Alinas vs Alinas
GR No 158040, April 14, 2008
Facts:
- Petitioners separated in 1982 leaving behind two lots:
- Lot 896-B-9-A with a bodega (LOT A)
- Lot 896-B-9-B with the petitioners' house (LOT B) (This
is the Lot which talks about conjugal partnership of gains)
- Petitioners entrusted both properties to Respondents with
the agreement that any income from rentals should be
remitted to the SSS and to the Rural Bank of Oroquieta
City (RBO) as the rentals would be for payment of
petitioners' loans.
- Sometime in 1993, petitioners find out that both lots were
titled in respondents' name
- Apparently both LOTS were foreclosed, and reacquired
by respondents
- Furthermore, records show that Onesiforo executed
Absolute Deed of Sale, dated March 10 1989, selling LOT
B to Victor.
- Petitioners file for recovery of lots
- RTC renders decision: Lot A is respondents'. The sale of
LOT B, is null and void, since Onesiforo sold w/o wife's
consent
- Respondents file with CA
- CA renders decision: Lot A is respondents'. LOT B's sale
in so far as Rosario's share of 1/2 is concerned is of no
force and effect.
- ISSUE: WON sale conducted by husband without
consent of wife to whom he is separated with is void
HELD: YES
- Art 124 of FC says that the absence of authority or
consent of wife shall make the disposition or
encumberance void.
- Respondent spouses who bought land (1) knew that it
was conjugal property (2) knew that the wife did not know
of the selling since they were separated (3) sale documents
do not bear the wife‘s signature, thus they are seen as
buyers of bad faith
However, petitioners are still ordered by court to
reimburse them with interest.
Uy vs. CA
346 SCRA 246
Facts:
- Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza suffers a stroke on March 25, 1991
- A piece of property was planned on being sold
- Upon knowledge of the planned selling, Teodoro
(Ernesto's son) files for petition praying for a court
appointed guardian to administer the property given the
present physical and mental incapacity of Ernesto
- Gilda (Ernesto's wife) files for petition praying for sole
powers of administration of conjugal properties and
authorization to sell the same
- Alleging that the her husband's medical treatment's bills
needed to be paid, hence the need to sell
- RTC awards petition to Gilda, pursuant to FC Art. 124
and governed by the rules on summary proceedings of Art.
253
- Teodoro files for Motion of Reconsideration
- While above case was pending, Gilda sells the property
to Jose and Glenda Uy
- Teodoro files opposition to the motion for approval of the
deed of sale
- TC approves sale / CA reverses the decision ordering the
TC to dismiss the proceedings to approve the deed of sale
ISSUE: WON Gilda Jardelez may assume sole powers of
administration of conjugal property and sell land since her
husband is incapacitated with a stroke to do so.
HELD: NO
- Art 124 contemplates a situation where spouse is absent,
separated, or abandoned the other or where consent is
withheld of cannot be obtained. Such rules don‘t apply
to cases where non-consenting spouse is incapacitated.
- Rule 93 of 1964 Revised Rules of Court is the proper
remedy in judicial guardianship proceedings. Also, FC
also recognizes that for the wife to assume power of
administration it has the same powers and duties as a
guardian under rules of court
o THUS, they must still observe rules of sale of ward‘s
estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964
Revised Rules of Court, not the summary proceedings
In this case, TC did not comply with procedure in Revised
Rules of Court and did not serve notice of petition to
incapacitated spouse and require him to show
Costuna vs. Domondon
180 SCRA 333
Sps. Amadeo and Estela Costuna bought 3 parcels of land
during their marriage and registered the same in the name
of Amadeo. Amadeo was later hospitalized (on different
dates) for 3rd degree burns on his legs. While already ill
due to old age, he went to his relatives in Samar to settle
his property documents. Because of his failure to return,
Estela refused to give her consent to the action of partition
of their conjugal partnership and the deed of sale allegedly
filed by Amadeo in Samar for the purpose of financing his
medical needs. Hence, Amadeo executed the mentioned
deed of sale, which sold his ½ indeterminate share on the
3-parcel property, in favour of Laureana Domondon.
When Amadeo died, Estela sought the execution of
Amadeo‘s will, executed prior to his trip to Samar, which
named her as sole. Laureana opposed the motion, claimed
her share in the property and sought to have Estela give
consent to the deed of sale.
CA:
- husband may not sell real estate without consent unless
(1) sale of personal properties (2) real properties acquired
before NCC (3) real properties acquired after NCC but
wife is in a leprosarium, declared spendthrift or under civil
interdiction, (4) purpose is to pay conjugal liabilities (5)
purpose is to secure future of children or finishing a career.
- Support of spouse by conjugal property is not relieved
when they do not live on the same roof.
ISSUE:
- (1) WON deed of sale should be nullified since it waas
without the consent of the wife
- (2) WON conjugal partnership should be made liable for
payment of hospital and
medical expenses of Amadeo who allegedly abandoned
conjugal home and wife
HELD:
(1) NO
- Amadeo sought the petitoner‘s consent but petitioner
withheld it. However when deed of sale was made, she did
nothing to impugn it and assailed it for the first time when
Respondent filed a case in RTC-QC.
- Amadeo only sold his ½ share of community property.
Her share in the property is intact.
- When consent is unreasonably withheld, one should
consider law as falling within the recognized exceptions
- (2) YES
it falls under the obligations protected by Art 161 of CC
since it gives a discernible advantage or good to the
conjugal partnership, directly or indirectly. Health would
obviously benefit their conjugal partnership
Frenzel vs. Catito
G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003
- Facts:
- Alfred (Australian, German descent) pilot with New
Guinea airlines. Started business in Philippines in 1974
and married Teresita Santos (Fil). They separated without
divorce in 1981.
- 1983 He met Ederlina Catito (Fil) a masseuse in
Australia. Unknown to him she is married to Klaus Muller
(German) and lived in Germany for a while. She is fluent
in German and Alfred enjoyed talking to her.
- Alfred offered Ederlina to stay in Phil and engage in
business. She put up a beauty parlor. Alfred decided to
stay in the Philippines for good and live with Ederlina.
They acquired properties in the name of Ederlina which
Alfred consented to since he plans on marrying Ederlina.
Klaus wrote Alfred about his marriage with Ederlina and
begged Alfred to return Ederlina. When Alfred confronted
Ederlina, she admitted that she and Klaus were married but
she assured Alfred that she would divorce Klaus. He
agreed to continue the amorous relationship and wait for
the outcome of Ederlina‘s petition for divorce. Alfred
hired the lawyer. Alfred acquired more properties in the
name of Ederlina. Ederlina‘s petition for divorce was
denied because Klaus opposed the same. A second petition
filed by her met the same fate. Klaus wanted half of all the
properties owned by Ederlina in the Philippines before he
would agree to a divorce. Worse, Klaus threatened to file a
bigamy case against Ederlina
- Alfred and Ederlina‘s relationship started deteriorating.
He demanded the return of all the properties acquired by
him and Ederlina during their coverture.
- Alfred filed a Complaint on October 28, 1985 with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, for recovery of real
and personal
properties located in Quezon City and Manila. For
Ederlina transfered funds from their joint account in HSBC
Hong Kong, to her own account without his knowledge
and consent. Using the said funds, Ederlina was able to
purchase the properties subject of the complaints. He also
alleged that the beauty parlor in Ermita was established
with his own funds, and that the Quezon City property was
likewise acquired by him with his personal funds.
- Alfred also filed a complaint against Ederlina with the
Regional Trial Court, Davao City, for specific
performance, declaration of ownership of real and personal
properties, sum of money, and damages. (RTC Davao in
favor of Ederlina, case dismissed)
- RTC of QC: the purchaser of land is Ederlina (Alfred as
an alien was precluded from recovering the properties
from the respondent)
- CA: upheld RTC (the petitioner knowingly violated the
Constitution; hence, was barred from recovering the
money used in the purchase of the three parcels of land. It
held that to allow the petitioner to recover the money used
for the purchase of the properties would embolden aliens
to violate the Constitution, and defeat, rather than enhance,
the public policy)
- Pertinent Issues: whether or not the land belongs to
Alfred
- Held/Ratio- No. It belongs to Ederlina.
The constitution prohibits Alfred from owning lands. He
cannot recover the money used to buy the properties.
Ayuste vs.CA
GR no. 118784, Sept. 2, 1999
- Facts:
- Christina Ayuste married Rafael Ayuste on September
24, 1961. They bought a machine shop (managed by
Rafael) in Lucena and bought a parcel
of land also in Lucena. The title of land was in the name of
Rafael married to Christina.
- In 1987, Rafael sold the land in favor of private
respondent. The
deed of sale was signed by Rafael and Christina. In 1990
Christina filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale.
She claims that her signature was forged and the sale was
without her knowledge of consent.
- RTC: sale is null and void
- CA: sale is valid, the annulment was instituted after
Rafael died (the deed is voidable but complaint should be
raised during the marriage as required by Art. 173.)
- Pertinent Issues: whether or not the sale is valid
- -Held/Ratio- Yes. The sale is valid.
- Art. 173 The wife may, during the marriage, and within
ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the
courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband
entered into without her consent, when such consent is
required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends
to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal
partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this
right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage,
may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated
by the husband.
Registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds
constitutes a notice to the whole world. Since the deed of
sale was registered on March 5, 1987, Christina Ayuste is
presumed to have constructive notice of the sale from such
date.
Villaranda vs. Spouses Villaranda
G.R. No. 153447, Feb,23, 2004
- Facts:
- Land was left to Vicente Villaranda and Honorio
Villaranda and their siblings by their parents. In 1976
Honorio and Vicente executed the deed of exchange where
Vicente agreed to convey his 64.22-square-meter portion
to Honorio, in exchange for a property in Macasandig,
Cagayan de Oro City. After the execution of the Deed,
Honorio took possession of the 64.22-square-meter lot and
constructed a building thereon.
- On April 6, 1992, a subdivision plan was completed, in
pursuit of which TCT No. T-65893 for the 64.22 square-
meter share of Vicente was issued in his name.
- Honorio and Ana brought an action before the RTC to
compel Vicente to comply with his obligations under the
Deed of Exchange. They want Vicente to identify and
delineate his undivided portion of the property and convey
to them the 64.22-square-meter Divisoria lot, in
compliance with his obligations under the Deed.
- During the pendency of the case, Honorio conditionally
sold the Divisoria lot to Colorhouse Laboratories, Inc.
- Vicente contends that because the property had not been
delivered, the Deed had not been consummated. Moreover,
he claimed that the Deed had already been revoked by both
parties.
- RTC: in favor of Honorio, contract valid
- CA: upheld RTC
- The provisions of the Civil Code were applicable to the
case at bar, since the Deed of Exchange had been entered
into prior to the enactment of the Family Code. Thus, the
absence of the wife‘s signature on the Deed made it only
voidable, not void.
- The CA further found that Ana was aware of the
execution of the Deed, and yet she brought no action for its
annulment within ten (10) years from its execution.
- Pertinent Issues: Whether there was a perfected and
consummated deed of exchange
- Whether the Deed of Exchange which was not signed by
the wife of Respondent Honorio G. Villaranda is valid and
enforceable.
- Held/Ratio- Yes. The deed is valid.
- The absence of the signature of Ana on the Deed does not
prove lack of her consent thereto, because a contract may
validly exist even if the parties have not reduced their
stipulations to writing. Too, assuming that her consent to
the Deed is lacking, such fact would not render the
agreement void, but merely voidable.
- There is no evidence that any action to annul the transfer
made by Honorio was ever brought by Ana within ten
years from "the transaction questioned." Her right to bring
an action to invalidate the contract has thus prescribed.
Hence, the assailed Deed is still valid and enforceable.
The legal prohibition against the disposition of conjugal
property by one spouse without consent of the other has
been established for the benefit, not of third persons, but
only of the other spouse for whom the law desires to save
the conjugal partnership from damages that might be
caused. Not being the proper party, Vicente cannot avail
himself of the remedy prescribed by Article 173.
Ainza vs.CA
G.R. No. 165420. June 30, 2005
- Facts:
- Antonio and Eugenia owned a lot with an unfinished
residential house located in Quezon City. In April
1987Concepcion bought one-half of an undivided portion
of the property from her daughter, Eugenia and the latter‘s
husband, Antonio, for One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00).
- No Deed of Absolute Sale was executed to evidence the
transaction, but cash payment was received by the
respondents, and ownership was transferred to Concepcion
through physical delivery to her attorney-in-fact and
daughter, Natividad Tuliao (Natividad). Concepcion
authorized Natividad and the latter‘s husband, Ceferino
Tuliao (Ceferino) to occupy the premises, and make
improvements on the unfinished building.
- Respondents caused the subdivision of the property.
Antonio said that he bought the property in 1980 and
introduced improvements thereon. That he and his wife
allowed Natividad and Ceferino to occupy the premises
temporarily. Antonio requested Natividad to vacate the
premises but the latter refused and claimed that
Concepcion owned the property. Antonio filed an
ejectment suit on April 1, 1999. Concepcion, represented
also filed on May 4, 1999 a civil case for partition of real
property and annulment of titles with damages.
- Antonio claimed that his wife, Eugenia, admitted that
Concepcion offered to buy one third (1/3) of the property
who gave her small amounts over several years which
totaled P100,000.00 by 1987 and for which she signed a
receipt.
- RTC: Sale is valid. In favor of Concepcion.( sale was
consummated when both contracting parties complied with
their respective obligations. Eugenia transferred possession
by delivering the property to Concepcion who in turn paid
the purchase price. )
- CA: sale is null and void. (Applying Article 124 of the
Family Code, the Court of
Appeals ruled that since the subject property is conjugal,
the written consent of Antonio must be obtained for the
sale to be valid. )
- Pertinent Issue: whether there was a valid contract of sale
between Eugenia and Concepcion
- Held/Ratio:
- Sc: Valid.
- There was a perfected contract of sale between Eugenia
and Concepcion. The records show that Eugenia offered to
sell a portion of the property to Concepcion, who accepted
the offer and agreed to pay P100,000.00 as consideration.
The contract of sale was consummated when both parties
fully complied with their respective obligations. Eugenia
delivered the property to Concepcion, who in turn, paid
Eugenia the price of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00), as evidenced by the receipt .
- The oral contract of sale between Eugenia and
Concepcion was evidenced by a receipt signed by Eugenia.
Antonio also stated that his wife admitted to him that she
sold the property to Concepcion.
- The action to annul an oral contract must be commenced
within six years from the time the right of action accrued.
No action was commenced by Antonio to annul the sale,
hence his right to seek its annulment was extinguished by
prescription.
- Under Art. 173 Antonio is still barred from instituting an
action to annul the sale because since April 1987, more
than ten (10) years had already lapsed without any such
action being filed.
Antonio failed to exercise his right to ask for the
annulment within the prescribed period, hence, he is now
barred from questioning the validity of the sale between
his wife and Concepcion.
Partosa-Jo v. CA
216 SCRA 693
FACTS:
- 1980, Prima Partosa-Jo filed two complaints against Jose
Jo for a)judicial separation of conjugal property and b)
complaint for support for her and their daughter Monina
- 29 Nov 1983: Negros Oriental RTC rendered judgment
in favor of Prima but failed to include judgment on judicial
separation of property in the dispositive portion
- Prima elevated this to CA, CA affirmed judgment on
support but dismissed petition for separation of
property for lack merit saying that it was not allowed as
their separation was due to their agreement rather and
not because of abandonment
ISSUES:
- W/N the decision of RTC can be questioned given that it
is final and executory
- W/N she is entitled to judicial separation of conjugal
property on the ground of abandonment
HELD/RATIO:
- The RTC failed put judgment on separation of property
in the dispositive portion, BUT it was made in the
penultimate paragraph reading as follows:
o ―…all the properties in question are considered
properties of Jose Jo, the defendant is subject to separation
of property…‖
- The RTC held that they were legally married and that the
properties were acquired during coverture although they
were in the name of a dummy (Chinese national kasi)
- Prima submits that their agreement was not to be
separated but for her to temporarily live with her parents
during the initial period of her
pregnancy and that he would visit and support her. But
when she returned to their house in Dumaguete in 1942, he
refused to accept her.
- She is entitled to separation of property on ground of
abandonment.
- Abandonment implies departure of one spouse with
intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence
without just cause and without providing for means
although able to do so. There must be absolute cessation
of marital relations, duties and rights, with the
intention of perpetual separation. The physical
separation of the parties, coupled by the refusalm by Jose
Jo to give support to Prima, sufficed to constitute
abandonment as a ground for legal separation of their
conjugal property. Aside from this, he admittedly
cohabitated with other women and have not established
just cause for his refusal to comply with his duties as
husband.
- Court ordered for division between the two hal/half. It
should include properties such as those which were
registered in the name of other persons in violation of the
anti-dummy law.
“The past has caught up with the private respondent. After
his extramarital flings and a succession of illegitimate
children, he must now make an accounting to his lawful
wife of the properties he denied her despite his promise to
her of his eternal love and care.‖
Metropolitan Bank vs Pascual
GR No. 163744, Feb. 29, 2008
FACTS:
- Nicholson Pascual m. Florencia Nevalga on 19Jan1985.
During the union, they bought a 250-square meter lot in
Makati from Clarito and Belen Sering.
- In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psycholohical incapacity.
31July1995, RTC ordered dissolution and liquidation of
ex-spouses‘ conjugal partnership of gains, however, they
failed to liquidate it.
- 30April1997, Florencia, with Norberto and Elvira
Oliveros obtained a 58 Million Peso loan from Metrobank.
To secure obligation, they mortgaged their properties,
including the lot in Makati. Florencia gave Metrobank a
copy of the RTC decision and a waiver allegedly executed
on 9Apr1995 by Nicholson in favor of Florencia covering
conjugal properties that were listed therein but did not
include the Makati property.
- They failed to pay their obligation so Metrobank initiated
foreclosure proceedings and at the auction sale emerged as
the highest bidder.
- 28June2000, Nicholson filed for nullity of marriage
alleging that the property was conjugal and was mortgaged
without his consent
- RTC declared the mortgages invalid and ordered
Metrobank and Florencia to pay Nicholson P100,000.00
moral damages and P75,000.00 attorney‘s fees.
- CA affirmed with modification, deleting the fees
imposed
ISSUE/S:
- W/N the property is conjugal
- W/N the Mortgage was valid
HELD:
- The disputed property is conjugal.
- Metrobank virtually recognized the conjugal nature of the
property when it refered to them as ―spouses‖, ―co-
mortgagor‖ in a)the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure b)
published notice for foreclosure and c) demand letter to
vacate premises of the property.
- Contrarty to Metrobank‘s submission, the matter of the
use of conjugal funds as an essential requirement for
the presumption of conjugal ownership to arise is
WRONG. only proof acquisition during the
marriage is needed to raise presumption.
- The declaration of nullity of marriage, without more,
does not
automatically result in the regime of complete
separation when it is shown that there was no
liquidation of the conjugal assets.
- While the declaration of nullity severed the marital bond
and dissolved conjugal partnership, the character of the
properties acquired continues to subsist as conjugal
property until and after the liquidation and partition of
the partnership.
- Pending its liquidation, the CPG is converted into an
implied ordinary co-ownership. What governs the property
relation is Art 493 which says the effect of the alienation
or the mortgage… shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination
of the co-ownership.
- Florencia has the right to mortgage ½ undivided interest
without consent
Mortgage is valid insofar as the share of Florencia is
concerned.
Santero v. CFI
153 SCRA 728
Facts:
Private respondents are requesting for a Motion for
Allowance from the estate of deceased Pablo Pascual
(legitimate father of private respondents) which was
granted by the CFI.
Petitioners (also legitimate children of Pascual with
another woman) oppose the motion on the grounds that
most of the private respondents are already of age.
NOTE: neither of the women are legally married to Pablo
Pascual.
Issue:
W/N court acted with grave abuse of discretion by
granting the motion for allowance.
Held: NO
Ratio:
Petition lacks merit.
Art. 290 (support for children can apply even beyond the
age of majority) and 188 (right to allowance) apply. It
doesn‘t matter if they are of age, gainfully employed and
married. The New Civil Code entitles the children to
allowance as advances of their shares in the inheritance
from their father, Pablo. A substantive right cannot be
impaired by a procedural one (Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the Rules
of Court)
Maquilan vs Maquilan June 8, 2007
Facts:
Spouses Maquilan were happily married until Virgilio
discovered that Dita was having an affair.
He filed a complaint for adultery in which Dita and her
paramour were found guilty.
June 15 2001: Private respondent filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and
Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and
Damages.
During pre-trial of case, spouses created a COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT.
This is with regard to some particular properties that they
either decided to divide between them or give to their
common child, Neil.
Compromise agreement was given judicial imprimatur by
respondent RTC Judge.
Jan. 15, 2002: Petitioner files an Omnibus Motion saying
that his lawyer did not ―intelligently and judiciously
apprise him of the consequential effects of the Agreement.‖
Respondent Judge denied Motion.
Aug. 30, 2002: CA also dismissed petition for lack of
merit.
The conviction of the crime of adultery of Dita does not
ipso facto disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal
property.
She was only sentenced with the penalty of prision
correccional, without civil interdiction, which would have
deprived her of the right to manage her property.
Since petition for declaration of nullity was not yet
decided, it would be premature to apply Art. 43 and 63 of
FC (re: effects of nullified marriage or LS)
The spouses also VOLUNTARILY agreed to a separation
of their property which was approved of by law, in
accordance with FC 134. It is the petitioner and his
lawyer‘s fault for not checking nor objecting to this right
away before it was approved of.
Main Issue:
Whether the partial voluntary separation of property made
by the spouses pending the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage is valid.
HELD:
YES. The court fully concurs with the CA
Ratio:
Art. 134 of the FC says that separation of property may be
effected and is subject to judicial approval. In the case at
bar, this was clearly allowed by the RTC so it holds.
Obiter: voluntary separation of property is subject to rights
of all creditors of CPG and other persons with pecuniary
interest (Art 136 FC)
Re: Dita being a guilty spouse: ―…the contention that the
Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention
of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the
conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and
jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.‖
Conviction of adultery does NOT carry the accessory of
civil interdiction, rendering the agreement still valid, as
opposed to what the petitioner believes. (Look at ratio of
CA)
Again, the petitioner cannot use the excuse that he was
misinformed by his previous counsel. ―Negligence of the
counsel binds the client.‖ (Salonga vs. CA)
Maxey v. CA
129 SCRA 187 cf. NCC 144
Facts:
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales (both deceased)
lived as husband and wife in Davao, out of this common
law marriage, they had 6 children (petitioners)
1903 – when they started living together 1911-1912 –
when Melbourne bought the lands
1919 – when they married in church and when 1st wife
died.
1953- husband remarried, when 2nd wife sold the land.
1961 – when children discovered sale
Plaintiffs are currently praying for the annulment of the
documents of sale over particular lands that were sold to
private respondent couple by their father‘s 2nd wife.
They allege that common properties belonged to their
parents who acquired the lands during their lifetime and
through their joint effort and capital. Sales of land by their
father were done without their knowledge and consent and
only after their mother, Regina had died in 1953.
Children discovered sale in 1961.
Respondent spouses insist that they are buyers in good
faith and they believed that the Melbourne was the sole
owner of the parcels of land.
Melbourne and maxey started living together in 1903. That
same year, the children allege that they got married ―in
the military fashion‖. They acquired properties in 1911 and
1912. They got married in 1919.
Regina died sometime in 1919, soon after the church
marriage.
1953: husband remarried.
Issue:
W/N spouses Maxey were married as early as 1903 ―in
a military fashion‖ as alleged by the children
NO. The CFI and the CA were correct in rejecting this
since the Act No. 3613 a.k.a. the Revised Marriage Law
was approved much later (Dec. 4, 1929). It could not apply
to a 1903 marriage.
W/N common law spouses, prior to marriage, share
conjugal property over lands acquired in 1912.
RTC: applied Art. 144 that states that in common law
marriages, the property acquired by both through
work, industry, wages, salaries are governed by the
rules of co-ownership.
CA: Ruled otherwise, they believed that the land was
exclusive property of Melbourne Maxey. Art. 144 should
not have applied because the Regina did not contribute to
the acquisition of the profit. She had no income of her
own. Cannot consider this a ―joint‖ effort.
SC: YES. Art. 144 of the Civil Code should apply there
being no showing that vested rights would be impaired or
prejudiced through its application.
Art. 144 may be retroactively applied, they do not
prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right.
Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August
30, 1950, the formation of an informal civil partnership
between a man and wife not legally married and their
corresponding right to an equal share in properties
acquired through their joint efforts and industry during
cohabitation was recognized through decisions of this
Court. (Aznar et al. vs. Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055; Flores vs.
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 94 Phil. 451; Marata
vs. Dionio, L-24449, December 31, 1925; Lesaca v.
Lesaca, 91 Phil. 135.)
Under this new code, it is believed that even if it is only
the man who works, there is still a 50-50 sharing of
property acquired during their cohabitation together.
The woman runs the household:
"in the Filipino family, the wife holds the purse, husbands
hand over their pay checks and get an allowance in return
and the wife manages the affairs of the household. . . .”
(Dean Cortes)
“In the Philippines, the best man is the woman." (Gov-Gen
Leonard Wood)
Ruling:
―the petitioners should return one-half of the P1,300.00
purchase price of the land while the private respondents
should pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half
of the properties. Equitable considerations, however, lead
us to rule out rentals on one hand and return of P650.00 on
the other.‖
Fehr vs. Fehr
G.R. No. 152716. October 23, 2003
Facts:
- March 1983 – petitioner and respondent moved in
together in Manila.
- July 1983 – bought Suite 204 of LGC condominium.
Deal was executed by respondent and was issued under
petitioner‘s name
- 1985 – got married
- 1997 – marriage was declared void under FC 36
- 1999 – RTC issued order resolving their property. This
was contested by petitioner adducing that Suite 204, LGC
condominium was purchased on installment basis when
they were living exclusively as husband and wife without
benefit of marriage thus rules on co-ownership should
apply (FC Art 147)
- TC: affirmed ruling that condo unit was acquired before
marriage thus is solely respondent‘s property
- CA: dismissed petition for lack of merit. Thus the present
petition.
ISSUE: WON Suite 204 is solely respondent‘s property
HELD: NO
- FC Art 147 – applies to unions of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to marry but
whose marriage is still void.
o Elements: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other
(2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
(3) union is without benefit of marriage or their marriage is
void = all 3 elements are present in this case
o ―Capacitated‖ – legal capacity of party to contract
marriage
o presumed that property was obtained through joint
efforts.
- Evidence clearly shows that condo unit was obtained
when they were living exclusively together thus is
considered COMMON PROPERTY of petitioner and
respondent
Civil code provisions on co-ownership should thus should
thus apply to answer property regime of the parties.
Gonzales vs Gonzales
478 SCRA 327
Facts: Before they started living together on March 1977,
Francisco Gonzales offered Erminda Gonzales to be his
partner in Fiesta Pizza, his pizza business, and to take over
its operations. She accepted the offer and took care of the
business‘ daily operations, personnel management, outlets
supervision, and met people during inspections.
- Despite their marriage on Feb. 4, 1979, the same was
declared void under FC 36 on Feb. 12, 1997. Erminda then
sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and
claimed the pizza business to be conjugal property where
she contributed to 80% of the total management.
Francisco, however, claimed that it was exclusive.
Issue: WON properties should be divided equally between
husband and wife
Held: YES
because the marriage was declared void, the property
regime that applies is co-ownership under FC 147. Under
the rules of co-ownership, properties acquired by both
parties during their union (under a void marriage) are
presumed to have been obtained through joint efforts and
will be owned by them in equal shares absent proof of the
contrary. Francisco admitted in a handwritten letter dated
Sept. 6, 1989 that Erminda had helped in the management
of the business and was not a mere housewife. Hence, the
business is co-owned and both Francisco and Erminda are
presumed to have contributed jointly.
- Art 147 applies when )1) when man and woman
capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each
other without benefit of marriage (2) when man and
woman live together under void marriage
o Presumption is anything acquired during both instances
are obtained through joint efforts and shall be divided
equally.
Party who didn‘t participate in acquisition by other party
of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly
in acquisition if former‘s efforts consisted of care and
maintenance of family and household.
Juaniza v. Jose
89 SCRA 306
FACTS:
Passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision
with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways
(Nov. 23, 1969) which resulted in the death to 7 and
physical injuries to 5 of its passengers
Eugenio Jose – registered owner and operator of the
passenger jeepney
 At the time of the accident, Eugenio Jose was legally
married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with
defendant-appellant Rosalia Arroyo for 16 years
CFI decision on resulting cases for damages:
o Ordered Jose and Rosalia Arroyo jointly and severally to
pay
Rosalia Arroyo filed for Motion for Reconsideration
denied
o Lower court based her liability on Art. 144 of the Civil
Code
CA certified question to SC
ISSUES:
WON Art. 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a case
where one of the
parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to
marry
WON Rosalia who isn‘t a registered owner of the jeep
can be held solidarily liable for damages with the
registered owner of the same
HELD:
NO
o Co-ownership contemplated in Art. 144 of the Civil
Code requires that the man and the woman living together
must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage
NO
o Rosalia Arroyo cannot e a co-owner of the jeepney
o Jeep belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his
legal wife
o No basis for the liability of Rosalia Arroyo for damages
Only the registered owner of a public service vehicle is
responsible for damages that may arise from consequences
incident to its operation or maybe caused to any of the
passengers therein
Agapay vs Agapay
276 SCRA 340
Facts:
Miguel Palang married Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol
on July 16, 1949
October 1949, he left to work in Hawaii
as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce
Carlina in Hawaii
July 15, 1973 Miguel married with nineteen-year-old
Erlinda Agapay
May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, jointly purchased a
parcel of rice land. Transfer Certificate of Title No.
101736 issued in their names
September 23, 1975 Erlinda allegedly purchased a
house and lot and title was issued in her name
October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed
a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement to
settle and end a case filed by the latter. The parties therein
agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six
parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang
1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of
Concubinage upon Carlina‘s complaint. Two years later,
on February 15, 1981, Miguel died
July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter
Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein private respondents,
instituted the case at bar, an action for recovery of
ownership and possession with damages of the house and
lot together with the riceland
Issue
Who is the owner of the two pieces of property
Held: Carlina, the first wife
Under FC Article 148, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion
to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that
actual contribution is required by this provision since it for
relationships that have legal impediments
o Art 147 is the law that recognizes relationships without
legal impediment and proof of care and maintenance of
family and household equates to joint effort.
Erlinda failed to persuade the court that she actually
contributed money to buy the subject Riceland hence the
riceland reverts to the first marriage
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly
bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975
when she was only 22 years old- however the notary
testified that the property was purchased by Miguel but put
in the name of Erlinda- the transaction was essentially a
void donation
Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that
the prohibition against donations between spouses now
applies to donations between persons living together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage
Compromise agreement entered into by Carliana and late
Miguel is not a separation of property and should not be
inferred as such. NO LIQUIDATION WAS MADE.
Domingo v. CA
226 SCRA 572 (All Opinions)
Facts:
- 1969 – previous marriage of Roberto Domingo and
Emerlina dela Paz
- 1976 – married Delia Soledad Domingo
- 1979 – present – Delia was working in Saudi Arabia
while husband has remained unemployed (1983-present)
o was the supporter of the family and purchased real and
personal properties out of her personal earnings.
Roberto was the administrator
- 1983 – when Delia knew of first marriage
- 1989 – when she discovered he had another woman and
was also selling her property without her consent.
o Thus asked lower court for
(1) a temporary restraining order stopping Roberto from
exercising any
act of administration and ownership over the properties
(2) fomarriage to be declared null and void
(3) Delia Domingo be declared sole and exclusive
owner of all properties acquired at time of their void
marriage.
- RTC – denied for lack of merit since marriage is seen as
void in the first place thus steps aren‘t necessary
- CA: held that prayer for nullity along with separation of
properties may be raised however they were still denied
for lack of merit. Thus case is in SC
ISSUE: WON respondent may recover certain real and
personal property exclusively belonging to her
HELD: YES
- Distribution and separation of property of spouses is one
of the reasons why there‘s a need to judicially declare that
a marriage is void.
- Court that declares a marriage void will also provide for
the liquidation, partition, and distribution of properties of
spouses. It is a necessary consequence of judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
o Rules that apply: FC Art 43 and 44
o Separation of property will be according to regime of
property relations governing them.
CONCURRING BY VITUG
When a void marriage is still in existence (without judical
declaration of nullity) neither the CPG or ACP will apply
instead, property relations shall be governed by co-
ownership rules under Art 147 or Art 148 of FC.
Tumlos vs. Sps. Fernandez
G.R. No. 137650, Apr 12, 2000
Facts:
Spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an
apartment
building and that they had allowed the defendants-private
respondents to occupy the apartment building for the last
seven (7) years, since 1989 without the payment of any
rent. They agreed that after a few months guillerma tumlos
would start paying rent but she failed to pay after repeated
demands. They prayed that defendants be ejected
Guillerma Tumlos averred therein that the Fernandez
spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a
co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a
Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a co-
vendee of the property in question together with
[Respondent] Mario Fernandez
Defendants alleged Mario Fernandez and Guillerma had
an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the
property in question as their ‗love nest‘
Guillerma administered the property, until she
discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of
his marriage. It was also during the early part of 1996
when Mario accused her of being unfaithful and
demonstrated his baseless jealousy
Petitioner‘s central theory and main defense against
respondents‘ action for ejectment is her claim of co-
ownership over the property with Respondent Mario
Fernandez. At the first instance before the MTC, she
presented a Contract to Sell indicating that she was his
spouse
CA rejected petitioner‘s claim that she and Respondent
Mario Fernandez were co-owners of the disputed property
Issue:
A. Is the petitioner a co-owner of the property?
B. Can the claim for support bar this ejectment suit?
Held:
the applicable law is not Article 144 of the Civil Code,
but Article 148 of the Family Code which provides
Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a
relationship between a man and a woman who are not
incapacitated to marry each other, or to one in which the
marriage of the parties is void from the beginning. It does
not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or
concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a co-
ownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership
or absolute community between the man and his lawful
wife
Based on evidence presented by respondents, as well as
those submitted by petitioner herself before the RTC, it is
clear that Mario Fernandez was incapacitated to marry
petitioner because he was legally married to Lourdes
Fernandez. It is also clear that, as readily admitted by
petitioner, she cohabited with Mario in a state of
concubinage. Therefore, Article 144 of the Civil Code is
inapplicable
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
preceding Article,[21] only the properties acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In
the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions
and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The
same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
"If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or
her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
"The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply
even if both parties are in bad faith
Petitioner‘s argument -- that the Family Code is
inapplicable because the cohabitation and the acquisition
of the property occurred before its effectivity -- deserves
scant consideration. Suffice it to say that the law itself
states that it can be applied retroactively if it does not
prejudice vested or acquired rights. In this case, petitioner
failed to show any vested right over the property in
question. Moreover, to resolve similar issues,
we have applied Article 148 of the Family Code
retroactively
Petitioner failed to present any evidence that she had made
an actual contribution to purchase the subject property.
She anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her
cohabitation with Respondent Mario Fernandez
Malilin vs Castillo
333 SCRA 628
Facts:
-Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint for "Partition
and/or Payment of Co-Ownership Share, Accounting and
Damages" against respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo
-petitioner and respondent, both married and with
children, but separated from their respective spouses,
cohabited after a brief courtship sometime in 1979 while
their respective marriages still subsisted.
-during their union, they set up the Superfreight
Customs brokerage corporation and also acquired
properties which were registered solely in Elvira‘s name.
-In 1992, due to irreconcilable differences, the couple
separated. Petitioner demanded from respondent his share
in the subject properties, but respondent refused alleging
that said properties had been registered solely in her name.
-She denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and
wife because the fact was that they were still legally
married to their respective spouses. She claimed to be the
exclusive owner of all real and personal properties
involved in petitioner‘s action for partition on the ground
that they were acquired entirely out of her own money and
registered solely in her name.
-RTC dismissed case. It also ruled that it is immaterial
whether the parties actually lived together as husband and
wife because Art. 144 of the Civil Code can not be made
to apply to them as they were both incapacitated to marry
each other. Hence, it was impossible for a co-ownership to
exist between them.
-CA granted respondent‘s motion. It said in its decision
that the desired declaration of co-ownership and eventual
partition will utterly be an indirect or collateral attack on
the subject titles in this suit. Verily, plaintiff-appellant
should have first pursued such remedy or any other relief
directly attacking the subject titles before instituting the
present partition suit. Apropos, the case at
bench appears to have been prematurely filed.
ISSUE: Can plaintiff validly claim the partition and/or
payment of co-ownership share, accounting and
damages, considering that plaintiff and defendant are
admittedly both married to their respective spouses
under still valid and subsisting marriages, even
assuming as claimed by plaintiff, that they lived together
as husband and wife without benefit of marriage? In other
words, can the parties be considered as co-owners of the
properties, under the law, considering the present status of
the parties as both married and incapable of marrying each
other, even assuming that they lived together as husband
and wife (?)
HELD: Yes
-Article 148 shall apply in this case. If the parties are
incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by
them through their joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion
to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus co-
ownership even though the couple are not capacitated to
marry each other.
-Petitioner sought partition of real properties and a
substantial amount of personal properties consisting of
motor vehicles and several pieces of jewelry. By
dismissing petitioner‘s complaint for partition on grounds
of due process and equity, the appellate court unwittingly
denied petitioner his right to prove ownership over the
claimed real and personal properties.
The amended decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May
7, 1998, is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City for
further proceedings on the merits.
Saguid vs. CA
G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003 Facts:
-Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married but
separated de facto from her husband, when she met
petitioner Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, sometime in July
1987
-the two decided to cohabit as husband and wife in a house
built on a lot owned by Jacinto‘s father.
-In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their
9-year cohabitation.
-On January 9, 1997, private respondent Gina Rey filed a
complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property
with Receivership against the petitioner with the Regional
Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque
-She alleged that from her salary of $1,500.00 a month as
entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute P70,000.00
in the completion of their unfinished house. Also, from her
own earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was
able to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of
furniture and household effects, with a total value of
P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole
owner of these personal properties and that the amount of
P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the
construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.
-Petitioner Jacinto Saguid claims that expenses for the
construction of their house were defrayed solely from his
income as a captain of their fishing vessel. He averred that
private respondent‘s meager income as fish dealer
rendered her unable to contribute in the construction of
said house; Gina did not work continuously in Japan from
1992 to 1994, but only for a 6-month duration each year.
When their house was repaired and improved sometime in
1995-1996, private respondent did not share in the
expenses because her earnings as entertainer were spent on
the daily needs and business of her parents
-RTC rendered judgment in favor of Gina Rey
-CA affirmed RTC ruling
ISSUE: whether or not the parties can be considered as co-
owners of the properties
Held: YES
- it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not
capacitated to marry each other because the former was
validly married to another man at the time of her
cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime
therefore is governed by Article 14830 of the Family
Code. In this case, the proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential.
- Art 148 applies even if cohabitation or acquisition of
property occurred before FC took effect since no law
before it answers cohabitation of couples living in adultery
or concubiange
- The controversy centers on the house and personal
properties of the parties. Private respondent alleged in her
complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the
completion of their house. However, nowhere in her
testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution.
What appears in the record are receipts in her name for the
purchase of construction materials on November 17, 1995
and December 23, 1995, in the total amount of P11,413.00.
-Both parties claim that the money used to purchase the
disputed personal properties came partly from their joint
account with First Allied Development Bank. There is no
sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective
shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family
Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties‘
respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be
equal. Here, the disputed personal properties were valued
at P111,375.00, the existence and value of which were not
questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their share therein is
equivalent to one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each.
- Private respondent Gina S. Rey is declared co-owner of
petitioner Jacinto Saguid in the controverted house to the
extent of P11,413.00 and personal properties to the extent
of P55,687.50. Petitioner is ordered to reimburse the
amount of P67,100.50 to private respondent, failing which
the house shall be sold at public auction to satisfy private
respondent‘s claim.
Francisco vs Master Iron Works
451 SCRA 494
Facts:
- Josefina Castillo was only 24 when she married Eduardo
Francisco in 1983.
- Imus Rural Bank then executed a deed of sale for
320,000 in favor of Josefina married to Eduardo.
- Eduardo then, on 1985, executed an affidavit of waiver
where he declared that Josefina purchased two parcels of
land including a house before their marriage.
- In 1986, Josefina mortageged the said property to Leonila
Cando for a loan of 157K
- 1990 Eduardo bought 7500 bags of cement from Master
Iron Works but failed tp pay.
- MIW filed a complaint against him, and the trial court
sided with MIW on 1992.
- Sheriff Alejo levied on the property of Josefina which
made her execute an affidavit of third party claim saying
that the two parcels of land were paraphernal.
- The property was sold in an auction for 1,350,000
- Josefina amended her complaint, to reconvey the
property with moral damages.
- Josefina then filed a petition to annul her marriage with
Eduardo on the grounds of bigamy.
- RTC of Paranaque granted her plea.
- RTC 1997 found also the sale of the two parcels of land
were null and void
- BUT the CA reversed the RTC‘s decision! Saying that
the property was conjugal in nature.
Issues: WON the said property is the paraphernal property
of Josefina
Held: No
Ratio: They are not paraphernal since she wasn‘t able to
prove that she bought the said land with her funds before
the marriage. There is no proof that she contributed money
on the acquisition of the said property. The presumption of
conjugality was not overcome.
- evidence lacking: no proof to show that she borrowed
money to buy land from mother and sister and also failed
to divulge their names.
o 3rd claim party affidavit claiming that properties are
exclusively from the fruits of own labor negates what she
said that she borrowed the money
o failed to testify against whose account the check was
drawn and issued and whose account it was
o was 23 when she married so doubtful that she‘d have
money before to buy such property
o bought the property 1 year and 7 months after marriage
AFFIDAVIT OF WAIVER – executed by Eduardo to
protect property against third party claims against him.
Also significant is he still attached his marital conformity
to the land‘s mortgage.
Atienza vs.de Castro
G.R. No. 1695698, Nov. 29, 2006
Facts:
- Lupo Atienza hired De Castro as accountant for his two
corporations (Enrico Shipping Corporation and Eurasian
Maritime Corporation) in 1983
- Then their relationship became intimate despite Lupo
being a married man! They lived together in the later part
of 1983. They had 2 children, after the second child they
parted ways.
- Then Lupo filed a complaint against Yolanda for a
judicial partition of a land between them in the Bel-Air
subdivision
- Lupo said Yolanda bought the said property with his own
funds.
- Yolanda on the otherhand said she bought it with her
own funds.
- Trial Court said that the contested property is owned
common by him and Yolanda and ordered the partition
into two equal parts.
- CA reversed the TC! Saying that it was the exclusive
property of Yolanda.
Issues: WON the disputed property is the exclusive
property of Yolanda
Held: Yes
Ratio: Since they are not capacitated to marry each other
in their cohabitation, FC 148 applies. Under this regime
only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in
proportion to their contributions. Absent of proof of
contribution, it shall be presumed to be equal. He did not
show any evidence that he contributed in the parcel of land
while the accountant showed bank accounts which
apparently shows that she was capacitated to buy the said
land.
- evidence of De Castro: job as accountant and
businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading,
money lending, and jewelry retail, promisorry notes of
dealings with clients, bank account statements, and
business transactions = had financial capacity
on the other hand Atienza merely provided evidence that
Yolanda had no such sufficient funds and didn‘t provide
for evidence regarding his own capacity to pay for such
property.
Acre vs Yutikki
2007
- Beatriz Acre and Sofronio Acre, Jr. married on
November 8, 1957. Have 6 children (petitioners)
- 1972 – Sofronio left conjugal dwelling
- Petitioners find out that Sofronio married Evangeline
Yuttikki May 18, 1972, while still married to Beatriz
- Sofronio dies Nov 16, 1996
- During respondent‘s marriage with Sofronio they
acquired properties, one registered to ―Evangeline Acre
married to Sofronio Acre‖ another to ―E. Acre, married to
S. Acre and N. del Mar, married to Jose del Mar‖ (Nellie is
Evangeline‘s sister)
- Petitioners file with RTC for recovery of properties,
saying Sofronio acquired it w/ his own funds
- TC dismisses, saying that the properties are owned in
common by Evangeline and Sofronio
- CA dismisses appeal as well, declaring defendant-
appellee exclusive owner
Issue: W/n the CA erred in declaring Evangeline the owner
of the contested properties?
Held: No. Petition denied, CA decision AFFIRMED.
- The marriage between Evangeline and Sofronio is indeed
bigamous, as such their property regime is under FC – 148
o Properties acquired by the parties out of their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership
o If there is no contribution from either or both of the
spouses, clearly there can be no co-ownership
- Petitioners did not present any evidence that shows
Sofronio made an actual contribution in acquiring the
said properties. Clearly, co-ownership does not exist
here.
CA correct in saying that the first land in question was
registered under ―Evangeline Acre married to Sofronio
Acre, the second land in question under ―Evangeline
Acre married to Sofronio Acre, and Nellie Del Mar,
married to Jose Del Mar‖ – rule well settled that the words
―married to‖ preceding Sofronio Acre Jr. are merely
descriptive of the status of Evangeline.
Signey v SSS
GR No. 173582, Jan. 28, 2008
Facts:
- Rodolfo Signey, SSS member, died on May 21 2001, in
the records he had designated Yolanda as primary
beneficiary and his 4 children with her as secondary
beneficiaries.
- 3 women started claiming his death benefits from SSS (in
order)
1. Yolanda Signey (petitioner)
o Claimed death benefits first (July 6 2001)
2. Gina Servano (respondent)
o Claimed death benefits (July 13 2001)
o Has 2 minor children with Rodolfo
o Claims that she and Yolanda were common law-wives,
while Editha is the legal wife.
3. Editha Espinosa (respondent)
o Claimed death benefits (Oct 2001)
o Claims that she is the legal wife
- SSS denies Yolanda, saying Gina‘s 2 children are the
primary beneficiaries under the SSS Law
- Says also that the marriage between Yolanda and
Rodolfo is null and void because Rodolfo was still married
with Editha
- Yolanda files a petition with Social Security Commission
(SSC) along with a waiver of rights by Editha wherein
Editha waived all claims of benefits from SSS because she
(Editha) was married to a diff person
- SSC affirms the SSS Decision
o Despite the new waiver by Editha, SSC gave more
weight to the confirmed marriage of Rodolfo and Editha
o SSC: Mere designation by Rodolfo in the records of who
his beneficiaries were is not a controlling factor
- SSC then applies SSS Law (RA 8282) where it says that
dependent legit / illegit children may be primary
beneficiaries, and they have to be minors.
o Rodolfo had one legitimate child who died earlier than
he did
o His children with Yolanda are all over 21 years old
o His children with Gina are qualified (them being minors)
Issue:
1. W/n petitioner‘s marriage with the deceased is valid?
2. W/n petitioner has the right to the benefits against the
illegitimate children?
Held: No. There is no merit to the petition
1. The existence of a prior marriage between Editha and
Rodolfa is supported by evidence
2. Section 8(e) and (k) of RA 8282 is very clear (court
applies statcon) (found in the case pg. 638):
o It defines who are dependents:
Legal Spouse
Legitimate, adopted, and illegitimate child who is
unmarried, not employed and is under 21 years old
o Whoever claims entitlement benefits should establish
his/her right by substantial evidence
o Since petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and
bec the deceased has no legitimate child, it follows that the
dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall
be entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries.
o Gina‘s 2 minor children are entitled to 100% of the
benefits
o Has 2 minor children with Rodolfo
o Claims that she and Yolanda were common law-wives,
while Editha is the legal wife.
4. Editha Espinosa (respondent)
o Claimed death benefits (Oct 2001)
o Claims that she is the legal wife
- SSS denies Yolanda, saying Gina‘s 2 children are the
primary beneficiaries under the SSS Law
- Says also that the marriage between Yolanda and
Rodolfo is null and void because Rodolfo was still married
with Editha
- Yolanda files with SSC
- SSC affirms the SSS Decision
o Sayin
Issue:
3. W/n petitioner‘s marriage with the deceased is valid?
4. W/n petitioner has the right to the benefits against the
illegitimate children?
Held: No. There is no merit to the petition
3. The existence of a prior marriage between Editha and
Rodolfa is supported by evidence
4. Section 8(e) and (k) of RA 8282 is very clear (found in
the case pg. 638):
o It defines who are dependents:
Legal Spouse
Legitimate, adopted, and illegitimate child who is
unmarried, not employed and is under 21 years old
o Whoever claims entitlement benefits should establish
his/her right by substantial evidence
o Since petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and
bec the deceased has no legitimate child, it follows that the
dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall
be entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries.
Gina‘s 2 minor children are entitled to 100% of the
benefits
Borromeo vs Descallar
GR No. 159310, Feb. 24, 2009
Facts:
1) Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the
Philippines in 1983. In 1984, he met respondent Antonietta
Opalla-Descallar, a separated mother of two boys who was
working as a waitress at St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich and
respondent fell in love and decided to live together.
2) In the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 19851 and
March 10, 19862 and A Deed of Absolute Sale dated
November 16, 1987 covering the properties in Agro-Macro
Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue City, Jambrich and
respondent were referred to as the buyers.
3) However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was
presented for registration before the Register of Deeds,
registration was refused on the ground that Jambrich was
an alien
and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain.
Thus they erased Jambrich‘s name from the document only
retaining his signature in certain areas.
4) Jambrich also formally adopted respondent‘s two sons.
5) April 1991, respondent found a new boyfriend while
Jambrich began to live with another woman in Danao City.
6) Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime
in 1986. In 1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and some
accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he
became indebted to the latter for about P150,000.00. To
pay the debt he sold his rights to the Agro-Macro
properties to the petitioner.
7) On July 26, 1991, when petitioner sought to register the
deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three
lots have been transferred
in the name of respondent, and that the subject property
has already been mortgaged.
8) On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint against
respondent for recovery of real property before the
Regional Trial Court, alleging that the deed of sale issued
for the property in favor of the respondent do not reflect
the true agreement of the parties, the latter having paid
nothing for the said properties.
9) Respondent denies the allegation citing that she had
paid for the property solely and exclusively using the
money from her copra business.
10) RTC rules for the petitioner (Borromeo) citing the
proofs presented on the earning capacity of Jambrich at the
time the property was purchased over the supposed
earnings of the respondent from her Copra business (which
were markedly fictional since the respondent was still
working as a waitress for P1000 a
month at the time of the purchase of the properties.
11) April 10, 2002 Respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals. CA sides w/ respondent citing: In the case at bar,
the title of the subject property is not in the name of
Jambrich but in the name of defendant-appellant. Thus,
Jambrich could not have transferred a property he has no
title thereto.

Issues: WON Respondent has a right over the said

property.
Held: NO, it was proven in the RTC trial that the
properties in question were in fact purchased from the
exclusive funds of Wilhelm Jambrich who at the time of
acquisition had sufficient income compared to the
waitress‘ wages of the respondent. As such the purchase of
the property could clearly be attributed Janbrich and
subsequently to the petitioner. Furthermore the vice of
alienage plaguing the sale of the property to Jambrich was
in fact cured by the transfer of the property to the
petitioner who is a Filipino citizen citing the case United
Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian.