, and then ordered them to skirt the very
edge of the sea, swimming across the places that were too precipitous to pass.
Thus by an unexpected attack from the rear he overwhelmed the guards of the
defile.51

In the passage above, Frontinus highlights some of the key operational tactics of modern
day special operations, a secret clandestine maritime operation that sneaks in behind enemy
lines using the most unsuspecting and difficult method and using camouflage. On reaching
the enemy lines a daring commando raid defeated the guards and opened the way for larger
formations of troops to engage the enemy, thereby achieving maximum surprise and the
intended end. This example also highlights that special operations worked as an adjunct
to regular forces. Special operations sort of “kick the doors open” for other forces to
enter.
Frontinus further highlights the difficulties of attacking and defeating a well-defended
castle. A well-prepared and -defended castle can hold out indefinitely and attempting to
capture it may take a long time with the attacker suffering high losses in manpower. In
overcoming such harsh combat realities, however, Frontinus again vividly highlights how
special operations may be used to gain access to supposedly impregnable fortresses. He
again uses another example from the Peloponnesian War to demonstrate another point in
how to besiege and capture castles:

The Arcadians, when besieging a stronghold of the Messenians, fabricated

certain weapons to resemble those of the enemy. Then, at the time when they
learned that another force was to relieve the first, they dressed themselves in
the uniform of those who were expected, and being admitted as comrades
in consequence of this confusion, they secured possession of the place and
wrought havoc among the foe.52

Frontinus presented another similar example later in Stratagematon:

. . . Hannibal one night dressed a number of Carthaginians in the garb of

hunters and introduced them among Cononeus’s attendants. When these men,
loaded with the game they were carrying, were admitted by the guards, they
straightaway attacked and slew the latter. Then breaking down the gate, they
admitted Hannibal with his troops, who slew all the Romans, save those who
had fled for refuge to the citadel.53

Frontinus’s thesis of using ruses to enter a well-defended castle by dressing up as the enemy
or as ordinary folks54 resonates with the practice of modern day special operations. For
example, during World War II, the British SOE and the American version, the Office of
Strategic Service (OSS), practiced similar tactics, disguising themselves as civilians and
parachuting into German-occupied Europe to gain access to the various partisan groups.55
They then trained and operated with these groups in conducting sabotage operations against
German military assets, as well as gathering and reporting crucial intelligence back to the
Allied Headquarters. Although the physical use of castles is obsolete today, metaphorically
modern military static defenses, such as those practiced by the Germans on the French
beaches in World War II, and Iraqi positions in Kuwait during the First Gulf War, are
140 A. L. K. Wey

conceptually similar to a well-defended castle. Penetrating such solid defenses requires the
ingenuity of using small units of men to probe and open ways for the main forces to gain
entry.
There are more examples of special operations in Frontinus’s work where he em-
phasizes the use of small units of troops utilizing secrecy and surprising the enemy with
unexpected approaches, or frequently using deception to overcome the enemy’s defensive
superiority and pave the way for his main body of troops to attack an objective.56 The
examples described here are sufficient to prove that Frontinus’s Strategematon, or what he
termed “stratagems,” have close conceptual principles related to special operations prac-
ticed today and a closer study of his text is extremely beneficial for the special operations
community.

Conclusion
Both Sun Tzu and Frontinus commonly argue that the utility of using special operations
had been acknowledged more than two thousand years ago despite their cultural differences
(Western or the Oriental way of warfare).57 Both Sun Tzu’s and Frontinus’s texts provide
important theoretical foundations for further explorations in mapping the practice of special
operations with a conceptual framework derived from key principles inferred from these
two texts. This conceptual framework of special operations could well be used to build and
advance a coherent theory of special operations.58

Notes
1. See Marc Ambinder, “The Secret Team that Killed bin Laden,” National Journal,
May 2, 2011, available at http://www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/the-secret-team-that-killed-
bin-laden-20010502? (accessed May 8, 2011); and Mike Boettcher, Richard Esposito, et al., “Osama
bin Laden Operation Ended With Coded Message ‘Geronimo-E KIA,”’ ABC News, available at http://
abcnews.go.com/Politics/osama-bin-laden-operation-code-geronimo/story?id=13507836 (accessed
May 8, 2011).
2. For example see Tom Clancy and Carl Stiner, Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces
(New York: Putnam’s, 2002); and Robin Moore, The Green Berets (New York: Crown, 1965) and
The Hunt for Bin Laden: Task Force Dagger, On the Ground with the Special Forces in Afghanistan
(New York: Random House, 2003).
3. Alastair Finlan, Special Forces, Strategy and the War on Terror: Warfare by Other Means
(London: Routledge, 2008); James D. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to
the War on Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2006); Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 141–231 and Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999), 286–290; Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations
Forces (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997); and Lucien Vandenbroucke, Perilous
Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993).
4. For example see Simon Anglim, “Special Forces—Strategic Asset,” Infinity Journal, vol. 1,
no. 2 (Spring 2011): 16–20, available at http://www.infinityjournal.com/article/10/Special Forces
Strategic Asset (accessed on November 11, 2011).
5. Sun Tzu’s work is claimed to have been written down about 2,500 years ago, while Fronti-
nus’s work was written down about 2,000 years ago.
6. For example, Homer’s tale The Iliad, of the Trojan–Greek War, has one of the most important
early examples of special operations: the Trojan horse account. Even if the story was a mythical
narration, the originator of this story had demonstrated in the Trojan horse that the ideas of using
 Principles of Special Operations 141

special operations to overcome tactical obstacles to obtain strategic effects had existed in the thoughts
of ancient mankind. See Robert Graves, “The Fall of Troy,” in John Arquilla, ed, From Troy to
Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times (London: University Press of America,
1996), 2–9.
7. See H. G. Robertson, “Commando Raids in the Peloponnesian War,” Classical Weekly, vol.
37, no. 11 (1944): 130.
8. For an excellent overview see Yuval Noah Harari, Special Operations in the Age of Chivalry,
1100–1550 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2007).
9. See Beatrice Heuser, “Small Wars in the Age of Clausewitz: The Watershed between Partisan
War and People’s War,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 33, no. 1 (February 2010): 139–162. See
also Lewis Michael de Jeney, The Partisan, or the Art of Making War in Detachment, trans. An Officer
of the Army (London: R. Griffiths, 1760); and Andreas Emmerich, The Partisan in War, of the Use
of a Corps of Light Troops to an Army (London: J. Debrett, 1789).
10. See Johann Ewald, Diary of an American War: A Hessian Journal, trans. Joseph P. Tustin
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979); and Johann Ewald, Treatise on Partisan Warfare,
trans. Robert Selig and David Skaggs (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991).
11. See Thomas J. Evans and James M. Moyer, Mosby’s Confederacy: A Guide to the Roads
and Sites of Colonel John Singleton Mosby (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing Co, 1991).
12. Ohad Leslau, “Worth the Bother? Israeli Experience and the Utility of Special Operations
Forces,” Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 31, no. 3 (December 2010): 511.
13. Ibid.
14. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, Joint Pub-
lication 3-05 (December 17, 2003), I-1. The U.S. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (JP 3-05)
further identified nine core tasks for U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF), which are direct action,
special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, counter-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, civil affairs operations, psychological operations, and
information operations. See ibid., II-3.
15. Kiras’s definition was, “ unconventional actions against enemy vulnerabilities in a sustained
campaign, undertaken by specially designated units, to enable conventional operations and/ or resolve
economically politico-military problems at the operational or strategic level that are difficult or
impossible to accomplish with conventional forces alone.” See Kiras, Special Operations, 5.
16. Robert G. Spulak stated, “Special Operations Forces (SOF) are small, specially organized
units manned by carefully selected people using modified equipment and trained in unconventional
applications of tactics against strategic and operational objectives. Further, the successful conduct of
special operations relies on individual and small unit proficiency in specialized skills applied with
adaptability, improvisation, and innovation against adversaries often unprepared to react. It has often
been stated that the unique capabilities of SOF complement those of conventional forces.” See Spulak,
“A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities and Use of SOF,” Joint Special Operations
University Report 07-07 (October 2007), 1.
17. William H. McRaven’s definition was, “A special operation is conducted by forces specially
trained, equipped and supported for a specific target whose destruction, elimination, or rescue (in the
case of hostages), is a political or military imperative.” See McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in
Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), 2. McRaven
acknowledged that it was difficult to give a proper definition of special operations and his definition
in his work was conjured purposefully for his study. See ibid., 3.
18. Edward N. Luttwak, Steven L. Canby, and David L. Thomas: “A Systematic Review
of ‘Commando’ (Special) Operations, 1939–1980,” unpublished report (Potomac, MD: C and L
Associates, 1982), 1.
19. Ibid.
20. Maurice Tugwell and David Charters, “Special Operations and the Threats to United States
Interests in the 1980s,” in Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Shultz, eds., Special
Operations in US Strategy (Washington, DC: National Defence University Press, 1984), 35; and
142 A. L. K. Wey

Gray, Explorations, 145. Colin Gray had further defined special operations as capable of handling
seventeen important aspects that give it strategic utility. These seventeen aspects can be summarized
into three main core themes, which are “a state of mind; forces; and a mission.” See Colin S. Gray,
“Handful of Heroes on Desperate Ventures,” Parameters, vol. 29, no. 1 (Spring 1999), 2–24. Gray
agreed that special operations is an understudied area, especially regarding its strategic utility and its
overall influence on the course of its campaign or war. It is much easier to analyse the tactical utility
of a special operations mission or what constitutes a special operations unit than conceptualizing it at
the strategic level. The study of special operations as a means of strategy is also similarly lacking. See
Gray, “Handful of Heroes,” 154. Harari, in his study of special operations in the age of chivalry, had
provided another interesting definition: “The difference between ‘special’ operations and ‘regular’
combat operations is more complicated. In their execution, special operations are frequently similar to
combat operations that involve the use of surprise and subterfuge. In their impact too, regular combat
operations could sometimes have strategic and political impact disproportionate to the resources
invested in them. The difference between special operations and regular combat operations lies
therefore not in their execution or in their impact, but in the preconceived matching of impact and
execution.” See Harari, Special Operations, 1–2.
21. Finlan, Special Forces, 3.
22. M. R. D. Foot, “Special Operations/I,” in Michael Elliott-Bateman, ed., The Fourth Di-
mension of Warfare: Vol. 1, Intelligence, Subversion, Resistance (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1970), 19.
23. A note on contemporary terms: British special operations units (Special Air Service and
Special Boat Service) have been known as Special Forces. The U.S. uses Special Operations Forces
as an overarching term to cover all special operations units. The U.S. Army has its own Special Forces
Groups, not to be confused with the British Special Forces. See Finlan, Special Forces, 7–8.
24. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1971), 91.See also Yuan Shibing’s translation, “It is the skilful operation of the extraordinary and the
normal forces that make an army capable of sustaining the enemy’s attack without suffering defeat,”
in Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Yuan Shibing (Ware: Wordsworth, 1998), 80–81. Although there
are various debates on the correct translation and definition of the terms used by Sun Tzu in chi/cheng;
for example ordinary and extraordinary or orthodox and unorthodox or direct and indirect forces, this
author acknowledges that there is such a discourse on these terms. However, for the purpose of this
research, a general understanding of its concept was accepted rather than encroaching into the debate
on linguistic definitive clarity. For further insights see D. C. Lau, “Some Notes on the ‘Sun Tzu,”’
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, vol. 28, no. 2 (1965):
319–35; and Benjamin E. Wallacker, “Two Concepts in Early Chinese Military Thought,” Language,
vol. 42, no. 2 (1966), 295–299.
25. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Griffith, 69. Michael Elliott-Bateman pointed out this prin-
ciple of using indirect and direct forces to engage the enemy in 1970. Elliott-Bateman’s commentary
was influenced by the events during the Vietnam War, and he posited the use of guerrilla fighters
as an indirect force. His idea, however, was not followed up by further studies on this principle.
See Michael Elliott-Bateman, “The Nature of People’s War,” in Michael Elliott-Bateman, ed., The
Fourth Dimension of Warfare: Vol. 1, Intelligence, Subversion, Resistance (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1970), 138–144.
26. These arguments were articulated by Ralph D. Sawyer in his in-depth study of ancient
Chinese military practice of unorthodox warfare. See Sawyer, The Tao of Deception: Unorthodox
Warfare in Historic and Modern China (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 65–66.
27. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Roger T. Ames (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993),
200–201.
28. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Yuan Shibing, 82–83.
29. Ibid.
30. Finlan, Special Forces, 22.
31. Ibid., 129.
 Principles of Special Operations 143

32. William H. McRaven had also posited the importance of surprise in his theory of special
operations. See McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and
Practice (New York: Presidio Press, 1996), 16–19.
33. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Griffith, 69.
34. Ian F. W. Beckett, Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Checkmark Books
2001), 47.
35. Peter Dickens, SAS, the Jungle Frontier: 22 Special Air Service Regiment in the Borneo
Campaign, 1963–1966 (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: S. Abdul Majeed & Co, 1991), 126.
36. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Griffith, 106.
37. Dickens, SAS, 19.
38. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Griffith, 144–149.
39. Ibid., 84.
40. John Parker, SBS: The Inside Story of the Special Boat Service (London: Headline Pub-
lishing 1998), 297.
41. Ibid., pp. 298–300.
42. Ibid., p. 66.
43. See C. E. Lucas Phillips, The Greatest Raid of All (London: Pan Books, 2000).
44. Michael Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 5: Strategic De-
ception (London: HMSO Publications, 1990), 32–33.
45. Ibid., 65–67.
46. Major Guy A. LeMire, “Employing Special Operations Forces to Conduct Decep-
tion in Support of Shaping and Decisive Operations,” (unpublished thesis, School of Ad-
vanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, 2002), 38–42, available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA403590&
Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed on February 14, 2011).
47. Beatrice Heuser, The Strategy Makers: Thoughts on War and Society from Machiavelli to
Clausewitz (Oxford: Praeger, 2010), 27.
48. Sextus Iulius Frontinus, Stratagematon (between 84–96 C.E.), trans. and ed., Charles E.
Bennett, Frontinus: The Stratagems; The Aqueducts of Rome (London: Harvard University Press,
1925), 7.
49. Frontinus, Stratagematon, 7.
50. Ibid., 311.
51. Ibid., 29–30.
52. Ibid., 209.
53. Ibid., 217.
54. For other examples see ibid., 211–217.
55. For detailed accounts see Kenneth Macksey, The Partisans of Europe in World War II
(London: Granada Publishing, 1975); M. R. D. Foot, Resistance: An Analysis of European Resistance
to Nazism, 1940—945 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1976); and Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors:
O.S.S and the Origins of the C.I.A. (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
56. For example see Frontinus, Stratagematon, 31, 33, 49, 231–232, and 313.
57. See Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989). For a critical view of such arguments see Patrick Porter, Military
Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes (London: Hurst, 2009).
58. There are a few texts on warfare and light infantry tactics, written in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, that may have value in aiding the study of special operations,too. These
texts mainly dealt with the tactical principles of partisans in scouting, ambushing, and logistical and
marching orders. See Lewis Michael de Jeney, The Partisan, or the Art of Making War in Detachment,
trans. An Officer of the Army (London: R. Griffiths, 1760); Andreas Emmerich, The Partisan in War,
of the Use of a Corps of Light Troops to an Army (London: J. Debrett, 1789); and Johann Ewald,
Treatise on Partisan Warfare, trans. Robert Selig and David Skaggs (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1991). Jomini had also touched on similar tactics. See Antoine Henri baron de Jomini, The Art of
144 A. L. K. Wey

War, trans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1971), 210–24. Partisan
warfare is described by Beatrice Heuser as having some similarities with today’s practice of special
operations. See Heuser, “Small Wars,” 139–62.

Adam Leong Kok Wey (adam@upnm.edu.my) is a senior lecturer in strategic studies at the
National Defence University of Malaysia. He holds a PhD in politics from the University of
Reading (UK), and a master’s of strategic and defence studies from the University of Malaya
(Malaysia). Dr. Adam’s main areas of research are strategic studies and military history,
with particular emphasis on special operations, grand strategy, and economic warfare. His
latest publication is “Operation Anthropoid: The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich and
the Fate of a Nation,” The RUSI Journal, vol. 157, no. 2 (April/May 2012): 68–75.