TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION

Susceptibility of 400 kV transmission

lines to bird streamers and bush fires
by H F Vosloo and A C Britten, Eskom and A A Burger, TAP

This paper describes the findings of a study done of the performance of two adjacent single circuit 400 kV lines in which the phase-to-ground
and phase-to-tower clearances on one of the lines were increased above the standard clearances. The key finding that the design with
increased clearances has been shown to withstand to a considerable degree the fire and streamer (excreta) stresses (without bird guards),
whereas the standard line does not, is analysed. The implications for future designs are discussed.

The per formance of Eskom’s main

transmission system (MTS) has for many
years been closely monitored and
analysed, particularly as regards the
identification of the causes of power
line faults in this system [1]. For the last
fifteen years, considerable effort has been
expended on reducing the number of
flashovers caused by fires and bird-related
effects, these factors being two of the
major causes. The performance of Eskom’s
transmission lines in terms of transient line
faults has been the subject of many studies
since the inception of the Transmission
Division in 1993. The transmission system
operates the standard voltages of 132,
220, 275, 400 and 765 kV, and comprises Fig. 1: Total line faults per category for the period 1993 – 2008 shows the dominance
a total length of over 28 000 km [2]. of birds, lightning and fires on the transmission system.

The lines are exposed to a variety of natural

stressors which affect performance; these
include lightning, fires and interaction with
birds, which account for approximately
86% of faults over the total period
(1993 – 2008). Due to the variation
in these natural factors (bird species
and population numbers, variation in
vegetation and weather), the effects
on the lines vary from one area to the
next. Variations in climate also result in
a variation in line faults from one year to
the next [1]. Over 11 400 line fault records
have been collected for the period 1993
to 2008. The analysis of this data has
enabled Eskom to gain valuable insights
into the performance of the transmission Fig. 2: This shows the variation in the number of faults for each category in response to natural weather
phenomena and human intervention. These values apply to the total transmission system.
system, and from these statistics remedial
actions as well as maintenance strategies
have been developed.  Bridging of the conductors-to-tower
airgap by the wings and body of the
Line faults also respond positively to the
bird (applies mainly to lines of 132 kV
successful application of remedies such
and lower)
as the application of bird guards or fire
suppressing vegetation management. As  Pollution flashover caused by the pre-
an example, the installation of bird guards deposit of excrement on ceramic
during 2000 reversed the rising trend of that insulators
fault category. It should be pointed out that  Bridging of the tower-to-conductor
the graphs in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 represent airgap by a streamer of excreta [3, 4]
faults for the entire grid, of which only about
The streamer is electrically conductive
one third has been fitted with bird guards.
and typically exhibits a resistance of
Mechanisms of insulation failure some 10 – 100 kS/mm [7]. Key parameters
which determine whether breakdown of
Birds
the airgap is statistically possible are the
Birds cause flashovers on power lines in physical length of the streamer and the Fig. 3: An example of a streamer excreted by an
three ways: dielectric stress across the air or unbridged African Fish Eagle (photo C. van Rooyen).

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TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION
and causes an immediate fault, the
polluted insulator flashes over along the
insulator during appropriate wetting, which
may only occur sometime later. The two
intrinsically different flashover paths are
shown in Fig. 4. In the placement of bird
guards, a critical distance of about one
meter on either side of the axis of the gap
has been found to be effective [1, 4].
Fires
Fires under transmission lines cause about
20% of the total number of flashovers.
It is important to point out that the fires
referred to in this study are not the high
intensity fires of Australia or California
recently reported in the media, but rather,
lower intensity grass fires that produce
enough ionized air and low enough air
resistance to cause enough spark-overs
in the flame-heated air medium to cause
the subsequent formation of a power
Fig. 4: The flashover paths of two different flashover mechanisms
arc. (This is roughly analogous to the dry
and paths are demonstrated in this figure.
band flashover mechanism on a polluted
ceramic insulator.) This normally occurs as
a phase-to-ground fault in the midspan
area of the line.
It also needs to be pointed out that
the breakdown process is not yet fully
understood; however, a practical way
of expressing the strength of power line
insulation in the presence of fire is in terms
of a “fire gradient” given by the phase-to-
ground voltage in kV/conductor ground
clearance in metres [4, 7, 8, 9].

Matimba – Spitskop 400 kV lines

Due to the fact that the two Matimba–
Spitskop 400 kV lines (one of which has
larger phase-to-tower and phase-to-earth
clearances than the other) run parallel to
each other and are thus exposed to the
same bird and fire environments, it was
Fig. 5: A picture of the Matimba – Spitskop No. 1 400 kV line on the left realised that this presented an important
and the Matimba – Spitskop No. 2 400 kV line on the right; this shows opportunity to compare the performance
the difference in height between the two towers. and design of the two lines.
During the permitting for the second line,
Eskom’s intention was to route the two lines
separately to prevent common-cause
failures. At the same time, eco-farming
started in the Thabazimbi area. New land
owners acquired former cattle farms and
introduced game species. In addition they
also started communal management
of large consolidated tracks of land by
removing all internal fencing to permit the
free movement of game.
When the land owners were approached
for servitudes for the number two line,
they were not willing to permit a second
Fig. 6: The detail for each tower shows the difference between
the insulators strings of the two lines. line to traverse these areas in a second
and separate servitude. Eventually Eskom
was forced to accept that the second
portion of the gap. This is the basis of a and 3 m. This being the case, the standard servitude would have to be adjacent to
rough electrical breakdown model. 3,2 m airgap clearance on 400 kV lines is the first line (personal. communication,
not necessarily large enough to prevent Bobby Richardson, negotiator).
Streamers are produced by a number of flashover. In the case of smaller birds,
large bird species, such a vultures, herons, Critical dimensions of the two lines
the gap is not bridged, but the effect is
hadeda Ibis and the bigger raptors. The to cause a build-up of pollution along The Matimba – Spitskop No.1 400 kV line
lengths of streamer excreted by these birds the (glass) insulator string. Whereas the was built in 1987, using types 514 and
have been observed as being between 2 streamer mechanism bridges the airgap 519 towers. The conductor used was a

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 TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total

Bird 0 3 0 8 2 2 3 22 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 42

Fire 5 0 0 3 1 0 0 7 10 1 0 3 1 2 0 1 34

Lightning 1 2 0 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 11

Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3

Pollution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Tree 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3

Unclassified 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4

Under Investigation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Unknown 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 97

Table 1: Line faults for the Matimba – Spitskop No.1 400 kV line for the period 1993 – 2008.

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total

Bird 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 6

Fire 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 15

Lightning 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5

Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Pollution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Tree 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2

Unclassified 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

Unknown 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total 0 0 1 4 4 1 0 6 5 0 0 1 2 3 0 3 30

Table 2: Line faults for the Matimba – Spitskop No.2 400 kV line for the period 1993 – 2008.

triple Dinosaur. The design provides for a
3,2 m space between the live hardware and
the tower [6]. The Matimba – Spitskop No.2
400 kV line was built in 1992 using
quadruple Zebra conductors on types
518 and 520 towers. The design also makes
provision for a 3,2 m space between the
live hardware and the tower [6], but was
later modified to provide a gap of 4,2 m.
It appears that certain changes were
made in an attempt to eliminate common
cause failures. In the first instance, the
suspension insulator strings of the No.2
line were modified by the introduction of
extensions (Fig. 6). In order to compensate
for the loss in midspan clearance the
attachment heights were increased by the
introduction of tower extensions (Fig. 5).
Close-up photographs of the towers (Fig.6)
show the difference in the insulator strings
of the two towers. The tower on the left
(with bird guards) is the No.1 line and the
No.2 line is shown on the right. (The 19
type U190 glass insulators used give a
connecting length of 19 x 0,178 = 3,38 m
and a specific creepage of 19 x 368/420
= 16,6 mm/kV
During a field visit it was established that
both lines have 19 glass disc insulators.
According to field staff, the number of
insulators on suspension towers of the
No.2 line was increased from 15 to 19,
to overcome alleged pollution problems.
(The original specific creepage was 13,1
mm/kV). The insulator extensions were
retained, so as to allow the tower window
clearance to be increased. This was done
apparently to reduce the number of
streamer faults.
The net effect of these changes was an
increased mid-span clearance of about
2 m, as well as an increase in window
size of about 1 m. If it is assumed that the
typical operational midspan clearance
for the number 1 line is 11 – 12 m, the
corresponding height for the number 2
line will be 13 – 15 m.
Performance of the two Matimba –
Spitskop lines
During the evaluation process for the
fitting of bird guards the difference in
performance of the two lines were first
noticed with regards to bird faults. Further
investigation revealed that the fire and
lightning faults also vary greatly, in spite of
the fact that both lines are subject to the
same environmental effects (This aspect
is outside the scope of the paper.) The
performance breakdown for the two lines
is shown in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8, as well as
Table 1 and Table 2.
Discussion of performance
Overall
The line fault statistics of the two lines show
a pronounced difference in performance
in the three main fault categories (Bird, Fire
and Lightning). During the period under
review (1993 – 2008) the No.1 experienced
three times the number of faults of the
No. 2 line. This is against the background
of the same fire and lightning regimes
and both lines being subjected to the
same bird species and environmental
conditions.
It should be pointed out that the No.1 line
was fitted with bird guards during 2000,
whilst the No. 2 line has not been fitted with
bird guards. In spite of the frequent roosting
of vultures on that line, very few bird faults
are recorded. The pronounced reduction in
this fault type after 2000 is shown in (Table
1). The category “bird” mostly refers to faults
caused by the streamer mechanism, but it
is acknowledged that the category could
contain pre-deposit and wetting type faults.
It is also evident that the majority of bird
faults were in fact streamer faults and that
pre-deposit pollution type faults are in the
minority. In the case of fire faults, the No.
2 line experienced less than half of the fire
faults of the adjacent No. 1 line.
Birds
On the basis of the airgap-streamer
breakdown model proposed in [7], it can
be argued that for the 2,5 – 2,7 m long
streamer in a 3,2 m gap, the resulting
portion of the airgap not bridged by the

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TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION
Fig. 7: Line faults for the Matimba – Spitskop No. 1 400 kV line for the period 1993 – 2008.
Fig. 8: Line faults for the Matimba – Spitskop No. 2 400 kV line for the period 1993 – 2008.
streamer will be about 0,5 m in length. The
full line–to-ground voltage of 400/√3 =
231 kV appears across this gap. As the
50 Hz AC breakdown strength of the gap,
is some 400 kV/m at an altitude of about
1200 m, the applied voltage will be high
enough to cause breakdown of the gap,
vaporisation of the streamer and the
development of a power arc.
In the case of the 4,2 m gap on the No.
2 line, the same streamer lengths will
yield an unbridged airgap of 4,2 – 2,7 =
1 , 5 m, f o r w h i c h t h e e s t i m a t e d A C
breakdown voltage would be 400 x 1,5 =
600 kV. The applied voltage is thus nowhere
near high enough to cause flashover
of the 4,2 m gap. The above analysis
roughly explains why the 4,2 m gap (in
the absence of bird guards!) withstands
vulture streamers, and the standard 3,2 m
gap not. It must be appreciated, however,
that the statistical nature of electrical
breakdown and streamer lengths will
mean some shorter vulture streamers will
not necessarily cause flashover on the
standard towers, and that an occasional
flashover on the 4,2 m structures may
occur. This is partly borne out by the bird
flashover statistics in Tables 1 and 2. The
use of 19 insulators on the suspension
towers of both lines means that the specific
creepage is the same both lines (16,6 mm/
kV). This suggests that pollution, taking into
account the dry climate, is probably not a
cause of flashovers.
Fire
For the No. 1 line, the “fire gradient” at
400 kV and conductor height of 11 – 13 m
is (400/√3)/(11 – 13) = 17,8 to 21,0 kV/m;
for the No. 2 line, the range is typically
(400/√3)/(13 – 15) = 15,4 to 17,8 kV/m. The
ratio of fire faults (all phase-to-ground) on
the two lines, namely 34/15 = 2,3 (Table 1
and Table 2) is significant, in that it suggests
that the withstand fire gradient for 400 kV
lines may be in the region of about 15 kV/m
for bushveld-type fires. This is more realistic
than the withstand value of 10 kV/m given
in [9], and would indicate that the small
difference in height is quite important.
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Conclusions
The conclusions from this case study are:
 The comparisons made have given
important new insights into the relative
performance of two slightly different
designs of 400 kV line in adjacent
servitudes.
 The installation of bird guards reduces
bird streamer flashovers substantially
on a standard 400 kV tower design.
 The almost complete absence of bird
streamer flashovers on the No. 2 line
shows a vertical clearance of 4,2 m
between conductor and tower on
all three phases is large enough to
prevent streamer faults, whereas 3,2 m,
the standardised value, is insufficient.
 The 4,2 m clearance obviates the
need for bird guards on horizontal
geometry 400 kV suspension towers of
the No. 2 line.
 Ver y few, if any, of the flashovers
attributed to bird streamers are caused
by insulator pollution in this region.
 The much lower incidence of fire
flashovers on the No. 2 line suggests
that a 13 to 15 m midspan height
approaches a withstand fire gradient
at 400 kV.
 The withstand fire gradient is in the
region of 15 kV/m for bushveld-type
fires.
 The reasons for the differences in
lightning outage rates need to be
investigated further.
References
[1] H F Vosloo, The Need for and Contents of
a Life Cycle Management Plan for Eskom
Transmission Line Servitudes. MSc Dissertation,
Department of Geography, Environmental and
Energy Studies, University of Johannesburg,
Johannesburg, 2005.
[2] Eskom Annual Report, Eskom, 2008.
[3] H Michener, Where Engineer and Ornithologist
Meet: Transmission Line Troubles Caused by
Birds. The Condor, May-June 1928.
[4] P V Taylor, Investigation into Bird Streamer
Caused Transient Earth Faults on a 275kV
Transmission Grid. MSc Thesis, Department of
Electrical Engineering, University of KwaZulu-
Natal, Durban, 1999.
[5] A Sukhnandan and DA Hoch, Fire Induced
Flashovers of Transmission Lines: Theoretical
Models. 6th Africon Conference, George,
South Africa, October 2002.
[6] Anon, 2009. Transmission Spatial Information
System. http://intranet.eskom.co.za/powerzone/
main800x600.htm.
[7] F A Bologna, A C Britten, R E Kohlmeyer and
H F Vosloo, Investigation into the Cause of
“Unknown” Faults on the ±533 kV DC Line in
South Africa. International Conference on
HVDC, Durban, July 2006.
[8] K J Sadurski and J P Reynders, High Voltage
AC Breakdown in the Presence of Fires.
Proceedings of the Sixth ISH Conference, New
Orleans, 1989.
[9] Chapter 12, The Planning, Design and
Construction of Overhead Power Lines: 132
kV and Above. Eskom Power Series, Crown
Publications, February 2005.
Contact Tony Britten, Eskom,
Tel 011 629-5033,
tony.britten@eskom.co.za 