2A Legal Ethics Digests

Fr. Ferrer

1. ALEJANDRO Less serious charges include:

3. Unauthorized practice of law
CODAL PROVISIONS
Civil Code
Chapter: 18.25 Judge Should Not Practice Law Art. 1491 (5)
1. Prohibition from engaging in the private practice of law The following persons cannot acquire by purchase,
- reason: rights, duties, privileges and function of the office of an attorney-at-law even at a public or judicial auction,
is so inherently incompatible with the high judicial functions, duties, powers, either
discretions and privileges of a judge. in person or
through the mediation of another:
- Obligations of judicial officers:
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts,
- give their full time and attention to their judicial duties and
- prevent the from extending special favours for their own private interest other officers and employees
- assure public of impartiality in the performance of their functions connected with the administration of justice,
2. Prohibition of law firms of which a judge was formerly an active member, to the property and rights
continue to carry his name in the firm name in litigation or
- reason: might create the impression that firm possesses improper levied upon an execution before the court
influence with the judge which would tend to impel those in need of legal within whose jurisdiction or territory
assistance to employ that law firm they exercise their respective functions;
3. Disqualification from engaging in private practice of law when an attorney is this prohibition includes
appointed or elected to a governmental office the act of acquiring by assignment and
- reason: public office is a public trust and a public officer or employees shall apply to lawyers,
obliged to perform his duties not only with the highest degree of with respect to the property and rights
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency but also with exclusive which may be the object of any litigation
fidelity. in which they may take part
by virtue of their profession.
Rule 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar Civil Code
Art. 739 (3)
Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. —
No judge or The following donations shall be void:
other official or employee (3) Those made
of the superior courts or to a public officer or
of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall his wife, descendants and ascendants,
engage in private practice by reason of his office.
as a member of the bar or
give professional advice 2. ANONAS
to clients.
Case Name: Candia vs. Tagabucba
Rule 140 Discipline of Judges of Regular and Special Courts and
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan Case Number: 33
Section 9. Less Serious Charges. –

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Footnote Number: 250
Chapter: 19
Catchy phrase:
Doctrine: A judge is prohibited to engage in private practice as a member of the
bar or give professional advice to clients.
Facts
● Spouses Maturan mortgaged 12 has. of land to PNB. It was later
foreclosed by the PNB. In order to redeem the property mortgaged,
Crispina with her four brothers and their mother (then living) sold 4 ½
has. portions of the 12 has. land to Manisan. Manisan was led to believe
that the PNB mortgage was redeemed when in fact it was not. Manisan
came to Judge Tagabucba for advice as to the possibility of filling a case of
Estafa.
● Judge Tagabucba subsequently called on Crispina and his 4 brothers.
Crispina asked whether there was still a chance to repurchase the
remaining 71/2 of the property. Judge then became the attorney-in-fact
of the siblings. Since Crispina and his bros. don’t have money to redeem,
the Judge was given special power of attorney to encumber the property
● He entered into a contract of sale with a right to repurchase with certain
Mr. Chupuico. It was later discussed in the case that the court found out
that Mr. Chupuico is in fact the Judge’s father-in-law and it was actually
the Judge who took possession of the property after the redemption.
Issue: Whether the judge violated the prohibition against a judge to give legal
advice and to act as a counsel.
Ruling: Yes. Court dismissed him from service, and his leave and retirement
privileges were forfeited.
● Judge was charged for taking personal interest in a litigious matter within
his jurisdiction, and acted as legal counsel and adviser for all the parties
thereto.
● Disregarding matters of less pivotal importance, it appears that
respondent has violated on of the fundamental principles governing the
performance of judges of their judicial functions, namely, never to use his
office for the promotion of his personal ineterests. Moreover, while it is
true that during the times material to this case, respondent was allowed
to engage in the practice of his profession, it was obviously improper for
him, however, to act as counsel for any party whose case would
eventually land in his court. Worse, in the case of the respondent, his
professional service were engaged by one of the parties and he
subsequently agreed to act a attorney-in-fact of the other party in
connection with the very subject matter of their controversy.
● Rule 138 Attorneys and Admission to Bar Section 35. Certain attorneys
not to practice. — No judge or other official or employee of the superior
courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private
practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients.
3. AYO
Case Name: Asuncion v Macariola
Case Number: n/a (new addition)
Footnote Number:
Chapter:
Catchy phrase: Victoria Court
Doctrine: A Judge should be discreet in his private and business activities
Facts:
On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion rendered a decision in Civil Case
3010 final for lack of an appeal.
On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion. The
project of partition of lots was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the
respective counsel of plaintiffs and petitioner Bernardita R. Macariola. The Judge
approved it in his order dated October 23, 1963.
One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5
lots denominated as Lot 1184 A – E. Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on July
31, 1964, who was issued transfer of certificate of Title No, 2338 of the Register of
Deeds of Tacloban City. On March 6, 1965, Galapon sold a portion of the lot to
Judge Asuncion and his wife.
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective
shares and interest inn Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing & Fishing
Industries Inc. Judge Asuncion was the President and his wife Victoria was the
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Secretary. The Asuncions and Galapons were also the stockholder of the branches of the Court of First Instance from the time of the drafting of the Articles
corporation. of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966 up to its incorporation on
January 9, 1967. The Judge realized early that their interest in the corporation
Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with "Acts unbecoming a Judge" for contravenes against Canon 25.
violating the following provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Article
14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par H of RA 3019 also known as the
Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and 4. BAUTISTA
Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
Case Name: Sotto v Samson
On November 2, 1970 a certain Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno dismissed the
complaints filed against Asuncion. Case Number: 469

Issue: Footnote Number: 65

Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned provisions.
Chapter: Ch. 8, sec. 9
Ruling:
No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned provisions constituting of "Acts Catchy phrase: Vic Sotto, manloloko
unbecoming a Judge" but was reminded to be more discreet in his private and
business activities. Doctrine: A lawyer cannot buy the property of his client while it is under litigation.

Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly on the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 3010 but from Dr. Galapon who earlier purchased the lot from 3 of the
plaintiffs. When the Asuncion bought the lot on March 6, 1965 from Dr. Galapon
after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case
No 3010 and his two orders dated October and November, 1963. The said
property was no longer the subject of litigation.
In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect
and cannot apply to the respondent. Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to the
US and to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of this Code of Commerce, which
sourced from the Spanish Code of Commerce, appears to have been abrogated
because whenever there is a change in the sovereignty, political laws of the
former sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are reenacted by
Affirmative Act of the New Sovereign.
Facts:
Sotto represented Samson as the latter’s counsel in several cases. Atty. Sotto,
acting on behalf of Samson, filed a case requesting for judicial authority to sell her
paraphernal property without the consent of her husband. Prior to the court’s final
ruling regarding the petition, Samson sold her property to Atty. Sotto.
Issue:
Is the sale void for being a sale to a lawyer of property subject of litigation?
Ruling:
Yes. At the time the sale was made, Atty. Sotto already represented Samson as her
counsel in a civil case. The Civil Code prohibits the sale of property involved in any
litigation to lawyers who take part in such litigation by virtue of their profession.
5. BERNARDO

Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H, Sec. 3 of RA 3019, citing that Case Name: Rubias v. Batiller
the public officers cannot partake in any business in connection with this office, or
intervened or take part in his official capacity. The Judge and his wife had Case Number:
withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the corporation and sold their respective
shares to 3rd parties, and it appears that the corporation did not benefit in any Footnote Number:
case filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed in the different

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Chapter: 8.09
Catchy phrase:
Doctrine:
Prohibition against purchase by lawyer of property in litigation from his client
Facts:
- This is an action for forcible entry filed by petitioner Rubias against the
current occupants of the property.
- Before the war with Japan, Fransisco Militante filed an application for
registration of the parcel of land in question which was subsequently denied.
While the case was pending appeal, Militante sold the land to Rubias, his son-
in-law, who was also his counsel in the land registration case.
- The current occupants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground
that Rubias had no cause of action, seeing as the sale between him and his
client-father was void.
- Rubias argues that the sale is voidable.
Issue: WON the contract of sale between Rubias and his father in law was void
because it was made when Rubias was counsel of his father in law in a land
registration case involving the property in dispute.
Ruling:
Yes. The sale is void.
- Article 1491 of our Civil Code (like Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code)
prohibits in its six paragraphs certain persons, by reason of the relation of trust
or their peculiar control over the property, from acquiring such property in
their trust or control either directly or indirectly and "even at a public or
judicial auction," as follows: (1) guardians; (2) agents; (3) administrators; (4)
public officers and employees; judicial officers and employees, prosecuting
attorneys, and lawyers; and (6) others especially disqualified by law
- The criterion of nullity of such prohibited contracts under Article 1459 of
the Spanish Civil Code (Article 1491 of our Civil Code) as a matter of public
order and policy as applied by the Supreme Court of Spain to administrators
and agents in its above cited decision should certainly apply with greater
reason to judges, judicial officers, fiscals and lawyers under paragraph 5 of the
codal article.
- It is noteworthy that Caltan's rationale for his conclusion that
fundamental consideration of public policy render void and inexistent such
expressly prohibited purchase (e.g. by public officers and employees of
government property intrusted to them and by justices, judges, fiscals and
lawyers of property and rights in litigation and submitted to or handled by
them, under Article 1491, paragraphs (4) and (5) of our Civil Code) has been
adopted in a new article of our Civil Code, viz, Article 1409 declaring such
prohibited contracts as "inexistent and void from the beginning
- The permanent disqualification of public and judicial officers and lawyers
grounded on public policy differs from the first three cases of guardians, agents
and administrators (Article 1491, Civil Code), as to whose transactions it had
been opined that they may be "ratified" by means of and in "the form of a new
contact, in which cases its validity shall be determined only by the
circumstances at the time the execution of such new contract. The causes of
nullity which have ceased to exist cannot impair the validity of the new
contract. Thus, the object which was illegal at the time of the first contract,
may have already become lawful at the time of the ratification or second
contract; or the service which was impossible may have become possible; or
the intention which could not be ascertained may have been clarified by the
parties. The ratification or second contract would then be valid from its
execution; however, it does not retroact to the date of the first contract.
6. BERNAS
Case Name: Severino v. Severino
Case Number: 464
Footnote Number: 68
Chapter: 8.9
Catchy phrase:
Doctrine: Prohibition against a lawyer buying his client’s property is absolute
Facts:
- Guillermo Severino is the brother of Melencio Severino
- He served as the administrator of his property and occupied a certain
portion of the property
- After Melencio died, Guillermo continued to maintain possession of his
property
- Case was filed in court seeking Guillermo to convey the property to the
heirs of Melecio
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- none of the proceedings were attended by Guillermo, only his attorney
was present the whole time
- he claimed that such property were inherited by Guillermo from their
father
- however in an earlier case, he admitted that Guillermo was in fact only
the administrator of the property
Issue:
- WON the property should be conveyed to the heirs of Melecio
Ruling:
- YES
- That the defendant came into the possession of the property here in
question as the agent of the deceased Melecio Severino in the
administration of the property, cannot be successfully disputed. His
testimony in the case of Montelibano vs. Severino (civil case No. 902 of
the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros and which forms a part of
the evidence in the present case) is, in fact, conclusive in this respect. He
there stated under oath that from the year 1902 up to the time the
testimony was given, in the year 1913, he had been continuously in
charge and occupation of the land as the encargado or administrator of
Melecio Severino; that he had always known the land as the property of
Melecio Severino; and that the possession of the latter had been
peaceful, continuous, and exclusive. In his answer filed in the same case,
the same defendant, through his attorney, disclaimed all personal interest
in the land and averred that it was wholly the property of his brother
Melecio.
- The relations of an agent to his principal are fiduciary and it is an
elementary and very old rule that in regard to property forming the
subject- matter of the agency, he is estopped from acquiring or asserting
a title adverse to that of the principal. His position is analogous to that of
a trustee and he cannot consistently, with the principles of good faith, be
allowed to create in himself an interest in opposition to that of his
principal or cestui que trust.
- The prohibition is entirely independent of any fraud that might have
intervened. No fraud in fact need be shown and no excuse will be heard.
It is to avoid the necessity of any such inquiry that the prohibition is made
absolute. It stands on the moral obligation of an attorney to refrain from
placing himself in a position which ordinarily excites conflict between self-
interest and integrity. It seeks to remove the temptation that might arise
out of such relation to serve himself at the expense of his integrity and
duty to his client, by making it impossible to profit by yielding to such
temptation.
7. BUNDALIAN
Case Name: Mananquil v. Villegas
Case Number:
Footnote Number:
Chapter: 8.10
Catchy phrase: Kahit anong paikot… wala ka pa ring lusot…
Doctrine: Disqualification imposed on public and judicial officers and lawyers is
grounded on public policy considerations which disallow the transactions entered
into by them, whether directly or indirectly, in view of the fiduciary relationship
involved, or the peculiar control. exercised by these individuals over the
properties or rights covered
Facts:
A verified complaint for disbarment dated July 5, 1982, Mauro P. Mananquil
charged respondent Atty. Crisostomo C. Villegas with gross misconduct or
malpractice committed while acting as counsel of record of one Felix Leong in the
latter's capacity as administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Felomina Zerna in
Special Proceedings No. 460 before then Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental. The complainant was appointed special administrator after Felix Leong
died.
Issue: WON Mananquil’s action is a circumvention of the prohibition stated in Art.
1646 with reference to Art. 1491.
Ruling:
The Court rules that the lease contracts are covered by the prohibition against any
acquisition or lease by a lawyer of properties involved in litigation in which he takes
part. To rule otherwise would be to lend a stamp of judicial approval on an
arrangement which, in effect, circumvents that which is directly prohibited by law.
For, piercing through the legal fiction of separate juridical personality, the Court
cannot ignore the obvious implication that respondent as one of the heirs of Jose
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Villegas and partner, later manager of, in HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS stands to benefit 8. CABOCHAN
from the contractual relationship created between his client Felix Leong and his
family partnership over properties involved in the ongoing testate proceedings. Case Name: Junquera v. Vano

By virtue of Article 1646 of the new Civil Code, the persons referred to in Article
1491 are prohibited from leasing, either in person or through the mediation of
another, the properties or things mentioned in that article, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under
his guardianship;
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been intrusted to
them, unless the consent of the principal have been given;
(3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under administration
(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any
subdivision thereof, or of any government owned or controlled corporation, or
institution, the administration of which has been intrusted to them; this provision
shall apply to judges and government experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take
part in the sale;
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts,
and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the
property or rights in litigation or levied upon on execution before the court within
whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers,
with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
(6) Any others specially disqualified by law
The above disqualification imposed on public and judicial officers and lawyers is
grounded on public policy considerations which disallow the transactions entered
into by them, whether directly or indirectly, in view of the fiduciary relationship
involved, or the peculiar control exercised by these individuals over the properties
or rights covered
It taxes this Courts imagination that respondent disclaims any knowledge in the
execution of the original lease contract between his client and his family
partnership represented by his brother-in-law. Be that as it may, it cannot be
denied that respondent himself had knowledge of and allowed the subsequent
renewals of the lease contract. In fact, he actively participated in the lease contracts
dated January 13, 1975 and December 4, 1978 by signing on behalf of the lessee
HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS.
Case Number: 269
Footnote Number: 74
Chapter: 8.10
Catchy phrase: Counsel de parte y traidor
Doctrine:The acquisition by the guardian’s lawyer of the ward’s property violates
the prohibition in Art. [1491].
Facts: > Junquera was a minor who had lots in Cebu. Vano was his tutor and
guardian.
> Junquera was in Spain to study.
> The value of one of the lots was depreciating in value so he requested to sell said
property. GRANTED so he was able to sell in public auction.
> Sold the three farms, with judicial authorization, to Thomas G. Ingalls,” the
guardian’s counsel, with the compliance of the curator ad litem of the appellant, at
a higher price than authorized"
> It is certainly rare and even shocking that the sale by Thomas G. Ingalls of lot No.
7864 to the appealed Du Chin Llu took place the day after he had acquired it.
IN SHORT: The guardian sold the ward’s property to his (the guardian’s) lawyer, and
the latter was to sell to another party for an even higher price (“He was going to
make a killing out of it”)
Issue: WON the sale to the lawyer is void?
Ruling: YES. Not only is it shocking but also openly contrary to the law, because
when buying it, he knew that what he was buying was the property of a minor in
whose custody file he intervened as his tutor's lawyer.
9. CARLOS
Case Name: Palma v. Cristobal
Case Number: 360

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Footnote Number: 95
Chapter: 8.12
Catchy phrase: Relationship of Trust can withstand the test of deceit and time
Doctrine: The lawyer holds the property or interest so purchased in trust for his
client
Palma and his wife hold a parcel of land in trust of their co-owners. The spouses
Palma would collect the rent from the tenants of such land and would give the co-
owners their just share. When Palma’s wife was on her death bed, she made him
promise that he will divide the land and distribute among the co-owners their just
share. However, he had the land registered in his name alone. He asked the
Cristobal to act as his attorney in having the title issued in his name.
Palma, declaring himself as the sole owner of the land, now seeks to eject Cristobal
from said parcel of land. Cristobal, as an heir of one of the co-owners, questioned
the ownership of Palma. His contention was that Palma only held the land in trust
of the other co-owners, thus, he cannot raise ownership against the real owners.
On the other hand, Palma claims that Cristobal is estopped by taking part of the
fraud against the other owners. He also raises that Cristobal’s claim has already
prescribed.
Issue: WN Palma is the rightful owner of the parcel of land
Ruling: NO
Palma holds the land in trust of the other co-owners. A position of a trustee is of a
representative nature. It is logical that all benefits derived by the possession and
acts of the agent shall accrue to the benefit of the principal. Thus, a trustee cannot
usurp the ownership of what was entrusted to him whether through fraud or
prescription. The participation of Cristobal in such fraud will not affect this
relationship between Palma and the co-owners. Therefore, Palma, as a trustee, may
not claim ownership over what he held in trust.
10. CASTILLO
Case Name: Ordonio v. Eduarte
Case Number:
Footnote Number:
Chapter:
Catchy phrase: Si Josephine-nagkatiwalaan, manloloko naman!
Doctrine: Buying of a property of a client under litigation and falsifying documents
to achieve that purpose are acts unbecoming of a lawyer.
Facts: Antonia Ulibari (Antonia) filed a petition for annulment of a document known
as Affidavit of Adjudication of the Estate of Felicisimo Velasco and Quitclaim against
her children in RTC Isabela. This case was handled by Atty. Henedino Eduarte, but
he was substituted by his wife Atty. Josephine Eduarte (Atty. Josephine) due to the
former’s appointment as an RTC Judge. RTC ruled in Antonia’s favor. While the case
was elevated to the CA, Antonia conveyed some parcels of land subject of litigation
to her children including Dominga Velasco-Ordonio (Dominga) and to spouses
Eduarte as payment for attorney’s fees.
Dominga then filed a claim for disbarment against Atty. Josephine, contending that
her mother Antonia never conveyed the parcels of land to the spouses and that she
(Dominga) did not receive any consideration for the transfer. As a result, the
Investigation Commissioner recommended Atty. Josephine’s suspension from the
practice of law for one year.
Issue: Whether Atty. Josephine should be suspended from the practice of law for
one year for acquiring a client’s property under litigation and for falsifying
documents to achieve that purpose.
Ruling: YES. By acquiring Antonia’s lands which are the subject of an ongoing
litigation with the CA, Atty. Josephine violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code which
prohibits lawyers from "acquiring by assignment property and rights which may be
the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession,” and Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that
"the lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subject matter of the litigation
which he is conducting." Additionally, by making it appear in the deeds of absolute
sale that there was a consideration when in reality there is none, she also violated
Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer
shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall be
mislead or allow the court to be mislead by any artifice. Due to her violations, a
suspension of one year from the practice of law is proper.
11. CHUNG
Case Name: Hernandez v Villanueva
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Case Number: 182
Footnote Number: 193
Chapter: 16 (section 25)
Catchy phrase: Bentang-benta ka man sa’kin, Hassle! hindi kita pwedeng bilhin!
Doctrine: "the lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subject-matter of
the litigation which he is conducting,
Facts:
● Hernandez files a disbarment case against Atty. Villanueva for 3 charges; 2
of which are dismissed, while the last charge is the subject of this case.
● The 3rd charge related to the fact that when his client Anuran has a
pending case in the Supreme Court involving a piece of land.
● Atty. Villanueva then bought this piece of land subject of the present
litigation he is conducting.
● when charges were filed against Atty. Villanueva, he admitted to this fact
but says that he did so in good faith believing that at the time of the
purchase, Art. 1459 of the CC is inoperative (because of the change of
regime from Spain to US).
Issue: WON Atty. Villanueva is guilty of Malpractice and/or Illegal Conduct? What
then is the proper penalty for such an action?
Ruling: YES. Suspension of 6 months will be proper considering the circumstances in
this case.
● The last paragraph of division 5 of article 1459 of the Civil Code making
the prohibition against persons who cannot take by purchase either in
person or through the mediation of another to include lawyers "with
respect to any property or rights involved in any litigation in which they
may take part by virtue of their profession and office," is held to be in full
force and effect.
● Section 10 of the Code of Ethics of the American Bar Association, adopted
by the Philippine Bar Association providing that "the lawyer should not
purchase any interest in the subject-matter of the litigation which he is
conducting," applied.
● In determining what action should be taken relative to the misconduct of
the respondent Attorney Francisco Villanueva, we call to mind the
following: Attorney Villanueva’s violation of the law and of the canons of
legal ethics — partly balanced by his alleged good faith, his long
professional career and former high standing at the bar — and the fact
that this was his first transgression against the ethics of the profession. A
mere reprimand would be mistaken charity; permanent disqualification
would be overly stern punishment; suspension for a reasonable period is
applied justice
● Additional note: Counsel finally invites attention to the fact that the
proceedings have been instituted not by the client, the injured party, but
by a third person. This is not fatal, since the proceeding is not in the
nature of a civil action to nullify the transaction, but is a charge presented
in the public interest in an effort to purge the legal profession of an
undesirable member. Any citizen would have sufficient interest to justify
him in bringing unprofessional conduct of any character to the attention
of the proper authorities.
12. CONSOLACION
Case Name: In Re Calderon
Case Number: 202
Footnote Number: 193
Chapter: 16
Catchy phrase: Sa Pagbili ng Palayok huwag kang Hayok na Hayok
Doctrine: An attorney who signs documents in behalf of his wife involving the sale
of a property belonging to the estate being represented by the attorney is
considered malpractice.
Facts:
● Respondent Atty. Calderon was charged with malpractice or illegal
conduct, in that he was an interested party in the sale of a pottery
belonging to the estate for which he was attorney. He instigated a public
sale and induced Enrique Ayllón to buy the same, and they divided it
itrbetween them. Enrique Ayllón did this, and a partnership was formed
as agreed.
● Respondent raised as his defense the fact that his wife was the actual
buyer of the pottery and that he was only the one who signed the
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documents evidencing the sale on behalf of his wife who did not know
how to read and write.
Issue:
● Whether the act of Attorney Calderon in signing the documents in behalf
of his wife evidencing the sale of pottery belonging to the estate for
which he is the attorney and during the pendency of settlement
proceedings involving the sam pottery constitutes malpractice
Ruling:
● Yes, the Supreme Court has ruled that it does not consider this case as a
violation of article 1459 of the Civil Code, but, according to the argument
of the Attorney-General, as a grave offense which involves malpractice or
serious illegal conduct on the part of a lawyer in the practice of his
profession, constituting a violation of his oath.
13. DAMASCO TY
Case Name: In Re: Ruste
Case Number:
Footnote Number:
Chapter: 16.25
Catchy phrase: Relax! Wag ka mag Rush-Teh!
Doctrine: Whether on the insistence of the lawyer or the client, the sale of property
in litigation while the case is pending constitutes malpractice.
Facts: Attorney Melchor Ruste was the counsel of a husband and wife in a cadastral
case. The spouses paid Ruste on different occasions for his legal services.
Eventually, Ruste demanded from the spouses additional fees. The spouses had no
money to pay Ruste.
As an alternative, Ruste suggested that the property in litigation be leased to him,
and eventually be sold to him. After the sale, Ruste allowed the spouses to occupy
the property without having to pay rent.
Later, Ruste sold the same property to Chua. This time, Ruste demands payment
from the spouses for rent. This prompted the spouses to file an administrative
complaint against Atty. Ruste.
Issue: Whether or not the purchase by Ruste of property in litigation constitutes
malpractice.
Ruling: The property being thus in suit, his acquisition thereof by the deed of sale
constitutes malpractice. Whether the deed of sale in question was executed at the
instance of the spouses driven by financial necessity, or at the lawyer’s instance is
of immaterial. In either case as attorney occupies a vantage position to press upon
or dictate his terms to a harassed client, in breach of the "rule so amply protective
of the confidential relations, which must necessarily exist between attorney and
client, and of the rights of both.
Suspension of one year
14. DE JESUS
Case Name: Beltran v. Fernandez
Case Number: 51
Footnote Number: 62
Chapter: 8.09
Catchy phrase: Honest Liar
Doctrine: Lawyer’s cannot have an interest in their client’s properties subjuect of
an ongoing litigation
Facts: Inocentes Fernandez represents spouses Honorio Pajaron and Natividad Ypan
against Go Beltran, for the misunderstanding regarding the conveyance of the Lot
A, B & C with Beltran asserting that Lot C is included. While Pending litigation,
Fernandez purchased lot C from Ypan. Fernandez denied the transaction but also
told the truth that he indeed purchased the lot pending litigation.
Issue: W/N his purchase of the subject lot made him liable for violation of
professional ethics
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Ruling: Yes. For violation of Article 1459 (VOID TRANSACTIONS). Suspended for 6
months.
(Simple lang yung digest since inamin niya yung violation)
15. DOMASIG
Case Name: IN RE MACARIO ADRIATICO
Case Number:
Footnote Number:
Chapter:
Catchy phrase: Motto ni Macario Adriatico, sana dalawa ang puso ko.
Doctrine: IT IS SUFFICIENT TO HOLD A LAWYER LIABLE ON THE GROUND THAT HE IS
COUNSEL FOR A CLIENT AT THE TIME HE ACQUIRES BY HIMSELF OR THRU ANOTHER
DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE LITIGATION THE CLIENT’S PROPERTY OR INTEREST
INVOLVED THEREIN. GOOD FAITH WILL NOT ABSOLVE BUT JUST MITIGATE THE
LIABILITY.
Facts:
Lawyer and administrator of Ramon valencia’s estate had a pending case in CFI
Mindoro for being guilty of malpractice and deceit in the discharge of the said
estate due to the ff circumstances:
1. He borrowed money from one felix lopez as admin. of Valencia’s estate,
saying that it was to comply with civil procedure
2. He made the court believe that he was the one who advanced or shelled
out the sum of money to the heirs when in fact he received from felix
lopez the money
3. In another case, as lawyer of Salazar, Adriatico demanded a large number
of cattle 108 per head as fee for his pretended services. Such fee is grossly
exorbitant and excessive as compensation for services. When salazar
dismissed adriatico from his services, in an open court, adriatico
intimidated and threatened her to disclose their professional
communications. Adriatico failed to conduct himself with all good fidelity.
4. He appeared as attorney for felix lopez against toribio gonzales. the latter
was convicted by the court with homicide. adriatico caused the case to be
appealed to get larger fees despite having already received 8k from his
associate and also having received 3k from gonzales’ wife for gonzales’
defense in court. this is also a misconduct.
● HE IS THEREFORE ORDERED TO APPEAR IN THE CASE TRIBUNAL TO SHOW
CAUSE WHY HE SHOULD NOT BE SUSPENDED FOR DECEIT, MALPRACTICE
AND OTHER GROSS MISCONDUCT, FROM THE PRACTICE OF HIS
PROFESSION AS A LAWYER AND FOR FAILING TO APPEAR AND ANSWER.
● ADRIATICO telegrammed the judge for the continuance of the suspension
proceedings. it was granted but if adriatico fails to appear, then the
proceedings will be heard ex parte.
● OTHER COURT FINDINGS: Adriatico while acting as an admin of ramon
valencia’s estate pledged shares of la compania electricista for 400
without any court authority on hiw own acct
○ He induced the heirs of valencia to sign receipts for sums of
money and the amounts he turned over to the heirs were less
than the amount indicated in the receipt.
○ He furnished cavans of rice to the heirs charging them 8 pesos
pero cavan when the real price of the rice is just around 5 pesos
per cavan
○ He received money from felix lopez to aid in the prosecution of
gonzales and after the termination of prosecution, he received
money from wife of gonzales for the prosecution of the appeal
Issue: W/N Atty. Macario is guilty of malpractice.
Ruling: YE. In view of the foregoing facts, ADRIATICO IS HEREBY REMOVED FROM
HIS OFFICE AS A LAWYER AND THE CERTIFICATE PERMITTING HIM TO PRACTICE IS
HEREBY CANCELLED AND ANNULLED. THE CASE WAS REFERRED TO ATTORNEY
GENERAL TO INVESTIGATE THE FACTS AND TI INSTITUTE CRIMINAL ACTION IF SO
WARRANTED.
MOTION FOR RECON:
The ruling was that he was ordered to be reinstated with the promise that he’ll be
compliant with the laws.
16. DY
Case Name: Bautista vs. Gonzales
Case Number: 46
Footnote Number:
Chapter: 16.25
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Doctrine: The prohibition of lawyer’s owning their client’s property extends only to
Catchy phrase: Properties paid to your lawyer will be gone, most expecially when properties under litigation. Any purchases of the properties which are no longer
that lawyer’s name is Ramon under litigation are considered valid.

Doctrine: Facts: There was a parcel of land that was being litigated by party A, who hired Atty.
de Laig to be his counsel. Party A used half the land as a contingent fee to pay for
Facts: G entered into an agreement with F wherein F would transer his properties the services of Atty. de Laig should they win the case. After winning the case, the
to G as a contingency fee as payment for G’s services as his lawyer property was given to Atty. de Laig while the other half was sold to him.

While the case was pending, G sold the properties to another party, thereby Party A the sought to get back the property, alleging that the sale was void ab initio
deceiving such third party and his client. due to the prohibition against lawyers owning the property of their clients.

G’s defense was that the new CPR no longer included the prohibition on lawyers Issue: Whether or not the sale of the land was valid.
acquiring the properties of their clients while still subject to litigation.
Ruling: VALID. The prohibition only extends to property under litigation. Lawyer’s
can own the land of their clients provided that they acquire the same after the
Issue: Can G be still held liable for selling the property of his client while it is still cases involved are closed.
subject to litigation?
18. EVANGELISTA
Ruling: Yes. While the new CPR no longer carried over the prohibition on lawyers
acquiring the properties of their client’s while it is still subject to litigation, The very Case Name: Director of Lands vs Ababa
first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process" Case Number: 133

Art. 1491 Prohibited such transactions between lawyers and their clients while the Footnote Number: 198
property is still subject to litigation. Therefore, making the transaction of G an
illegal transaction, thus constituting a violation of Canon 1 of the CPR which is a Chapter: 16.25
catch all phrase for violations of lawyers.
Catchy phrase: Matalino man ang abogado, naisahan pa din ni Maximo
17. ESCALANTE
Doctrine: A contract for a contingent fee is not covered by Article 1491 because the
Case Name: Vda de Laig v. CA transfer or assignment of the property in litigation takes effect only after the finality
of a favorable judgment. For the prohibition of Article 1491 to operate, the sale of
Case Number: 506 the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the
property.
Footnote Number:
Facts: Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez was retained as counsel by Maximo Abarquez, in
Chapter: 16.25 Civil Case No. R-6573 entitled "Maximo Abarquez vs. Agripina Abarquez", for the
annulment of a contract of sale with right of repurchase and for the recovery of the
Catchy phrase: Abstinence is the best contravention (of the prohibition on lawyer’s land which was the subject matter thereof. The Court of First Instance of Cebu
to purchase their client’s property) rendered a decision on May 29, 1961 adverse to the petitioner and so he appealed
to the Court of Appeals. Litigating as a pauper in the lower court and engaging the

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Fr. Ferrer
services of his lawyer on a contingent basis, petitioner, unable to compensate his
lawyer whom he also retained for his appeal, executed a document whereby he
obliged himself to give to his lawyer one-half (½) of whatever he might recover
should the appeal prosper. Maximo won in the appeal. Subsequently, Transfer
Certificate of Title was issued in the name of Maximo Abarquez. Maximo refused to
comply with his obligation with Atty. Alberto and instead offered to sell the whole
parcels of land to Juan Larrazabal and Marta C. de Larrazabal. Upon being informed
of the intention of Maximo, Atty. Alberto immediately took steps to protect his
interest. Maximo avers that his agreement with Atty. Alberto is void.
Issue: WON a contract for a contingent fee violates Article 1491 because it involves
an assignment of a property subject of litigation?
Ruling: No.
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase even at a
public or judicial auction, either in person or through the petition of another.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior and
other o and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property
and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose
jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions;this prohibition
includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect
to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they
may take part by virtue of their profession
This contention is without merit. Article 1491 prohibits only the sale or assignment
between the lawyer and his client, of property which is the subject of litigation. For
the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place
during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. A contract for a
contingent fee is not covered by Article 1491 because the transfer or assignment of
the property in litigation takes effect only after the finality of a favorable judgment.
19. FABIA
a. Rule 138 section 35 (lawyers side)- certain attorneys not to practice- no
judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the osg, shall
engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to
clients
b. 1491 par 5 civil code- those prohibited to acquire by purchase directly or
indirectly
even by assignment… lawyers with respect to the property and rights which may
be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession
c.a. CPE canon 10- (acquiring interest in litigation) the lawyer should not
purchase any interest in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting
d.Consti art 6 section 14 1st sentence-No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or
before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies
e. Article 7 section 13 second sentence- They shall not, during said tenure,
directly or indirectly, practice any other profession
f. Art 9a section 2 second sentence - Neither shall he engage in the practice of any
profession
20. FELLONE
Case Name: Villegas v Legaspi
Case Number: 47
Footnote Number: 513
Chapter: 11
Catchy phrase: Basta nasa Kongreso, huwag humarap sa husgado
Doctrine: In the current constitution, 1987 Constitution, the prohibition now
stands as:
Art 6, Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral
Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract
with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned
or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not
intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary
benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
Facts:
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● This case was a consolidation of 2 cases involving the 1973 Constitutional
provision that “No member of the National Assembly shall appear before
any court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction” (Art. VIII Sec. 11).
● In the 1st case: Villegas filed a complaint for annulment of bank checks
and damages against spouses Vera Cruz. Legaspi, an Assemblyman from
Cebu, filed an answer as their counsel. The Judge (Judge Dulay) of the CFI
of Cebu inhibited himself from the proceedings because Legaspi was also
his wife’s lawyer in 2 cases. The case was reraffled and the new Judge
(Judge Burgos) denied the disqualification of Legaspi.
● 2nd case: Reyes filed a case against Maas for the annulment of the sale of
Excelsior shares in a company. Reyes claimed that the same shares had
already been sold to him. Assemblyman Fernandez entered his
appearance as counsel for Excelsior. The appearance of Fernandez was
questioned on the ground of the Constitutional provision – Section 11,
Art. 8, 1973 Constitution.
● The novel issue for determination is whether or not members of the
Batasang Pambansa, like Attorneys Valentino L. Legaspi and Estanislao A.
Fernandez, can appear as counsel before Courts of First Instance.
Issue: W/N members of the Batasang Pambansa can appear as counsel before CFIs.
Ruling: NO.
● The 1935 and 1973 Constitutions were compared by the Court because
the cases were filed before the 1973 Consitution. The court nevertheless
resolved the cases under the amended provision. In the 1935
Constitution, only members of the Commission on Appointments were
barred from appearing as counsel before any court inferior to a collegiate
court of appellate jurisdiction. While the 1973 provision barred all
members of the Batasang Pambansa from appearing as counsel in any
court without appellate jurisdiction. What is prohibited is the appearance
as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction. Appearance as
counsel is a voluntary submission to a court’s jurisdiction by an advising
lawyer professionally engaged to represent and plead the cause of
another. There is no question that in both cases both Assemblymen are
appearing as counsel; they represent and plead the cause of another
before a court of justice.
● Furthermore, the court discussed if CFIs are courts with appellate
jurisdiction. Appellate jurisdiction is the jurisdiction to review the
judgment of an inferior court. The jurisdiction of CFIs is of 2 kinds: original
and appellate. Pursuant to the Judiciary Act, CFIs can be courts with
appellate jurisdiction. By the wording of the amendment to the 1973
Constitution, CFIs no longer fall within the ambit of the prohibition.
However, in the cases at bar the CFIs took cognizance of the cases in their
exclusive original jurisdiction and not appellate one. As a result, both
Assemblymen are still barred from appearing as counsel before said
courts. The courts looked at the purpose behind the prohibition, which
was to remove any possibility of undue influence or use of office for
personal gain and to ensure the trial’s impartiality.
● The possible influence of an Assemblyman on a CFI judge is diminished
when the CFI acts in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction because the
decision being appealed in this situation has the presumption of regularity
and correctness in its favor. Thus, to give effect to the Constitutional
prohibition, appearance by Assemblymen before CFIs should be limited to
cases wherein the CFIs exercise their appellate jurisdiction, not original.
21. FLAMEÑO
LAWS ON DISABILITIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Disability of Public Officials to Practice
· Appointment of an attorney to a government office disqualifies him from
engaging in the private practice of law
o Public office is a public trust
o Public officer or employee is obliged not only to perform his
duties with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, but also with exclusive fidelity
o To preserve public trust
o Avoid conflict of interests or a possibility thereof
o Assure the people of impartiality
o Promote public welfare
· Public officials who are absolutely prohibited engaging in the private
practice of law or giving professional advice to clients as members of the bar:
o Judges and other officials or employees of the courts
o Officials or employees of the office of the Solicitor General
and of other government prosecution offices
o President
o Vice president
o Members of the cabinet and their deputies and assistants
o Members of the constitutional commissions
o Civil service officers or employees
· When these officials are appointed or elected and has qualified, he
ceases as a general rule, to engage in the private practice of law and his right
to practice is suspended during his tenure of office
· Lawyer member of the Legislature is not absolutely prohibited from
personally engaging in the practice of his professions
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o Only prohibited from appearing as counsel before any court
of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-
judicial and other administrative bodies”
o What is prohibited is to “personally appear” in court and
other bodies
§ Appearance—includes not only arguing a case
before any such body but also filing a pleading
on behalf of a client
Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7610)
Sec 90 Practice of Profession—All governors, city and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other
than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives;
Sanggunian members may practice their profession, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during school hours: Provided, that sanggunian members
who are also members of the Bar shall not:
1. Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local
government unit or any office, agency or instrumentality of the government
is the adverse party
2. Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of
the national or local government is accused of an offense committed in
relation to his office
3. Collect any fee for their appearance in the administrative proceeding
involving the local government unit of which he is an official
4. Use property and personnel of the government except when the
sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the government
Note:
· A civil service officer or employee whose duty or responsibility does not
require his entire time to be at the disposal of the Government may not
engage in the private practice of law without the written permit from the
head of the department concerned
· Government officials who by express mandate of law are prohibited from
practicing law, may NOT, even with the consent of the department head
concerned, engage in the practice of law
o But if so authorized, he may in an isolated case, act as
counsel for a relative or close family friend
· Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays are the following:
o Governor
o Vice governor
o Members of the sangguniang panlalawigan
o City mayor
o City vice mayor
o Members of the sanggguniang panlungsod
o Municipal mayor
o Municipal vice mayor
o Members of the sangguniang bayan
o Punong barangay
o Members of the sangguniang barangay
o Members of the sangunniang kabataan for barangays
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials (RA 6713)
Sec. 7(b)(2) Prohibited Acts and Transactions—Outside Employment and other
activities related thereto—public officials and employees during their incumbency
shall not x x x (2) engage in the private practice of law UNLESS authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions
Sec. 11 Penalties
(a) Any public official, regardless of whether or not he holds office or employment
in a casual, temporary, holdover, permanent or regular capacity, committing any
violation in this act shall be punishable by: fine not exceeding the equivalent of 6
months salary or, suspension not exceeding 1 year or, removal depending on the
gravity of the offense after due notice and hearing
a. If the violation is punishable by a heavier penalty under
another law, he shall be prosecuted under the latter
statute
b. Violations of Sec. 7, 8 and 9 of this Act shall be punishable
with: imprisonment not exceeding 5 years or a fine not
exceeding 5,000 pesos or both
(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall
be sufficient case for removal or dismissal of a public official or employee,
even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him
(c) Private individuals who participate in conspiracy as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with public officials or employees shall be subject
to the same penal liabilities as public officials and shall be tried jointly
(d) The official or employee concerned may bring an action against any
person who obtains or uses a report for any purpose prohibited by Sec. 8(d)
of this Act. The Court in which such action is brought may assess against such
person a penalty in any amount not to exceed P25,000. If another sanction
hereunder or under any other law is heavier, the latter shall apply
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Note:
· A civil service officer whose responsibilities do not require his time to be
fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of
law only with the written permission of the head of the department
concerned
Revised Rules of Civil Service
Sec. 12 Rule XVIII
No officer of employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural,
or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the
Department: Provided, that this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those
officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire
time be at the disposal of the Government Provided further, that if an employee is
granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of
office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any
way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided finally, that no
permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or
employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his
duties , and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become
an officer of the board of directors
22. FRANCISCO
Case Name: TAN v GALLARDO
Case Number: 155
Footnote: 26
Chapter: 8
Catchy phrase: “Talk is good when wine is fine”
Doctrine: Judges should disqualify themselves in participating in proceedings in
which they are unable to decide the matter impartially
Facts: Petitioner Tan seeks to annul the Judge Gallardo’s order in the criminal case
People v Tan, for frustrated murder and double murder for the son and uncle of
Mayor Inigo Larrazabal. Tan and Solicitor General argued that Judge Gallardo kept
improper contact with and was illegally influenced by Mayor Larrazabal. It was
alleged that Judge Gallardo was given a bottle of whisky and wine wrapped in
newspaper which was “thick” and “bulky” containing “something else inside”. After
the Judge’s meeting with the Mayor, Judge Gallardo amended his already prepared
decision.
Issue: W.N Judge Gallardo should be disqualified from further proceeding with the
criminal case
Ruling: YES. Under Canon 3 Sec 5 - Judges should disqualify themselves from
participating in any proceeding in which they are unable to decide the matter
impartially or in which appears to a reasonable observer that they are unable to
decide the matter impartially. In this case, it was shown that there is bias or
prejudice in the judgment of the Judge after the Mayor gave whisky and wine to the
Judge.
23. FULACHE
Case Name: Palang vs. Zosa
Case Number: 116
Footnote Number: 27
Chapter: 18.07
Catchy phrase: A clear concocted story
Doctrine: A judge should not just be pure, but be impartial beyond suspicion.
Facts:
The case stems from a criminal case of estafa filed by Palang against Herrera.
Respondent Judge Zosa acquitted Herrera. In his decision, he made a statement
that in his opinion the charge was nothing but “a clear concocted story” with the
testimonies being “rehearsed and rehashed,” therefore causing great damage and
prejudice to moral and social standing of Herrera. Herrera then filed a civil case
action for damages. Palang is concerned that the Judge will not be able to decide
the civil case justly and impartially considering the latter’s language in his decision.
Issue: WON Judge Zosa should be inhibited from trying the case.
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Ruling:
The case was rendered moot and academic by the Court since Judge Zosa
voluntarily inhibited himself from trying the case. The Court said that his voluntary
inhibition should be commended. It is not enough that the judges decide cases
without bias and favoritism. This is an instance where appearance is just as
important as reality. A judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion.
Sir’s Discussion: This case falls under ‘voluntary inhibition’: PREJUDGMENT
24. GALANG
Case Name: GUTIERREZ v. HON. ARSENIO SANTOS
Case Number: 66
Footnote Number: 28
Chapter: 18 (Footnote 28, Case 66)
Catchy phrase: When in doubt, inhibit.
Doctrine: Due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
Facts:
● Benigno Musni filed a complaint with the Secretary of Works and
Communications against Gutierrez alleging that the latter had illegally
constructed obstructions across public navigable waters located in
Macabebe, Pampanga. He wanted the obstructions be destroyed or
removed.
● Gutierrez filed a motion to dismiss this complaint because the
proceedings before the investigator would be void because RA 2056 was
unconstitutional for conferring judicial powers to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications. This motion was denied.
● Gutierrez then filed a case with the CFI of Pampanga against the Musni
and other officials.
● One of the respondents, however, filed a motion to disqualify Judge
Santos alleging that sometime in 1948, when he was still a law
practitioner, he acted as counsel for fishpond owners, like petitioner
Gutierrez, in an administrative case involving at least the similar issues
and properties. As counsel, he previously wrote a letter to the Secretary
of Interior expressing the opinion that navigable waterways were private
in nature, a view which was prejudicial or adverse to that of the
respondents in the present case.
● Judge Santos issued an order disqualifying himself and endorsing the case
to a different branch.
● Gutierrez elevated the case to SC to compel Judge Santos to continue
with the case, alleging that he did not fall under the disqualifications of
judicial officers set forth under Section 1, Rule 126.
Issue:
Whether or not the inhibition of Judge Santos was proper
Ruling:
Yes, it was proper.
● It should not be forgotten that, in construing and applying said legal
provision, we cannot disregard its true intention nor the real ground for
the disqualification of a judge or judicial officer, which is the impossibility
of rendering an impartial judgment upon the matter before him.
● It has been said, in fact that due process of law requires a hearing before
an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled
to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
● In the present case, the respondent judge himself has candidly stated that
the opinion expressed by him in a letter dated June 1, 1948 addressed by
him as counsel for Manuel Borja and others to the then Secretary of the
Interior, attached to the motion for disqualification, "might, some way or
another, influence (on) his decision in the case at bar."
25. GERALDEZ
Case Name: Martinez vs Gironella
Case Number:97
Footnote: 28
Chapter: 18
Catchy phrase:
Doctrine: A judge should always be impartial
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Facts: Martinez as principal and 2 others were charged for murder. Martinez was
not apprehended so trial ensued for one of his accessories. Eventually the
accessory was acquitted and in the decision the Judge said that “the crime was Issue: W/N the Comelec Chairman was wrong in not inhibiting himself despite him
clearly committed by Martinez” saying that he would not be bias.

Issue: Should the judge be replaced because he has clearly shown biased Ruling:
sentiments in his decision? 1. Yes, a judge should at all times present himself with a cold impartiality
and even more so must also act in such a way in order to give the parties
Ruling: Yes! A judge should always remain impartial and should not form opinions assurance that their case will be tried and heard by an impartial Judge
upon himself before trial. An accused is to be presumed innocent until proven 2. Where a judge has a relationship with one of the parties that may make
guilty! him partial regardless if it is only possible or probable the judge must
inhibit himself in the interest of due process or at least delicadeza
26. GOMEZ
27. HERMOSO
Case Name: Javier v Comelec
Case Name: Castillo v Juan
Case Number: 29
Case Number: 40
Footnote: 80
Footnote: 30
Chapter: 18
Chapter: 18
Catchy phrase: The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the
blood of patriots and tyrants Catchy phrase: Juan Tamad

Doctrine:the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable
imperative of due process.
Facts:
1. Petitioner was going to run as representative to the Batasang pambansa
of his Home province.
2. Respondent was also going to run as representative to the Batasan
Pambansa
3. On the Even of elections a convoy of the Petitioner’s supporters were
gunned down but regardless voting proceeded the next day
4. Petitioner went to the COMELEC to request for suspension of
proclamation of the winner because the elections were marred with
violence, terrorism and fear
5. The COMELEC chairman deciding petitioner’s case was Respondent’s
Partner at one point in time when they used to have a law firm
6. For fear of bias Petitioner requested the COMELEC chairman to inhibit
himself but he denied it and claimed he was impartial
Doctrine: The standard is a cold neutrality of an impartial judge
Facts:
● In two separate occasions, and in the secrecy of his chambers, Judge
Celestino Juan informed two young maidens of the weakness of their rape
cases
● He informed them of the likelihood of the accused’s acquittal and thus it
is advantageous to have it settled between them; the accused will only
have to indemnify them
● These acts of the Judge Juan occured prior to the prosecutor finished
presenting evidence and before one of the victims could testify
● The maidens filed a case for the disqualification of the Judge Juan for bias
and prejudice
● Judge Juan contends however that his acts were done as an “act of
charity” and “to humanize justice” as he wanted to spare them from
embarrassment because of the suits
Issue: WON Judge Juan should be disqualified for bias and prejudice?

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Ruling:
● The manner and attitude of a judge are crucial to everyone concerned. He
is to refrain from hasty conclusions or prejudging matters.
● One must follow the traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he
hear both sides with patience and understanding. He should avoid
conduct that doubts his impartiality.
● More than judicial ethics, it is of constitutional significance. Due process
requires an impartial tribunal and the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge.
● A judge may also be disqualified on causes that could erode the trait of
objectivity. Even if it be admitted that Judge Juan acted from a sense of
sympathy or "charity", his conduct cannot be said to be consonant with
the exacting standard of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
● Judge Juan should not continue to preside such trial
28. IGNACIO
Case Name: Jugueta v Boncaros
Case Number: 83
Footnote: 112
Chapter: 18
Catchy phrase: “Kiss me Goodbye”
Doctrine:
FROM THE BOOK (the footnote): He should avoid such action as would subject him
to suspicion of interest in a case in his court.
[NCJC: Canon 18.07 = A judge should exhibit the cold neutrality of impartial judge]
Facts:
Petitioner – Remedios Jugueta
Respondent – Judge Boncaros of CFI Tarlac
A rape case was filed in the sala of Judge Boncaros, where the accused was Ruben
Domingo and the offended party was Melissa Jugueta, the daughter of petitioner.
Before the hearing, the fiscal called into the judge’s chambers only Ruben and
Melissa. Judge Boncaros was present when the two parties entered his chambers.
Ruben proposed to marry Melissa (presumably because if she accepted, his criminal
liability would be extinguished), but she refused. As she was leaving, Ruben kissed
her cheek.
Judge Boncaros witnessed the incident and said, “Bakit sa pisngi, hindi sa labi?”
(Why the cheek, not the lips).
Melissa reported the judge’s remark to her mother, herein petitioner, who
subsequently lodged an administrative complaint against Judge Boncaros, claiming
that he manifested partiality and was in favor of the accused.
Issue:
Was there manifest partiality on the part of the judge?
Ruling:
The issue has now become moot and academic for Judge Boncaros already
voluntarily inhibited himself from the case. Nonetheless, the Court took the
opportunity to severely admonish him for his remarks. “One who occupies an
exalted position in the administration of justice must pay a high price for the honor
bestowed upon him, for his private as well as his official conduct must at all times
be free from the appearance of impropriety.”
WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint against Judge Boncaros is dismissed.
We, however, admonish respondent to observe at all times a norm of conduct
which will inspire the community he serves with respect for and confidence in the
office he holds.
29. LEONG
Case Name: Paguirigan v. Clavano
Case number: 115
Chapter: 18
Catchy phrase:
Doctrine: A judge should refrain from doing essentially police work that may involve
the prosecution of crimes which he may have to hear and decide for his
involvement, through civic mindedness, may blur his sense of duty to administer
justice or subject him to a suspicion of partiality in the discharge thereof.
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Facts: The City Mayor requested Judge Clavano to help city officials in their drive to
curb traffic violations. Judge Clavano caught Paguirigan for overloading and
overspeeding. Judge Clavano allegedly pointed a gun and he confiscated the license
of Paguirigan. Judge Clavano advised Paguirigan to claim his license in his office the
next day but Paguirigan failed to appear. Judge Clavano subsequently lost
Paguirigan’s license.
Issue: Whether Judge Clavano had authority to confiscate Paguirigan’s license? - NO
Ruling: The court held that a judge should refrain from essentially doing police work
that may involve prosecution of crimes which he may hear and decide. His
involvement, though actuated by civic mindedness, may blur his sense of duty to
administer justice or subject him to suspicion of partiality in the discharge thereof.
Confiscating driver’s licenses is the duty of the police and is outside Clavano’s
official duty as a judge. While Judge Clavano might have been motivated by the
spirit of civisism, it is obvious that investigation and enforcement belongs to police
functions. Judge Clavano is reprimanded.
30. LU
Case Name: Judge Santiago v. CA
Case Number: 134
Footnote: 39
Chapter: 18
Catchy phrase:
Doctrine: 1) Judicial hierarchy is violated when a judge questions the reversal of his
decision by a higher court. 2) The function of a judge is to adjudicate. Once the
judge litigates, he loses his impartiality. (#2 is based on Agpalo and the concurring
opinion in the decision).
Facts:
● Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) filed an expropriation case with
respect to 2 parcels of land which was raffled to the sala of Judge
Santiago.
● Pending the determination of just compensation, EPZA and the owners of
the land were able to amicably settle. The land was bought by EPZA and
the TCTs were transferred to EPZA’s name.
● Due to this development, the parties filed for a motion to dismiss with the
RTC which Judge Santiago denied. Judge Santiago asked that the deed of
sale and the settlement be submitted to him. Santiago did not recognize
the settlement because there was a gross disproportion with respect to
the selling price and the market value of the properties involved.
● The CA reversed the order of Judge Santiago which nullified the sale and
settlement of EPZA and the private respondent.
● Judge Santiago filed for a petition for review questioning the reversal of
the CA on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
Issue:
● Whether it was appropriate for Judge Santiago to file the said petition. -
NO.
Ruling:
● In special proceedings, the judge whose order is under attack is merely a
nominal party; wherefore, a judge in his official capacity, should not be
made to appear as a party seeking reversal of a decision that is
unfavorable to the action taken by him. A decent regard for the judicial
hierarchy bars a judge from suing against the adverse opinion of a higher
court.
● Judge has the duty of detachment in cases where his decision is elevated
to a higher court for its review. (Concurring Opinion of Justice Cruz)
31. LUMAPAS
Case Name: Velez vs. CA 23 SCRA 109 (1970)
Case Number: 166
Footnote: 86
Chapter: 18.17
Catchy phrase:
Doctrine: Rule 137 Rules of Court
Facts:
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- This case started when Velez Spouses filed for rescission of a deed of
absolute sale of a house and lot, with assumption of mortgage, executed
by the said spouses in favor of Bacay in the CFI of Cebu. The CFI decided in
favor of Sps. Velez and ordered Bacay to make certain money payments
to the plaintiffs and to restore to them the possession of the property.
- Subsequently, Bacay filed a motion for certiorari and inhibition in the CA.
But the sheriff of the CFI implemented the writ of execution at 1:45pm on
09 June 1965 thus evicting Bacay. On the same day, the petition gave due
course to Bacay but the CFI judge and sheriff was only notified at around
9:15pm. Thus, the CFI could not execute the order since the writ has
already been served.
- On June 23, the Court of Appeals issued another order, directing the
provincial sheriff to "maintain petitioner's possession of the premises,
ousting respondents therefrom," and requiring the City sheriff as well as
the Velez spouses to show cause why they should not be cited for
contempt of court.
- One of the members in the CA was Mr. Justice Edmundo S. Piccio. On July
1, 1965 the Velez spouses filed a motion that he disqualify himself from
taking part in the consideration of the case on the ground that he had
allegedly granted private interviews with Bacay's wife.
- On July 14, 1965 the Court of Appeals issued an order for the arrest of
Magin and Lucy Velez and their confinement in the provincial jail of Cebu
until they relinquished the possession of the disputed property to Bacay.
- Thus this petition.
Issue: W/N the motion to disqualify was invalid?
Ruling: NO. It should be noted that when Justice Piccio issued the order of arrest of
herein petitioners, the motion for disqualification was impliedly denied. In any
event it cannot be said that the action was an absolute nullity, because the reason
adduced to disqualify him, which is nothing but an indirect imputation of partiality
or bias, is not one of the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 1 of
Rule 137 concerning disqualification of judges. Other than upon those grounds a
judge cannot be disqualified by a litigant. Insofar as further proceedings in the Court
of Appeals are concerned the issue of disqualification has become moot, since
death has long since removed Justice Piccio from membership in the appellate
court.
Note: This case was before the current rule that has the second paragraph of Rule
137 concerning valid voluntary inhibitions. This was not yet present then.
32. MAGBUHOS
Chapter: 18
Case Name: Geotina vs. Gonzalez
Case Number: 64
Footnote: 87
Catchy phrase: Relasyon kay judge ‘di maitatanggi,
palusot ni judge ‘di maaari.
Doctrine: Sec. 1 of Rule 137 provides that “no judge or judicial officer shall sit in any
case in which he is related to either party within 6th degree of consanguinity or
affinity.” Sec. 1 intends that a judge sitting in a case must be free, disinterested,
impartial, and independent.
Facts:
- Rosario Calderon filed a complaint against Dr. Jose Geotina and Remedios
Kierulf for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The
complaint against Kierulf was dismissed, but Judge Gonzalez ordered the
arrest of Dr. Geotina.
- Dr. Geotina filed a Motion to Disqualify against Judge Gonzalez, alleging
that respondent judge and complainant Calderon are relatives within 6th
civil degree by affinity-- the husband of Rosario Calderon and Judge
Gonzalez have common great grandparents.
- Respondent Judge dismissed the Motion for Disqualification. He
interpreted that the term “either party” in Section 1 of Rule 137 pertains
to the plaintiff and defendant (which is in this case, Republic of the
Philippines and Dr. Geotina). He asserted that he was not related to either
the Republic or Dr. Geotina and that Calderon was a mere witness in the
case.
Issue: WON Respondent Judge should have disqualified himself from presiding over
the case. - YES.
Ruling:
- Sec. 1 of Rule 137 provides that “no judge or judicial officer shall sit in any
case in which he is related to either party within 6th degree of
consanguinity or affinity.”
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- Sec. 1 intends that a judge sitting in a case must be free, disinterested,
impartial, and independent.
- In this case, the legal ground for the judge’s disqualification is
indubitable. He did not make any denial of his relationship with
complainant Calderon.
- Instead of disputing the petitioner’s averment of his relationship, he
evaded the vital question and ruled on the inapplicability of section 1 on
the ground that he bears no relationship with the Republic.
- The records of the case at bar reveals that the judge, despite his
relationship to the complainant Calderon within the prohibited degree
and protestations of the petitioner, adamantly refused to inhibit himself
from proceeding with the criminal action.
- “The disqualification of the person called upon to preside over a specific
case does not divest his court of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of
or the persons of the parties to the said case.” (Lifted from the case,
emphasized by Fr. Ferrer)
33. MORDENO
Case Name: Dais v. Torres (February 25, 1933)
Case Number: 45
Chapter: 18.18
Catchy phrase: You can’t cage me in.
Doctrine:
Although a judge may not have been disqualified under said section, nevertheless
if it appears to this court that the appellant was not given a fair and impartial trial
because of the trial judge's bias or prejudice, this court will order a new trial if it
deems it necessary, in the interest of justice.
Facts:
- Dais filed a complaint against Torres. Torres allegedly took advantage of
the fact that he was Dais’s lawyer. He induced Dais to sign a doucment
which was actually a sale with the right of repurchase of Dais’s land in
favor Ibanez, the mother-in-law of Torres.
- Torres denied the allegations of the complaint. He claimed that Dais had
instituted the action to avoid paying his fees as plaintiff’s lawyer.
- Judge Garduno ruled in favor of Dais.
- Davidas, the administrator of Torres, made several assignment of errors
regarding the decision. He said that when the case was filed, the
relationship between Garduno and Torres was strained and at that point,
it was at its climax because Torres filed charges against Garduno.
- Torres had previously asked for the transfer of trial to the next month but
was denied by Garduno. Torres then filed a motion for recusation, in
which he challenged the competency of Judge Garduno to hear and
decide the case and prayed him to abstain for the following reasons:
- Torres had filed a complaint against Torres with the SC. The SC
then ordered Garduno to remove from his courtroom the iron
cage to keep persons accused of crimes of violence during the
trial of their cases.
- Torres then filed another complaint against Garduno. Many of
the charges were for partiality, bias, and hostility against Torres
in various cases.
Issue:
Ruling:
- The filing of the charges by Torres against Garduno gave rise to
resentment on the part of Judge Garduno, leading to bias or prejudice,
which is reflected in the decision.
- In the case, Garduno made mention of charges of malpractice
against Torres, which are not relevant in the case at bar
- Section 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that no judge,
magistrate, justice of the peace, assessor, referee, or presiding officer of
any tribunal shall sit in any cause or proceeding in which he is pecuniarily
interested, or related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, computed according to the rules of the civil law,
nor in which he has been counsel, nor in which he has presided in any
inferior judicature when his ruling or decision is the subject of review,
without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and
entered upon the record.
- If it appears to this court that the appellant was not given a fair and
impartial trial because of the trial judge’s bias or prejudice, this court
will order a new trial if it deems it necessary, in the interest of justice.
34. NAPA
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Case Name: Sergio F. Del Castillo vs. Manuel H. Javelona, JP of Bago of Pulupandan,
Negros Occidental.
Case number: 51
Chapter: 18
Footnote: 100
Catchy phrase: Ay, Iniwasan si Pinsan!
Doctrine: SC relaxed the rule and allowed a judge to voluntary inhibit himself to sit
in a case because he was closely related to the lawyer of one of the litigants, and
stated that the law on compulsory disqualification does not preclude cases of
voluntary inhibition based on good, sound or ethical grounds. (Agpalo Book
Doctrine)
Facts:
- Justice of Peace (JP) Javellona in Negros Occidental has in his sala a civil
case for breach of contract against a sugar company.
- Javellona filed before the executive judge to inhibit himself because the
counsel of the defendant-company is his first degree counsel.
- Petitioner now questions the voluntary inhibition since under the (old)
rules on disqualification of judges, there is nothing in the grounds that
based on the counsel of a party
- It was based on the old rules for judicial ethics under Rule 126 (In the our
new judicial ethics there’s a new paragraph that was just added after
1965). In the old rules inhibition was only based on: (1) when either party
is a relative until 4th civil degree (2) has pecuniary interest on the subject
matter; and/or (3) he previously tried the case.
Issue:
- Whether or not the voluntary inhibition, as the ground is without having
part of the rules is correct and just? - YES
Ratio:
- For while the judge who is disqualified under said Rule 126 may and
should inhibit himself; he who remains qualified may be inhibited or may
inhibit himself on some other grounds. In other words, while Rule 126
provides for disqualification, it does not include nor preclude cases and
circumstances for voluntary inhibition which depends upon the
discretion of the officers concerned.
- JP Javellona have taken a bold step towards strengthening of the judicial
and ethical precepts discussed in this opinion
35. PANALIGAN
Case Name: People v Gomez
Case Number: 121
Chapter: 18
Footnote: 101
Doctrine: A judge may voluntarily inhibit himself from taking part in a case where
he feels that he will not be able to exercise cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
This was the result of the enactment revised rules of procedure (prior to this
enactment, only compulsory inhibition was allowed)
Facts: Judge Gomez was a judge of a RTC in Cebu. Before his sala were criminal
cases of overshipment of copra, in violation of Sec. 4, Money Board Circular 31 in
re. to Sec. 34, RA 265. Special Prosecutor Agana was assigned by the Sec. of Justice
to prosecute the case.
A total of 7 motions to quash/bill of particulars were filed by the defendants of the
criminal case (made up of the GM, asst. manager, warehouseman of Corominas
Richards & Co, Inc.). These were all considered by Judge Gomez, resulting in the
delay in the prosecution of the case for a total of 10 months (where nothing
happened). On the 1st day of the scheduled trial, Special Prosecutor Agana was not
available, having been assigned to handle another case in Tacloban. Asst Prosecutor
Ybanez appeared in his behalf, but he filed a motion for postponement, alleging
that he was not as familiar with the case and that all the records were with Agana.
The accused all vehemently opposed the motion and instead asked for a dismissal
of the case with prejudice (as opposed to provisional dismissal, because according
to them this would violate their right against double jeopardy). Judge Gomez
dismissed the case outright with prejudice.
Special Prosecutor Agana filed a certiorari petition (Rule 65) before the SC, alleging
GADALEJ on Gomez’ part for dismissing outright the criminal cases.
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Issue: WON Judge Gomez committed GADALEJ in dismissing outright the criminal
cases against the accused.
Held: Yes, he did. Apparently he considered extraneous circumstances in dismissing
the cases outright, confessing to the court that he had received a dinner invitation
coursed through a colonel but was actually from Asst Prosecutor Ybanez. This was
an implication that some people (ie, Agana and Ybanez) were using his Court to
extort those accused of criminal cases of overshipment. According to him this
made him lose all respect for Special Prosecutor Agana and how he handled the
case, so he ended up asking the Court to voluntarily inhibit him from participating
any further with the case. The SC granted his request but ordered a remand of the
case to the RTC level but this time to a different sala.
36. PARAS
Case Name: Umale v. Villaluz
Case number: 159
Chapter: 18
Footnote: 103
Catchy phrase: “Kung may alam ka talaga, ‘wag na lang.”
Doctrine:
Facts:
- Petitioner Leon Umale impugns the validity of the order dated April 15,
1971 of respondent Judge Onofre A. Villaluz of the Circuit Criminal Court
sitting at Pasig, Rizal, disqualifying or inhibiting himself from trying the
robbery charge against sixteen (16) accused including the six (6) herein
private respondents.
- Petitioner Leon Umale is the complainant in the said robbery case, the
robbery having been allegedly committed on September 21, 1970 in his
warehouse in Pasig, Rizal from which were assorted textile materials
valued at P229,659.904.
- Respondent Judge Onofre A. Villaluz, who from January 19 to April 12,
1971, issued several orders for the arrest of the accused, fixing their bail
bonds, allowing an accused to post cash or surety bond for his provisional
liberty, for their arraignment, or for their commitment to the provincial
jail, as well as issued subpoena duces tecum and contempt citations
against certain police officers who failed to appear on the days set for
hearing.
- However, on April 15, 1971, without any party moving for his
disqualification or inhibition, respondent Judge Onofre Villaluz voluntarily
inhibited himself from trying the case "for the peace of mind of the
parties concerned and to insure an impartial administration of justice" on
the ground that before the criminal case was filed in his court, he already
had personal knowledge of the same; and directed the immediate
forwarding of the records of the case to the Executive Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, for proper disposition.
Issue: WON respondent judge can voluntary inhibit himself, without any motion by
the parties, on the ground of his personal knowledge of the case. - YES
Ruling:
- Undoubtedly, personal knowledge of the case pending before him is not
one of the causes for the disqualification of a judge under the first
paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court which
took effect on January 1, 1964.
- But paragraph 2 of said Section 1 of Rule 137 authorizes the judge, "in the
exercise of his sound discretion, to disqualify himself from sitting in a
case, for just or valid reason other than those mentioned" in paragraph 1.
- Herein respondent Judge, because of his personal knowledge of the case,
at least had conducted a careful self-examination after hearing some
incidents on the criminal case wherein petitioner is the complainant,
because such personal knowledge on his part might generate in his mind
some bias or prejudice against the complaining witness or any of the
accused or in an manner unconsciously color his judgment one way or the
other without the parties having the opportunity to cross-examine him as
a witness.
- Herein respondent Judge should be commended this time for heeding
Our ruling in the case of Geotina vs. Gonzales that "a judge, sitting on a
case must at all times be fully free, disinterested, impartial and
independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing before an
impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of
rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely
free from suspicion as to his fairness and as to his integrity."
37. PEREZ
Case Name: Query Of Executive Judge Estrella T. Estrada, Regional Trial Court Of
Malolos, Bulacan, On The Conflicting Views Of Regional Trial Court — Judges
Masadao And Elizaga Re: Criminal Case No. 4954-m
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Case Number: 98
Footnote: 104
Chapter: 18
Catchy phrase: “Kapag ninong si Justice, hayaan na nating umalis.”
Doctrine:
Where the relationship between the judge and an attorney for a party is
such that there would be a natural inclination to prejudice the case, the
judge should be disqualified in order to guarantee a fair trial.
Facts:
- Judge Masadao in the case “People v. Tadeo” convicted the accused for
the crime of Estafa. When a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by
accused, his counsel was then replaced by retired Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who
was had been among those who recommended Masadao to the bench as
judge.
- Because of this, Masadao issued an order inhibiting himself from the trial
and directing that the case be transmitted to the Executive Judge for re-
raffling.
- The case was raffled to the sala of Judge Elizaga, who refused to handle
the case, saying that the raffle was impractical and uncalled for. This
prompted the Executive Judge to certify the matter to the SC.
Issue: W/N Masadao validly inhibited himself from trying the case on the ground
that the counsel for one of the parties was the one who recommended him to the
bench.
Ruling: Yes, Masadao’s inhibition was valid.
- The Rules of Court in Section 1, Rule 137 in its first paragraph provide for
the grounds that a judge may validly disqualify himself from trying a case.
- The same Rule in paragraph 2 provides that when no grounds for
disqualification as enumerated in the 1st paragraph exist, “A judge may,
in the exercise of his discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case,
for just or valid reasons…”
- Where the relationship between the judge and an attorney for a party is
such that there would be a natural inclination to prejudice the case, the
judge should be disqualified in order to guarantee a fair trial.
- Inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a friend, classmate,
associate or patron of a presiding judge appears before him as counsel for
one of the parties to a case. "Utang na loob", per se, should not be a
hindrance to the administration of justice. Nor should recognition of such
value in Philippine society prevent the performance of one's duties as
judge. However, where, as in this case, the judge admits that he may be
suspected of surrendering to the persuasions of utang na loob or he may
even succumb to it considering that he "and the members of his family,
no less, shall ever remain obliged in eternal gratitude to Justice Reyes",
the rule of non-inhibition because of associations with counsels or parties
yields to exceptions in extraordinary cases.
38. REYES, MARY CHASTINE
Case Name: Urbanes vs CA
Case Number: 160
Footnote: 106
Chapter:
Catchy phrase: “Sorry for the inconvenience, it was just mere inadvertence.”
“Naku po, naku po, nakalimutan ni Lolo. Sorry po, sorry po, ibalik ang kaso.”
Doctrine: The rationale for Section 1 Rule 137 of the Rules of Court is that judges
should not handle cases in which he might be perceived rightly or wrongly
susceptible to bias and partiality.
Digest: The ethical issue in this case is directed towards Justice Montenegro. He
was previously an acting Solicitor before becoming an Associate Justice of the CA.
Petitioner Urbanes, in this case, filed a Motion for Inhibition against Justice
Montenegro for failing to inhibit in the case filed against NPC, wherein he was
previously the counsel (in his capacity as the acting Solicitor General at that time
and NPC being a GOCC).
The Supreme Court held that total inhibition is required from Justice Montenegro
as called for in Section 1 Rule 137 of the Rules of Court (Disqualification of Judges).
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides, thus:
Sec.1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he was presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
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record. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Justice Montenegro explained that his failure to do so was mere inadvertence and
oversight. He immediately disengaged himself from the case thereafter.
39. REYES, Phoebe
Case Name: Garcia vs. Dela Peña
Case Number: 62
Footnote: 108
Chapter: 18
Catchy phrase: Gotchu fam // Blood over troubled water
Doctrine: The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case as in
the instant case, the respondent judge is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity rests on the salutary principle that no judge
should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial
and independent. The purpose is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in
the courts of justice.
Facts:
Edgardo Garcia filed against respondent judge for partiality, grave abuse of
authority and grave abuse of discretion in relation to a criminal case filed against his
wife accused Ignacia Garcia in a criminal case for grave oral defamation filed by
respondent judge’s brother. After preliminary examination, respondent judge
issued a warrant of arrest for the accused. On the same day the accused was
arrested, petitioner posted a cash bail bond for her release, but because
respondent judge left for Cebu for a medical check up, petitioner’s wife’s release
was delayed to the next day. Respondent judge argued that that there is no room
for bias or partiality in the issuance of a warrant of arrest which is both a mandatory
and ministerial duty.
Issue: Whether respondent judge is guilty of partiality in the discharge of his official
functions in taking cognizance of the case where his brother was a party
Ruling:
YES. Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides, thus:
Sec.1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case
in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he was presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
The fact that respondent judge took cognizance of the criminal case,
notwithstanding the fact that he is related within the second degree of
consanguinity to private complainant is obviously a glaring violation of the rule on
compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case. The rule on compulsory
disqualification of a judge to hear a case as in the instant case, the respondent
judge is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity
rests on the salutary principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is
not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. The purpose is to
preserve the people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice.
Judge was dismissed from service.
40. RODRIGUEZ
Case Name: Villaluz v. Mijares
Case Number: 169
Footnote:108
Chapter: 18
Catchy phrase: Basta Judge si Lola, siya bahala
Doctrine: Respondent violated Rule 2.03, Canon 2 of Code of Judicial Conduct
which states that: “A Judge shall not allow family, social or other relationships to
influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be
used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit
others to convey the impression
that they are in a special position to influence the judge.”
Facts:
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Retired CA Justice Villaluz filed a complaint against Judge Mijares and charged the
latter with dishonesty, corrupt practices, and grave misconduct because (1) in a
case, Mijares placed the rental deposits of the plaintiff in her private bank account,
and (2) Mijares took cognizance of a petition for correction of entry in the birth
record of her grandson, and even granted exemption of publication fees in the said
case.
Mijares denied any participation in the collection of deposits, claiming that the
accusation was the concoction of her disgruntled employees. As for the second
charge, she asserted that the rule on disqualification stated in Section 1, Rule 107 of
the Rules of Court does not apply because the proceedings simple called for the
clarification and correction of an erroneous entry in the birth certificate of her
grandson regarding his father’s nationality. She also granted exemptions as
according to her, it is for the “parents who are just starting to have a family.” She
defended such act by stating that the amount was an unnecessary expense that will
not inure to the benefit of the government anyway.
Issue: Whether Judge Mijares should be penalized.
Ruling:
The SC ruled that her actuations in the first charge placed her honesty and integrity
under serious doubt.
There was no justification for Mijares in not requiring the Clerk of Court to collect
the rental deposits.
As for the second charge, she clearly violated the Rules of Court. It was mandatory
for respondent to have inhibited herself from hearing the case. Even on the
assumption that the petition for correction of entry of respondent’s grandson is not
controversial in nature, this does not detract from the fact that she cannot be free
from bias or partiality. In fact, bias was clearly demonstrated when she waived the
requirement of publication on the petition because the parents of the minor were
then just “starting to have a family”.
41. ROSALES
Case Name: Mantaring vs Roman
Case Number: 112
Footnote: 96
Chapter: 18
Catchy phrase: Kaso moko, Kulong kita
Doctrine:
The mere filing of an administrative case against a judge by one of the parties
before him is not a ground for disqualifying him from hearing a case. An
examination of these cases reveals, however, that the administrative cases were
filed during the pendency of the cases, and it is evident that the administrative
cases were filed only to force the judge to inhibit himself from the consideration of
the case before him. But if the the case is filed beforehand, an inhibition is merited
to uphold the cold impartiality of a judge.
Facts:
● Mantaring filed an admin case against Judge Molato and Judge Roman for
conduct unbecoming members of the judiciary in Jan 1993 but was
dismissed
● The present case is for harassment against Molato for issuing a warrant of
arrest instead of inhibiting himself from the preliminary investigation
● J. Molato denies the allegation and interposed that the search warrant
was for Mantaring Sr, Manataring Jr and Gamo in connection to illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition
● That the house searched where Gamo was staying belonged to
Mantaring Sr and Mantaring Jr also resides in the house
● The prosecutor later dropped the case against the Mantarings because
the house did not belong to Mantaring.
Issue: WON the Judge should have inhibited himself because of the the previous
filing of administrative case? - YES
Ruling:
● The respondent judge should have inhibited himself from conducting the
preliminary investigation of the criminal case, considering that the
respondent was the present complainant, who had earlier filed an
administrative case against the judge and another one.
● We are not unmindful of the cases in which it was stated that the mere
filing of an administrative case against a judge by one of the parties
before him is not a ground for disqualifying him from hearing a case. An
examination of these cases reveals, however, that the administrative
cases were filed during the pendency of the cases, and it is evident that
the administrative cases were filed only to force the judge to inhibit
himself from the consideration of the case before him. As this Court held,
if on every occasion the party apparently aggrieved were allowed to stop
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the proceedings in order to await the final decision on the desired
disqualification, or demand the immediate inhibition of the judge on the
basis alone of his being so charged, many cases would have to be kept
pending or perhaps there would not be enough judges left to handle all
the cases pending in all the courts. On the other hand, there is a remedy
available to the party seeking the disqualification of the judge. If he is
denied a fair and impartial trial, caused by the judge’s bias or prejudice,
he can ask for a new trial in the interest of justice which will be granted if
that is really the case.
● But, in the case at bar, an administrative complaint against respondent
and Judge Manuel A. Roman, Jr. had previously been filed and it was
paramount that respondent was free from any appearance of bias
against, or hostility toward, the complainant. The impression could not be
helped that his action in that case was dictated by a spirit of revenge
against complainant for the latter’s having filed an administrative
disciplinary action against the judge. The situation called for sedulous
regard on his part for the principle that a party is entitled to nothing less
than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
42. SAN PEDRO
Case Name: Choa v. Chiongson
Case Number: 6 (from the supplementary list)
Footnote: 114
Chapter: 18
Catchy phrase: Ok lang mangapitbahay, basta wag sumakabilangbahay
Doctrine:
Being a next-door-neighbor is not a ground to disqualify a judge.
Facts:
● Alfonso Choa petitioned for naturalization
● Leni Ong Choa, Alfonso’s wife, filed a criminal case against Alfonso Choa
for perjury
○ In Alfonso’s verified petition for Naturalization, he stated among
others:
■ His wife and children live in 46 Malaspina St. Bacolod
City
■ He is of good moral character
○ Leni Ong Choa contends that these statements are lies
■ She and her children now live in Hervias Subdivision,
Bacolod
■ Alfonso is in an immoral relationship with Stella
Saludar, a woman not his wife and with whom he has
2 children
● Judge Chiongson found Alfonso Choa guilty of perjury
● Alfonso filed an MR but was denied
● Alfonso filed the instant complaint, praying for the removal of Judge
Chiongson from office, citing as grounds Grave Misconduct, Gross Bias
and Partiality, and Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment
○ Alfonso claims that Judge Chiongson intentionally failed to
divulge that he is the next-door-neighbor of Leni
○ This is the first time he is raising these matters
● Judge Chiongson claims that he is not Leni’s next-door-neighbor because
there is a house between his and Leni’s. He adds that he does not even
personally know Leni
● Reviewing the case, the Deputy Court Administrator recommended that
the complaint against Judge Chiongson should be dismissed for lack of
merit
● According to the Deputy Court Administrator, the charge that respondent
Judge and Leni Choa are neighbors [sic] appears to be petty under the
circumstances. Granting that they are indeed next-door neighbors does
not necessarily mean that respondent Judge has violated Rule 137 of the
Rules of Court for Disqualification of Judges. Nowhere in said Rule is it
ordained that being the neighbor of a party-litigant is reason enough for
the Judge to disqualify himself from hearing the formers case.
Issue: WON being a next-door-neighbor of a party in the case is a ground for
mandatory or voluntary disqualification - NO
Ruling:
● As to the respondent Judges being a next-door neighbor of the
complainants wife - the complainant in the perjury case - it must be
stressed that that alone is not a ground for either a mandatory
disqualification under the first paragraph or for a voluntary
disqualification under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the
Rules of Court.
● In any event, the complainant has failed to disclose in his complaint that
he had raised this matter at any time before the rendition of the
judgment.
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● In fact, the summary of the grounds of his motion for reconsideration in
the respondents order denying the said motion does not include this
matter. If indeed the complainant honestly believed in the justness of this
grievance, he would have raised it in an appropriate pleading before the
trial court.
43. SANTOS
Case Name: Villapando v. Qunitain
Case Number: 168
Footnote: 119
Chapter: 18
Catchy Phrase: Kapag partial at biased ang husgado, kahit holiday, sasampahan ka
parin ng kaso.
Doctrine: “The Commitment of this Court to a strict application of the procedural
due process mandate of every litigant being entitled, to follow the language of
Gutierrez, to ‘nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge’ is firm and
deepseated.”
Facts:
● This case is about five certiorari and prohibition proceedings against the
Honorable Judge Elviro Q. Quitain filed by petitioner Restituto Villapando
after their series of interactions during the proceedings regarding
petitioner’s case of theft.
● The notable event in this case was an altercation between petitioner and
private respondents Chat Buendegrado G. Patulayin (brother of the Vice-
mayor), Leonardo Marasigan (brother of the Municipal Councilor) and
Miguel Pillerba (a policeman of the municipality) in a restaurant in San
Antonio, Quezon.
○ The altercation happened during good friday.
● After the fight, petitioner woke up to the notice that he was being
charged with theft of two cases by the three private respondents and that
respondent judge was to conduct the preliminary investigation of finding
probable cause.
○ It was said that in petitioner’s memorandum, it was apparent
that respondent judge was “openly and brazenly” favoring the
three private respondents.
● Furthermore, as petitioner was filing his case with the help of the
Philippine Constabulary, as filing it without the former’s help was
fruitless, respondent judge along with the three private respondents also
went to the CIS Detachment to inform the investigators that petitioner’s
complaint was a mere countercharge.
○ He wants to file charges of maltreatment and physical injuries.
● When the case of petitioner was eventually filed, he mentioned in his
memorandum that respondent judge exhibited “manifest bias and
partiality in favor of the three accused” to the point that he would lax in
the handling of petitioner’s case while would conduct with haste the
hearing of all the other cases.
○ Significantly, the preliminary investigation of respondents’ case
of theft against petitioner was concluded during the Saturday
after good friday - a holiday.
ISSUE:
WON respondent judge acted with manifest bias and partiality for respondent?
RULING: Yas
● “The commitment of this Court to a strict application of the procedural
due process mandate of every litigant being entitled, to follow the
language of Gutierrez, to ‘nothing less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge’ is firm and deepseated.”
● “What is even less commendable is that respondent Judge’s actuation
clearly leaves the impression that he was not immune to the disparity in
the economic, social and political standing of the litigants. Favoritism is
not to be tolerated, but is much more odious if directed against one
coming from the poor and the dispossessed.”
44. SARTE
Case Name: Mateo v. Villaluz
Case Number: 99
Footnote: 122
Chapter: 18
Catchy Phrase: Sinabi mo na, binawi mo pa
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Doctrine: If circumstances exist indicating a danger of partiality on the part of a
judge trying a case, said judge, in the exercise of his sound discretion should
disqualify himself from sitting in the case
Facts: A bank was robbed and a was killed. As a result, four (4) criminal actions were
filed against petitioners for robbery in band with homicide.
They filed a Motion To Dismiss on the ground of "insufficiency of evidence for
failure of prosecution (1) to prove the existence of conspiracy, and (2) to identify
the accused by competent evidence.
In the meantime, another suspect in the robbery — one Rolando Reyes — was
arrested. Thereafter, respondent Judge deferred the resolution on the motion to
dismiss until after the prosecution has presented and rested its evidence as against
Rolando Reyes.
Rolando Reyes had executed an extra-judicial statement and had signed and sworn
to its truth before the Honorable Respondent Judge; and, in that statement had
implicated petitioners; the Honorable Respondent Judge was aware of this, and it
was for this reason that he had deferred ruling on petitioner Ruben Martinez'
motions and supplemental motion to dismiss 'until after the prosecution has
presented and rested its evidence as against Rolando Reyes.
The prosecution filed a 'Motion to Present Additional Evidence. respondent Judge
granted. the prosecution called Rolando Reyes as an additional witness, and when
his extrajudicial statement was presented as evidence, he repudiated it claiming
that he executed it because he was threatened by a government agent.
petitioners filed a Motion for Disqualification of respondent Judge contending that
respondent Judge 'in the exercise of his sound discretion should disqualify himself
from sitting in this case because Rolando Reyes had repudiated the statement that
he, Reyes, had sworn to before the Honorable Respondent Judge and the latter
perforce would have to pass upon that repudiation. Respondent Judge denied said
motion.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge should disqualify himself from the case
Ruling: YES
Respondent Judge could not be totally immune to what apparently was asserted
before him in such extrajudicial statement. Moreover, it is unlikely that he was not
in the slightest bit offended by the affiant's turnabout with his later declaration
that there was intimidation by a government agent exerted on him.
Further, he would have to pass on a question that by implication had already been
answered by him. For respondent Judge was called upon to review a matter on
which he had previously given his opinion.
45. SEBASTIAN
Case Name: People vs. Moreno
Case Number: 123
Footnote: 94
Chapter: 18
Catchy phrase:
Doctrine: Prior to Jan. 1, 1964, when the provision concerning voluntary
disqualification took effect, the rigid rule is that the question as to whether a judge
should take cognizance of a case or not does not depend upon his discretion. If he is
not legally disqualified, it is a matter of official duty for him to proceed with the trial
and decision of the case.
Facts:
● At the outbreak of the war in 1941, Moreno was serving sentence in the
San Ramon Penal Farm. He was ordered to burn the wharf in Recodo, get
some machinery and truck nearby and bring them to San Ramon.
● According to him, he was pardoned by President Quezon in the early part
of 1942.
● After the Japanese had landed in Zamboanga, Moreno was made a
commander of the "Kaigun Juitai," a military organization attached to the
Japanese naval police of Zamboanga.
● He beat up and killed suspected guerillas and several other people whom
he thought helped the latter.
● The trial court found Moreno guilty of treason complexed with multiple
murder of 15 persons, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death
and to pay a fine, indemnity, and costs.
● Because of the fact that Judge Florentino Saguin (one of the members of
the trial court) had previously sentenced Moreno for murder, Moreno’s
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counsel moved for the voluntary inhibition of said judge to sit in this
treason case.
● The trial court dismissed Moreno’s petition for the Judge Saguin’s
voluntary inhibition.
Issue:
WON the trial court erred in denying Moreno’s petition for the voluntary inhibition
of the trial judge who tried this case for the simple reason that they had already
formed a biased opinion and therefore could not render an impartial judgment
Ruling:
● No. The complaint is groundless.
● Moreno’s counsel was not able to invoke any provision of law in support
of his motion. As a matter of fact, there is none. The petition was
addressed to Judge Saguin’s discretion, and he acted properly and wisely
in sitting in this case.
● It is not contended that Judge Saguin was disqualified under any special
provision of law. It was his duty to take cognizance of a case. To take or
not to take cognizance of a case, does not depend upon the discretion of
a judge not legally disqualified to sit in a given case.
● It is his duty not to sit in its trial and decision if legally disqualified; but if
the judge is not disqualified, it is a matter of official duty for him to
proceed with the trial and decision of the case. He cannot shirk the
responsibility without the risk of being called upon to account for his
dereliction.
46. SY
Case Name: People vs. Moreno
Case Number: 82
Footnote: 95
Chapter: 18
Catchy phrases: Walang delikadesa sa Korte/ No matter how delicate/ No other
grounds/ Wala kang choice, tuloy ang kaso.
Doctrine: This is a 1913 case. Prior to Jan. 1, 1964, a judge shall proceed with trial
and decision of the case if he is not legally disqualified and this is not discretionary.
It has been held that a judge could not voluntarily inhibit himself on grounds of
extreme delicadeza, prejudice, bias, hostility, or conflict of interests. (Agpalo)
The grounds for disqualification of judges in a case is laid down in Section 8 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. In this case, judge inhibited himself on the ground of
extreme delicacy which is not one of the grounds. SC granted the petition for
mandamus to compel the judge to continue with the case.
FACTS: Joaquin instituted an action in the CFI against Herrera to compel issuance of
a license to operate a cockpit. Later, Santos, the provincial board of Rizal, and Jose
Javier was added as defendants. On May 24, 1913, all parties appeared, except for
Jose Javier.
Before the hearing began, Judge Alberto Barretto received a telegram from Mr.
Cohn, Jose Javier’s attorney. The letter contains the words, “In cockpit cases
Caloocan intervener and lawyer in Pasig by mistake. Notification says Manila to
Pasig. They protest against the trial of the resolution of the motion by reason of lack
of competency and disqualification of the judge and for in insufficiency of notice."
In view of this telegram, the court adjourned the hearing to June 6, 1913. All parties
appeared with their attorneys. The judge entered the following orders:
1. Defendants raised the disqualification of the judge based on legal
grounds. However, in the course of the arguments, there exists no legal
reasons which the disqualification can be based. They therefore appeal to the
extreme delicacy (extreme delicadeza) of the judge.
2. The judge although recognizing of no legal grounds for disqualifications,
retired from the case solely and exclusively for reasons of extreme delicacy.
NOTE: Defendants claim Extreme delicadeza on the circumstance judge previously
acted as attorney in the pending case for Angeles, Bertol, and the others and that
Joaquin was just the representative of these individuals.
Joaquin instituted this petition for mandamus to compel Judge Barretto to proceed
with the case.
ISSUE: Whether mandamus shall lie to compel the judge to continue with the case?
RULING: YES. Section 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, “SEC. 8
Disqualification of judges. - No judge, magistrate, justice of the peace, assessor,
referee or presiding officer of any tribunal shall sit in any cause or proceeding in
which he is pecuniary interested, or related to either party within the sixth degree
of consanguinity or affinity, computed according to the rules of the civil law, nor in
which he has been counsel, nor in which he has presided in any inferior judicature
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when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written counsel of
all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
No challenge as to the competency of any of the officials named in this
section shall be received or allowed; but if it be claimed that the official is
disqualified by the provisions of this section, the party objecting to his
competency may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the
grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial,
or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the
question of his disqualification. His decision shall be forthwith made in
writing and filed with the other papers in the case, but no appeal or stay
of action shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his
own competency, until after final judgment in his court.”
- Extreme delicadeza is not a legal ground for retirement. The writ of
mandamus lies to compel the judge to go on with the case.
- On the issue of whether the judge was in fact an attorney in the case, it
can be seen in his order that the parties admitted in open court that he had
not been such attorney and no subject to disqualification.
o If the question whether judge acted as attorney was
presented to the judge, then he disqualified himself based
on extreme delicadeza.
o If the question was not presented, such cannot be raised in
this action. The judge sought to be disqualified has the
exclusive jurisdiction and authority to determine, in first
instance, his own competency.
§ SC will only decide based on the facts which the
judge based his decisions. New facts will not be
considered.
- The argument that the reason of the judge for his decision is immaterial is
also without merit if he has in the records facts sufficient to sustain that
decision
47. TAN
Case name: Talisay Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs Hon. Jose Teodoro St., et.al.
Footnote 97
Case number: 154
Chapter 18
Catchy Phrase: Di porket si Judge Professor ay binabayaran ng paaralan, dapat
nang kasuhan
DOCTRINE:
Section 1 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which reads as follows:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. — No Judge or judicial officer shall sit in any
case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, computed according to the rules of Civil Law, or
in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in
which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject
of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and
entered upon the record.
FACTS:
Judge Teodoro handles Civil Case no 1814 wherein petitioner is Simplicio
Lizares and respondent is Talisay SIlay Milling Co., Inc. He issued an injunction
against Talisay via petition by Lizares in said civil case. Thereafter, Talisay filed a
petition against Simplicio Lizares, Antonio Lizares and Judge Teodoro, the latter to
be disqualified for further proceeding with the civil case on the grounds that Judge
Teodoro is a professor of law at an institute owned by the Lizares.
ISSUE:
W/N Judge Teodoro be disqualified from Civil Case 1814.
RULING:
No. The petition filed by Talisay gave notice to Canons of Law which
basically says that it is desirable that the judge should so far as reasonably possible,
refrain from all relations which would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that
such relations warp or bias his judgment, or prevent his impartial attitude of mind
in the administration of his judicial duties. BUT these Canons are not grounds for
disqualification. The SC ruled that a judge can be disqualified based on Section 1 of
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. (See doctrine at start of case)
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48. VILLANUEVA Case number: 157

Case Name: US v Lumampao Chapter:

Footnote: 98 Catchy phrase: Juzgadong pursigido,

Sisenta'y singko pero de facto
Case number: 161

Chapter: 18 Doctrine: If the judge is convinced that a witness before him is deliberately
swearing falsely on a material matter, it is his right and duty to see that such
Catchy phrase: Wag magtangkang magsinungaling sa judge na magaling. witness is duly prosecuted.

Doctrine: If the judge is convinced that a witness before him is deliberately
swearing falsely on a material matter, it is his right and duty to see that such
witness is duly prosecuted.
Facts:
1. The present case is an appeal from the CFI of Iloilo, convicting Vicente
Lumampao of perjury.
2. In a previous case for seduction of a young lady by Lumampao caused by a
fictitious marriage ceremony, the accused testified as a witness that he
was in the company of his friend’s brother, later proved who performed
the marriage ceremony, when the said ceremony took place.
3. Judge Powell, presiding judge, ascertained that the testimony was false,
and later prosecuted him for perjury.
4. He later admitted the falsity of his testimony, and was found guilty.
Issue:
W/N judge erred in denying the application of the accused that he be tried before
another court, due to alleged prejudice against him by the presiding judge.
Ruling:
SC held that this is no sense disqualifies the judge. If the judge is convinced that a
witness before him is deliberately swearing falsely on a material matter, it is his
right and duty to see that such witness is duly prosecuted.
49. WY
Case Name: Felipe Tayko v Capistrano
Footnote:
Facts:
1. Petition for writ of prohibition Capistrano from taking cognizance of civil
and criminal cases in which Tayko et al. Are parties
2. Capistrano was appointed judge of the CFI Negros Oriental until he
reaches 65
3. He now reached that age, therefore under section 148 of the
administrative Code as amended, is disqualified from acting as judge of
CFI.
4. In addition, Judge de la Costa, designated as auxillary judge of Negros
Oriental, and Capistrano had an agreement that
a. De la costa - election related cases
b. Capistrano ordinary cases
5. However, despite the agreement, Capistrano still took cognizance of
election cases
a. that the respondent judge declared in open court that he will
try the criminal cases herein mentioned for the reason that the
auxiliary judge refused to try the same on the ground that the
preliminary investigations were held before him, when, in truth
and in fact,
b. took great interest and active part in the filing of criminal
charges against the petitioners herein to the unjustifiable extent
of appointing a deputy fiscal, who then filed the proper
informations, when the provincial fiscal refused to file criminal
charges against the petitioners for violation of the election law
for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain the same
6. Tayko camp allege that judge is acting bend his jurisdiction and also after
acting after the loss of jurisdiction.
7. Capistrano:

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1. None of the facts alleged in the petition divest the respondent
judge of his jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cases referred
to in the complaint, and
2. Even admitting as true, for the sake of this demurrer, the facts
alleged in paragraph 7 of the petition, the respondent judge is
still a de facto judge and his title to the office and his jurisdiction
to hear the cases referred to in the petition cannot be
questioned by prohibition, as this writ, even when directed
against persons acting as judged, cannot be treated as a
substitute for quo warranto, or be rightfully called upon to
perform any of the functions
Issue: W/N Capistrano, reaching the age of 65, automatically loses ceases to be
the judge of the CFI or Negros Oriental. W/N he is a de facto judge.
Ruling:
A de facto judge is one who exercises the duties of a judicial office under color of an
appointment or election thereto. He differs, on the one hand, from a mere usurper
who undertakes to act officially without any color of right, and on the others hand,
from a judge de jure who is in all respects legally appointed and qualified and
whose term of office has not expired
His term of office may have expired, but his successor has not been appointed, and
as good faith is presumed, he must be regarded as holding over in good faith.
The acts of a justice de facto cannot be called in question in any suit to which he is
not a party. The official acts of a de facto justice cannot be attacked collaterally.
50. YARRA
G.R. No. L-46117, BAUTISTA v. REBUENO, Feb 22, 1978 (Footnote 104, Case 23)
FACTS: Facts indicate that Judge Rebueno was a distant relative and a town mate of
the plaintiff in a civil case presided over by the former, “giving rise to the strong
possibility that whatever his actuations are in the instant case and any of its
incidents, he might be suspected of being partial to plaintiff.” Thus, Rebueno
disqualified himself from the case.
This mandamus proceeding seeks to compel respondent Judge Rebueno of a CFI
Branch in Naga City, to continue trying the civil case assigned.
ISSUE: The issue raised being that his Order disqualifying himself amounted to a
grave abuse of discretion based as it was on a ground other than that provided for
in the Rules of Court.
RULING: No. Rebueno did not commit grave abuse of discretion in deciding to
disqualify himself from the case. Petitioner’s (Bautista) claim is unmeritorious for it
would ignore the second paragraph of Rule 137: "A judge may, in the exercise of his
sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons,
other than those mentioned above.
This Court (Rebueno) knew from reliable sources that the defendant (herein
petitioner) has been doubting the actuations of the Court as biased on the belief
that the Presiding Judge is related to the plaintiff. Similarly, however, from reliable
sources the Court also knows that the plaintiff is doubting his actuations because of
the defendant's alleged utterances that he will surely win this case. These
circumstances has placed the Court in a very unpleasant position, because either
way he acts, whether in favor or against the plaintiff or vice-versa, his actuation will
always be tainted and beset with doubt which is highly detrimental to the good
name and integrity of the Court. The Judge must maintain and preserve the trust
and faith of the parties. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the
very first sign of lack of faith and trust to his actions, whether well grounded or not,
the Judge has no other alternative but inhibit himself from the case. A judge may
not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear
that which induce doubt to his honest actuations and probity in favor of either
party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self petition. He
should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the Courts of Justice
is not impaired. The better course for the Judge under such circumstances is to
disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood, his reputation for
probity and objectivity is preserved. What is more important, the Ideal of impartial
administration of justice is lived up to.
This is well settled and in line with jurisprudence. SC cited two rulings (See Gutierrez
v. Santos, Del Castillo v. Javellona) similar to this case where although the ground is
not among those expressly provided in Rule 137, Judge can still, in the exercise of
his discretion, disqualify himself for other just and valid reasons.The principle was
further stressed in this wise: "In other words, while Rule 126 provides for
disqualification, it does not include nor preclude cases and circumstances for
voluntary inhibition which depends upon the discretion of the officers concerned."
16 To repeat, what was implicit before is now an explicit provision recording the
discretion of a judge to disqualify himself from sitting in a case, "for just and valid
reasons" other than those mentioned in the first paragraph of Rule 137.
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51. YARTE
Case Name: Pimentel v Salanga
Case Number: 125
Footnote:
Chapter: 125
Catchy phrase:
Doctrine: The filing of an administrative case by a lawyer against a judge is not a
ground for a judge’s disqualification.
Facts:
● Petitioner Atty. Pimentel filed an administrative case against Respondent
Judge Salanga imputing serious misconduct, inefficiency in office,
partiality and ignorance of the law. Petitioner prayed for the removal of
the judge from his office.
● Since 4 cases handled by petitioner were assigned to the sala of Judge
Salanga, he filed a motion for respondent to disqualify himself from
hearing the cases.
● The motion was dismissed. Judge Salanga said that there was no reason
for him to inhibit himself from hearing the case. The administrative case
against him was not a cause for disqualification under the Rules of Court.
● Thus, this petition for certiorari was filed by Petitioner.
Issue: Is a judge disqualified from hearing cases where one of the counsel on record
filed an administrative case against him?
Ruling: No, that is not a ground for disqualification of a judge.
● Petitioner Pimentel theorizes that Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court has
provided a broad policy-oriented ground for disqualification of judges.
That a judge can now be barred by reasons not specifically enumerated
under the law.
● The court reiterated that “to take or not to take cognizance” of a case
does not depend on the discretion of the judge. If the judge chose not to
inhibit himself, and he is not legally disqualified, it is his duty to continue
with trial and render a decision.
● The exercise of discretion only refers to a situation where the judge
disqualifies himself.
● The grounds for disqualification are limited to those enumerated in the
first paragraph of Sec. 21, Rule 137, Rules of Court.
● The petition for certiorari was denied.
52. LEE
Case Name: Aparicio v Andal
105
Case Number:
Footnote Number:
Chapter:
Catchy phrase: walang personalan, trabaho lang. / imaginary hostility
Doctrine: the mere filing of an administrative case against respondent judge is not a
ground for disqualifying him from hearing the case
Facts: Assailed in this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
are the orders of respondent judge (Andal) denying the petitioner's Motion for
Inhibition.
In this case, the judge is the Ermelindo Andal and the petitioner and lawyer in the
said case is Lolito Aparicio. Andal denied motions of inhibition in different civil
cases wherein Aparacio was the lawyer handling the cases. Aparicio then filed
special civil actions and administrative cases against judge Andal (prohibition,
certiorari, mandamus, etc.) and also filed for a motion for inhibition praying for
judge Andal to inhibit himself from hearing and trying any case handled by Atty.
Aparicio. The reason expressed by Aparicio was that there was an existing state of
hostility between him and judge Andal caused by the administrative cases filed
against Andal. He avers that although the Motion for Inhibition did not explicitly
state on its face the valid grounds relied upon to support his motion, such grounds
were known to Judge Andal. He theorizes that the Judge in refusing to inhibit
himself from the cases subject of the Motion for Inhibition and in all the other cases
pending before him in which the petitioner is acting either as counsel or a party
litigant, Judge Andal violated his constitutional rights to due process, equal
protection of the law, access to the court and speedy disposition of cases, making
Judge Andal civilly liable under Art. 32 of the new Civil Code. He asserts that
because of Judge Andal's refusal to inhibit himself, he (petitioner) and his family
suffered mental anguish and incurred expenses for which they must be compensated.
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Issue: whether or not Judge Andal acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction when he denied the petitioner's Motion for Inhibition
Ruling:
Judge Andal maintains that the motion for inhibition did not cite any valid grounds
to justify his inhibition. He submits that when he denied the motion for inhibition, he
was not aware that an administrative case was filed against him.
He describes as a mere gratuitous assumption the petitioner's assertion that in
denying the Motion for Inhibition he was motivated by rancor and resentment
because of the certiorari and administrative cases earlier filed against him. In this
score, he asseverates that he does not normally resent the filing of certiorari cases
against him as he has neither the reason nor the luxury of time to entertain such a
feeling.
It must be observed that the Motion for Inhibition, as correctly stated by Judge Andal
in his orders denying the same, cited no valid ground, which fact was confirmed by
the prosecuting fiscal and the counsel for the accused in the criminal cases and the
defendants in the civil cases. There is, therefore, no doubt that the denial of the said
motion was not whimsical or capricious.
The state of hostility being pressed by the petitioner is purely imaginary.
--------------------------------------------SECONDBATCH---------------------------------------
1. ALEJANDRO
Case Name: Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan
Case Number: 117
Footnote: 115
Chapter: 18.18
Catchy Phrase: Arraignment: Akala mo lang wala pero meron, meron, MERON! :)
Doctrine: Mere divergence of opinions between a judge and a party’s counsel as to
applicable laws and jurisprudence is not sufficient ground for disqualifying the judge
from hearing the case on the ground of bias and partiality.
Facts:
Gelacio, vice mayor of San Francisco Agusan Del Sur, filed a complaint against
Paredes Jr, provincial governor, together with Honrado (clerk of court of MTC of SF
Agusan Del Sur) and Atty. Sansaet (Paredes’ counsel) for misrepresenting that an
arraignment has been held in another case where in fact there was none. In support
of this, Gelacio submitted a Certification issued by Judge Ario of MCTC to the effect
that the criminal case never reached arraignment stage.
A preliminary investigation was conducted by Public Prosecutor Axalan. All the
three defendants denied the allegations. Prosecutor Axalan submitted his
resolution to the Ombudsman but before this could be acted upon,Sansaet
retracted his earlier statement to the effect that Paredes had been arraigned before
the case against him was dismissed. Sansaet claimed that there was really no
arraignment held and that Honrado Made a false certification held in the criminal
case and that Honrado made false certifications.
Because of the new development, reinvestigation was made. VIolan, Graft
Investigation Officer of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman recommended that
petitioners and Atty. Sansaet be charged with Falsification of Public Documents.
Such recommendation was approved and three informations for the said charge
was filed in the Sandiganbayan.
The parties complained about the following:
1. The resolution recommending the filing of the cases was not prepared by
Public Prosecutor Axalan who conducted the the preliminary investigation
but by Violan, who allegedly had no hand in the investigation.
2. Violan did not have such cold neutrality of an impartial judge to be
trusted with the fair investigation since she gave credence to the
Certification of the Judge when in fact such judge later on said that he did
not expect that such certification would be used as evidence. Also, Violan
should have disregarded the rectification of Atty. Sansaet because this
was made in violation of the confidentiality of attorney-client
communication.
Issue
1. Whether or not their constitutional right to due process was violated at
various stages of the preliminary investigation. - Not violated
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2. Whether or not Violan was biased hence, should not have been entrusted
with the case. - Not biased
Held:
1. Violan, Graft Investigation Officer II of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Mindanao, was designated to conduct the investigation
and prepare a report, which she did. Her recommendation was indorsed
by Deputy Ombudsman to Ombudsman, who then referred the matter to
Special Proescution Officer Querubin concurred with the
recommendation of Violan but suggested that instead of one, three
separate informations be filed. There is thus no basis for petitioners claim
that the resolution was prepared by one who did not take any part in the
investigation. What happened here is similar to the trial of a case by one
judge who, without being able to finish the hearing, ceases from office for
one reason or another and by necessity the decision is rendered by
another judge who has taken over the conduct of the case. Such an
arrangement has never been thought to raise any question of due
process. For what is important is that the judge who decides does so on
the basis of the evidence in record. It does not matter that he did not
conduct the hearing of that case from the beginning.
2. That Violan gave credence to the Certification of Judge Ario in concluding
that no arraignment had been held in Criminal Case No. 1393 is not proof
that Violan was biased against petitioners. Although Judge Ario
subsequently gave an Affidavit, he never in that Affidavit repudiated what
he had earlier stated. The fact that Judge Ario did not anticipate that his
certificate might be used in evidence, much less in the criminal cases now
pending in the Sandiganbayan, is not a reason to disregard it. The fact is
that Judge Ario did not retract his previous Certification that there was no
arraignment held in Criminal Case No. 1393. If that is the truth, then the
fact that he now says he did not anticipate that his certificate would be
used in evidence in any case would not diminish a whit the value of the
certificate. Nor was consideration of the retraction of Atty. Sansaet proof
that GIO II Violan was biased against petitioners. Petitioners contend that
Sansaets confession was privileged and that Violan herself acknowledged
that the affidavit of retraction might be inadmissible in court. In the first
place, there is nothing in the resolution of Violan which shows that she
based her conclusion (that petitioners were probably guilty of falsification
of public documents) on Atty. Sansaets retraction. In her resolution, all
that she stated is that the confession of Atty. Sansaet has important
bearing in this case. Otherwise she did not cite the confession as proof of
the falsification of public documents. To the contrary, Violan thought that
the retraction was made in violation of attorney-client privilege and
therefore, would be inadmissible in evidence. Violan could not, therefore,
have relied on the affidavit of retraction. Moreover, the admissibility of
this piece of evidence is a question for the Sandiganbayan to determine in
the event it is used by the prosecution. It is untenable to ascribe bias and
partiality to the investigator because she considered this retraction in her
resolution of the case. Even if she relied on it mere divergence of
opinions between a judge and a partys counsel as to applicable laws and
jurisprudence is not sufficient ground for disqualifying the judge from
hearing the case on the ground of bias and partiality. ( footnote in the
book)
2. ANONAS
Case: Vda. de Bonifacio vs. B.L.T Bus Co., Inc
Chapter 18 Sec 18
Footnote: Footnote 116
Case: 171
Doctrine: Being a former classmate of one of the counsels is not a legal ground for
disqualification
Facts
Jovito Bonifacio Sr. and his wife, together with their neighbors were on their way to
Los Banos, Laguna. The spouses’ Mercedes Benz was driven by Alberto Concepcion,
a duly licensed driver. They began to travel at 4am and around 5:20am Concepcion
noticed a cargo truck parked on the left portion of the highway without any parking
light. Concepcion was running the Benz only at the speed of 30 miles per hour
because it was drizzling. He also noticed a bus on the left side of the highway which
was going the opposite direction as they were. Since the benz was on the correct
lane Concepcion continued the route. Just as he was about to pass the parked
truck, the bus swrved to the lane of the benz and collided with the latter. This
caused Jovito to be thrown out of the car and die. Others were seriously injured.
Appellants stress that the trial court should be held disqualified because the
counsel for the plaintiffs-appellees had been a classmate of the trial judge
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Issue: Is being a former classmate of the counsel for plaintiffs-appellees a ground
for disqualification of the judge?
Held
No. This is not a legal ground for disqualification. To allow it would unnecessarily
burden other trial judges to whom the case would be transferred. Ultimately
confussion would result, for under the rule advocated, a judge would be barred
from sitting in a case whenever one of his former classmates appeared. Nor have
appellants successfully shown here that bias distorted the judgment or conduct of
the challenged trier of the case. That he should question defense witnesses more
closely than those of the plaintiffs is but natural, since the defendants’ evidence
varies from proof already in record. A desire to get at the truth is no proof of bias or
prejudice.
3. AYO
Case Name: Luque v Kayanan
Case Number:
Footnote:
Chapter:
Doctrine: It is the duty of both counsel and judge to maintain, not to destroy, the
high esteem and regard for courts. Any act on the part of one or the other that
tends to undermine the people's respect for, and confidence in, the administration
of justice is to be avoided. And this, even if both may have to restrain pride from
taking the better part of their system. To be expected then from both of them is a
sense of shared responsibility, a crucial factor in the administration of justice.
Facts:
Petitioner Luque, a lawyer, moved to disqualify the respondent Judge Kayanan for
having doctored the results, that he suppressed the true and genuine proceedings
of a previous case where the issue was whether a compromise agreement was
procured thru duress and intimidation. Due to this reason, hostility between the
two parties developed.
The petitioner was cited for contempt by respondent judge. Pettioner then
registered a petition for impeachment against the judge, but this was dismissed.
Judge asked the petitioner to withdraw the motion to disqualify and ordered the
guard to commit the petitioner to jail. After 2 hours, he was set free. Petitioner
then asked that the judge inhibit himself.
Issue: Whether the acts of both parties are proper as officers of the court
Ruling:
No. Petitioner (Lawyer) was admonished for his use of improper language and a
warning that repetition will be dealt with accordingly. A lawyer is an officer of the
court and is expected that he will maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude,
not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance.
As for the respondent (Judge), the Court emphasized on the propriety of inhibiting
himself from the case. Where the capacity of the judge to try and decide a case
fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the
parties, although he may not be legally disqualified from hearing the case, should
inhibit himself therefrom where that case could be heard by another judge and
where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved therein.|||
|||
4. BAUTISTA
Case Name: Romero v Valle
Case Number:
Footnote:
Chapter:
Doctrine:
The administration of justice is a joint responsibility of the judge and the lawyer.
The people expect of them a sense of shared responsibility, which is a crucial factor
in the administration of justice. Their relations should be based on mutual respect
and on a deep appreciation by one of the duties of the other.
Facts:
Judge Valle and Atty. Romero got into an argument in the courtroom in relation to
the marking of evidence. Atty. Romero raised his voice and was admonished by
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Judge Valle. Judge Valle then went inside his chambers and was subsequently seen
in the corridors outside the courtroom holding his gun while looking at Atty.
Romero in an intimidating manner. Atty. Romero charged Judge Valle with grave
misconduct and oppression.
Issue:
Is Judge Valle guilty of grave misconduct and oppression?
Ruling:
Yes. Judge Valle was ordered dismissed from the service.
It is evident from the foregoing that complainant and respondent judge are equally
to blame for the incident under consideration.
It is the duty of both counsel and judge to maintain, not to destroy, the high esteem
and regard for courts. Any act on the part of one or the other that tends to
undermine the people's respect for, and confidence in, the administration of justice
is to be avoided.
5. BERNARDO
Case Name: Austria v. Masaquel
Austria as the owner of the properties in question. Plaintiff filed a motion
for the immediate execution of judgement.
- Sometime after, defendant got a new lawyer, Atty. Sicat, a former
assistant or associate of Judge Masaquel.
- Austria, apprehensive about the connection between Atty. Sicat and the
Judge, told his lawyer, Atty. Macaraeg, that he wanted to request that the
Judge inhibit himself from further hearing the case. Austria’s lawyer went
into the judge in his chamber and forwarded this request. Judge
Masaquel, thoroughly offended by the act, rejected Austria’s request
saying that the reason for the request of his inhibition is not one of the
grounds for disqualification of a judge provided for in the Rules of Court.
The Judge also found Austria guilty of contempt of court.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid ground for the judge to inhibit himself from
hearing the case?
Held: YES.
- Although the judge may not be compelled to disqualify himself, the fact
that the counsel was his former associate was counsel for a party in a case
being tried by him, may constitute a just and valid reason for him to
voluntarily inhibit himself.
- A judge should not be too thin-skinned as to feel hurt if a citizen
expresses himself truthfully. Austria, a layman had not committed an act
amounting to contempt of court when he made that answer. He had not
misbehaved in court, or in the presence of the Judge, as to obstruct or
interrupt the proceedings. Neither did he act in a manner that was
disrespectful to the judge.

Case Number: FR FERRER SIDE COMMENT:

- You can enter the chambers of the judge as long as the other party is also
Footnote: 42 present.

Chapter: 18.09 6. BERNAS

Catchy phrase: “Just and valid reason” Case Name: Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan

Doctrine: The fact that the counsel was his former associate was counsel for a party Case Number:
in a case being tried by him, may constitute a just and valid reason for him to
voluntarily inhibit himself. Footnote: 77

Facts: Chapter: 18.15

- This stemmed from a case for recovery of a parcel of land filed by
plaintiff, Domingo Austria. Judge Masaquel rendered a decision declaring Catchy phrase: A judge who asks a lot of questions creates the wrong impression.

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Doctrine: Judge should limit his questions to clarificatory questions so as not to be
seen as an advocate of one of the parties only.
Facts:
● Tabuena and peralta were general manager and acting finance services
manager respectively of the MIAA
● They were charged in the sandiganbayan for malversation of funds
● They allegedly misappropriated a total of 55 million
● According to the case against them tabuena and peralta applied for the
issuance of managers checks in the name of tabuena for the payment of
MIAAs outstanding obligations to Philippine National Construction
Corporation despite knowing that no such obligation exists
● In their defense, they said that they only acted in good faith as they were
only complying with the orders of marcos to pay immediately what MIAA
owes to PNCC in cash and to remit such amount to the office of the
president
● The sandiganbayan convicted the accused denying the defense of good
faith as they found that PNCC did not receive anything
● Tabuena and peralta elevated the case to the supreme court
● The sc acquitted the accused on the ground of good faith
● They also found it worth noting, even though the accused did not raise it,
is the violation of the accused’s constitutional right to due process
● The court said that it was struck by how actively the sandiganbayan
participated in the question of tabuena and peralta, particularly the
volume of questions that were hurled to them
● A total of 67 questions were asked to tabuena and 41 to peralta, which
was 5 times the number of questions that the prosecutor asked
ISSUE:
WON the questioning done by the Sandiganbayan justices were proper
HELD: NO
● This Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question
witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind upon any material point
which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides.
● But not only should his examination be limited to asking “clarificatory”
questions, the right should be sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule
is that the court should stay out of it as much as possible, neither
interfering nor intervening in the conduct of the trial. Here, these
limitations were not observed. (this is what is in the footnote)
● The “cold neutrality of an impartial judge” requirement of due process
was certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with its
overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate.
● However anxious a judge may be for the enforcement of the law, he
should always remember that he is as much judge in behalf of the
defendant accused of crime, and whose liberty is in jeopardy, as he is
judge in behalf of the state, for the purpose of safeguarding the interests
of society.
● Ordinarily it is not good practice for the presiding judge himself to
examine witnesses at length. The circumstances may be such in a given
case as to justify the court in so doing . . .. This court, however, has more
than once said that the examination of witnesses is the more appropriate
function of counsel, and the instances are rare and the conditions
exceptional which will justify the presiding judge in conducting an
extensive examination. It is always embarrassing for counsel to object to
what he may deem improper questions by the court. Then, in conducting
a lengthy examination, it would be almost impossible for the judge to
preserve a judicial attitude.
● “The impartiality of the judge—his avoidance of the appearance of
becoming the advocate of either one side or the other of the pending
controversy is a fundamental and essential rule of special importance in
criminal cases
FATHER FERRER NOTES:
- Clearly, there is something very fishy about this case as seen in the
irregularity by which the respondents remitted the debt
- it was a chance to finally prosecute a “big fish” but it was clear that the
prosecutor and the SC were in on the scheme
- due to the limited questions of the prosecutor (14 questions) which were
not enough to find someone guilty of malveration, the Sandiganbayan
had no choice but to ask further questions in order to find out the truth
and convict the respondents
- so actually it was just really a numbers game and the doctrine was used
wrongly since it was used to impede justice
7. BUNDALIAN
Case Name TURQUEZA v. HERNANDO
Case Number: 158
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Footnote: 159
Chapter: 18.21
Catchy phrase: Wag kang attached… Napapasagot ka kaagad e…
Doctrine:
If a judge’s order is challenged in an appellate court, he does not have to file any
answer or take active part in the proceeding unless expressly directed by the
appellate court. He is merely a nominal party to the case. It is the duty of the
private respondent to appear and defend both in his behalf and in behalf of the
court or judge whose order or decision is at issue. The judge should maintain a
detached attitude from the case and should not waste his time by taking an active
part in the proceeding which relates to official actuations in a case, but should apply
himself to his principal task of hearing and adjudicating the cases in his court.
Facts:
● Car accident involving Emma sa Abra-Benguet road area.
● Emma was pinned down and suffered multiple serious injuries, with her
pelvic bones and lower limbs broken, which left her lame and crippled for
life.
● he case was set for pre-trial on October 25, 1977 but neither private
respondent nor her lawyer appeared despite due notice to both of them.
On motion of petitioners, respondent judge declared respondent in
default and petitioners were allowed to submit their evidence.
● Judge declared respondent in default therefore decision made ex-parte.
● On July 13, 1978, upon motion of petitioner's counsel a writ of execution
of the judgment was issued. The same was enforced on September 1,
1978 and in full satisfaction of the judgment, twelve parcels of ricelands
of respondent were sold at public auction to herein petitioners as the only
bidders for the same amount of P56,000.00.
● The present controversy arose from the lower court's "special order" of
November 6, 1978 granting respondent's belated "Motion to Reopen
Case" dated October 16, 1978 which invoked respondent judge's
"magnanimity and benevolence" to set aside the final and executed
judgment of October 25, 1977 and the proceedings subsequent thereto
on the ground that the said judgment rendered by default against
respondent was due to the fault or negligence of her lawyer. The
"Special Order" of November 6,1978, reads as follows:
● The decision of this Court dated October 25, 1977 is one rendered ex-
parte because the defendant was in default. Let this decision remain
undisturbed. However, the defendant Marina Elvena Pacapac is hereby
ordered or allowed to present her evidence in support of her Answer
which is found on pages 10 and 11 of the records of this case and which
must be received formally before this Court on November 28, 1978 at
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
● Judgments by default are frowned upon especially in the appellate courts.
It is but fair and to give justice to the defendant her day in Court a full
blown litigation. Anyway, the Order of this Court dated November 6, 1978
expressly provides that the Decision shall remain undisturbed in the
meantime in order to allow the defendant her day in Court and to adduce
her evidence in support of her defenses.
Issue: Was the Special Order by Judge Hernando valid?
Ruling:
● The Court finds merit in the petition. There is no justification in law and in
fact for respondent judge's void act of ordering the reopening of the case
which has long become final and which has in fact been executed. It is
settled that once a decision becomes final and executory, it is removed
from the power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further
alter or amend, much less revoke it.
● "Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy and judicial time
and the interests of litigants as well as the peace and order of society, all
require that stability be accorded the solemn and final judgments of the
courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction
● It further appears that respondent through counsel had promptly filed a
motion to lift the order of default and set aside the decision of October 25,
1977 and respondent judge did grant the motion per his Order of October
27, 1977 so as "to give the defendant her day in Court" that she "present
her evidence without any postponement whatsoever on December 8, 1977
at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon" failing which "the decision of the Court
dated October 26, 1977 shall be reinstated in toto.
● The hearing of December 8, 1977 was deferred however by agreement of
the parties with the assurance that they would submit an amicable
settlement to terminate the case. When the settlement did not
materialize, respondent judge declared the decision of October 26, 1977
final and executory per his Order dated January 20, 1978.
● Obviously, respondent did not take any step to protect her interest and
allowed the judgment to become final and executory, notwithstanding
respondent judge's having conditionally lifted the default order and
setting the case anew for the reception of her evidence on December 8.
1977.
● The Court has said time and again that the doctrine of finality of
judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and
sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of courts
must become final at some definite date fixed by law. The law gives an
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exception or "last chance" of a timely petition for relief from judgment
within the reglementary period (within 60 days from knowledge and 6
months from entry of judgment) under Rule 38, supra, but such grace
period must be taken as "absolutely fixed, inextendible, never interrupted
and cannot be subjected to any condition or contingency. Because the
period fixed is itself devised to meet a condition or contingency (fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable neglect), the equitable remedy is an act of
grace, as it were, designed to give the aggrieved party another and last
chance" and failure to avail of such last chance within the grace period
fixed by the statute or Rules of Court is fatal
● The Court notes that respondent judge himself took up the cudgels for
respondent and in defense of his challenged order by filing his own
extended five-page "Comment and Answer" dated October 18, 1977
praying for dismissal of the petition "for lack of merit". The Court has
heretofore reminded the judges of the lower courts that under Section 5 of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a judge whose order is challenged in an
appellate court does not have to file any answer or take active part in the
p unless expressly directed by order of this Court.
● Respondent judge is finally admonished to exercise proper care and
restraint in his language. In his Comment and Answer of October 18, 1979,
he refers to the petition which the Court had found to be well-grounded
and meritorious as "reckless and stupid." His choice of words, aside from
being baseless, betrays a lack of judicial decorum which requires that a
magistrate of the law must at all times be temperate in his language.
8. CABOCHAN
Case Name: Cariaga v. Judge Justo-Guerrero
Case Number: 35
Footnote Number: 19
Chapter: 18.06
Catchy-Phrase: The Informal Information and Judge OR Under the table
Information
Doctrine: A judge must conduct himself in such a manner that they give no ground
for reproach.
Facts: > Petition to prohibit the respondent municipal judge of Pasuquin, Ilocos
Norte from hearing its Criminal Case No. 600, for grave slander, filed by some thirty
teachers of the Pasuquin National Agricultural School against the herein petitioner,
Julia D. Cariaga.
> COMPLAINT: “for the purpose of exposing these teachers and employees of the
said Pasuquin National Agricultural School to the public hatred, contempt and
ridicule spoke injurious and defamatory remarks relative to and concerning the
integrity and capabilities of the teachers and employees of the Pasuquin National
Agricultural School…”
"BULLSIET", "SIET I BETTER WALK OUT" "OKININAYO AMIN NGA MAMAESTRA
CASLA CAYLA CASIGURIAN.”
VULVA OF YOUR MOTHER ALL OF YOU TEACHERS AS IF YOU ARE ALWAYS IN THE
RIGHT TRACK.
> to insinuate and made by the accused and was in effect understood and
interpreted by the teachers of Pasuquin, National Agricultural School to have placed
them into discredit, disrepute and ridicule in front of the public.
> On 14 December 1964, petitioner Cariaga, claiming that she did not know on
which charge she would undergo trial, the "Complaint" or the "Information", moved
to quash on the ground that she would be put twice in jeopardy for the same
offense.
> According to the respondent judge, the offended parties had appeared before her
on 14 April 1964, complaining verbally against the petitioner. On the same day,
petitioner Cariaga also approached the judge and requested her intervention in
settling the case. On 15 April 1964, the complainants subscribed and swore to the
truth of the "Information" and gave the same to the judge, who received it.
Issue: WON the judge act of receiving the complaint personally improper?
Ruling: YES. The action of respondent Judge in informally receiving the
"Information", and just as informally having allowed its withdrawal, without any
notice to the accused, apparently generated suspicion of bias in the mind of the
accused, which could have been avoided had the actions of the Judge been more
formal and discreet; still there is only one case for grave slander filed against the
petitioner.
As such, the case below was commenced and prosecuted without the intervention,
mediation or participation of the fiscal or any of his deputies. This, notwithstanding,
the jurisdiction of the court was not affected but the court should have cited the
public prosecutor to intervene.
9. CARLOS
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Case Name: Royeca v Animas
Case Number: 137, Judges
Footnote: 95
Chapter: 8, Section 12
Catchy Phrase: Pag masakit na, hindi na tama
Doctrine: [A judge] may utilize his opportunities to criticize and correct
unprofessional conduct of attorneys, brought to his attention, but he may not do
so in an insulting manner
Facts: Petitioner was found guilty of direct contempt by respondent Judge because
of allegations contained in a motion for the inhibition of the latter filed in a pending
civil case where the former was the plaintiff. It was admitted by petitioner’s counsel
that the Motion for Inhibition tended to degrade and assault the integrity of the
Honorable Presiding Judge. Petitioner contention was that the respondent abused
its inherent judicial power to punish for contempt. He characterized the order as
“character assassination”, when he was referred as “polluted and stupid mind”,
“self-anointed local tyrant”, and “crocodile with fake tears” The defense of the
respondent Judge was that he did not intend to assassinate the character of
petitioner, but only to defend himself.
Issue: WN Respondent actions constituted a grave abuse of power of contempt
Ruling: YES. While it is an inherent judicial power to punish for contempt, such
power shall only be exercised on the preservative principle, which is to preserve the
respect with the court without which the administration of justice must falter of
fail. In such exercise of power, the judge must be mindful of his high calling and his
mission as an impartial and dispassionate arbiter. He must not resort to
intemperate and insulting language.
10. CASTILLO
Case Name: Libarios v. Dabalos
Case Number: 198
Footnote Number: 87
Chapter: 19, Section 41
Catchy phrase: Basta’t kumpare kita, okay ka
Doctrine: A judge must always observe procedural rules and avoid any instance
where partiality may be attributed to him.
Facts: Former Mayor Mariano Corvera, Sr. (Corvera, Sr.) was shot by Pablo Macapas
(Macapas) inside the courtroom of Judge Dabalos in a hearing of a frustrated
murder case against the latter. Corvera, Sr. was the private complainant in that
case, while Mayor Calo, Jr. was appearing as Macapas’ counsel. As a result of the
killing, another charge, this time of murder was filed against Macapas, Calo, Jr., and
3 others.
Investigating Fiscal Macario Balansag (Balansag) found a prima facie case of murder
against Macapas and Calo, Jr. A motion of reconsideration was filed but before it
could be resolved, Balansag was gunned down. As a result, another formal
complaint for murder was filed against Calo, Jr. et. al. The previous information
signed by Balansag was filed in court but it was found to be defective. As a result,
another information was filed signed by Acting City Fiscal Brocoy with a NO BAIL
recommendation.
Before the case is to be raffled, the son of the former mayor, Corvera, Jr. staged a
rally demanding the immediate arrest of the accused. Without conducting any prior
hearing, Judge Dabalos issued warrants of arrest against the accused, fixing bail for
Calo, Jr. Believing that Judge Dabalos committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the warrants and allowing bail without any hearing, Corvera, Jr. filed a petition with
the CA. CA ruled against Judge Dabalos.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Dabalos committed acts constituting grave ignorance
of the law, grave abuse of discretion, gross misconduct and partiality.
Ruling: YES. By not conducting a hearing, Judge Dabalos violated Sec. 5, Rule 114 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure which requires a hearing of an application for
admission to bail filed by a person who committed a capital offense (such as murder
in this case). Even if the court did not find any fraud on the part of Judge Dabalos
that would warrant imposition of disciplinary action, it emphasized that judges
must be conversant with basic legal principles and exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules to maintain the faith of the public
in the administration of justice. Judge Dabalos’ invocation of the staged rally is not a
sufficient excuse for his unjustified haste in issuing the warrants.
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2A Legal Ethics Digests
Fr. Ferrer

Additionally, since Judge Dabalos was a former employee of accused Calo, Jr., said
Judge must have exercised more prudence and regard for his position as a judge. He
should have refrained from fixing the bail and concluding that the evidence was
circumstantial. He should have waited for the raffle of the case and allowed the
judge to whom the case was actually raffled to resolve the issue. A judge should not
only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in a manner free
from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity.

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